On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis

This article contains the most important parts of the seminar given during the first two terms of the academic year 1955–6, at the École Normale Supérieure. It first appeared in La Psychanalyse, vol. 4.

Hoc quod triginta tres per annos in ipso loco studui, et Sanctae Annae Genio loci, et dilectae juventuti, quae eo me secutata est, diligentem dedico.

I Towards Freud

1. Half a century of Freudianism applied to psychosis leaves its problem still to be rethought, in other words, at the status quo ante.

It might be said that before Freud discussion of psychosis did not detach itself from a theoretical background that presented itself as psychology, but which was merely a 'laicized' remainder of what we shall call the long metaphysical coction of science in the School (with the capital 'S' that it deserves).

Now if our science, which concerns the physis, in its ever purer mathematization, retains from this cooking no more than a whiff so subtle that one may legitimately wonder whether there has not been a substitution of person, the same cannot be said of the antiphysis (that is, the living apparatus that one hopes is capable of measuring the said physis), whose smell of burnt fat betrays without the slightest doubt the age-old practice in the said cooking of the preparation of brains.

Thus the theory of abstraction, necessary in accounting for knowledge, has become fixed in an abstract theory of the faculties of the subject, which the most radical sensualist petitions could not render more functional with regard to subjective effects.
The constantly renewed attempts to correct its results by the varied counterweights of the affect are doomed to failure as long as one omits to ask if it is indeed the same subject that is affected.

2. It is the question that one learns on the school bench (with a small 's') to avoid once and for all: for even if the alternations of identity of the perciptiens are admitted, its function in the constitution of the unity of the perceptum is not discussed. The diversity of structure of the perceptum affects in the perciptiens only a diversity of register, in the final analysis, that of the sensoriums. In law, this diversity is always surmountable if the perciptiens is capable of apprehending reality.

That is why those whose task it is to answer the question posed by the existence of the madman could not prevent themselves from interposing between it and them those same school benches, which provided such a convenient shelter.

Indeed, I would dare to lump together, if I may say so, all the positions, whether they are mechanist or dynamist, whether they see genesis as deriving from the organism or from the psyche, and structure from disintegration or from conflict. All of them, ingenious as they are in declaring, in the name of a manifest fact that a hallucination is a perceptum without an object end up asking the perciptiens the reason for this perceptum, without anyone realizing that in this request, a step has been skipped, the step of asking oneself whether the perceptum itself bequeathed a univocal sense to the perciptiens here required to explain it.

This step, however, ought to appear legitimate in any unbiased examination of verbal hallucination, because it is not reducible to a specific sensorium, still less to a perciptiens in the sense that the latter would give it its unity.

In effect, it is an error to hold it as essentially auditive when it is conceivable that it be not so at all (for a deaf-mute, for example, or in some non-auditive register of hallucinatory spelling). It is an error moreover because we realise that the act of hearing is not the same, according to whether it aims at the coherence of the verbal chain, namely, its over-determination at each instant by the deferred action (après-coup) of its sequence, as, too, the suspension at each instant of its value at the advent of a meaning, ever ready for return — or according to whether it accommodates itself in speech to sound modulation, to this or that end of acoustic analysis: tonal or phonetic, even of musical power.

These very brief remarks were enough to bring out the difference of the subjectivities concerned in the perspective of the perceptum (and the extent to which it is misunderstood in the questioning of patients and the nosology of 'voices').

But one might claim to reduce this difference to a level of objectification in the perciptiens.

This, however, is not the case. For it is at the level at which subjective 'synthesis' confers its full meaning on speech that the subject reveals all the paradoxes of which he is the patient in this singular perception. These paradoxes already appear when it is the other who offers speech: this is sufficiently evidenced in the subject by the possibility of his obeying this speech in so far as it governs his hearing and his being-on-his-guard, for simply by entering the other's auditory field, the subject falls under the sway of a suggestion from which he can escape only by reducing the other to being no more than the spokesman of a discourse that is not his own or of an intention that he is holding in reserve.

But still more striking is the subject's relation to his own speech, in which the important factor is rather masked by the purely acoustic fact that he cannot speak without hearing himself. Nor is there anything special about the fact that he cannot listen to himself without being divided as far as the behaviour of the consciousness is concerned. Clinicians did better by discovering verbal motor hallucination by detecting the outline of phonatory movements. Yet they have not articulated where the crucial point resides; it is that the sensorium being indifferent in the production of a signifying chain:

(a) this signifying chain imposes itself, by itself, on the subject in its vocal dimension;
(b) it takes as such a reality proportional to the time, perfectly observable in experience, that its subjective attribution involves;
(c) its own structure qua signifier is determinant in this attribution, which, as a rule, is distributive, that is to say, possesses several voices, and, therefore, renders equivocal a supposedly unifying perciptiens.

3. I shall illustrate what I have just said with a phenomenon taken from one of my clinical presentations for the year 1955–6, that is, the year of the seminar referred to here. Let us say that such a discovery can be made only at the cost of complete submission, even if it is intentional, to the properly subjective positions of the patient, positions which all too often one distorts in reducing them to a morbid process, thus reinforcing the difficulty of penetrating them with a not unjustified reticence on the part of the subject.
It was a case in fact of one of those shared delusions, of which I long ago showed the type in the mother/daughter couple, in which a sense of intrusion, developing into a delusion of being spied on, was merely the development of the defence proper to an affective binary relation, open as such to any form of alienation.

It was the daughter who, when interviewed, gave me as proof of the insults to which both of them were subjected by their neighbours a fact concerning the lover of the neighbour who was supposed to be harassing them with her attacks, after they had had to break off a friendship with her that was at first encouraged. This man, who was no more therefore than an indirect party to the situation, and indeed a somewhat shadowy figure in the patient's allegations, had, apparently, called after her, as he passed her in the corridor of the block of flats in which they lived, the offensive word: 'Sow!'.

