1. It has become a commonplace to say that an analysis is marked by the person of the analysand. But if anyone interests himself in the effects that the person of the analyst may have on the analysis, he is thought to be a very bold man indeed. This, at least, would explain the slight tremor we feel when modish remarks are made about the counter-transference - remarks that serve simply to mask its conceptual inadequacy. What nobility of soul we display when we reveal that we ourselves are made of the same clay as those we mould!

Now that's a naughty thing to say. But it's hardly enough for those at whom it is aimed, when people now go about proclaiming, under the banner of psychoanalysis, that they are striving for 'an emotional re-education of the patient' [23].

Situating the action of the analyst at this level sweeps away a position of principle, with regard to which anything that might be said about the counter-transference, however valid it may be in itself, is merely a diversion. For the imposture that I wish to dislodge here now lies beyond such considerations.

What I am denouncing, however, is not those elements in present-day psychoanalysis that might be termed anti-Freudian. For in that we should be grateful to them for lowering their mask, since they pride themselves on going beyond what, in fact, they are ignorant of, having retained from Freud's teaching just enough to feel to what extent what they have said about their experience is not consonant with that teaching. I hope to show how the inability to sustain a praxis in an authentic manner results, as is usually the case with mankind, in the exercise of power.

2. Certainly the psychoanalyst directs the treatment. The first principle of this treatment, the one that is spelt out to him before all else, and which he meets throughout his training, to the extent that he becomes utterly imbued with it, is that he must not direct the patient. The direction of conscience, in the sense of the moral guidance that a Catholic might find in it, is radically excluded here. If psychoanalysis poses problems for moral theology, they are not those of the direction of conscience, speaking of which I would add that the direction of conscience itself poses problems.

The direction of the treatment is something quite different. First of all, it consists in making the subject apply the analytic rule, that is, the directives whose presence cannot be ignored in the counter-transference - remarks that serve simply to mask its conceptual inadequacy. What nobility of soul we display when we reveal that we ourselves are made of the same clay as those we mould!

This is already enough to show us that, from the initial directives on, the problem of direction cannot be formulated in an univocal communication - a fact that forces us to pause at this stage and to throw further light on it in what follows.

Let us simply state that, reducing it to its bare truth, this stage consists in making the patient forget that it is merely a question of words spoken, but that this does not excuse the analyst for forgetting it himself [16].

3. Moreover, I have declared that it is from the angle of the analyst that I intend to approach my subject.

Let us say that in the pooling of resources involved in the common enterprise, the patient is not the only one who finds it difficult to pay his share. The analyst too must pay:

- pay with words no doubt, if the transmutation that they undergo from the analytic operation raises them to the level of interpretation;
- but also pay with his person, in that, whatever happens, he lends it as a support for the singular phenomena that analysis has discovered in the transference;
- can anyone forget that, in order to intervene in an action that goes to
the heart of being (Kern unseres Wesens, as Freud put it [6]), he must pay with that which is essential in his most intimate judgement: could he remain alone outside the field of play?

Let those who support our cause not be concerned at the thought that I am offering myself here once again to opponents who are always only too happy to send me back to my metaphysics.

For it is only on the basis of their claim to be satisfied with practical efficacy that a statement like 'the analyst cures not so much by what he says and does than by what he is' [22] can be made. Nobody, apparently, demands an explanation for such a statement, any more than one appeals to their author's sense of modesty when, with a tired smile directed at the derision that he incurs, he falls back on goodness, his goodness (we must be good, no transcendence in the context), to put an end to the endless argument about the transference neurosis.5 But who would be cruel enough to question someone bent double under the weight of his luggage, when his bearing already indicates that it is full of bricks?

Yet being is being, whoever invokes it, and we have a right to ask what it is doing here.

4. So I shall cross-examine the analyst again, in so far as I am myself one, and observe that the less sure he is of his action the more interested he is in his being.

As an interpreter of what is presented to me in words or deeds, I am my own oracle and articulate it as I please, sole master of my ship after God, and of course far from being able to measure the whole effect of my words, but well aware of the fact and striving to guard against it, in other words always free in the timing, frequency and choice of my interventions, to the point that it seems that the rule has been arranged entirely so as not to impede in any way my own freedom of movement, that to which the 'material' aspect is correlative, and under which my action here taken what it produces.

5. In my handling of the transference, on the other hand, my freedom is alienated by the duplication to which my person is subjected in it, and everyone knows that it is there that the secret of analysis is to be sought. This does not prevent people believing that they are really getting somewhere when they discover the learned notion that psychoanalysis must be studied as a situation involving two persons. It is no doubt hedged about by conditions that restrain its movements, but the situation thus conceived serves nevertheless to articulate (and without more artifice than the emotional re-education referred to above) the principles of a training of the 'weak' ego, by an ego that one pleases to believe is capable, on account of its 'strength', of carrying out such a project. That such a view is not expressed without a certain embarrassment is shown by the strikingly clumsy regrets that are offered, like the one that specifies that there must be no compromise on the need for a 'cure from within' [22].6 But it is all the more significant to observe that the ascent of the subject, referred to in this passage, comes only secondarily, after an effect that was first of all imposed.

It gives me no pleasure to point out these deviations; my aim is rather that these reefs should serve as beacons on our route.

In fact, every analyst (even if he is one of those who wander off course in this way) always experiences the transference in wonder at the least expected effect of a relationship between two people that seems like any other. He tells himself that he has to make his peace with a phenomenon for which he is not responsible, and we know with what insistence Freud stressed the spontaneity of the patient's transference.

For some time now, analysts in the heart-rending revisions that they treat us to have been ready enough to insinuate that this insistence, of which they were for so long the bulwark, expresses in Freud a flight from the commitment that the notion of situation presupposes. We are, you see, up to date.

But it is rather the facile exaltation of their gesture in throwing feelings, which they class under the heading of their counter-transference, in one side of the scales, thus balancing the transference itself with their own weight, which for me is evidence of an unhappy consciousness correlative with a failure to conceive the true nature of the transference.

One cannot regard the phantasies that the analysand imposes on the person of the analyst in the same way as a perfect card player might guess his opponent's intentions. No doubt there is always an element of strategy, but one should not be deceived by the metaphor of the mirror, appropriate as it may be to the smooth surface that the analyst presents to the patient. An impassive face and sealed lips do not have the same purpose here as in a game of bridge. Here the analyst is rather bringing to his mind what in bridge is called the dummy (le mort), but he is doing so in order to introduce the fourth player who is to be the partner of the analysand here, and whose hand the analyst, by his tactics, will try to expose: such is the link, let us say the abnegation, that is imposed on the analyst by the stake of the game in the analysis.

One might pursue the metaphor by deducing his game according to
whether he places himself 'on the right' or 'on the left' of the patient that, is to say, in a position to play after or before the fourth player, to play, that is to say, before or after the player with the dummy.

But what is certain is that the analyst's feelings have only one possible place in the game, that of the dummy; and that if he is re-animated the game will proceed without anyone knowing who is leading.

That is why the analyst is less free in his strategy than in his tactics.

6. Let us take this further. The analyst is even less free as to that which dominates strategy and tactics, namely, his policy, where he would better advised to take his bearings from his want-to-be (manque à être) rather than from his being.

To put it another way: his action on the patient escapes him through the idea that he forms of it as long as he does not grasp its starting-point in that by which it is possible, as long as he does not retain the paradox of its four-sidedness, in order to revise in principle the structure by which any action intervenes in reality.

For today's psychoanalysts, this relation to reality goes without saying. They measure the patient's defections from that relation on the authoritarian principle that is always employed by educators. Furthermore, they rely on the teaching analysis to ensure its maintenance at a sufficient rate among analysts, who are not allowed to feel that, in confronting the human problems that are presented to them, their views will sometimes be somewhat parochial. This is merely to remove the problem from an individual level.

And it is hardly reassuring, when they trace the procedure of analysis as the reduction in the subject of deviations attributed to his transference and his resistances, but mapped in relation to reality, to hear them declaring about the 'perfectly simple situation' that is provided by analysis as a means of measuring up to reality. Come now! The educator is not ready to be educated if he can take so lightly an experience that he, too, must have undergone.

One would have expected from such an appreciation that these analysts would have given other twists to this experience if they had had to depend on their sense of reality to invent it themselves: a priority too shameful to be thought of. They suspect as much, and that is why they are so punctilious in preserving its forms.

One understands that in order to prop up so obviously precarious a conception certain individuals on the other side of the Atlantic should have felt the need to introduce into it some stable value, some standard of the measure of the real: this turns out to be the autonomous ego. This is the supposedly organized ensemble of the most disparate functions that lend their support to the subject's feeling of innateness. It is regarded as autonomous because it appears to be sheltered from the conflicts of the person (non-conflictual sphere) [14].

One recognizes there a down-at-heel mirage that had already been rejected as untenable by the most academic psychology of introspection. Yet this regression is celebrated as a return to the fold of 'general psychology'.

However, it does solve the problem of the analyst's being. A team of egos no doubt less equal than autonomous (but by what trade-mark do they recognize in one another the sufficiency of their autonomy?) is offered to the Americans to guide them towards happiness, without upsetting the autonomies, egoistical or otherwise, that pave with their non-conflictual spheres the American way of getting there.

7. To sum up. If the analyst were dealing only with resistances, he would look twice before hazarding an interpretation, as is in fact the case, but in doing so he would have done all that could be expected of him.

However, this interpretation, if he gives it, will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be. Will he agree to benefit from this error concerning the person? The ethics of analysis do not contradict this, on condition that the analyst interprets this effect, otherwise the analysis will amount to little more than a crude suggestion.

An incontestable position, except that the analyst's words will still be heard as coming from the Other of the transference, the emergence of the subject from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum.

It is therefore because the subject imputes being (being that is else-
where) to the analyst that an interpretation can return to the place from which it may bear on the distribution of responses.

But who will say what the analyst is, and what remains of him when it comes to the task of interpreting? Let him dare to say it himself if all he has to say to us by way of an answer is that he is a man. Whether or not he has anything to say would then be all there is to it: yet it is there that he beats a retreat, not only on account of the impudence of the mystery, but because in this having, it is being that is in question, and how. We shall see later that this 'how' is not an easy matter.

Moreover, he prefers to fall back on his ego, and on the bit of reality he knows. But then he is on terms of I and me (à je et à moi) with his patient. How can he manage if it they're at daggers drawn? It is here that one is
For interpretation is based on no assumption of divine archetypes, but on the fact that the unconscious is structured in the most radical way like a language, that a material operates in it according to certain laws, which are the same laws as those discovered in the study of actual languages, languages that are or were actually spoken.

