1 "La topique," the French rendering of the Freudian "die Topik" (literally: "arrangement of material"). The accepted English term, which there seems no reason to change, is "topography," and it does in fact match the Freudian metaphor of the "double inscription." But another candidate would be "topology," especially since Lacan seems to use it from time to time as a synonym for Topik.

For the nontechnical reader, it may be of assistance to state briefly some of the varying "points of view" used by Freud to represent the psychic system:

(1) the functional: Freud's earliest attempt to systematize his discovery, concerned with the difference between memory and perception and with the unsolved problem of consciousness, is usually described as functional (Standard Edition, V, 571);
(2) the descriptive: conscious/unconscious—that is, Cs./Pes./Ucs.;
(3) the topographical (or structural): Cs.Pes./Ucs. This includes the concept of the double inscription (Niederschrift);
(4) the dynamic: where the unconscious is equated with the repressed;
(5) the systematic: equivalent to the topographical plus the dynamic, where the division is: secondary system/primary system;
(6) the economic (essentially functional): concerned with the "principle of constancy" expressed in the opposition of pleasure and unpleasure with the attempt of the system to re-establish an original inertia, and with the notion of cathexis.
(7) the "new topography" (1920): the ego, the id, and the superego.

In reference to the "new topography," the last diagrammatic representation of it by Freud in the New Introductory Lectures (1933), Standard
Edition, XXII, 78, is of value in clearing up some popular misconceptions about the status of these "divisions." But perhaps the most important point of view in the present context is to be found in the quotation from Freud in note 66. It is essentially systematic, but if one were to give it a label, it would be the "linguistic view."

Note that the "new topography" is intimately connected with Freud's later attempts to deal with "disavowal" (Verleugnung—note 11), outside the perversions, in the terms of a "splitting" of the ego (Ichspaltung). See, for example, p. 58 of the New Introductory Lectures and the unfinished article: "The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense" (1940), Standard Edition XXIII, 273, where a number of other references will be found.

2 Le symbolique, l'imaginaire, and le réel are the three "orders"—basically, the discursive, the perceptive, and the real orders—introduced into psychoanalytical terminology by Lacan in 1953.

For some remarks on the Imaginary and its relation to the Symbolic and the Real, see the 1958 article by Leclaire on psychosis. Leclaire says in part: "The experience of the Real presupposes the simultaneous use of two correlative functions, the Imaginary function and the Symbolic function. That is Imaginary which, like shadows, has no existence of its own, and yet whose absence, in the light of life, cannot be conceived; that which, without power of distinction inundates singularity and thus escapes any truly rational grasp. That is Imaginary which is irremediably opposed or which is indistinctly confused, without any dialectical movement; the dream is Imaginary . . . just as long as it is not interpreted." And later: "no symbol can do without Imaginary support" (pp. 383-84).

The topographical regression of the "dream thoughts" to images in the dream might be described as a process of the Symbolic becoming Imaginary.

Lacan's views on phenomenology and existentialism are not explicitly developed in the Discours, but are significant for its comprehension. Their most extended development will be found in the 1961 article on Merleau-Ponty. In 1953, after referring to the condemnation of the autonomy of the consciousness-of-self in Hegel, to Freud's discovery of "the contrary power," to the logico-mathematical theory of sets, and to the linguistic theory of the phoneme, he goes on:

In this light the whole phenomenological—or even existentialist—movement appears like an exasperated compensation of a philosophy which is no longer sure of being master of its motives; and one that must not be confused, although this movement plagiarizes them, with Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's interrogations of the relationships of being and Language, an interrogation so pensive because it knows itself to be enclosed within what it questions, so slow to seek out its time (Actes, p. 251).

An analyst would obviously be less than sympathetic to philosophies taking their departure, or their certitude, directly from the cogito, or centered on it. The following extract from the article on the stade du miroir (1949) is of particular significance in this respect:

The term 'primary narcissism' by which analytical doctrine designates the libidinal cathexis proper to this moment [that of the completion of the stade du miroir by the identification with the image of the counterpart], reveals in its discoverers [Näcke, Havelock Ellis, Freud. See: "Narcissism" (1914), Standard Edition, XIV, 67], as I see it, a truly profound feeling for the latencies of semantics. But semantics also clarifies the dynamic opposition of this libido to the sexual libido, which they sought to define when they invoked instincts of destruction, even the death instinct, in order to explain the evident relation of narcissistic libido to the alienating function of the je, to the aggressivity which arises out of it in every relation with the other, be it that of the most Samaritan kind of help.

The fact is that they touched on that existential negativity whose reality is so vividly promoted by the contemporary philosophy of being and nothingness.

But this philosophy unhappily grasps this negativity only within the limits of a self-sufficiency of consciousness, which, by the fact of being inscribed in its premises, binds to the constitutive misconstructions of the moi, the illusion of autonomy in which it puts its trust. Word play in the mind which, nourishing itself in singular fashion on borrowings from analytic experience, culminates in the pretension of setting up an existential psychoanalysis.

At the end of the historical enterprise of a society which now no longer recognizes in itself any but a utilitarian function, and in the anguish of the individual in the face of the concentrationary form of the social tie, the anguish whose surging forth seems to be a compensation for that effort, existentialism is judged by the justifications which it gives for the subjective impass which in fact result from it: a liberty which never affirms itself so authentic as when within the walls of a prison, an exigency of engagement in which the impotence of pure consciousness to surmount any situation is expressed, a voyeur-sadistic idealization of the sexual relationship, a personality which can only realize itself in suicide, a consciousness of the other which can only be satisfied by the Hegelian murder [that is, by a refusal of the
master-slave dialectic in the mutual annihilation of both one and the other).

Everything in our experience is opposed to these views, insofar as it dissuades us from conceiving the *moi* as centered on the system perception-consciousness, as organized by the "reality principle" in which is formulated the prejudice of scientism the most contrary to the dialectic of *connaissance*—so as to indicate to us to make our departure from the function of *méconnaissance* which characterizes the *moi* in all the structures so forcibly articulated by Miss Anna Freud: for if the *Verneinung* represents the patent form of this misconstruction, its effects will remain latent for the most part so long as they are not clarified by a gleam of light reflected on the level of fatality, where it is the *id* that manifests itself (pp. 454-55).

*4 For Lacan, the didactic analysis is far from being a simple business of learning the "rules" of a therapeutic technique; it puts the student himself in question. He uses the word "formation" in a sense very similar to the German Bildung, as in Hegel, or in the concept of the Bildungsroman. See: La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit, I, 165ff.; II, 50ff., particularly Hypolite's note 14, p. 55, (Phénoménologie, p. 148ff; p. 350ff.) Cf. Hypolite on Bildung, Entäussерung, and Entfremdung in his Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit, II (1946), 371ff.*


6 "Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoïdes)" (1911), *Standard Edition*, XII, 9.


I myself set a higher value on my contributions to the psychology of religion, which began with the establishment of a remarkable similarity between obsessive actions and religious practices or ritual ("Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices" (1907), *Standard Edition*, IX, 117). Without as yet understanding the deeper connections, I described the obsessional neurosis as a distorted private religion and religion as a kind of universal obsessional neurosis.

8 "Sens" presents difficulties. In the present context, it is not simply a question of choosing between "sense," "meaning," "direction," "feel," and so forth, but also that of maintaining the difference between *sens* and *signification*. For example:

But it is not because the enterprises of grammar and lexicology exhaust themselves at a certain limit that we must think that *signification* [*signification*] reigns over it all alone. This would be an error.

For the signifier of its very nature invariably anticipates on the meaning [*sens*] by a sort of unfolding ahead of itself of the dimension of sense. This can be seen at the level of the sentence when it is interrupted before the signifiative term: 'I never . . . , 'It is always . . . , 'Again, perhaps . . . .'

The sentence doesn't make any less sense, and all the more oppressively because the meaning expresses itself adequately by making one wait for it. [. . .]

As a result, one can say that it is in the chain of the signifier that the sense *insists*, but that none of its elements *consists* in the signification of which the sense is capable at that particular moment ("L'Instance de la lettre" [1957], p. 56).

Although I doubt whether Lacan always maintains an observable difference between the two words, the convention has been adopted of translating *signification* by "signification" and *sens* by "sense" or by "meaning," except where the best rendering seems to be something like the hendiadys of "sense and direction." *Nonsens* will be rendered "non-sense," *contre-sens* left as in the French.

9 That is, if the subject refuses to recognize the meaning of a symptom it is quite pointless to tell him about it (as Freud repeatedly explains). For Lacan, cognition depends on recognition, and is necessitated by an original mis-cognition. See note 12 on méconnaissance.

10 For "isolation" and "undoing what has been done" (annulation), both technical terms used by Freud, see "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926), *Standard Edition*, XX, especially pp. 119-20.

Both are mechanisms of defense characteristic of obsessional neurosis. In the first, after some significant but unacceptable occurrence in his life, the subject seeks to break its continuity with the rest of his existence by interpolating an isolating interval in which nothing further must happen. In the second, he seeks to "blow away"—in a fashion even closer to the magical and the ceremonial—what he does not wish to accept. Both are consequently forms of *Verneinung*, or denegation.

Both were originally referred to in the case of the Rat Man: "Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis" (1909), *Standard Edition*, X, 235-36, 243, 246.

11 I have retained the French word because it is Lacan's emendation of the usual translation of Freud's *Verneinung* as "négation" (for the
English, see the article “Die Verneinung” [“Negation” (1925)] in *Standard Edition*, XIX, 223). The *Verneinung* is not simply “negation,” nor is it simply “denial,” which in any case entails confusion with the Freudian *Verleugnung*, usually translated “denial,” but which the *Standard Edition* now translates “disavowal.” (See the note on p. 143 of Vol. XIX.) Freud uses *Verneinung* in the 1925 article to refer both to the concrete attitude of “no-saying” met with in experience (“You ask who this person in the dream can be. It's not my mother.”) and to the creation of the symbol of negation, constitutive of judgment itself. See J. Hyppolite, “Commentaire parlé sur la *Verneinung* de Freud” (1956), and the introduction and commentary by Lacan. Needless to say, it is the first sense that is in question here.

There is no simple equivalent for *méconnaissance* in English. It is an important term in the Lacanian vocabulary of the *moi*. The problem is to render it by terms that will bring out the sense of a “failure to appreciate,” a “refusal to recognize,” a “mis-cognition,” and at the same time to remind the reader of its etymological affinity with *connaissance* (“knowledge,” “understanding,” “acquaintance with”) and *reconnaissance* (“recognition,” “appreciation”). Depending upon the English context, therefore, *méconnaissance* will be rendered “misconstruction” (that is, “something misconstrued”) or “failure to recognize,” and *méconnaître* by similar expressions.

The following passage, related to Lacan's theory of *la connaissance paranoïaque*, will illustrate Lacan's use of these terms:

Quel est donc le phénomène de la croyance délirante?—Il est, disons-nous, *méconnaissance*, avec ce que ce terme contient d'antinomie essentielle. Car *méconnaître* suppose une reconnaissance, comme le manifeste la *méconnaissance* systématique, où il faut bien admettre que ce qui est nié soit en quelque façon reconnu.

It seems clear to me that in his feelings of influence and automatism, the subject does not recognize his productions as his own. It is in this respect that we all agree that a madman is a madman. But isn't the remarkable part rather that he should have to take cognizance of it? And isn't the question rather to discover what he knows about himself in these productions without recognizing himself in them? (“Propos sur la causalité psychique” [1950], pp. 33-34.)


This and the preceding paragraph were slightly modified in 1966.

As noted in the Translator's Introduction, the asterisks refer to revisions made by Lacan in 1966.

The reference is to “The Lice Seekers” by Rimbaud. The author in question is the French analyst Bénassy.

“Give [me] a true and stable Word in my mouth and make of me a cautious tongue” (The Internal Consolation, Forty-fifth Chapter: that one must not believe everyone and of the lapses of spoken words). The French title of this chapter is “Parole vide et parole pleine dans la réalisation psychanalytique du sujet.” On this notion, compare Heidegger's *Gerede and Rede* and Kojève's view of the *discours adéquat*, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (1947), pp. 550f. “Idle talk” in Heidegger (Being and Time [1962], pp. 211-14 et passim) is not, however, disparaging, as the *parole vide* (the *discours imaginaire*) is for Lacan. Compare also the empty discourse of the *belle âme*: *Phénoménologie*, II, 189 (Phénoménologie, p. 462).

“Always a cause” or “keep talking.”

The French text reads as follows:

Mais si le psychanalyste ignore qu'il en va ainsi de la fonction de la parole, il n'en subira que plus fortement l'appel, et si c'est le vide qui d'abord s'y fait entendre, c'est en lui-même qu'il l'éprouvera et c'est au delà de la parole qu'il cherchera une réalité qui comble ce vide.

Ainsi en vient-il à analyser le comportement du sujet pour y trouver ce
qu'il ne dit pas. Mais pour en obtenir l'aveu, il faut bien qu'il lui en parle. Il retrouve alors la parole, mais rendue suspecte de n'avoir répondu qu'à la défètè de son silence, devant l'écho perçue de son propre néant.

23 Béance, another key word, lacks any usable equivalent in English ("openness," "yawningness," "gapingness"). The following quotation from Leclaire will bring out the weaker sense in which béance is used in general, and also the stronger sense in which it is used by Lacan in reference to psychosis:

If we imagine experience to be a sort of tissue, that is, taking the word literally, like a piece of cloth made of intersecting threads, we can say that repression would be represented in it by a snag or rip of some sort, perhaps even a large rent, but always something that can be darned or rewoven, whereas foreclosure [Verwerfung] would be represented by a béance of some sort, resulting from the way in which the original tissue itself was woven; foreclosure would be a sort of 'original hole,' never capable of finding its own substance again since it had never been anything other than 'hole-substance'; this hole can be filled, but never more than imperfectly, only by a 'patch,' to take up the Freudian term [already cited].

This reference is to "Neurosis and Psychosis" (1924), Standard Edition, XIX, 151: "In regard to the genesis of delusions, a fair number of analyses have taught us that the delusion is found applied like a patch over the place where originally a rent had appeared in the ego's relation to the external world."

Lacan has brought out Freud's distinction between the concept of Verwerfung ("rejection," "reputation," "censure"), which he now translates "foreclusion," and that of "normal" neurotic repression or Verdrängung. In 1954 he translated it "retranchement" ("cutting off," "cutting out," "withdrawal") and spoke of the repression of a specific signifier (Freud's Signorelli) as "une parole retranchée" ("Introduction au commentaire de J. Hyppolite" [1956], p. 27). In relation to the concept of béance, it is worth noting the various meanings of the verb verwerfen (basically: "throw away," "throw in the wrong direction," "reject"), especially the reflexive forms meaning "to become warped," "to show a (geological) fault," Verwerfung itself also meaning "fault" in this sense. For failure, see note 116. The concept of Verwerfung is further referred to as "a primordial deficiency [carence] in the signifier" (Seminars of January, 1958, p. 293).

In 1949, Lacan expressed the concept of béance in a more strictly biological context, and one without particular reference to psychosis. Speaking of the "spatial capture" of the stade du miroir as manifested in man, he characterizes it as the effect of "an organic insufficiency of his natural reality (man always being prematurely born in relation to other animals) and then relates it to the function of the imago (see passage quoted in note 106). He continues: "But this relation to nature is impaired in man by a certain dehiscence of the organism within itself, by a primordial Discord which is revealed by the signs of malaise and the lack of motor co-ordination of the neonatal months" ("Le Stade du miroir" [1949], p. 452).

