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SOME RECENT TRENDS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

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Some years ago (1945) in course of examining the Klein system of child psychology I took occasion to remark that 'hypothetical reconstructions of the mind in early infancy, however far they may be extended, can never quite link up with clinical (analytical) observations. They are of a different order. They may increase the plausibility of a clinical interpretation, and their own plausibility may be re-enforced by clinical interpretations; but they cannot really dovetail with clinical facts. Attempts to merge the two systems usually lead to confusion.'[1]

Two years later, discussing the nature of 'basic mental concepts', I defined these as concepts that are 'incapable of further reduction, indispensable to the development of analytical theory and to that extent fixed ideas'.[2] These dynamic, economic, and structural concepts, I suggested, can however be used as a *discipline* to control all hypothetical reconstructions of infantile mental development. True, they cannot of themselves bridge the developmental gap between birth and the age period when standard analytic techniques can be applied to children; but when employed in conjunction with behavioristic data they can, subject to the laws of economy of hypothesis, provide a speculative frame of reference to point the behavioristic researches of those psychoanalysts who at long last use methods of direct observation to examine infants who are of their nature analytically inaccessible. There are, however, some risks attendant on the procedure. Concepts 'of the first order' (basic concepts) can and must be extended to meet the theoretical exigencies of mental growth. We must sooner or later be able to account for the 'clinically observed' appearances of the organized ego to say nothing of its various parts. But since the means of extending these basic concepts depend more on the logical techniques of metaphysics than

[1] Glover, Edward: An Examination of the Klein System of Child Psychology. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. I.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1945. Reprinted as a monograph, H. K. Lewis & Co., Ltd., London.

[2] Glover, Edward: *Basic Mental Concepts.* London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1947. Published in abridged form in This QUARTERLY, XVI, 1947, pp. 482-506.

on those of metapsychology, the risk of unchecked and superfluous proliferation of terms and theories is always present.

These reflections are stimulated by two books: one by Heinz Hartmann and the other by René A. Spitz.[3] The essence of Dr. Hartmann's monograph, first published by him over twenty years ago, exemplifies some of the earlier impacts of Freud's ego psychology on his more theoretical-minded followers, and it is slanted largely toward a theory of adaptation to growth. Dr. Spitz's booklet is an expanded version of his 'field theory' of ego formation first outlined in 1958. The scope of both books is almost identical, the main difference being that whereas the former is an armchair exercise directed toward the theoretical extension of ego adaptation, Dr. Spitz's book has obviously been stimulated by his practical work as a descriptive observer of infants and small children. It is all the more interesting therefore to inquire how much the two presentations of ego theory have in common, indeed how far the ideologies adumbrated by Hartmann continue to survive in the theories of mental development and of maladaptation favored by Spitz.

It is characteristic of most books on theory that their first chapter requires to be scanned almost line by line. Dr. Hartmann, feeling that therapeutic concentration on the psychopathological aspects of conflict has led to a neglect of the adaptational aspects of normal mental function, plunges immediately into deep waters by postulating a 'conflict-free ego sphere'. Now in a number of ways the concept of conflict-free mental activity can be regarded as axiomatic. It is a truism that applies readily to a good deal of preconscious function; it applies equally to the function of mental mechanisms and to those orienting functions which ultimately subserve the purposes of the organized ego. It is also a plausible hypothesis, which I have advanced on various occasions,[4] that a 'primary functional

[3] Hartmann, Heinz: *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.* (Trans. by David Rapaport.) Monograph Series No. 1 of the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958, 121 pp.

Spitz, René A.: *A Genetic Field Theory of Ego Formation. Its Implications for Pathology.* (The Freud Anniversary Lecture Series, The New York Psychoanalytic Institute.) New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1959, 123 pp.

[4] Glover, Edward: *Functional Aspects of the Mental Apparatus.* Int. J. Psa., XXXI, 1950, pp. 125-131; and *On the Desirability of Isolating a 'Functional' (Psychosomatic) Group of Delinquent Disorders.* Brit. J. Delinquency, I, 1950,

phase of psychic development' exists prior to the formation and integration of various 'ego nuclei' (and to any subsequent differentiations of ego institutions) which can be regarded as 'conflict-free' in the sense that the various driving affects do not include guilt. Dr. Hartmann would in my opinion have done better to reserve the term 'conflict-free' for this primary phase. But he has elected for a 'sphere' which he describes as an 'ensemble of *functions* which *at any given time* exert their effects outside the *region* of mental conflicts' (italics added). It is not, he maintains, a 'province' but rather an ensemble of 'processes'. Apart from the fact that the definition begs its own question, why, we may ask, use a static structural image for activities that are best described dynamically and economically and subdivided in chronological sequence? And speaking of terminology, why use the term 'ego apparatuses' as Dr. Hartmann does to describe processes and functions? Admittedly one sometimes speaks rather loosely of 'ego instruments', largely for the purpose of distinguishing these *activities* from the structural and executive connotations of the ego. Economy of terminology is indeed every bit as essential as economy of hypothesis, as Freud's metapsychological terminology so convincingly demonstrated.