The phlogiston metaphor, which was suggested to me a moment ago by Glover, gets its appropriateness from the error that it suggests: signification no more emanates from life than phlogiston in combustion escapes from bodies. We should speak of it rather as of the combination of life with the atom O of the sign, first and foremost of the sign in so far as it connotes presence or absence, by introducing essentially the and that links them, since in connoting presence or absence, it establishes presence against a background of absence, just as it constitutes absence in presence.

One will recall that with the sureness of touch that was his in this field, Freud, seeking the model of the repetition compulsion, stopped at the crossroads formed by a game of occultation and an alternate scansion of two phonemes, whose conjugation in a child made a striking impression on him.

At the same time, there also appears in it the value of the object as in itself non-signifying (the object that the child causes to appear and disappear), and the subsidiary character of phonetic perfection in relation to phonematic distinction — and no one would dispute that Freud was right to translate it immediately by the Fort/Da! of the German he as an adult spoke [9].

This is the point of insertion of a symbolic order that pre-exists the infantile subject and in accordance with which he will have to structure himself.

I will spare myself the task of giving the rules of interpretation. It is not that they cannot be formulated, but their formulæ presuppose developments that I cannot presume to be known, and it would be impossible to provide a condensed account of them here.

I will confine myself to remarking that when one reads the classical commentaries on interpretation, one always regrets how little is made of the data offered.

For example, everyone recognizes in his own way that to confirm that an interpretation is well founded, it is not the conviction with which it is received that matters, since the criterion of conviction will be found rather in the material that will emerge as a result of the interpretation.

But the psychologizing superstition is so powerful in people’s minds that one will always solicit the phenomenon in terms of the subject’s assent, entirely omitting the consequences of what Freud says about Verneinung as a form of avowal — to say the least, it cannot be treated as the equivalent of just any old thing.

This is how theory describes the way in which resistance is engendered in practice. It is also what I mean when I say that there is no other resistance to analysis than that of the analyst himself.

The serious thing is that with present-day authors the sequence of analytic effects seems to be understood inside out. What they seem to be saying is that interpretation can only be a hesitant and uncertain stammer in comparison with a wider relation in which, at last, true understanding reigns (‘from the inside’ no doubt).

According to this view, an exigency of the interpretation becomes weakness to which we must offer help. It is also something else, something that is very difficult to swallow without rejecting it. It is both at once, that is to say, a very inconvenient means.

But what we have here is only the effect of the analyst’s passions: his fear, which is not error, but ignorance, his taste, which is not to satisfy, but not to disappoint either, his need, which is not to govern, but to keep the upper hand. It has nothing to do with any counter-transference on the part of this or that individual; it is a question of the consequences of the dual relation, if the therapist does not overcome it, and how can he overcome it if he sees it as the ideal of his action?

Primum vivere no doubt: a break must be avoided. That one should regard as technique the practice of puerile, honest civility to be taught to this end is bad enough. But that one should confuse this physical necessity, the patient’s presence at the appointment, with the analytic relation, is a mistake that will mislead the novice for a long time to come.

6. From this point of view, the transference becomes the analyst’s security, and the relation to the real the terrain on which the combat is decided. The interpretation, which has been postponed until the consolidation of the transference, now becomes subordinated to the reduction of the transference.

As a result, the interpretation is reabsorbed into a ‘working through’, 10 which serves as an alibi for a sort of revenge taken for the initial timidity, that is to say, for an insistence that opens the door to all kinds of pressure, conveniently dubbed ‘strengthening of the ego’ [21—22].

7. But has anyone observed, in criticizing Freud’s approach,
presented for example in the case of the Rat Man, that what strikes us as preconceived doctrine is due simply to the fact that he proceeds in inverse order? Namely, that he begins by introducing the patient to an initial mapping of his position in the real, even if the real involves a precipitation — I would even go so far as to say a systematization — of the symptoms [8].

Another famous example: when he reduces Dora to realizing that she has done more than merely contribute to the great disorder of her father's world, the damage to which forms the object of her protest, but that she was in fact the mainspring of it and that he was unable to accept her complacency [7].

I have long stressed the Hegelian procedure at work in this reversal of the positions of the belle âme in relation to the reality that it accuses. It is hardly a question of adapting to it, but to show it that it is only too well adapted, since it assists in the construction of that very reality.

But the path to be followed with the other stops here. For the transference has already done its work, showing that it is certainly a question of something other than the relations between the ego and the world.

Freud does not always seem to be quite clear about this in the cases he describes. And that is why they are so valuable.

For he recognized at once that the principle of his power lay there, in the transference — in which respect it was not very different from sugger-

...
The direction of the treatment

What proves that it is, in fact, erroneous is the very thing in which Kris is confirmed, namely, that just when he thinks he is able to ask the patient what he thinks of the coat being turned in this way, the patient, day-dreaming for a moment, replies that for some time, on leaving the session, he has wandered along a street full of attractive little restaurants, scrutinizing the menus in search of his favourite dish, cold brains.

An avowal which, rather than sanctioning the benefits of the intervention by virtue of the material that it contributes, seems to me to have the corrective value of acting out in the very relation that it makes of it.

This after-the-event air that the patient breathes seems to me rather to tell the hostess that she is failing in her service. Compulsive as he is to inhale it, it is a hint, a transitory symptom no doubt, but it warns the analyst that he is barking up the wrong tree.

You are indeed barking up the wrong tree, I would repeat, addressing the late Ernst Kris, as I remember him at the Marienbad Congress, where the day following my address on the mirror stage, I took a day off, anxious to get a feeling of the spirit of the times, heavy with promises, at the Berlin Olympiad. He gently objected: ‘ Ça ne se fait pas!’ (in French), thus showing that he had already acquired that taste for the respectable that perhaps deflects his approach here.

Was it this that misled you, Ernst Kris, or simply that upright as your intentions may have been, for your judgement, too, is beyond question, things themselves ‘were shaky.

It’s not that your patient doesn’t steal that is important here. It’s that he doesn’t... No, not doesn’t: it’s that he steals nothing. And that’s what he should have been told.

Contrary to what you believe, it is not his defence against the idea of stealing that makes him believe that he steals. It’s his having an idea of his own that never occurs to him, or hardly even crosses his mind. It is useless, therefore, to engage him in this process of taking into consideration, in which God himself could not recognize himself, what his friend pinches from him that is more or less original when they are talking together.

May not this desire for cold brains refresh your own concepts, and remind you of what Roman Jakobson says of the function of metonymy? I shall return to this later.
III Where have we got with the transference?

1. It is to the work of my colleague Daniel Lagache that we must turn for a true account of the work which, around Freud while he was pursuing his activity and since in what he has left us, has been devoted to the transference, which he discovered. The object of this work goes well beyond this, by introducing into the function of the phenomenon structural distinctions that are essential for its critique. One has only to recall the very relevant alternative that he presents, as to its ultimate nature, between the need for repetition and the repetition of need.

Such work, if I believe I have been able to convey in my teaching the consequences that it brings with it, shows very clearly by means of the ordering that it introduces to what extent the aspects on which discussion is centred are often partial, and particularly to what extent the ordinary use of the term, even in analysis, cannot free itself from its most questionable, not to say most vulgar approach, namely, to review or enumerate the positive or negative feelings that the patient has for his analyst.

In deciding where we have got with the transference in our scientific community, could it be said that neither agreement nor illumination has surrounded the following points on which they would seem nevertheless to be necessary: is it the same effect of the relation with the analyst that is manifested in the initial infatuation to be observed at the beginning of treatment and in the web of satisfactions that make this relation so difficult to break when the transference neurosis seems to go beyond the properly analytic means? Is it, again, the relation with the analyst and its fundamental frustration which, in the second period of analysis, sustains the rhythm of frustration, aggression, and regression in which the most fruitful effects of analysis appear to occur? How must we conceive of the ordination of phenomena when their movement is traversed by fantasies that openly involve the figure of the analyst?

The reason for these persistent obscurities has been formulated in an exceptionally lucid study: at each of the stages at which an attempt has been made to revise the problems of the transference, the technical divergences that made such a revision a matter of urgency have left no place for a true critique of the notion itself [26].

2. It is so central a notion for the analytic action that I wish to take up here that it may serve as a measure for the partiality of the theories in which one spends so much time thinking about it. That is, one will not
be misled into judging it from the handling of the transference that those theories involve. This pragmatism is justified. For this handling of the transference is at one with the notion, and however little elaborated this notion is in practice, it cannot do otherwise than range itself with the partialities of the theory.

On the other hand, the simultaneous existence of these partialities does nothing to make them complement one another – which confirms that they suffer from a central defect.

In order to introduce a little order into the question, I will reduce these peculiarities of the theory to three, even if it means exposing myself to a certain amount of prejudice, less serious for being only a matter of exposition.

3. I will link geneticism, in the sense that it tends to ground analytic phenomena in the developmental stages that concern them and to be nourished on the so-called direct observation of the child, to a special technique that concentrates on the analysis of the defences.

This link is obvious from a historical point of view. One might even say that it is based on nothing else, since this link is constituted only by the failure of the solidarity that it presupposes.

One can locate its beginnings in the legitimate credence given the notion of an unconscious ego with which Freud reoriented his doctrine. To pass from this to the hypothesis that the mechanisms of defence that are grouped together under its function ought themselves to be able to reveal a comparable law of appearance, one that even corresponds to the succession of stages by which Freud had attempted to link the emergence of the drives to physiology – that was the step that Anna Freud, in her book *The Mechanisms of Defence*, proposed to take in order to put it to the test of experience.

It could have been an opportunity to make a fruitful critique of the relations between development and the obviously more complex structures that Freud introduced into psychology. But the sights were lowered – it was so much more tempting to try and insert into the observable stages of sensorimotor development and of the developing skills of intelligent behaviour these mechanisms of defence, supposedly independent of their development.

One might say that the hopes that Anna Freud placed in such an exploration were disappointed: nothing emerged from this line of approach that threw any light on problems of technique, though the details of a child analysis have yielded some very interesting suggestions.

The notion of *pattern*, which functions here as an alibi of the abandoned typology, dominates a technique which, in pursuing the detection of a non-contemporaneous pattern, concentrates all too easily, it seems, on its departure from a pattern that finds in its conformism the guarantees of its conformity. One cannot recall without a sense of shame the criteria of success in which this shoddy work culminates: the achievement of a higher income, and the emergency exit provided by the affair with one’s secretary, regulating the release of forces strictly bound up in marriage, career and the political community, do not seem to me to be worthy of an appeal (articulated in the analyst’s planning, and even in his interpretation) to the Discord of the instincts of life and death – except by way of decorating his words with the pretentious term ‘economic’, and to pursue it, in complete misunderstanding of Freud’s thought, as the play of two forces homologous in their opposition.