Upon which, I, little inclined to see in it a counter-thrust to 'Pig!', which would be too easy to extrapolate in the name of a projection which, in such a case, is never more than the psychiatrist's own projection, went on to ask her what she might have said the moment before. Not without success: for, with a smile, she conceded that, on seeing the man, she had murmured the apparently harmless enough words: 'I've just been to the pork butcher's...'

Who were these words directed to? She was hard put to say it, thus giving me the right to help her. For their textual meaning, we cannot ignore the fact, among others, that the patient had suddenly taken leave of her husband and her family-in-law and thus given to a marriage that her mother disapproved of an outcome that has remained unchanged. This departure rested on the conviction she had acquired that these peasants proposed nothing less, in order to put an end to this good-for-nothing city girl, than to cut her into pieces.

What does it matter, however, whether or not one has to resort to the phantasy of the fragmented body in order to understand how the patient, a prisoner of the dual relationship, responds once more here to a situation that is beyond her comprehension.

For our present purposes, it is enough that the patient should have admitted that the phrase was allusive, even though she was unable to be anything other than perplexed as to which of the two present or the one absent person was being alluded to, for it thus appears that the I, as subject of the sentence in direct style, left in suspense, in accordance with its function as a 'shifter', as it is called in linguistics, the designation of the speaking subject, for as long as the allusion, in its conjuratory intention no doubt, itself remained in a state of oscillation. After the pause, this uncertainty came to an end with the apposition of the word 'Sow', itself too loaded with inventive to follow the oscillation isochronically. Thus the discourse came to realize its intention as rejection in hallucination. In the place where the unanswerable object is rejected in the real, a word makes itself heard, so that, coming in the place of that which has no name, it was unable to follow the intention of the subject without detaching itself from it by the dash preceding the reply: opposing its disparaging antithese to the cursing of the strophe thus restored to the patient with the index of the I, resembling in its opacity the ejaculations of love, when, lacking a signifier to name the object of its epithalamium, it employs the crudest trickery of the imaginary. 'I'll eat you up... Sweetie!' 'You'll love it... Rat!'

4. I have referred to this example here only to show in living, concrete detail that the function of irrealization is not everything in the symbol.

For, in order that its irruption into the real should be beyond question, it has only to present itself, as it usually does, in the form of a broken chain.

We also touch here upon the effect that every signifier has, once it is perceived, of arousing in the percipiens an assent composed of the awakening of the hidden duality of the second by the manifest ambiguity of the first.

Of course, all this may be regarded as mirage effects from the classical point of view of the unifying subject.

But it is striking that this point of view, reduced to itself, should offer, on hallucination for example, only views of such poverty that the work of a madman, no doubt as remarkable as Judge Schreber in his Memoirs of My Nervous Illness may, after being welcomed most enthusiastically, before Freud, by psychiatrists, be regarded, even after him, as a collection of writings to be offered as an introduction to the phenomenology of psychosis, and not only for the beginner.

He provided me, too, with the basis of a structural analysis, when, in my seminar for the year 1955-6 on Freudian structures in psychosis, I followed Freud's advice and re-examined his case.

The relation between the signifier and the subject that this analysis reveals is to be met – it is apparent in this address – with the very appearance of these phenomena, if, returning from Freud's experience, one is aware of the point to which it is leading.
But this departure from the phenomenon, if properly carried out, would lead us back to that point, as was the case for me when an early study of paranoia led me thirty years ago to the threshold of psychoanalysis.

Nowhere, in fact, is the fallacious conception of a psychical process in Jaspers' conception of this process, in which the symptom is merely the index, more irrelevant than in the approach to psychosis, because nowhere is the symptom, if one can decipher it, more clearly articulated in the structure itself.

Which makes it incumbent on us to define this process by the most radical determinants of the relation of man to the signifier.

5. But we do not have to have reached that stage to be interested in the variety of verbal hallucinations to be found in Schreber's Memoirs, or to recognize in them differences quite other than those in which they are 'classically' classified, according to their mode of involvement in the percipients (the degree of his 'belief') or in the reality of the same ('auditation'): or rather, the differences that derive from their speech structure, in so far as this structure is already in the percepturn.

Simply by considering the text of the hallucinations, a distinction arises for the linguist between code phenomena and message phenomena.

To the phenomena of code belong, in this approach, the voices that use the Grundsprache, which I would translate as 'basic language' (langue-de-fond), and which Schreber describes (S. 13-I) as 'a somewhat archaic, but always rigorous German that is particularly marked by its great wealth of euphemisms'. Elsewhere (S. 167-XII) he refers regretfully to 'its form, which is authentic on account of its characteristics of noble distinction and simplicity'.

This part of the phenomena is specified in expressions that are neologistic in form (new compound words – the process of compounding being governed here by the rules of the patient's language, langue) and usage. Hallucinations inform the subject of the forms and usages that constitute the neo-code: the subject owes them, for example, primarily, the term Grundsprache to designate it.

It is something fairly close to these messages that linguists call autonyms, even though it is the signifier itself (and not that which it signifies) that is the object of the communication. But this peculiar, but normal relation between the message and itself is reduplicated here by the fact that these messages are regarded as being supported by beings whose relations they themselves state in modes that prove to be very similar to the connections of the signifier. The term Nervenanhang, which I would translate as nerve-annexation (annexion-de-netts), and which also derives from these messages, illustrates this remark in that passion and action between these beings is reduced to those annexed or disannexed nerves, but also in that these nerves, quite as much as the divine rays (Gottesstrahlen) to which they are homogeneous, are simply the joining together of the words (paroles) that they support (S. 130-X: what the voices formulate as: 'Do not forget that the nature of the rays is that they must speak').

There is the relation here of the system to its own constitution as signifier, which would seem to be relevant to the question of metalanguage and which, in my opinion, will demonstrate the impropriety of that notion if it is intended to define differentiated elements in language.

It should be noted, furthermore, that we are presented here with phenomena that have been wrongly called intuitive, on account of the fact that the effect of the signification anticipates the development of the signification. What is involved here, in fact is an effect of the signifier, in so far as its degree of certainty (second degree: signification of signification) assumes a weight proportional to the enigmatic void that first presents itself in the place of the signification itself.

