PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TRAINING

A Socio-Psychological Analysis of its History and Present Status*

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It is, in fact, nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry; for this delicate little plant, aside from stimulation, stands mainly in need of freedom; without this it goes to wreck and ruin without fail. It is a very grave mistake to think that the enjoyment of seeing and searching can be promoted by means of coercion and a sense of duty. To the contrary, I believe that it would be possible to rob even a healthy beast of prey of its voraciousness, if it were possible, with the aid of a whip, to force the beast to devour continuously, even when not hungry, especially if the food, handed out under such coercion, were to be selected accordingly'.

Albert Einstein (22)

'Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind'.

Plato (60)

I

INTRODUCTION

'The . . . union of idealism and love of power has led men astray over and over again, and is still doing so in the present day'.

Bertrand Russell (69, p. 100)

The psycho-analytic training system is a social organization designed and 'enforced' by educators for the avowed purpose of teaching students. Implicit in this scheme is the judgement that the process is for the 'primary' benefit of the students. While this may or may not be the case, such a premise is prejudicial to its scientific investigation in much the same way as would be the assumption, in a sociological study, that a given political system is for the benefit of the 'people'.

Matters of education, in common with other changes in social processes, are often formulated in idealistic terms. As a result, the avowed intention of some of the participants in the educational process may easily become the focus of attention. A detached and deliberately non-ethical approach to problems of education is thus discouraged and becomes uncommon and even unpopular.

Michael Balint's candid and thought-provoking paper, written in 1947 (4), initiated what may be considered the scientific literature on psycho-analytic training. He noted that in spite of great interest in this subject, and discussions of it in meetings, there was, until then, 'practically no literature on psycho-analytical training'. Today, this statement can, of course, no longer be made. Several analysts have contributed to our knowledge on this subject in recent years. References to their works are given in the bibliography. No attempt is made here to review these contributions. Suffice it is to say that most authors have stressed one, or more, of the following points:

1. Psycho-analytic training differs now from what it was at various times in the past; 2. The existing practice of selecting future analysts is criticized and recommendations are made for new methods; 3. The nature and duration of the training or preparatory analysis and problems related to seminars and supervisory analyses are considered. Inasmuch as previous contributions to psycho-analytic training have focused on, or have dealt chiefly with, these subjects, they can be said to have concentrated on what is essentially a 'content-analysis' of this problem.

It is my aim in this essay to examine the subject from a point of view which will combine historical, sociological, and psycho-analytic considerations. The historical analysis will follow closely on the lines laid down by Balint. The sociological aspects of the essay will deal

* Numbers raised above the line refer to notes appended at the end of the paper. Numbers in parentheses refer to references in the Bibliography.

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with the nature of the relationship between teacher and student, particularly as this applies now and has applied in the past to analytic training. In addition, some sociological and psychological (psycho-analytic) aspects of the problem of power and its relationship to learning and knowledge will be considered.

II

ON THE HISTORY OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TRAINING

'. . . he who knows how to revile most eloquently or subtilly the weakness of the human mind is looked upon divine'.

Spinoza (74)

'The span of life for modern scientific schemes is about thirty years. The father of European philosophy, in one of his moods of thought, laid down the axiom that the deeper truths must be adumbrated by myths. Surely, the subsequent history of Western thought has amply justified his fleeting intuition'.

A. N. Whitehead (84)

Balint (4) has divided the history of psycho-analytic training into three periods.

'The first or 'prehistoric' period can be reckoned to run till the Budapest Congress, 1918, or to the founding of the Berlin Institute, 1920. It is characterized by the fact that there was no systematic, organized training. Both the teaching and the learning of psycho-analysis were left to individual enterprise with no official control'.

This period also *coincides* (by no means fortuitously) with that period of social history in which psycho-analysis was not a social force: to achieve the status of psycho-analyst resulted in neither social prestige or power nor in economic gain. Obviously, there were no *external* forces or pressures which could have, by any stretch of the imagination, driven anyone towards pursuing psycho-analytic studies. The *opportunity* to pursue psycho-analytic training was open to (almost) anyone who wanted to avail himself of it. There was no problem of 'selection': the students selected themselves. Obviously, in order to pursue a particular course of study (be that psycho-analysis or mathematics) one must be in possession of various kinds of general knowledge and must also be in a position, so to speak, to become 'interested' in the particular study in question. Naturally, therefore, physicians and psychiatrists were among the first students of psycho-analysis. The field, however, was open equally to psychologists, teachers, lawyers, as well as to others. Thus there arose the social foundation for what later was to become the 'problem of lay analysis'.

The second period, to which Balint gives no name, might be called the 'period of ascendancy'. It begins either with the Budapest Congress in 1918 or with the founding of the Berlin Institute in 1920, and ends anywhere between 1937 and 1939 (see later). Balint states that at the Budapest Congress Freud 'warned' the membership that

'. . . the time had come when analysis must prepare for the coming demand of psychotherapy for the masses both in its technique and in its training'.

Here we encounter a striking manifestation of the great changes which had occurred in the social status of psycho-analysis during the preceding two decades. Until this time, it was as if 'nobody wanted psycho-analysis'. Physicians in general were hostile to it, with the exception of a few 'revolutionaries'. Patients subjected themselves to it, usually, only as a means of last resort. Now we hear that psycho-analysis is, and will increasingly be, *in demand*. It has become a *socially useful* technique. Accordingly, those who were to possess this useful 'commodity' (that is, the technique) were to gain a measure of power by it, compared to those who were without it.

During the same meeting, Nunberg was said to have remarked in a private conversation that 'no one should henceforth be *allowed* to analyse who himself has not been analysed previously' (italics mine). I would like to emphasize in this connexion that our customary view of this historical step—that is, the requirement of a personal analysis as a prerequisite for becoming an analyst—is simply that it reflects an increasing appreciation among analysts that their own psychological make-up has an important bearing on their work. The first consciously avowed aims of the 'training analysis' were, accordingly, to acquaint the analyst-to-be with his own Oedipus complex and his repressions (47).

Now, it seems to me possible—and in fact, quite likely—that the *requirement* of a personal analysis was motivated largely by elements having to do with *power*. For we must note that to be able to require something of someone else is *prima facie* evidence of our power over him. In this manner we not only demonstrate this power to him: we also achieve an institutionalization of our power by creating a structured authority which can admit some to, and exclude others from, the exercise of certain types of activity ('work') (12, 54). It is thus desirable to make explicit that the shift from an analysis sought out by the student himself to an analysis that is required of him restructures the (social) situation in such a way that the notions of *force* and *restriction* become intimately connected with the 'required' activity.

