This has a precise meaning in the economy of the signifier, the formalization of which I can do no more than indicate here, but which will be familiar to those of you who are attending the seminar I am giving this year on the formations of the unconscious. Namely: formula of the metaphor, or of signifying substitution:

\[ \frac{S \cdot S'}{x} \rightarrow S \left( \frac{1}{x} \right) \]

in which the capital Ss are signifiers, x the unknown signification and \( S' \) the signified induced by the metaphor, which consists of the substitution in the signifying chain of S for \( S' \). The elision of \( S' \), represented here by the bar through it, is the condition of the success of the metaphor.

This applies equally to the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father, that is, the metaphor that substitutes this Name in the place first symbolized by the operation of the absence of the mother.

| Name-of-the-Father | Desire of the Mother | Signified to the subject \\
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Let us now try to conceive of a circumstance of the subjective position in which, to the appeal of the Name-of-the-Father responds, not the absence of the real father, for this absence is more than compatible with the presence of the signifier, but the inadequacy of the signifier itself.

This is not a conception that should come as a complete surprise. The presence of the signifier in the Other is, in effect, a presence usually closed to the subject, because it usually persists in a state of repression (verdrängt), and because from there it insists on representing itself in the signified by means of its repetition compulsion (Wiederholungszwang).

Let us extract from several of Freud's texts a term that is sufficiently articulated in them to render them unjustifiable if this term does not designate in them a function of the unconscious that is distinct from the repressed. Let us take as demonstrated the essence of my seminar on the psychoses, namely, that this term refers to the most necessary implication of his thought on the phenomenon of psychosis: this term is Verwerfung (foreclosure).

It is articulated in this register as the absence of that Bejahung, or judgement of attribution, that Freud poses as a necessary precedent for any possible application of Verneinung (negation), which he opposes to it as a judgement of existence: whereas the whole article from which he detaches this Verneinung as an element of analytic experience demonstrates in it the avowal of the signifier itself that it annuls.

It is on the signifier, then, that the primordial Bejahung bears, and other texts enable us to recognize this, in particular letter 52 of the Frei correspondence, in which it is expressly isolated as the term of an original perception under the name of sign, Zeichen.

We will take Verwerfung, then, to be foreclosure of the signifier. To the point at which the Name-of-the-Father is called — we shall see how — may correspond in the Other, then, a mere hole, which, by the inadequacy of the metaphoric effect will provoke a corresponding hole at the place of the phallic signification.

It is the only form in which it is possible for us to conceptualize what Schreber shows us to be the result of the damage that he is in a position to reveal only in part and in which, he says, together with the names of Fleischig and Schreber, the term 'soul-murder' (Seelenmord: S. 22-11) plays an essential role.

It is clear that what we are presented with here is a disorder caused at the most personal juncture between the subject and his sense of being alive; the censorship that mutilates the text before the addition mentioned by Schreber to the somewhat distorted explanations that he has offered of his method leaves one to think that he associated with the names of living people facts that could not have been published on account of the conventions of the time. Moreover, the following chapter is missing in its entirety, and Freud had to be content to exercise his perspicacity on the allusion to Faust, to Der Freischütz and to Byron's Manfred, a work (from which he supposes the name of Ahriman, one of the apophanies of God in Schreber's delusion, to be borrowed) that seemed to him to derive in that reference all the value of its theme, namely, that the hero dies from the curse borne in him by the death of the object of fraternal incest.

For me, since like Freud I have chosen to trust a text which, apart from these few mutilations, regrettable as they are, remains a document whose guarantees of credibility are unrivalled, it is in the most advanced form of delusion of which the book is an expression, that I will try to show a structure that will prove to be similar to the process of psychosis itself.

2. Following this line of approach, I will observe with the touch of surprise with which Freud sees the subjective connotation of the recognized unconscious, that the delusion deploys all the wealth of its tapestry
around the power of creation attributed to speech, of which the divine rays (Gottesstrahlen) are the hypostasis.

This begins as a leit-motiv in the first chapter, where the author first pauses at the fact that the act of giving birth to an existence out of nothing offends reason, flies in the face of the evidence that experience provides in the transformations of a matter in which reality finds its substance.

He emphasizes the paradox to be found in his contrast with the most familiar ideas for the man he claims to be, as if there was any need of that: a gebilder German of the Wilhelmine period, nourished on Haeckelian metascientism, on the basis of which he provides a list of readings, an occasion for us to complete, by referring to them, what Gavarni calls somewhere a cerebral idea of Man.21

It is even in this considered paradox of the intrusion of a thought, for him hitherto unthinkable, that Schreber sees the proof that something must have happened that does not proceed from his own mind: a proof against which, it seems, only the petitio principii, outlined above in the position of the psychiatrist, give us the right to resist.

3. Having said this, let us follow a sequence of phenomena that Schreber establishes in his fifteenth chapter (S. 204-13).

We now know that the strength of his hand in the forced game of thought (Denkwang) in which the words of God constrain him (see above, 1-5) has a dramatic stake, which is that God, whose powers of misunderstanding, will appear later, considering the subject as annihilated, leaves him in the lurch (liegen lassen), a threat to which we will return.

The effort of repose, then, by which the subject is thus suspended, let us say, in his being as subject, eventually fails by a moment of ‘thinking-nothing’ (Nichtsdenken), certainly seems to be the least one can humanly expect by way of rest (Schreber says). This is what, according to him, occurs:

(a) What he calls the miracle of howling (Brüllenwunder), a cry torn from his breast that surprises him beyond all expectations, whether he is alone or with others, who are horrified by the spectacle he offers them of his mouth suddenly gaping over the unspeakable void, abandoning the cigar that was stuck there only a moment earlier;
(b) The call for help ('Hilfe rufen'), emitted by 'divine nerves detached from the mass', the plaintive tone of which is caused by the greater distance into which God withdraws;

(two phenomena in which the subjective tearing is sufficiently indistinguishable enough from its signifying mode for us not to labour the point);

(c) The forthcoming blossoming, that is, in the occult zone of the perceptual field, in the corridor, in the next room, or manifestations which, though not extraordinary, appear to the subject to be intended for him;
(d) The appearance at the next level of the distant, that is, beyond the grasp of the senses, in the park, in the real, of miraculous creations, that is, newly created ones, and Mrs Macalpine makes the perceptive observation that they always belong to flying species - birds or insects.

