Appendix I: A Spoken Commentary on Freud’s “Verneinung” by Jean Hyppolite

To start off with, I must thank Dr. Lacan for insisting that I present this article by Freud to you, because it gave me the opportunity to do a night’s work and to bring you the child of this labor.1 I hope that it will prove worthy in your eyes. Dr. Lacan was kind enough to send me the German text along with the French. It was a wise thing to do, because I don’t think I would have understood anything in the French text if I hadn’t had the German.2

I wasn’t familiar with this text. It has an absolutely extraordinary structure, and deep down it is extremely enigmatic. Its construction is not at all like that of a professor. The text’s construction is, I don’t want to say dialectical, so as not to overuse the word, but extremely subtle. And it obliged me to come up with a real interpretation using both the German text and the French text (in which the translation is not very accurate but is, on the whole, honest enough when compared with others). This is the interpretation I am going to offer you. I think it is valid, but it is not the only possible one and it is certainly worth discussing.

Freud begins by presenting his title, “Die Verneinung.” And I realized, making the same discovery Dr. Lacan had already made, that it would be better to translate it into French as “La dénégation.”

Similarly, further on you will find “etwas im Urteil verneinen,” which is not “the negation of something in the judgment,” but a sort of “revocation of a judgment” [déjugement].3 Throughout the text, I think one must distinguish
between the negation [négation] within judgment and the attitude of negation [négation]; otherwise it does not seem possible to understand it.

The French text does not bring out the extremely concrete, almost amusing style of the examples of negation with which Freud begins. Consider the first one, which contains a projection whose role you can easily situate given the work you’ve done in this seminar, in which the patient, let us call him the psychoanalyzed person [psychoanalyse], says to his analyst: “Now you’ll think I mean to say something insulting, but really I’ve no such intention.” “We realize,” Freud says, “that this is a rejection, by projection, of an idea that has just come to mind” [SE XIX, 235].

“I realized in everyday life that when, as frequently happens, we hear someone say ‘I certainly don’t mean to offend you by saying what I am about to say,’ we must translate this as ‘I mean to offend you.’ Such an intention is never lacking.”

But this remark leads Freud to a very bold generalization, in which he raises the problem of negation insofar as it might be at the very origin of intelligence. This is how I understand the article, in all its philosophical density.

Similarly, he gives an example of someone saying: “You ask who this person in the dream can be. It’s not my mother.” In which case, the question is settled, we can be sure that it is indeed her.

He goes on to cite a technique which is useful to the psychoanalyst but, in addition, we could say, to anyone, for shedding light on what has been repressed in a given situation. “What would you consider the most unlikely imaginable thing in that situation? What do you think was furthest from your mind at that time?” If the patient, or whomever you happen to be talking to at a party or over dinner, lets himself fall into your trap and tells you what he considers to be the most unbelievable thing, then that is what you have to believe.

Thus we have here an analysis of concrete techniques which is generalized until its foundation is encountered in a mode of presenting what one is in the mode of not being it. Because that is exactly how it is constituted: “I am going to tell you what I am not; pay attention, this is precisely what I am.” This is how Freud takes up the function of negation and, in order to do so, he uses a word which I could not but feel at home with, the word Aufhebung, which, as you know, has had a variety of fates; it is not for me to say it . . .

Dr. Lacan: Indeed, it is. If not you, then whose responsibility would it be?

Prof. Hyppolite: It is Hegel’s dialectical word, which means simultaneously to deny, to suppress, and to conserve, and fundamentally to lift [soulever]. In
reality, it might be the *Aufhebung* of a stone, or equally the cancellation of my subscription to a newspaper. Freud tells us here: "negation is an *Aufhebung* of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed" [*SE XIX*, 235–36].

Something truly extraordinary begins here in Freud's analysis; something emerges from these anecdotes, which we might well have taken for nothing more than anecdotes, that is of prodigious philosophical import and that I will attempt to summarize shortly.

Presenting one's being in the mode of not being it is truly what is at stake in this *Aufhebung* of the repression, which is not an acceptance of that which is repressed. The person who is speaking says, "This is what I am not." There would no longer be any repression here, if repression signified unconsciousness, since it is conscious. But the crux of the repression persists in the form of unacceptance.

Freud now leads us through an argument of extreme philosophical subtlety. It would be a gross oversight were we to let a remark Freud makes slip by, simply on account of its unreflective use in everyday speech: "in this the intellectual function is separated from the affective process" [*SE XIX*, 236].

