You have been able to gauge how fruitful my method of returning to Freud’s texts proves to be for providing a critical examination of the current use of the fundamental concepts of psychoanalytic technique and especially of the notion of resistance.

The adulteration this latter notion has undergone is all the more serious because of the order that Freud consecrated with his own authority to give pride of place in psychoanalytic technique to the analysis of resistances. For although Freud intended to mark thereby a turning point in psychoanalytic practice, I believe that there is nothing but confusion and misinterpretation in the way in which people justify a technique that misrecognizes nothing less than what it is applied to on the basis of an emergency measure.

The question is that of the meaning that we must restore to the precepts of this technique which, since they will soon be reduced to fixed formulas, have lost the indicative virtue that they can only preserve through an authentic comprehension of the truth of the experience they are designed to guide. Freud, of course, could not but have such a comprehension, like those who immerse themselves in his work. But, as you have had the opportunity to see, this is not the case of those in our discipline who noisily seek refuge behind the primacy of technique—no doubt in order to hide behind the simultaneous harmonizing of their technique with progress in the theory, in the dumbed-down usage of analytic concepts which alone can justify their technique.

One will be quite disappointed if one attempts to look a little more closely
at what the analysis of resistances represents in the dominant usage. For what
strikes one first in reading the work of the doctrinaires of this perspective is
that the dialectical handling of any idea whatsoever is so unthinkable to them
that they cannot even recognize it when they are thrown into it—like Mon-
sieur Jourdain was when he spoke in prose without realizing it—by a practice
in which dialectic is in fact immanent. Thus they cannot reflect upon it with-
out latching in panic onto the most simplistic or the most grossly imaginative
objectifications.

This is why resistance comes to be imagined rather than conceptualized by
them according to what it connotes in its average semantic usage—namely,
if we examine this usage closely, in the indefinite transitive acception.
Thanks to which the phrase “the subject resists” is understood as “he resists
something.” What does he resist? No doubt he resists his tendencies in the
way he forces himself to behave as a neurotic subject, and resists avowing them
in the justifications he proposes for his behavior to the analyst. But since the
tendencies come back in force, and since the analyst’s technique had some-
ting to do with it, this resistance is presumed to be seriously tried; hence, in
order to maintain it, he must work at it and, before we even have the chance
to turn around, we have slipped into the rut of the obtuse idea that the patient
“is being defensive.” For the misinterpretation is only definitively sealed due
to its conjunction with another misuse of language, the one that gives the term
“defense” the carte blanche it has in medicine, without us realizing—for one
does not become a better physician by being a bad psychoanalyst—that there
is a misunderstanding in medicine too regarding the notion if we intend to
echo its correct meaning in physiopathology. And we betray no less—for one
becomes no better instructed in psychoanalysis by being ignorant in medi-
cine—the perfectly well-informed application Freud made of it in his first writ-
ings on the pathogenesis of the neuroses.

But, people will ask us, by centering your aim of grasping a confused idea
at its lowest point of disintegration, don’t you fall into the trap of condem-
ning the patient, not for his acts, but for intentions you attribute to him [procès
de tendance]? The fact is, I will answer, that nothing stops the users of a tech-
nique thus fitted out from sliding down this dangerous slope, for the precepts
with which they parry its original confusion do not in any wise remedy its
consequences. This is what allows people to proffer the following: that the
subject can communicate to us only about his ego and with his ego (here we
see the defiant look of common sense that comes home to roost); that it is
necessary, in order to get anywhere, to strengthen the ego or at least, they
correct themselves, its healthy part (and heads nod in assent at this tomfool-
ery); that in the use of analytic material we proceed by following blueprints
(of which we have, of course, the certified plans in our pocket); that we proceed thusly from the surface to the depths (no putting the cart before the horse); that in order to do so the masters' secret is to analyse the subject's aggressiveness (no attaching a cart which would kill the horse); here, finally, are the dynamics of anxiety and the arcana of its economy (let no one touch the potential of this sublime mana if he is not an expert in hydraulics). All these precepts, let it be said, and their theoretical trappings shall be ignored here because they are simply macaronic.