4. Less eroded in its analytic relief it seems to me is the other side of the coin, where we find depicted that which eludes the transference, namely, the axis taken from the object relation.

This theory, although it has lost much of its appeal in France in recent years, has, like geneticism, a noble origin. It was Karl Abraham who pulled out the stop on this theory, and the notion of the part-object is his original contribution to it. This is not the place to demonstrate the value of that contribution. I am more concerned to indicate its connexion with the partiality of the aspect that Abraham detaches from the transference, and then proceeds in his opaque way to transform it into the ability to love: as if that were a constitutional given of the patient in which one might read the degree of his amenability to treatment, and, in particular, the only one in which the treatment of psychosis would fail.

We have two equations here in effect. The so-called sexual transference (*Sexualübertragung*) is the basis of the love we call object love (*Objektliebe*). The capacity for transference is a measure of the patient’s access to the real. One cannot stress too much that this merely begs the question.

Unlike the presuppositions of geneticism, which is supposed to be based on an order of formal emergences in the subject, Abraham’s approach can be explained as a finality that allows itself to be instincual, in the sense that it is based on the image of the maturation of an ineffable object, the Object with a capital O that governs the phase of objectality (to be distinguished, significantly, from objectivity by virtue of its affective substance).

This ectoplasmic conception of the object soon revealed its dangers
when it became degraded into the crude dichotomy expressed in the opposition of the pregenital character and the genital character.

This over-simplified thematization is summarily developed by attributing to the pregenital character the accumulated features of projective unrealism, greater or lesser degrees of autism, restriction of satisfaction by the defences, the conditioning of the object by a doubly protective isolation of the destructive effects that connoted it, in other words, an amalgam of all the defects of the object relation with a view to showing the motives of extreme dependence that result from them for the subject. A picture that would be useful despite its ineradicable confusion if it did not seem made to serve as a negative to the puerility of 'the passage from the pregenital form to the genital form', in which the drives 'no longer take on that character of a need of uncoercible, unlimited, unconditional possession, involving a destructive aspect. They are truly tender, loving, and even if the subject does not show himself to be obbligatory, that is to say, disinterested, and even if these objects' (here the author recalls my remarks) 'are as profoundly narcissistic objects as in the previous case, he is capable of comprehension, and adaptation to the other. Indeed, the intimate structure of these object relations shows that the objects' participation in its own pleasure is indispensable to the subject's happiness. The proprieties, the desires, the needs of the object [what a mess!] are taken into consideration to the highest degree.'

However, this does not prevent the ego from having 'a stability that runs no risk of being compromised by the loss of a significant Object. It remains independent of its objects.'

'It is organized in such a mode of thought that it uses is essentially logical. It does not spontaneously present regression to an archaic mode of apprehending reality, affective thinking, magical belief, playing only an absolutely secondary role; symbolization does not grow in extent and importance beyond what it is in normal life.[!!]'. The style of the relations between subject and object is one of the most highly evolved [sic].

This is the promise held out to those who 'at the end of a successful analysis . . . realize the enormous difference between what they once believed sexual pleasure to be and what they now experience'.

One is led to understand that for those who enjoy this pleasure from the outset, 'the genital relation is, in short, untroubled' [21].

Untroubled except for conjugating itself irresistibly in the verb 'to tap the chandelier with one's behind' (se taper le derrière au lustre), whose place here seems to me to be marked for the future scholiast to meet his eternal opportunity.

5. If, indeed, we must follow Abraham when he presents us with the object-relation as typically demonstrated in the activity of the collector perhaps the rule is not given in this edifying antinomy, but is to be sought rather in some impasse that is constitutive of desire itself.

This means that the object is presented as broken and decomposed, and is perhaps something other than a pathological factor. And what has this absurd hymn to the harmony of the genital got to do with the real?

Should we erase the Oedipal drama from our experience when it must have been forged by Freud precisely to explain the barriers and snubs (Erniedrigungen) that are so common in even the most fulfilled love relation?

Is it our job to disguise the black God in the sheep's clothing of the Good Shepherd Eros?

Sublimation may well be at work in the oblation that radiates from love, but we should try to go a little farther into the structure of the sublime, and not confuse it with the perfect orgasm - which was something Freud, at least, was anxious to disprove.

The worst thing about all this is that souls who overflow with the most natural tenderness are led to wonder if they can cope with the delusional 'normality' of the genital relation - a new burden which, like those cursed by the Evangelist, we have bound on to the shoulders of the innocents.

Yet to read what I have written, if any of it survives into a time when people will no longer know what it was in practice that these excited words were a reply to, one might imagine that our art was employed to revive sexual hunger in those afflicted with a retardation of the sexual gland - that it was applied to physiology, to which we have made no contribution, and of which very little was there to be known.

6. At least three sides are needed to make a pyramid, even a heretical one. The one that closes the dihedron described here in the gap left by the conception of the transference, strives, one might say, to unite the edges.

If the transference takes on its virtue from being brought back to the reality of which the analyst is the representative, and if it is a question of ripening the Object in the hot house of a confined situation, the analysand is left with only one object, if you will pardon the expression, to get his teeth into, and that's the analyst.
Hence the third mistake on our list: the notion of intersubjective introjection establishes itself, unfortunately, in a dual relation.

For we are certainly dealing with a unitive way of which the various theoretical sauces with which it is served up, depending on the topography to which one is referring, can do no more than retain the metaphor whilst varying it according to the level of the operation regarded as serious: introjection for Ferenczi, identification with the analyst's superego for Strachey, a terminal narcissistic trance for Balint.

I am trying to draw attention to the substance of this mystical consumption, and if once more I must take to task what is happening on my doorstep it is because the analytic experience is known to draw its strength from the distance between patient and analyst as the object of the dual relation.

That is why the importance given in analysis to the phantasy of phallic devouring, to which the image of the analyst is subjected, seems to me to be worthy of note, because it tallies so well with a conception of the direction of the treatment that is based entirely upon the arrangement of the distance between patient and analyst as the object of the dual relation.

For, however weak the theory with which an author systematizes his technique, the fact remains that he really does analyse, and the coherence revealed in the error is the guarantor here of the wrong route that has been taken in practice.

It is the privileged function of the signifying phallus in the mode of the subject's presence to desire that is illustrated here, but in an experience that might be called blind — blind in the absence of any sense of direction concerning the true relations of the analytic situation, which, as in any other situation involving speech, can only, by trying to inscribe it in a dual relation, be crushed.

Since the nature of symbolic incorporation is misunderstood, and with good reason, and since it is unthinkable that anything real should be accomplished in the analysis, it will appear, from a cursory study of my teaching, that nothing can be recognized in what occurs that is not imaginary. For it is not necessary to know the plan of a house to knock one's head against its walls: indeed, to do so, one can do very well without any plan.

I have myself suggested to this author, in discussion, that if one confines oneself to an imaginary relation between objects there remains only the dimension of distance to order it. This was not how he saw things at all.

To make distance the sole dimension in which the neurotic's relations with the object are played out produces unsurmountable contradictions that can be read well enough both within the system and in the opposed direction that different authors will derive from the same metaphor to organize their impressions. Too much or too little distance from the object will sometimes appear to become confused to an inextricable degree. And it is not the distance from the object, but rather its too great intimacy with the subject that seemed to Ferenczi to characterize the neurotic.

What decides what each one means is its technical use and the technique of the 'bringing-together' (le rapprocher), however priceless the effect of the untranslated term may be in an exposition in English, reveals in practice a tendency that borders upon obsession.

It is difficult to believe that given the ideal reduction of this distance to zero (nil in English) which he prescribes its author can fail to see that its theoretical paradox is concentrated there.

Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that this distance is taken as a universal parameter, regulating variations in the technique (however double-Dutch the debate on their breadth may seem) for the dismantling of neurosis.

What such a conception owes to the special conditions of obsessional neurosis is not to be ascribed entirely to the object.

It does not seem that any justification can be got from the result obtained by the application of this conception to obsessional neurosis. For if I allow myself, as I did Kris, to cite an analysis, which, like Kris, I had taken over from another analyst, I can provide evidence that such a technique in the hands of an analyst of indisputable talent succeeded in producing in a clinical case of pure obsession in a man the irruption of an infatuation that was no less passionate for being Platonic, and which proved no less irreducible for being directed at the first object of the same sex that happened to be to hand.

To speak of transitory perversion here may satisfy an invincible optimist, but only at the cost of recognizing, in this untypical restoration of the usually all too neglected third party of the relation, that one should not pull too hard on the spring of proximity in the object relation.

7. There is no limit to the erosion of analytic technique through deconceptualization. I have already referred to the discoveries of a 'wild' analysis in which, to my painful astonishment, there had been no supervision. To be able to smell one's analyst seemed in one work to be an aim to be taken literally, as an index of the happy outcome of the transference.

One can perceive here a sort of involuntary humour, which is what
makes this example so valuable. It would have delighted Jarry. It is, in fact, no more than one might expect from carrying the development of the analytic situation over into the real: and it is true that, taste apart, the olfactory is the only dimension that enables one to reduce the distance to zero (nil), this time in the real. To what extent it provides a clue for the direction of the treatment and the principles of its power is more doubtful.

But that the odour of a cage should find its way into a technique that is conducted largely by ‘sniffing out’ as they say, is not as ridiculous as it sounds. Students from my seminar will recall the smell of urine that marked the turning-point in a case of transitory perversion, which I used as a criticism of this technique. It cannot be said that it was unconnected with the accident that motivates the observation, since it is in spying, through a crack in the wall of a public lavatory, on a woman pissing that the patient suddenly transposed his libido, without anything, it seemed, predetermining it: infantile emotions bound up with the phantasy of the phallic mother having until then taken the form of a phobia [23].

It is not a direct link, however, any more than it would be correct to see in this voyeurism an inversion of the exhibition involved in the atypia of the phobia to the correctly posed diagnosis: under the patient’s anxiety at being teased for being too tall.

As I said, the analyst to whom we owe this remarkable publication gives proof of rare perspicacity in coming back, to the point of tormenting the patient, to the interpretation that she gave of a coat of arms, which appeared in a dream, in pursuivant and armed, what’s more, with a fly-spray, as a symbol of the phallic mother.

Shouldn’t I rather have talked about her father? she wondered. She justified not doing so by the fact that the real father had been missing in the patient’s history.