The foregoing considerations gain further in their psychological significance when we consider the so-called 'need' for this requirement. While obviously I cannot speak from first-hand experience, it seems to me—from all that one can learn by reading and by personal contact with older colleagues who are themselves closer to this period of psycho-analysis—that during the years prior to 1918, and even for many

years thereafter, most people who sought out psycho-analysis as a career did so because of a genuine interest in the workings of the 'minds' of not only others but also of themselves. Even prior to 1918, most analysts had had personal analyses (47). Many sought out the opportunity to undergo analysis despite great geographical barriers. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the requirement of a personal analysis was introduced in the psycho-analytic curriculum because of an expectation (at that time) that otherwise the interested students would prefer to forego being analysed. Finally, the suggestion that the requirement of a personal analysis arose in the history of psycho-analytic training as an expression of a power-struggle is strengthened further by the later additions of *new requirements* (e.g., seminars, supervised analyses, examinations, etc.). (These will be discussed later). The objection might arise that a personal analysis is, in fact, necessary and helpful for the student: therefore, why should it not be required? It is precisely this usefulness of the process for the student which has obscured some important aspects of this subject. This has made possible the *rationalization* of this and subsequent moves towards new requirements on the basis of a genuine *educational need*. Like all good rationalizations, the more valid the argument regarding the displaced motive the more difficult it is to see the original motives, and situations, which may have necessitated the rationalization.[1] It is therefore *not* argued that a personal analysis is not a necessity and that it is of no value for the student. Here we reach a paradoxical situation, for the more we maintain that the requirement in question is for the student's *benefit*, the more irrational it becomes to *require* it of him; why should he not want it himself? Clearly, we are familiar with this problem in relation to the bringing up of children. And so we see how we can maintain *both* that a training analysis is for the student's own good *and* that it should be required of him, only if we insist that he is too childish (or ignorant) to know what he himself 'needs'. I will take up this subject repeatedly in this essay, since it constitutes one of its main themes. But now I want to trace out further the history of psycho-analytic training, with special emphasis on the increasing—albeit well hidden—structuring of the two groups, teacher and student, on the basis of disparities of power.

During the second period there occurred a rapid expansion of psycho-analysis. Officially, training was under the control of the International Training Committee which, again according to Balint (4), 'was not able to produce anything in print but records of the most futile disputes'. The question of lay-analysis was, apparently, a problem throughout this period (1925–1938). In psycho-analysis, this highly-charged subject (i.e., the problem of lay-analysis) seems to have drawn unto itself the whole problem—occurring in practically all areas of human work—of how to determine whether or not someone may pursue a certain work-activity: Is this to be determined and governed by the person's own inclinations, or is the opportunity to pursue the particular activity something to be dispensed, or withheld, by a powerful social body? (The medieval guilds, the modern labour unions, medical societies, and innumerable other social phenomena furnish examples of similar problems).

The third or present period in the history of psycho-analytic training 'can be reckoned as starting either from the Declaration of Independence of the American Institutes, 1937, or from Professor Freud's death, 1939'. Balint refers to the power-struggle inherent in enforcing regulations when he states:

> 'In the previous period a powerful attempt was made at establishing international standards and an international control organization. This commendable enough attempt failed (a) because of the suspicious, over-demanding and over-bearing attitude of the older generation, and (b) because of the suspicious, unnecessarily self-asserting behaviour of the younger generation. As far as I know, the present period acknowledges only local-national or group-standards and control'.

Are these echoes of the 'return of the Oedipus complex', of the rivalry between father and son? (62). Or is the similarity merely fortuitous? The reader may well decide for himself. I would say this, however; in sociological terms, we have seen that with the increasing acquisition of power on the part of the analytic group (or movement, if you like), those aspiring to become analysts were pushed into an increasingly more *powerless* position. The well-known phenomena of (i) the powerless identifying himself with and imitating the powerful, and (ii) the strife for power between the two groups, (and among the 'powerful' themselves) follow *inevitably* from such social structuring, irrespective of how it may have originally arisen.

The present era in psycho-analytic training does, in fact, show many phenomena which can be most readily interpreted in terms of a 'struggle between those who have power in society and those who have not'. (Fenichel, 26, p. 148). Balint (5) noted that modern psycho-analytic training tends to *lead* to the (uncritical) introjection of the teacher: '... each school of thought tries hard to win more candidates to itself and to educate them to be safe, trustworthy and loyal followers'.[2] And he concluded that 'What we need—is a new orientation of our training system which must aim less at establishing a new and firm superego but more at enabling the candidate to free himself and to build up a strong ego which shall be both critical and liberal at the same time'.

While from an ethical point of view I am in agreement with this goal as something desirable, I want to show that we are not as 'free' to pick out one goal or another for our students as the foregoing

statement might appear to imply. In other words, I propose to discuss in what ways the general social organization of psycho-analysis (e.g., the Institutes, Societies, etc., and also the social status of analysis) might limit the freedom and predetermine the choice of goals in the training process.[3]

I have referred to evidences of a power-struggle between the analytic group on the one hand, and those aspiring to become analysts on the other. What are the phenomena that may be looked upon as constituting such evidence?

The shift in the direction of an increasing disparity of power between analysts and candidates began, as was noted, with the requirement of a personal analysis. The requirements grew gradually and now include —in the United States—not only that the candidate be a physician, but also that he have completed an 'approved' internship, and at least one year of an 'approved' psychiatric residency.[4] In addition to the training analysis—which tends to be progressively longer—there is the added requirement of attendance at lectures and seminars over a period of several (usually 3-5) years. The lecture courses at Psycho-analytic Institutes, while again allegedly for the students' benefit, no longer have to depend on making the subject interesting and profitable to the student: attendance at these courses is *compulsory*. The number and duration of supervised analyses, as well as the selection of the supervisory analyst (unless privately arranged), are also no longer left to the discretion of the student. All this is arranged by Curriculum or Educational Committees and the work is assigned and compulsory. Yet even this is felt to be insufficient. A veritable crescendo of courses, seminars, and other requirements appears to have been generated in this process. Curricula tend to be lengthened so that the seminar and supervisory work in most institutes now requires at least five years. Then, as if the instructors had not already formed their opinions of the candidate, a *final examination* is required.

Membership in local societies and in the American Psychoanalytic Association depends on the fulfilment of still further requirements. (The performance of scientific work, incidentally, is conspicuous by its absence among the long list of requirements for membership in the analytic community.) Illustrative of the trend is the recent move* on the part of some members of the American Psycho-analytic Association to make full membership in the Association conditional upon certification by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. Although this proposal was dropped, it shows that the tendency is to make the period of analytic apprenticeship even longer and more onerous; while, at the same time, it is not made more difficult, but rather easier, so that most of those who start, with sufficient perseverance can and do get through.

The impression that the emphasis on psycho-analytic 'teaching' is currently hypercathected is supported by the following considerations. As the novelty of psycho-analytic theories began to wear off and as these theories were increasingly 'incorporated' into general psychiatry, both the *exclusiveness* and the *power* of psycho-analysis (as a social organization) came to reside in matters related to training. Thus, dissensions in the first period of analytic training centred around disagreements concerning *theory* (e.g., Jung, Adler, etc.). In other words, the issue was: '*What* is psycho-analysis?' (*not* in terms of method, but rather in terms of theory) and '*What* should be taught and be designated by this word?' (30, 47, 78, 81). In the current period, the disagreements and secessions centre around the issue of *training*[4]: '*Who* should be taught?' and '*How* should the student be taught?' (i.e., selection of candidates, duration and nature of training).[5] Although the question of *what* should be taught is often discussed, this issue has really lost its emotional charge as can be discerned from the fact that considerable divergences of theoretical opinion are now tolerated within the International and American Associations. On the other hand, a marked uniformity of training requirements is enforced by the American Psychoanalytic Association among its constituent Institutes (42). This has led to a remarkable similarity of *training patterns* among Institutes of varied—sometimes outright contradictory—theoretical positions. Within a period of about thirty years (1915-1945) we have witnessed a metamorphosis in the analytic community from an insistence on theoretical uniformity among the members to an insistence on adherence to uniform training procedures. I have discussed this subject in some detail because it seems to me that no clearer documentation could be had of the fact that both these emphases have important connexions with the issue of *power*. In the early days of analysis, its power (such as it was) lay in its bold and novel theoretical views. At present, its power lies in the training system. In either case, insistence on uniformity—whether of theory or of training standards—favours the development of group-formation, but does not favour scientific development. Therefore, if we not only talk about history but propose to learn from it—as Freud so magnificently showed us how to do—it seems to me that moving away from the current over-emphasis on training would be in the best interests of psycho-analysis as a science.