To return to Dr. Hartmann's 'conflict-free sphere': if this refers to mental processes which operate without disturbance in the preconscious system, in other words to the secondary processes of mind, his subsequent discussion of the interaction of conflict-free activities, of ego 'apparatuses', and of conflict-inducing impulses in promoting reality adaptation, could pass without comment. But clearly Dr. Hartmann has in mind the early *development* of adaptation through the interaction in ego formation of biological, maturational, acquired endopsychic, and environmental factors. This, for a number of reasons, lays Dr. Hartmann's account of his 'conflict-free sphere' open to debate, or alternatively reduces it to a series of assumptions. For one thing he neglects the influence of primary mental processes and in particular the factor of primary repression which blankets the earliest derivatives of conflict and creates a semblance of conflict-free activity. No discussion of the relations between

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pp. 104-112. Both reprinted in: *On the Early Development of Mind*. London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1956; New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1956.

instinct, fantasy, and apparent reality adaptation of the early ego can afford to do this.

In short Dr. Hartmann's concept of a 'conflict-free sphere' is at the same time too wide and too confused. Even if it were limited to the range of a 'primary functional phase', its clinical utility would be restricted to elucidation of the psychosomatic states. Moreover, in the case of a primary functional phase it should not be forgotten that although guilt is absent the infant may at any given moment of frustration rocket into a yelling anxiety. In other words the role both of affective reactions and of acquired endopsychic factors in promoting adaptation cannot be restricted solely to a comparison of the influence of guilt factors on the one hand and of biological and maturational factors on the other. In any case the influence of guilt factors in inciting mental development, and consequently on processes of adaptation, cannot be overestimated. Dr. Hartmann, in my opinion, underestimates them. For this reason alone his concept of the 'conflict-free sphere' confuses more than it illuminates. If on the other hand the concept is merely a structural paraphrase for the undisturbed function of ego instruments, it merely indicates that under certain circumstances (which call in each case for particularization) their function is undisturbed; and this gets us nowhere.

Having established his terms of reference, Dr. Hartmann, using biological, developmental, and environmental criteria, proceeds to subject the concept of adaptation to a detailed analysis. With many items in this presentation the analytical reader will find himself in agreement. But it would have strengthened his presentation greatly had the author dealt more systematically (as Dr. Spitz does) with *consecutive* phases of adaptation. To be sure, he emphasizes the 'multiple layering' of man's adaptational processes and distinguishes the early relations of the child to familial objects from later reactions to the 'already partly molded' environment, ultimately to social structure. But the main accent of this chapter is laid on the 'influence of tradition' which gives rise to what Dr. Hartmann terms 'social compliance'; and these are essentially post-infantile factors, the roots of which lie in the degree and nature of what, following Dr. Hartmann's terminology, one might call 'infantile object compliance'.

Above all one misses any systematic reference in this section to the

dynamic factors operating at each phase of adaptation, in other words to the 'vicissitudes of instincts' (*Triebe*). These are extremely relevant to the discussion of such terms as 'biological', 'environmental', and to the definition of 'realit sense'. If one assumes that the relations of the individual to environment boil down to object contact (of whatever sort, i.e., unmodified or, as in sublimation, modified) and danger avoidance (including the endopsychic dangers of stimulated guilt), it would be possible to outline the processes of adaptation to instinctual stress in a more dynamic idiom. Dr. Hartmann's outline is inevitably static, perhaps because of his patent preference for a structural and mechanistic psychology.

Pursuing his line of argument Dr. Hartmann then examines the various forms of maintaining mental equilibrium, laying special stress on what he describes as 'fitting together'—a biological concept which, in his view, appears to be represented psychologically by the 'synthetic function' of the mind, and which is a prerequisite of adaptation. Thus his fourth equilibrium is between the synthetic function and 'the rest of the ego', whatever 'the rest of the ego' may mean in this context. Discussing the processes of regulation, the author goes on to examine the relations of the reality principle to the pleasure principle, and distinguishes a 'broader biological reality principle'—which is independent of the pleasure principle, historically precedes it, and outranks it hierarchically—from a 'narrower reality principle' which develops from, although in a sense continuing, the pleasure principle.

Here again one encounters the difficulties inherent in tripartite metapsychology, in this case the tendency to express in structural and functional terms what would be better expressed under dynamic and economic headings. The 'broader reality principle' is a typical biological *cum* metaphysical concept, a teleological piece of reasoning which can better be expressed in clinical terms of instinctual drives. Like Freud's concept of 'primary identification' it is less a basic concept than a reconstruction,[5] in this case representing the observer's attempt to describe the influence of an id factor on ego adaptation. What Dr. Hartmann designates as the 'narrower reality principle' comprises the clinical history of ego object relations; it

[5] Glover, Edward: *Psychoanalysis and Child Psychiatry*. Samiksa, VI, 1953, pp. 141-162. Reprinted in extended form by Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., London, 1953.

only confuses the legitimate use of the term 'reality' to extend it in this 'biological' fashion.

Clearly it would require a review as lengthy as Dr. Hartmann's brochure to do justice to the innumerable metapsychological issues which arise from his presentation. It must suffice to say that he proceeds to describe the special processes of adaptation which depend on the functions of the 'inner world' and considers in particular the function of thinking which, he says, pertains to the ego but cannot be equated with it. This leads in turn to the problem of 'rational action' and the use of the term 'reality syntonic'. Rationality becomes the equivalent to the superordinate organizing function of intelligence which, however, does not abrogate other mental functions. Then follows a brief consideration of some integrative functions of the ego, with special reference to 'value hierarchies', the synthetic achievements of art, and the integrative aspects of religion.

