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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPENSATIONS OF THE ANALYST

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Much has already been written concerning the requirements of the analyst for his work, the problems which beset him in connexion with transference and counter-transference, and the special dangers he is liable to, such as the increase of omnipotence-feelings, and the lowering of super-ego standards, among others. Not as much attention has been given to the problem of psychological 'compensation' for the inevitable deprivations experienced by the analyst. It is true that all are agreed by now on the necessity of an analysis, as complete as possible, for the would-be analyst, but does the recognition take us far enough? The analyst is presumed to be one who can recognize and handle satisfactorily the bias of his own unconscious, and is able to remain master of his own psyche throughout the analysis. In actual fact we know that this is very much a fancy picture, save in the case of the exceptional natures. We know that the analytic situation can be used by the analyst, as it is by the patient, for the gratification of unconscious wishes, especially of those belonging to the pre-genital, and infantile-genital phases (since the latter frequently have been but partially dealt with in the analyst's own analysis); or, it may be converted into what Dr. Edward Glover calls 'a viewing process', thus gratifying the infantile wish to look at forbidden sexual objects; or the analyst may succumb to the temptation of becoming the consoler and saviour—to mention only a few of the usages to which the process may be turned. Yet all such gratifications must be denied if the analysis is not to be wrecked, and in addition the situation is

made more difficult owing to the sharp contrast between the participants in it.

To forego in perpetuity the gratifications of the loved and omnipotent child, of the revered omniscient father, the pleasures of exhibitionism, of sadism, of masochism, this is no easy achievement: nor is it a smaller one to surrender ourselves to intellectual uncertainty, to remain suspended in judgement, to abandon the desire for comforting quick solutions. Still more difficult, perhaps, is the abandonment of super-ego standards in favour of a freer outlook and a fuller ego-development, whereas the patient on his side may be said to 'luxuriate' (if the term may be used) in all these privileges.

Since there can never be the 'completely analysed' person, since the id and its powerful force can never be analysed away, since (as Freud has shown us) the unconscious cannot tolerate more than a certain degree of deprivation without compensation, it seems that we are postulating a fictitious situation unless that compensation is forthcoming.

Three deprivations, as inescapable as they are burdensome, may be taken in illustration: namely, the inhibition of narcissistic pleasure, especially on the pre-genital level (e.g. emotions of impatience, resentment, retaliation): the inhibition of dogmatic certitude in the intellectual sphere; and the modification of the super-ego—this last involving the greatest deprivation of all. To put it shortly, the analyst is under the necessity to translate and interpret the patient's material without reacting emotionally to it. But here we are faced with two difficulties: if he should fail in this task then he will nullify the analysis: on the other hand, only through his own emotional activity can he achieve correct interpretation and translation of that material. The work, practical and theoretical, of the great exponents of psycho-analysis, serves to illustrate this.

To allow freely one's own emotional response to one's own material is a very different matter from reaction to the patient's emotions, but the former is as essential to the analytic work as the latter is destructive to it. In *Paradise Lost*, it will be remembered, Milton makes the spirit of God distil three drops of divine essence into the eyes of the outlawed Adam, whereat the latter 'to the centre and core of sight pierced with his eyes', which suggests a parallel to the emotion which can release the power of interpretative vision. How then may this be arrived at?

The blinded state of no-vision corresponds to incorporated material which is 'dead' until emotion breathes life into the dry bones, and

then we 'see' as did Adam. The essential process appears to be a form of introjection and projection directed towards the material presented by the patient, a situation which parallels the relationship between the artist and the external world upon which he works. This interchange is the way of the artist (with whom we may include the real scientist) and without it 'compensation' seems unattainable. In a paper called 'The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis' (which appears in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Vol. XV, p. 127), Mr. James Strachey deals with the question of interpretation, and especially with the type named by him 'mutative interpretation' of which he writes: 'The mutative interpretation is the ultimate operative factor in the therapeutic action of psycho-analysis'.

Here, I think, Mr. Strachey is dealing with the problem I have already referred to. I take it that 'mutative interpretation' is the product of the analyst's insight, which is born of a direct free contact with his own emotions. This, as I suggest, affords possibility of vision to the analyst, and enables the patient, who is in contact with him, to become more free in his own emotional life, and therefore to change. We are all aware that interpretation—when, how, and to what degree it shall be given—is one of the vital problems for the analyst as well as for the patient, and puts to the test the analyst's relations with his own unconscious impulses. One thing is certain, namely, that interpretation from the analyst, if forthcoming at the appropriate stage and directed truly to its goal, can be of the highest dynamic influence upon the patient's unconscious, causing a 'flow' of energy towards fresh functioning, on the one hand, and a self-protective aggressive resistance on the other.