At this point, my pupils will be able to deplore the fact that the teaching of my seminar was unable to help her at the time, since they know by what principles I have taught them to distinguish between the phobic object qua all-purpose signifier to fill the lack of the Other and the fundamental fetish of every perversion qua object perceived in the cut (coupure) of the signifier.

Failing that, shouldn’t this gifted novice have remembered the dialogue between the suits of armour in André Breton’s Discours sur le peu de réalité? That would have put her on the right path.

But how could we hope for such a thing when this analysis was, in supervision, given a direction that involved constant harassment to bring the patient back to the real situation? How can we be surprised that, unlike the queen of Spain, the analyst has legs, when she herself emphasizes the fact in the vigour of her appeals to the order of the present?

Of course, this procedure is far from having nothing to do with the benign outcome of the acting out under examination: since the analyst, too, who is of course conscious of the fact, was in a situation of permanent castrating intervention.

But why, then, attribute this role to the mother, when everything in the anamnysis of this case would indicate that she always acted rather as a go-between?

The faltering Oedipus complex was compensated, but always in the form, disarming here in its naivety, of an entirely forced, not to say arbitrary, reference to the person of the analyst’s husband — a situation encouraged here by the fact that it was he, himself a psychiatrist, who provided the analyst with this particular patient.

This is not a very common situation. In any case, it is to be rejected as lying outside the analytic situation.

One’s reservations about its outcome are not entirely due to the graceless detours of the analysis, and the no doubt unmischievous humour involving the fees for the last session, as misappropriated for the purpose of debauchery, is no bad sign for the future.

The question that can be raised is that of the boundary between analysis and re-education when its very process is guided by a predominant solicitation of its real effects. As further evidence for which in this case one need only compare the given facts of the biography and the transference formations: any contribution made by the decipherment of the unconscious is truly minimal. So much so that one wonders whether most of it does not remain intact in the encystation of the enigma, which, under the label of transitory perversion, constitutes the object of this instructive communication.

8. But the non-analyst reader should not misunderstand me: I wish in no way to depreciate a work to which Virgil’s epithet improbus can rightly be applied.

My only purpose is to warn analysts of the decline that threatens their technique if they fail to recognize the true place in which its effects are produced.

They are tireless in their attempts to define that place, and one cannot say that when they back fall on positions of modesty, or even when they are guided by fictions, the experience that they develop is always unfruitful.
Genetic research and direct observation are far from being cut off from properly analytic realities. And in my own treatment of the themes of the object relation in a year's seminar, I showed the value of a conception in which child observation is nourished by the most accurate reconsideration of the function of mothering in the genesis of the object: I mean the notion of the transitional object, introduced by D. W. Winnicott, which is a key-point for the explanation of the genesis of fetishism [27].

Nevertheless, the flagrant uncertainties of the reading of the great Freudian concepts are correlative with the weaknesses that encumber analytic practice.

What I mean is that it is in proportion to the impasses encountered in grasping their action in its authenticity that researchers and groups end up forcing it in the direction of the exercise of power.

They substitute this power for the relation to the being where this action takes place, producing a decline of its resources, especially those of speech, from their veridical eminence. This is why it is a sort of return of the repressed, however strange it may be, which, out of the pretensions least disposed to encumber themselves with the dignity of these means, occasions this blunder of a recourse to being as though it were a given of the real, when the discourse that informs it rejects any interrogation beyond mere platitude.

Direction of treatment and principles of its power

2. Must one pay this comical price for simply recognizing the subject's want-to-be as the heart of the analytic experience, as the very field in which the neurotic's passion is deployed?

Apart from Ferenczi and the now dispersed Hungarian school, only the English, with their cold objectivity, have been able to articulate this gap, of which the neurotic, in wishing to justify his existence, provides evidence, and hence implicitly to distinguish from the interhuman relation, with its warmth and its allurements (leures), that relation to the Other in which being finds its status.

We have only to cite Ella Sharpe and her very relevant remarks to follow the neurotic's true concerns [24]. The strength of her remarks lies in a sort of naivety reflected in the justly celebrated brusqueness of her style as both therapist and writer. She is far from ordinary in the extent to which she requires the analyst to be familiar with all branches of human knowledge if he is to read the intentions of the analysand's discourse correctly.

We must be grateful to her for having placed a literary culture in pride of place in the training of practitioners, even if she does not seem to realize that in the minimum reading list that she gives them there is a predominance of works of the imagination in which the signifier of the phallus plays a central role beneath a transparent veil. This simply proves that choice is no less guided by experience for being a felicitous analytic principle.

3. It is again by the British, by birth or by adoption, that the end of the analysis has been most categorically defined by the subject's identification with the analyst. Certainly, opinion varies as to whether it is his ego or superego that is involved. It is not so easy to master the structure that Freud elucidated in the subject, unless one distinguishes between the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real.

It is enough to say that statements made so much with a view to oppose are never forged without some pressure from within those who advance them. The dialectic of phantasy objects promulgated in practice by Melanie Klein tends to be expressed in theory in terms of identification.

For these objects, part-or not, but certainly signifying – the breast, excrement, the phallus – are no doubt won or lost by the subject. He is destroyed by them or he preserves them, but above all he is these objects,
according to the place where they function in his fundamental phantasy. This mode of identification simply demonstrates the pathology of the slope down which the subject is pushed in a world where his needs are reduced to exchange values – this slope itself finding its radical possibility only in the mortification that the signifier imposes on his life in enumerating it.

4. The psychoanalyst, it would seem, simply in order to help the subject, should be saved from this pathology, which, as we will see, rests on nothing less than an iron law. This is why people imagine that a psychoanalyst should be a happy man. Indeed, is it not happiness that one is asking of him, and how could he give it, common sense asks, if he did not have it to some extent himself?

It is a fact that we do not disclaim our competence to promise happiness in a period in which the question of its extent has become so complicated: principally because happiness, as Saint-Just said, has become a political factor.

To be fair, the progress of humanism from Aristotle to St Francis (of Sales) did not fill the aporias of happiness either.

It is a waste of time, we know, to look for the shirt of a happy man, and what is called a happy shadow is to be avoided for the ills it brings.

It is certainly in the relation to being that the analyst has to find his operating level, and the opportunities that the training analysis offers him for this purpose are not only to be calculated according to the problem supposedly already resolved for the analyst who is guiding him.

There are unhappinesses of being that the prudence of schools and the false shame that ensures domination dare not cut out of one.

An ethic is yet to be formulated that integrates the Freudian conquests in the realm of desire: one that would place in the forefront the question of the analyst's desire.

5. If one is sensitive to the resonance of earlier work, one cannot fail to be struck by the decline, especially in this order, in analytic speculation. Because they understand a lot of things, analysts on the whole imagine that to understand is an end in itself, and that it can only be a 'happy end'.

The example of the physical sciences may show them, however, that the greatest successes do not require that one knows where one is going.

To think, it is often better not to understand, and one can gallop through miles of understanding without the least thought being produced.

This, indeed, was how the Behaviourists began: they gave up the attempt to understand. But because they lacked any other thought as far as our particular subject, which is antiphysis, is concerned they adopted

to change values - this slope itself finding its radical possibility only down which the subject is pushed in a world where his needs are reduced that to understand is an end in itself, and that it can only be a 'happy end' according to the place where they function in his fundamental phantasy.

Direction of treatment and principles of its power

the course of using, without understanding it, what we understand: which, I suppose, could be a source of pride for us.

A sample of what we are capable of producing in fact by way of mutability is provided by the notion of oblativity. This is the phantasy of an obsessional neurotic, of itself misunderstood: everything for the other, my fellow man, is offered in it, without recognizing in it the anxiety that the Other (with a capital O) inspires by not being a fellow man.

6. I do not claim to teach psychoanalysts what thinking is. They know. But they did not understand this off their own bat. They learnt their lesson from the psychologists. Thought is an attempt at action, they repeat, like well behaved pupils. (The same can be said of Freud himself, which does not prevent him from being a doughty thinker, whose action culminates in thought.)

The thought of analysts is really an action that undoes itself. This leaves some hope that, if one makes them think about it, take it up again, they will come to think about it again.

7. The analyst is the man to whom one speaks and to whom one speaks freely. That is what he is there for. What does that mean?

All that can be said about the association of ideas is mere psychological packaging. Induced puns are far-away; because of their protocol, moreover, nothing could be less free.

The subject invited to speak in analysis does not really reveal a great deal of freedom in what he says. Not that he is bound by the rigour of his associations: no doubt they do oppress him, but it is rather that they open up on to a free speech, a full speech that is painful to him.

Nothing is more to be feared than saying something that might be true. For if it were, it would become entirely so, and God knows what happens when something, by the very fact of its being true, can no longer be doubted.

Is that the method used in analysis – a progress towards truth? I can already hear the apprentices murmuring that I intellectualize analysis: though I am in the very act, I believe, of preserving the unsayable aspect of it.

That it is beyond the discourse accommodated by our listening, I know better than anyone, if only I take the trouble to hear, and not to auscultate. Yes certainly not the way of auscultating the resistance, the tension, the opisthotonos, the pallor, the adrenalinic discharge in which a stronger (resic) ego should be re-formed: what I listen to comes from hearing.
Hearing does not force me to understand. What I hear is nonetheless a discourse, even if it is as little discursive as an interjection. For an interjection is of the order of language and not of the expressive cry. It is a part of the discourse that is unrivalled for its syntactical effects in a particular language.

To what I hear, I have nothing more to say if I understand nothing, and if I do understand something I am sure to be mistaken. However, this is not what would stop me from replying. It’s what happens outside analysis in such a case. I keep quiet. Everybody agrees that I frustrate the speaker, him first, but me too. Why?

If I frustrate him it is because he asks me for something. To answer him, in fact. But he knows very well that it would be mere words. And he can get those from whomever he likes. It’s not even certain that he’d be grateful to me if they were good words, let alone if they were bad ones. It’s not these words he’s asking for. He is simply asking me...

Of course, his demand is deployed on the field of an implicit demand, that for which he is there: the demand to cure him, to reveal him to himself, to introduce him to psychoanalysis, to help him to qualify as an analyst. But, as he knows, this demand can wait. His present demand has nothing to do with this, it is not even his own, for after all it is I who have offered to speak to him. (Only the subject is transitive here.)

In short, I have succeeded in doing what in the field of ordinary commerce one would dearly like to be able to do with such ease: with supply I have created demand.

8. But it is, one might say, a radical demand.

Mrs Macalpine is no doubt right to seek the motive force of the transference in the analytic rule alone. But she errs in attributing to the absence of all object the open door to infantile regression [24]. This would seem to be an obstacle, for, as everyone knows, infant analysts more than anyone, it takes a lot of little objects to keep up a relation with children.