Do not these last meteors of delusion appear as the trace of a furrow, or as a fringe effect, showing both times in which the signifier that remained silent in the subject projects from its darkness a gleam of signification on to the surface of the real, then illuminates the real with a flash projected from below its basement of nothingness?

Thus, at the tip of hallucinatory effects, these creatures which, if one wished to apply with maximum rigour the criterion of the apparition of the phenomenon in reality, would alone be worthy of the name of hallucinations, recommend us to reconsider in their symbolic solidarity the trio of Creator, Creature, and Created that emerges here.

4. It is from the position of the Creator, in effect, that we will go back to that of the Created, which subjectively creates it.

Unique in his Multiplicity, Multiple in his Unity (such are the attributes, reminiscent of Heraclitus, with which Schreber defines him), this God, reduced in effect to a hierarchy of realms, which would be worth a study in itself, lowers himself into beings who appropriate disconnected identities.

Immanent in these beings, whose capture by their inclusion in Schreber’s being threatens his integrity, God is not without the intuitive support of a hyperspace, in which Schreber even sees significant transmissions conducted along wires (Fäden), which materialize the parabolic trajectory in accordance with which they enter his cranium through the occiput (S. 315-P.S. V).

Yet, in the course of time, through his manifestations, God lets the field of non-intelligent beings, beings who do not know what they say, beings of inanity, such as those enchanted birds, those talking birds,
though he be, either to elude with his words the traps set by the alarming
inanity of his Lord, or to maintain himself in the face of the destruction
that he believes his Lord capable of launching against him, or anyone
else, by virtue of a right to which he is entitled in the name of the order of
the World (Weiterordnung), a right which, for all that it is his motivates
this unique example of the victory of a creature that a series of disorders has
made the object of his creator's 'perfide'. (The word let out, not without
reservations, is in French: S. 226-XVI.)

Does not this recalcitrant created being, who prevents his fall only by
the support of his Word (verbe) and by his faith in speech, form a strange
pendant to Malebranche's continuous creation?

Perhaps we should take another look at the authors prescribed for the
philosophy paper of the Baccalauréat, among which perhaps we have been
too contemptuous of those outside the line leading up to the homo
psychologicus in which our period finds the measure of a perhaps somewhat
pedestrian, don't you think, humanism.

De Malebranche ou de Locke
Plus malin le plus loufoque...23

Yes, but which of the two is it? There's the rub, dear colleague.
Come on, drop that stiff manner. When will you feel at ease, then, when
you are on your own ground?

5. Let us now try and re-situate the position of the subject as it is
constituted here in the symbolic order on the triad that maps it in our
schema R.

It seems to me, then, that if the Created I assumes in it the place in F,
left vacant by the Law, the place of the Creator is designated in it by that
liegen lassen, that fundamental let-lie, in which the absence that made it
possible to construct oneself out of the primordial symbolization M of the
mother appears to be denuded, from the foreclosure of the Father.

From one to the other a line, which would end in the Creatures of
speech, occupying the place of the child rejected in the hopes of the sub-
ject (see the Post-scriptum), would thus be conceived as circumventing
the hole dug in the field of the signifier by the foreclosure of the Name-
of-the-Father (see Schema I, p. 212).

It is around this hole, in which the support of the signifying chain is
lacking in the subject, and which has no need, one notes, of being ine-
ffable in order to be awe-inspiring, that the whole struggle in which
the subject reconstructed itself took place. In this struggle, he conducted

...
himself with honour, and the vaginas of heaven (another meaning of the word Vorkäfe, see above), the cohort of miraculous girls who laid siege to the edges of the hole provided the counterpoint, in the clucks of admiration from their harpies’ throats: ‘Verfluchter Kord! What a lad!’ In other words: what a ram! Alas! It was by way of antiphora.

6. For already, and not long since, there had opened up for him in the field of the imaginary the gap that corresponded in it to the defect of symbolic metaphor, the gap that could only be resolved in the accomplishment of the Entmannung (emasculations).

At first an object of horror for the subject, it was then accepted as a reasonable compromise (vernünftig, S. 177-XIII), consequently as an irrevocable choice (S. note to p. 179-XIII), and as a future motive of a redemption of interest to the entire world.

Although we can’t leave the term Entmannung quite so easily, it will surely embarrass us less than it does Ida Macalpine in the position that I have described as being hers. No doubt she thought she was putting a little order into the matter by substituting the word ‘unmanning’ for ‘emasculating’, which the translator of volume III of the Collected Papers had innocently believed to suffice, and even going so far as to ensure that the translation was altered in the authorized version then under preparation. Perhaps she detected some imperceptible etymological suggestion that differentiated the two terms, despite their identical usage.

But to what avail? Rejecting as improper the questioning of an organ which Mrs Macalpine, referring to the Memoirs, wishes to be destined to nothing more than a peaceful reabsorption in the subject’s entrails – does she mean by this to represent to us the timorous slyboots in which he takes refuge when he shakes with fear, or the conscientious objection to description on which the author of The Satyricon lingers so mischievously?

Or does she believe perhaps that it was never a question of real castration in the complex of the same name?

No doubt she has good grounds for noticing the ambiguity there is in regarding as equivalents the transformation of the subject into a woman (Verweiblichung) and castration (for that is certainly the meaning of Entmannung). But she does not see that this ambiguity is that of the subjective structure itself, which produces it here: which involves only that which is confined at the imaginary level to the transformation of the subject into a woman, namely, precisely that which makes it decline from any heritage from which it may legitimately expect the attribution of a penis to his person. This because if being and having are mutually exclusive in principle, they are confounded, at least as far as the result is concerned, when it is a question of a lack. Which does not prevent the distinction between them being of decisive importance subsequently.