Passing over a rather thin and indeterminate chapter in which Dr. Hartmann considers the implications of his views of 'adaptation', 'synthesis', 'rank order', and 'rational action' for the concepts of health and education, we come to a discussion of the uses in adaptation of 'preconscious automatisms'. Dr. Hartmann distinguishes these on the one hand from 'habits' and on the other from the functioning of the repetition compulsion and pleasure principle. The final chapter resumes earlier discussions of 'ego apparatuses', both constitutional and acquired, and the influence exerted on these by mental maturation processes. The book ends with an apologia which can be summarized as follows: 'Many of these lengthy but still incomplete considerations are not psychoanalytic in a narrow sense and some of them seem to have taken us quite far from the core of psychoanalysis. . . . I will agree with you if you should find that I have been one-sided, stressing certain relationships and neglecting others of equal or greater importance . . . : that was my intention.'

In view of this disarming confession, it would seem a work of supererogation to assess the value and status of Dr. Hartmann's book. His own appraisal does not however indicate the main flaw in his presentation. Metapsychology achieved its tripartite form by sheer force of the fact that the description of mental activity could not be achieved by means of a single set of analogies. By concentrating on structural terminology eked out by general functional

expressions Dr. Hartmann has attempted the impossible. For example, when discussing 'ego apparatuses' he says, 'To consider every inborn mechanism an instinctual drive would be contrary to the concept of instinctual drive as it is commonly used in psychoanalysis'. Not only so; it would be contrary to the usages of metapsychology which distinguishes the rise and fall of mental energy from the mechanisms which regulate the distribution of cathexes. It is also contrary to metapsychological usage to speak, as Dr. Hartmann does, of ego mechanisms being 'structuralized', (i.e., that they imply 'structure and formedness'). In almost the same breath he speaks of the antithesis of ego (as regulative factor) and ego apparatuses. At one time we are told that ego apparatuses 'constitute one of the roots of the ego'; at another that they enter 'into the services of the ego'. This kind of haphazardness in the use of metapsychological terms is often combined with unnecessary paraphrases and condensations of existing terminology. Thus speaking of the increased lability of the mental apparatus brought about by structural development and differentiation, Dr. Hartmann says '. . . therefore, we must expect temporary (and occasionally enduring) dedifferentiation phenomena'; in simpler words we must recognize the existence of phases of regression.

Take again the support Dr. Hartmann lends to the use of the term 'reality syntonic'. To be sure he admits that the term is 'so elastic that it covers diverse and even partly contradictory views'. This is a sure indication that current definitions of syntonicity and reality call for simplification rather than elaboration. Indeed when Dr. Hartmann himself comes to consider the problem, he finds it necessary to distinguish between 'subjective' and 'objective' reality syntonicity, each variety having elaborate determinants. It would have been simpler had he been content to preserve the environmental connotation of the term 'reality adapted' and to consider 'reality testing' in its essential context of 'subject-object' appraisement,[6] whether accurate or inaccurate. This would have avoided any implication that reality syntonicity has any binding relation to ego syntonicity and would have put the whole problem of instinctual modification in its correct perspective. In short Dr. Hartmann might have applied Occam's razor to the conception of reality syntonicity by abandoning the term.

[6] See Glover, Edward: *The Relation of Perversion-Formation to the Development of Reality-Sense.* Int. J. Psa., XIV, 1933, pp. 486-504.

To give one last brief example, this time of overcondensation: Dr. Hartmann says 'the normal ego must be *able to must*' (author's italics). To be sure later on in the same paragraph he breaks down this condensation of structural and energic concepts by stating that 'the normal ego is able to yield to musts'. Perhaps the fault lies in a certain tortuosity both of thinking and of prose expression; but the effect must be confusing to students who are prone to metapsychological preferences and cannot be too often reminded that metapsychology is not confined to one mode of expression.

As has been suggested the supreme merit of Dr. Spitz's book lies in the fact that it has been stimulated by actual observation of infants and children. For a long time psychoanalysts neglected the behavioristic observation of children and reconstructed infantile stages of mental development from study of the adult in analysis. When their turn came, child analysts followed a similar course; they reconstructed infantile stages from study of children accessible to analysis. However, when it came to *direct observation* of infants all theoreticians found themselves in the same box: they had perforce to *interpret* their behavioristic data without confirmation by direct analysis. We must therefore divide their theoretical formulations into two categories; namely, postulates (basic interpretations) which have some plausible connection with the data of observation, and a more ambitious elaboration and interweaving of postulates which, however skeletal, constitutes a theoretical, and of course hypothetical, *reconstruction* of infantile mental development. Needless to say the first of these categories is by far the more suggestive; the second depends more on metaphysical skill than on clinical acumen.

Employing these categories we find that Dr. Spitz postulates three successive stages of psychological development in the first year, the inception of each of which is marked by the appearance of specific affective behavior which he terms an 'indicator'. In the beginning, and extending approximately to the middle of the third month, comes the 'nondifferentiated phase' (Hartmann speaks of an 'undifferentiated' phase of the same duration). Then appears the first indicator, viz., the 'smiling response', which signifies a gestalt perception of environmental stimuli. (Hartmann speaks of the beginning of 'intentionality' at this period, but this is a broader and more indefinite term than that used by Spitz.) This however is only a

forestage of object relations, from which true object relations will follow. Responses take on the character of anticipation; alternatively an exchange of signals with the object-precursor takes place. The reality ego begins to be established and with it the reality principle begins to operate. Preconscious memory traces are laid down and thinking becomes operative. A crystallization of the psyche occurs: a higher level has been reached. In place of undirected, unorganized drives, a 'force field' has been established, an integrated, structural, operational unit, an emergent, dominant center of integration; in short, an 'organizer of the psyche'.