24 The French text reads as follows:

Mais qu'était donc cet appel du sujet au dela du vide de son dire? Appel à la vérité dans son principe, à travers quoi vacilleront les appels de besoins plus humbles. Mais d'abord et d'émblée appel propre du vide, dans la bénance ambiague d'une séduction tentée sur l'autre par les moyens où le sujet met sa complaisance et où il va engager le monument de son narcissisme.

25 Freud does not normally use the usual German expressions for frustration (Verzettelung, Verhinderung). The Freudian term translated "frustration," which is obviously that in question here, is Versagung, which might be defined as a particular kind of denial of satisfaction or of an object to the subject by his own ego. Cf. Freud on Versagung, "Types of Onset of Neurosis" (1912), Standard Edition, XII, 231-42, especially p. 234 and the Editor's Notes.

Lacan later characterized Versagung as being essentially "promesse et rupture de promesse" in the seminar of January-February 1957, p. 743, and again as being a process in which the subject "goes back on his word," "gainsays himself" (se dêdire: ver-sagen).

26 The French text reads as follows:

Le sujet ne s'y engage-t-il pas dans une dépossession toujours plus grande de cet être de lui-même, dont, à force de peintures sincères qui n'en laissent pas moins incohérente l'idée, de rectifications qui n'atteignent pas à dégager
son essence, d’état et de défenses qui n’empêchent pas de vaciller sa statue, d’étranges narcissiques qui se font souffle à l’animer, il finit par reconnaître que cet être n’a jamais été que son œuvre dans l’imaginaire et que cette œuvre dépose en lui toute certitude. Car dans ce travail qu’il fait de la reconstruire pour un autre, il retrouve l’aliénation fondamentale qui lui a fait construire comme une autre, et qui lui a toujours destinée à lui être dérobée par un autre.

Referring to the work of Charlotte Bühler on the behavior of very young children, Lacan speaks of the (paranoid) phenomenon of “transitivism” as “a veritable capture by the other” in a “primordial ambivalence which appears to us . . . as in a mirror,” in the sense that the subject identifies his sentiment of Self in the image of the other. “Thus, and this is essential, the first effect of the Imago which appears in human beings is an effect of alienation in the subject. It is in the other that the subject identifies and even senses himself at first” (“Propos sur la causalité psychique” [1950], p. 45).

Compare the following:

In order for us to come back to a more dialectical view of the analytic experience, I would say that analysis consists precisely in distinguishing the person lying on the analyst’s couch from the person who is speaking. With the person listening, that makes three persons present in the analytical situation, among whom it is the rule that the question at the base in all cases of hysteria be put: Where is the moi of the subject? Once this is admitted, it must be said that the situation is not three-way, but four-way, since the role of dummy [le mort], as in bridge, is always part of the game, and so much so that if it is not taken into account, it is impossible to articulate anything of any sense whatsoever in regard to obsessional neurosis (Actes, p. 210).

See also Leclaire in the 1958 article on psychosis: “The moi is the locus of the Imaginary identifications of the subject.” My intention is above all to indicate by this definition the Imaginary function of the ‘moi’ (formation, deformation, information) in opposition to the symbolic character of the ‘subject’ (p. 399).

For the “first person,” see note 110.

28 “. . . jusqu’à l’image passivante par où le sujet se fait objet dans la parade du miroir . . . .” See the description of the child’s behavior before a mirror at the beginning of the article on the stade du miroir (1949). “Passivation” describes the chemical process of “pickling” metal to make it ready to receive a coating, such as paint or plating.

29 jouissance has no simple English equivalent. In a less significant context, it might be translated “enjoyment,” “possession,” “appropriation,” “right,” “pleasure.” Since in Lacan’s view the enjoyment of possession of an object is dependent for its pleasure on others, the ambiguity of the French jouissance nicely serves his purpose.

30 The words ego, moi, and je are left as in the French. The ambiguity of Freud’s use of the term das Ich is well known, but Lacan’s concept of the moi is essentially that of the Idealich or the Ichideal. There is a nice distinction between the ego-ideal and the ideal-ego, a distinction never methodologically clarified by Freud, and Lacan’s assimilation of narcissism to identification is in the tradition of that same ambiguity. At the same time, Lacan’s use of moi shares the Ich’s sense of “self,” as Freud sometimes employs it, especially in the earlier works.

The concept of the moi which Freud demonstrated particularly in the theory of narcissism viewed as the source of all enamoration or ‘falling in love’ (Verliebtheit)—and in the technique of resistance viewed as supported by the latent and patent forms of dénégation (Verneinung)—brings out in the most precise way its function of irreality: mirage and misconstruction. He completed the concept by a genetic view which situates the moi clearly in the order of the Imaginary relations and which shows in its radical alienation the matrix which specifies interhuman aggressivity as essentially intrasubjective (Actes, p. 209).

31 Compare the following:

. . . The subject may take pleasure in the desire of the Other. He may respond to it, or believe he is responding to it, by minting his own signs, the gifts by virtue of which he may believe himself to be loved. But the analytic attitude is designed to suspend his certitudes on this subject, and the analyst’s interpretation, when the opportunity offers, is designed to show him what Lacan calls the ‘vanity’ of his gifts, or in other words, their regressive character. To this extent, the analytic way is that which leads towards anxiety (M. Safouan, “Le Rêve et son interprétation,” La Psychanalyse, VIII [1964], p. 119).

32 The allusion is to the function of the tessera as a token of recognition, or “password.” The tessera was employed in the early mystery religions where fitting together again the two halves of a broken piece of pottery was used as a means of recognition by the initiates—and in Greece the tessera was called the symbolon. Note that the central concept involved in the symbol is that of a link, but that Lacan views this
link as one between systems, not between terms or between terms and things. See note 80.

The allusion to Mallarmé is to a passage in his preface to René Ghil's *Traité du Verbe* (1886); it can be found in the *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Pléiade, 1945), pp. 368, 857.

80 That is, the discourse of the subject being treated by the analyst under the supervision of another analyst:

... If the intermediary of the Word were not essential to the analytic structure, the supervision of an analysis by another analyst who has only a verbal relationship to that analysis would be absolutely inconceivable, whereas it is in fact one of the clearest and most fruitful modes of the analytic relation (cf. my report) (Actes, p. 210).

81 That is, the analyst's "evenly suspended attention." This, or a similar expression, appears in Standard Edition, X, 23 ("Little Hans"); XII, 111; and XVIII, 239; and elsewhere.

82 Compare the following:

I beg you simply to note the link which I affirm to exist between the second position [that psychoanalysis is the resolution of the symbolic exigency that Freud revealed in the unconscious and which his last topography linked so strikingly with the death instinct], the only correct one for us, and the recognition of the validity of Freud's often debated position on the death instinct. You will agree with me on this when I say that any abrogation of that part of his work is accompanied among those who pride themselves on it by a repudiation which extends all the way to Freud's basic principles, in the sense that these are the same people—and not by chance—who no longer seek anything in the subject of the analytical experience that they do not situate beyond the Word (Actes, pp. 207–8).

And further on, p. 17: "[The psychotherapeutic method] brings to an end the operative force of the idea [Vorstellung] which was not abraded in the first instance, by allowing its stranguled affect to find a way out through speech [Rede = discours]..." See also pp. 225, 288–89.

84 "Act of becoming aware." Compare the following:

It will ... be understood why it is as false to attribute the analytical dénouement to the prise de conscience as it is to be surprised at its not happening to have the power to do it. It is not a question of passing from the unconscious, plunged in obscurity, to consciousness, site of clarity, by some sort of mysterious elevator. This really is objectification—by which the subject ordinarily tries to avoid his responsibility—and it is here that the bully-boys of intellectualization show their intelligence by involving him in it yet again.

It is not a question of a passage into consciousness, but of a passage into the Word ... (Actes, p. 206).

See also note 66.

85 Freud's rejection of his early "intellectualist" views and the prise de conscience is elaborated in his papers on technique, in particular: "On Beginning the Treatment" (1913), Standard Edition, XII, 141–42. See also the paper on "Negation" (XIX, 233).
**Verbaliser**, in its legal sense, would be the equivalent of “to write a traffic ticket.” *Pandore* is a slang term for gendarme. But *verbaliser* also retains its older, pejorative sense of “to discourse at needless length” and, in a rather special technical sense, “to certify in writing.”

The term *verbe* will be left untranslated since it is more or less synonymous with *mot, parole, logos, and the Logos* (le *Verbe*), depending on the context—and “more or less” means precisely that it has a particular flavor of its own. The following translation of a citation from Littre may assist the reader unfamiliar with French to appreciate the usage of the term: “Your wise men, says Tertullian, agree that the logos, that is to say, le *verbe, la parole*, seems to be the craftsman of the universe; we believe, moreover, that the proper substance of this *verbe*, of this reason, by which God has made all things, is l’*esprit*” (Condillac). This reference to the father of the ideologists is not without particular relevance to the tradition in which Lacan is writing.

*Verbe* was in fact very early on reserved for religious and ecclesiastical contexts (as Lacan later points out), and as such it has remained the (poetical) “word” par excellence.

It will assist the reader to take into account the several meanings of this Greek term: “word,” “speech,” “tale,” “song,” “promise,” “saying,” “word” (opposed to deed), “message,” and in the plural: “epic poetry,” “lines of verse.” On this whole passage, see Flegel on the Homeric epos, *Phénoménologie*, II, 242ff., especially p. 243 (*Phénoménologie*, 570ff.).

“Représentation” also means “performance” (of a play) (*Darstellung*). It also translates both the Hegelian and the Freudian *Vorstellung*. The word translated “stage” is the French *scène*.

Cf. Freud on transference: “So what he is showing us is the kernel of his intimate life history: *he is reproducing it tangibly, as though it were actually happening, instead of remembering it.*” “The Question of Lay Analysis” (1926), *Standard Edition*, XX, 226. This is referred to in the next paragraph as the patient’s obligation “to stage a revival of an old piece.” See also: “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” (1914), *Standard Edition*, XII, 147.

The French text reads as follows:

On peut dire dans le langage heideggerien que l’une et l’autre constituent le sujet comme *gewesen*, c'est-à-dire comme étant celui qui a ainsi été. Mais dans l’unité interne de cette temporalisation, l’étant marque la convergence des ayant été. C’est-à-dire que d’autres rencontres étant supposées depuis l’un quelconque de ces moments ayant été, il en serait issu un autre étant qui le ferait avoir été tout autrement.

Compare with Heidegger:

As authentically futural, Dasein *is* authentically as “*having been*” [gewesen]. Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility [death] is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost “been.” Only insofar as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of “having been” [*Gewessenheit*] arises, in a certain way, from the future (*Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson [1962], p. 373).

Compare the following:

To tell the truth, the subject who is invited to speak in analysis doesn’t demonstrate a great deal of liberty. Not that he is enchained by the rigor of his associations: no doubt they oppress him, but it is rather that they open up onto a free Word, onto a full Word which is painful to him (“La Direction de la cure” [1961], p. 179).

On the “theory of deferred action,” see also the “Project” of 1895 in *The Origins of Psychoanalysis* (1954), Part II, particularly Section 4 (pp. 410-13). This theory crops up constantly in Freud’s early writings on psychoanalysis—for example, in the French article of 1896 referred to in Lacan’s note i,—as well as throughout the case of the Wolf Man. See the editor’s remarks at the end of the note cited by Lacan (*Standard Edition*, XVII, p. 45, n.1), and also the further references given at the end of the lengthy note on p. 167 in *Standard Edition*, III.

See: “Le temps logique et l’assertion de certitude anticipée” (1945). Lacan’s analysis of this sophism is concerned with the psychological and temporal process involved between three hypothetical prisoners of which the first to discover whether he is wearing a black or a white patch on his back has been offered his freedom by the prison governor. The prisoners are not allowed to communicate directly. The governor has shown them three white and two black patches and has then fixed a white patch on each man’s back.

Lacan analyzes the intersubjective process in which each man has to put himself in the place of the others and to gauge the correctness of his deductions through their actions in time, from the *instant du regard* to the *moment de conclure.* The first moment of the *temps pour com-
prendre is a wait (which tells each man that no one can see two black patches), followed by a decision by each that he is white ("If I were black, one of the others would have already concluded that he is white, because nobody has as yet started for the door"). Then they all set off towards the door and all hesitate in a retrospective moment of doubt. The fact that they all stop sets them going again. This hesitation will only be repeated twice (in this hypothetically ideal case), before all three leave the prison cell together.

48 The word-play is between “interlocution” and “interloqué.”

49 The following passages from his later writings will be of assistance in clarifying Lacan’s further elaboration of this concept. In opposition to what he calls a certain “phenomenological” trend in psychoanalysis, Lacan refers to the divergence between himself and his colleague Daniel Lagache in the following terms:

[Our divergence] lies in the actual function which he confers on intersubjectivity. For intersubjectivity is defined for him in a relation to the otherness of the counterpart [l’autre du semblable], a symmetrical relation in principle, as can be seen from the fact that Daniel Lagache sets up the formula that the subject learns to treat himself as an object through the other. My position is that the subject has to emerge from the given of the signifiers which cover him in an Other which is their transcendental locus: through this he constitutes himself in an existence where the manifestly constituting vector of the Freudian area of experience is possible: that is to say, what is called desire ("Remarque sur le rapport de Daniel Lagache" [1961], p. 119).

In the article on Merleau-Ponty in Les Temps Modernes (1961), Lacan points out the problematic involved in philosophizing from the primacy of the cogito, or from that of the percipio:

To put it in a nutshell, it seems to me that the ‘I think,’ to which presence is reduced, continues to imply, no matter how indeterminate one may make it, all the powers of the reflection [réflexion] by which subject and consciousness are confounded—namely, the mirage which psychoanalytic experience places at the basis [principe] of the méconnaissance of the subject and which I myself have tried to focus on in the stade du miroir by concentrating it there (pp. 248–49).

The structure of intersubjectivity is further elaborated as follows:

Thus it is that if man comes to thinking the Symbolic order, it is because he is caught in it from the first in his being. The illusion that he has formed it by his consciousness results from the fact that it was by the way of a béance specific to his Imaginary relation to his counterpart, that he was able to enter into this order as a subject. But he was only able to make this entrance by the radical defile of the Word, the same, in fact, of which we have recognized a genetic moment in the play of the child [the Fort Dal of Beyond the Pleasure Principle] but which, in its complete form, is reproduced each time that the subject addresses himself to the Other as absolute, that is to say, as the Other who can nullify the subject himself, in the same way as he can do for him, that is, by making himself an object in order to deceive him. This dialectic of intersubjectivity, whose use I have shown to be necessary—from the theory of transference to the structure of paranoia itself—during the past three years of my seminar at Sainte-Anne, is readily backed up by the following schema which has long been familiar to my students:

Schéma I:

The two middle terms represent the coupled reciprocal Imaginary objectification which I have emphasized in the stade du miroir" ("Le Séminaire sur La lettre volée [1956], p. 9).

There is a simplified and slightly different version of the schema in the “Traitement possible de la psychose” (1958), p. 18, with the following comments:

Schéma II:

This schema signifies that the condition of the subject S (neurotic or psychotic) depends on what is being unfolded in the Other A. What is being unfolded there is articulated like a discourse (the unconscious is the discourse of the Other)—a discourse whose syntax Freud first sought to define for those fragments of it which come to us in certain privileged moments, dreams, slips of the tongue or pen, flashes of wit.

How would the subject be an interested party in this discourse, if he were not taking part? He is one, in fact, in that he is drawn to the four corners of
the schema, which are: S, his ineffable and stupid existence; a, his objects; 
a', his moi—that is, what is reflected of his form in his objects; and A, the 
locus from which the question of his existence may be put to him.

