Chapter 7
The Direction of the Treatment
and the Principles of Its Power

Overview

The present essay, edited 14 months after "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious" (Chapter 5), was composed as a report to be delivered at an international symposium sponsored by the Société française de psychanalyse (Royaumont, July 1958). In its own right a self-contained text, it may be presumed to continue the line of thought already evident in the previous essay. It unquestionably crystallizes many of the themes that Lacan was discussing in his seminars at that time.

In question is the nature of psychoanalysis as a treatment process or, more specifically, what path is to be followed in the development of the treatment and how. The first part of the question finds its response in the notion of "direction," where what is at stake is obviously not the "direction" of the patient in the sense of "guidance," "instruction" or "control" by the analyst (1977, p. 227/586) but rather the direction of the treatment, where the issue is the sequence or emphasis to be given to the
various elements found within it: interpretation, transference, and the rectification of the subject's relationship to the real (1977, p. 237/589). As to the how of the process, this is addressed under the guise of the "principles of its power." Freud himself believed that the principle of his power lay in the transference (1977, p. 226/585), but the reserves with which this is to be understood are subject to discussion in this essay.

I

Who analyses today?

The word "today" in the heading of this first section suggests that we are in for a polemic against certain contemporary conceptions of the analytic process that are foreign to Lacan's own. Thus the opening paragraph strikes a subtly derisive tone toward certain themes popularized chiefly in La Psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui. These themes include the stress on the importance of the analyst's person (1977, pp. 226, 228/585, 587), and hence the role of countertransference in the treatment (1977, pp. 226, 229/585, 589); the insistence that the heart of the treatment is an "emotional re-education of the patient" (1977, p. 226/585); the focus on the fact that the analytic situation involves "two persons" (1977, p. 228/588); the emphasis on the treatment's proceeding "from within," etc. (1977, p. 229/588). But the central difficulty that Lacan finds fault with, permeating in one way or another all of these themes, seems to be the conception of the ego as an agency of adaptation both in the patient and in the analyst, with any interaction between them to be understood in these terms. Hence, the question "Who analyses today?" is by implication a question about the nature and function of the analyst—for that matter, of psychoanalysis itself.

Lacan's approach to the problem is hardly direct. He begins by referring to the notion of "direction" that is the theme of the entire essay. Granted that the direction in question is not of the patient but of the treatment, who, then, supplies it? The analyst, of course, but how? The analyst's first task is to make the

object follow the analytic rule (1977, p. 227/586). The analyst thus starts by instructing the patient up to the limits of his own (perhaps deficient) understanding of the rule. Given the differences among analysts even on this level, it is clear that "from the initial directives on, the problem of direction cannot be formulated in an univocal communication" (1977, p. 227/586).

But the analyst's involvement goes deeper than the level of mere instruction, and this is not without cost to himself. He must pay, for example, "with words," i.e., "if the transmutation that they undergo from the analytic operation raises them to the level of interpretation" (1977, p. 227/587). He must pay, too, "with his person" to the extent that he lends his whole person "as a support for the singular phenomenon that analysis has discovered in the transference" (1977, p. 227/587). Finally, he must pay with his very being, for if his analytic action "goes to the heart of being" in his patient, how can he expect "to remain alone outside the field of play" (1977, pp. 227-228/587)? Such talk about being sounds terribly metaphysical, of course, but it is only on the level of being that we can make sense out of such claims as that the "analyst cures not so much by what he says and does as by what he is" (1977, p. 228/587). What about the being of the analyst, then?

At this point, Lacan wastes no time with metaphysics but addresses the question of the analyst's being in terms of how the analyst conceives his function to be his "own oracle," "master" of his own ship, i.e., "free in the timing, frequency and choice of [his] interventions, to the point that it seems that the [analytic] rule has been arranged entirely so as not to impede in any way [his] own freedom of movement" (1977, p. 228/588). Freedom of movement, however, to do precisely what? The answer to this question depends on how each analyst understands the role of transference in the analytic venture.

The fact is that every analyst, no matter how questionable his manner of procedure may be, "experiences the transference in wonder at the least expected effect of a relationship between two people that seems like any other" (1977, p. 229/588). The
whole issue of how the analyst fulfills his function ("who it is, then, that analyses today") turns on how he deals with the phenomenon of transference.