For there is truly a profound discovery in the manner in which he goes on to deal with it.

To present my hypothesis, I will say that, in order to carry out an analysis of the intellectual function, he does not show how the intellectual separates from the affective, but how the intellectual is that sort of suspension of content for which the somewhat barbaric term "sublimation" would not be inappropriate. Perhaps what is born here is thought as such, but not before the content has been affected by a negation.

Let me recall to mind a philosophical text (I once again apologize for doing so, although Dr. Lacan can guarantee you that it is necessary). At the end of one of Hegel's chapters, the point is to substitute true negativity for the appetite for destruction that takes hold of desire and that is conceptualized there in a profoundly mythical rather than a psychological manner—to substitute, as I was saying, an ideal negation [*négation*] for the appetite for destruction that takes hold of desire and that is such that, in the final outcome of the primordial struggle in which the two combatants face off, there is no one left to determine who won and who lost.

The negation that Freud talks about here, insofar as it is different from the ideal negation [*négation*] in which the intellectual is constituted, shows us the sort of genesis whose vestiges Freud points to, at the moment of concluding his text, in the negativism characteristic of certain psychotics.
And Freud goes on to explain, mythically speaking still, what differentiates this moment [of ideal negation] from negativity.

In my view, this is what has to be acknowledged in order to understand what is truly being spoken of as “negation” in this article, even though it is not immediately obvious. Similarly, a dissymmetry expressed by two different words in Freud’s text—which have been translated by the same word in French—must be noted between the movement toward affirmation based on the unifying tendency of love, and the genesis, based on the destructive tendency, of the kind of negation whose true function is to engender intelligence and the very position of thought.

But let us proceed more slowly.

We have seen that Freud posits the intellectual as separate from the affective. Even if the desired modification, “the acceptance of what is repressed,” occurs during the analysis, the repression is not, for all that, eliminated. Let us try to conceptualize the situation.

First stage: here is what I am not. What I am is deduced therefrom. The repression still persists in the guise of negation.

Second stage: the psychoanalyst obliges me to accept intellectually what I formerly denied [ _niasa_ ], and Freud adds, after a dash and without any explanation—“the repressive process itself is not yet removed ( _aufgehoben_ ) by this” [ _SE_ XIX, 236].

This seems very profound to me. If the psychoanalyzed person accepts this, he goes back on his negation and yet the repression is still there! I conclude from this that one must give what happens here a philosophical name, a name Freud did not pronounce: negation of the negation. Literally, what transpires here is intellectual, but only intellectual, affirmation qua negation of the negation. These terms are not to be found in Freud’s text, but I think that all we are doing is extending his thought by formulating it in this way. That is what he really means.

At this point (and let us be vigilant in working with a difficult text!), Freud finds himself in a position to be able to show how the intellectual separates _<in action>_7 from the affective, and to give a formulation of a sort of genesis of judgment, that is, in short, a genesis of thought.

I apologize to the psychologists here, but I am not very fond of positive psychology in itself. One might take this genesis for positive psychology, but its import seems more profound to me, being historical and mythical in nature. And given the role that Freud has this primordial affectivity play, insofar as it gives rise to intelligence, I think that it should be understood in the way that Dr. Lacan teaches, which is that the primal form of relation
known psychologically as the affective is itself situated within the distinctive field of the human situation, and that, while it gives rise to intelligence, it is because, from the outset, it already brings with it a fundamental historicity. There is no pure affect on the one hand, entirely engaged in the real, and pure intellect on the other, which detaches itself from it in order to grasp it anew. In the genesis described here, I see a sort of grand myth. And behind the appearance of positivity in Freud’s text, there is a grand myth sustaining it.

What does this mean? What is there behind affirmation? There is Vereinigung, which is Eros. And what is there behind negation (careful—intellectual negation will be something more)? The appearance here of a fundamental, dissymmetrical symbol. Primordial affirmation is nothing more than affirming: but to negate [niet] is more than to wish to destroy.

The process that leads to this point, which has been translated into French as rejet [rejection], even though Freud did not use the term Verwerfung here, is still more strongly stressed, since he uses Ausstossung, which means expulsion.

We have here, in some sense, <the formal couple of> two primary forces—the force of attraction and the force of expulsion—both of which seem to be under the sway of the pleasure principle, which cannot but strike one in this text. This is, thus, the earliest [première] history of judgment. Freud now distinguishes between two different types of judgment.