The second organizer heralding the second organized phase (the third phase if one includes the nondifferentiated stage) is signalized by the appearance of 'eight-month anxiety', i.e., displeasure at the appearance of unfamiliar persons. The 'libidinal object proper' has been established; in other words the love object and relations with the love object are now paramount. Social relations become more complex; 'relations between things' are understood a month or so later. Affective responses become more complicated before the end of the first year. Identifications become evident. Psychological developments take precedence over maturation factors; the ego has come into its own. To which it should be added that the first and second organizers fall into the oral stage.

The third organizer is the acquisition of speech (cf., Hartmann). This passes through a transitional phase of 'need-gratifying global words' which continues up to eighteen months when the use of verbal symbols heralds adult speech. The 'indicator' of the third organizer is not, however, a speech product but a derivative of gesture 'language' (communication); in other words, the appearance of the 'no-gesture' at about fifteen months marks the unfolding of higher intellectual functions and the placing of these in the service of adaptation and mastery.

To sum up, the first organizer 'structures perception and establishes the beginnings of the ego; the second integrates object relations with the drives and establishes the ego as an organized psychic structure with a variety of systems, apparatuses, and functions; the third finally opens the road for the development of object relations on the human pattern, that is, the pattern of semantic communication'. Save for a few references to child behavior apropos the nature of fixation, Dr. Spitz's association of clinical observational

data with theoretical postulates or fundamental interpretations comes to an end.[7] The remainder of the book consists of a theoretical elaboration of ego development which, according to Dr. Spitz, would seem to follow from his basic postulates.

Before assessing his analytic interpretation of infantile behavioristic data (indicators) and for that matter before examining the metapsychological status of Dr. Spitz's additions to basic terminology ('organizers', etc.), it is desirable to study the general trend of his more speculative reconstructions; and to do this one must first study the ideological factors which apparently have influenced Dr. Spitz.

In the first place this is a much more ambitious work than that of Dr. Hartmann, for clearly Dr. Spitz's aim is to systematize theoretically and practically not only normal adaptation but any variety of psychic maladaptation. Dr. Hartmann on the whole uses pathological data to embroider the theme of normal adaptation. In the second place, Dr. Spitz is concerned to draw extensive parallels between embryological and psychological concept formations, and does so with more chronological particularity than does Dr. Hartmann. Of course both writers develop their ideas on a pure (classical) freudian basis for both of them are punctilious freudians and Hartmann's citations from freudian literature are in the classical sense impeccable. But Dr. Spitz has much more at stake than Dr. Hartmann, in particular a characterological psychopathology.

Of his theoretical preamble little need be said. He operates with Freud's concepts of the nature of psychic energy, libidinal phases, and the formation of psychic structure, the Nirvana principle, the pleasure principle (cf., Dr. Hartmann), the reality ego, and the body ego. From Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein he takes over the terms 'maturation' and 'development' (although recognizing that these terms had already a long-standing psychological history and connotation). Unlike Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein he distinguishes biological from psychological development, reserving the former for phenomena concerning the embryological field. He also takes over from these writers the idea that beginning from the second month *both* the ego and the id are gradually formed from an undifferentiated matrix.

[7] As far as this particular book is concerned; elsewhere Dr. Spitz has of course written extensively on various other aspects of child behavior and their implications.

Translating embryological analogies (derived mainly from Speeman and Waddington) into psychological analogies, Dr. Spitz then develops the idea of 'organizers', calling the period of establishment of each organizer a 'critical period' during which it is essential for normal development that maturational and developmental factors should coincide. In other words, normal differentiation and integration are 'dependent'. But so it appears are abnormal differentiations. Failing synchronicity at the optimum point, the developmental items will be modified and distorted, imbalance will ensue, and this in turn will affect the next organizer and critical period, thus throughout the series giving rise ultimately to 'asymmetric ego development' or 'deviant integration'. This results in the formation of 'abnormal ego nuclei' which may be the constituents of a 'fragmented ego' (Beata Rank, 1947). They will thus constitute one of the origins of fixation points. These nuclei will inevitably come into conflict with the normal demands of environment at a much later stage. Fixation will be 'attached to' this conflict. 'Ego apparatuses [cf., Hartmann], ego systems, ego functions will be out of balance, overinhibited, overemphasized.' Regression to earlier levels will follow frustration.

Turning finally to the implications for therapy, Dr. Spitz repeats that deficiencies in adaptation enforce compensating defensive processes which are anchored to fixation points. 'They play a major role in the etiology of psychiatric disease', constitute 'pivotal points' for pathological regression. Analysis must concern itself with the reduction of defenses, and the making good of developmental deficiencies with the assistance of the transference. In Dr. Spitz's own words, 'I have no therapeutic innovations to offer'. So we may fairly limit our concern to an evaluation of his expansions of ego theory.

If it should appear niggling to pass new terminology through the metapsychological mill, it must be said that, as in the case of Dr. Hartmann, the onus is on the coiner of terms to justify their introduction, in particular to show that they constitute improvements on or useful expansions of existing terminology. To begin with: the term 'critical period' is a descriptive and historical caption which cannot be preempted for the purposes of metapsychology. Clinically it usually describes a state of affairs recognized by the observer in retrospect. To the infant every period is of course a critical period. What Dr. Spitz does is first to anchor the term to specific clinical manifestations, and this is a valuable pointer to clinical observa-

tional research; and second, to anchor it theoretically to particular stages of organization, and this is where scrutiny must begin. An 'organizer' has more dynamic implications than a state or stage or phase of organization. As a regulator it must operate with mental energies; even as a stimulus to differentiation it must exploit a variety of mechanisms and it must represent in each instance an integrated pattern.