The rest of this article is given over to an analysis of the Schreber 
case, accompanied by a topological transformation of the schema seeking 
to represent the distortion of the psychotic's relation to others and to 
reality.

See also Leclaire in the 1958 article on psychosis, pp. 399f., where a and 
a' are explicitly the moi's of S and A, and the axes S—A and a—a' are, 
explicitly, the Symbolic axis and the Imaginary axis, respectively.

For Freud's "defile' of consciousness" see: "The Psychotherapy of 

On the theoretical background of the preceding remarks, see the 
posthumous Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940), Standard Edition, XXIII, 
144, especially pp. 157ff., where it is a question of the representation of 
the lacunae in the "broken sequences" of consciousness, as well as of the 
prise de conscience. Cf. also p. 177: "For a patient never forgets again 
what he has experienced in the form of transference; it carries a greater 
force of conviction than anything he can acquire in other ways."

"La pensée inconsciente." The sit venia verbo ("let the word be 
pardoned") occurs in the analysis of the Wolf Man (XVII, 84), where 
the expression in question is rendered "an unconscious concept."

One immediately recognizes in this passage a whole series of allusions 
to the Freudian metaphors about the unconscious, as Lacan mentions in 
the next paragraph. One recognizes the metaphor of the ancient city 
undergoing excavation through various layers: that of the somatic com-
pliance of the hysterical symptom, which may exhibit the condensation 
and displacement to be found in language and which "joins in the 
conversation" (matsprechen), as Freud put it; that of Freud's view that 
resonances of unconscious meanings and linguistic relationships from a 
mythical earlier time are exhibited in the language of dreams; that of 
the double inscription. Moreover, we are reminded of Freud's constant 
recourse to the myth and to the fairy tale as exhibiting universal struc-
tures or as serving as representatives in the subject's discourse—the 
whole analysis of the Wolf Man revolves around the attempted integra-
tion of a fable by the subject into his own history—as well as to the 
personal or individual myth of the subject, normal, neurotic, or psy-
chotic. And lastly, there is the instance of "secondary revision" and of 
the Entstellungen ("distortions") in the dream and in the symptom, 
where the subject, unbeknownst to himself, seeks to "make it all make 
better sense"—notably after the topographical regression to perception 
in the dream, the fundamental meaning being finally restored only by 
the putting into words of the "images" (the thing presentations) and 
their assumption by the subject's discourse in the dream text, where the 
linguistic working through of associations enables the subject to pro-
vide himself (unconsciously at first) with the exegesis of his own dream 
(or symptom).

83 The relationship made by Lacan between metaphor (condensation) 
and the symptom, and that between metonymy (displacement) and 
desire, is elaborated in the notes to Chapter II (for example, note 67) 
and dealt with in further detail in the essay following these notes. In 
1953 Lacan did not make the later distinction between metaphor and 
metonymy.

Freud first came to recognize the mechanism of condensation (Ver-
dichtung) in the simple fact that the dream itself is much shorter and 
much more compressed than its verbal representation (the dream text). 
Dreams are "laconic," as is the dream text itself in relation to its later 
interpretation. Condensation represents the "nodal point" (Knotenpunkte) 
of the dream and will be like a railroad switch in the dream work, al-
ways allowing multiple interpretations (overdetermination).

After noting that it is impossible ever to know whether a dream has 
been fully interpreted, Freud goes on to the use of words in dreams: 
"The work of condensation in dreams is seen at its clearest when it 
handles words and names. It is true in general that words are frequently 
treated in dreams as though they were things, and for that reason they 
are apt to be combined in just the same way as thing presentations" 

Displacement (Verschiebung) is less clearly defined. It is a form of 
distortion (Entstellung) and "indirect representation" in dreams, in 
respect of both words and images. The censorship will displace the
center of the dream onto objects or words of minor importance, and thus reveal its latent content. Displacement in dreams, for Freud, not only covers any kind of "diversion from a train of thought but every sort of indirect representation as well," including "substitution by a piece of symbolism, or an analogy, or something small" (Jokes and the Unconscious, Standard Edition, VIII, 171). In this context (the context of presentations), he also employs the term Verschiebungersatz: "displacement-substitute." Connected with the concept of displacement in his early writings are a number of other terms, including "dislodge" (dislozieren), "transpose" (transponieren), and Uebertragung itself ("transference," "translation") in the usual nontechnical German sense, as well as concepts involving "false connections" and "conversion."

In mental illness itself, displacement as a mode of symptom formation is one of Freud's earliest methodological terms, referring to the transfer of a "quantity of affect" from one presentation to another, or from a presentation to the body itself (hysteria). This mechanism is especially evident in obsessive neurosis.

64 "... au for interne comme au for extérieur."

In the paragraphs which follow, the reader should consider what Lacan has just said about the domain of the metaphor, as well as keeping in mind the Freudian metaphors translated as the "primal scene" and the "other scene" (the dream). 65 English in the original.

66 "There are people who would never have been in love, if they had never heard talk of love" (Maxim CXXXVI, Garnier et al.).

67 "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918), Standard Edition, XVII, 46, 102, 110-11, 118.

68 "Une vérité de La Place" is a self-evident truth, a truism.


In the "Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir" (1966), Lacan clarified the "de" as to be read in the sense of the Latin de (objective determination): "de Allo in oratione (to complete the phrase: tua res agitur)" (Écrits, p. 814).

60 English in the original.

61 This incident is described at the end of Lecture XXX of the New Introductory Lectures (1933), Standard Edition, XXII, following the analysis of the "Forsyte" incident alluded to in the first part of this sentence. This last is the "third case" omitted (as a result of Freud's unconscious resistance to the occult) from the article "Psychoanalysis and Telepathy" (1941 [1921]), XVIII, 177-93.

62 The orientation of psychoanalysis after World War II, both in England and in the United States, had especially concentrated on the countertransference (of the analyst onto the patient), that is to say, on the two-way or dual nature of transference (first mentioned by Freud in 1910). See, for instance: Michael Balint, "Changing Therapeutical Aims and Techniques in Psycho-analysis," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (1950), XXXI, 117.

63 This is the phrase employed by the chorus in the macaronic Latin of the burlesqued ceremony which closes Molière's Le Malade Imaginaire. The example is a real one. The allusion to Plato is to the Sophist, 249b.

64 "Des éléments signifiants." "The dream-work follows the laws of the signifier." "The unconscious is not the primordial, nor the instinctual, and elementarily it is acquainted only with the elements of the signifier" ("L'Instance de la lettre" 1957), pp. 65, 74). As Lacan points out elsewhere, the dream is not the unconscious, but rather what Freud called the "royal road" to the unconscious, the latter being revealed not by the manifest text of the dream as such, but by the lacunae latent within it.

Cf. Freud: "The Unconscious" (1915), Standard Edition, XIV, 167:

All these conscious acts [parapraxes, dreams, symptoms, obsessions, ideas that "come into our head we do not know from where"] remain disconnected and unintelligible if we insist upon claiming that every mental act that oc-
curs in us must also necessarily be experienced by us through consciousness; on the other hand they fall into a demonstrable connection if we interpolate between them the unconscious acts which we have inferred.


If we reflect that the means of representation in dreams are principally visual images [Bilder] and not words, we shall see that it is even more appropriate to compare dreams with a system of writing than with a language. In fact the interpretation of dreams is completely analogous to the decipherment of an ancient pictographic script such as Egyptian hieroglyphs. In both cases there are certain elements which are not intended to be interpreted (or read, as the case may be) but are only designed to serve as ‘determinatives,’ that is to establish the meaning of some other element.

For the specific reference of this passage of Lacan’s (and for Freud’s use of the metaphor of the rebus), see Standard Edition, IV, 277-78.

The reader will note the relationship, in Freud’s own system of metaphors, between the “double inscription” (Niederschrift), as a means of accounting for the coexistence of conscious and repressed ideas, and the reference to hieroglyphs (Bilderschriften).

These passages should be read with the later analysis of the topographical regression in the dream from the dream-thoughts to visual images (the Rückicht auf Darstellbarkeit, or “concern for representability”) where Freud makes the distinction between “word presentations” (Wortvorstellungen) and “thing presentations” (Sachvorstellungen or Dingvorstellungen) and where these two types of Vorstellungen are used in relating the dream-language to the language of schizophrenias. This “backward course, through the Ucs to perception” is discussed in the “Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1917), Standard Edition, XIV, 222-35. This paper was written at the same time as the article “The Unconscious” (1915), Standard Edition, XIV, 166-204, where the following passage occurs, part of which is quoted by Leclaire and Laplanche in their structural analysis of the two modes of representation in their article on the unconscious:

What we have permissibly called the conscious presentation [Vorstellung] of the object can now be split up into the presentation of the word and the presentation of the thing . . . . We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a conscious and an unconscious presentation. The two are not, as we supposed, different registrations of the same content in different psychological localities, nor yet different functional states of cathexis [Bese-

zung] in the same locality; but the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone . . . .

Now, too, we are in a position to state precisely what it is that repression denies to the rejected presentation in the transference neuroses: what it denies to the presentation is translation into words which shall remain attached to the object. A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not hypercathected, remains thereafter in the Ucs. in a state of repression (pp. 201-2).

Lacan takes up the whole question of representation in greater detail in “L’Instance de la lettre” (1957), where he also deals with the hieroglyphic “determinatives.”

Lacan elaborates on his use of the concepts of metaphor and metonymy and explains the algorithmic representation he uses, in “L’Instance de la lettre” (1957) and “La Direction de la cure” (1961).

Metonymy represents the connection of “word to word” (mot à mot) in the signifying chain, or the combination of signifier to signifier (S . . . S’), and represents the subject’s desire; metaphor—the substitution of “one word for another one” in which the first signifier is occulted and falls to the level of the signified while retaining its metonymic connection with the rest of the chain—represents the symptomatic passage across the bar of the Lacanian algorithm \( \left( \frac{S'}{S} \right) \). The articles in question should be consulted, but in the first, basing his elaboration on the Traumdeutung, Lacan proceeds as follows:

Entstellung, translated transposition [“distortion” in English], where Freud demonstrates the general precondition of the dream, is what I designated earlier in this article, following Saussure, as the glissement [sliding] of the signified under the signifier, always in action (unconscious action, let it be noted) in the discourse.

But the two aspects of the incidence of the signifier over the signified are to be found again in it. Verdrängung, condensation, is the structure of the superimposition of the signifiers in which the field of the metaphor is found, and whose name, condensing within itself the word Dichtung [poetry], indicates the natural affinity of the mechanism to poetry, to the point that this mechanism envelops the traditional function proper to poetry.

Verschiebung, or displacement: this transfer [virement] of signification demonstrated by metonymy is closer to the German term. From its first appearance in Freud, displacement is represented as the most appropriate means used by the unconscious to foil the censorship.
What is it that distinguishes these two mechanisms, which play such a privileged role in the dream-work (Traumarbeit), from their homologous function in the discourse? Nothing, except a condition imposed upon the signifying material, called Rückicht auf Darstellbarkeit (“considerations of representability”), which is to be translated: concern for the means of the mise en scène . . . (p. 64).

[And later:] . . . It is the connection of signifier to signifier which permits the elision through which the signifier installs the lack of being in the object relation, by using the power of ‘reference back’ of signification in order to invest it with the desire aimed at this lack which it supports (p. 68).


Freud brings out the sense of Entstellung as meaning “to put something in another place,” “to displace,” in Moses and Monotheism (1939), Standard Edition, XXIII, 43.

68 In 1946 Lacan paraphrased Hegel as follows:

The very desire of man, [Hegel] tells us, is constituted under the sign of mediation; it is desire to make its desire recognized. It has for its object a desire, that of the other, in the sense that there is no object for man’s desire which is constituted without some sort of mediation—which appears in his most primitive needs: for example, even his food has to be prepared—and which is found again throughout the development of satisfaction from the moment of the master-slave conflict throughout the dialectic of labor (“Propos sur la causalité psychique” [1950], p. 45).

See also the first chapter of Kojève’s Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (1947).

In the “Direction de la cure” (1961), Lacan summarizes his remarks on the nature of desire:

One of the principles which follow from these premises is that:
— if desire is an effect in the subject of that condition which is imposed on him by the existence of the discourse, to make his need pass through the defiles of the signifier;
— if on the other hand . . . , by opening up the dialectic of transference, we must ground the notion of the Other with a big O as being the locus of the deployment of the Word (the other scene, eine andere Schauplatz, of which Freud speaks in the Traumdeutung);
— it must be posited that, as a facet of an animal at the mercy of Language, man’s desire is desire of the Other.

This formulation is aimed at quite another function than that of the primary identification [with objects—see note 181] mentioned earlier in this article, for it is not a question of the assumption by the subject of the insignia of the other, but rather the condition that the subject has to find the constituting structure of his desire in the same blance opened up by the effect of the signifiers in those who come [through transference] to represent the Other for him, insofar as his demand is subjected to them (p. 190).

For some further remarks on the dialectic of desire, and concerning its relation to need and to demand, see notes 143 and 183; for the andere Schauplatz (a remark of Fechner’s) see: Standard Edition, IV, 48; V, 526; and Letter 83 (1898) in The Origins of Psychoanalysis (1954).

For further clarification, see the “Subversion du sujet” (1966), especially p. 814. The “de” is a subjective genitive—that is, man desires insofar as he is Other. Man’s ignorance (nescience) of his desire is “less ignorance of what he demands, which can after all be defined or limited, than ignorance of whence he desires.”


See also the seminar of November, 1957, pp. 295-96, and “La Psychanalyse et son enseignement” (1957), p. 75, for further comments on the forgetting of “Signorelli.”

70 Compare the following:

Symptoms of conversion, inhibition, anguish, these are not there to offer you the opportunity to confirm their nodal points, however seductive their topology may be; it is a question of untangling these knots, and this means to return them to the Word function that they hold in a discourse whose signification determines their use and sense (Actes, p. 206).

The letter of the message is the important thing here. In order to grasp it, one must stop an instant at the fundamentally equivocal character of the Word, insofar as its function is as much to hide as to uncover . . . . It is this [division into the different parts of an] orchestral score inherent in the ambiguity of Language which alone explains the multiplicity of the ways of access to the secret of the Word. The fact remains that there is only one text where it is possible to read what the Word says and what it does not say, and that it is to this text that the symptoms are connected just as intimately as is a rebus to the sentence it represents.
For some time now there has been utter confusion between the multiple ways of access to the deciphering of this sentence, and what Freud calls the overdetermination of the symptoms which represent it (Actes, p. 207).

Freud is as a matter of fact too coherent in his thinking to consider that [this] overdetermination ... actually enters into a present conflict insofar as this conflict reproduces an old conflict of a sexual nature; and the support—which is not adventitious—of an organic biance (some lesional stimulus or somatic compliance) or of an Imaginary one (fixation) would have appeared to him as something other than a verbal loophole to be scorned, if in these circumstances it were not a question of the structure which unites the signifier to the signified in Language (Actes, p. 207).

What the linguistic conception which must form the worker from the beginning will teach him, is to look for the symptom to provide proof of its function as a signifier—that is, proof of what distinguishes it from the 'natural indicator' that the same term currently designates in medicine ("La Chose freudienne" [1956], p. 238).

The psychoanalyzable symptom, whether normal or pathological, is distinct not only from the diagnostic 'indicator,' but also from every distinguishable form of pure expressivity, in the sense that it is sustained by a structure which is identical to the structure of Language. And by this, I do not mean a structure to be situated in some sort of so-called generalized semiology drawn from the limbo of its periphery, but the structure of Language as it manifests itself in the languages which I might call positive, those which are actually spoken by the mass of human beings ("La Psychanalyse et son enseignement" [1957], p. 72).