In accordance with what everyone learns about the elements of philosophy, there is a judgment of attribution and a judgment of existence: “The function of judgment . . . affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputes that a representation [Vorstellung] has an existence in reality” [SE XIX, 236].

Freud now shows what lies behind the judgment of attribution and behind the judgment of existence. It seems to me that in order to understand his article, one must consider both the negation [néglage] of the attributive judgment and the negation [néglage] of the judgment of existence as falling short of negation [néglage] when it appears in its symbolic function. In the final analysis, judgment does not yet exist in this moment of emergence; rather, there is an early [premier] myth of the outside and the inside, and that is what we have to figure out.

You can sense the import of this myth of the formation of the outside and the inside, for alienation is grounded in these two terms. What is translated in their formal opposition becomes, beyond that, alienation and hostility between the two.

What makes these four or five pages so dense is that, as you see, they call everything into question, and move from concrete remarks, seemingly so
Appendix I

minor and yet so profound in their generality, to something which brings with it an entire philosophy, an entire structure of thought.

What is there behind the judgment of attribution? There is the “I should like to take in (to myself) [(m’)approprier], introject” or the “I should like to expel.”

At the outset, Freud seems to be saying, but “at the outset” means nothing more than in the myth “once upon a time . . .” In this story, once upon a time there was an ego [moi] (by which we should understand here a subject) for whom nothing was as yet foreign.

The distinction between the foreign and himself involves an operation, an expulsion. This renders comprehensible a proposition which, appearing rather abruptly, seems for a moment to be contradictory:

“Das Schlechte,” what is bad, “das dem Ich Fremde,” what is foreign to the ego [moi], “das Aussenbefindliche,” and what is found outside, “ist ihm zunächst identisch,” are, at first, identical for him.

Now, just before this, Freud says that one introjects and one expels, and that there is therefore an operation which is the operation of expulsion <without which> the operation of introjection <would have no meaning>. This is the primordial operation that is the <basis for> the judgment of attribution.

But what lies at the origin of the judgment of existence is the relationship between representation and perception. It is very difficult here not to miss the sense in which Freud deepens this relationship. What is important is that, “at the outset,” it is indifferent whether one knows if there is [il y a] or there is not. There is: the subject reproduces his representation of things based on the initial perception he had of them. When he says now that this exists, the question is <not>\(^\text{12}\) whether this representation still has the same status in reality but whether he can or cannot refine it. This is the relationship between the representation and reality that Freud emphasizes <as testing; he bases this relationship> on the possibility of refining its object once again. Repetition as the emphasized mainspring proves that Freud is operating in a more profound dimension than Jung, the latter’s dimension being more properly that of memory.\(^\text{13}\) We must not lose the thread of Freud’s analysis here. (But it is so difficult and detailed that I am afraid of making you lose it.)

What was at stake in the judgment of attribution was expelling or introjecting. In the judgment of existence, it is a question of attributing to the ego, or rather to the subject (it is more comprehensive), a representation that no longer has an object that corresponds to it, although an object had corresponded to it at an earlier stage. What is at stake here is the genesis “of the outside and of the inside.”
Hence this offers us, as Freud says, “an insight into the birth” of judgment, “from the interplay of primary drive-impulses.” So here there is a sort of “continuation, along lines of expediency, of the original process by which the ego took things into itself [appropriation au moi] or expelled them from itself, according to the pleasure principle” [SE XIX, 239].

“Die Bejahung,” affirmation, Freud tells us, “als Ersatz der Vereinigung,” insofar as it is simply the equivalent of unification, “gehört dem Eros an,” is due to Eros, which is what lies at the source of affirmation. For example, in the judgment of attribution, there is the fact of introjecting, of taking into oneself [approprier] instead of expelling outside.

He doesn’t use the word Ersatz regarding negation [négation], but rather the word Nachfolge. But the French translator renders it by the same word as Ersatz. The German text gives: affirmation is the Ersatz of Vereinigung, and negation [négation] is the Nachfolge of expulsion or, more precisely, of the destructive drive (Destruktionstrieb).

This thus becomes entirely mythical. There are two instincts, which are, as it were, tangled together in this myth which bears the subject: one instinct of unification, the other of destruction. A grand myth, as you see, and one which repeats others. But the little nuance—whereby affirmation in some sense merely substitutes for unification, whereas negation [négation] results (afterward) from expulsion—alone seems to me capable of explaining the sentence that follows regarding only negativism and the destructive instinct. For this explains how there can be a pleasure in negating [dénier], a negativism that results straightforwardly from the suppression14 of the libidinal components; in other words, what has disappeared in this pleasure in negating [nier] (disappeared = repressed) are the libidinal components.