Before concluding this survey of the various changes in the nature of the analytic training system during its relatively short history, I would like to call attention to what appears to me to be a remarkable similarity between the regulations governing analytic training on the one hand, and those pertaining to immigration to the United States on the other. Briefly, the similarity in the pattern can be summarized as follows. The first period of analytic

* This essay was written in 1955, and was submitted for publication in 1956.

training, as was noted, was characterized by a complete 'open-ness' of analysis; everyone was welcome; and analysis was generally not well regarded. This phase corresponds to the immigration policies prior to the first World War (or, more precisely, before 1924). During this period, there were no 'regulations' concerning immigration; almost everyone was welcome; and America—much like early analysis—was not held in great esteem. Also, until the first World War, the United States was not considered to be a source of power. The second period in analysis was characterized by the laying down of increasingly strict rules governing training—that is to say, regulations concerning procedures governing settlement in the 'land of analysis' (the analytic community). This period coincides with the increasing prestige of analysis and with the wish of those already 'arrived' to keep the number of new 'immigrants' down to a minimum (e.g., the problem of lay analysis). This period in analytic training is paralleled by the immigration policies beginning with the establishment of the 'quota system' in 1924 and ending with the post-war (1945) tightening up of immigration by the McCarran-Walter act. Lastly, the present period in both analytic training and immigration policy is characterized by complex rules concerning the selection of those who are to be permitted to enter. The requirements for attaining membership in the new group are now at an all-time high.*

III

On Power, Teaching and Learning

'There is too much education altogether, especially in American schools. The only rational way of educating is to be an example—of what to avoid, if one can't be the other sort.'

Albert Einstein (18)

'All history shows that, as might be expected, minorities cannot be trusted to care for the interests of majorities'.

Bertrand Russell (68, p. 275)

The psychology of education is admittedly a broad and complex subject. It is, however, not my intention here to contribute to the knowledge of educational processes in general. Rather, I shall be satisfied to single out a few aspects of psycho-analytic training and will touch on the broader psychology of education only in so far as such issues pertain to analytic training. In such circumstances we have two choices open to us: we can either choose to emphasize the similarities between two processes where one is more familiar to us and the other less so, or we can attempt to study the matter by focusing on the differences between them. Now, what we might call the educational process (as a human interaction) will vary according to the developmental state of both participants: patently, the approach to the proper 'teaching' of the five-year-old, the fifteen-year-old, and the thirty-five-year old must differ in many crucial respects. Cultural aspects too, in addition to the age factor, have a decisive rôle in determining the inter-personal pattern of the educational situation. For example, in the more patriarchal, politically autocratic countries of (pre-World War II) Europe, the education of children was essentially a process of *indoctrination*: they were taught what the adults wanted them to know, and were not taught those things which they were not supposed to know. At the same time, this process was openly recognized for what it was, and children were held out the promise of being able to 'learn' what they themselves wanted to know when they were older. And indeed, university education was, relatively speaking, free: there was a minimum of compulsion about required subjects, duration of attendance, examinations, and so forth.

The educational pattern in the United States is in many ways just the opposite: children tend to be treated with more 'freedom'; there is a tendency to let them do and learn those things in which they are interested and to foster their interest rather than to force them to learn. In colleges and universities, on the other hand, courses are rigidly prescribed, attendance is compulsory and examinations frequent.

In England, it seems to me, the situation is on the whole somewhere in between these two 'extremes': that is to say, the education of the child is less autocratic than it was in (pre-World War II) Germany and Central Europe, but it is more firmly guided and demanding than it is in America. Similarly, university education is not as rebellions and 'open' as it was on the Continent, nor as regimented as it is in the United States. So much for a general sketching of various educational milieus. A systematic analysis of the sociology and psychology of different educational systems, however interesting and important, need not concern us further in this essay (10, 25, 43, 67).

The evolution of psycho-analytic training presents a real challenge when it comes to an accurate and unbiased scientific analysis of it. This is so not only because we are all the 'products' of it and could not help but be affected by it in various ways. But beyond this, the field presents an intriguing subject of study inasmuch as its international character has brought to bear upon psycho-analytic training, in its process of evolution, cultural influences from all three types of educational patterns just mentioned. In other words, men and women educated in Germany and in Central Europe have had an important influence on analytic training in England as well as in America. Furthermore, Englishmen and Americans have contributed their own, by no means small, share to the development of psycho-analysis as a science and as a systematized discipline. And, lastly, Europeans have migrated to England and to America and have themselves come under the influence of cultural and educational influences

prevalent in their new homeland. In the course of this process, it may have happened that some have become more ardent proponents of the new (previously alien) ways of doing things than the 'natives' themselves. The effects of all these—and undoubtedly of still other—processes must be examined and evaluated if one wishes to arrive at a balanced view of the development of psycho-analytic training. Such an approach might, hopefully, facilitate our arriving at a more general agreement about which goals and methods are desirable, and which are not. It is then within the scope of science to show how—by what methods and at what price—certain goals can be most effectively reached.

The three periods in the history of psycho-analytic training are characterized—among other things—by a progressive increase in the power of the (analytic) teacher over his student. We shall briefly trace the implications of this fact on the various 'teaching-learning situations' (75) of the different analytic training systems.

The 'prehistoric' period of psycho-analytic training.

'When men are rightly occupied, their amusement grows out of their work, as the colour-petals out of a fruitful flower'.

John Ruskin (66, p. 123)

In the first period of analysis, that is, prior to 1918, psycho-analysis possessed no social power. On the contrary, it was repudiated by the contemporary medical and psychiatric community. Its adherents could reasonably expect unfair discrimination rather than social prestige as their reward. Accordingly, it seems to me that the appeal of psycho-analysis at that time was chiefly based on the following two factors: (i) Its *revolutionary, anti-authoritarian* ('anti-social') orientation; and (ii) Its *scientific power*, that is to say, its ability to order and explain previously chaotic and confusing phenomena.

The revolutionary character of psycho-analysis during the first two decades of this century requires little comment. Emphasis on the unconscious, the id, and sexuality made psycho-analysis not only an early scientific theory of human behaviour, but one that was in distinct opposition to *all* other theories of life. Accordingly, one of the attractions by means of which analysis might have appealed to the prospective student was by virtue of its (then) anti-authoritarian pronouncements. This simple fact has not received the attention which it deserves, inasmuch as it alone might account (in very large part) for the dissensions which soon followed (e.g., Jung, Adler, Stekel, etc.).[7] Furthermore, the social structure of psycho-analysis in the first two decades of this century stands in great contrast to that of the present era, and the effects of this difference on analytic training are probably more important than the other considerations which are usually brought to bear on this subject. We shall return to this matter presently.