Through the mediation of the demand, the whole past opens up right down to early infancy. The subject has never done anything other than demand, he could not have survived otherwise, and we just follow on from there.

It is in this way that analytic regression may take place and present itself in effect. One talks of it as if the subject set out to be a child. That no doubt happens, and such pretence is not a very good omen. It stands out in any case from what is usually observed in what passes for regression. For regression shows nothing other than a return to the present of signifiers used in demands for which there is prescription.

9. To return once more to the beginning, this situation explains the primary transference, and the love that is sometimes declared in it.

For if love is giving what one does not have, it is certainly true that the subject can wait to be given it, since the psychoanalyst has nothing else to give him. But he does not even give him this nothing, and it is just as well: and that is why he is paid for this nothing, preferably well paid, in order to show that it would not otherwise be worth much.

But although the primary transference generally remains little more than a shadow; it is not this that prevents the shadow from dreaming and reproducing his demand when there is nothing left to demand. This demand will be all the purer for being empty.

Nonetheless, it may be objected, the analyst gives his presence, but I believe that this presence is first of all simply the implication of his listening, and that this listening is simply the condition of speech. Furthermore why does the technique require that he should be so discreet if, in fact, this is not the case? It is only later that his presence will be felt.

Anyway, the most acute feeling of his presence is bound up with a moment when the subject can only remain silent, that is to say, when he even recoils before the shadow of demand.

Thus the analyst is he who supports the demand, not, as has been said, to frustrate the subject, but in order to allow the signifiers in which his frustration is bound up to reappear.

10. It is worth recalling that it is in the oldest demand that the primary identification is produced, that which is brought about by the mother’s omnipotence, that is to say, the identification that not only suspends the satisfaction of needs from the signifying apparatus, but also that which fragments them, filters them, models them upon the defiles of the structure of the signifier.

Needs become subordinated to the same conventional conditions as those of the signifier in its double register: the synchronic register of opposition between irreducible elements, and the diachronic register of substitution and combination, through which language, even if it does not fulfil all functions, structures everything concerning relations between human beings.

Hence the oscillation that is to be observed in Freud’s statements concerning the relations between the superego and reality. The superego
not, of course, the source of reality, as he says somewhere, but it marks out the paths that reality will take, before rediscovering in the unconscious the first ideal marks in which the drives are constituted as repressed in the substitution of the signifier for needs.

1. There is now no need to seek further for the source of the identification with the analyst. That identification may assume very different forms, but it will always be an identification with signifiers.

As an analysis develops, the analyst deals in turn with all the articulations of the subject’s demand. But, as I will point out later, he must respond to them only from the position of the transference.

Who, in fact, emphasizes the importance of what might be called the permissive hypothesis of the analysis? But we need no particular political regime for that which is not forbidden to become obligatory.

Those analysts who might be said to be fascinated by the sequellae of frustration hold no more than a position of suggestion that reduces the subject to restate his demand. May be that is what is meant by emotional re-education.

Kindness is no doubt as necessary there as everywhere else, but it would be incapable of curing the evil that it engenders. The analyst who desires the subject’s well-being repeats that by which he was formed, and sometimes, even, deformed. The most aberrant education has never had any other motive than the well-being of the subject.

A theory of analysis is conceived which, unlike the delicate articulation of Freud’s analysis, reduces the source of symptoms to fear. It engenders a practice in which what I have called elsewhere the ferocious figure of the superego is imprinted, in which there is no other way out of the transference neurosis than to make the patient sit down by the window and show him all the pleasant aspects of nature, adding: ‘Go out there. Now you’re a good child.’

Desire must be taken literally. After all, a dream is just a dream, one sometimes hears these days. Does it mean nothing that Freud should have recognized in it the workings of desire?

Desire, not the drives. For we must read ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ to discover what is meant by what Freud calls in that essay ‘desire’.

We must pause at the vocables Wünsch and its English translation wish,
The desire of the hysteric's dream, and indeed any other snippet in this text of Freud summarizes what the whole book explains about the so-called unconscious mechanisms, condensation, sliding (glissement), etc., by bearing witness to their common structure: that is, the relation of desire to that mark of language that specifies the Freudian unconscious and decentres our conception of the subject.

I think my pupils will appreciate the access that I provide here to the fundamental opposition between the signifier and the signified, in which, as I show them, the powers of language begin, though in conceiving the exercise of these powers I leave them plenty of rope to twist.

Let me recall to your attention the automatism of the laws by which are articulated in the signifying chain:

(a) the substitution of one term for another to produce the effect of metaphor;
(b) the combination of one term with another to produce the effect of metonymy.

If we apply them here, we see that whereas in our patient's dream the smoked salmon, the object of her friend's desire, is all that she has to offer, Freud, by suggesting that the smoked salmon is substituted here for caviar, which, indeed, he considers to be the signifier of the patient's desire, is presenting the dream as a metaphor of desire.

But what is metaphor if not an effect of positive meaning, that is, a certain passage from the subject to the meaning of the desire? Since the subject's desire is presented here as that which is implied by her (conscious) discourse, that is to say as preconscious — which is obvious enough since her husband is willing to satisfy her desire, but the patient, who persuaded him of the existence of this desire, insists that he should do nothing about it, and it has to be Freud again who articulates it as the desire for an unsatisfied desire — one must go further if one is to learn what such a desire means in the unconscious.

Now the dream is not the unconscious itself, but, as Freud points out, the royal way to it. This confirms me in the belief that it proceeds by means of metaphor. It is this metaphorical effect that the dream uncovers. But for whom? We shall return to this later.

Let us observe for the moment that if the desire is signified as unsatisfied, it does so through the signifier: caviar, qua signifier, symbolizes the desire as inaccessible, but, as soon as it slips as desire into the caviar, the desire for caviar becomes its metonymy — rendered necessary by the want-to-be in which it is situated.

Metonymy is, as I have shown you, the effect made possible by the fact that there is no signification that does not refer to another signification, and in which their common denominator is produced, namely the little meaning (frequently confused with the insignificant), the little meaning, I say, that proves to lie at the basis of the desire, and lends it that element of perversion that it would be tempting to find in this case of hysteria.

The truth of this appearance is that the desire is the metonymy of the want-to-be.

3. Let us now return to the book we call La science des rêves (Traumdeutung) — though perhaps mantique, or, better, signification would be a better translation than science.

In this book, Freud certainly does not claim to exhaust the psychological problems of the dream. One has only to read it to realize that Freud does not touch on a number of problems that have still been largely ignored (little work of value has been done on space and time in the dream, on the sensorial raw material of the dream, on whether one dreams in colour or in black and white, on whether smell, taste and touch occur, or the sense of vertigo, of the turgid and the heavy). To say that Freudian doctrine is a psychology is a crude equivocation.

Freud does nothing to encourage such an equivocation. On the contrary, he warns us that he is interested only in the elaboration of the dream. What does that mean? It means exactly what we would now call its linguistic structure. How could Freud be aware of this structure, when it was articulated only at a later date by Ferdinand de Saussure? If the two terms are synonymous, it is all the more striking that Freud should have anticipated Saussure. But where did Freud discover this structure? He discovered it in a signifying flow, the mystery of which lies in the fact that the subject does not even know where to pretend to be its organizer.

To do so, to find oneself as the desirer is the opposite of getting oneself recognized as the subject of it, for it is as a derivation of the signifying chain that the channel of desire flows, and the subject must have the advantage of a cross-over to catch his own feed-back.
Desire merely subjects what analysis makes subjective.

4. And this brings us back to the question touched on above: to whom does the dream reveal its meaning before the arrival on the scene of the analyst? This meaning exists prior to being read, just as it exists prior to its decipherment.

Both show that the dream is made for the recognition – I have taken a long time to get to it – of desire. For desire, if what Freud says of the unconscious is right and if analysis is necessary, can be grasped only in interpretation.

But let us continue: the elaboration of the dream is nourished by desire. Why does my voice fail to finish, out of recognition, as if the second word was extinguished which, a little while ago the first, re-absorbed the other in its light. For, in fact, it is not while one is asleep that one is recognized. And the dream, Freud tells us, without appearing to be aware of the slightest contradiction, serves above all the desire to sleep. It is a narcissistic folding back of the libido and a disinvestment of reality.

Moreover, we know from experience that if my dream overtake my demand (not reality, as has incorrectly been said, which may preserve my sleep), or what is shown here to be equivalent to it, the demand of the other, I awake.

5. After all, a dream is only a dream. Those who now disdain it as a tool of analysis have found, as we have seen, safer and more direct ways of bringing the patient back to right thinking and normal desires – those that satisfy true needs. Which needs, though? Well, the needs that we all feel. If that scares you, you’d better go and see your analyst, and go up the Eiffel Tower to see how beautiful Paris is. Too bad that there are some who climb over the railings at the first floor, and precisely those whose needs have been reduced to proper size. A negative therapeutic reaction, I would say.

Thank God, refusal does not go so far in everyone! It’s just that the symptom reappears like weeds – repetition compulsion.

But that, of course, is merely a misdeal: one is not cured because one remembers. One remembers because one is cured. Ever since this formula was discovered, the reproduction of symptoms is no longer a problem – only the reproduction of analysts is a problem. The reproduction of patients has been resolved.

6. So a dream is only a dream. One psychoanalyst who dabbles in teaching has even written that the dream is a production of the ego. This proves that one runs no great risk in wishing to waken men from their dreams: here’s one that is going on in broad daylight, and among those who hardly allow themselves to dream.

But even for these people, if they are psychoanalysts, Freud on dreams must be read, because it is not otherwise possible to understand what he means by the neurotic’s desire, by repressed, by unconscious, by interpretation, by analysis itself, or to approach his technique and his doctrine in any way at all. We will see how important the little dream that I picked out above is for my purpose.

For this desire of our witty hysterical (Freud’s own description) – I mean her aroused desire, her desire for caviar – is the desire of a woman who has everything, and who rejects precisely that. For her butcher husband is adept at supplying the satisfactions that everyone needs, he does the ‘I’s, and he does not mince his words to a painter who is chatting her up, God knows with what end in view, on the subject of her interesting face: ‘Nuts! a slice of the backside of some pretty shit is what you need, and if you think I’m going to supply you with it, you can go and jump in the lake.’

There’s a man a woman could have nothing to complain about, a genital character, and one, therefore, who no doubt sees to it that, when he fucks his wife, she has no need to masturbate afterwards. In any case, Freud does not hide the fact that she is very much in love with him, and provokes him constantly.