Does the destructive instinct also depend consequently upon <the> pleasure <principle>? I think this is very important, crucial for technique.15

However, Freud tells us that “the performance of the function of judgment is only made possible by the creation of the symbol of negation.”16

Why doesn’t Freud say that the functioning of judgment is made possible by affirmation? Because negation [négation] has a role to play, not as a tendency toward destruction, nor within a form of judgment, but insofar as it is the fundamental attitude of symbollicity rendered explicit.

“The creation of the symbol of negation permitted an initial degree of independence from repression and its consequences and, thereby, also from the compulsion (Zwang) of the pleasure principle” [SE XIX, 239].

A sentence whose meaning would not have created any problem for me, if I had not first linked the tendency toward destruction to the pleasure principle.
Because there is a difficulty here. What does the dissymmetry between affirmation and negation [négation] thus signify? It signifies that all of the repressed can once again be taken up and reutilized in a sort of suspension, and that, in some sense, instead of being dominated by the instincts of attraction and expulsion, a margin for thought can be generated, an appearance of being so in the guise of not being so, which is generated with negation—that is, where the symbol of negation [négation] is linked to the concrete attitude of negation.

For this is how one must understand the text, if one accepts its conclusion, which at first struck me as a bit strange:

“This view of negation fits in very well with the fact that in analysis we never discover a ‘no’ in the unconscious . . .” [SE XIX, 239].

But we certainly find destruction there. We must thus clearly distinguish between the destructive instinct and the form of destruction, otherwise we will not understand what Freud meant. In negation, we must see a concrete attitude at the origin of the explicit symbol of negation [négation]; this explicit symbol alone makes possible something like the use of the unconscious, all the while maintaining the repression.

This is what seems to me to be the meaning of the end of the concluding sentence: “recognition of the unconscious on the part of the ego is expressed in a negative formula” [SE XIX, 239].

That’s it in a nutshell: in analysis there is no “no” to be found in the unconscious, but recognition of the unconscious by the ego demonstrates that the ego is always misrecognition; even in knowledge [connaissance], one always finds in the ego, in a negative formulation, the hallmark of the possibility of having the unconscious at one’s disposal even as one refuses it.

“There is no stronger evidence that we have been successful in our effort to uncover the unconscious than when the patient reacts to it with the words ‘I didn’t think that,’ or ‘I didn’t (ever) think of that’” [SE XIX, 239].

Thus, in these four or five pages of Freud’s—and I apologize if I myself have demonstrated some difficulty in finding in them what I believe to be their thread—there is, on the one hand, an analysis of the sort of concrete attitude that emerges from the very observation of negation; on the other hand, the possibility of seeing the intellectual dissociate <in action> from the affective; finally, and above all, a genesis of everything that leads up to the primal level, and consequently the origin of judgment and of thought itself (in the form of thought as such, since thought is already there before, in the primal [state], but it is not there as thought of), which is grasped by means of negation.
1. (Lacan's note:) "Je t'apporte l'enfant d'une nuit d'Idumée!"

2. The French translation of Freud's *Verneinung* was published as "La Négation" in the official organ of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, *RFP* VII, 2 (1934): 174–77. The German text first came out in *Imago* IX in 1925 and has since been reproduced in several collections of Freud's works. It can be found in *GF* XIV, as the second article, pages 11–15. [In English, see "Negation" in *SE* XIX, 235–39; the newer German edition is *Studienausgabe* III (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1982), 373–77, abbreviated here as *Stud.*]

3. (Lacan's note:) This is indicated by the sentence that follows beginning with *Verneinung*, that is, the condemnation that it designates as equivalent to (Ersatz [SE XIX, 236: "substitute for"] repression, whose very "no" must be taken as a hallmark, as a certificate of origin comparable to "Made in Germany"** stamped on an object.

4. "Bei Fortbestand des Wesentlichen an der Verdrängung" (GF XIV, 12; *Stud* III, 374). ["What is essential to the repression persists" (SE XIX, 236).]

5. (Lacan's note in 1955:) I intend some day to establish a strict definition of this term in psychoanalysis—something which has not yet been done. (Lacan's note in 1966:) A promise since kept.