In effect, resistance can but be misrecognized in its essence if it is not understood on the basis of the dimensions of the discourse in which it manifests itself in analysis. We encountered them right away in the metaphor with which Freud illustrated his first definition of resistance. I mean the one I commented on some time ago which evokes the staves on which the subject unfolds the chains of his discourse "longitudinally," to use Freud's term, according to a musical score whose "pathogenic nucleus" is the leitmotiv. In the reading of this score, resistance manifests itself "radially"—a term which is opposed to the preceding term "[longitudinally]"—and with a strength proportional to the proximity of the line being deciphered to the line that delivers the central melody by completing it. So much so that this strength, Freud stresses, can serve as a measure of this proximity.

Certain analysts even tried to find in this metaphor an indication of the mechanistic tendency with which Freud's thought is supposedly shackled. This attempt evinces a complete lack of comprehension, as can be seen in the research I have carried out step-by-step into the successive clarifications Freud gave to the notion of resistance, especially in the writing we are now considering in which he gives the clearest formulation of it.

What does Freud tell us, in fact? He reveals to us a phenomenon that structures every revelation of truth in the [psychoanalytic] dialogue. There is the fundamental difficulty that the subject encounters in what he has to say; the most common is the one that Freud demonstrated in repression, namely, the sort of discordance between the signified and the signifier that is brought on by all censorship of social origin. The truth can always, in this case, be communicated between the lines. That is, he who wishes to make the truth known can always adopt the technique indicated by the fact that truth is identical to the symbols that reveal it; in other words, he can always arrive at his ends by deliberately introducing into a text discordances that cryptographically correspond to those imposed by the censorship.

The true subject—that is, the subject of the unconscious—proceeds no differently in the language of his symptoms; that language is not so much deciphered by the analyst as it comes to be more and more solidly addressed
to him, for the ever renewed satisfaction of analytic experience. Indeed, this is what analysis recognized in the phenomenon of transference.

What the subject who speaks says, however empty his discourse may at first be, derives its effect from the approximation made in it on the basis of speech in which he tries to fully convert the truth expressed by his symptoms. Let me indicate right away that this formulation is of more general import, as we shall see today, than the phenomenon of repression by which I just introduced it.

Be that as it may, it is insofar as the subject arrives at the limit of what the moment allows his discourse to effectuate by way of speech, that a phenomenon is produced in which, as Freud shows us, resistance is linked to the psychoanalytic dialectic. For this moment and this limit are balanced in the emergence, outside of the subject’s discourse, of the trait that can most particularly be addressed to you in what he is in the process of saying. And this juncture is raised to the function of the punctuation of his speech. In order to convey this effect I have used the image that the subject’s speech suddenly swings toward the presence of the listener. 4

This presence, which is the purest relationship the subject can have with a being and which is all the more deeply felt as such since this being is for him less qualified, this presence, momentarily freed to the utmost from the veils that cover it over and elude it in everyday discourse insofar as the latter is constituted as "they" [on] discourse precisely for this purpose, this presence is marked in discourse by a suspensive scanion often connoted by a moment of anxiety, as I have shown you in an example from my own experience.

Hence the import of the indication that Freud gave us from his own experience: namely, that when the subject interrupts his discourse you can be sure that a thought is occupying him that is related to the analyst.

You will see this indication most often confirmed if you ask the subject the following question: “What are you thinking about right now that is related to what is around you here and more precisely to me who is listening to you?” Still, the inner satisfaction you may derive from hearing more or less unflattering remarks about your general appearance and your mood that day, about your taste as denoted by your choice of furniture or the way in which you are dressed, does not suffice to justify your initiative if you do not know what you are expecting from these remarks, and the idea—which for many is a received idea—that these remarks give the subject the opportunity to discharge his aggression is utterly idiotic.

As Freud said prior to the elaboration of the new topography, resistance is essentially an ego phenomenon. Let us try to understand here what that means. This will allow us later to understand what we mean by resistance when we relate it to the subject’s other agencies.
The phenomenon in question here shows one of the purest forms in which the ego can manifest its function in the dynamic of analysis. This is why it makes us realize that the ego, as it operates in analytic experience, has nothing to do with the supposed unity of the subject’s reality that so-called general psychology abstracts as instituted in its “synthetic functions.” The ego we are talking about is absolutely impossible to distinguish from the imaginary captures that constitute it from head to toe—in both its genesis and its status, in both its function and its actuality—by an other and for an other. Stated differently, the dialectic that sustains our experience, being situated at the most enveloping level of the subject’s efficacy, obliges us to understand the ego entirely in the movement of progressive alienation in which self-consciousness is constituted in Hegel’s phenomenology.