While from a psychological point of view the relevance of the foregoing appeal of psycho-analysis to an understanding of its evolution is considerable, its genuine *scientific appeal* is more important because of its greater durability. In other words, psycho-analysis in its early days could not hold out to the student the promise of social power (i.e., university appointments, profitable private practice, and so forth). It could, however, appeal to him by promising gratification of his needs for intellectual mastery: the 'power' that comes from knowledge. The more 'rational' therapeutic orientation of analysis and its actual therapeutic successes are to be included in this category. The validity of the latter assertion, that is, that psycho-analysis appealed particularly to those who were seeking a better understanding of human behaviour, is supported by the incredibly large number of significant publications which came from the early workers in our field.[8]

It is to be noted, finally, that both types of appeals by which the early analytic 'teachers' influenced their 'students' relate to *progressive* motives in the student. That is to say, both the anti-authoritarian attitude and the wish for knowledge are motivated—in a quite general sense—by the child's (adolescent's) wish to grow up and be independent. It follows that appeals to these motives tend to be incompatible with coercive measures on the part of the educators towards the students.

I will omit a detailed analysis—in terms of power and its relation to the training situation—of the second period in the history of psycho-analytic training. It appears to me that this period is best viewed as a rather heterogeneous mixture of elements characteristic of the first and third periods. I will offer a few comments about this phase after a discussion of the third, or current, phase of analytic training.

The present period of psycho-analytic training.

'Liberal institutions immediately cease to be liberal, as soon as they are attained; afterwards, there are no more mischievous or more radical enemies of freedom than liberal institutions.'

'The same institutions produce quite other results as long as they are fought for; they then, in fact, further freedom in a powerful manner'.[9]

Nietzsche (58, pp. 198–199)

A comparison of the social structure, particularly in regard to the prestige and social power of analysis, within which analytic training took place in the first period with that characteristic of the current era presents a picture of striking contrast. During the period between the two World Wars, psycho-analysis gained steadily both in its scientific standing and in its social acceptability (the latter particularly in America). World War II, with its attendant propagandistic emphasis on psychiatry and on 'mental health', acted as a further impetus in establishing

'psychiatry' (and psycho-analysis, lumped in with it) as a socially useful, and therefore increasingly powerful, discipline (3, 36, 48). These two factors combined in their effect and led to the situation with which we are familiar at present (but which we usually do not scrutinize). The situation to which I refer is briefly this: Psychiatrists are, to begin with, divided into two large groups. First, there are those who are 'organically oriented'; they work along the lines of new pharmacological agents, shock treatments and neurosurgical interventions. The other group comprises all those who orient themselves along psychological, social or interpersonal lines. Now it is among the members of this group that there has developed a definite prestige-hierarchy. This is based on the degree of analytic training acquired by the psychiatrist and is just barely short of a classical caste-system. The highest caste is composed of the 'full-fledged' analysts (among whom the training analysts constitute a still higher order); to belong to this group, it is necessary to be a graduate of a 'recognized' training institute and to be a member of the American Psychoanalytic Association (in the United States). The next group is composed of those who consider themselves as 'analytically oriented' or 'dynamic' psychiatrists. And lastly, we have the lowest caste, into which all those are relegated who can claim no contact with psycho-analysis at all. Indeed, to claim to be neither 'analytic' nor 'dynamic'[10] is a luxury which probably no psychotherapist today can safely afford.

The status of the 'partially trained' psychiatrist is relevant in this connexion. Such a physician—one who has been 'rejected' somewhere in the course of his training and was not permitted to 'graduate'—enjoys a generally higher status than one who is 'completely untrained' (i.e., someone who has not submitted himself to the analytic training system at all). These psychiatrists are cast into a definite rôle of their own; they are considered as 'too sick' to treat patients analytically—but are, otherwise, looked upon as 'spiritual members' of the analytic community. In contrast, those who have had no (formal) training at all, are looked upon as 'outsiders' (probably hostile and dangerous). This status of the (analytically) partially trained psychiatrist bears a striking similarity to the social status of divorced women in present-day American life. In other words, in contrast to the customs of past times and of other lands, a divorced woman in America today enjoys a higher social standing (prestige, rôle) than does a woman who has never married. This follows from marriage being regarded (among other things) as a measure and proof of one's desirability and 'normality'. Thus any contact with the 'institution' in question (marriage, analysis) will bestow some of its magical greatness upon the individual. Accordingly, some 'contact' with it is better than none.

This hierarchical caste-system has, of course, far-reaching implications for analytic training. For, in contrast to the early history of psycho-analysis, those who seek training must obviously relate themselves in some manner to the social scene sketched above. Accordingly, individuals with certain anti-authoritarian tendencies can hardly hope to be able to 'live out' such proclivities in the course of their analytic training (71). (One could expect that such individuals will now tend to gravitate elsewhere.) The scientific (and therapeutic) appeal of analysis—which was one of the two chief motives which seemed to be most important during the early phase of analytic training—is, of course, undiminished, and perhaps in some ways it is even brighter than before even though it is less novel.

The social importance and advantages which accrue to the student upon becoming an analyst, together with the power of the training organizations, form the social structure which is 'responsible for'—or from which inevitably follow—many of the characteristic features of present-day psychoanalytic training.[11] Thus, on the one hand, the analytic group tends to establish ever more exacting criteria of *selection*. This has led to the somewhat paradoxical result that while the more obviously 'abnormal' candidates tend to be excluded, there is at the same time a great deal of emphasis on how 'sick' the students are and how much analysis they need. On the part of the students, the importance of becoming an analyst naturally leads to a frame of mind receptive to all influences which make this goal more readily attainable. In other words, the students adopt the 'collegiate' rôle, form student organizations, and submit 'gladly' to the educational requirements. This situation has led Balint (4) to state openly that the students are far 'too respectful to their training analysts'. Balint then goes on and compares this aspect of the training to primitive initiation ceremonies:

> 'On the part of the initiators—the training committee and the training analysts—we observe secretiveness about our esoteric knowledge, dogmatic announcements of our demands and the use of authoritative techniques. On the part of the candidates, i.e., those to be initiated, we observe the willing acceptance of the exoteric fables, submissiveness to dogmatic and authoritative treatment without much protest and too respectful behaviour.' 'We know that the general aim of all initiation rites is to force the candidate to identify himself with his initiator, to introject the initiator and his ideals, and to build up from these identifications a strong superego which will influence him all his life.'

We can gain further insight into this subject by considering it in the light of Fenichel's beautiful analysis of the psychology of trophies. The successful completion of an 'examination' and its reward, the diploma—or membership in an exclusive association—may be looked upon as a 'trophy'. Fenichel refers to Stengel's study concerning examinations

and notes that this author has demonstrated 'the irrational character of modern examinations and their origin in initiation rites' (26, p. 147). Fenichel then continues as follows: 'To be sure, Stengel saw in this primarily the expression of the 'eternal struggle between generations', instead of the eternal struggle between those who have power in society and those who have not—or rather, those who aspire to power and to whom *under certain conditions* some participation in it is granted. The irrational meaning of all examinations is that those in power grant the candidates a real participation only if they at the same time make the latter believe that they must in return renounce all more radical attempts to seize power' (26, pp. 147–148).