The amusing thing in this case is that it is precisely to the extent that for the subject this high voltage of the signifier drops, that is to say, that the hallucinations are reduced to ritornelli, to mere repetitions, the inanity of which imputed to beings devoid of intelligence and personality, if not frankly effaced from the register of being, that it is to precisely this extent, as I say, that the voices take account of the Seelenaussagen, the conception-of-souls (in the basic language), a conception that is manifested in a catalogue of thoughts that is not unworthy of a book of classical psychology. A catalogue bound up in the voices with a pedantesque intention, a fact that does not prevent the subject from introducing the most pertinent commentaries. I would note that in these commentaries the source of the terms is always carefully distinguished, for example that although the subject uses the word Instant (S. note of 30-II – lecture notes from 11 to 21-I), he emphasizes in a note: 'that word is mine'.

Thus the fundamental importance of memory-thoughts (Erinnerungs-gedanken, pensées-de-mémoire) in the psychical economy does not escape him, and he immediately offers proof of this in the poetic and musical use of modulating repetition.

Our patient, who provides the priceless description of this 'conception of souls' as 'the somewhat idealized representation that souls have formed
of life and human thought' (S. 164-XII), thinks that he has 'gained insights into the essence of the process of thought and feeling in man that might be the envy of many psychologists' (S. 167-XII).

I would agree all the more readily in that, unlike him, he does not imagine that this knowledge, the scope of which he appreciates so humorously, proceeds from the nature of things, and that, although he thinks that he must make use of it, it is, as I have shown, on the basis of a semantic analysis!

But to take up the thread of our argument, let us turn to the phenomena that I will contrast with the earlier ones as message phenomena.

We are dealing here with interrupted messages, by which a relation is sustained between the subject and his divine interlocutor, a relation to which the messages give the form of a challenge or endurance test.

Indeed, the voice of the partner limits the messages involved to the beginning of a sentence whose complement of sense presents, moreover, no difficulty for the subject, other than its harassing, offensive side, which is usually of an ineptitude such as to discourage him. The bravery he shows in not falttering in his reply, even in thwarting the traps laid for him, is not the least important aspect for our analysis of the phenomenon.

But he will pause here again at the very text of what might be called hallucinatory provocation (or protasis). The subject gives us the following examples of such a structure (S. 217-XVI): (1) Nun will ich mich (now I will . . . myself . . .); (2) Sie sollen natürlich . . . (as for you, you ought to . . .); (3) Das will ich mir . . . (I will certainly . . .) - to take only these three - to which he must reply with their significant supplement, for him beyond doubt, namely: (1) face the fact that I am an idiot; (2) as for you, you ought to be exposed (a word of the basic language) as the negator of God and as given up to dissolve sensuality, not to mention other things; (3) think about it.

One might note that the sentence is interrupted at the point at which the group of words that one might call index-terms ends, the terms being either those designated by their function in the signifier, according to the term employed above, as shifters, or precisely the terms which, in the code, indicate the position of the subject on the basis of the message itself.

After which, the properly lexical part of the sentence, in other words that which comprises the words that the code defines by their use, whether the common code or the delusional code is involved, remains elided.

Is one not struck by the predominance of the function of the signifier in these two orders of phenomena, not to say urged to seek what lies at the bottom of the association that they constitute; of a code constituted by messages on the code, and of a message reduced to that in the code which indicates the message.

All this had to be transferred with the greatest care to a graph,* in which this year I tried to represent the connexions internal to the signifier, in so far as they structure the subject.

For there is a topology here that is quite distinct from what might be imagined given the requirement of an immediate parallel between the form of the phenomena and their pathways in the neuraxis.

But this topology, which follows the lines laid down by Freud when, after opening up the field of the unconscious through his work on dreams, he set out to describe the dynamics of the unconscious, without feeling restricted by any concern with cortical localization, is precisely what may best prepare the way for the questions that will be addressed to the surface of the cortex.

For it is only after the linguistic analysis of the phenomenon of language that one can legitimately establish the relation that it constitutes in the subject, and at the same time delimit the order of the 'machines' (in the purely associative sense that this term possesses in the mathematical theory of networks) that may realize this phenomenon.

It is no less remarkable that it should have been the Freudian experience that led the author of these lines in the direction presented here. Let us examine, then, what this experience introduces into our question.

II After Freud

1. What has Freud contributed here? We began by stating that, so far as the problem of psychosis was concerned, this contribution had led to a falling back.

This is immediately apparent in the simplistic character of the elements invoked in conceptions that all amount to a single fundamental schema, namely, how can the internal be transmitted to the external? It is no use, in effect, for the subject to try and encompass here an opaque id, since it is as ego, after all, in a way fully expressed in the present psychoanalytic orientation, as this same indestructible percipiens, that he is invoked in the motivation of psychosis. This percipiens is all-powerful over its no less unchanged correlative, reality, and the model of this power is derived from a datum accessible to common experience, that of affective projection.
For present theories are noteworthy for the totally uncritical way in which this mechanism of projection is used. The objections against such a use are overwhelming, yet this seems to deter no one, and this despite all the clinical evidence that there is nothing in common between affective projection and its supposed delusional effects, between the jealousy of the unfaithful spouse and that of the alcoholic, for example.

That Freud, in his essay of interpretation of the Schreber case, which is read so badly that it is usually reduced to the rehashings that followed, uses the form of a grammatical deduction in order to present the switching of the relation to the other in psychosis, namely, the different ways of denying the proposition, 'I love him', from which it follows that this negative judgement is structured in two stages: the first, the reversal of the value of the verb ('I hate him'), or inversion of the gender of the agent or object ('It is not I' or 'It is not him, but her' – or inversely); the second, an intervention of subjects ('He hates me', 'It is she he loves', 'It is she who loves me') – the logical problems formally involved in this deduction have retained no one's interest.

Especially as Freud in this text expressly dismisses the mechanism of projection as insufficient to account for the problem, and enters at that point on a very long, detailed and subtle discussion of repression, providing us at the same time with some tooth-stones for our problem – let us say simply that these tooth-stones continue to stand out inviolate above the clouds of dust produced in the psychoanalytic construction site.