This means that if, in the moment we are studying, you are dealing with the subject’s ego*, it is because you are at that moment the prop for his alter ego.

I have reminded you that one of our colleagues—who has since been cured of this pruritus of thought which still tormented him at the time when he was cogitating about the cases in which psychoanalysis is indicated as a treatment—was seized by a suspicion of this truth; the miracle of intelligence illuminating his face, he ended his talk regarding these indications by announcing the great news that analysis had to be subordinated to the primary condition that the subject have some sense of the existence of the other.

It is precisely here that the question begins: What is the kind of alterity by which the subject is interested in this existence? For the subject’s ego partakes of this very alterity, so much so that if there is something to be known [une connaissance] which is truly classificatory for the analyst—and of a kind that can satisfy the requirement of having a preliminary orientation that the new technique proclaims with a tone that is all the more hilarious since it misrecognizes it right to the very core—it is the thing which in each neurotic structure defines the sector that is open to the ego’s* alibis.

In short, what we expect from the subject’s reply in asking him this stereotypical question, which most often frees him from the silence that serves us as a signal of this privileged moment of resistance, is that he show us who is speaking and to whom—which is, in fact, one and the same question.

But it remains up to you to get him to understand it by questioning him in the imaginary place where he is situated; this will depend on whether or not you can tie the [unflattering] jibe [he makes at that moment of resistance] to the point in his discourse where his speech ground to a halt.

You will thereby confirm this point as a correct punctuation. And it is here that the analysis of resistances and the analysis of the material, whose oppo-
stitution it would be ruinous to formally endorse, harmoniously converge. This is a technique in which you are given practical training in supervision.

To those who have nevertheless learned another technique, the systematics of which I know only too well, and who still lend it some credence, I would observe that you of course will not fail to obtain a relevant response by pointing out the subject’s aggression toward you and even by showing some modicum of finesse in recognizing therein, by way of contrast, the “need for love.” And after thus plying your art, the field of defense’s ploys will open up before you. Big deal! Don’t we know that where speech gives up, the domain of violence begins, and that violence reigns there already without us even provoking it?

Thus, if you bring war to it, you should at least be aware of its principles and realize that we misrecognize its limits when we do not understand it, as Clausewitz does, as a particular form of human commerce.

We know that it was by recognizing, by the name of total war, its internal dialectic that Clausewitz was able to formulate that war is in command because it is considered to be an extension of political expedients.

This has allowed more advanced practitioners in the modern experience of social warfare, to which he served as a prelude, to formulate the corollary that the first rule to be observed is not to allow the moment at which the adversary becomes other than he was to slip away—which means that we should rapidly divide up the stakes that form the basis of an equitable peace. It has been made amply clear to your generation that this art is unknown to demagogues who can no more detach themselves from abstractions than your ordinary psychoanalyst can. This is why the very wars they win serve only to engender contradictions in which one can rarely perceive the effects that they promised would be achieved thereby.

Hence they throw themselves headlong into the undertaking of humanizing the adversary who has become their responsibility through his defeat—even calling the psychoanalyst to the rescue to collaborate in restoring “human relations,”* a task in which the analyst, given the pace at which he now pursues things, does not hesitate to go astray.

None of this seems irrelevant when we rediscover, at a turning point, Freud’s note (in the same text) about which I have already spoken, and this perhaps sheds new light on what Freud means when he says that one must not infer, on the basis of a battle that is waged sometimes for months around an isolated farm, that the farm itself represents the national sanctuary of one of the warring parties, or even that it shelters one of their military industries. In other words, the meaning of a defensive or offensive action is not to be found in the
object that is apparently fought over, but rather in the plan it forms a part of, which defines the adversary by his strategy.

The gallows humor evinced in the morosity of the analysis of the defenses would no doubt bear more encouraging fruit for those who trust in it if they simply took their cue from the smallest real struggle, which would teach them that the most effective response to a defense is not to bring to bear upon it the test of strength.

What they in fact do—instead of confining themselves to the dialectical pathways by which psychoanalysis has been elaborated, and lacking the talent necessary to return to the pure and simple use of suggestion—is merely resort to a pedantic form of suggestion, taking advantage of our culture’s ambient psychologism. In doing so, they offer up to their contemporaries the spectacle of people who were drawn to their profession by nothing other than the desire to always be able to have the last word, and who, when they encounter a little more difficulty than in other so-called professional [libéraux] activities, sport the ridiculous face of Purges, obsessed as they are by the “defense” of whomsoever does not understand why his daughter is mute.