Dr. Spitz is of course well aware of this and says so; but he has not entirely rescued his student from a sense of confusion. An 'organizer' he maintains at first is a theoretical construct, a psychological analogy derived from a somatic (embryological) analogy. Yet as he goes on it becomes more than an analogy; it is a 'modification of psychic structure' (cf., Hartmann on the ego forming 'apparatuses' and ego roots); it is 'an integration of a number of functions' (cf., Hartmann's description of the conflict-free sphere as an 'ensemble of processes'), a state of coördination; it is a dynamic entity which can be fitted into stages in the development of instinctual primacies; it is the prototype of ego synthesis (alternatively, of the synthetic 'function' of the ego). So clearly the term 'organizer' is itself a synthetic product, a unifying caption which can be readily broken down into its metapsychological constituents. One might even describe it as a 'ring' formula.

To be sure one can say the same of all save basic mental concepts (concepts of the first order). To return for a moment to 'critical periods', these can be described according to the metapsychological taste of the observer as transitional periods when one instinctual primacy gives place to a later primacy (or priority of urgency); or when one structural formation is superimposed on another (the series narcissism, object formation, superego formation); or again, transitions in the governing mechanisms (or complementary set of mechanisms) operative at different stages; or indeed, transitions or fusions of elements in an affective sequence (chain). Unless therefore one is prepared to postulate a fourth metapsychological order, a 'something else', a metapsychological fourth dimension (and this, I sometimes think, is what Dr. Spitz is aiming at), the term 'organizer' is useful mainly in highlighting 'phases' of development (cf., Erikson) of increasing complexity, a suggestive concept which however must dance attendance on clinical observations and their clinical interpretation. I have always maintained that both the

reconstruction of normal mental development and the establishment of psychoanalytic etiologies calls for a *sequence* of correlations, combinations, and permutations of the three metapsychological criteria in both progressive and regressive directions. But this historical reconstruction is not a fourth metapsychological dimension: it is rather a cautionary *Massstab* based on the direct interpretation of clinical data. And it is in this sense that the concept of an 'organizer' might prove of some heuristic utility.[8]

The term is based on a *cross-sectional view* of the development of mental apparatus, and this neglects the uses of the *longitudinal* (vertical) approach. In his later formulations Dr. Spitz does indeed exploit the longitudinal view in the case of ego structure and function. But in his theory of 'dependent differentiation' and 'deviant integration', occurring irreversibly at specific and optimum periods, he nevertheless adopts a somewhat rigid cross-sectional approach. It should be remembered that instinctual life is also characterized by canalization, fusion and defusion, and the gradual attainment of an optimum selectivity. Economic mechanisms likewise manifest (longitudinal, serial) vicissitudes, the simplest example being that of

[8] I have constantly maintained that when examining any mental event one must not only apply the three metapsychological criteria but estimate its significance in terms of genetic development or of regression (see, for example, *The Concept of Dissociation*, Int. J. Psa., XXIV, 1943, pp. 7-13). This last mode of approach is *not* however a metapsychological one. It is a description (record) of mental growth useful in clinical psychoanalysis (either normal or abnormal) and, when combined with secondary (theoretical) elaborations, can function as a *psychological* measure.

Similarly in the case of adaptational standards (*op. cit.*), metapsychologically speaking, adaptation is the history of object relations and can be considered from three points of view: 1, dynamic (instinctual) aspects, e.g., the progression of component instincts (appetitive and reactive) from earlier to later objects; 2, mechanistic aspects, e.g., the maturation of mechanisms; 3, structural aspects, e.g., modifications of the ego following object abandonment and consequent introjection. In other words, although essential to the evaluation of psychic events, developmental and adaptational measures are complex serial interpretations, not basic (irreducible) postulates. Incidentally, it does not constitute a new metapsychological dimension to telescope, fuse, or condense any two or all three metapsychological elements, as Hartmann does in the case of 'ego apparatuses' and Spitz in the case of 'organizers'.

See also, Glover, Edward: *The Uses of Freudian Theory in Psychiatry*, Brit. J. Med. Psychol., XXXI, 1958, pp. 143-152; and Rapaport, David and Gill, Merton M.: *The Points of View and Assumptions of Metapsychology*, Int. J. Psa., XL, 1959, pp. 153-162.

projection which, we may assume, begins during the phase of 'primary identification' as a psychic tendency—(there is, by the way, little virtue in the term 'tendency' which is not contained in the economic term 'mechanism')—but does not attain its maximum function (either normal or pathogenic) until instinctual drives to objects reach their more advanced childhood forms (positive or negative œdipal relations). To be sure these 'serial' vicissitudes are influenced en route by a great number of factors, constitutional, maturational, endopsychic, and environmental; nevertheless the advantage of the serial approach in describing psychic growth cannot be gainsaid. By concentrating on 'levels' or 'critical periods', the theory of 'dependent differentiation' obstructs this approach.