As one realizes in observing that it is not by being foreclosed to the penis, but by having to be the phallus that the patient is doomed to become a woman.

The symbolic parity Mädchen = Phallus, or in English the equation Girl = Phallus, in the words of M. Fénichel,25 to whom she gives the theme of an essay of some merit, if somewhat confused, has its root in the imaginary paths by which the child’s desire succeeds in identifying itself with the mother’s want-to-be, to which of course she was herself introduced by the symbolic law in which this lack is constituted.

It is as a result of the same mechanism that women in the real order serve, if they’ll forgive me saying so, as objects for the exchanges required by the elementary structures of kinship and which are sometimes perpetuated in the imaginary order, while what is transmitted in a parallel way in the symbolic order is the phallus.

7. Here the identification, whatever it may be, by which the subject assumed the desire of the mother, triggers off, as a result of being shaken, the dissolution of the imaginary tripod (remarkably enough, it was in his mother’s apartment, where he had taken refuge, that the subject had his first attack of anxious confusion with suicidal raptus: S. 39–40-IV).

No doubt the divination of the unconscious very soon warned the subject that, incapable as he is of being the phallus that the mother lacks, he is left with the solution of being the woman that men lack.

This is the meaning of this phantasy, his account of which has often been commented on and which I quoted above as belonging to the incubation period of his second illness, namely the idea ‘that it would be beautiful being a woman submitting to copulation’. This mesmo asinorum of the Schreberian literature is here pinned in place.

Yet this solution was a premature one at the time, because for the Menschenspielerei (‘Men’s little games’, a term that appeared in the fundamental language) that would normally follow, one can say that the call to the braves was doomed to fall flat, for the good reason that these braves became as improbable as the subject himself, as divested as him of any phallus. This is because there was omitted in the subject’s imaginary order, no less for them than for him, that line parallel with the outline of their faces, that can be seen in a drawing by Little Hans, and which is
familiar to those who know children's drawing. It is because others were now no more than 'images of men flung together any old how', to combine in this translation of flüchtig hingemachte Männer W. G. Nieder- land's remarks on the uses of hinmachen and Edouard Pichon's brilliant stroke in the French translation.26

So the affair would have been in danger of marking time in a rather dishonourable way, had not the subject succeeded in saving the day quite brilliantly.

He himself articulated the outcome (in November 1895, that is, two years after the beginning of his illness) under the name of Versöhnung; the word has the meaning of expiation, propitiation, and, in view of the characteristics of the fundamental language, must be drawn even more towards the primitive meaning of Sühne, that is to say, towards sacrifice, whereas one accentuates it in the direction of compromise (reasonable compromise, which the subject gives as the motivation for accepting his destiny).

Here Freud, going well beyond the rationalization of the subject himself, admits paradoxically that reconciliation (since it is the flat meaning that has been chosen in French), which the subject takes account of, finds its source in the deception of the partner that it involves, namely in the consideration that the spouse of God contracts in any case an alli ance of nature to satisfy the most demanding self-love.

I think we can say that in this instance Freud failed his own norms and in the most contradictory way, in that he accepts as a turning-point of the delusion what he rejected in his general conception, namely to make the homosexual theme depend on the idea of grandeur (I will assume that my readers know his text).

The failure is to be found in necessity, that is, in the fact that Freud had not yet formulated what was to become 'On Narcissism: an Introduction'.

8. No doubt he he not three years later (1911-14) failed to grasp the true cause of the reversal of the position of indignation, which was first raised in the person of the subject by the idea of Entmännung: it is precisely because in the interval the subject had died.

This, at least, was what the voices, always informed by the right sources and always reliable in their information service, made known to him after the event with the date and the name of the newspaper in which the announcement had appeared in the list of recent deaths (S. 81-VII).

Personally, I can content myself with the evidence provided by the medical certificates, which give us at the right moment the picture of the patient plunged in catatonic stupor.

As usual, his memories of this period are plentiful. Thus we know that, modifying the custom by which one departs this life feet first, our patient, so as to cross it only in transit, was pleased to keep his feet out of it, that is to say, stuck out of the window under the tendentious pretext of getting some fresh air (S. 172-XII), thus renewing perhaps (let us leave this to be appreciated by those who will be interested here only by its imaginary manifestation) the presentation of his birth.

But this is not a career that one takes up in one's late fifties without experiencing some feeling of unfamiliarity. Hence the faithful portrait that the voices, the analists I would say, gave him of himself as a 'leprous corpse leading to another leprous corpse' (S. 92-VII), a very brilliant description, it must be admitted, of an identity reduced to a confrontation with its psychical double, but which moreover renders patent the subject's regression - a topographical, not a genetic, regression - to the mirror stage, even though the relation with the specular other is reduced to its fatal aspect.

It was also the time at which his body was merely a collection of colonies of foreign 'nerves', a sort of sump for fragments detached from the identities of his persecutors (S. XIV).

The relation of all this to homosexuality, which is certainly manifest in the delusion seems to me to necessitate a more advanced regulation of the use that can be made of this reference in theory.

It has great interest, since it is certain that the use of this term in interpretation may produce serious damage, if it is not illuminated with the symbolic relations that I would say were determinant here.

9. I believe that this symbolic determination is demonstrated in the form in which the imaginary structure is restored. At this stage, this imaginary structure presents two aspects that Freud himself distinguished.

The first is that of a trans-sexualist practice, in no way unworthy of being compared with 'perversion', the features of which have emerged in innumerable cases since.27

Furthermore, I must indicate in what way the structure outlined here may throw light on the strange insistence shown by the subjects of these cases in obtaining for their more radically rectifying demands the permission, even one might say the co-operation, of their father.

In any case, we see our subject abandon himself to an erotic activity,
which he emphasizes as being strictly reserved for solitude, but the satisfactions of which he nevertheless admits to. They are those given him by his image in the mirror, when, dressed in the trinkets of female dress, nothing, he says, in the upper part of his body, seems to him incapable of convincing any possible lover of the female bust (S. 280-XXI).