But in so doing they merely enter the dialectic of the ego and the other that constitutes the neurotic’s impasse and renders his situation of a piece with the analyst’s biased belief [préjugé] in his ill will. This is why I sometimes say that there is no other resistance in analysis than that of the analyst. For this biased belief can only give way through a true dialectical conversion, a conversion that must, moreover, be maintained in the analyst by continual use. This is what all the conditions of the training of a psychoanalyst truly come down to.

Without such training this bias [préjugé], which has found its most stable formulation in the conception of pithiatism, will remain forever dominant. But other formulations had preceded it and I merely want to infer what Freud thought of it by recalling his feelings about its latest incarnation during his youth. I will extract his testimony about it from Chapter 4 of his great text, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. He speaks there of Bernheim’s astonishing *tours de force* with suggestion, which he witnessed in 1899.

But I can remember even then feeling a muffled hostility to this tyranny of suggestion. When a patient who showed himself unamenable was met with a shout: “What are you doing? *Vous vous contre-suggestionnez!*”, I said to myself that this was an evident injustice and an act of violence. For the man certainly had a right to countersuggestions if people were trying to subdue him with suggestions. Later on my resistance took the direction of protesting against the view that suggestion, which
explained everything, was itself to be exempt from explanation. Thinking of it, I repeated the old conundrum:

Christopher bore Christ; Christ bore the whole world;
Say, where did Christopher then put his foot? [SE XVIII, 89]

And given that Freud goes on to deplore the fact that the concept of suggestion has drifted in an ever vaguer direction, which does not allow us to foresee the clarification of the phenomenon any time soon, what mightn’t he have said about the current usage of the notion of resistance? How could he not have encouraged, at the very least, my efforts to tighten up its use in analytic technique? In any case, my way of reintegrating it into the whole of the dialectical movement of an analysis is perhaps what will allow me to someday provide a formulation of suggestion that will stand up to the criteria of analytic experience.

This is the aim that guides me when I shed light on resistance at the moment of transparency at which it presents itself by its transferential end, to borrow an apt expression from Octave Mannoni.

This is why I shed light on it with examples in which one can see the same dialectical syncope at work.

This led me to highlight the example with which Freud illustrates, almost acrobatically, what he means by the desire in a dream. For while he provides this example in order to cut short the objection that a dream undergoes alteration when it is recollected in the narrative, it appears quite clearly that only the elaboration of the dream interests him insofar as it is carried out in the narrative itself—in other words, the dream has no value for him except as a vector of speech. Hence all the phenomena that he furnishes of forgetting, and even of doubt, which block the narrative must be interpreted as signifiers in this speech. And were there to remain of a dream but a fragment as evanescent as the memory floating in the air of the Cheshire cat who fades away in such a worrisome manner in Alice’s eyes, this would simply render more certain that we have here the broken end of what constitutes the dream’s transferential tip—in other words, the part of the dream that directly addresses the analyst. Here this occurs by means of the word “channel,” the sole vestige remaining of the dream—namely, a smile here too, but this time a woman’s impertinent smile, with which she to whom Freud took the trouble to give a taste of his theory of jokes paid homage to it—which is translated by the sentence that concludes the funny story that she associates, at Freud’s invitation, to the word “channel”: “Du sublime au ridicule il n’y a qu’un pas” (“From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but one step”).

Similarly, in the example of the forgetting of names which I just recently
Examined, it being literally the first that came along, in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, I was able to discern that Freud’s inability to find the name Signorelli in the dialogue he carried on with his colleague who was his traveling companion at that time, corresponded to the fact that—by censoring earlier in the conversation with the same gentleman everything that this man’s remarks had stirred up in him both by their content and by memories that came in their wake, regarding the relationship of man and doctor to death, the absolute master, Herr, signor—Freud had literally left in his partner, excised *retranché* from himself therefore, the broken half (to be understood in the most material sense of the term) of the sword of speech. For a little while, precisely the time during which he continued to speak with this partner, he could no longer have this term as signifying material at his disposal since it remained attached to the repressed signification—especially since the theme of the work he needed to find anew in Signorelli, the author, namely, the fresco of the Antichrist at Orvieto, simply illustrated the mastery of death in one of the most manifest, albeit apocalyptic, forms.