One way to deal with transference is for the analyst to experience it as the alienation of his own freedom "by the duplication to which [his] person is subject in it" (1977, p. 228/588). He experiences this duplication as an intrusion upon himself insofar as his freedom is perceived as residing in the other of the transference. This third dimension, however, does not prevent people from believing that psychoanalysis is a situation involving two persons, one of whom sees his task to be the "training of the 'weak' ego, by an ego that [he] is pleased to believe is capable, on account of its 'strength,' of carrying out such a project" (1977, p. 229/588). The assumption is, of course, that the ego's weakness or strength is measured by its ability to serve as the agency by which the subject adapts to reality, and that reality, i.e., his own relation to reality, is clearly discernible by the analyst. This "relation to reality [in the analyst] goes without saying" (1977, p. 230/590). It is transmitted to him by the educational process of his training analysis and imposed by him in turn on the analysand with all the authoritarianism of an educator, despite the experience of his own analysis which should have made him know better. In this context, one can appreciate the appeal of the notion of the "autonomous ego," developed particularly by American psychology as a "standard of the measure of the real" (1977, pp. 230–231/590). Be this as it may, Lacan dismisses this "American" tradition of ego psychology with bemused disdain: "[this] does not solve the problem of the analyst's being. A team of egos no doubt less equal than autonomous...is offered to the Americans to guide them towards happiness, without upsetting the autonomies, egoistical or otherwise, that pave with their non-conflictual spheres the American way of getting there" (1977, p. 231/591).

But this is only one way for the analyst to deal with the transference. There are others. One of these would be simply to deal with transference as resistance. In this case, the analyst would look twice before hazard aing an interpretation" (1977, p. 231/591). Another way would be to examine and interpret the transference as such, but then how would such an interpretation be received by the analysand? "[T]his interpretation...will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be." Of course, this second level of transference, too, could be interpreted, but "the analyst's words will still be heard as coming from the Other of the transference, [and] the emergence of the subject from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum" (1977, p. 231/591).

None of these solutions to the problem of transference is satisfactory for Lacan, however, and it is to bring out the unsatisfactoriness of them that he poses at the end of this section the questions that in effect summarize the whole: "Who is the analyst? He who interprets, profiting from the transference? He who analyses it as resistance? Or he who imposes his idea of reality?" (1977, p. 232/592). We are left expecting the answer: "None of the above."

What we have seen so far in this section is largely negative. Is there nothing positive, no indication of how the analyst should proceed in the analytic situation, transference and all? As a matter of fact, Lacan does propose one way of conceiving the process which is no more than suggested here and will be elaborated elsewhere. The matter arises in his discussion of the role of countertransference in the process. He speaks rather disparagingly of those who throw their feelings, "which they class under the heading of their counter-transference, on one side of the scales, thus balancing the transference itself with their own weight" (1977, p. 229/589). This, Lacan claims, indicates "a failure to conceive the true nature of the transference" (1977, p. 229/589).

Lacan then changes the metaphor and continues: "One cannot regard the phantasies that the analysand imposes on the person of the analyst in the same way as a perfect card player might guess his opponent's intentions" (1977, p. 229/589). Rath-
er, by his deliberate reserve (e.g., "impassive face," "sealed lips," etc.), the analyst brings "to his aid what in bridge is called the dummy (le mort), but he is doing so in order to introduce the fourth player who is to be the partner of the analysand here, and whose hand the analyst, by his tactics, will try to expose" (1977, p. 229/589). Here the dummy, i.e., the analyst's manner of austere reserve, enters the game as the analyst's ally—its task being to help the analyst uncover the hand of the fourth player, i.e., the analysand's partner—presumably his unconscious.