It is striking that Fenichel—without making any reference to psycho-analytic training—anticipates in this essay many of Balint's comments about the present state of analytic training. In connection with the latter's thesis regarding the 'paramount rôle of superego formation in psycho-analytical training', the following excerpts from Fenichel are relevant:

'With the help of the superego the ego 'participates' in the more powerful father's might, and the acquisition of the superego is the equivalent of the acquisition of a trophy.—It is in keeping with the supposition that all trophies are somehow personified 'superegos' that they all have one thing in common with the superego: they both protect and threaten their possessor') (26, p. 157). '*Triumph is the disappearance of fear and inhibition as a result of the acquisition of the trophy;* it is the joining of the hitherto powerless with power.—As intoxication can be followed by a hangover, so can triumph be followed by an intensified fear of the trophy's continuing independent existence' (26, p. 159).

Finally, Fenichel's following words regarding the psychology of 'facing power' seem to me also of great relevance to an understanding of present-day psycho-analytic training:

'Clearly human beings have only two ways of facing a power which restricts them: revolt; or else a (more or less illusory) participation, which makes it possible for them to bear their suppression—a submission (with more or less masochistic sexualization) in which their hostility, their 'latent revolt', persists somewhere, but is combated by the fantasy that it has been already accomplished, and that they are already one with authority' (26, p. 158).

If Fenichel's thesis is valid—as I believe it is—it becomes impossible to evade or to eliminate the psychological significance of *requirements* in an educational system. Amazing as it seems, the psychological implications of a *compulsory* training analysis, seminars, and supervised analyses are practically never mentioned: instead emphasis is invariably focused on the *content* of these requirements—for example, how the analysis should be conducted, what sort of courses to teach, and so forth. This makes for an entirely misleading debate, inasmuch as to be cast in a rôle opposing education is much like being 'against virtue'. The issue has to be brought back to the power-struggle described by Fenichel: compulsory 'teaching' may not be 'education' at all. Balint (4) has not failed to touch on this point also, but here—it seems to me—he is too 'optimistic' when he states that: 'Training standards imposed from the outside, especially by exacting father figures, must be rejected, while practically the same standards proposed by images with whom identification is possible, can be accepted without strain'.

I believe this problem is much more complicated than it would appear from the foregoing statement. For one thing, one cannot meaningfully speak of 'standards' unless they are enforced by some sort of authority. The concepts of standards, requirements, and power are intimately connected.

Nacht (56) is one of the few analysts who has commented explicitly (in print) on the deleterious effects of the training analyst's power over his trainee. He made various suggestions to change the situation—' . . . so that the career of the future psycho-analyst should not depend on his own analyst's opinion of him'. Unfortunately, Nacht then proceeded with a paradoxical recommendation: 'Lastly, another measure could be considered, one that has often been thought desirable but which ought to become a *formal obligation:* I refer to a subsequent complementary analysis for an analyst already recognized and a member of a society. It would be possible for this second personal analysis to avoid the difficulties of the first, since it would allow of no more possible 'sanctions' on the part of the analyst. The transference situation would be normalized because of this, and the deficiencies inherent in a first analysis would thus be put right' (italics mine).

I want to comment on Nacht's foregoing statement in some detail, since it seems to me that its spirit is characteristic of many recent recommendations concerning analytic training. What appears to me a most serious error in the foregoing, and other similar recommendations, is this: Nacht notes that the first analysis is handicapped because of the analyst's power over the candidate. This makes a second analysis desirable. If it is desirable—it should be obligatory! But how can something be obligatory without sanctions, that is, without *power* to enforce the obligation in those cases where resistance to the requirement in encountered? The obligatory nature of the second analysis would, of course, impart to it the same limitations as were inherent in the first analysis and made for the new recommendation.

The real alternative to exacting standards seems to me to lie in the direction of greater emphasis on the *learning* aspects of the training system. In order to encourage this phase of the 'teaching-learning

situation ', however, it is necessary that the power of the teacher be curtailed; this seems to favour the student's progressive aspirations for ' learning '. We shall consider this subject briefly in the concluding pages of this paper.

The second period of psycho-analytic training.

' It is the fate of rebels to found new orthodoxies.'

Bertrand Russell (71, p. 21).

A few comments about the second period of psycho-analytic training—which in time covers the interval between the two World Wars—are now in order. I began by first presenting some observations concerning the earliest phase of training on the one hand and of the current situation on the other. These two phases contrast sharply in many ways: indeed, they even appear at times like the two opposite poles in the swinging of a metaphorical pendulum. The period of ascendancy (i.e., the second phase in psycho-analytic training) might be best characterized, from the point of view of our present inquiry, as follows. First, it can be said to form a transitional period between the time when psycho-analysis was altogether powerless and its present status of considerable power. In regard to training standards, methods, candidate-selection, and related issues, we see many features which on the one hand stem from the earlier phase of analysis, and on the other form the beginnings of the present customs. In the former group, we have the continued training of lay persons (in most centres outside the U.S.) and the essential self-selection of candidates. Among the latter customs, we have not only the beginning of the required training-analysis, but also the formalization of all sorts of other training requirements.

I suggested and tried to document that while ' requirements ' regarding training have always been put forward in the name of scientific advances,[12] the steady alterations in the training system cannot be understood without due attention to certain socio-psychological considerations. This thesis is consistent with, and gains support from, the power-struggle between the International Training Committee and the American Institutes. This conflict and its outcome are obviously of great importance for a proper assessment of the events which led to the present training systems. The historical details of this controversy are well known and need not be repeated here. Balint's (4) interpretation of the conflict is as follows: ' The history of the conflict clearly shows that the fathers, i.e., the I.T.C., tried to keep the young American Institutes unnecessarily long *in statu pupillari*, demanding filial respect and obedience from them, in fact an unconditional acknowledgement of the censuring paternal authority of the I.T.C., i.e., the older European Institutes. The reaction to this unnecessarily exacting demand was an equally unnecessarily fierce rebellion, leading to what I have called a new Declaration of Independence in 1937, inaugurating the third, and present, period of psycho-analytic training '.

It is important to note here that—as is the case with so many other revolutions with which we are familiar—even though the rebellion starts out with the officially avowed aim of ' making things more democratic ', once it becomes successful the old drama is re-enacted exactly as before, only with different ' actors '. The formerly rebellious group now becomes the possessor of power and wields it usually even more forcibly than did its predecessor. The ' rôles ' of those who have power and those who have not remains unaltered; only the identity of the specific individuals who compose the two groups changes.

Some might object that we have painted a too disheartening picture of these events. Perhaps that is true, but this is not all that we have to say on this subject. In any case, as scientists it behoves us to try to observe and describe events—even if they pertain to our own actions, individual or collective—as they appear to be in their actual day-to-day operations, and not as they are claimed to be by us, or by those who speak for us. Lastly, since new scientific insights lead to new social situations—accurate perceptions and descriptions of events form an important link in the chain of events which shape social, including educational, change. We shall therefore conclude with a few observations regarding some inferences which might be drawn from our study of the relationship between power and education, as seen in the development of psycho-analytic training.

IV

The Psychology of Adult Education

' Academic chairs are many, but wise and noble teachers few; lecture-rooms are numerous and large, but the number of young people who genuinely thirst after truth and justice is small '.