To which we must link, I believe, the development, alleged to be an endosomatic perception, of the so-called nerves of female pleasure in his own testament, that is, in those areas in which they are supposed to be erogenous in women.

One remark, namely, that by concerning oneself unceasingly with the contemplation of the image of woman, and never detaching one's thoughts from the support of something feminine, the divine pleasure will be all the more fulfilled, diverts us into the other aspect of the libidinal phantasies.

This aspect links the feminization of the subject to the co-ordinate of divine copulation.

Freud saw very clearly the element of mortification in this when he stressed what linked 'soul-pleasure' ('volupté d'âme') (Seelenwollust), which is included in it, with 'bliss' (béatitude) (Seligkeit), in the sense in which it is the state of souls after death (abschiedenen Wesen).

That pleasure, regarded henceforth as blessed, should become the soul’s bliss, is, indeed, an essential turning-point, of which Freud, it should be noted, stresses the linguistic motivation when he suggests that the history of his language might throw some light on it.28

This is simply to make a mistake about the dimension in which the letter manifests itself in the unconscious, and which, in accordance with its own agency as letter, is much less etymological (or diachronic, to be precise) than homophonic. Indeed, there is nothing in the German language that would enable us to link selig and Seele, or the bliss that transports the lovers to 'the heavens', even though it is this to which Freud refers when he quotes from the aria in Don Giovanni, and that promised to the 'blessed' souls in heaven. The dead are selig in German only by virtue of a borrowing from Latin, and because the Latin phrase beatae memoriae ('of blessed memory') is translated as seliger Gedächtnis. Their Seelen has more to do with the lakes (Seen) in which they resided for a time than with beatitude. The unconscious, however, is concerned more with the signifier than with the signified and the phrase 'feu mon père' ('my late father') may mean, as far as the unconscious is concerned, that my father was the fire of God ('le feu de Dieu'), or even that I am ordering him to be shot (Fire!)

But this digression apart, it remains that we are here beyond the world, which accommodates itself very well to an endless postponement of the realization of its aim.

Certainly, indeed, when Schreber has completed his transformation into a woman, the act of divine fecundation will take place, in which, of course, God could not commit himself in an obscure passage through the organs (S. 3-Introduct.). (We must not forget God’s aversion to the living creature.) It is through a spiritual operation, therefore, that Schreber will feel awakening within him the embryonic germ, the stirrings of which he has already experienced in the early stages of his illness.

No doubt the new spiritual humanity of the Schreberian creatures will be entirely engendered through his loins, so that the corrupt, doomed humanity of the present age may be reborn. This is indeed a sort of redemption, since the delusion has been catalogued in this way, but it is a redemption aimed only at the creature of the future, for the creature of the present is struck by a decadence correlative with the capture of the divine rays by the pleasure that rivets them to Schreber (S. 31-2-V).

In this there is adumbrated the dimension of mirage that is even more emphasized by the indefiniteness of the time in which the promise of redemption is suspended, and is profoundly conditioned by the absence of mediation to which the phantasy bears witness. For one can see that it parodies the situation of the couple of ultimate survivors who, following some human catastrophe, would see themselves, with the power to repopulate the earth, confronted by that element of totality that the act of animal reproduction bears within itself.

Here again one can place under the sign of the creature the turning-point at which the line divides into its two branches, that of narcissistic pleasure and that of the ideal identification. But it is in the sense in which its image is the trap of imaginary capture in which each is rooted. And there too the line moves around a hole, more specifically the hole in which 'soul-murder' installed death.

Was this other abyss formed simply by the effect in the imaginary order of the vain appeal made in the symbolic order to the paternal metaphor? Or should we conceive it as produced in a second degree by the elision of the phallus, which the subject seems to re-introduce in order to resolve it in the mortifying gap of the mirror-stage? Certainly the link – this time a genetic one – between this stage and the symbolization of the Mother as primordial could not fail to be referred to in motivating this solution.

Can we map the geometrical points of schema R on to a schema of the
structure of the subject at the termination of the psychotic process? This is what I have tried to do in schema I below.

It may well be, of course, that this schema suffers from the excess endemic in any attempt to formalize the intuitive.

That is to say, the distortion that it manifests between the functions identified in it by the letters introduced into it from schema R can be appreciated only in a dialectical way.

Let us point out here simply in the double curve of the hyperbola that it forms, at the closest point of these two curves, along one of the directing lines, the link made apparent, in the double asymptote that unites the delusional ego to the divine other, from their imaginary divergence in space and time to the ideal convergence of their conjunction. But it must not be forgotten that Freud himself had an intuition of such a form, since it was he who introduced the term asymptotisch in this regard.29

All the density of the real creature, on the other hand, is interposed for the subject between narcissistic jouissance of his image and the alienation of speech in which the ego ideal has taken the place of the Other.

The schema shows that the terminal state of the psychosis does not represent the frozen chaos culminating in the debris caused by an earthquake, but rather that bringing to light of lines of efficiency, which causes speech when it is a question of an elegant solution to a problem.

It materializes in a significant way that which lies in the very principle of the effective fruitfulness of Freud's research; for it is a fact that without any other support than a written document, not only evidence, but also the production of this terminal state of the psychosis, Freud first threw light on the evolution itself of the process, thus making it possible to illuminate its own determination, by which I mean the only organicity that is essentially relevant to this process: that which motivates the structure of signification.

Brought together in the form of this schema, the relations emerge by which the induction effects of the signifier, bearing on the imaginary order, determine this overthrow of the subject that clinical experience designates under the aspects of the twilight of the world, necessitating in order to reply to them new signifying effects.

In my seminar I showed that the symbolic succession of the anterior and posterior kingdoms of God, the lower and the higher, Ahriman and Ormuz, and their shifts of 'policy' (a word of the fundamental language) with regard to the subject, give precisely those answers to the different stages of imaginary dissolution, which, indeed, the patient's memories and the medical certificates connote sufficiently, in order to restore to them an order of the subject.