2. Freud has since provided the article 'On Narcissism'. This text has been put to the same use, namely, a sort of pumping in and out of the libido with the percipients, according to every twist and turn of the psychoanalytic party line. The percipients is thus entitled to inflate and deflate a dummy reality.

Freud provided the first theory of the way in which the ego is constituted according to the other in the new subjective economy, determined by the unconscious: one responded to it by acclaming in this ego the rediscovery of the good old fool-proof percipients and the synthesizing function.

Is it surprising that no other benefit should have been derived from it for psychosis than the definitive promotion of the notion of loss of reality?

This is not all. In 1924, Freud wrote an incisive article, 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychoisis', in which he draws attention to the fact that the problem lies not in the reality that is lost, but in that which takes its place. It is like talking to the deaf, since the problem has been resolved; the store of accessories is inside, and they are taken out as required.

In fact, such is the schema with which even M. Katan, in the studies in which he follows so attentively the different stages of Schreber's psychosis, guided by his concern to penetrate the prepsychotic phase, satisfies himself, when he uses the defence against instinctual temptation, against masturbation and homosexuality in this case, to justify the upsurge of the hallucinatory phantasmasagoria, a curtain interposed by the operation of the percipients between the tendency and its real stimulant.

To think that this simplicity should have comforted us for a time, if we had considered that it should suffice to explain the problem of literary creation in psychosis!

3. After all, what problem would he still erect as an obstacle to the discourse of psychoanalysis, when the implication of a tendency in reality is a response from the regression of their couple? What might tire minds who accept that one should talk to them of regression, without distinguishing between regression in structure, regression in history, and regression in development (which Freud always differentiates as topographical, temporal, or genetic)?

I shall refrain from spending more time here drawing up an inventory of the confusion. It is quite familiar to those whom we train and would be of no interest to others. I shall be content to propose for their common meditation the effect of bewilderment (dépaysement) produced, at the sight of a speculation that is doomed to go round in circles between development and entourage, simply by features that are nevertheless the armature of the Freudian edifice: namely, the equivalence maintained by Freud of the imaginary function of the phallus in both sexes (for long the despair of lovers of false 'biological' windows, that is to say, the naturalists), the castration complex found as a normative phase of the assumption by the subject of his own sex, the myth of the murder of the father rendered necessary by the constituent presence of the Oedipus complex in every personal history, and, last but not . . ., the effect of duplication introduced into the love life by the very repetitive agency of the object that is always to be rediscovered as unique. Must we recall once more the profoundly dissident character of the notion of drive in Freud, the disjunction of principle between the tendency, its direction, and its object, and not only its original 'perversion', but its implication in a conceptual systematic, a systematic whose place Freud indicated, from
the very beginning of his work, under the heading of the sexual theories of childhood?

Is it not clear that we left all that behind long ago in an educative naturism that has no other principle than the notion of gratification and its obverse, frustration, which is nowhere mentioned by Freud.

No doubt the structures revealed by Freud continue to sustain, not only in their plausibility, but also in the way they are manipulated, the would-be dynamic forces with which psychoanalysis today claims to direct its flow. A deserted technique would be even more capable of 'miracles', was it not for the additional conformism that reduces its effects to those of an ambiguous mixture of social suggestion and psychological superstition.

It is even striking that a demand for rigour is manifested only in people whom the course of things maintains by some aspect outside this concert, such as Mrs Ida Macalpine, who gave me cause to marvel and who, as I read her, seemed level-headed enough.

Her critique of the cliché that is confined in the factor of the repression of a homosexual drive, which, in fact, is quite unclear, to explain psychosis, is masterly, and she demonstrates this beautifully in the Schreber case itself. Homosexuality, supposedly a determinant of paranoiaic psychosis, is really a symptom articulated in its process.

This process began at an early stage, at the moment when the first sign of it appeared in Schreber in the form of one of those hypnopomopic ideas, which in their fragility present us with sorts of tomographies of the ego, an idea whose imaginary function is sufficiently indicated to us in its form: that it would be beautiful to be a woman undergoing the act of copulation.

Ida Macalpine, to make one just criticism, seems nonetheless to ignore the fact that although Freud placed considerable stress on the homosexual question, it was first to show that it conditions the idea of grandeur in delusion, but, more essentially, he indicates in it the mode of otherness in accordance with which the metaphorization of the subject operates, in other words, the place in which his delusional 'transferences' succeed one another. She would have done better to trust the reason to which Freud once again clings here in a reference to the Oedipus complex, which she does not accept.

This difficulty should have led her to discoveries that would certainly have been illuminating for us, for nothing has yet been said about the function of what is known as the inverted Oedipus complex. Mrs Macalpine prefers to reject here any recourse to the Oedipus complex, replacing it by a phantasy of procreation, which is observed in children of both sexes, even in the form of phantasies involving pregnancy, which, indeed, she regards as being linked to the structure of hypochondria.10

This phantasy is, indeed, essential, and I would add that in the first case in which I obtained this phantasy in a man, it was by a means that marked an important stage in my career, and the man in question was neither a hypochondriac nor a hyster.

She feels, with some subtlety, even—mirabile the way things are today—the need to link this phantasy to a symbolic structure. But in order to find this outside the Oedipus complex, she goes off in search of ethnographical references which, on the evidence of her writing, she does not appear to have fully assimilated. This involves the 'helliolithic' theme, which has been championed by one of the most eminent adherents of the English diffusionist school. I am aware of the merits of these conceptions, but they do not appear to me to support in the least the idea that Mrs Macalpine tries to give of asexual procreation as a 'primitive' conception.11

Mrs Macalpine's error is revealed, however, in the fact that she arrives at a result that is the opposite of the one she is looking for.