6. "Die allgemeine Verneinungslust, der Negativismus mancher Psychotiker ist wahrscheinlich als Anzeichen der Triebentmischung durch Abzug der libidinösen Komponenten zu verstehen" (GF XIV, 15). ["The general pleasure in negation, the negativism displayed by many psychotics, is probably to be understood as a sign of a defusion of drives that has taken place through a withdrawal of the libidinal components" (*Stud* III, 376–77; SE XIX, 239, translation modified).]

7. (Lacan's note:) All words in such brackets have been added.

8. *Bejahung*.


10. *Einbeziehung*.

11. The seminar in which Lacan gave a commentary on *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* did not take place until 1954–55.

12. (Lacan's note:) Words added by the editor in accordance with Freud's text: "Der erste und nächste Zweck der Realitätsprüfung ist also nicht, ein dem Vorgestellten entsprechendes Objekt in der realen Wahrnehmung zu finden, sondern es wiederganz, sich zu überzeugen, dass es noch vorhanden ist" (GF XIV, 14). ["The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to convince oneself that it is still there" (SE XIX, 237–38, *Stud* III, 375).]

13. (Lacan's note:) Is the author referring here to Platonic reminiscence?

14. The German here is *Abzug*: deduction, discount, withholding; "what is withheld in the pleasure in negating are the libidinal components." Its possibility is related to the *Triebentmischung*, which is a sort of return to a pure state, a decanting of the drives that is usually, and poorly, translated as *déinscrifaction des instincts* ["defusion of instincts" (SE XIX, 239)].

15. (Lacan's note:) The admirable way in which Prof. Hypolite's exposé at this point closes in on the difficulty seems all the more significant to me in that I had not as yet produced the theses, which I was to develop the following year in my commentary on *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, on the death instinct, which is so thoroughly evaded and yet so present in this text.

16. Underlined by Freud.
Translator’s Endnotes

847

shut) also means closes it, and thus one could read it as closing or shutting truth in or off.

(860.2) Cause (causing) also means to chat, talk, or gab.


(870.7) “The truth of pain is pain itself”: as Jacques-Alain Miller indicated in his class (“From the Symptom to Fantasy and Back”) on April 13, 1983, the reference here is to Michel Henry; see his L’Essence de la manifestation (Paris: PUF, 1963).

(871.1) Objurgations (insistent prayers) could alternatively be translated as “objurgations”—harsh or violent reproofs.

(873.5) The Filióque is a doctrine according to which the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son (in Latin, Filióque means and from the son).

(874.3) Diaphragmatisation (stopping down) indicates the closing of an aperture, like that of a camera.

(875.2) Freud introduced the term “successful paranoia.”

(875.6) Sans pouvoir être le signe à représenter le sexe étant du partenaire (it is unable, however, to be the sign representing sex, the partner’s sex) is quite ambiguous, devoid as it is of punctuation. Le sexe could be understood as the “fairer sex”; le sexe étant du partenaire could conceivably be construed as “the partner’s existent sex”; and étant du partenaire could be rendered as “the partner’s sign” (instead of “the partner’s sex”).

(876.5) The reference here is to 198a, lines 15–16, of Aristotle’s Physics, translated in rather different ways by the various French and English translators, many of whom combine it with the sentence that immediately precedes it in the original. Wicksteed and Cornford, for example, give: “It is clear, then, that there are such things as causes, and that they can be classified under the four heads that have been enumerated” (the part in italics corresponding roughly to the Greek text cited). See Aristotle, The Physics, translated by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford (London: Harvard University Press, 1929). A word seems to be missing from Lacan’s quote, as in all of the versions of the Greek I consulted, the first word, Τονομάζεται, is followed by γεν.

(876.6) A polymer is a large aggregate molecule, that is, it is made up of several smaller molecules; “polymerizing” can thus be understood here in the sense of aggregating, or becoming an aggregate: the cause becomes a composite.

(877.1) Lacan seems to be deliberately distorting the name of the International Psychoanalytical Association, generally known in French as the Association psychanalytique internationale; Lacan’s name for it here, Internationale psychanalytique, evokes the communist Internationals.

(877.7) Pas can mean both no (or not) and step; we might also read pas-de-savoir as “the no that makes for (or constitutes) knowledge,” which might also be written “no-ledge.”

(877.8) Le point de vérité (truth’s site) means the point, place, or position of truth; “site of lack” in the next sentence corresponds to the French ce point de manque.