But there you are, she doesn’t want to be satisfied only at the level of her real needs. She wants other, gratuitous needs, and to be sure that they are gratuitous they must be satisfied. This is why to the question, ‘What does the witty butcher’s wife want?’, we can reply, ‘Caviar’. But this reply is hopeless, because she also does not want it.

7. But that isn’t all there is to say about her mystery. Far from imprisoning her, this impasse provides her with the key to the fields, the key to the field of the desires of all the witty hysterics, whether butchers’ wives or not, in the world.

This is what Freud grasps in one of those sidelong looks with which he surprises the true, shattering on his way the abstractions to which positivist minds so readily lend themselves as an explanation for everything: what we have here is the imitation dear to Tarde. In each particular case one must activate the mainspring that he provides there – namely, hysterical identification. If our patient identifies with her friend, it is because she is inimitable in her unsatisfied desire for this goddamned salmon – if God doesn’t smoke it himself!

Thus the patient’s dream corresponds to her friend’s request for her
to come and dine at her home. And what would make her want to do so, other than that one dines well there, if not the fact, which our butcher's wife never loses sight of, namely, that her husband always speaks well of her. But thin as she is, she is hardly built to attract him, with his taste for curves.

Has he too, perhaps, not got a desire that is somewhat thwarted, when everything in him is satisfied? It is the same mechanism which, in the dream, will, with the desire of her friend, cause the failure of her demand.

For however precisely symbolized the demand may be by means of the new-born telephone, it goes for nothing. The appeal of the patient does not reach its goal; a fine thing it would be to see the other get fatter so that her husband can feast himself on her.

But how can another woman be loved (isn't it enough, for the patient to think about it, that her husband should consider her?) by a man who cannot be satisfied by her (he, the man of the slice of backside)? That's precisely the question, which is usually that of hysterical identification, brought into focus.

8. Even here this question becomes the subject — the question in which the woman identifies herself with the man, and the slice of smoked salmon takes the place of the desire of the Other.

Since this desire is totally inadequate (how can one receive all these people with only one slice of smoked salmon?), I really must when all (or the dream) is said and done give up my desire to give a dinner (that is, my search for the desire of the Other, which is the secret of my desire). Everything has gone wrong, and you say that the dream is wish-fulfilment. How do you work that one out, professor?

For a long time now psychoanalysts have given up answering when questioned in this way, for they have ceased to question themselves about their patients' desires: they reduce these desires to their demands, which makes the task of converting them into their own that much easier. Isn't that the reasonable way? — it is certainly the one they have adopted.

But sometimes desire is not to be conjured away, but appears as here, at the centre of the stage, all too visibly, on the festive board, in the form of a salmon. It is an attractive-looking fish, and if it is presented, as is the custom in restaurants, under a thin gauze, the raising of this gauze creates a similar effect to that which occurred at the culmination of the ancient mysteries.

To be the phallus, if only a somewhat thin one. Was not that the ultimate identification with the signifier of desire?

That does not look like being self-evident for a woman, and there are those among us who prefer to have nothing more to do with this word-puzzle. Are we going to have to spell out the role of the signifier only to find that we have the castration complex and penis envy — which, God knows, we could be well rid of — on our hands? When Freud reached that particular juncture, he found himself at a loss as to how to extricate himself, seeing ahead of him merely the desert of analysis.

Yes, he led them to that point, and it was a less infested place than the transference neurosis, which reduces you to chasing the patient, while at the same time begging him to go slowly so as to take his flies with him.

9. But let us articulate that which structures desire.

Desire is that which is manifested in the interval that demand hollows within itself, in as much as the subject, in articulating the signifying chain, brings to light the want-to-be, together with the appeal to receive the complement from the Other, if the Other, the locus of speech, is also the locus of this want, or lack.

That which is thus given to the Other to fill, and which is strictly that which it does not have, since it, too, lacks being, is what is called love, but it is also hate and ignorance.

It is also what is evoked by any demand beyond the need that is articulated in it, and it is certainly that of which the subject remains all the more deprived to the extent that the need articulated in the demand is satisfied.

Furthermore, the satisfaction of need appears only as the lure in which the demand for love is crushed, by sending the subject back to sleep, where he haunts the limbo regions of being, by letting it speak in him. For the being of language is the non-being of objects, and the fact that desire was discovered by Freud in its place in the dream, which has always been the stumbling-block of any attempt on the part of thought to situate itself in reality, should be sufficient lesson for us.

To be or not to be, to sleep, perchance to dream, even the so-called simplest dreams of the child (as 'simple' as the analytic situation, no doubt) simply show miraculous or forbidden objects.

10. But the child does not always fall asleep in this way in the bosom of being, especially if the Other, which has its own ideas about his needs, interferes, and in place of that which it does not have, stuffs him with the choking pap of what it has, that is to say, confuses his needs with the gift of its love.
It is the child one feeds with most love who refuses food and plays with his refusal as with a desire (anorexia nervosa).

Confines where one grasps as nowhere else that hate pays the coin of love, but where it is ignorance that is unforgivable.

In the final analysis, by refusing to satisfy the mother’s demand, is not the child demanding that the mother should have a desire outside him, because the way towards the desire that he lacks is to be found there?

11. One of the principles that follow from this is that:

- if desire is an effect in the subject of the condition that is imposed on him by the existence of the discourse, to make his need pass through the defiles of the signifier;
- if, on the other hand, as I have intimated above, by opening up the dialectic of the transference, we must establish the notion of the Other with a capital O as being the locus of the deployment of speech (the other scene, ein andere Schauplatz, of which Freud speaks in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’);
- it must be posited that, produced as it is by an animal at the mercy of language, man’s desire is the desire of the Other.

This concerns a quite different function from that of the primary identification referred to above, for it does not involve the assumption by the subject of the insignia of the other, but rather the condition that the subject has to find the constituting structure of his desire in the same gap opened up by the effect of the signifiers in those who come to represent the Other for him, in so far as his demand is subjected to them.

Perhaps one can catch a glimpse in passing of the reason for his effect of occultation that caught our attention in the recognition of the desire of the dream. The desire of the dream is not assumed by the subject who says ‘I’ in his speech. Articulated, nevertheless, in the locus of the Other, it is discourse – a discourse whose grammar Freud has begun to declare to be such. Thus the wishes that it constitutes have no optative inflexion to alter the indicative of their formula.

Looking at this from a linguistic point of view, we can see that what is called the aspect of the verb is here that of the ‘perfect’, the fulfilled (in the true sense of Wünscherfüllung).

It is this ex-sistence (Entstellung) of desire in the dream that explains how the significance of the dream masks the desire that is present in it, whereas its motive vanishes by being simply problematic.

12. Desire is produced in the beyond of the demand, in that, in articulating the life of the subject according to its conditions, demand cuts off the need from that life. But desire is also hollowed within the demand, in that, as an unconditional demand of presence and absence, demand evokes the want-to-be under the three figures of the nothing that constitutes the basis of the demand for love, of the hate that even denies the other’s being, and of the unspeakable element in that which is ignored in its request. In this embodied aporia, of which one might say that it borrows, as it were, its heavy soul from the hardy shoots of the wounded drive, and its subtle body from the death actualized in the signifying sequence, desire is affirmed as the absolute condition.

Even less than the nothing that passes into the round of significations that act upon men, desire is the furrow inscribed in the course; it is, as it were, the mark of the iron of the signifier on the shoulder of the speaking subject. It is not so much a pure passion of the signified as a pure action of the signifier that stops at the moment when the living being becomes sign, rendering it insignificant.

This moment of cut is haunted by the form of a bloody scrap – the pound of flesh that life pays in order to turn it into the signifier of the signifiers, which it is impossible to restore, as such, to the imaginary body; it is the lost phallus of the embalmed Osiris.

13. The function of this signifier as such in the quest of desire is, as Freud mapped it out, the key to what we need to know in order to terminate his analyses: and no artifice can take its place if we are to achieve that end.

To give some idea of this function, I will describe an incident that occurred at the end of the analysis of an obsessional neurotic, that is, after a great deal of work in which I was not content to analyse the subject’s aggressivity (in other words, to play blind man’s buff with his imaginary aggressions), but in which he was made to recognize the place that he had assumed in the play of destruction exerted by one of his parents on the desire of the other. He guessed at his powerlessness to desire without destroying the Other, and hence his desire itself in so far as it is desire of the Other.

To arrive at this stage, he was shown how at every moment he manipulated the situation so as to protect the Other, by exhausting in the working-through (Durcharbeitung) all the artifices of a verbalization that distinguishes the other from the Other (with a small o and a capital O), and which, from the box reserved for the boredom of the Other (capital O)
makes it arrange the circus acts between the two others (the petit a and the ego, its shadow).

Certainly, it is not enough to go round in circles in some well-explored area of obsessional neurosis in order to bring him to this round-about, or to know this round-about in order to bring him to it by a route that will never be the shortest. What is needed is not only the plan of a reconstructed labyrinth, or even a batch of plans already drawn up. What is needed above all is to possess the general combinatory that governs their variety certainly, but which also, even more usefully, accounts for the illusions, or rather shifts of perspective to be found in the labyrinth. For there is no shortage of either in obsessional neurosis, which is an architecture of contrasts — a fact that has not yet been sufficiently remarked on — which it is not enough to attribute to forms of fa ade. In the midst of so many seductive, insurgent, impactive attitudes, we must grasp the anxieties that are bound up with performances, the rancour that does not impede his generosity (to think that anyone could hold that obsessional neurotics are lacking in ogularity!), the mental instabilities that sustain unbreakable loyalties. All this moves together in an analysis, though not without local blemishes; but the great load remains.

And so our subject has come to the end of his tether, to the point at which he can play a rather special three-card trick on us, in that it partially reveals a structure of desire.

Let me say that being as he is of mature years, as the comical phrase goes, and of a mind shorn of illusions, he would be quite ready to mislead us with his menopause in order to excuse his own impotence, and to accuse me of the same.

In fact, the redistributions of the libido are not brought about without certain objects losing their function, even if they are non-detachable.

In short, he is impotent with his mistress, and, having taken it into his head to use his discoveries about the function of the potential third person in the couple, he suggests that she sleep with another man to see.

But if she remains in the place given her by the neurosis and if the analysis effects her in that position it is because of the agreement that no doubt she long ago made with the patient’s desires, but still more with the unconscious postulates that were maintained by those desires.

And it will come as no surprise to learn that without stopping, even at night, she has this dream, which, freshly minted, she brings to our unfortunate patient.

She has a phallus, she feels its shape under her clothes, which does not prevent her from having a vagina as well, nor, of course, from wanting this phallus to enter it.

On hearing this, our patient is immediately restored to his virility and demonstrates this quite brilliantly to his partner.