By isolating a phantasy in a dynamic that she describes as intrapsychical, according to a perspective that she opens up on the notion of the transference, she ends up by designating in the psychotic's uncertainty about his own sex, the weak spot on which the analyst must bring his intervention to bear, contrasting the happy effects of this intervention with the catastrophic effect, which, in fact, is constantly to be observed among psychotics, of any suggestion that he should recognize a latent homosexuality.

Now, uncertainty about one's sex is precisely a common feature in hysteria, whose encroachments in diagnosis Mrs Macalpine denounces. This is because no imaginary formation is specific.12 None is determinant either in the structure, or in the dynamics of a process. And that is why one is condemned to lacking both when, in the hope of reaching them more easily, one wishes to ignore the symbolic articulation that Freud discovered at the same time as the unconscious, and which, for him, is, in effect, consubstantial with it: it is the need for this articulation that he signifies for us in his methodical reference to the Oedipus complex.

5. How can one impute responsibility for this méconnaissance to Mrs Macalpine, when, far from disappearing, it has continued to grow and flourish in psychoanalysis?

This is why, in order to define the minimal split, which is certainly
between neurosis and psychosis, psychoanalysts are reduced to leaving responsibility for reality to the ego: which is what I would call leaving the problem of psychosis at the status quo ante.

One point, however, was very specifically designated as the bridge across the frontier of the two domains.

They have even made use of it, in the most excessive way, on the question of the transference in psychosis. It would be uncharitable to assemble here what has been said on this subject. I shall simply take the opportunity of paying homage to Ida Macalpine's intelligence, when she sums up a position typical of the genius to be found in psychoanalysis today in these terms: in short, psychoanalysts claim to be able to cure psychosis in all cases where a psychosis is not involved.13

It is on this point that Midas, laying down the law one day on what psychoanalysis could do, expressed himself thus: 'It is clear that psychoanalysis is possible only with a subject for whom there is another!' And Midas crossed the two-way bridge thinking it to be a piece of waste land. How could it have been otherwise, since he was unaware that the river was there?

The term 'other', hitherto unheard among the psychoanalyst population, had no more meaning for it than the murmur of the reeds.

III With Freud

1. It is somewhat striking that a dimension that is felt as that of Something else in so many of the experiences that men undergo, not at all without thinking about them, rather while thinking about them, but without thinking that they are thinking, and like Telemachus thinking of the expense (pensant à la dépense), should never have been thought to the extent of being congruently said by those whom the idea of thought assures of thinking.

Desire, boredom, confinement, revolt, prayer, sleeplessness (I would like to stop there, since Freud refers specifically to it by quoting in the middle of his Schreber a passage from Nietzsche's Zarathustra14), and panic are there as evidence of the dimension of that Elsewhere, and to draw our attention to it, not so much, as I would say, as mere states of mind that thinking-without-laughing15 can put back into place, but much more as permanent principles of collective organizations, outside which human life does not appear capable of maintaining itself for long.

No doubt it is not impossible that the most thinkable thinking-to-think, thinking itself to be that Other-thing, should always have been unable to tolerate this possible competition.

But this aversion becomes quite clear once the conceptual juncture, which nobody had yet thought of, was made, between this Elsewhere and the place, present for all and closed to each, in which Freud discovered that, without thinking about it, and without anyone being able to think he thinks about it better than anyone else therefore, it thinks (as pense). It thinks rather badly, but it does think. For it is in these terms that it announces the unconscious to us: thoughts which, if their laws are not quite the same as those of our everyday thoughts, however noble or vulgar they may be, are perfectly articulated.

There is no longer any way, therefore, of reducing this Elsewhere to the imaginary form of a nostalgia, a lost or future Paradise; what one finds is the paradise of the child's loves, where, baudelaire de Dieu!, something's going on, I can tell you.

Moreover, if any doubt still remained in our minds, Freud named the locus of the unconscious by a term that had struck him in Fechner (who, incidentally, is an experimentalist, and not at all the realist that our literary reference books suggest), namely, ein anderer Schauplatz, another scene; he makes use of it some twenty times in his early works.

This sprinkling of cold water having, let us hope, refreshed our minds, let us move on to the scientific formulation of the subject's relation to this Other.

2. By way of 'fixing our ideas' and the souls suffering here, I will apply the said relation to schema L, already produced and here simplified:

- This schema signifies that the condition of the subject S (neurosis or psychosis) is dependent on what is being unfolded in the Other O. What is being unfolded there is articulated like a discourse (the unconscious is the discourse of the Other), whose syntax Freud first sought to define for those bits that come to us in certain privileged moments, in dreams, in slips of the tongue or pen, in flashes of wit.

Why would the subject be interested in this discourse, if he were not
taking part in it? He is, indeed, a participator, in that he is stretched over the four corners of the schema: namely, S, his ineffable, stupid existence, o, his objects, o', his ego, that is, that which is reflected of his form in his objects, and O, the locus from which the question of his existence may be presented to him.

For it is a truth of experience for analysis that the subject is presented with the question of his existence, not in terms of the anxiety that it arouses at the level of the ego, and which is only one element in the series, but as an articulated question: 'What am I there?', concerning his sex and his contingency in being, namely, that, on the one hand, he is a man or a woman, and, on the other, that he might not be, the two conjugating their mystery, and binding it in the symbols of procreation and death.

That the question of his existence bathes the subject, supports him, invades him, tears him apart even, is shown in the tensions, the lapses, the phantasies that the analyst encounters; and, it should be added, by means of elements of the particular discourse in which this question is articulated in the Other. It is because these phenomena are ordered in the figures of this discourse that they have the fixity of symptoms, are legible and can be resolved when deciphered.

3. One must insist, therefore, that this question is not presented in the unconscious as ineffable, that this question is a questioning (une mise en question), that is to say, that prior to all analysis it is articulated in it in discrete elements. This is most important, for these elements are those that linguistic analysis forces us to isolate as signifiers, and here they are seen at work in their purest form at the most unlikely, yet most likely point:

– the most unlikely, since their chain is found to survive in an alterity in relation to the subject as radical as that of as yet indecipherable hieroglyphics in the solitude of the desert;

– the most likely, because there alone their function of inducing the signification into the signified by imposing their structure on it may appear quite unambiguously.