Notes to “A Spoken Commentary on Freud’s ‘Verneinung’ by Jean Hyppolite”

(879.1) Interpolations in less than (<) and greater than (>) signs are Lacan’s, whereas interpolations in square brackets are the translator’s. The footnotes are Hyppolite’s, unless otherwise indicated.

(879.4) In keeping with Strachey’s translation of Verneinung in the Standard Edition, négation is translated here as “negation” (although it could arguably be better translated as “denial”), and négation is translated as “negation” followed by the French in brackets. Dénier means to refuse to recognize as one’s own; it is the opposite of avow, confirn, and grant. Although Hyppolite admits that dénégation is a better translation than négation for Verneinung, he does not seem to consistently translate it as dénégation.

(879.5) Strachey translates “etwas im Urteil
848
Translator's Endnotes

verneinen" as "to negate something in a judgment" (SE XIX, 236).
(879,fn1) "I bring you the child of an Idrisian night!" is a line from Séraphine Mal-
larme's "Don du poème" ("Gift of a Poem").
(879,fn3) The phrase "Made in Germany" appears in English in the original German (and in
the French), highlighting the fact that the hallmark of repression is written in a foreign
language. The requirement that German goods display a hallmark of origin (written in Eng-
lish) was imposed on the governments of Germany and Austria following World War I, and
although the ruling was intended to facilitate discrimination against German goods, in fact
it had the opposite effect, since goods bearing the stamp "Made in Germany" soon became
sought after.
(880,3) This passage in quotes seems to be from one of Freud's other texts.
(880,8) Jean Hypolite translated Hegel's Phénoménotologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of
Spirit) into French in 1941 and published a long study of Hegel's text in 1946, translated into
English as Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phéno-
menology of Spirit (Evanston, Ill.: North-
western University Press, 1974).
(885,3) The term in the German text at this point is "Einbeziehung," earlier rendered as
"attraction," whereas the earlier use of "appro-
priate" was a rendering of "einführen"; SE ren-
ders both "Einbeziehung" and "einführen" as
"take into."
(885,5) For this sentence, Strachey gives:
"Affirmation—as a substitute for uniting—
belongs to Eros; negation—the successor to
expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruc-
tion" (SE XIX, 239).
(886,7) In une apparition de l'être sous la forme
de ne l'être pas (an appearance of being so in
the guise of not being so), l'être could, alternatively,
be understood as "being repressed" or even
"being thought."
(886,fn3) This passage is not actually under-
lined in the German text, which reads as fol-
lows: "Die Leistung der Urteilsfunktion wird
aber erst dadurch ermöglicht, dass die Schöp-
fung des Verneinungssymbols dem Denken
einen ersten Grad von Unabhängigkeit von den
Erfolgen der Verdrängung und somit auch vom
Zwang des Lustprinzips gestattet hat" (GW
XIV, 15; Stud III, 377). "But the performance
of the function of judgment is not made possi-
ble until the creation of the symbol of negation
has endowed thinking with a first measure of
freedom from the consequences of repression
and, with it, from the compulsion of the plea-
sure principle" (SE XIX, 239).

Notes to "Metaphor of the Subject"

(889,1) The title, La Metaphore du Sujet,
could also be rendered, "The Metaphor That
Is the Subject," "The Subject's Metaphor," or
better still, "The Subject as Metaphor."
(890,1) Note that Lacan modifies the usual
order of the letters in this formulation, which,
according to Aristotle and Perelman, is A/B
and C/D or A:B:C:D. "Phoros" comes from
the Greek pheerin, meaning to carry or bear;
according to Perelman, "theme" refers to the
couple A/B, while "phoros" refers to the
couple C/D.
(890,6) The expression by Berkeley may
be found, for example, in Berkeley's Philo-
sophical Writings (New York: Collier Books,
1974), 221; the French translation renders
Berkeley's "learning" as "science."
(890,9) La cathédrale engloutie (The
sunken cathedral) is the title of the Prelude
for Piano, Book 1, Number 10 (1910), by
Claude Debussy in which Debussy manages to
make the piano sound very much like bells
ringing. See The New Grove Dictionary of
Music and Musicians, ed. Stanley Sadie (New
one with a strong French accent in English is
likely to emphasize the second syllable in
"learning," making a ringing sort of sound
('ning, 'ning).
(891,2) The Greek Lacan provides here
has many meanings, among which the
Doric for θηρμος, meaning terra firma,
continent, or land; infinite or immense;
inextricable or without issue; and igno-
rance of or lacking in experience of.
(891,5) Injure (insult) could also be under-