Just because it evokes the patient's active aggressive id-energy, equally it can be the moment which evokes the analyst's id-energy directed towards the material (of the patient) which is now a part of himself, and so releases new and richer phantasies, accompanied by a pleasurable sense of movement. As a result there must be a far more favourable attitude on the part of the analyst, with a lessening of unconscious hostility.

What, then, can occur to prevent unconscious hostility and revenge for those deprivations of which I have already spoken? Can the deprivations be turned into positive gains? Dr. Sachs has referred to one aspect of the analyst's work which puts him into the position of the creative artist; namely, participation in a great multitude of

other lives. To few of us, indeed, would this *entrée* be granted, apart from the analytic process, except in so far as we can obtain it through forms of artistic creation, art, music, and so forth: it is in the direction of this 'sharing-in' that we must look for compensation.

But we have to be sure that this 'sharing-in' is a true *sharing* and a *creative* process. If our so-called participation is as more or less passive spectators, our pleasure being largely based upon the gratification of infantile curiosity and identification wishes, pleasure thus obtained will not necessarily prove a true dynamic force; moreover, the gratification may easily mask hostility, more likely to emerge where we are looking on at living human beings. 'Alas, how bitter a thing it is to look through a window at *other* men's satisfaction', as one of our poets wrote.

If 'looking on at' can be changed into 'living from' the experience we are sharing, the inhibitions already mentioned might be changed into positives: the foregone narcissistic gratification exchanged for the pleasure of a lease of fresh life, the modified super-ego standards replaced by less trammelled ego-impulses; and the inhibition of dogmatic certitude by bolder legitimate curiosity. The result of such exchange will enable the analyst to develop in two directions: he can use much more (and more freely) his conscious mind, and can bring to light more of his unconscious.

What I have called 'living from' (in place of 'looking on') may be illuminated if we think of the poet Wordsworth's description of the essential process of poetic creation. He said it must be '*Emotion recollected* (i.e. re-experienced) in *tranquillity*'. And again, think of Hamlet's advice to the troupe of players: '*Be not too tame . . . in the very torrent, tempest, and* (*as I may say*) *whirlwind of passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance*'. In such a way we may really bring about the desired situation, i.e. ability to translate the patient's material, adaptability to his unconscious requirements, but without submergence. Wordsworth and Hamlet demand emotion and passion, and so does psycho-analytic procedure, but subject to analytic 'handling', which is, I think, the parallel of their 'tranquillity' and 'temperance'. Examples illustrating this 'emotion in tranquillity' are known to us all, and I would select as foremost among them Freud's own technique. In the very exposition of it we find in his style (that is, in the vehicle and expression of his psyche) profound emotion and the greatest freedom to use that emotion: his attitude to his material, expressed through words and ideas, might almost be called *joyous*,

and one is struck in reading his work by the identity in this respect with the artist's attitude, who, through the process of interpretation enriches himself, turns a *negative* situation (the result of a gulf between the incorporated material and his own emotional flow) into a *positive* one, and gratifies a highly sublimated sense of power. In respect to Freud's style, friend and foe alike feel its extraordinarily unloosening and illuminating effects, certainly akin to those which any great artist achieves—a Michael Angelo, a Shakespeare, or a Goethe. His writing seems to be in free contact with his own phantasies, swayed by the passion that Hamlet demanded of his players, yet ever under the control of ' temperance ' and ' tranquillity '.

In different kind and degree, we find this same condition in other analytic writers (in Ferenczi and Dr. James Glover, to mention two no longer with us). The freedom for phantasy, little as we may agree with his basic ideas, certainly gave richness and force to the late Dr. Groddeck's writings, and, I should say, effectiveness to his handling of human beings.

The evident delight (born of emotional satisfaction) which the people above referred to obtain from their own freedom makes repercussion upon those in contact with it, and that is what I mean in speaking of the reaction upon the patient of the analyst's real sharing in the experiences with which he is presented. We must discover, therefore, what actually is involved in such ' sharing-in '.

The capacity, on the one hand, for taking in external material, moulding and recreating it, and thereby creating new combinations (the essential quality of the artist in any sphere), and, on the other hand, the power to give out again material which has passed into us and is combined by fusion with our own individual experience ; this must be based upon oral and anal impulse-life, as has been pointed out in numerous researches into creative activity. The production and assimilation of this material has the closest parallel to the taking in and recombining of actual food-material, and the pleasure-activity accompanying the processes.

If the analyst, therefore, can ' eat his own meal ' side by side with the patient's, he has access to a free pleasure (in its sublimated form), and this is what I call ' reliving his own inner sequence '. And just as a meal shared between two people is an entirely different affair from the two individual meals, so a new creation is evolved out of this fused living, which results in new developments in the patient. I am here reminded of a patient of my own—himself a novelist and

poet of some excellence—who used to say when able to release freely his phantasies: 'I feel as though I were having a delightful meal—I feel rich and satisfied inside'.