What interpretation is indicated here?

I guessed from the demand that my patient had addressed to his mistress that he had been trying for a long time to get me to confirm his repressed homosexuality.

This was an effect of his discovery of the unconscious that Freud was very quick to anticipate: among the regressive demands, one of the fables will be based on the truths spread by analysis. Analysis on its return trip from America exceeded his expectations.

But I have remained, it is thought, somewhat difficult to persuade on that point.

Let me observe that the dreamer is no more complaisant, since her scenario excludes any coadju tor. This would guide even a novice to trust only the text, if he is trained according to my principles.

Yet I am analysing not her dream, but its effect on my patient.

It would run counter to my practice if I got him to read in the dream this truth, less widespread for having passed into history, of my own contribution: that the refusal of castration, if anything is like it, is first of all a refusal of the castration of the Other (initially, the mother).

A true opinion is not science, and conscience without science is merely the complicity of ignorance. Our science is transmitted only by articulating what is particular in the situation.

Here the situation is unique in showing the figure that I state in these terms; that unconscious desire is the desire of the Other — since the dream is produced in order to satisfy the patient’s desire beyond his demand, as is suggested by the fact that it succeeds in doing so. Though not a dream of the patient’s it may be no less precious for the analyst if, while not addressed to the analyst, unlike the patient’s report, it addresses the patient as clearly as the analyst is able to do so.

It is an opportunity to get the patient to grasp the signifying function that the phallus has in his desire. For it is as such that the phallus operates in the dream in order to enable him to recover the use of the organ that it represents, as I will show by the place at which the dream is aimed in the structure within which his desire is trapped.

Apart from what the woman dreamt, there is the fact that she talks to him about it. If, in this discourse, she presents herself as having the
phallus, is that the only way in which her erotic value is restored to her? Having a phallus, in effect, is not enough to restore her to an object position that appropriates her to a phantasy from which, as an obsessional neurotic, our patient can maintain his desire in an impossibility that preserves its metonymic conditions. The choices left open by these conditions govern a game of escape that analysis has disturbed, but which the woman restores here by a ruse, the crudeness of which conceals a refinement well fitted to illustrate the science included in the unconscious.

For, as far as our patient is concerned, it is no good having this phallus, since his desire is to be it. And the woman’s desire cedes it here to his, by showing him that she does not have it.

Undiscriminating observation will always make much of the announcement of a castrating mother, however little importance the anaesthesia gives it. She looms large here, which is as it should be.

One then thinks that one has finished. But we have nothing to do with it in the interpretation, where to invoke it would not take us very far, except to bring the patient back to the same point where he slips between a desire and contempt for that desire: certainly the contempt of his ill-tempered mother decreeing his father’s over keen desire the image of which his father bequeathed him.

But it would be not so much to teach him about it, as what his mistress said to him: that having this phallus did not diminish her desire for it. And here it is his own want-to-be that has been touched on.

A want that is the result of an exodus: his being is always elsewhere. He has put it ‘on the left’, one might say. Do we say this in order to explain the difficulty of the desire? No, rather to say that the desire is constituted by difficulty.

We must not be misled, therefore, by this assurance that the subject receives from the fact that the dreamer has a phallus, that she will not have to take it from him—except to point out, wisely, that such an assurance is too strong not to be fragile.

For that would be precisely to fail to recognize that this assurance would not exert so much weight if it did not have to impress itself in a sign, and that it is by showing this sign as such, by making it appear where it cannot be, that it has its effect.

The condition of desire that confines the obsessional neurotic in particular is the very mark of the origin of his object, which spoils it for him—contraband.

A singular mode of grace: which appears only on the basis of a denial.
attach to the $S$ of the subject in order to indicate that it is that subject, thus $S$.)

The regression that is placed in the forefront in analysis (temporal regression no doubt, providing one specifies that it is a question of the time of recollection) concerns only the signifiers (oral, anal, etc.) of demand, and involves the corresponding drive only through them.

Reducing this demand to its place may operate on desire an appearance of reduction by the alleviation of need.

But this is really only the effect of the analyst’s heavy approach. For if the signifiers of demand have sustained the frustrations in which desire is fixed (Freud’s Fixierung), it is only in their place that desire is a source of subjection.

Whether it intends to frustrate or to gratify, any reply to demand in analysis brings the transference back to suggestion.

Between the transference and suggestion, there is, as Freud discovered, a relation. The fact is that the transference is also a suggestion, but one that can operate only on the basis of the demand for love, which is not a demand arising from any need. That this demand is constituted only in so far as the subject is the subject of the signifier is what allows it to be misused by reducing it to the needs from which these signifiers have been borrowed – which is what psychoanalysts, as we know, never fail to do.

But identification with the all-powerful signifier of demand, of which I have already spoken, must not be confused with identification with the object of the demand for love. This demand for love is also a regression, as Freud insists, when it produces the second mode of identification, which he distinguished in his second topography when he wrote Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. But it is another kind of regression.

There is the exit that enables one to emerge from suggestion. Identification with the object as regression, because it sets out from the demand for love, opens up the sequence of the transference (opens up, not closes it), that is to say, the way by which the identifications that, in blocking this regression, punctuate it, can be denounced.

But this regression is no more dependent on the need in demand than sadistic desire is explained by anal demand, for to believe that the crybale is in itself a noxious object is simply one of the ordinary lures of understanding. (‘Understanding’ in the pejorative sense given the word by Jaspers. ‘You understand ...’ is an introductory phrase by which someone who has nothing to be understood thinks he can impose on someone else who understands nothing.) But the demand to be a turd, that’s some-

thing that makes it preferable to move a little to one side when the subject becomes aware of it. It’s the ‘misery of being’ (malheur de l’être) referred to above.

Whoever cannot carry his training analyses to the turning-point at which it is proved with fear and trembling that all the demands that have been articulated in the analysis, and more than any other the original demand to become an analyst, which is now about to be fulfilled, were merely transferences intended to maintain in place a desire that was unstable or dubious in its problematic – such a person knows nothing of what must be obtained from the subject if he is to be able to assume the direction of an analysis, or merely offer an accurate interpretation of it.

These considerations confirm me in the belief that it is natural to analyse the transference. For the transference is already, in itself, an analysis of suggestion, in so far as it places the subject with regard to his demand in a position that he holds only because of his desire.

It is only in order to maintain this framework of the transference that frustration must prevail over gratification.

When the subject’s resistance opposes suggestion, it is only a desire to maintain the subject’s desire. As such, it would have to be placed in the ranks of the positive transference, since it is desire that maintains the direction of the analysis, quite apart from the effects of demand.

As we see, these propositions are rather different from the received opinions on this matter. If only they lead people to think that something has gone wrong somewhere, I will have succeeded in my aim.

15. This is the place for a few remarks on the formation of symptoms.

Ever since Freud wrote his study of such subjective phenomena as dreams, slips of the tongue and flashes of wit, which, he says quite categorically, are structurally identical with symptoms (but, of course, as far as our scientists are concerned, all this falls too short of the experimental knowledge that they have acquired – and by what means! – for them even to consider returning to it) – Freud, as I was saying, stressed over and over again that symptoms are overdetermined. For the worker employed in the daily threshing that holds out the promise of a future reduction of analysis to its biological bases, this is obvious enough; it is so easy to say that he does not even hear it. So what?

Let us leave to one side my remarks on the fact that overdetermination is strictly speaking only conceivable within the structure of language. What does this mean, as far as neurotic symptoms are concerned?
It means that interference will occur between the effects that correspond in a subject to a particular demand and the effects of a position in relation to the other (here, his counterpart) that he sustains as subject.

'That he sustains as subject' means that language allows him to regard himself as the scene-shifter, or even the director of the entire imaginary capture of which he would otherwise be nothing more than the living marionette.

Phantasy is the perfect illustration of this original possibility. That is why any temptation to reduce it to the imagination, because one cannot admit its failure, is a permanent misconception, a misconception from which the Kleinian school, which has certainly carried things very far in this field, is not free, largely because it has been incapable of even so much as suspecting the existence of the category of the signifier.

However, once it is defined as an image set to work in the signifying structure, the notion of the unconscious phantasy no longer presents any difficulty.

Let us say that in its fundamental use the phantasy is that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing in so far as the very satisfaction of demand hides his object from him.

Oh, these neurotics are so fussy! What can we do with them? You can't understand a word they say, as one father put it.

But this is precisely what was said long ago, and has always been said, yet the analysts don't seem to have got any further. The simple minded call it the irrational, since they haven't even realized that Freud's discovery is confirmed first by regarding as certain that the real is rational - which, in itself, was enough to knock our exegete off balance - and then by affirming that the rational is real. As a result, Freud can articulate the fact that what presents itself as unreasonable in desire is an effect of the passage of the rational in so far as it is real - that is to say, the passage of language - into the real, in so far as the rational has already traced its circumvallation there.

For the paradox of desire is not the privilege of the neurotic; it is rather that he takes the existence of paradox into account when confronting desire. This does not give him such a bad position in the order of human dignity, and does no honour to mediocre analysts (this is not an assessment, but an ideal formulated in a wish, overtly expressed, of the interested parties), who on this point do not achieve the same dignity: a surprising distance that analysts have always noted somewhat cryptically ... others, though I don't know how they can be distinguished, since they would never have thought of doing it themselves, if they had been forced to oppose the errors of the former.

16. It is, then, the position of the neurotic with regard to desire, let us say by way of abbreviating the phantasy, that marks with his presence the subject's response to demand, in other words the signification of his need.

But this phantasy has nothing to do with the signification in which it interferes. Indeed, this signification comes from the Other, in so far as it depends on the Other whether the demand is satisfied. But the phantasy arrives there only to find itself on the return journey of a wider circuit, a circuit that, in carrying demand to the limits of being, makes the subject question himself as to the lack in which he appears to himself as desire.

It is incredible that certain features, which have nevertheless always been obvious enough, of man's action as such should not have been illuminated here by analysis. I wish to speak about that by which this action of man is the geste that finds support in his chanson. This side of exploit, of performance, of outcome strangled by symbol, that which makes it symbolic therefore (but not in the alienating sense that this term denotes for the layman), that for which one speaks of passage à l'acte, that Rubicon whose own desire is always concealed in the history to the benefit of its success, all that to which the experience of what the analyst calls 'acting out' gives it a quasi-experimental access, since he shares in its entire artifice, the analyst reduces it at best to a relapse of the subject, at worst to a fault on the part of the therapist.

One is stupefied by this false shame displayed by the analyst in the face of action - shame that no doubt conceals true shame, the shame that he has about an action, his own action, one of the highest, when it descends to abjection.