Speaking of the two registers of the signifier and the signified—"register" designating "two chained-sequences taken in their globality" which are related as system to system (in the mathematical sense of group theory) and not as term to term—Lacan continues:

Thus it is that if the symptom can be read, it is because it is already itself inscribed in a process of writing. Insofar as a particular formation of the unconscious, it is not a signification, but its relation to a signifying structure which determines it. If I may be permitted a play on words, I would say that it is always a question of the agreement of the subject with the verbe. (Ibid., p. 73).

The difficulty of translating the word esprit, which covers most of both Witz and Geist, is well known, but in this passage it becomes an insoluble problem. I have chosen to translate it by the least objectionable term, "spirit," except in the quotation from Freud in which the word Witz is used in the German, and in the expression esprit libre ("mind free from care").

The substance of the passage on l'esprit is as follows:

... et le visage qu'il nous révèle est celui même de l'esprit dans l'ambiguïté que lui confère le langage, où l'autre face de son pouvoir régalien est la 'pointe' par qui son ordre entier s'anéantit en un instant,—pointe en effet où son activité créatrice dévoie sa gratuité absolue, où sa domination sur le réel s'exprime dans le défi du non-sens, où l'humour, dans la grâce méchante de l'esprit libre, symbolise une vérité qui ne dit pas son dernier mot. ... Ici tout est substance, tout est perle. L'esprit qui vit en exil dans la création dont il est l'invisible soutien, sait qu'il est maître à tout instant de l'anéantir. ... C'est la vérité en effet, qui dans sa bouche jette li le masque, mais c'est pour que l'esprit en prenne un plus trompeur, la sophistique qui n'est que stratagème, la logique qui n'est qu'un leurre, le comique même qui ne va là qu'à éblouir. L'esprit est toujours ailleurs. 'L'esprit comporte en effet une telle conditionnalité subjective ... : n'est esprit que ce que j'accepte comme tel,' poursuit Freud qui sait de quoi il parle.

The French text reads as follows:

... et le visage qu'il nous révèle est celui même de l'esprit dans l'ambiguïté que lui confère le langage, où l'autre face de son pouvoir régalien est la 'pointe' par qui son ordre entier s'anéantit en un instant,—pointe en effet où son activité créatrice dévoie sa gratuité absolue, où sa domination sur le réel s'exprime dans le défi du non-sens, où l'humour, dans la grâce méchante de l'esprit libre, symbolise une vérité qui ne dit pas son dernier mot. ... Ici tout est substance, tout est perle. L'esprit qui vit en exil dans la création dont il est l'invisible soutien, sait qu'il est maître à tout instant de l'anéantir. ... C'est la vérité en effet, qui dans sa bouche jette li le masque, mais c'est pour que l'esprit en prenne un plus trompeur, la sophistique qui n'est que stratagème, la logique qui n'est qu'un leurre, le comique même qui ne va là qu'à éblouir. L'esprit est toujours ailleurs. 'L'esprit comporte en effet une telle conditionnalité subjective ... : n'est esprit que ce que j'accepte comme tel,' poursuit Freud qui sait de quoi il parle.

The French text reads as follows:

Nulle part l'intention de l'individu n'est en effet plus manifestement dépassée par la trouvaille du sujet,—nulle part la distinction que nous faisons
de l'un à l'autre ne se fait mieux comprendre,—puisque non seulement il faut que quelque chose m'ait été étranger dans ma trouvaille pour que j'y aie mon plaisir, mais qu'il faut qu'il en reste ainsi pour qu'elle porte.

78 The French text reads as follows:

Ceci prenant sa place de la nécessité, si bien marquée par Freud, du tiers auditeur toujours supposé, et du fait que le mot d'esprit ne perd pas son pouvoir dans sa transmission au style indirect. Bref pointant au lieu de l'Ame et de l'interlocuteur qu'éclaire l'artifice du mot fusant dans sa suprême alacrité.

The first sentence was modified in 1966, and the last sentence replaces that in the original text. An amboceptor, a medical entity, has a double affinity for opposites.


79 Compare the following:

Setting off from the action of the Word in that it is what grounds man in his authenticity, or seizing it in the original and absolute position of the ‘In the beginning was the Word [le Verbe] . . . of the Fourth Gospel, with which Faust’s ‘In the beginning was the action’ cannot be in contradiction, since this action of the Verbe is coextensive with it and renews its creation every day—this is to go straight along both routes, beyond the phenomenology of the alter ego in Imaginary alienation, to the problem of the mediation of an Other [who is] not second when the One is not yet (Actus, p. 203).

The alter ego is the autre du semblable referred to in note 49, the “counterpart whose image captures and supports us” (Seminar of April–June 1958, p. 252).

Compare also:

Who is this other to whom I am more attached than to myself, since at the most profound level of approbation of my identity to myself, it is he who agitates me?

His presence can only be understood at a second degree of otherness, which therefore situates him in a position of mediation in relation to my own doubling, in relation to my division from myself as from a counterpart (“L'Instance de la lettre” [1957], p. 77).

80 This passage abounds in allusions to the Greek terms from which parole and symbole are derived. Although etymologies are notoriously false friends and although they are often abused, a few references may clarify Lacan's apparent intent.

Parole and symbole, as is well known, are derived from the same root verb, “to throw,” the two compounds meaning literally “to throw towards,” “to throw besides,” and “to throw with.” The verb sumballo means “to meet,” “to unite,” “to join,” “to make a contract,” “to lend,” “to contribute,” “to join (battle),” and, with logos understood, “to converse” (or so say Liddell and Scott). Lacan has already referred to the function of the Word as a tessera or “token of recognition,” even “password” (see note 32), and he refers it explicitly—and in a wider context—to the etymology of symbole in the “Introduction au commentaire de J. Hyppolite” (1956), p. 28. (Cf. also Freud's use of the expression “verbal bridge” and Passwort in the case of the Rat Man, Standard Edition, X, 213, 318.)

The noun sumbolon, with its associated forms, has a wide variety of meanings. In a legal sense, it is used in the plural to refer to covenants or pacts entered into by states for the protection of commerce. In a religious context, it came to refer to the distinctive Credo or confession of faith of the early Christians. In its widest sense (“the sign or token by which one infers a thing”), Euripides uses it to refer to marks on the body (recognition of Orestes); Galen employs it for “symptom.” It has also the sense of “seal,” “signet” (sceau), “impression in wax,” “insignia.”

Sophocles uses sambolaion in the plural for “symptom”; the general sense of the term is that of a debtor's note or contract. The feminine form, sumbèle, “meeting,” is also used in contexts where it would be translated “knotting,” “twisting together,” “bond” (noeud), “intercourse,” and in a rather specific sense “contribution to a common meal or feast,” which might be referred to the potlatch.


The verb paraballo, with its derivatives, has a similar network of meanings: “to hold out as bait,” “throw towards,” “set beside,” “entrust to,” “approach,” “meet,” “cross over,” “go by sea,” and, in the middle voice, “to deceive.” Various derivatives have the sense of “thrown to or besides,” “venturesome,” “deceitful.”

It is worth remarking that “Danaoi” echoes the network of words derived from the root “da” (“give,” “share,” even “lend”). The “Argo-
nautes pacifiques" suggests the title of Malinowski's book: *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*.

If Language is a process of the degradation of the symbol into the sign, and if the symbol "manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing," this death constituting in the subject "the eternalization of his desire"—which takes us back to the conjecture of Freud in 1914: "things that are symbolically connected today were probably united in prehistoric times by conceptual and linguistic identity" (*The Interpretation of Dreams* [1900], *Standard Edition*, V, 352)—then the poetic intuition of Schiller, quoted by Freud in a different but more heavily symbolic context (*Moses and Monotheism* [1939], *Standard Edition*, XXIII, 101) is perhaps of relevance here:

> Was unsterblich im Gesang soll I-eben,  
> Muss im Leben untergehn.

["What is to live immortal in song must perish in life,"

The anthropological echoes in these two paragraphs, as Lacan notes, are derived in part from Maurice Leenhardt's *Do Kamo: La personne et le mythe dans le monde mélanesien* (1947), which is referred to by Lacan as "sometimes confused" but "highly suggestive" (*Actes*, p. 246).

In the two chapters referred to ("La parole" and "La parole constructive," pp. 164–97), Leenhardt deals with the Melanesian concepts *no* and *eweke*, in the Houaïlou and Lifou languages, respectively, translated by the natives themselves as *parole* and later, after missionaries introduced them to the New Testament, by *verbe*. The native words cover a vast range of concepts including "thought," "act," "action," and "discourse," all of which are fundamentally related to the myth, to the structure of society, and to the being of the native himself. (He and all living beings considered to be human, or to have an element of humanity, are *kamo*.)

... The gift carries in itself its signification, and the declaration that accompanies it in many a ritual is a non-essential act. One often sees pieces of *balassor* [a type of bark] folded like remnant pieces at the fabric counter of a store. These are offered on the occasion of births and deaths. They are the body of the message: the object and the sense of this message are made more precise by means of a symbolic palm-branch laid across the *balassor* at the time of the presentation. And this branch is called: the 'indicating stem' of the *balassor*. It explicates the message, but the message is entirely in the bark-cloth itself whose fibres are the symbol of the fibres of all beings.

The discourse which supports these gifts is an extraneous addition. It may be poetic; it is itself another gift, not an offering but a homage. However, the *parole*, *no*, is not this discourse, but the *balassor* itself and its stem (p. 167).

In reference to *eweke*, whose use complements and overlaps that of *no*, Leenhardt states:

All that belongs to man is *eweke*, his eloquence, the object he fashions, what he creates, what he possesses in his own right, his work, his speech, his goods, his garden, his wife, his psychic health, his sex. All this is *parole* . . . . . . .

... The two terms clearly translate what the Melanesian understands by *parole*: the manifestation of a being, or of an existent, if the word 'being' appears too precise; the manifestation of the human, in all its aspects, from psychic life to work done by the hands and to the expression of thought. This is an indication of the little differentiation established between being and thing. But the thing can be substance or object, it can be no more than a detached, but essential, part of him to whom it belongs. From this point of view, the *parole* is an object. This object comes forth from man, and man finds his support in it. And without this object, man goes astray and the group falls apart (pp. 172–73).

Before the coming of the white man, the Caledonians employed the word *êve* for gift, meaning "friendship-gift"—to give was to give of oneself in order to establish a reciprocal correspondence with the other. The term was replaced after some years of white administration by *apo*, a corruption of *impôt*, "tax" (p. 147).

The title *do kamo*, which refers to the native who has "evolved" from the predominantly 'mythical' to the predominantly "rational" mentality under the pressure of economic and religious influences—*kamo* no longer being sufficient to express what he feels himself to be—is translated by the author: "man in his authenticity" (p. 10), "truly human" (p. 38). The native who is able to detach himself from the "personage" whose "self" has no existence for him apart from the circle of relationships in which he is constituted as a locus—invariably as part of a duality—in other words, the native who no longer confuses the first and third person, who can say "I" and who can distinguish the figure "one," who knows the difference "between me and thee," who has become a person without becoming an "individual," says: "Go do kamo: I am real person" (p. 219).

Referring to the work of Cassirer and to Leenhardt's "Ethnologie de la parole," Lévi-Strauss summarizes: "... It is evident from this that the conception of the Word as *verbe*, as power and as action, certainly repre-
sents a universal trait of human thought” (Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté [1949], p. 613).

Leenhardt had translated the New Testament into Houailou in 1922.

Compare the following:

The signal does not go beyond the level of communication: its function is to be perceived, without entailing a search for signification, the anticipation of its message offering only a restricted amount of free play, of a binary type: the presence or absence, affirmation or negation, positive or negative (for example, the password, a red light, the tilt light on a pinball machine, a white flag) (Rosolato, “Le Symbolique” [1959], p. 226).

English in the original.

Compare the following:

The first network, that of the signifier, is the synchronic structure of the material of Language insofar as each element takes on in it its exact usage as being different from the others; this is the principle of distribution which alone regulates the function of the elements of the language at its different levels, from the phonemic pair of oppositions to compound expressions of which the task of the most modern research is to disengage its stable forms.

The second network, that of the signified, is the diachronic set of concretely pronounced discourses, which set reacts historically on the first, in the same way in which the structure of the latter governs the paths of the second. Here what dominates is the unity of signification which establishes itself as never becoming resolved into a pure indication of the Real, but always as referring to another signification. This is to say that if the significations 'grasp' the things, it is only by constituting their set by enveloping it in the signifier; and that if their web always covers this set enough to overflow it, it is because the set of the signifier is not a signification of anything. This point confirms that Language is never signal, but always dialectical movement (“La Chose freudienne” [1956], p. 235).

“What link do you make,” I heard myself ask, “between that instrument of Language, whose given data man must accept every bit as much as those of the Real, and that grounding function which you say is the function of the Word insofar as it constitutes the subject in an intersubjective relation?”

I reply: in making Language the intermediary in which to set the analytic experience to rights, it is not the sense of means implied by this term that I emphasize, but that of locus . . . .

I add that it is from the point of view of the notion of communication that I deliberately orient my conception of Language; its function as expression, as far as I know, was mentioned only once in my report.

Let me therefore say precisely what Language signifies in what it communicates: it is neither signal, nor sign, nor even sign of the thing insofar as the thing is an exterior reality. The relation between signifier and signified is entirely enclosed in the order of Language itself, which completely conditions its two terms.

Let us examine the term signifier first of all. It is constituted by a set of material elements linked by a structure of which I shall indicate presently the extent to which it is simple in its elements, or even where one can situate its point of origin. But, even if I have to pass for a materialist, it is on the fact that it is a question of material that I shall insist first of all, and in order to emphasize, in this question of locus which we are discussing, the place occupied by this material. This is with the sole purpose of destroying the mirage which by a process of elimination seems to assign to the human brain the locus of the phenomenon of language. Well, where could it be then? Replying for the signifier: 'everywhere else.' [Lacan then mentions modern communication theory which has given to the reduction of the signifier into nonsignifying units (Hartley units) the 'scientific' status of use in industry, and then to the 'frozen words' of Rabelais, which anticipate the "two pounds or so of signifier" rolled up in the recorder in front of him.]

Let us move on to the signified. If it is not the thing, as I told you, what is it then? Precisely the sense. The discourse which I am delivering to you here . . . is concerned with an experience common to all of us, but you will estimate its value insofar as it communicates to you the sense of that experience, and not the experience itself . . . .

And this sense, where is it? The correct reply here, 'nowhere,' if opposed —when it is a question of the signified—to the correct reply that suited the signifier, will not disappoint my questioner any the less, if he expected in it something approaching the 'denomination of things.' For, besides the fact that no 'part of speech' has the privilege of such a function, contrary to the grammatical appearances which attribute this function to the substantive, meaning is never capable of being sensed except in the uniqueness of the signification developed by the discourse.

Thus it is that interhuman communication is always information on information, put to the test of a community of Language, a numbering and a perfecting of the target which will surround the objects, themselves born of the concurrence of a primordial rivalry.

No doubt that the discourse is concerned with things. It is in fact in this encounter that from realities they become things. It is so true that the word is not the sign of the thing, that the word tends to become the thing itself. But it is only insofar as it abandons the sense . . . .

If someone should oppose me with the traditional view that it is the definition that gives a word its meaning, I would not say no: after all it was not I who said that every word presupposes by its use the entire dis-
course of the dictionary...—or even that of all the texts of a given language (Actes, pp. 242–44).