The sublimated aspect of these processes must be the important issue for us, and it is on the question of the analyst's sublimations that so much turns. This problem seems always with us. How far have we ' true ' sublimation, and if ' true ', to what extent can it be carried ? That is why I have raised the question of ' compensation ', for it would seem that too often we are positing a degree of sublimation that cannot be achieved, and that we may even be demanding a ' sublimation ' which is only masquerading as such, in so far as it rules out contact with free phantasy.

In relating his cases, Freud so often gives indication of 'living from ' the material presented. For example, in dealing with a phase of his case of ' Miss Elizabeth ' and her blindness to the meaning of certain very obvious symptoms, he relates how just then he recalled his own striking blindness in a certain situation, revealing peculiar discrepancy between his unconscious knowledge and conscious observation, and goes on to explain and give further interpretation of his own psychic condition at the given time.

It is quite clear that Freud's increased contact with his unconscious material gave him much more freedom : in fact, he writes that he now felt a triumphant feeling of being in possession of the desired knowledge for dealing with his patient's unconscious, and with the next analytic session the latter made great advance. This (only one illustration out of innumerable ones to be found in the case-expositions of Freud) serves me as an example of the analyst reliving his own inner sequence side by side with the patient's similar re-living, a process attended by dynamic effect upon both, the importance of which has been emphasized by Freud himself and many other writers. And here we meet with what is, probably, a fundamental human situation—the need for, and dynamic effect of, this primitive relationship—one which Edward Glover has described as the baby in the patient making rapport with the baby in the analyst, with the result that the baby-patient feels freed from much of his anxiety, feels that since the superior one (the analyst) has been in the dangerous and painful position, but yet has emerged, he can do likewise. Such a rapport must be a factor in every analysis, since without it there could be no sense of movement, and the analysis would cease to be a living process, becoming a ' castrating ' one for both analyst and patient.

One of the advantages of 'active' therapy (in Ferenczi's later interpretation of the phrase) may lie in the production of a greater sense of movement, although when dynamic energy cannot operate, it is probably a question of unconscious bias rather than of technique.

Nevertheless, the ability to 'force' phantasy in the patient and to tolerate great 'activity' in the latter, provided it is not a screen for flight from the patient's deeper sadism, and from the analyst's own reactions to this, may be an expression of freedom for the latter's instinctive impulses, leading to a more positive ego-synthesis in the patient.

It is not a case of reacting to the patient's phantasies, rather it is a form of co-operative love-feast, and we know that those who eat together, thereby becoming blood-brothers, may satisfy legitimate demands on the unconscious oral level, and on a conscious sublimated sexual level. To take the introjected material and bring to bear upon it law, order, and unity, is the method whereby unconscious urges are satisfied: to project it again in new form gratifies sublimated desires. This is the work of artist and scientist, and so must it be the work of analyst. We may not, as Freud has told us, take the rôle of prophet, saviour, or consoler to the patient, but may we not—indeed, must we not—become the lover of the material projected by the patient and make it our introjected 'good object'? It is this love which will allow of the process I have called 'sharing-in', if it is strong enough to release the analyst's pleasure-phantasies. And here it may be that we can get help from child-analysis. The child-analyst may show us the way in which more and more deeply the analyst can release his phantasy-life, to the end that there may be a freer flow between himself and his patient. For the child-analyst must perforce be deeply and instinctively in touch with the phantasy-life of the child if he is to succeed at all: he cannot damn up phantasy behind the screen of words in the same way as can the analyst of the adult.

I have no further time to enlarge upon the slight indications I have here given. Perhaps the best summing up of the analyst's danger if he attempts to maintain the fiction of immunity from emotion in the analytic process is to be found in the words used by Freud in reference to Leonardo's tragedy: 'The *artist* had once taken into his service the *investigator* to assist him: now the servant was stronger and suppressed his master . . . he neither loved nor hated . . . he investigated instead of having loved'. It is against such a situation that Freud's forerunner, in the person of Hamlet, protested: 'You

would seem to know my steps and you would pluck out the heart of my mystery: you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my compass, and there is excellent service in this little organ: yet cannot *you* make it speak'.

The analyst's successful achievement, for himself and patient alike, can best be described if we turn again to Freud and his picture of the artist. The artist, he tells us, (for artist we may here substitute analyst) in contact with the external world (for which we may substitute patient) obtains his material, moulds and illuminates it by fusion with his own unconscious, and presents it again, thus re-shaped, in forms acceptable to reality-demands and to the unconscious of the world (the patient). Through such revelation he obtains a means of release, both for his fellow-men and for himself.