Apropos the temptation to use terms such as 'tendency' as a forerunner of 'mechanism', it may be noted that Dr. Spitz follows Hartmann in supporting the view that *both* the ego and the id are gradually formed from an undifferentiated matrix, in other words from a common forerunner. As far as the id is concerned this amounts to the somewhat tautological proposition that an unorganized psychic system is developed (differentiated) from an unorganized matrix. The concept of the id functions usefully as a boundary concept in psychic topography (a status formerly confined to the concept of instinct) as well as constituting an unorganized psychic system, through which constitutional factors, (fixed, inherited) 'psychological-tendency-genes', can exert their influence alongside the pressure of instinctual drives. The ego on the other hand is more clearly grasped as a psychic cortex to the id which gradually increases in complexity and penetrative (infiltrative, id-regulative) power, a conception which permits of the idea that *focal centers* in this cortex constitute the early polymorphic (multinuclear) ego. It would seem that for Dr. Spitz the ego (however rudimentary) is, if not indeed unified in the sense of organization, at any rate of unbroken texture —in other words a single system. It is true that Dr. Spitz refers later to ego nuclei but it is clear that, following Beata Rank's views on the 'fragmented ego', he has in mind later psychopathological or anyhow potentially pathogenic ego forms due to 'deviant integration'; whereas if the 'nuclear theory' of early ego formation, which I first adumbrated over thirty years ago,[9] postulating primitive ego

[9] Glover, Edward: *Grades of Ego Differentiation*, Int. J. Psa., XI, 1930, pp. 1-11; *A Psychoanalytical Approach to the Classification of Mental Disorders*, J. Ment.

nuclei resulting from the experience of component impulses (both appetitive and reactive) associated with specific aims and ultimately specific objects (or 'part objects' as they are often, I now think erroneously, called), is at all plausible, then while it would still be permissible to talk of 'critical periods', provided they had a sound clinical background, it would be necessary to modify Spitz's theory of dependent differentiation. In other words 'primary differentiation' or, as I would prefer to say, the emergence of 'scattered nuclei' would require some primary integration before secondary differentiation of the total ego of each period, however dependent, could ensue. Not only so, the concepts of fixation and regression, which Dr. Spitz ties up in at least one respect to conflict caused by the development of 'abnormal ego nuclei', gain in perspective by the assumption of primitive ego nuclei.

Here we come to the crux of the matter. Whether or not we accept the concept of 'organizers' we are bound to concede that the concept of 'dependent differentiation' is a tempting one. It has of course been implicitly accepted in most accounts of serial psychic development, whether dynamic (see, for example, Ferenczi's concept of 'amphimixis'), economic, or structural, but not until now associated with the specific concept of 'organizers'. Following Dr. Spitz's modifications of Waddington's diagram illustrating the relation of embryological 'organizers' to 'dependent differentiation' and to 'directional development', it is not hard to see that even if these assumptions were only approximately applicable to the mental apparatus they would provide the skeletal framework for a character psychology. The chaos that exists in characterological classifications cries out for attention; and since the therapeutic field of psychoanalysis is sometimes alleged to have shifted from symptom formations to character disorders, Dr. Spitz's diagrammatic field formula would at least afford *lebensraum* for a practical (clinical) classification.

Sci., LXXVIII, 1932, pp. 819-842; *On the Etiology of Drug Addiction*, Int. J. Psa., XIII, 1932, pp. 298-328; *The Concept of Dissociation*, Int. J. Psa., XXIV, 1943, pp. 7-13; *An Examination of the Klein System of Child Psychology*, London: H. K. Lewis & Co., Ltd., 1945; *Basic Mental Concepts*, London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1949; *Psychoanalysis*, London: Staples Press, 1947; *Psychoanalysis and Child Psychiatry*, London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1953. (The first three papers listed above were reprinted in: *On the Early Development of the Mind*, London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1956.)

As an over-all ego theory, and particularly as a psychopathological framework, however, Dr. Spitz's concept of 'dependent differentiation' is subject to some reservations. To give but two examples: not all mental mechanisms are equally pattern forming (or ego forming). Introjection, identification, reaction-formation, and displacement are immensely more character forming (structural) in effect than projection, reflexion, and repression. To be sure, actual repression implies the existence of preconscious structure and cathexis, however simple. But primal repression requires no preconscious activity whatsoever. Certainly in the case of Spitz's second and third 'organizers', the influence of repression is an unknown quantity. For this reason alone 'dependent differentiation' with its emphasis on structural modification is not likely to provide us with adequate etiological formulas for conditions due mainly to a fault in repression. This is borne out by study of the 'encapsulated' neuroses (simple phobias and the like) where outside the confines of the neurosis the ego will often stand the closest examination. For despite somewhat popular prejudices to the contrary, the ego of the anxiety hysteric is frequently of a normal or even superior quality. And the same can be said of many individuals suffering from sexual abnormalities of one kind or another. On theoretical grounds this is only to be expected, for if a conflict disorder manifests itself mainly in dynamic (instinctual) form, it would be uneconomic to drag the ego also into malfunction.[10] The fact that sexual and ego disorders often run hand in hand is no counter to this argument; it simply means that psychoanalysts are more familiar with these combined disorders in their therapeutic practice. Those however who have frequent occasion to analyze 'normal' people can testify to the validity of this first reservation.

The second reservation follows from Dr. Spitz's suggestion that 'gratifications which have become possible through the achievement of a given level of integration would not be completely abandoned at the next level of integration'. 'Once achieved', Dr. Spitz goes on, 'gratifications are not easily abandoned, but are carried over into the next higher state of gratification, even if they should be meaningless at this stage'. Despite the adverbial qualification, the loading of this statement lies in its tail. Of course gratifications are carried on,

[10] See Glover, Edward: *The Relation of Perversion-Formation to the Development of Reality-Sense.* Int. J. Psa., XIV, 1933, pp. 486-503.

and unless they arouse conflict and have to be disguised in symptomatic form, they are explicitly meaningful. In describing the 'primary functional phase' where the mental apparatus responds to mounting energic stresses, I pointed out that these functional reactions are not superseded by more organized and modified phases but continue to operate alongside them.[11] Hence the combinations of psychosomatic symptoms and neurotic symptom formations. The point, however, is that such functional reactions exist in *both* normal and mentally disordered individuals. The wholesale application of a distinction between normal 'dependent differentiation' and 'deviant integration' would scarcely apply when the determining factors are quantitative rather than qualitative.