86 “L’ordre symbolique” or “le symbolique” is to be distinguished from “la symbolique” (die Symbolik):

La symbolique, descriptive ‘science,’ enumerates signs and compares them in order to constitute the keys to dreams, to make inventories of myths, to arrange the repertories of esthetic qualities, to set up heraldries. Paradoxically, it neglects the Symbol, in its characters (Rosolato, “Le Symbolique” [1959], p. 226).

The symbol is that transmuted sign [“giving access to le Symbolique,” Rosolato’s note] which comprises a network of relations between signifiers and signifieds, themselves, by this fact, plurivalent. This entails the consequence that the Symbolic does not take into account “some-thing,” nor does it represent (Ibid., p. 225).

Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Standard Edition, V, 350-404, where the material added from 1909 to 1925, mainly as a result of the influence of Stekel, sets forth Freud’s theory of a fixed symbolic code.

Compare the following:

The concepts of psychoanalysis are to be grasped in a field of Language, and its domain extends to the point that a function used as an apparatus of display [une fonction d’appareil], a mirage of consciousness, a segment of the body or of its image, a social phenomenon, a metamorphosis of the symbols themselves can serve as signifying material for what the unconscious subject has to signify.

This is the essential order in which psychoanalysis is situated, and I shall call it henceforth the Symbolic order (Actes, p. 206).

It remains to say that, apart from the case of living species, from which Aristotle’s logic takes its support [in the] Real, and whose link to nomination is already sufficiently indicated in the Book of Genesis, all reification [choisification] entails a confusion between the Symbolic and the Real, an error we must know how to correct.

The so-called physical sciences have guarded against this error in radical fashion by reducing the Symbolic to the function of a tool with which to carve up the Real—no doubt with a success which, on this principle, takes on more obviously every day the renunciation which it entails of any knowledge of being or even of the existent, however much l’étant might answer to the etymology—in any case entirely forgotten—of the term ‘physical’ [φύσις: “grow,” “beget,” être-là, das sein.] (Actes, p. 245).

87 Compare the following:

... Man will soon no longer appear [in the human sciences] in any serious way except in the techniques where he is ‘taken into account’ like so many head of cattle; in other words, he would soon be more effectively effaced in the human sciences than nature has been in the physical sciences, if we psychoanalysts did not know how to bring to the fore what in his being is dependent only upon the Symbolic.

The fact remains that the Symbolic is something that cannot possibly be reified in any way at all—any more than we think of doing so for the series of whole numbers or the notion of a mathematical expectation (Actes, p. 245).

88 “A stone, two houses, three ruins, four ditchdiggers, a garden, some flowers, a raccoon.”


90 That is, the Fort! Dal where a child’s (phonemic) opposition O/A was related by Freud to the presence and absence of persons and things, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Standard Edition, XVIII, 14–17. (See also note 183.)

The allusion to the Chinese kua which follows is presumably based on the fact that what the child actually uttered was an “o-o-o-o” (disappearance) followed by a “da” (return).

91 The French text reads as follows:

Par ce qui ne prend gout que d’être la trace d’un néant et dont le support dès lors ne peut s’altérer, le concept, sauvant la durée de ce qui passe, engendre la chose.

... C’est le monde des mots qui crée le monde des choses d’abord confondues dans l’ici et l’unic du tout en devenir, en donnant son être concret à leur essence, et sa place partout à ce qui est de toujours...

Compare: “No doubt that the discourse is concerned with things. It is in fact in this encounter that from realities they become things” (Actes, p. 244).

92 “An eternal possession.” Thucydides, I, xxi: “My history has been composed to be an everlasting possession, not the showpiece of an hour.”
This proverb is the epigraph to Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté* (1949), which is alluded to more directly in the two sentences that follow.

In 1947, Lacan expressed himself on the Oedipus complex as follows:

I have often taken a stand against the risky way in which Freud interpreted sociologically the capital discovery for the human mind that we owe to him [in the discovery of the Oedipus complex]. I do not think that the Oedipus complex appeared with the origin of man (if indeed it is not completely senseless to try to write the history of that moment), but rather at the dawn of history, of 'historical' history, at the limit of 'ethnographic' cultures. Obviously the Oedipus complex can appear only in the patriarchal form of the institution of the family—but it has a no less incontestable value as a threshold, and I am convinced that in those cultures which exclude it, its function must be or have been fulfilled by initiation experiences, as ethnology in any case still permits us to see this fact today, and the value of the Oedipus complex as a closing-off of a psychic cycle results from the fact that it represents the family situation, insofar as by its institution this situation marks the intersection, in the cultural sphere, of the biological and the social (“Propos sur la causalité psychique” [1950], p. 47).

Compare the following:

For where on earth would one situate the determinations of the unconscious if it is not in those nominal cadres in which marriage ties and kinship are always grounded for the speaking being that we are, in those laws of the Word where lineages found their right, in this universe of discourse with which these laws mingle their tradition, and how would one apprehend the analytical conflicts and their Oedipian prototype outside the engagements which have fixed, long before the subject came into the world, not only his destiny but his identity itself? (Actes, p. 205.)

What is meant by le nom du père is elaborated in the later theoretical article on psychosis (1958), especially pp. 22-24. “The name of the father” is the signifier of “the function of the father,” and the question of the sense in which these terms are to be taken is briefly dealt with in “La Psychanalyse et son enseignement” (1957). The signifier is not only “to be taken au pied de la lettre, it is the letter.”

... The incidence of the signifier over the signified is something completely sensible at the level of the B, A, Ba of the analyst’s experience. Consider for instance the function of the father; this function is absolutely unthinkable in this experience if the signifier which is its term is not brought out in it: this signifier is the name of the father, as one says in religious invocations; absolutely unthinkable if the ‘name of the father’ does not have that signifying value which condenses, orients, and polarizes in its direction a whole series of significations which are on a number of extremely diverse planes (p. 94).

Certain primitive societies, against all the evidence, do not attribute procreation to the father. But, says Lacan, whether they do or not is of no significant importance,

... since, if the symbolic context requires it, paternity will nonetheless be attributed to the fact that the woman met a spirit at some fountain or some rock in which he is supposed to live.

This is certainly what demonstrates that the attribution of procreation to the father can only be the effect of a pure signifier, of a recognition, not of the real father, but of what religion has taught us to invoke as the Name-of-the-Father.

There’s no need of a signifier, of course, to be a father, no more than there is to be dead, but without the signifier no one would ever know anything at all about either of these two states of being (“Traitement possible de la psychose” [1958], p. 24).

It is this article, by way of a detailed commentary on Schreber’s book, which elaborates the concept of Verwurfung, of “the hole hollowed out in the field of the signifier by the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father” (p. 31), and its relationship to the symbolic father of Totem and Taboo (1912-13).

Notably in his “Introduction à l’oeuvre de Marcel Mauss” (1950), where he compares the notion of mana to the concept of the zero-phoneme introduced into phonology by Roman Jakobson.

Concepts like that of mana devolve from what Lévi-Strauss conceives of as an “overabundance of signifier” in relation to the actual signifieds (that is, the universe, the cosmos) which are available to human “symbolic thought.” Thus a concept like mana seeks to fulfill the function of representing all this “floating signifier,” and consequently all the antinomies and contradictions involved—since mana may in fact mean almost anything. Mauss’s celebrated *Essai sur le don* depends upon the
notion of *hau* or mana as the *raison d'être* of the symbolic exchange (whose prime importance lies in the act or transmission of mana or *hau* rather than in any profit or advantage), and Lévi-Strauss seeks to interpret this mysterious anthropological entity in scientific terms as something like an algebraic symbol, representing an "indeterminate value of signification," in the same way as the zero-phoneme is one whose function is simply to be opposed to all other phonemes, without entailing any constant phonetic or differential value in itself. Just as the function of the zero-phoneme is also to exist in opposition to the absence of phonemes, mana is viewed by Lévi-Strauss as a significative symbol empty of meaning in itself, but therefore capable of taking on any meaning required. The function of mana is therefore to fill a gap between signifier and signified at whatever level a lack of adequation between them is revealed. For the native, mana is simply "the subjective reflexion of the exigencies of a totality which he cannot perceive." Mana is a category of thought rather than a category of the Real; it fulfils for the native the role of explanation that modern science fulfils for us. On this view, like the zero-phoneme, mana is pure form without specific content, pure symbol, a symbol with the value of zero (pp. xliv–l).


100 The French text reads as follows:

Les symboles enveloppent en effet la vie de l'homme d'un réseau si total qu'ils conjoinrent avant qu'il vienne au monde ceux qui vont l'engendrer par l'os et par la chair, qu'ils apportent à sa naissance avec les dons des astres, sinon avec des dons des fées, le dessin de sa destinée, qu'ils donnent les mots qui le feront fidèle ou rénégat, la loi des actes qui le suivront jusque-là même où il n'est pas encore et au-delà de sa mort même, et que par eux sa fin trouve son sens dans le jugement dernier où le verbe aboutit son être ou le condamne—sauf à atteindre à la réalisation subjective de l'être-pour-la-mort.

The Heideggerian *Sein-zum-Tode* is normally rendered in English as "Being-towards-death."

101 The French text reads as follows:

Servitude et grandeur où s'anéantirait le vivant, si le désir ne préservait sa part dans les interférences et les battements que font converger sur lui les cycles du langage, quand la confusion des langues s'en mêle et que les ordres se contrarient dans les déchirements de l'oeuvre universelle.

Mais ce désir lui-même, pour être satisfait dans l'homme, exige d'être reconnu, par l'accord de la parole ou par la lutte de prestige, dans le symbole ou dans l'imagination.

L'enjeu d'une psychanalyse est l'avènement dans le sujet du peu de réalité que ce désir y soutient au regard des conflits symboliques et des fixations imaginaires comme moyen de leur accord, et notre voie est l'expérience intersubjective où ce désir se fait reconnaître.

102 Further to Lichtenberg's aphorism cited by Lacan in note 5, see the "Propos sur la causalité psychique" (1950), which examines what Lacan calls "paranoiac knowledge." Summing up the substance of his doctoral thesis of 1932, Lacan refers to that analysis of a "Romantic" paranoiac patient as follows:

In this way I sought to focus on psychosis in its relationship with the totality of the biographical antecedents of the patient, with the totality of her intentions, avowed or not, and, finally, with the totality of the motives, perceived or not, which came out of the contemporary situation of her delusion—that is, as the title of my thesis indicates, psychosis in its relationships with the personality.

Out of this, it seems to me, and from the very first, there emerges the general structure of méconnaissance. But we must be careful how we understand this.

Certainly it can be said that the madman thinks he is other than he is, a view expressed in the remark about 'those who think themselves arrayed in gold and purple' by which Descartes revealed himself conforming with the most anecdotal of stories about madmen, and a view with which an authority on the subject contents himself—that is to say, the author for whom the concept of *Bouvayse,* adapted to the measure of his sympathy for the mentally ill, was the key to paranoia.

But besides the fact that Gaultier's theory *of Bouvayse* concerns one of the most normal relationships of the human personality—his ideals—it is worth adding that if a man who believes he's a king is mad, a king who believes he's a king is no less so (pp. 37–38).

For Lacan, the Language "without dialectic" is to be found in schizophrenic or psychotic language, where a "regression" to treating words like things leaves the speaker in the grip of an uncontrollable shifting between opposites in which binary differential elements (for example, inside, outside; good, bad; O, A) are not "anchored" to the "points de capot" supposed by Lacan's theory of the "paternal metaphor." His discourse is incomprehensible; for him all the Symbolic is
Real, in Lacan’s terms, or in other words, there has been a Verwerfung (foreclusion) of the Symbolic. The thing presentations of the language of the unconscious (see note 66) have become conscious for him; there is no dialectic, no “dia-logos,” because his discourse, in Lacan’s view, is composed of nothing but words, rather than of the Word. This is the “obstacle to transference” in certain types of psychosis.

Speaking of the Schreber case and of his theory of psychosis as founded on “a primordial deficiency of the signifier” (the concept of Verwerfung), Lacan goes on to say:

The Other as the seat of the Word and guarantor of Truth is compensated for in psychosis by the other; it is the suppression of the duality between the symbolic Other and the other who is an Imaginary partner that causes the psychotic such difficulty in maintaining himself in the human Real, that is to say in a Real which is symbolic (Seminar of November, 1957, p. 293).

Lévi-Strauss has brought out the notion that the myth, like the discourse of the “they” (Gerede) in Heidegger, speaks itself through the subject—that is, the subject is being spoken by the myth. Sartre has taken up the idea again in his analysis of Flaubert’s almost paranoid horror of the bêtise of the idée reçue, where “one is spoken rather than speaking,” in “La conscience de classe chez Flaubert” (Part II), Temps Modernes, No. 241 (June, 1966), pp. 2113-153.

Cf. Lacan’s analysis of the Wolf Man’s rejection (Verwerfung) of castration “in the sense of repression” in the reply to Hyppolite’s commentary on the Verneinung (1956).

The following note was kindly supplied by Jean Hyppolite:

‘Man is the sick animal, or sickness is the becoming of the subject’: all these texts (taken up again by Nietzsche) are to be found in Hegel’s work at Jena (Realphilosophie, ed. Hoffmeister, vol. II, pp. 167-75) and eventually in the Encyclopedia, towards the end of the section on the philosophy of nature (ed. Lanson, #371 to #376). If the Phenomenology does not explicitly contain this view of illness, the same process is very much in the spirit of Hegel’s remarks on death (the master-slave dialectic, and so forth).

See also Kojève’s Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (1947), pp. 553ff.

Compare: “The function of the stade du miroir establishes itself for me . . . as a special case of the function of the imago, which is to establish a relation of the organism to its reality—or, as it is said, of the Innenwelt to the Umwelt” (“Le Stade du miroir” [1949], p. 452).

Maia, associated by the Romans with an old Italian earth goddess, is derived from the Greek for “O mother earth,” whence it came to mean “mother,” “nurse,” “grandmother,” “midwife,” eventually emerging as mamma. Voile is presumably to be read in the sense of the Latin velum, sometimes used in distinctions between female clothing and the toga.

“Different from the perverse subject who clasps the rag that the Word has permitted him to tear from the veil of Maia, to make of it the object of his satisfaction, the neurotic is the question articulated on what is beyond the veil” (“La Psychanalyse et son enseignement” [1957], p. 89). (Cf. Freud: “Fetishism” [1927], Standard Edition, XXI, 152-57.)

See also the discussion of fetishism and the veil in the seminar of January–February 1957. In the Hindu writers, of course, the veil of Maya conceals “the illusion to which this whole world is due,” an illusion “begotten of entrenched selfhood,” as Whorf once put it.

On the symptom and the signifier, see “L’instance de la lettre” (1957):

. . . If the symptom is a metaphor, it is not a metaphor to say so, no more than it is to say that man’s desire is a metonymy. For the symptom is a metaphor, whether it be admitted or not, just as desire is a metonymy, even if man mocks the notion that it is so.

. . . Nothing of value has so far been articulated concerning what links the metaphor to the question of being and metonymy to lack of being . . . (p. 91).

In the Sartrean terminology, “lack of being” (manque d’être) is the ontological absence which provides the possibility of the pour-soi’s desire: “For the pour-soi is described ontologically as manque d’être, and the possible belongs to the pour-soi as what is lacking to it.” “Liberty is the concrete mode of being of the lack of being . . . Man is fundamentally desire of being . . . [since] desire is a lack . . . .” “And the being lacking to the pour-soi is the en-soi” (L’Etre et le Néant [Paris: Gallimard, 1943], p. 652).