Albert Einstein (19)

Expressions in our everyday language show that we tend to distinguish between two types of ' educational influence '; first, we have that situation in which *A* (individual or group) brings certain influences to bear upon *B* (individual or group) and we assume—rightly or wrongly—that the outcome is desired by, and will be favourable for, *A*. *A* must have more power than *B*, or else such a situation cannot come into being. Accordingly, *B* is usually threatened by punishment, loss of love, and so forth, to get him to comply with the educational pressure. We designate such processes variously as ' teaching ', indoctrination ', ' brain-washing ', etc., depending on the social circumstances and our position *vis-à-vis* the proceedings. Conversely, *B* may be desirous of altering his own state of ' knowing ' and may then approach *A* (individual, group, a book, nature) in order to bring about the desired changes. Here *B* is in *control* and is, accord-

ingly, more powerful than A, at least in so far as the particular relationship (or some aspects of it) is concerned (even if A is considered more powerful in some 'over-all' sense, as for example, nature *vis-à-vis* the scientist). We designate such processes of interaction as 'studying', 'learning', 'exploration', 'research', etc. Lastly, the term 'education' is used usually in a rather neutral and general sense, implying that certain pressures from the outside are brought to bear on the student, while at the same time, the student is desirous to be influenced (for his 'own good') in a manner which is not entirely self-determined.

We can conclude that—the psychology of human relationships being what it is—*in adult education there is an inverse relationship between 'power' and 'learning'*. Only the 'weak' can teach.[13] If the teacher comes into too much power, he ceases to be a 'teacher' and becomes instead a religious or political (or other 'group') 'leader'.

The psychological differences between 'adult education' on the one hand and 'indoctrination' (or Balint's 'superego intropression') on the other can be illuminated further by focusing attention on what position or attitude of the learner (student) is most *profitable* to him. If the teacher has power, it is obvious that it will be profitable for the student to comply—to agree—with him (37). In fact, one could say that the closer the student's conceptual position approaches that of his teacher, the more profitable (e.g., in prestige, money, etc.) this might be for the student. Conversely, disagreement with power is dangerous and may lead not only to loss of status, but even to loss of life (examples are hardly necessary). All too little attention has been paid, it seems to me, to the remarkably different social organization of that group which is truly deserving of the name 'scientific': here matters are so arranged that the student might profit *equally* from any one of the following 'positions'. First, he can profit simply from 'listening'; no undue emphasis is placed on 'agreement' as to content. Secondly, he might profit potentially equally from either agreement or disagreement with what is being taught. Third, and lastly, the greatest incentive ('profit') attaches itself to constructive 'disagreement': what the scientific community honours most is an improvement on currently maintained (and taught) views. Here we encounter a psycho-sociological structure exactly opposite to that which pertains to the relationship between powerful teachers and their students.

In these considerations we touch, of course, on the ancient problems of submission to power, rebellion against it, and lastly the achievement of an attitude of 'discriminating disagreement'. Some social groups (national, professional, etc.) are so organized that submission is rewarded and rebellion punished. Others—notably revolutions, 'gangs', some aspects of sport—could be said to reward 'disagreement' indiscriminately, that is, regardless of its results. A position of discriminating watchfulness characterizes scientific groups and makes possible a rewarding of both *adherence* to established and operationally profitable systems of order, as well as the rewarding of *disagreements* with established views whenever these lead to increased knowledge.

V

On the Renunciation of Power

'Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely'.[14]

Lord Acton (2)

If we sincerely desire to foster a psycho-analytic education which will promote learning rather than teaching, or scientific inquiry rather than indoctrination—then we must draw certain inferences which follow logically from our knowledge of education. Balint (4) said that

'What we need—is a new orientation of our training system which must aim less at establishing a new and firm superego but more at enabling the candidate to free himself and to build up a strong ego which shall be both critical and liberal at the same time'.

If the main theme of this paper concerning the relationship between power and teaching, and its application to psycho-analytic training, is valid, it follows that we cannot bring about the development of a strong and liberal ego by educational *requirements*. As Einstein (22) has noted in connexion with his own education—which, it must be emphasized, was much less coercive than the present-day psycho-analytic training system—the spirit of free inquiry needs freedom above everything else. Or, to put it somewhat differently, if we wish to encourage the development of a 'strong ego' in our students, we must give them an *opportunity* to learn, but we cannot *force* them to be taught! Remarkably enough, in all the discussions of training analysis and analytic curricula, the coercive aspects of training and their psychological implications are almost never mentioned.[15]

Clearly, then, effective teaching (in the liberal sense) requires a *renunciation of power* on the part of the teacher. We are familiar with how this works, not so much within the structure of 'school situations', but rather in the realm of the actual development of scientific exploration. Here every scientist sometimes learns from and at other times teaches his colleagues. And the spread of a new idea (in the most advanced sciences) depends but little on the scientific prestige of its originator.

Interestingly, the notion that ego development (or learning, in the adult sense) requires that the teacher do *not* exercise any power over the student, was well appreciated by Freud, and was clearly stated by him as one of the characteristic features of the analytic relationship: '. . . now and then occasions arise in which the physician is bound to take up the position of teacher and mentor, but it

must be done with great caution, and the patient should be educated to liberate and to fulfil his own nature and not to resemble ourselves' (31, p. 399).

And again, 'We reject most emphatically the view that we should convert into our property the patient who put himself into our hands in search of help, that we should carve his destiny for him, force our own ideals upon him, and with the arrogance of a Creator form him in our own image and see that it was good' (31, p. 398).

Here we see that the necessity to decline the power which the patient may bestow upon us (by virtue of transferences or other reasons) constitutes a crucial requirement of psycho-analysis. I would like to call attention, in this connexion, to the important question of whether analysing is 'good' or 'bad' for the analyst. Lampl-de Groot (51) quotes Freud as having said that 'Analysing spoils the analyst's character'. She then adds: 'The analytic situation, in which the analyst is the leader, the patient's confidant, the object of the patient's love, admiration, and infantile adoration, is a real temptation to the analyst to mobilize his own feelings of grandeur and to overrate himself'. Others have suggested that analysing is 'therapeutic' for the analyst himself (75). These contradictory opinions can be easily resolved, it seems to me, if we reduce them to considerations of power. For it seems clear that it is not 'analysing' *per se*, as some unique activity, that spoils the analyst; it is rather his use—and possible abuse—of power over the patient. In Freud's warning, accordingly, we simply rediscover Lord Acton's famous utterance that 'power corrupts . . .' It would seem, therefore, that in so far as the analyst (or teacher) accepts, uses, and 'enjoys' the power which may accrue to him in his position *vis-à-vis* the patient (student)—his character becomes, *from the point of view of science*, less admirable. It is in this way that the teacher (analyst, scientist, etc.) becomes more and more the 'savant' in the sense in which Anatole France used this word when he said: 'Les savants ne sont pas curieux . . .'

On the other hand, if, in spite of a potentially powerful position, the teacher (analyst) chooses not to use his power—that is, if he declines this 'rôle'—then the experience may prove beneficial to him also, since it will favour his orienting himself to the situation at hand with detachment and a spirit of inquiry (e.g., 'self-analysis'). John Spiegel (73) has recently presented an analysis of the physician's rôles in psychotherapy and in psycho-analysis, and has thrown further light on the analytic relationship by showing that in it the physician tends to decline rôles of all sorts which the patient assigns to him.