These are but a few of the reflections prompted by Dr. Spitz's stimulating brochure. But it would be ungenerous not to repeat that the outstanding virtue of the book lies in the author's endeavor to correlate specific clinical (observational) data with some basic theoretical assumptions (interpretations or reconstructions) regarding the progress and regress of mental development. In this matter Dr. Spitz displays a most commendable openness of mind. He even quotes with some approval Benjamin's views that the first undifferentiated or nondifferentiated stage manifests at the fourth week definite signs of organization and integration of muscular behavior. He holds, however, that inasmuch as no specific affective behavior has so far been noted at this stage, the alleged stage of organization is a subdivision of the first (nondifferentiated) stage, a not-too-convincing assertion by the way. Any degree of organization in a dynamic and functional psychic phase has some claim to recognition as a step in development. Writing on this point, I described the situation, rather journalistically it is true, by saying that the child 'passes through a number of lives' in his early development and recommended that these years should be 'set off in periods of three to six months and studied separately', adding that the first six months

[11] This was a clinical extension of Freud's early generalization (1913) that 'modes' (*cf.*, Erikson *passim*) of reaction and attitudes of childhood are still demonstrably present in maturity and in appropriate circumstances can emerge once more. My view is that they are a constant feature of mental life, whether appropriate or inappropriate.

See *inter alia* Glover, Edward: *Functional Aspects of the Mental Apparatus*, Int. J. Psa., XXXI, 1950, pp. 125-131; and Rapaport, David and Gill, Merton M.: *Op. cit.*

of life 'might well be studied in monthly stages'.[12] To take one consideration alone, it is hard to conceive that the development or enforcement of a new feeding habit or regimen in the first two months of life (and these are by no means uncommon occurrences even in baby hospitals) does not evoke affective responses of a quite specific kind however irregular and scattered the system of affective discharge may otherwise be. Quite uninstructed mothers are in no doubt that such changes give rise to 'critical periods' in the child's development. Interestingly enough the theory that anxiety has some genetic connection with the massive stimulation of birth suggests that one of the earliest 'critical periods' is experienced during labor. This is not to say that the immediate result can be expressed in terms of ego differentiation, but it does remind us that structural criteria are not the only measures of development.

Considerations of this sort prompt a final reflection on the nature of 'indicators'. Dr. Spitz claims that his three chosen 'indicators' are characterized by 'specific affective behavior'. This may be true of his first and second 'indicators' although it is to be noted that the first is of a positive, the second of a reactive (in the sense of hostile) affect, i.e., they are different orders of affect.[13] But in the case of the third 'indicator' it is hard to see how the acquisition of speech conforms to his own standard. And indeed Dr. Spitz confesses that he arrived at it as the result of reflections on comparative biology, in other words, by selecting the level in the second year of life which separates the primates from man; and so he nominated communication with the help of verbal symbols. Communication by verbal signals is no doubt promoted by affective states, but it is not an affective state *sui generis.*

It would take us too far to examine this standard in detail. But it does raise the issue as to whether Spitz's 'third indicator' is at least as much a sign that a critical period has *passed,* as a signal that a new critical period is *about to commence.* Writing in 1947 on the subject of preconscious cathexes and the period at which they begin

[12] Glover, Edward: *Psychoanalysis and Child Psychiatry.* London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1953.

[13] It is by the way inherently probable that the indicator of a 'critical period' will be a sustained anxiety, or reactive (hostile) or later a guilt affect rather than a gratification affect. Spitz's 'smiling response' (first indicator) suggests a gratification affect, whereas his 'eight-month anxiety' (second indicator) is often signalized by the 'scowling response', equally often by the 'stony-stare response'.

to bind unconscious charges, I maintained that the development of speech, together with the correlation of auditory perceptions and motor activity, 'provides us with a reliable time measure of early developmental phases'. 'With the development of speech', I added, 'the *primary dynamic* phase of mental function, we may infer, begins to draw to its close'.[14] But I was cautious enough to add that the meaning of words is apprehended some months before their effective use. So it would be justifiable to infer that the acquisition of 'meaning' represents a critical phase in development. This would not however detract from the rapidity of *preconscious* organization that *follows* the acquisition of speech. It is possible that a similar qualification could be made regarding all 'indicators'.

The truth is that there are a number of sources of confusion incident to attempts to reconstruct infantile mental development. The first is to concentrate too exclusively on one of the three metapsychological approaches to mental activity. The only period when this restricted approach is fully justified is during the 'primary functional phase'. This is essentially a dynamic phase; such psychic systems of memory traces as have evolved exert merely a canalizing, not yet a controlling, function. As far as reconstruction is concerned psychoanalysis has not yet recovered from the impact of Freud's later formulations on psychic structure. Theoretical speculations tend consequently to aggrandize structural at the expense of dynamic and economic concepts, to postulate organized regulative systems at periods when the major psychic functions are regulated by primitive mechanisms. This does not imply that no structural formations exist during the functional stage. The moment two sets of memory traces concerning experiences of gratification and frustration are linked (associated or merged) we have the makings of an ego nucleus. Simple reflection would suggest however that at a period when the infant sleeps for the greater part of the twenty-four hours and during waking hours has his major preservative needs catered to by the environment, the organized strength of early ego nuclei must be greatly at a discount.