The palimpsest is a piece of parchment or other writing material from which the writing has been partially or completely erased (literally: “scraped again”) to make way for a new text. This is perhaps to be viewed in the light of Freud’s discussion of rememoration and memory in “A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad” (1925), Standard Edition, XIX, 227-32.

But see also the metaphor of the palimpsest (common in the nineteenth

109 This passage seems to echo Vico’s *Scienza Nuova* (1725), where Vico examines what he calls Poetic Wisdom: “[This] second kind of speech, corresponding to the age of heroes, was said by the Egyptians to have been spoken by symbols. To these may be reduced the heroic emblems, which must have been the mute comparisons which Homer calls *semata* (the signs in which the heroes wrote). In consequence they must have been metaphors, images, similitudes, or comparisons, which, having passed into articulate speech, supplied all the resources of poetic expression” (II, iv). The first language, corresponding to the age of the gods when men believed themselves governed by divinities, auspices, and oracles, was “a mute language of signs and physical objects having natural relations to the ideas they wished to express” (“Idea of the Work’), it was a “hieroglyphic” language, “with natural significations” (II, iv). The third language, corresponding to the age of men, the age of equality, is a language “using words agreed on by the people, a language of which they are the absolute lords” (unlike the secret languages of the priests and nobles of the earlier stages); he calls it the “epistolary or vulgar language”; its purpose is the communication necessary in ordinary life; it consists of words which are arbitrary signs.

Part of Vico’s demonstration, which is too diffuse, repetitive, and complicated to be reproduced here, is to derive the origins of all insignia, emblems, blazons, markers, and coats of arms, through a repeated series of etymologies, from his theory of the three languages and his theory of signs, based upon the idea of the necessity of marking ownership of property by recognizable signs. These views are developed under the heading: “Corollaries concerning the Origins of Languages and Letters; and, Therein, the Origins of Hieroglyphics, Laws, Names, Family Arms, Medals, and Money; and Hence of the First Language and Literature of the Natural Law of the Gentes.” In Book IV, Section v, he summarizes: “The first [the hieroglyphic language] was a divine mental language by mute religious acts or divine ceremonies . . . . The second [the symbolic language] was by heroic blazonings, with which arms are made to speak . . . . The third [the epistolary language] is by articulate speech, which is used by all nations today.” (The above quotations are taken from the translation of the *Scienza Nuova* by Thomas Bergin and Max Fisch [Anchor Books, New York: 1961].)

These passages from Vico illustrate Lacan’s cryptic note v about Reich’s theory of the protective “character armor” of the neurotic, from which there arises “character resistances” (as opposed to symptom resistances): “. . . Reich made only one mistake in his character analysis: What he called ‘armor’ (character armor) and treated as such is only an armorial bearing. After the treatment, the subject keeps the weight of the arms nature gave him; all he has done is to erase the blazon or bearings” (“Variantes de la cure-type” [1955], *Ecrits*, p. 342).

110 This linguistic phenomenon is mentioned again by Lacan in dealing with the *Ich* of Freud’s “Wo es war soll Ich werden,” deformed by the French translators into “Le moi doit déloger le ça” and originally rendered in English by “Where the id was there the ego shall be” (the definite articles have since been dropped—the id is das Es and the ego das Ich—see the New Introductory Lectures [1933], *Standard Edition*, XXII, 80). The reader should refer to “La Chose freudienne” (1956), pp. 237–38, for the development of Lacan’s “translation” and its justification as: “Là où c’était, peut-on dire, là où s’était, voudrions-nous faire qu’on entendit, c’est mon devoir que je vienne à être.” The created verb *s’être* being used to express “absolute subjectivity insofar as Freud properly discovered it in its radical ex-centricity,” the English would be approximately “‘There where it was,’ one might say, ‘where es was an absolute subject,’ I would like it understood, ‘it is my duty that I come to be.’” For Lacan it would seem that since “soll,” “vielle,” and “come” can each be read as either first or third person verb forms, they are not necessarily in agreement with the *moi qui parle*.

See also the seminar of November, 1958-January, 1959, p. 266, and “L’Instance de la lettre” (1957), p. 76, where Lacan adds: “This aim is one of reintegration and of accord, I would say, one of reconciliation (Versöhnung).” The problem of this reconciliation is perhaps as central for Freud as it is for Hegel, but in the context of analysis, it is an essentially asymptotic return to “unity” (see note 113). Cf. Hegel on reconciliation:

> The promise of reconciliation [das Wort der Versöhnung] is the objectively-existing spirit which contemplates [anschauen] the pure Knowledge of itself as universal essence in its counterpart [Gegenstel], in the pure Knowledge of
self as individuality [Einzelnheit] which is absolutely within itself—a reciprocal recognition which is the Absolute Spirit (Phänomenologie, p. 471; Phénoménologie, II, 198).

Lacan’s constant insistence upon a number of radical translations of this aphorism of Freud’s results in part from the fact that in the passage in question Freud is discussing the strengthening of the ego.

For the moi of modern man:

One cannot insist too heavily in fact on the correlation which links psychological objectification to the growing dominance that the function of the moi has taken on in the lived experience of modern man, beginning from a set of sociotechnological and dialectical conjunctures, whose cultural Gestalt is visibly constituted by the beginning of the seventeenth century (Actes, p. 208).

For the belle âme:

One might . . . remark that every verbal denunciation of a disorder participates in the disorder against which it protests, in the sense that the disorder has been set up by its discourse. Hegel, in the dialectic of the belle âme, had already shown that this remark is tautologous only if the tauto-onetic effect in which it is rooted is not recognized—that is to say that being is primary in the disorder on which the belle âme lives in all the senses (including the economic sense) which can be found in the expression, “enough to live on,” and that in denouncing the disorder, the belle âme proceeds only to the still misconstrued mediation of himself by the conduct through which he subsists on it (“La Chose freudienne” [1956], p. 235).


At the time of the delivery of the Discours the “elsewhere” mentioned in the text was the “Propos sur la causalité psychique” (1947), where the example of the belle âme is the Alceste of Molière’s Le Misanthrope.

112 Used without a modifier, science has of course a much wider connotation than the English “science”—for example, “knowledge,” “learning.”

113 In the article on the stade du miroir, writing of the child’s experience of himself when placed in front of a mirror (Köhler’s Aha-Erlebnis), which is quite different from that of the chimpanzee (which does not recognize what it sees), Lacan speaks of this fundamental “ontological structure of the human world” as follows:

It suffices to comprehend the stade du miroir as an identification in the full sense of the term in analysis—that is, the transformation produced in the subject when he assumes an image . . .

The joyful assumption of his specular image by a being still unable to control his motor functions and still dependent on his mother to nurse him, as is the infans at this stage, therefore seems to me to reveal in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the je precipitates itself in a primordial form, before it becomes objectified in the dialectic of the identification with the other, and before Language restores to it in the universal its function as subject.

This primordial form would probably be best designated as je-ideal, if I wished to fit it into the usual terminology of psychoanalysis, in the sense that it would also be the root stock of secondary identifications, whose functions of libidinal normalization we recognize in this term. But the important point is that this form situates the instance of the moi, from before its social determination, in a fictional line, eternally irreducible for the single individual—or rather, an instance which will only asymptotically rejoin the becoming of the subject, whatever may be the success of the dialectical syntheses by which the subject is to resolve as je his discordance with his own reality (“Le Stade du miroir” [1949], p. 450).

Lacan’s translation of “Ich” by “je” had been dropped by 1953.

114 “Un mur de langage.” See note 174.

Compare the early Freud on the technique of following the patient’s associations past his resistances: “It is at first as though we were standing before a wall which shuts out every prospect and prevents us from having any idea whether there is anything behind it, and if so, what” (“Psychotherapy of Hysteria” [1895], standard Edition, I, 283).

115 For example, Phénoménologie, I, 268ff (Phénoménologie, pp. 237ff.).

116 “Men are so necessarily mad that it would be being mad by another kind of madness not to be mad” (Pensées, Brunschvicq ed. #414 [Pléiade ed. #184]).

Compare the following:

For a characteristic which is much more decisive for the reality which the subject confers on these phenomena [of madness], than the sensorality which he experiences by them or the belief which he attaches to them, is that all of them, whatever they are—hallucinations, interpretations, intuitions, and
with whatever extraneousness and strangeness they are lived by him—these phenomena are aimed at him personally: they split him into two, respond to him, echo him, read in him as he identifies them, provokes them, and deciphers them. And when the point comes where he lacks any further way of expressing them, his perplexity reveals to us questioning bénèce within him: in other words, madness is lived wholly in the register of meaning.

The moving interest which madness arouses gives a first reply to the question I proposed concerning the human value of the phenomenon of madness. Its metaphysical import is revealed in the fact that the phenomenon of madness is not separable from the problem of signification for being in general—that is, from the problem of Language for man ("Propos sur la causalité psychique" [1950], p. 34).

For the risk of madness can be measured by the very attractiveness of identifications, in which man commits at one and the same time his Truth and his being.

Madness is therefore far from being the contingent fact of the fragilities of his organism; it is the permanent virtuality of an open fault [faillle] in his essence.

Madness is far from being an 'insult' to liberty: it is her most faithful companion, it follows her movement like a shadow.

And the being of man not only cannot be understood without madness, but it would not be the being of man if it did not carry madness within it as the limit of its liberty (Ibid., p. 41).

117 Chapter V, in particular, of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Standard Edition, XVIII.

118 That is, "guidance," as in the religious sense of "direction de conciencences."

119 See: Jakobson and Halle, "Phonology and Phonetics" (1955). Morphemes, the ultimate constituents of language endowed with meaning, are composed of syllables which are in turn composed of sequences of phonemes. Phonemes are bundles of concurrent distinctive features (for example, tone, force, quantity, and the twelve inherent binary oppositions of qualities like grave/acute, voiced/voiceless, and so forth), these last being the ultimate components of language (equivalent to Saussure's "éléments différenciels"). A phoneme has "no singleness of reference" (Sapir). All phonemes "denote nothing but mere otherness" (p. 11). "This lack of individual denotation sets apart the distinctive features, and their combinations into phonemes, from all other linguistic units" (Ibid.).

120 Notably in Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," in: MYTH: A Symposium, Journal of American Folklore, Vol. 78, No. 270, (Oct.–Dec., 1955), pp. 428-44 (republished with modifications in his Anthropologie Structurale [1958]). The mytheme is described and employed by Lévi-Strauss as a "gross constitutive element" of the myth—that is, an element "higher" than the morpheme or the semanteme in language, and one to be analyzed in its occurrence within "bundles of relations" at the sentence level. (The mytheme is more or less equivalent to the use of "concept" in the general sense.)

Lévi-Strauss's point is that the view of myth as having some sort of "natural," "symbolic," or "archetypal" meaning (in the Jungian sense) is a view still on the level of the investigations of the ancient philosophers into the "natural" relationship between sound and sense in language (Plato's Cratylus, for instance, which ends with a non liquet)—a relationship which many poets, theorists of synaesthesia, and linguists (Roman Jakobson, for example) agree exists at the level of the affective power of phonemes. (Mallarmé complains that jour is "dark" and nuit is "light" in French.)

Obviously for all words the relationship is clearly arbitrary, however. Thus Lévi-Strauss claims as a working hypothesis that (1) the meaning of the myth does not reside in the isolated elements which make it up, but "only in the way these elements are combined," (2) that myth, although it is language, has specific properties, which (3) are "above the ordinary linguistic level" because they are "more complex than those to be found in any kind of linguistic expression."

See also the intervention of Lacan in the discussion following Lévi-Strauss's lecture: "Sur les rapports entre la mythologie et le rituel" (1956), pp. 113–18.

The application of this type of structural analysis (but at a much less formal and less methodological level) can be seen in Lacan's use of the elements of the Oedipus complex in analysis of a myth. See: "Le Mythe individuel du névrosé" (1953) and the seminars on "La Relation d'objet et les structures freudiennes."

121 The French text reads as follows:

Si ces deux exemples se lèvent, pour nous des champs les plus contrastés dans le concret: jeu toujours plus loisible de la loi mathématique, front...
croiser en un double renversement: la science la plus subjective ayant forgé une réalité nouvelle, la ténèbre du partage social s’armant d’un symbole agissant.

There is an allusion, apparently, to Lassalle’s loi d’airain, the iron law of wages.

“...that [august] voice
Who knows herself when she sings
To be no longer the voice of anyone
As much as the voice of the waves and the woods.”

Valéry: La Pythie.

The whole stanza is as follows:

Honneur des Hommes, Saint LANGAGE,
Discours prophétique et paré,
Belles chaines en qui s’engage
Le dieu dans la chaire égaré,
Illumination, largesse.

Voici parler une Sagesse
Et sonner cette auguste Voix
Qui se connaît quand elle sonne
N’être plus la voix de personne
Tant que des ondes et des bois!


124 “Between man and love, there is woman. Between man and woman, there is a world. Between man and the world, there is a wall.”

125 “For I have seen with my own eyes the Cumean Sibyll hanging inside a jar, and whenever boys asked her: ‘What do you wish, O Sibyll,’ she would reply: ‘I wish to die.’” This is the epigraph to The Waste Land (1922); Lacan has already quoted from The Hollow Men (1925). There seems to be a connection between Lacan’s choice of this epigraph on death and Heidegger’s commentary on Heraclitus in “Logos,” translated by Lacan in La Psychanalyse, I (1956). On p. 75 Heidegger comments on the sense of ἐλπίς (ἐλπίς)—not simply “to wish” but “to be ready to...” in the sense of “admitting something in retroactive reference to oneself.” Lacan adds the note: “Soit le français: con-sentir à,” which is echoed in the later remarks in the Discours on the master, the slave, and the absolut Herr: death.

Compare Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (1947), p. 379:

The Concept is Time ... Man is the empirical existence of the Concept in the World. He is therefore the empirical existence in the World of a future which will never become present. This Future—is for Man his death ... Man is essentially mortal; and he is only the Concept, i.e. absolute Knowledge, incarnate Wisdom, if he knows it. The Logos only becomes flesh, only becomes Man, on condition of wanting to and being able to die.”

126 Standard Edition, X, 167–68. The word translated “pleasure” is jouissance in the French. The “clarifications” mentioned later in this sentence occur on pp. 175–78. This paragraph was slightly modified in 1966.


128 That is, in the order of Language. The metaphor of the partition and the registre is to be found very frequently in Lacan’s writings. This topic is taken up again in the introduction to the commentary on the Verneinung (1956).

The metaphor of the orchestra score derives its value for Lacan (and for Lévi-Strauss; see the reference in note 120) from the fact that it is read both vertically and horizontally at the same time.

129 Referring to the statement that, when all is said and done, “neurotics are really incomprehensible,” in his analysis of desire in “La Direction de la cure” (1961), Lacan continues:

But this is precisely what was said long ago, and has always been said—and yet there are analysts who have only just come round to it, analysts who are stuck on this fact. The simpleton calls it the irrational, since he hasn’t even realized that Freud’s discovery is confirmed [l’homologue] by Freud’s considering it certain, from the very first—a fact which draws the teeth of our exegesis from the start—that the Real is rational, and then by his affirming that the rational is real. As a result Freud can articulate the fact that what presents itself as unreasonable in desire is an effect of the passage of the rational insofar as it is real—that is to say, the passage of Language, into the Real, in so far as the rational has already traced its circumvallation there (p. 199).