For what else, in fact, is it, when the analyst interposes in order to degrade the message of the transference that he is there to interpret, in a fallacious signification of the real that is nothing more than mystification.

For the point at which the present-day analyst claims to grasp the transference is the distance he defines between the phantasy and the so-called adapted response. But adapted to what if not to the demand of the Other, and in what would this demand have greater or lesser consistency than the response obtained, if he did not believe that he was authorized to deny all value to the phantasy to the extent that it takes on its own reality?

Here the very path by which he proceeds betrays him, when it is necessary for him to introduce himself into the phantasy by way of that
path, and offer himself as an imaginary victim to fictions in which a
besotted desire proliferates – an unexpected Ulysses giving himself as
food so that Circe's pigs may grow fat.

And let it not be said that I am defaming anyone, for it is the precise
point at which those who cannot articulate their practice in any other way
are themselves sufficiently concerned to question what they are doing:
are not phantasies the means by which we provide the subject with the
gratification in which the analysis becomes bogged down? That is the
question they repeat to themselves with the hopeless insistence of an
unconscious obsession.

17. Thus, at best, the present-day analyst leaves his patient at the point
of purely imaginary identification in which the hysteric remains captive,
because her phantasy implies its ensnarement.

That is to say, at the very point from which Freud, throughout the
first part of his career, wished to extricate himself too quickly by forcing the
appeal for love on to the object of identification (for Elisabeth von R...,
his brother-in-law [j]; for Dora, M. K...; for the young homosexual
woman in the case of female homosexuality, he sees the problem more
clearly, but errs when he regards himself as the object aimed at in the real
by the negative transference).

It was not until the chapter on 'identification' in 'Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego' that Freud clearly distinguished this third
mode of identification that is conditioned by its function of sustaining
desire, and which is therefore specified by the indifference of its object.

But our psychoanalysts insist: this indifferent object is the substance of
the object, eat my body, drink my blood (the profanatory reference is
theirs). The mystery of the redemption of the analysand is to be found
in this imaginary shedding of blood, of which the analyst is the sacrificial
object.

How can the ego on which they claim to call for help here not fall,
in effect, under the blow of the reinforced alienation to which they lead
the subject? Long before Freud came on the scene, psychologists knew,
even if they did not express it in these terms, that if desire is the metonymy
of the want-to-be, the ego is the metonymy of desire.

This is how the terminal identification, in which analysts take such
pride, operates.

If it is a question of their patient's ego or superego, they hesitate, or
rather, and there can be no doubt about it, they don't care, but that with
which the patient identifies is their strong ego.

Freud predicted this result very clearly in the article just quoted, when
he shows the role of ideal that the most insignificant object may assume
in the genesis of the leading partner.

It is not in vain that psychoanalytic psychology is turning increasingly
towards group psychology, and even to the psychotherapy of that
name.

Let us observe the effects of this tendency in the analytic group itself.
It is not true that the so-called training analysands conform to the image
of their analyst, at whatever level one wishes to examine it. It is rather
among themselves that analysands of the same analyst share a common
feature that may be quite secondary in the psychical economy of each of
them, but in which the inadequacy of the analyst with regard to his work
is clearly marked.

Thus the analyst, for whom the problem of desire can be reduced to the
lifting of the veil of fear, leaves wrapped in this shroud all those he has
guided.

18. So we have now reached the cunning principle of the power that is
ever open to a blind direction. It is the power to do good – no power has
any other end – and that is why the power has no end. But it is a question
here of something else, it is a question of truth, of the only truth, of the
truth about the effects of truth. As soon as Oedipus set foot along this
path, he had already renounced power.

Where, then, is the direction of the treatment going? Perhaps one
would only have to question its means to define it correctly.

It should therefore be noted:

(1) that speech is all-powerful in the treatment, that it possesses special
powers;
(2) that, according to the analytic rule, the analyst is a long way from
directing the subject towards 'full' speech, or towards a coherent
discourse, but that the analyst leaves the subject free to try it;
(3) that this freedom is what the subject tolerates least easily;
(4) that demand is properly that which is placed in parentheses in the
analysis, since the analyst is excluded from satisfying any of the
patient's demands;
(5) that since no obstacle is put in the way of the subject's avowal of his
desire, it is towards this avowal that he is directed, even shepherded;
(6) that his resistance to this avowal can, in the last analysis, only be the
result of the incompatibility between desire and speech.
direction of treatment and principles of its power 277

There may still be a few people, even among my usual listeners, who are surprised to find such propositions in my discourse. One is aware here of the terrible temptation that must face the analyst to respond however little to demand.

Furthermore, how can the analyst prevent the subject from attributing this response to him, in the form of the demand to cure, and in accordance with the horizon of a discourse that the subject imputes to him with all the more reason in that our authority, for no good reason, assumed it.

Who will now disencumber us of this tunic of Nessus that we have spun for ourselves: does analysis respond to all the desiderata of demand, and by diffused norms? Who will sweep away this pile of dung from the Augean stables of the psychoanalytic literature?

What silence must the analyst now impose upon himself if he is to make out, rising above this bog, the raised finger of Leonardo's St John, if interpretation is to rediscover the disinhabited horizon of being in which its allusive virtue must be deployed?

19. Since it is a question of taking desire, and it can only be taken literally, since it is the nets of the letter that determine, overdetermine, its place as a bird of paradise, how can we fail to demand that the bird-catcher be first of all literate?

Which of us, other than a professor of literature at Zürich who has begun to spell it out, has attempted to articulate the importance of the 'literary' element in Freud's work?

This is merely an indication. Let us go further. Let us question what part it should play for the analyst (in the analyst's being), as far as his own desire is concerned.

Who would be so naive as to continue to see Freud as the Viennese bourgeois of regular habits who so astonished André Breton by his utter lack of any trace of the Bacchanalian? Now that we have nothing but his works, will we not recognize in him a river of fire, which, incidentally, owes nothing to François Mauriac's artificial river?

Who was more able than he, when avowing his dreams, to spin the thread on which is slipped the ring that binds us to being, and, holding it in his closed hands, which pass it through the game of hunt-the-slipper that human passion constitutes, to make it shine with its brief glow?

Who has inveighed as much as this medical practitioner against the monopolization of jouissance by those who load the burdens of need on to others' shoulders?

Who, more fearlessly than this clinician, so firmly tied to mundane suffering, has questioned life as to its meaning, and not to say that it has none, which is a convenient way of washing one's hands of the whole business, but to say that it has only one meaning, that in which desire is borne by death?

A man of desire, of a desire that he followed against his will into ways in which he saw himself reflected in feeling, domination and knowledge, but of which he, unaided, succeeded in unveiling, like an initiate at the defunct mysteries, the unparalleled signifier: that phallus of which the receiving and the giving are equally impossible for the neurotic, whether he knows that the Other does not have it, or knows that he does have it, because in either case his desire is elsewhere; it belongs to being, and man, whether male or female, must accept having it and not having it, on the basis of the discovery that he isn’t it.

It is here that is inscribed that final Spaltung by which the subject articulates himself in the Logos, and on which Freud was beginning to write [12], giving us, at the ultimate point of an œuvre that has the dimensions of being, the solution of the 'infinite' analysis, when his death applied to it the word Nothing.

Notes and References

This report formed part of my teaching seminars. It was later replaced by my speech to the Congress and the replies that it elicited.

In that speech I presented a graph that precisely articulates the directions proposed here for the field of analysis and its direction.

Below, the reader will find, in alphabetical order of authors, the references indicated in my text by numbers in square brackets.

I have used the following abbreviations:


The P.Q.: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly.

La P.D.A.: a work called La Psychanalyse d’aujourd’hui, published by the Presses Universitaires de France, to which I refer only for the
naivé simplicity with which it presents the tendency to degrade the direction of the treatment and the principles of its power in psychoanalysis. No doubt it performs a task of communication outside the psychoanalytic community, but within that community it is obstructive in its effects. I do not quote, therefore, authors who have made no properly scientific contribution.


[5] Freud (Sigmund), 'Studien über Hysterie', 1895, G.W. I, p. 23 (on the need to justify one's existence); pp. 27–49 (on the distance to the object, principle of its power).

1. First report of the international symposium that met at this time at the invitation of the Société française de psychanalyse, published in La Psychanalyse, 6.

2. The figures in square brackets indicate references placed immediately at the end of this report.

3. To turn against the spirit of a society a term at the price of which it can only be appropriately rendered in the sentence in which Freud proved himself the equal of the pre-Socratic – We es war, soll Ich werden – is translated, quite simply, as La Moi doit déloger le Ça.


5. I promise not to tire my readers any further with such stupid formulae, which really have no other use here than to show the state into which analytic
discourse has declined. I apologized to my foreign listeners who no doubt had as many available in their own language, if not of quite the same platitudinous level. 

In France the doctrine of being, quoted above, went straight to the following solution: the being of the psychoanalyst is innate [cf. La P.D.A., I 136].

This is the case I have left 'ego' italicized [Tr.].

In France the doctrinaire of being, quoted above, went straight to the following solution: the being of the psychoanalyst is innate [cf. La P.D.A., I 136].

The following is the original, unaltered text of a lecture that I delivered in German on 9 May, 1938, at the Max-Planck Institute, Munich, where Professor Paul Matussek had invited me to speak.

If one has any notion of the state of mind then prevalent in even the least unaware circles, one will appreciate the effect that my use of such terms as, for example, 'the other scene', which I was the first to extract from Freud's work, must have had.

If 'deferred action' (Nachtrag), to rescue another of these terms from the facility into which they have since fallen, renders this effort impracticable, it should be known that they were unheard of at that time.

We know that the unconscious castration complex has the function of a knot:

(1) in the dynamic structuring of symptoms in the analytic sense of the term, that is to say, in that which is analysable in the neuroses, perversions, and psychoses;

(2) in a regulation of the development that gives its ratio to this first role: namely, the installation in the subject of an unconscious position without which he would be unable to identify himself with the ideal type of his sex, or to respond without grave risk to the needs of his partner in the sexual relation, or even to accept in a satisfactory way the needs of the child who may be produced by this relation.

There is an antinomy, here, that is internal to the assumption by man (Mensch) of his sex: why must he assume the attributes of that sex only through a threat — the threat, indeed, of their privation? In 'Civilization and its Discontents' Freud, as we know, went so far as to suggest a disturbance of human sexuality, not of a contingent, but of an essential kind, and one of his last articles concerns the irreducibility in any finite (endliche) analysis of the sequellae resulting from the castration complex in the masculine unconscious and from penisneid in the unconscious of women.