As for the question that I am proposing here concerning the alienating effect of the signifier, I would refer to that nadir of a July night in 1894 when Ahriman, the lower God, revealing himself to Schreber in the most impressive apparel of his power, called him by that simple word, which, according to the subject, is a common word of the fundamental language: Luder/30

To translate the word we must do more than simply look it up in the Sachs-Villate dictionary, which is what the French translator was content to do. M. Niederland's reference to the English lewd does not seem to me to be acceptable as an attempt to convey the sense of 'wretch' or 'slut', which is what it means when used as a term of abuse.

But if we take account of the archaism indicated as characteristic of the fundamental language, we may feel justified in linking this term to the root of the French lure, and of the English lure, which is certainly the best address ad hominem to be expected from the symbolic order: the Other can be very impertinent.

There remains the disposition of the field R in the schema, in that it represents the conditions in which reality was restored for the subject: for him a sort of islet the consistency of which is imposed on him after the trial of his constancy,31 which for me is linked to that which makes it habitable for him, but also which distorts it, namely, eccentric reshapings of the imaginary I and of the symbolic S, which reduce it to the field of their staggered shift.
The subordinate conception that we must give ourselves of the function of reality in the process, in its cause as well as in its effects, is important here.

We cannot develop here the admittedly crucial question of knowing what we are for the subject, we, whom he addresses as readers, nor the question of what remains of his relations with his wife, to whom the first draft of his book was dedicated, whose visits during his illness were always welcomed with the most intense emotion, and for whom, he assures us, concurrently with his most decisive avowal of his delusional vocation, he has 'retained his old love' (S. note to p. 179-XIII).

The maintenance in schema I of the trajectory So'o'O symbolizes in it the opinion that I have made of the examination of this case, that the relation to the other in so far as it is similar to him, and even a relation as elevated as that of friendship in the sense in which Aristotle sees it as constituting the essence of the conjugal relation, are perfectly compatible with the unbalancing of the relation to the capital Other, and the radical anomaly that it involves, qualified, improperly, but not without some approximation to the truth, in old clinical medicine, as partial delusion.

However, it would be better to confine this schema to the waste-bin, if, like so many others, it was to lead anyone to forget in an intuitive image the analysis on which it is based.

Indeed, one only has to think about it to realize how this would be to the greater credit of the commentator, Mrs Ida Macalpine, whose authentic thinking I should like to praise for the last time, provided one failed to recognize my reasons for introducing this schema.

What I am saying here is that it is the business of reason to recognize the drama of madness, sua res agitum, because it is in man's relation to the signifier that this drama is situated.

The notion that one will become as mad as the patient no more intimidates me than it did Freud.

Like Freud, I hold that we must listen to the speaker, when it is a question of a message that does not come from a subject beyond language, but from speech beyond the subject. For only then will one hear that speech, which Schreber captured in the Other, when from Ahriman to Ormuz, from the evil God to the absent God, it brings the seed in which the very law of the signifier is articulated: 'Aller Unsinn hebt sich auf!' 'All Nonsense is abolished!' (S. 182–3-XIII and 312-P.S. IV).

A point at which I return (leaving to those who will concern themselves with me the trouble of finding out why I have left it in suspense for ten years) to what I said in my dialogue with Henri Ey: 'Not only can man's being not be understood without madness, it would not be man's being if it did not bear madness within itself as the limit of his freedom.'

V Post-Scriptum

Following Freud I teach that the Other is the locus of that memory that he discovered and called the unconscious, a memory that he regards as the object of a question that has remained open in that it conditions the indestructibility of certain desires. I would reply to this question in terms of the conception of the signifying chain, as inaugurated by the primordial symbolization (made manifest in the game Fort! Dal!, which Freud revealed as lying at the origin of the repetition compulsion); this chain develops in accordance with logical links whose grasp on that which is to be signified, namely the being (l'être) and the existent (l'étant) operates through the effects of the signifier, which I describe as metaphor and metonymy.

It is in an accident in this register and in what takes place in it, namely, the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in the place of the Other, and in the failure of the paternal metaphor, that I designate the defect that gives psychosis its essential condition, and the structure that separates it from neurosis.

This thesis, which I introduce here as the question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis, pursues its dialectic beyond this point: but I shall stop it here and I will say why.

First, because it is worth indicating what can be discovered from my pause.

A perspective that does not isolate Schreber's relationship with God from its subjective relief, the mark of negative features that make it appear rather as a mixture than a union of being and being, and which, in the voracity that is compounded in it with disgust, in the complicity that supports its exaction, shows nothing, to call things by their real names, of the Presence and Joy that illuminate the mystical experience: an opposition that is not only demonstrated by, but which is based on the astonishing absence in this relationship of the Du, in French the Tu, which in English (Thou) is reserved for the call from God and the appeal to God, and which is the signifier of the Other in speech.
I know the false modesty that is current in science on this subject; it is a fit companion for the false thought of pedantry, when it argues the ineffable nature of lived experience, even of the 'morbid consciousness', in order to disarm the effort that it expends, namely, that required at precisely the point at which it is not ineffable since it (we) speaks, at which lived experience, far from separating, communicates itself, at which subjectivity yields up its true structure, the structure in which what is analysed is identical with what is articulated.

And from the same dramatic viewpoint to which delusional subjectivity has brought us, we will also turn our attention to scientific subjectivity: I mean that which the scientist at work in science shares with the man of the civilization that supports it. I will not deny that in the part of the world in which we reside, I have seen enough of it to question myself as to the criteria by which man with a discourse on freedom that must certainly be called delusional (I have devoted one of my seminars to it), with a concept of the real in which determinism is no more than an alibi that soon arouses anxiety if one tries to extend its field to chance (I have tried this out on my listeners in an experiment), with a belief that gathers men together, for half the world at least, under the symbol of Father Christmas (which can hardly escape anyone), this man would divert me from situating him, by a legitimate analogy, in the category of social psychosis – in the establishment of which Pascal, if I am not mistaken, preceded me.