And in the Actes, he described analysis as embodying “the most developed of dialectical methods” in the

essential procedure through which the psychoanalyst, in his experience, conjugates the particular to the universal; through which, in his theory, he subordinates the Real to the rational; through which, in his technique, he recalls the subject to his constituting role for the object; through which, in short, in his strategy, he often intersects with the Hegelian phenomenology—as in the turning back [réversion] on the discourse of the belle âme of the support which he brings to the disorder of the world where his revolt takes on its theme (p. 209).
Since the adjective Hegel uses in the aphorism on the rational and the real from the Philosophy of Right is *wirklich*, it should probably be translated: "What is rational is actual (or effectively real), and what is actual (or effectively real) is rational." In the Phenomenology a similar notion is expressed by the phrase "the spiritual [das Geistige] alone is the effectively real [das Wirkliche]" (Phänomenologie, p. 24; Phénoménologie, I, 23). When linked with Hegel's statements about the relationship between the spirit, language, and consciousness at various stages of the Phenomenology—for example: that the "nonmediate Dasein of the spirit is consciousness" (p. 32; I, 31), that "language is the Dasein of the pure Self as Self" (p. 362; II, 69), that "once more we see language as the Dasein of the spirit" (p. 458; II, 184), and that "language is the [nonmediate] consciousness-of-self which is for others" (ibid.)—it seems clear that both his statement and Lacan's application of it to Freud are open to wide interpretation in relation to Heidegger's view of the logos and in relation to theories of intersubjective communication.

The discovery of Freud is that the movement of this dialectic does not simply determine the subject unbeknownst to him by the paths of his *mécognition*—which Hegel had already formulated in the 'cunning of reason' which is the first principle of the phenomenology of the spirit—but that this movement constitutes him in an order which can only be ex-centric in relation to any bringing to realization of the consciousness-of-self... (Actes, p. 206).

Hegel, says Lacan, is always sure that Truth will be found again in his final accounting, because it is already there. If the analyst could be equally sure of it—which he cannot, because the Truth is only there in the form of the symptom, that is to say, pretty well twisted—he would be able to be neutral in a much more fundamental way. "It is to this Other beyond the other that the analyst cedes place by the neutrality through which he becomes ne-uter, neither one nor the other of the two who are there, and if he keeps silent, it is in order to let the Other speak" ("La Psychanalyse et son enseignement" [1957], p. 67).

The Kierkegaardian repetition is taken up again in the "Séminaire sur La lettre volée" (1956). Here Lacan links the "compulsion to repeat" (Wiederholungswang) and the death instinct of Beyond the Pleasure Principle to the necessity of finding the object originally lost which Freud declared to be the characteristic of the system ψ in the "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895):

Thus it is that Freud takes a position from the very beginning in the opposition, which Kierkegaard has taught us about, concerning the two notions of existence founded respectively on reminiscence and on repetition. If Kierkegaard discerns in this opposition, and admirably so, the difference between the classical and modern conceptions of man, it nevertheless appears that Freud, by taking away from the human agent—identified with consciousness—the necessity included in this repetition, causes the second conception to take a decisive step forward. Since this repetition is a symbolic repetition, the fact becomes established as a result that the order of the symbol can no longer be conceived as constituted by man, but rather as constituting him (p. 2).

Cf. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (1947), p. 375, n. 1: "For Man the adequation of Being and Concept is a process (*Bewegung*), and truth (*Wahrheit*) is a *result*. It is only this 'result of the process' which merits the name of (discursive) 'truth,' for only this process is Logos or Discourse."

The sense of this passage takes its support from the je-moi distinction and from the difference between the full Word and the empty Word.

"The subject... begins the analysis by talking about him[Self] without talking to you, or by talking to you without talking about him[Self]. When he can talk to you about him[Self], the analysis will be over" ("Introduction au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite" [1956], p. 21, n. 1).

In the resistance displayed by the subject's *Verneinung*, Freud uncovers for us a phenomenon which structures all revelation of Truth in the dialogue. There is the fundamental difficulty encountered by the subject in what he has to say; the most common difficulty being that which Freud demonstrated in repression—in other words, that sort of discordance between the signified and the signifier determined by every censorship of social origin. The Truth can always be communicated between the lines in this case. That is to say, that whoever wants to make it heard can always have recourse to the technique which is indicated by the identity between the Truth and the symbols which reveal it; in other words, he can attain his ends by deliberately introducing into a text discorances which will correspond cryptographically to those imposed by the censorship.
The true subject, that is, the subject of the unconscious, does not proceed differently in the Language of his symptoms which, although it is in a sense deciphered by the analyst, is more a process of the subject's coming around to address himself to him in a more and more consistent way, for the ever-renewed satisfaction of our experience. This is in fact what our experience has recognized in the phenomenon of transference.

What the subject who is speaking says, however empty his discourse may be at first, takes on its effect from the process of approaching to the Word which is realized in his discourse, a coming closer to the Word into which he will fully convert the Truth which his symptoms express" [that is, the parole vide will become a parole pleine] (Ibid., pp. 20-21).

"Refoulé." It is perhaps worth remarking at this point on certain lexical distinctions. Psychoanalytic “repression” (Verdrängung) is rendered by the French refoulement; répression in French, best translated “suppression,” or “conscious repression,” corresponds to the Freudian Unterdrückung. There is the further distinction between what Freud called the “primal repression” (refoulement originaire: Urverdrängung) and what he first called Nachdrängen (“after pressure”) and referred to as “repression proper” (Standard Edition, XIV, 148), later Nachverdrängung (refoulement après coup: “after repression”) (Standard Edition, XXIII, 227). But for there to be a primal repression, a “mythical” earlier stage must be supposed; for Freud, the primal repression is inaccessible to consciousness; moreover, it never was “conscious.” Leclaire and Laplanche develop their own theory around these distinctions in “L’Inconscient” (1961). The reader will note the relationship between these concepts and the theory of deferred action (Nachträglichkeit).

The early schools of poetic theory in the Hindu writers were (1) the school of rasa (sentiment), (2) the school of riti (style), (3) the school of dhaani, (4) the school of vakrōkṣi (beautiful expression), as well as the school of citra (picture), of which only the third is still of any importance.

Dhaani means “sound, murmur, roar,” even “thunder”; but most important here are the meanings: “tone,” “allusion.” Dhaani represents “that power of a word or sentence,” says Apte’s dictionary, “by virtue of which it conveys a sense different from its primary or secondary meaning, suggestive power.” The doctrine of dhaani, tone, long dominant in Hindu poetics and one of which Abhinavagupta was a leading exponent, is usually called the doctrine of “suggestion,” but no doubt it would be better described in this context as a theory of metaphor or metonymy. See below on lakṣanālakṣana (note 177).

188 In his “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937), Standard Edition, XXIII, 219.

189 Compare the following:

The creative spark of the metaphor does not fly forth from the making-present of two images, that is, of two signifiers equally actualized. It surges forth between two signifiers of which one is substituted for the other by taking its place in the chain of signifiers, the occulted signifier remaining present because of its (metonymic) connection to the rest of the chain (“L’Instance de la lettre” [1956], p. 60).

The supplantation of one signifier by another means that “the one which is supplanted falls to the level of the signified and as a latent signifier perpetuates at that level the interval in which another chain of signifiers can be grafted on to it” (“Théorie du symbolisme” [1959], p. 12).

140 English in the original.

141 English in the original.

142 English in the original.

143 “L’intimation de la parole.”

The relation of need, demand, and desire and the relation of desire to the signifier are elaborated throughout the later writings of Lacan, and in detail in the unpublished seminars (see the summaries of J. B. Pontalis): “It must be granted that it is the concrete incidence of the signifier in the submission of need to demand which, by repressing desire into the position of being faultily recognized, confers on the unconscious its order” (“Théorie du symbolisme” [1959], p. 13).

The question is further delineated by Leclaire in “L’Obsession et son désir” (1959). After stating that “need aims at the object and is satisfied by it”; that demand “puts the other as such into question”; that it is “that sort of appeal to the Other” whose nature is “to open up on to a biance and to remain unsatisfied”; and that desire participates of both, he summarizes:

[Desire] is the necessary mediation between the implacable mechanism of need and the dizzy solitude of demand . . . .

. . . Desire is proper to the Imaginary; it is to be conceived as significative mediation of a fundamental antinomy. Thus it participates in need insofar
as it is relatively satisfied by an object, but only sustains itself insofar as it participates in demand by its perennially unsatisfied quest of the being of the Other, locus of the signifier (pp. 386–90).

144 “Le malentendu du langage-signe.”

The varied technical use of terms like “sign (signum),” “signans,” “signatum,” “signifier (significans),” “signified (significatum),” “signal,” “index,” “referent,” “object,” and so forth readily leads to confusion among different authors and in different domains.

Lacan has clarified his point verbally as follows:

The langage-signe is any language which aims at basing itself only on its ‘reference’ to the object, any language which thus confuses the signified with the object, and which consequently misses the point that it is constituted of signifiers and not of signs—with this further condition that it is never a question of a code but rather of une batterie de signiflets.

For Lacan the signifier seems to take over the role of the sign for Saussure or for Lévi-Strauss. The further Lacan pursues his epistemology of the signifier, the less one hears about the signified (Saussure's “concept”) as such.

145 English in the original.

146 That is, as a code arrived at by convention, such as the alphabet, or a traffic system, or a spectrograph, and so forth.

Further to what follows, see the discussion of von Frisch's discoveries (the precise significance of the “wagging dance” was only made public in 1948, whereas the original observations date from 1923) in E. Benveniste, “Communication animale et langage humain,” Problèmes de linguistique générale (1966), pp. 56–62.

147 Compare the following:

For this revelation of meaning [in the practice of analysis] requires that the subject be already ready to hear it—that is to say, that he would not be waiting for it if he had not already found it. But if his comprehension requires the echo of your word, is it not that it is in a Word, which from the fact of being addressed to you was already yours, that the message which he is to receive from it is constituted? Thus the act of the Word appears less as communication than as the grounding of the subject in an essential annunciation (Actes, p. 204).

Later, in the formal discussion in 1953, Lacan gave what he called “the general equation of transsubjective communication”: “This formula is as follows: the action of the Word, as far as the subject means to ground himself in it, is such that the sender, in order to communicate his message, must receive it from the receiver, and all the same he only manages to do it by emitting his message in an inverted form” (Actes, p. 248).

“The unconscious is that discourse of the Other where the subject receives, in the inverted form suited to the promise, his own forgotten message” (“La Psychanalyse et son enseignement” [1957], p. 67).

148 “You would not be looking for me if you had not already found me,” the words of Christ in Le mystère de Jésus, Pensées (Brunschevicq ed. #553 [Pléiade ed. #736]).


There is a distinction to be made between the formal necessity of redundancy uncovered by the theory of information—undifferentiated information being intransmissible as such—and the existential redundancy of speech. Since the theory of communication is concerned with the transmission of messages between all sorts of senders and receivers (for example, man and Nature, man and machine, machine and machine), it poses the possibility of reducing human language to a (theoretically) one-to-one relationship of signifier and signified, or of signifier and signifier, on the assumption that the unconscious code of language is in fact a convention.


151 Standard Edition, X, 225, 260, 280–81, 294–95. The original formula is decondensed on pp. 280–81, where the condensation of “Gisela” into “S” is also demonstrated.

152 This is the “constellation familiale” of the subject, the history and the internal relationships of the subject's family—and “history” in the precise sense of both a lived experience as well as of what the subject is told by his parents about their lives (as the incidents mentioned indicate). See: “Le Mythe individuel du névrosé” (1953), pp. 8ff., where Lacan deals with these aspects of the case of the Rat Man in detail, and
particularly with the theme of the double therein, which he relates to an obsessional episode in the life of the young Goethe, taken from Dichtung und Wahrheit.

The reference in the preceding paragraph to Freud’s “inexact interpretation” of the father’s role will clarify what Lacan means by the role of “dummy” in analysis (as in bridge: le mort in French), as well as the role of the “Symbolic father” (the dead father—see note 96) in the subject’s history, if it is compared to the following passage:

[This interpretation of Freud’s] is contradicted by the reality it assumes, but [it] is nevertheless a true interpretation in that Freud’s intuition anticipates on what I have brought out about the function of the Other in obsessional neurosis. I have demonstrated that this function is particularly suited to being held by a dead man (or “dummy”) and that in this case it could not be better held than by the father, insofar as by his death the Rat Man’s father had rejoined the position which Freud recognized as that of the absolute Father (“La Direction de la cure” [1961], p. 161).


154 The French text reads as follows:

L’hystérique captive cet objet dans une intrigue raffinée et son ego est dans le tiers par le milieu de qui le sujet jouit de cet objet où sa question s’incarne. L’obsessionnel entraîne dans la cage de son narcissisme les objets où sa question se répercute dans l’alibi multiplié de figures mortelles et, domptant leur haute voltige, en adresse l’hommage ambigu vers la loge où lui-même a sa place, celle du maître qui ne peut se voir.

155 For Lacan, the mediation of the Word “is conceivable only if a third term is supposed to be present in the Imaginary relationship itself: mortal reality, the death instinct, which has been shown to condition the marvels of narcissism,” notably in analyses conducted to their termination as relationships of moi to moi.

In order for the transference relation to escape these effects henceforth, it would be necessary for the analyst to strip the narcissistic image of his moi of all the forms of the desire in which this image has been constituted, so as to reduce it to the sole figure which can sustain it under their masks: the face of the absolute master, death (“Variantes de la cure-type” [1955], Ecrits, p. 348).

And death, for Lacan, is the fourth term to be integrated into the triangle of the three persons making up the oedipal relationship (ibid., p. 362). (For the phallus as the fourth term, see the last part of the essay following the translator’s notes.)

156 “Toutes les intimations.”

Now the Real confronted by analysis is a man who must be allowed to go on speaking. It is in proportion to the sense that the subject effectively brings to pronouncing the “je” which decides whether he is or is not the one who is speaking. But the fatality of the Word, in fact the condition of its plenitude, requires that the subject by whose decision is actually measured at every instant the being in question in his humanity, be the one who is listening as much as the one who is speaking. For at the moment of the full Word, they both take an equal part in it (Actes, p. 204).

157 Literally “that (thing).” The French for the id is le ça, but this cela—the “phenomenological” object—is precisely not the ça. For Freud’s “Wo es war soll Ich werden,” see note 110.

158 Compare the following:

The moi of which we speak is absolutely impossible to distinguish from the insidious Imaginary captures [captations] which constitute it from head to foot, in its genesis as in its status, in its function as in its actuality, by another and for another. In other words, the dialectic which sustains our experience, situated as it is at the most enveloping level of the efficacy of the subject, obliges us to comprehend the moi through and through in the movement of progressive alienation in which the consciousness-of-self is constituted in the Hegelian phenomenology.

This means that if you are dealing with the ego of the subject, in the moment which we are studying, the fact is that you are at this moment the support of his alter ego (“Introduction au commentaire de J. Hyppolite” [1956], p. 22).

159 “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905), Standard Edition, VII, 7. It is here (pp. 117-18) that Freud for the first time indicates the importance of transference in the progress of analytical therapy. (The term Übertragung first appears in the Studies on Hysteria [1895].)


Freud first raised the question of countertransference in 1910 (“Future Prospects of Psycho-Analysis,” Standard Edition, XI, 144-45). He re-
turned to it in the paper on transference love cited below. The editor of the *Standard Edition* notes that these are probably the only two explicit discussions of countertransference in Freud's published works.

100 *Standard Edition*, VII, 120. The account itself was published four years after the breaking off of the analysis in 1901.

101 Compare the following passage from "The Question of Lay Analysis" (1926), where Freud engages in an imaginary dialogue with an "impartial critic."