But can we confine our attention to repression here? I can, of course, assure you that repression is at work here thanks to the overdeterminations Freud himself supplies us with regarding the phenomenon; and we can also confirm here, thanks to the relevance of these circumstances, the import of what I want to convey to you with the formulation, “the unconscious is the Other’s discourse.”

For the man who breaks the bread of truth with his semblable in the act of speech shares a lie.

But is that the whole story? Could the speech that was excised *retranchée* here avoid being extinguished before being-toward-death when speech approached it at a level at which only witticisms are still viable, appearances of seriousness no longer seeming to be anything but hypocritical in responding to its gravity?

Hence death brings the question of what negates *nie* discourse, but also the question whether or not it is death that introduces negation into discourse. For the negativity of discourse, insofar as it brings into being that which is not, refers us to the question of what nonbeing, which manifests itself in the symbolic order, owes to the reality of death.

It is in this way that the axis of poles by which a first field of speech was oriented, whose primordial image is the material of the tessera (in which one finds anew the etymology of the symbol), is crossed here by a second dimension which is not repressed but of necessity a lure. This is the dimension from which, alongside nonbeing, the definition of reality arises.

Thus we already see the cement crumble, the cement with which the so-
Introduction to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s “Verneinung”

called new technique ordinarily plugs up its cracks by resorting to the relationship to reality [réel], without in any way critiquing the notion.

In order to get you to see that such critique is part and parcel of Freud’s thought, I didn’t think I could do any better than to confide the demonstration to Jean Hyppolite who not only graces this seminar with his kind interest, but who, by his very presence, also in some sense guarantees you that I don’t go astray in my dialectic.

I asked him to comment on a text by Freud that is very short, but that, being situated in 1925—in other words, much further along in the development of Freud’s thought, since it comes after the main writings on the new topography—brings us right to the heart of the new question raised by our examination of resistance. I am referring to the text on negation [dénégation].

Jean Hyppolite, by taking responsibility for this text, is sparing me an exercise in which my competence is far from attaining the level of his own. Let me thank him for having granted my request and let us give him the floor regarding Freud’s “Verneinung.”

---

Notes

1. I am providing here the text of one of the meetings of the seminar held at the Saint Anne Hospital University Clinic which was devoted, during the 1953–1954 academic year, to Freud’s writings on technique and their relation to current technique. I have added to it a few references, which seemed useful, back to earlier classes, but I was not able to remove the difficulty of access inherent to a piece extracted from an ongoing teaching.

2. This usage, let it be said in passing, certainly includes nonnegligible oscillations regarding the accentuation of its transitivity, depending on the type of alterity to which it is applied. One says, “to resist the evidence” like to “resist the authority of the Court,” but, on the other hand, one says, nicht der Versuchung widerstehen. Note the range of nuances that can far more easily be displayed in the diversity of the semanteme in German—widerstehen; widerstreben; sich sträuben gegen, undauen, fortbestehen—whereby widerstehen can intentionally correspond more closely to the meaning I am going to isolate as being the properly analytic meaning of resistance.


4. One will recognize in this the formulation by which I introduced what is at stake here at the very beginning of my teaching. The subject, as I said then, begins analysis by speaking of himself without speaking to you, or by speaking to you without speaking of himself. When he can speak to you about himself, the analysis will be finished.

5. GW II–III, 522, fn1; SE V, 517–18, fn2; Science des rêves, 427.


7. I devoted the next year of my seminar to a commentary on the writing entitled Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

8. Jean Hyppolite’s discourse can be found as an appendix to the present volume, beginning on page 879.
Translator’s Endnotes

a coarse, ignorant, or servile person of low extraction.
(367,5) De notre index le commandement de sa boucle (my index would command it to continue) strikes me as quite obscure; there seems to be a play on bout and boucle.

Notes to “Introduction to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s ‘Verneinung’”

(370,2) Monsieur Jourdain is a character in Molière’s play, Le bourgeois gentilhomme, best known in English as The Would-Be Gentleman (see especially Act II, Scene 4). Cf. Écrits 1966, 456 and 478. Imaginaire (imaginative) is a philosophical term found in Sartre’s L’imaginaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1940) meaning productive of images; it is translated in The Psychology of Imagination (New York: Rider and Company, 1950) as “imaginative.”

(372,1) See SE II, 289, and SE XIV, 149.
(373,3) See SE XII, 101.
(373,fn1) See Seminar III, 181–82, where Lacan indicates that he had made the same comment in an earlier seminar.