That such a psychosis may prove to be compatible with what is called good order is not in question, but neither does it authorize the psychiatrist, even if he is a psychoanalyst, to trust to his own compatibility with that order to the extent of believing that he is in possession of an adequate idea of the reality to which his patient appears to be unequal.

Perhaps in these conditions it would be better to abandon this idea of his appreciation of the foundations of psychosis: which brings us back to the aim of his treatment.

To measure the path that separates us, we have only to recall all the delays with which its pilgrims have marked it. Everyone knows that no elaboration of the transference mechanism, however skilful it may be, has succeeded in so arranging things that in practice it is not conceived as a relation that is purely dual in its terms and utterly confused in its substratum.

Let us introduce the question of what, to take the transference only for its fundamental value as a phenomenon of repetition, it should repeat in the persecuting persons in which Freud here designates its effects?

I can just hear the feeble reply: following your approach, paternal inadequacy no doubt. In this style, there has been no shortage of accounts of every kind: and the 'entourage' of the psychotic has been the object of a meticulous enumeration of all the biographical and characterological labels that anamnesis enabled them to extract from the *dramatis personae*, even from their 'interhuman relations'.

But let us proceed according to the structural terms that we have outlined.

For the psychosis to be triggered off, the Name-of-the-Father, *verworfen*, foreclosed, that is to say, never having attained the place of the Other, must be called into symbolic opposition to the subject.

It is the lack of the Name-of-the-Father in that place which, by the hole that it opens up in the signified, sets off the cascade of reshappenings of the signifier from which the increasing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, to the point at which the level is reached at which signifier and signified are stabilized in the delusional metaphor.

But how can the Name-of-the-Father be called by the subject to the only place in which it could have reached him and in which it has never been? Simply by a real father, not necessarily by the subject's own father, but by A-father.

Again, this A-father must attain that place to which the subject was unable to call him before. It is enough that this A-father should be situated in a third position in some relation based on the imaginary dyad o-o', that is to say, ego-object or reality-ideal, that interests the subject in the field of eroticized aggression that it induces.

Let us try to find this conjuncture at the beginning of the psychosis. Whether it occurs, for the woman who has just given birth, in her husband's face, for the penitent confessing his sins in the person of his confessor, for the girl in love in her meeting with 'the young man's father', it will always be found, and be found more easily if one allows oneself to be guided by 'situations' in the sense in which the word is used of the novel. It should be said in passing, however, that for the novelist these situations are his true resource, namely, that which makes possible the emergence of 'depth psychology', where no psychological insight would enable him to penetrate.

To move on now to the principle of the foreclosure (*Verwerfung*) of the Name-of-the-Father, it must be admitted that the Name-of-the-Father reduplicates in the place of the Other the signifier itself of the symbolic triad, in that it constitutes the law of the signifier.
The attempt will cost nothing, it seems, for those who in the search for the environmental co-ordinates of psychosis wander like lost souls from the frustrating mother to the smothering mother, feeling nevertheless perhaps that in moving towards the situation of the father of the family, they are getting warmer, as one says in the game of hunt-the-slipper.

Again, in this groping search for a paternal inadequacy, whose ceaseless, disquieting hesitation between the dominating father, the easy-going father, the all-powerful father, the humiliated father, the awkward father, the pitiful father, the home-loving father, the father on the loose, would it not be too much to expect some release of tension from the following remark: namely, that the effects of prestige that are involved in all this, and in which (thank heaven!) the ternary relation of the Oedipus complex is not entirely omitted, since the veneration of the mother is regarded as decisive in it, are reduced to the rivalry between the two parents in the subject's imaginary order—that is, to that which is articulated in the question that appears to be normal, not to say obligatory, in any self-respecting childhood: 'Who do you love most, mummy or daddy?'

My aim in this parallel is not to reduce anything; quite the contrary, for this question, in which the child never fails to concretize the nausea that he feels at the infantilism of his parents is precisely that with which those children that the parents really are (in this sense, there are no others in the family but them) try to mask the mystery of their union, or disunion, namely, of that which their offspring knows very well is the whole problem and is posed as such.

It will be said that the accent is placed on precisely the link of love and respect, by which the mother does or does not put the father in his ideal place. Curious, I would reply at first, that one hardly takes account of the same links the other way round, in which it is proved that the theory participates in the veil thrown over the parents' coitus by infantile amnesia.

But what I do wish to insist on is that we should concern ourselves not only with the way in which the mother accommodates herself to the person of the father, but also with the way she takes his speech, the word (mat), let us say, of his authority, in other words, of the place that she reserves for the Name-of-the-Father in the promulgation of the law.

Further still, the father's relation to this law must be considered in itself, for one will find in it the reason for that paradox, by which the ravaging effects of the paternal figure are to be observed with particular frequency in cases where the father really has the function of a legislator or, at least has the upper hand, whether in fact he is one of those fathers who make the laws or whether he poses as the pillar of the faith, as a paragon of integrity and devotion, as virtuous or as a virtuoso, by serving a work of salvation, of whatever object or lack of object, of nation or of birth, of safeguard or salubrity, of legacy or legality, of the pure, the impure or of empire, all ideals that provide him with all too many opportunities of being in a posture of undeserving, inadequacy, even of fraud, and, in short, of excluding the Name-of-the-Father from its position in the signifier.

So much is not needed to obtain this result, and none of those who practise child analysis will deny that dishonest behaviour is totally transparent to them. But who articulates that the lie thus perceived implies a reference to the constituting function of speech?

It thus proves that a little severity is not too much to give to the most accessible experience its true meaning. The consequences that may be expected in their examination and technique are to be judged elsewhere.

I am giving here only what is needed for an appreciation of the clumsiness with which the most inspired authors handle what they find most valuable in following Freud over the terrain of the pre-eminence that he accords to the transference of the relation to the father in the genesis of psychosis.