For certainly the furrows opened up by the signifier in the real world will seek, in order to broaden them, the gaps that the real world qua existent (étant) offers to the signifier, to such an extent that an ambiguity may well survive in our understanding as to whether the signifier does not follow the law of the signified here.

But this is not the case at the level of the questioning not of the place of the subject in the world, but of his existence as subject, a questioning which, beginning with himself, will extend to his in-the-world relation to objects, and to the Other, so far as it, too, may be questioned beyond its.

4. It is of the utmost importance to realize in the experience of the unconscious Other in which Freud guides us that the question does not find its lineaments in protomorphic proliferations of the image, in vegetative intumescences, in animic halos irradiating from the palpitations of life.

The whole difference between Freud's orientation and that of the Jungian school, which attaches itself to such forms, is there: Wandlungen der libido. These forms may be promoted to the first level of a mantic, for they can be produced by the appropriate techniques (promoting imaginary creations: reveries, drawings, etc.) in a mappable site: one sees it on our schema stretched between o and o', that is, in the veil of the narcissistic mirage, eminently suited to sustaining with its effects of seduction and capture whatever is reflected in it.

If Freud rejected this mantic, it is at the point at which it neglected the directing function of a signifying articulation, which takes effect from its internal law and from a material subjected to the poverty that is essential to it.

Similarly, it is to the extent that this style of articulation has been maintained, by virtue of the Freudian Word (verbe), albeit dismembered, in the community that claims to represent orthodoxy, that so deep a difference remains between the two schools, even to the point, as things are now are, that neither is in a position to formulate the reason for it. As a result, the level of their practice will soon appear to be reducible to the distance between the modes of dreaming of the Alps and the Atlantic.

To take up Charcot's formula, which so delighted Freud, 'this does not prevent [the Other] from existing' in his place O.

For if he is taken away, man can no longer even sustain himself in the position of Narcissus. As if by elastic, the anima springs back on to the animus and the animus on to the animal, which between S and o sustains with its Umwelt 'external relations' noticeably closer than ours, without, moreover, one being able to say that its relation with the Other is negligible, but only that it appears otherwise than in the sporadic sketches of neurosis.

5. The L of the questioning of the subject in his existence has a combinatory structure that must not be confused with its spatial aspect. As such, it is the signifier itself that must be articulated in the Other, especially in its position as fourth term in the topology.

As support for this structure, we find in it the three signifiers in which
the Other may be identified in the Oedipus complex. They are sufficient to symbolize the significations of sexed reproduction, under the signifiers of relation, 'love' and 'procreation'.

The fourth term is given by the subject in his reality, foreclosed as such in the system, and entering into the play of the signifiers only in the mode of death, but becoming the true subject to the extent that this play of the signifiers will make it signify.

This play of the signifiers is not, in effect, an inert one, since it is animated in each particular part by the whole history of the ancestry of real others that the denomination of signifying Others involves in the contemporaneity of the Subject. Furthermore, in so far as it is set up qua rule over and above each part, this play already structures in the subject the three agencies: ego (ideal), reality, superego, the determination of which was to be the task of the second Freudian topography.

Furthermore, the subject enters the game as the dummy (mort), but it is as a living being that he plays it; it is in his life that he must take up the suit (coulour) that he may bid. He will do so by means of a set of imaginary figures, selected from among the innumerable forms of aninic relations, the choice of which involves a certain arbitrariness, since, in order to correspond homologically to the symbolic triads, it must be numerically reduced.

To do this, the polar relation, by which the specular image (of the narcissistic relation) is linked as a unifier to all the imaginary elements of what is called the fragmented body, provides a couple that is prepared not only by a natural conformity of development and structure to serve as a homologue for the Mother/Child symbolic relation. The imaginary couple of the mirror stage, through that counter-nature that it manifests, if it must be related to a specific prematuration of birth in man, is appropriated to provide the imaginary triangle with the base to which the symbolic relation may in a sense correspond (see schema R).

In effect, it is by means of the gap opened up by this prematuration in the imaginary, and in which the effects of the mirror stage proliferate, that the human animal is capable of imagining himself as mortal, which does not mean that he would be able to do so without his symbiosis with the symbolic, but rather that without this gap that alienates him from his own image, this symbiosis with the symbolic, in which he constitutes himself as subject to death, could not have occurred.

6. The third term of the imaginary triad, that in which the subject identifies himself, on the contrary, with himself as a living being is simply the phallic image the unveiling of which in this function is not the least scandalous aspect of the Freudian discovery.

Let us inscribe here at once, under the heading of conceptual visualization of this double triad, what we shall henceforth call schema R, and which represents the lines of conditioning of the perceptum, in other words, of the object, in so far as these lines circumscribe the field of reality, rather than merely depending on them.

Thus taking the summits of the symbolic triangle: I as the ego-ideal, M as the signifier of the primordial object, and F as the position in O of the Name-of-the-Father, one can see how the homological fastening of the signification of the subject S under the signifier of the phallus may affect the support of the field of reality delimited by the quadrangle MzI. The other two summits of this quadrangle, e and i, represent the two imaginary terms of the narcissistic relation, the ego and the specular image.

One may thus situate from i to M, that is in o, the extremities of the segments Si, So', So^2, So^3, SM, in which are placed the figures of the imaginary other in the relations of erotic aggression where they are realized — similarly, from e to I, that is in o', the extremities of segments Se, So_1, So_2, So_3, SI, in which the ego identifies itself, from its specular Urbild to the paternal identification of the ego-ideal.18

Those of you who attended my seminar for the year 1936–7 know the use that I made of the imaginary triad presented here, a triad of which the child as the desired object constitutes in reality the summit I – to restore to the notion of the Object Relation, now somewhat discredited by the mass of nonsense that the term has been used in recent years to validate, the capital of experience that legitimately belongs to it.