(375,5) La belle affaire! (Big deal!) could also be translated as “Isn’t that just great!”

(375,6) Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was a Prussian general and a military theorist who wrote On War (Vom Kriege).

(376,3) See SE XII, 104, footnote 1.
(377,1) Purgons is a doctor from Molière’s play The Imaginary Invalid (see especially Act III, Scene 5).

(377,3) See endnote to Écrits 1966, 80, paragraph 2.

(378,4) Élaboration (elaboration) could also be translated as “revision,” in which case se poursuit (is carried out) might better be rendered as “continues.” As we see (SE V, 518 fn2), the one step (pas) from the sublime to the ridiculous is the Pas de Calais, the English Channel.

(379,1) Lacan had just discussed Freud’s forgetting of the name Signorelli a week earlier in Seminar I, 57–59/46–48. Actually, Freud’s traveling companion is not a medical colleague, but he discussed with this traveling companion a part of a conversation he had had earlier with a fellow physician. Reranker (Lacan’s translation for Freud’s Verwerfung, as we shall see in his “Response to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary”) means to suppress, cut off a part, prune, remove, amputate, excise, and eliminate. “The broken half of the sword of speech” may be a reference to the tale of Tristan and Isolde, in which a part of Tristan’s sword remains stuck in the head of the giant, Morholt, whom he slays. Cf. Écrits 1966, 447.

(379,2) For a different gloss on discours de l’Autre, see Écrits 1966, 814, where it is translated as “discourse about the Other.”

(380,2) A tessera is a small tablet or die used by the ancient Romans as a ticket, tally, voucher, means of identification, or password. The tessera was used in the early mystery religions, where fitting together again the two halves of a broken piece of pottery was used as a means of recognition by the initiates, and in Greece the tessera was called the sum bolon. A central concept involved in the symbol is that of a link.

Notes to “Response to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s ‘Verneinung’”

(382,7) The Heideggerian terminology here, l’être dans l’existant, could alternatively be translated as “Being (with)in the existent.”

(383,2) The French at the end of the paragraph, d’aloi peu relevé (that hardly seems promising), is more ironic than the English suggests in that aloi also used to refer to the legal status of a currency or of a goldsmith’s work, and relevé can also mean spicy or strong (for tastes and odors). This may be a reference

(383,3) The first sentence here could, alternatively, be rendered as: “In this text by Freud, the affective is conceived of as that which, of a primordial symbolization, preserves its effects right down to the discursive structuration” or “In this text by Freud, the affective is conceived of as that part of a primal symbolization that preserves its effects right down to the discursive structuration.”

(383,7) The first example will be seen to concern hallucination in Freud’s case of the Wolf Man, whereas the second example concerns acting out in Kris’ case of the man who loved fresh brains.


(385,5) One of the “neopractitioners” Lacan seems to have in mind here is Ernst Kris, discussed further on. The topic of “planning” is explicitly addressed in the last section of his article, “Ego Psychology and Interpretation in Psychoanalytic Therapy,” PQ XX, 1 (1951): 15–29. “Planning” seems to imply the establishment of regular patterns in analyses, allowing the analyst to predict the course of a specific analytic case and plan his or her interventions accordingly. Lacan may also have Anna Freud in mind; see Écrits 1966, 604.

(386,3) Est restée lettre morte (went unheeded) literally means remained a dead letter.

(386,fn1) No stenographer was present at the seminars Lacan gave in 1951–1952 and 1952–1953, nor were they tape-recorded.

(386,fn2) Strachey renders the German phrase here as “he would have nothing to do with it, in the sense of having repressed it.” Verwiefung is translated as “condemning judgement” in SÉ XVII, 80, and the verb form as “to reject” in SÉ XVII, 79 and 84. Retrancher means to suppress, cut off a part, prune, remove, amputate, excise, and eliminate. Freud’s clearest statement about foreclosure is found in “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (SÉ III, 58), where the verb form verwirft is translated by Strachey as “rejects”: “In both the instances of defence considered so far, defence against the incompatible idea was effected by separating it from its affect; the idea itself remained in consciousness, even though weakened and isolated. There is, however, a much more energetic and successful kind of defence. Here, the ego rejects the incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all. But from the moment at which this has been successfully done the subject is in a psychosis, which can only be classified as ‘hallucinatory confusion.’”