Niederland provides a remarkable example of this when he draws attention to Flechsig's delusional genealogy, constructed with the names of Schreber's real ancestors, Gottfried, Gottlieb, Fürchtegott, and, above all, Daniel, which is handed down from father to son and of which he gives the meaning in Hebrew, to show in their convergence on the name of God (Gott) an important symbolic chain by which the function of the father can be manifested in the delusion.

But failing to distinguish in it the agency of the Name-of-the-Father, and it is obviously not enough, in order to recognize it, that it should be visible here to the naked eye, he misses the opportunity of grasping it in the chain in which the erotic aggressions experienced by the subject are formed, and thereby of contributing to putting in its place what should properly be termed delusional homosexuality.

How, then, can he stop at what is concealed in the statement of the sentence quoted above from the first lines of Schreber's second chapter? One of those statements so obviously made not to be heard that they must be noted. What, to take it literally, is the meaning of the equal footing on which the author joins the names of Flechsig and Schreber to soul-murder in order to introduce us to the principle of abuse of which he
is the victim? We must leave something for future commentators to penetrate.

As uncertain is the attempt made by Niederland in the same article to specify, this time on the basis of the subject, rather than the signifier (the terms, of course, are not his), the role of the paternal function in the triggering off of delusion.

If, indeed, he claims to be able to designate the occasion of the psychosis in the mere assumption of paternity by the subject, which is the theme of his attempt, it is contradictory to regard as equivalent the frustration noted by Schreber of his hopes of paternity and his appointment as a High Court judge, the title of which (Senatspräsident) emphasizes the quality of Father (albeit a conscript father) that it accords him: this for the sole motivation of his second crisis, without prejudice to the first, which can be explained in a similar way by the failure of his candidature for the Reichstag.

Whereas the reference to the third position, to which the signifier of paternity is called in all such cases, would be correct and would resolve this contradiction.

But from the point of view of my thesis it is the primordial foreclosure (Verwerfung) that dominates everything with its problem, and the preceding considerations leave me here unprepared.

For to refer to the work of Daniel Gottlob Moritz Schreber, founder of an orthopaedic institute at the University of Leipzig, an educator, or, better still, an ‘educationalist’ as they say in English, a social reformer ‘with an apostolic vocation to bring health, well-being and happiness to the masses’ (sic. Ida Macalpine, op. cit. 137) through physical culture, initiator of those garden allotments intended to preserve in the employee a kind of cabbage-patch idealism, which in Germany are still known as Schrebergärten, not to mention forty editions of the Indoor Medical Gymnastics, of which the roughly sketched little fellows that illustrate it are more or less referred to by Schreber (S. 166-XII), we will be able to regard as past the limits at which the native and the natal extend to nature, to the natural, to naturism, even to naturalization, at which virtue becomes vertigo, legacy the league, salvation salutation, at which the pure touches on the ‘impure and the empire’ (malempire), and at which I will not be surprised if the child, like the cabin-boy of Prévert’s famous trawler, throws back (verwerfe) the whale of imposture, after piercing, according to the line of this immortal piece, the web from one end to the other (de père en part).

There can be no doubt that the face of Judge Flechsig, with its scientist’s gravity (Mrs Macalpine’s book contains a photograph that shows him profiled against a colossal enlargement of a cerebral hemisphere), failed to fill the sudden void perceived in the inaugural Verwerfung (‘Little Flechsig!’ ‘Little Flechsig!’ shout the voices).

At least, that is Freud’s conception, in so far as it designates in the transference that the subject operated on the person of Flechsig the factor that precipitated the subject into psychosis.

In consideration of which, some months later, the divine voices will make their concert heard in the subject in order to tell the Name-of-the-Father to fuck himself with the Name of God38 in his backside and to found the Son in his certainty that at the end of his trials, he could not do better than ‘do’ on9 the whole world (S. 226-XVI).

Thus the last word in which ‘the internal experience’ of our century should have yielded us its computation, is articulated fifty years ahead of its time in the theodicy to which Schreber is exposed: ‘God is a tart’ (Dieu est une p...).40

The term, in which the process by which the signifier has ‘unleashed’ itself in the real culminates, after the failure of the Name-of-the-Father was opened up – that is to say, the failure of the signifier in the Other, as locus of the signifier, is the signifier of the Other as locus of the law.

And there for the time being I will leave this question that is preliminary to any possible treatment of the psychoses – a question that introduces, as we see, the conception to be formed of the handling, in this treatment, of the transference.

To say that on this terrain we can do anything would be premature, because it would now be to go ‘beyond Freud’, and there can be no question of going beyond Freud when post-Freud psychoanalysis has, as I have said, gone back to an earlier stage.

At least that is what separates me from any other object than to restore access to the experience that Freud discovered.

For to use the technique that he established, outside the experience to which it was applied, is as stupid as to toil at the oars when the ship is on sand.


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Notes

1. Roman Jakobson borrows this term from Jespersen to designate those words of the code that take on meaning only from the co-ordinates (attribution, date, place of emission) of the message. In Pierce's classification they are indexical symbols. Personal pronouns are the most obvious example: the difficulties involved in their acquisition and their function to deficiencies illustrate the problematic created by these signifiers in the subject. (Roman Jakobson, Shifters, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb, Russian Language Project, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University, 1957.)

2. Cf. the seminar of 8 February 1956 in which I developed the example of the 'normal' vocalization of 'la paix du soir'.

3. Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken, von Dr. jur. Daniel-Paul Schreber, Senatspräsident beim kgl. Oberlarient-Beicht, Dresden 1810, Oswald Mutze, Leipzig, 1903, the French translation of which I have prepared for the use of my group.

4. This is particularly the opinion expressed by the English translator of these Memoirs, which appeared in the same year as this seminar (cf. Memoirs of my Nervous Illness, translated by Ida Macalpine and Richard Hunter, London, W. M. Dawson & Sons), in her introduction, p. 23. She also gives an account of the success of the book, pp. 6–10.

5. This was the subject of my thesis for the doctorate in medicine, De la psychose paranôtique dans ses rapports avec la personnalité, which my master Heuer, in a letter to me, judged very particularly in these terms: 'One swallow doesn't make a spring', adding in conjunction with my bibliography: 'If you've read all that, I'm sorry for you'. In fact I had read it all.