Nothing takes place between [the analyst and patient] except that they talk to each other . . . .

The Impartial Person's features now show signs of unmistakable relief and relaxation, but they also clearly betray some contempt. It is as though he were thinking: 'Nothing more than that? Words, words, words, as Prince Hamlet says.'

'... So it is a kind of magic,' he comments: 'you talk, and blow away his ailments.'

Quite true. It *would* be magic if it worked rather quicker . . . . And incidentally do not let us despise the *word*. After all it is a powerful instrument; it is the means by which we convey our feelings to one another, our method of influencing other people. Words can do unspeakable good and cause terrible wounds. No doubt 'in the beginning was the deed' [*Im Anfang war die Tat*, Goethe, *Faust* I, sc. 3] and the word came later; in some circumstances it meant an advance in civilization when deeds were softened into words. But originally the word was magic—a magical act; and it has retained much of its ancient power (*Standard Edition*, XX, 187-88).

102 See the passage quoted from the French in note 22.

103 The French text reads as follows:

Car pour ne plus nous occuper dès lors, comme l'on s'en tague, que de ces bruits, il faut convenir que nous ne nous sommes pas mis dans les conditions les plus propices à en déchiffrer le sens: comment, sans mettre bille-en-tête de le comprendre, traduire ce qui n'est pas de soi langage? Ainsi menés à en faire appel au sujet, puisque après tout c'est à son actif que nous avons à faire virer ce comprendre, nous le mettrons avec nous dans le pari, lequel est bien que nous le comprenons, et attendons qu'un retour nous fasse gagnants tous les deux. Moyennant quoi, à poursuivre ce train de navette, il apprendra fort simplement à battre lui-même la mesure, forme de suggestion qui en vaut bien une autre, c'est-à-dire comme en toute autre on ne sait qui donne la marque. Le procédé est reconnu pour assez sûr quand il s'agit d'aller au trou.


105 In the case of the Wolf Man, *loc. cit.*, pp. 10-11. This is where the lion only springs once. See: "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), XXIII, 217-19, and the lengthy discussion following, which brings out Freud's concept of the castration complex as the "bedrock" beyond which analysis cannot go.

106 In France, a type of boarding school.


After my elucidation of what these terms *no* and *cuckê* signify, it will be readily understood that the Caledonian considers *la parole* as a solid reality. He likes to say *'la parole qui dure.'* It is *la parole* in fact which links together the rhythms of life and marks their continuity through the time lived by the succeeding generations (p. 173). [. . .]

The name of the ancestor to be 'reimbursed' [for a debt, an injury, a woman 'lent' by his generation, and so forth] may be forgotten, but the
thought, the act previously pledged, are not. They are la parole qui dure. And this dominates time (p. 173).

Thus la parole maintains the integrity of social life. It constructs the social behavior of the members of the group. It is an object which consolidates what goes on within man, and it plays the role of a stabilizer for him (p. 176).

See also note 80.

160 English in the original. The following “moments of haste” refer to the 1945 article in Cahiers d’Art.

161 The preceding six paragraphs were rearranged and slightly modified in 1966.

162 The French text reads as follows:

Cependant tout son travail s’opère sous le chef de cette intention, et devient de ce chef doublement aliénant. Car non seulement l’oeuvre du sujet lui est dérobée par un autre, ce qui est la relation constitutive de tout travail, mais la reconnaissance par le sujet de sa propre essence dans son œuvre où ce travail trouve sa raison, ne lui échappe pas moins, car lui-même ‘n’y est pas,’ il est dans le moment anticipé de la mort du maître, à partir de quoi il vivra, mais en attendant quoi il s’identifie à lui comme mort, et ce moyennant quoi il est lui-même déjà mort.

For the echo of this passage in a different context, see note 27.

162 “Angoisse.” Both the Freudian and the Heideggerian Angst have been generally translated “anxiety” in English, “angoisse” in French. But Freud, unlike Heidegger, by no means uses this term, sanctified since “existentialism,” in an entirely coherent way, although he does stress the anticipatory element and the absence of an object in Angst, as Heidegger does. The Standard Edition uses “anxiety” as the technical term (for example, Angstneurose), but where Angst is used by Freud as an “everyday term,” it is translated accordingly. In his French papers, Freud uses both “angoisse” and “anxieté.” See the editor’s note on Angst, Standard Edition, III, 116; also the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Sein und Zeit (1927), Division I, 6, Secs. 39-40, especially the translators’ note on page 277 where it is pointed out that Angst appears as “dread” in translations of Kierkegaard and in a number of discussions of Heidegger.

In the seminar of May–July, 1957, on “La Relation d’objet et les structures freudiennes,” speaking in relation to little Hans, Lacan defined “angoisse” as follows: “Angoisse is not the fear of an object, but the confrontation of the subject with an absence of object, with a lack of being in which he is stuck or caught, in which he loses himself and to which anything is preferable, even the forging of that most strange and alien of objects: a phobia” (p. 32).

163 In the “Traité possible de la psychose” (1958), pp. 14-15, Lacan describes this incident as “une voie qui a fait date dans ma carrière.”

164 In the discussion at Rome Lacan elaborated: “If you will permit me the metaphor, we should act with Language as one does with sound: move at its speed to break its barrier.” After referring to the “bang-bang de l’interprétation,” he continued:

You can make use [of this mur du langage] in order to reach your interlocutor, but on condition that you understand, from the moment that it is a question of using this wall, that both you and he are on this side, and that you must aim to reach him along it, like a cue-shot along the cushion, and not objectify him beyond it.

This is what I wanted to point out by saying that the normal subject shares this position along with all the paranoiacs in the world insofar as the psychological beliefs to which this subject is attached in modern civilization constitute a variety of delusion that must not be considered less harmful just because it is more general . . .

In no possible way does this justify your putting on the leaden shoes of pedagogy, decked out as it may be in the name of the analysis of resistances, to play at being a bear explaining to the showman how to dance (Actes, p. 252).

165 “Instinct de mort.” Lacan more usually employs the expression “pulsion de mort” for the Freudian Todestrieb, and especially since one of his repeated contentions has been that “Trieb” (“drive”) is to be distinguished from “Instinkt” in the text of Freud. (Whether the two words may or may not be synonymous in modern German is irrelevant.) But the Standard Edition has settled on “instinct”—and indeed one does not often hear the expression “death drive.” Cf. the editor’s introduction to “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” (1915), Standard Edition, XIV, 109.

166 Notably in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

167 See Lacan’s note*. The Sanskrit noun lakṣāna means “mark,” “token,” “sign,” “symptom,” “definition,” “designation,” “name,” “secondary signification,” “mark on the body,” “sign or organ of virility.” The compound lakṣānalakṣāna is defined as follows in Macdonell’s dictionary: “indicative indication (e.g. a herd station on the Ganges = on the
This is to be explained by reference to the doctrine of *dhvani* mentioned in note 137. The following quotation is from Keith's *History of Sanskrit Literature* (Oxford: 1928), p. 387:

The theory of *dhvani* finds its origin in the analysis of language and meaning. The phrase, a herdsmen's station on the Ganges is obviously as it stands absurd; the denotation (*abhidiha*) gives no sense, and we are obliged to find a transferred sense (*lakṣhana*) which gives us the sense of a station on the bank of the Ganges . . . . There is brought to us by such a phrase deliberately used in poetry a sense of the holy calm of such a station on the sacred stream with all its associations of piety.

On the views of those who held the doctrine of *dhvani*, Keith comments (p. 388):

Suggestion, however, can be expressed in two ways, for it may rest on the metaphorical sense of words . . . a species of Dhvanikavya [suggested sense] where the literal meaning is not intended at all . . . . Or, again, the literal sense may be intended; but a deeper suggestion implied . . . .


179 See: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), *Standard Edition*, XVIII, 57ff.; and the *Three Essays* (1905), VII, 136. For the elaboration of these remarks, see Freud on dénégation (*Standard Edition*, XIX, 235) and the previously cited commentaries on this article by Lacan and Hyppolite.


181 See: *Being and Time* (1962), p. 294: "Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped (unüberholbare)."


183 "Jeux d'occultation." The child in question would associate the appearance and disappearance of a toy which he alternately threw away and drew back again with the vowel sounds "ö" and "a," which Freud interpreted as those of the German words for "gone!" (Fort!) and "here!" (Da!). The repetition of this game was apparently evidence of the child's beginning to master his environment actively through speech, for the active repetition seemed clearly to replace the passivity of the situation where the child's mother was alternately present and absent. Freud notes the eventual detachment of the game from the figure of the mother, and he notes the importance of the antithesis of disappearance and return rather than the content of the opposition: by means of his image in a mirror, the child soon discovered how to make himself disappear. See: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), *Standard Edition*, XVIII, 14ff.

Although it is not referred specifically to the Fort! Da! and although it is expressed in the universal terms which Lacan regularly applies to particular cases, the following passage seems to be a more informative later statement of what Lacan is saying in the *Discours* at this point:

It is worth recalling that it is in the oldest demand that the primary identification is produced, that which is brought about by the all-powerful [status] of the mother, that is to say, the identification which not only suspends the satisfaction of needs from the signifying apparatus, but also that which carves them up, filters them, and models them in relation to the defiles of the structure of the signifier.

Needs become subordinate to the same conventional conditions as those of the signifier in its double register: the synchronic register of opposition between irreducible elements and the diachronic register of substitution and combination, through which Language, even if it obviously does not fulfill all functions, structures the whole of the relationship between humans ("La Direction de la cure" [1961], p. 181).

Lacan goes on to point out that it is from this fact that result Freud's ambiguities about the relationship of the superego to reality—Freud says somewhere that the superego is the source of reality, which it obviously cannot be. It was eventually in the unconscious, says Lacan, that Freud rediscovered "the first ideal marks where the tendencies [Triebe] are constituted as repressed in the substitution of the signifier for needs" (ibid.)—presumably at the level of the "primal repression."

Earlier in this article (p. 177), Lacan had said that the Kleinian dialectic of phantasied objects is usually considered to refer to identification, for these objects, partial or not, but certainly significant [signifiants]—the breast, excrement, the phallus—are doubtless won or lost by the subject. He is destroyed by them or he preserves them, but above all he is these objects, according to the place where they function in his fundamental phantasy. This mode of identification simply demonstrates the pathology of the slope down which the subject is pushed in a world where his needs are reduced to exchange values . . . .
Thus Lacan concludes that the identification with the analyst, which is sometimes how transference is described, notably by English analysts, amounts ultimately to "an identification with signifiers."

These remarks are taken up from another point of view in the essay following the translator's notes.

In "La Direction de la cure" (1961), p. 158, Lacan describes this moment as: "The point of the insemination of a Symbolic order which pre-exists in relation to the child and according to which it will be necessary for him to structure himself."

For the notion of the couple or pair as anterior to the isolated element, see Henri Wallon, Les Origines de la pensée chez l'enfant (1945), Chapter III, "The Elementary Structures":

Even at the very beginning, the thought of the child is far from being totally unorganized. It is not simply a question of a content resulting from formations of an empirical or subjective origin which contact with objects and experience of events have succeeded in juxtaposing between these formations. By themselves, they would never be more than an amorphous succession of psychic moments, one replacing another or simply conglomerating, with no real principle of unity. In reality, thought only exists insofar as it introduces structures into things—very elementary structures at first. What can be ascertained at the very beginning is the existence of coupled elements. The element of thought is this binary structure, not the elements which constitute it. Duality has preceded unity. The couple or pair are anterior to the isolated element. Every term identifiable by thought, every thinkable term, requires a complementary term in relation to which it will be differentiated and to which it can be opposed... Without this initial relationship of the couple, the whole later edifice of relationships would be impossible (p. 41).

On the intellectual plane also the couple is oriented in neither time nor space. It is the act which unifies at the same time as it differentiates, without at first being able to specify the nature of the relationship (pp. 130–31).

This work is one cited by Jakobson and Halle in discussing Chao's question as to whether the dichotomous scale is actually inherent in the structure of language, or whether it is an imposition on the linguistic code by the analyzer:

... The phonemic code is acquired in the earliest years of childhood and, as psychology reveals, in a child's mind the pair is anterior to isolated objects. The binary opposition is a child's first logical operation. Both opposites arise simultaneously and force the infant to choose one and to suppress the other of the two alternative terms" ("Phonology and Phonetics" [1956], p. 47).

See also pp. 37–38 on "pa."

185 "... dont l'objet de désir est désormais sa propre peine"; that is, the object of the desire of the other is what makes it possible for the child to desire the desire of the Other—and this is "sa propre peine."

For the "Imaginary partner," see the remark on the mirror in note 183. The "Real partner" is presumably related to the fact that when the child could talk, he replaced the "o-o-o" with "Go to the front!" as he threw the toy down. His father was fighting "at the front" in World War I, and the child was not displeased by his absence, which left him in sole possession of his mother. On the other hand, when the child's mother died in 1920, shortly before he was six, Freud reports that the child (his eldest grandson) "showed no signs of grief."

186 For "le meurtre de la chose," see Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (1947), pp. 372ff. Lacan takes up another Kojevian formula when he says in "La Direction de la cure" (1961), p. 189, that "the being of Language is the non-being of objects." ("The mind [Manar]," said the author of the Voice of the Silence, "is the great slayer of the real.") Kojève expresses the idea as follows:

What distinguishes Being from the concept 'Being' is purely and simply the Being of Being itself... Thus one obtains the concept 'Being' by subtracting being from Being: Being minus being equals the concept 'Being' (and not Nothing or 'zero'; for the negation of A is not Nothing, but 'non-A,' that is, 'something'). This subtraction... takes place literally 'at every instant'; it is called 'Time.' (Introduction à la lecture de Hegel [1947], p. 375, n. 1.)

187 "... dans un vouloir qui est vouloir de l'autre." The double sense of "vouloir de l'autre" ("to want of the other") cannot be brought out in the English. On this whole passage, see the Verneinung articles.

188 Leenhardt, for example, employs this spatial representation in his Do kamo to represent the native's existence as a locus of relationships with others.

189 "... comme médiatrice entre l'homme du souci et le sujet du savoir absolu." Souci is the usual French rendering of the Heideggerian Sorge, and savoir, of the Hegelian Wissen.

190 The French text reads as follows:

Qu'il connaisse bien la spire où son époque l'entraîne dans l'œuvre continuée de Babel, et qu'il sache sa fonction d'interprète dans la discorde des langages. Pour les ténèbres du mundus autour de quoi s'enroule la tour im-
mense, qu'il laisse à la vision mystique le soin d'y voir s'élancer sur un bois éternel le serpent pourrissant de la vie.

The serpent is Moses' brazen serpent, god of healing (Numbers, xxvi, 9).

193 Cf. Freud's analysis of Dora, *Standard Edition*, VII, 39: "It is a rule of psycho-analytic technique that an internal connection which is still undiscovered will announce its presence by means of a contiguity—a temporal proximity—of associations; just as in writing, if 'a' and 'b' are put side by side, it means that the syllable 'ab' is to be formed out of them." Lacan's allusion plays on the fashion in which French children learn to read. Freud's first use of this metaphor occurs in the *Traumdeutung, Standard Edition*, IV, 247, 314.

192 "Soumission, don, grâce." The three Sanskrit nouns (*damah, dánam, dayd*) are also rendered: "maîtrise de soi," "aumône," "pitié" (Senart); "self-control," "giving," "compassion" (Rhadhakrishnan); the three verbs: "control," "give," "sympathize" (T. S. Eliot: *The Waste Land*, Part V: "What the Thunder Said").