Thus, as psycho-analysis has grown and developed, analysts learned, and probably frequently succeeded, to relinquish their position of power *vis-à-vis* the patient. Yet, we must also recognize that it is difficult to do this: otherwise there would not have been any need for Freud (and others) to emphasize it repeatedly; and also, if not for this fact, psycho-analysis would not have been as distinctively different from other psychotherapies as it has for many years. It is therefore not surprising that precisely where analysts have succeeded with their patients, they have failed with their students. Metaphorically one might say that *the 'power' which was repressed from analytic therapy returns and luxuriates in analytic training.*

Another contrasting comparison between analytic therapy and analytic training (as a system) suggests itself. It is this: the 'analytic situation' as a relationship between people is remarkably *different* from most types of human relationships; the analytic training system, on the other hand, is remarkably *similar* to other group formations (in which variations on the theme of the Oedipus complex are re-enacted with little real interest in abstract 'scientific' matters).

This sobering conclusion, of course, tells us nothing new. To say that analysts are 'merely human'—and not a group of 'chosen people'—would be to utter a banality. We can, however, conclude something more than this: namely, that in the *privacy* of the analytic situation, the analyst has risen above the tumult and chaos of the passions which dominate most human relationships: he manages to bring the soothing relief of reason and understanding to a crucially important segment of Nature, and to one where there had been little of it heretofore. Taken from the privacy and safeguards of this sutuation—and finding himself the member of a larger *group*—the analyst once again behaves in a manner much more like others. This is consistent with our knowledge of group psychology—namely, that groups tend to behave more 'immaturely' than do individuals.[16]

I would like to conclude this discussion by quoting a passage from Fenichel which illustrates very strikingly the similarity between the structure of psycho-analytic training and other (familiar) forms of social organizations. Fenichel was, of course, not speaking of the psycho-analytic training system when he wrote this. We must therefore interpolate analytic training in the appropriate places:

> 'It is in the interest of the mighty to make voluntary concessions to the helpless whose aggression is to be forestalled; for trophies voluntarily surrendered, they can demand and obtain compensation in the form of respect and submission. Since, however, *magical* participations may have the same aggression-preventing effect as real ones, such magical participation in power of all kinds can induce the helpless to remain voluntarily in their state of helplessness. The illusion that the authority, which has robbed a man of his activity and brought him into a masochistic-receptive position, loves him and gives him the supplies which maintain and raise his self-regard, is obviously one of the means by which class societies maintain themselves.' (26, p. 162)

It appears that psycho-analytic training will evolve in either one of two directions. The direction of its recent past points toward a pattern with which we are familiar in connexion with social (i.e., political, religious) structure: Here the 'scientific content', so to speak, by which the group lives is quite secondary to—and may be nothing more than the fabric of—*power*. One could look upon this pattern of life as not unlike a game of ping-pong—where the ball is power, and while the specific 'identities' of the players (individuals, groups) do change, the essential pattern of the play remains ever the same. The other direction would appear to lie in the *renunciation of power*: in teaching by example and by offering opportunity to the student for learning. A choice between these alternatives also faces many of the other sciences, beside psycho-analysis, at the present time. While we do not understand very much about the factors which determine choices of this type, we do know this much: that the progress of science is favoured by individual freedom and is retarded by coercion. When we thus speak of 'freedom', we usually think of the politcal and economic structure of society. Is it not possible that, while we might be gradually gaining (historically) in freedom in the politcal and economic spheres, we are steadily losing it in the sphere of (higher) education?

VI

Summary

The aim of this essay is to present some socio-psychological considerations regarding the evolution of the psycho-analytic training system. Educational institutions and the principles by which teaching is carried out in them usually change rather slowly. Within the span of but a few decades, however, the educational system of psycho-analysis has undergone enormous changes. Analytic training began as a short period of apprenticeship and rapidly evolved into a complex social structure, the modern training system. In the latter, the system and its representatives have great power over the selection of candidates and their fate. It is held that the psychological implications and effects of this sociological change in the analytic training system have not received the attention which they deserve. Indeed, to focus on the *content* of psycho-analytic training (e.g., training analysis, seminars, supervised analyses, etc.) while disregarding the total structure of the educational system is grossly misleading. It is reminiscent of the traditional parental attitude about raising children, according to which parents 'tell' all the 'right things' to their child and are later full of indignant 'surprise' at the human end product which results.

> 'If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists about the methods they use,' said Einstein 'I advise you to stick closely to one principle: don't listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds' (17).

Have we any reason to assume that this principle is any less valid for our understanding of the methods of education?

NOTES

We are familiar with this type of argument, as it occurs in almost all struggles between 'have' and 'have-not' groups. Those in power are wont to argue that certain 'educational' or other requirements are for the benefit of the trainee himself as well as for the 'general good'. The important element of truth in the argument obscures its aggressive character toward those who do not comply with the group's authority. A good example of this process can be seen in modern medical education: its rigid and often-times exacting requirements are justified on the grounds that they serve, in the last analysis, the protection of the public from incompetent practitioners. While again I want to emphasize that I am not opposed to 'good education'—as who can be?—it appears that the foregoing claim is a cover for the exercise of power, for it is obvious that organized medicine is far more aggressive and prohibitive toward those who refuse to submit to its authority (e.g., lay practitioners of all sorts), than toward those among its own membership who have demonstrated themselves to be incompetent. When American medical education was being overhauled under Flexner's influence, Osler was said to have remarked: 'It is a good thing that we are professors, for now we could not get in as students. . . .' This witticism expresses clearly that altogether different criteria of acceptability are used: (1) On the part of an authority-group toward those who aspire to join the group; and (2) on the part of members of the same group toward one another.

[illegible] 'Propaganda may be defined as any attempt, by means of persuasion, to enlist human beings in the service of one party to any dispute. It is thus distinguished from persecution by its method, which is one that eschews force, and from instruction by its motive, which is not the dissemination of knowledge, but the generating of some kind of party feeling'. (Bertrand Russell in *Education and The Modern World* (67, p. 207)).

[illegible] The thesis that the choice of goals is, in part, situationally determined, and is not, in this sense, 'free', is fundamental to this discussion. See in this connexion the following pertinent and illustrative works:

a. Jacob Burckhardt: *Force and Freedom* (12). 'The small State' wrote Burckhardt, 'possesses nothing but real, actual freedom, an ideal possession which fully counterbalances the huge advantages of the big State, even its power. Any decline into despotism cuts the ground from under its feet even should it be the despotism from below, for all its clamour' (pp. 101–102).

b. Wilfred Trotter: 'Has the Intellect a Function?' (79). He wrote: 'There is no aspiration more commonly

expressed by conscientious teachers than that they should be able to give their pupils the power to think for themselves. This ambition seems so innocent and laudable that we are apt to let it pass without examining its merits as a practical proposition. If we do look at it closely in that light we cannot fail to notice certain unexpected features about it. One is that those who propose to confer this great gift of free thought often manifest but little of that activity themselves. A second is that when a pupil does by chance show some evidence of individual thinking the teacher himself is apt to seem a little disconcerted; but perhaps the oddest thing that is noticeable in these good intentions is a reticence about how they are to be carried out. Pupils are to be taught to think for themselves, but how it is to be done is withheld from us ' (p. 165).

c. My essay, ' On the Theory of Psycho-analytic Treatment ' (77). The manner in which the nature of the analytic situation predetermines its ' goal ' is set forth in detail in this paper.

[4] ' Approved ' means that the training is accredited by the American Medical Association and its affiliated Specialty Boards.