6. The brackets around the letter S followed by figures (Arabic and Roman respectively) will be used here to refer to the corresponding page and chapter of the original edition of the Denkwürdigkeiten, the pagination being fortunately retained in the margins of the English translation.

7. It should be noted that my homage here is merely an extension of that of Freud, who was not averse to recognizing in Schreber's delusion itself a foreshadowing of the theory of the Libido (G.W., VIII, 315).


9. English in the original.

10. To attempt to prove too much is to wander from the point. Thus Mrs Macalpine, who otherwise is wise enough to stop at the character, noted by the patient himself as being much too perseverative (S. 39–IV), of the suggestive invigoration in which Judge Flechsig indulges (everything indicates that he was usually more calm) in relation to Schreber on the subject of the promises of a sleep cure that he proposes for him, Mrs Macalpine, I would say, interprets at length the themes of procreation, which she regards as being suggested by this discourse (See Memoirs... Discussion, p. 306, lines 12 and 21), basing her case on the use of the verb to deliver to designate the effect to be expected from the treatment of his disorders, and on that of the adjective prolific, with which she translates, extremely loosely, the German term, ausgiebig, applied to the sleep in question.

Now the word to deliver is indisputable as a translation, for the simple reason that there is nothing to translate. I looked again and again at the German text. The verb was simply forgotten by either the author or the compositor, and Mrs Macalpine, in an effort to make sense of the translation, has, unknown to herself, restored it. The pleasure that she must later have experienced on rediscovering it so close to her wishes was surely well deserved!


12. I would ask Mrs Macalpine (see Memoirs, Part VIII, 409) whether the figure 9, as it is involved in such diverse durations as the delays of 9 hours, 9 days, 9 months, 9 years, which she springs out at us at every point in the patient's anamnesis, only to find it again at the time by the clock at which his anxiety postponed the beginning of the sleep-cure referred to above, and, again, even in the hesitation between 4 and 5 days that recurred several times in the same period that saw the return of his memory of himself, should be conceived as forming part as such, that is to say, as a symbol of the imaginary relation isolated by it as a procreation phantasy.

The question is of interest to everybody, for it differs from the use Freud, in the Wolf Man Case, makes of the form of the figure V, which is presumed to have been retained from the point of the hand on the clock during a scene witnessed at the age of one and a half, and to reappear in the beating of a butterfly's wings, the open legs of a girl, etc.


14. Before Sunrise, 'For donon-auf-gang', Also Sprach Zarathustra, Dritter Teil. It is the fourth song of this third part.

15. 'Le pense sans rire' - A pun on the phrase 'pinceaux rire', 'keeping a straight face' [Tr.]

16. A pun on 'Baudelaire' and the oath 'bordel de Dieu' [Tr.]

17. English in the original [Tr.]

18. The mapping in this schema R of the object (object a) is interesting for the light it sheds on the field of reality (the field that bars it).

I have since laid great stress on the need to develop it - by stating that this field functions only by obliterating itself from the phantasy - but this still requires a good deal of attention.

There might be some point in recognizing that, enigmatic as it may then have seemed, but perfectly legible for anyone who knows the outcome, as is the case if one claims to use it as a support, what schema R shows is a projective plan.

In particular the writer is not by chance (or by a sense of play) that I chose the letters that correspond to them - e M, i I - and which are those that frame the only valid cut in this schema (the cut e, MI), are sufficient indication that this cut isolates a Moebius strip in the field.

To say this is to say all, since this field will now be merely the representative of the phantasy of which this cut provides the entire structure.

I mean that only the cut reveals the structure of the entire surface from being able to detach from it those two heterogeneous elements (represented in my algorithm ($\Phi_0$) of the phantasy: the $S$, $S$ barred by the strip to be expected here in fact, that is to say, covering the field $R$ of reality, and the $o$, which corresponds to the fields I and S.

It is as the representative of the representation in phantasy, therefore, that is to say as the originally repressed subject that $S$, the barred $S$ of desire, here supports the field of reality, and this field is sustained only by the extraction of the object $o$, which, however, gives it its third part.

By measuring in stages, all vectorialized by an intrusion into the field $R$ only of the field $I$, which is well articulated in my text only as the effect of narcissism, it is therefore quite out of the question that I would wish to reintroduce, by some back door, the notion that these effects ('system of identifications', as I would say) may, in some way, theoretically ground reality.

Whoever has followed my topological expositions (which are justified by nothing but the structure of the phantasy as it is articulated) must know very well that in the Moebius strip there is nothing measurable to be retained in its structure, and that it is reduced, like the real with which we are concerned here, to the cut itself.
I think I can better fulfil my duties to scientific rigour by pointing out the hypocrisy which, in this detour as in others, reduces to the benign, not to say to the tame, what the Freudian experience demonstrates. I mean the indefinable use to which references like the following are put: at this stage in his analysis, the patient regressed to the anal phase. It would be good to see the analyst's face if the patient suddenly defecated, or even slobbered, on his couch.

All this is no more than a concealed return to the sublimation that finds shelter in the *inter urinam et faucies nascanum*, with its implication that this sordid origin is of concern only to our bodies.

What analysis uncovers is something quite other. It is not his rags, but the very being of man that takes up its position among the waste matter in which his first frolics occur, much as the law of symbolization in which his desire must operate catches him in its net by the position of the part-object in which he offers himself on arrival in the world, in a world in which the desire of the Other lays down the law.

This relation, of course, is clearly articulated by Schreber in what he ascribes, to leave no possible ambiguity, to the act of shifting – namely, the fact of feeling the elements of his being, the dispersion of which into the infinity of his delusion constitutes his suffering, gathered together.

40. Under the form: *Die Sonne ist eine Hure* (S. 384–App.). For Schreber, the sun is the central aspect of God. The interior experience referred to here is the title of Georges Bataille's most central work. In *Madame Edwarda*, he describes the strange extremity of this experience.