In effect, this schema enables us to show the relations that refer not to pre-Oedipal stages, which are not of course non-existent, but which cannot be conceived of in analytic terms (as is sufficiently apparent in the hysteric, but controlled work of Melanie Klein), but to the pregenital stages in so far as they are ordered in the retroaction of the Oedipus complex.

The whole problem of the perversions consists in conceiving how the
child, in his relation to the mother, a relation constituted in analysis not by his vital dependence on her, but by his dependence on her love, that is to say, by the desire for her desire, identifies himself with the imaginary object of this desire in so far as the mother herself symbolizes it in the phallus.

The phallocentrism produced by this dialectic is all that need concern us here. It is, of course, entirely conditioned by the intrusion of the signifier in man's psyche, and strictly impossible to deduce from any pre-established harmony of this psyche with the nature that it expresses.

This imaginary effect, which can be felt as a discord only from the prejudged vantage point of a normativity proper to instinct, has nevertheless determined the long quarrel, which has now died down, but whose damaging after effects still linger on, concerning the primary or secondary nature of the phallic phase. Even apart from the extreme importance of the question, this quarrel would merit our interest for the dialectical exploits it imposed on Dr Ernest Jones in maintaining that he was in complete agreement with Freud, while affirming a position that was diametrically opposed to his, namely, that which made him, with certain minor reservations no doubt, the champion of the English feminists, with their beloved egalitarian principle 'to each his own'—for the boys the phallus for the girls the c... (aux boys le phall, aux girls le c...).

7. Freud revealed this imaginary function of the phallus, then, to be the pivot of the symbolic process that completes in both sexes the questioning of the sex by the castration complex.

The present obscuring of this function of the phallus (reduced to the role of partobject) in the psychoanalytic concert is simply the consequence of the profound mystification in which culture maintains the symbol of it, in the sense that paganism itself produced it only at the culmination of its most secret mysteries.

Indeed, in the subjective economy, governed as we see it by the unconscious, it is a signification that is evoked only by what we call a metaphor, in particular, the paternal metaphor.

And this leads us, since it is with Mrs Macalpine that we chose to open this dialogue, to her need to refer to a 'heliolitism', by means of which she claims to see the codification of procreation in a pre-Oedipal culture, in which the procreative function of the father would be eluded.

Anything one can advance along these lines, in whatever form, will merely accentuate the signifying function that conditions paternity.

For in another debate dating from the time when psychoanalysts still questioned themselves about doctrine, Dr Ernest Jones, with a remark that was more relevant than his previous one, did not provide a less inappropriate argument.

Concerning, in effect, the state of beliefs in some Australian tribe, he refused to admit that any collectivity of men could fail to recognize the fact of experience that, with certain enigmatic exceptions, no woman gives birth to a child without having undergone coitus, or even be ignorant of the lapse of time between the two events. For the credit that seems to me to be accorded quite legitimately to the human capacities to observe the real is precisely that which has not the slightest importance in the matter.

For, if the symbolic context requires it, paternity will nonetheless be attributed to the fact that the woman met a spirit at some fountain or some rock in which he is supposed to live.

It is certainly this that demonstrates that the attribution of procreation to the father can only be the effect of a pure signifier, of a recognition, not of a real father, but of what religion has taught us to refer to as the Name-of-the-Father.

Of course, there is no need of a signifier to be a father, any more than to be dead, but without a signifier, no one would ever know anything about either state of being.

I would take this opportunity of reminding those who cannot be persuaded to seek in Freud's texts an extension of the enlightenment that their pedagogues dispense to them how insistently Freud stresses the affinity of the two signifying relations that I have just referred to, whenever the neurotic subject (especially the obsessional) manifests this affinity through the conjunction of the themes of the father and death.

How, indeed, could Freud fail to recognize such an affinity, when the necessity of his reflexion led him to link the appearance of the signifier of the Father, as author of the Law, with death, even to the murder of the Father – thus showing that if this murder is the fruitful moment of debt through which the subject binds himself for life to the Law, the symbolic Father is, in so far as he signifies this Law, the dead Father.

IV Schreber's way

1. We can now enter the subjectivity of Schreber’s delusion.

The signification of the phallus, I have said, must be evoked in the subject's imaginary by the paternal metaphor.
This has a precise meaning in the economy of the signifier, the formalization of which I can do no more than indicate here, but which will be familiar to those of you who are attending the seminar I am giving this year on the formations of the unconscious. Namely: formula of the metaphor, or of signifying substitution:

\[ S \rightarrow S' \rightarrow S \left( \frac{I}{x} \right) \]

in which the capital Ss are signifiers, x the unknown signification and the signified induced by the metaphor, which consists of the substitution in the signifying chain of S for S'. The elision of S', represented here by the bar through it, is the condition of the success of the metaphor.

This applies equally to the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father, that is, the metaphor that substitutes this Name in the place first symbolized by the operation of the absence of the mother.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name-of-the-Father</th>
<th>Desire of the Mother</th>
<th>Signified to the subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name-of-the-Father</td>
<td>(O) (Phallus)</td>
<td></td>
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Let us now try to conceive of a circumstance of the subjective position in which, to the appeal of the Name-of-the-Father responds, not the absence of the real father, for this absence is more than compatible with the presence of the signifier, but the inadequacy of the signifier itself.

This is not a conception that should come as a complete surprise. The presence of the signifier in the Other is, in effect, a presence usually closed to the subject, because it usually persists in a state of repression (verdrängt), and because from there it insists on representing itself in the signified by means of its repetition compulsion (Wiederholungszwang).

Let us extract from several of Freud's texts a term that is sufficiently articulated in them to render them unjustifiable if this term does not designate in them a function of the unconscious that is distinct from the repressed. Let us take as demonstrated the essence of my seminar on the psychoses, namely, that this term refers to the most necessary implication of his thought on the phenomenon of psychosis: this term is Verwerfung (foreclosure).

It is articulated in this register as the absence of that Bejahung, or judgement of attribution, that Freud poses as a necessary precedent for any possible application of Verneinung (negation), which he opposes to it as a judgement of existence: whereas the whole article from which he detaches this Verneinung as an element of analytic experience demonstrates in it the avowal of the signifier itself that it annuls.