[5] Cf. Knight: ' All of the important disputes of this period (i.e., 1938–1946) were concerned with training, and New York was the storm centre, as might be expected from the fact that the increase of analysts there, especially through immigration, was far greater than in any other city ' (49, p. 202).

[6] I want to add finally, without however insisting on any necessarily causal connexions between these events, that the period of ' *five years* ' emerges as still another remarkable similarity between the systems of American immigration policies and of psycho-analytic training. As is well known, a period of five years must elapse (following his entry into the country) before an immigrant may file for his final naturalization certificate, and take his ' examination'. Similarly, formal analytic training, as now established in most training institutes, requires a period of five years. The status of becoming a training analyst is further conditional upon a five-year period of membership in the local psycho-analytic society. Whether or not these similarities are purely fortuitous is assuredly an interesting question; in any case, inquiry into this question is not within the scope of this essay. The prepotent rôle, however, of European analysts (who came to America in the nineteen-thirties) in the affairs of the American Psychoanalytic Association and in the evolving training standards constitutes a sociological fact which should warn the sceptic against a too ready dismissal of the possible connexions between the history of analytic training on the one hand, and the policies governing immigration to America on the other.

It must be remembered that both the foregoing processes reflect the general pattern which characterizes the growth of any ' exclusive club ' type of organization. The foundation of the ' club ' requires that it be relatively open and ' liberal '; as it acquires more prestige and power, the organization becomes progressively more *exclusive*. This word should be taken literally, to signify that without due emphasis on *excluding* those who want to join it, the club's particular identity would not be what it is at the zenith of its power. Moreover, the more exclusive the organization becomes, the more people (as a rule) want to join it. If expansion of the group continues, its members soon feel that membership in the ' club ' is no longer very valuable. (The ' general feeling ' about specialty board certification in psychiatry is a case in point. I have the impression too that many of the younger analysts feel somewhat chagrined that to be an ' analyst ' is no longer as unusual as it used to be). At this point the prestige and power of the ' club ' begins to wane and often leads to the formation of new ' clubs '.

[7] ' Jung often said he was by nature a heretic, which was why he was drawn at first to Freud's very heretical work ' (Jones, 47, p. 142).

[8] It is quite unusual in the history of sciences to see such a flowering of productivity at its very beginning. Riesman has commented on this phenomenon also (65).

[9] The essential theme of this utterance is repeated over and over again by men who have become respected in the history of our civilization by virtue of their thoughtful humaneness. See, for example, the following:

' Every movement becomes exaggerated, becomes a mere process and a lie as soon as it is taken up by fashion. There is no truth which is good in the beginning, for which theoretically one would shed one's blood, which does not become, through imitation, the worst of errors, the tare which must be ruthlessly mowed down '. (Emile Zola (1896), quoted by Hilde Bruch (11)).

' . . . education in the modern world tends to be a reactionary force, supporting the government when it is conservative, and opposing it when it is progressive '. ' The first thing the average educator sets to work to kill in the young is imagination '. (Bertrand Russell, 67, pp. 18–19 and 157–158).

[10] The connotation of these terms has become thoroughly magical, so that they tend to mean simply ' exalted ' or ' good ', and do not designate any clear-cut scientific (or therapeutic) method. A striking illustration in support of this assertion may be found in the following observation. In the second edition of his authoritative textbook *Treatment in Psychiatry*, (1950), Diethelm (15) devotes an entire chapter to ' Distributive Analysis and Synthesis '. In the third edition (16) of this book (1955), this term is omitted as a chapter heading, and instead there is a chapter on ' Dynamic Psychotherapy '. However, *the same two case histories* which in the second edition illustrate ' distributive analysis and synthesis ' are used in the third edition to show how ' dynamic psychotherapy ' works.

[11] Numerous 'scientific ' (i.e., ' educational ') and ethical considerations are usually brought to bear on the controversy as to whether non-medical persons should be permitted to practise analysis. It seems striking, however, that such diametrically opposite patterns as characterize the attitude to lay analysis in the United States and in Great Britain should prevail, in as much as the philosophy and practice of medical education in these two countries is quite similar. One is forced to conclude that economic factors—and thus once again considerations of ' power '—play a paramount rôle in this matter: for in England, where the practice of medicine is not particularly lucrative, there is no strong opposition to lay analysis; whereas in the United States, where physicians enjoy a much higher financial reward for their work, a powerful opposition to lay analysis prevails.

[12] It is hardly possible to use this justification in good faith for the increasingly exacting training requirements. This situation is analogous to the process of justifications for social change, about which Cassirer (as have also many others) said: ' All political parties have assured us that they are ever the true representatives and guardians of freedom. But they have always defined the term in their own sense and used it for their particular interests' (14, p. 361).

[13] It must be emphasized that the foregoing statements do *not* apply to the education of children. No intelligent discussion of education is possible without a clear statement of the biological and social position (age, maturity, power, etc.) of both student and teacher. Just as children require different kinds and amounts of food and sleep from adults, so their respective educational ' needs ' are also different.

[14] The lines immediately preceding this famous statement are less well known but appear of sufficient interest in this context to be quoted in full:

' I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men, with favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is the other way against holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make

up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely' (2, p. 335).

Elsewhere, Acton wrote:

'History is not a web woven with innocent hands. Among all the causes which degrade and demoralize men, power is the most constant and the most active' (44, p. 239).

Nearly twenty years before Lord Acton expressed the thought (1887) which was destined to become one of the famous sayings of our age, Jacob Burckhardt (1868–69) voiced similar opinions:

'Every power, of course, as long as its period of growth lasts, aims at completion and perfection within and without, and has no regard for the rights of the weaker' (12, p. 102).

'Now the truth is . . . that power is in itself evil. Utterly regardless of all religion, the privilege of egoism, which is denied the individual, is bestowed on the State'.

'Now power is of its nature evil, whoever wields it. It is not stability but a lust, and *ipso facto* insatiable, therefore unhappy in itself and doomed to make others unhappy' (12, p. 164).

The sceptical psychologist of our day might even suggest that Lord Acton's famous dictum be rephrased to state: 'The corrupt seek power and those most corrupt seek absolute power'.

[14] Nielsen's paper on training analysis (57) constitutes an important exception. He wrote:

'The analyst is a very real authority, who holds the patient's professional fate in his hands. The patient will have a very strong tendency to placate him, to subordinate himself to and identify himself with the analyst. We may analyse this as a transference as much as we like, but it will always be very difficult to convince the patient that it is transference only. He may have heard of other analysands who have been refused, he may know the reason why, and he can certainly not avoid trying to mould his behaviour thereafter. The art of winning friends and influencing people is extensively practiced and I do not think that all analysts are immune to it nowadays.'. In this connexion consider also Rickman's (64) following words, written as part of his discussion of the question 'Will the former opposition to analysis return?' 'The study of the individual's weakness holds less terror now, indeed is often thought of as a relief from the strain of enduring our unstable economic and political lot. What is thought of as dangerous now is a study of the shaky foundations of the institutions of society—if *group* disruptiveness is brought to light then nothing is secure. On this ground among others the focal point of the public apprehension may well have shifted from psychodynamics to socio-dynamics or rather to a study of these forces which result in disruption in the areas of group action'.

[15] Cf. Einstein: 'Communities tend to be less guided than individuals by conscience and a sense of responsibility. What a fruitful source of suffering to mankind this fact is!' (20).

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