To put the matter another way, there are two special dangers incident to reconstruction. One is to overestimate the organization of the mind during early development and the other is to underesti-

[14] Glover, Edward: *Basic Mental Concepts*. London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1947.

mate it. One must of course distinguish between 'formation' and 'effective use', and in the latter sense I have been prepared to underestimate it until the phase of unaided locomotion begins and the period of *continuous* regulative scrutiny on the part of environment draws to a close. In the formative sense I do not think it can be overestimated even at the period when instinct and aim exist without clear differentiation of object. But I do not believe, as does Dr. Spitz, in 'object precursors'; nor do I think that the psychology of 'complete objects' and still less the psychology of 'part objects' is at all satisfactory. The object of an instinct is that on which the aim of an instinct is or can be achieved, a definition with which the infant, if he could be consulted, would be in entire agreement, as witness his behavior when offered an inadequate substitute.[15]

This leads us to yet another source of confusion, namely, the tendency to transpose backwards (displace, project, impute) to an earlier stage the organization of a later stage, and in this way attribute complex states of organization to relatively unorganized phases of mental development. This was, in my opinion, the fundamental mistake of which Klein and her followers were and still are guilty. In principle it can be described as an attribution of ego characteristics to the id and is carried to even more absurd lengths by those who claim to have uncovered in the course of analysis and in circumstantial detail 'prenatal experiences'. Psychoanalysts have long recognized that basic psychoanalytic concepts have to be protected from erosion as well as from bowdlerization. From this angle it is perhaps not too extravagant to visualize and even to hope for

[15] As a matter of interest it was Abraham who first indicated what he conceived to be the earliest postnatal 'critical period', commencing on the average at six months, when he distinguished a biting from a sucking phase of oral libido. This maturational phenomenon has outstanding affective indicators (commonly subsumed under the caption of 'teething'), heralds some of the earliest fusions of libidinal and aggressive elements, and represents a dramatic change in primitive 'object' relations. In short, it conforms to all Dr. Spitz's standards of a 'critical period', though of course one that extends over twelve months. Although the interpretation of infantile behavioristic phenomena is clearly the special preserve of the psychoanalyst, the study of 'indicators' should be the concern of an International Commission of Ortho-psycho-pediatricians. I have long advocated the committee system of psychoanalytic research to deal with such matters and even succeeded some years ago in setting up an International Research Committee. But, alas, for various reasons into which it is now pointless to enter the effort was stillborn.

the formation of an International Association for the Protection of the Id Concept.

It would be, in the broadest sense of the term, invidious to make close comparisons between these two books. The reader must judge for himself which of them is the more productive of theoretical clarity and at the same time cleaves the more closely to the fundamental principles of metapsychology. On this matter tastes differ widely. Those who think most clearly in structural and topographic terms will no doubt be intrigued by both books, although they will find Dr. Spitz's exposition the easier to follow. This may be due in part to a linguistic factor. Dr. Hartmann's stylistic habit is the more involved. And he jumps about a bit so that one is often brought up short by a hiatus in presentation or a promise that there is 'more to follow'. On the other hand Dr. Spitz, though also concerned mainly with structural differentiation, pays more attention to the other elements in the metapsychological triad. And his presentation is more systematic and consecutive.

From the practical point of view there is no doubt that Dr. Spitz's book is the more rewarding, partly because some at least of his thinking has been more closely linked with systematic clinical observations, partly because he is more concerned with deviant (potentially pathological) integrations, and partly because his skeletal framework, if clinically well-founded, would prove the greater incentive to classification of characterological types, both normal and disordered. Whether or not it is soundly based is again a matter of taste to be determined by the individual reader. For on matters of speculative import the factor of taste is sometimes decisive. It depends to a considerable extent on the reader's preferred modes of thought, to say nothing of his powers of 'directed (and disciplined) fantasy', a preconscious attribute or activity which Dr. Hartmann would no doubt prefer to designate as a 'conflict-free functioning' of an 'ego apparatus'.

But it is not simply a matter of taste; it is to a certain extent also a matter of fashion. In the preamble to this review I suggested that it would be interesting to see how far Spitz had been influenced by Hartmann. To be fair it must be conceded that although he adopts several of Hartmann's points of view, his most important lines of thought are his own, allowing of course for the fact that he has been

fascinated by embryological analogies and is not averse to paying court to ethological 'parallels'. To be sure most analysts are, despite any demurrers on their part, influenced by fashion, a fortunate circumstance indeed when the fashion was set by Freud himself, but not so fortunate when less intuitive and at the same time less orderly minds try their hands at theoretical reconstruction or definition of terms or the coining of new terminologies. The influence of fashion may indeed have regrettable consequences as when an apparently new formulation is launched on the bibliographical stream and continues to float thereon without any discriminating examination on the part of those who, standing on the banks, are content to assert that 'so and so has shown' when in fact 'so and so' has only 'suggested'.

But when all is said let us not be ungrateful for what may be described as two brave metapsychological tries. For whether the expositions of Hartmann and Spitz are well-founded or simply metaphysical exercises, they at least demonstrate that theories of development are not just crystallized reconstructions,[16] but can function also as auxiliary instruments of research. If we accept the terminology of Hartmann we might well dub them 'ego apparatuses'; or if we prefer the Spitzean idiom, experiments in 'dependent differentiation'.

[16] Dr. Hartmann says, 'The advantages of the theoretical approach over the discussion of many-faceted concrete (*sic*) phenomena is, if nothing else, its brevity'. True, but although brevity may be the soul of metapsychological wit, it is likewise a prolific source of metapsychological misunderstanding. Error like truth can be crystallized; it can also become petrified.