(387,5) The usual French for what is known in English as Freud’s “primary process” is processus primaire; here Lacan gives procès primaire (primal process).

(388,1) Comme étant (as existential) could, alternatively, be rendered as “in the guise of a being.”

(388,3) Au jour de la symbolisation primordiale (to light in the primal symbolization) could also be rendered as “into the light of primal symbolization”; au jour du symbolique (to light in the symbolic) could also be rendered as “into the light of the symbolic.”

(388,4) See SÉ XIX, 239, which reads “the ego took things into itself or expelled them from itself.” Lacan referred to punctuation in his introduction to Hyppolite’s presentation.

(389,2) Freud’s sentence is from SÉ XIX, 237 (translation modified). Cause tout seul (talks all by itself) could also be rendered as “talks to itself” or “causes all by itself.”

(389,3) SÉ XVII, 85, reads, “When I was five years old, I was playing in the garden near my nurse, and was carving with my pocket-knife in the bark of one of the walnut trees that come into my dream as well. Suddenly, to my unspeakable terror, I noticed that I had cut through the little finger of my (right or left?) hand, so that it was hanging on by its skin. I felt no pain, but great fear. I did not venture to say anything to my nurse, who was only a few paces distant, but I sank down on the nearest seat and sat there incapable of casting another glance at my finger. At last I calmed down, took a look at the finger, and saw that it was entirely uninjured.”
Translator's Endnotes

(390) (4) Mouffe (balk) could also be rendered as "open his trap" or "flinch."

(392) (1) Délic (click) is a notoriously difficult term to translate, signifying as it does something that happens or gives way ("snaps"), which then constitutes a breakthrough or turning point of some kind (in comprehension, in speaking a language, in one's psychological state, etc.).

(392) (3) Lacan here uses a term, ek-sistence (which he later spells ex-sistence), which was first introduced into French in translations of Heidegger's work (e.g., Being and Time), as a translation for the Greek ekstasis and the German Ekstase. The root meaning of the term in Greek is standing outside of or standing apart from something. In Greek, it was generally used for the "removal" or "displacement" of something, but it also came to be applied to states of mind which we would now call "ecstatic." (Thus a derivative meaning of the word is "ecstasy.") Heidegger often played on the root meaning of the word, "standing outside" or "stepping outside oneself," but also on its close connection in Greek with the root of the word for "existence." Lacan uses it to talk about "an existence which stands apart from," which insists as it were from the outside, to talk about something not included on the inside, something which, rather than being intimate, is "extimate."

(394) (5) Again, Lacan's interpretation of the English is open to question. Kris writes: "His paradoxical tone of satisfaction and excitement [about finding his idea in the treatise in the library] led me to inquire in very great detail about the text he was afraid to plagiarize. In a process of extended scrutiny it turned out that the old publication contained useful support of his thesis but no hint of the thesis itself" (Ibid., 22).

(395) (3) Disordre (disorder) can also be rendered as "chaos," "havoc," or "mess."

(396) (1) Lacan inserts "(sic)" after the word he proposes to translate Kris' "exploratory": préparatoire (preparatory). His French rendition of Kris' text is highly abbreviated.

(397) (2) Reading patrie (homeland) for partie (part).

(397) (3) Lacan provides a comment here (which I have omitted) on the English term "engineering," suggesting that it is related to the famous American "how to," or, if not, to the notion of planning (discussed in the last section of Kris' article). He seems, however, not to understand the meaning of the verb form, "to engineer," as used here, for the translation he provides is "s'en emparer est une question de savoir s'y prendre" (taking it is a matter of knowing how to go about it).

(397) (4) Lacan perhaps confuses "attractive" with "attentive" here, because he suggests in his translation that these are restaurants where one is well looked after, or well attended to (as l'on est bien soigné).


Notes to "The Freudian Thing"

(401) (6) Il se consummait (it occurred) can also be rendered as "it came to an end" or "it was at its height."

(402) (2) It should be kept in mind throughout this article that sens (meaning) also means both direction and sense.

(406) (2) Lacan makes a pun here on the French pronunciation of Bondy and bandits.

The Bondy Forest, to the north of Paris, was long famous as a haunt of bandits.

(406) (3) Gros sabots (big clobehoppers) figuratively means all-too-obvious allusions or intentions visible from a mile away.

(407) (1) The Pays du Tendre was an allegorical country in which love was the sole preoccupation. It was the creation of Mademoiselle