It is on the signifier, then, that the primordial Bejahung bears, and other texts enable us to recognize this, in particular letter 52 of the Fliess correspondence, in which it is expressly isolated as the term of an original perception under the name of sign, Zeichen.

We will take Verwerfung, then, to be foreclosure of the signifier. To the point at which the Name-of-the-Father is called – we shall see how – may correspond in the Other, then, a mere hole, which, by the inadequacy of the metathoric effect will provoke a corresponding hole at the place of the phallic signification.

It is the only form in which it is possible for us to conceptualize what Schreber shows us to be the result of the damage that he is in a position to reveal only in part and in which, he says, together with the names of Flechsig and Schreber, the term 'soul-murder' (Seelenmord: S. 22-11) plays an essential role.

It is clear that what we are presented with here is a disorder caused at the most personal juncture between the subject and his sense of being alive; the censorship that mutilates the text before the addition mentioned by Schreber to the somewhat distorted explanations that he has offered of his method leaves one to think that he associated with the names of living people facts that could not have been published on account of the conventions of the time. Moreover, the following chapter is missing in its entirety, and Freud had to be content to exercise his perspicacity on the allusion to Faust, to Der Freischütz and to Byron's Manfred, a work (from which he supposes the name of Ahriman, one of the apophanes of God in Schreber's delusion, to be borrowed) that seemed to him to derive in that reference all of the value of its theme, namely, that the hero dies from the curse borne in him by the death of the object of fraternal incest.

For me, since like Freud I have chosen to trust a text which, apart from these few mutilations, regrettable as they are, remains a document whose guarantees of credibility are unrivalled, it is in the most advanced form of delusion of which the book is an expression, that I will try to show a structure that will prove to be similar to the process of psychosis itself.

2. Following this line of approach, I will observe with the touch of surprise with which Freud sees the subjective connotation of the recognized unconscious, that the delusion deploys all the wealth of its tapestry.
around the power of creation attributed to speech, of which the divine
rays (Gottesstrahlen) are the hypostasis.

This begins as a leit-motiv in the first chapter, where the author first
pauses at the fact that the act of giving birth to an existence out of nothing
offends reason, flies in the face of the evidence that experience provides in
the transformations of a matter in which reality finds its substance.

He emphasizes the paradox to be found in his contrast with the most
familiar ideas for the man he claims to be, as if there was any need of that:
gebilde German of the Wilhelmine period, nourished on Haeckelian
metascientism, on the basis of which he provides a list of readings, an
occasion for us to complete, by referring to them, what Gavarni calls
somewhere a cerebral idea of Man.21

It is even in this considered paradox of the intrusion of a thought, for
him hitherto unthinkable, that Schreber sees the proof that something
must have happened that does not proceed from his own mind: a proof
against which, it seems, only the petitio principii, outlined above in the
position of the psychiatrist, give us the right to resist.

3. Having said this, let us follow a sequence of phenomena that Schreber
establishes in his fifteenth chapter (S. 204–11).

We now know that the strength of his hand in the forced game of
thought (Denkzwang) in which the words of God constrain him (see
above, I–3) has a dramatic stake, which is that God, whose powers of
misunderstanding, will appear later, considering the subject as annihilated,
leaves him in the lurch (liegen lassen), a threat to which we will return.

The effort of repose, then, by which the subject is thus suspended, let
us say, in his being as subject, eventually fails by a moment of ‘thinking-
nothing’ (Nichtsdenken), certainly seems to be the least one can humanly
expect by way of rest (Schreber says). This is what, according to him,
occurring:

(a) What he calls the miracle of howling (Brüllenwunder), a cry torn from
his breast that surprises him beyond all expectations, whether he is
alone or with others, who are horrified by the spectacle he offers them
of his mouth suddenly gaping over the unspeakable void, abandoning
the cigar that was stuck there only a moment earlier;
(b) The call for help (Hilfe rufen), emitted by ‘divine nerves detached
from the mass’, the plaintive tone of which is caused by the greater
distance into which God withdraws;

(two phenomena in which the subjective tearing is sufficiently indis-
tinguishable enough from its signifying mode for us not to labour the
point);

(c) The forthcoming blossoming, that is, in the occult zone of the per-
ceptual field, in the corridor, in the next room, or manifestations
which, though not extraordinary, appear to the subject to be intended
for him;
(d) The appearance at the next level of the distant, that is, beyond the
grasp of the senses, in the park, in the real, of miraculous creations,
that is, newly created ones, and Mrs Macalpine makes the perceptive
observation that they always belong to flying species – birds or
insects.

Do not these last meteors of delusion appear as the trace of a furrow, or
as a fringe effect, showing both times in which the signifier that remained
silent in the subject projects from its darkness a gleam of signification on
to the surface of the real, then illuminates the real with a flash projected
from below its basement of nothingness?

Thus, at the tip of hallucinatory effects, these creatures which, if one
wished to apply with maximum rigour the criterion of the apparition of
the phenomenon in reality, would alone be worthy of the name of hallu-
cinations, recommend us to reconsider in their symbolic solidarity the
trio of Creator, Creature, and Created that emerges here.

4. It is from the position of the Creator, in effect, that we will go back
to that of the Created, which subjectively creates it.

Unique in his Multiplicity, Multiple in his Unity (such are the attribu-
tes, reminiscent of Heraclitus, with which Schreber defines him), this
God, reduced in effect to a hierarchy of realms, which would be worth a
study in itself, lowers himself into beings who appropriate disconnected
identities.

Immanent in these beings, whose capture by their inclusion in Schre-
ber’s being threatens his integrity, God is not without the intuitive sup-
port of a hyperspace, in which Schreber even sees significant transmis-
sions conducted along wires (Fäden), which materialize the parabolic trajectory
in accordance with which they enter his cranium through the occiput
(S. 315–P.S. V).

Yet, in the course of time, through his manifestations, God lets the
field of non-intelligent beings, beings who do not know what they say,
beings of inanity, such as those enchanted birds, those talking birds,