Lacan now pursues this metaphor in a way that makes sense if we view the game as in progress, where each player has an opportunity to take the lead and play to the dummy. We could deduce the way the analyst is playing "according to whether he places himself 'on the right' or 'on the left' of the patient, that is to say, in a position to play after or before the fourth player, that is to say, to play . . . before or after the player with the dummy" (1977, pp. 229-230/589). The dummy enables the transference to take place, to have a place in this four-sided structure, and the patient's unconscious (the fourth player) will at times take the lead and play to the dummy. Where the analyst places himself makes a difference in terms of who takes the lead and whose hand he will force. The essential seems to be that the dummy in analysis plays an important function as an ally of the therapist in helping the unconscious of the patient to reveal its hand. At any rate, this much is certain: the feelings of the analyst have a part in this game only as part of the dummy that he plays (1977, p. 230/589).

II

What is the place of interpretation?

Given the importance of transference in analytic treatment (and we shall return to the matter below), what place does interpretation have in the process? Any answer to such a question depends, of course, on how one understands the term, and the wariness of contemporary psychoanalytic writers in using the term suggests their uneasiness in dealing with it (1977, p. 232/592).

The fact is that interpretation seems to involve a "transmutation" in the subject that is somehow uncovered by the interpretation (1977, p. 233/593). This is understandable, however, only if we recognize the radical importance of the signifier in localizing "analytic truth" for the subject.

For interpretation does not consist in just any wild attribution of signification to phenomena, as if it were "a sort of phlogiston: manifest in everything that is understood rightly or wrongly" (1977, p. 233/593)—"signification no more emanates from life than [the] phlogiston in combustion escapes from bodies" (1977, p. 234/594). Rather, in interpretation the signification of a series (i.e., "diachrony") of "unconscious repetitions" is deciphered inasmuch as a given constellation (i.e., "synchrony") of signifiers permits the "missing element" in that series to appear, thus making translation possible. This happens through the function of the Other in the process, "it being in relation to that Other that the missing element appears" (1977, p. 233/593). This Other, of course, we take to be the unconscious, inasmuch as it "is structured in the most radical way like a language" (1977, p. 234/594)—a structure synonymous with the symbolic order that "pre-exists the infantile subject" and to which this subject is introduced in the experience described by Freud in terms of *For! Da!* In any case, it is in this fashion that "the signifier effects the advent of the signified, which is the only conceivable way that interpretation can produce anything new" (1977, p. 233/594).

As to rules of interpretation, they can indeed be formulated, though this is not the place to formulate them. Let it suffice to say that the index of a correct interpretation is not acknowledgment by the patient (for, as Freud pointed out, denial, too, is a "form of avowal") but rather "the material that will emerge as a result of the interpretation" (1977, p. 234/594).

More important here, perhaps, is Freud's example in using it, since his manner of proceeding is far different from that of
contemporary analysts. The latter are caught in an initial timidity that goes along with their conception of their role as engaged in a dual relationship with the patient’s ego. For them, then, the development of transference offers a sense of “security” that permits them to use interpretation in order to reduce the transference (by a kind of “working through”) as a way of helping the patient deal with his relation to the “real” (1977, p. 235/596). Freud, however, following an “inverse order,” “begins by introducing the patient to an initial mapping of his position in the real” (1977, p. 236/596). He then proceeds to the development of the transference—in which he recognized the “principle of his power” (1977, p. 236/597)—and finally to interpretation (1977, p. 237/598).

Freud’s conception of interpretation is a bold one. When we see, for example, how his notion of “drive” (Trieb) as distinct from “instinct” implies “the advent of a signifier” (1977, p. 236/597), it is clear that in his conception of interpretation Freud recognizes, however implicitly, the function of the symbolic order. Hence, far more is involved for him than a “dual relation” between the analyst’s ego and the patient’s ego—operative, too, is the whole dimension of the Other, the role of the “absolute Father” (1977, p. 237/598).

Lacan concludes this section by offering a clinical vignette that suggests how his understanding of interpretation differs from that of the so-called “id” psychologists (e.g., Melitta Schmideberg) on the one hand, and the so-called “ego” psychologists (e.g., Ernst Kris) on the other. The case is that of an inhibited intellectual unable to bring his research to a finish because of a compulsion to plagiarize (1977, p. 238/599). Schmideberg (1934) allegedly sees the unconscious conflict in straightforward fashion as the perdurance of an “infantile delinquency” (he had stolen sweets and books); hence she focuses on the role of the “id.” Kris (1951), taking over the case, resorts to the tools of “ego” psychology and approaches the problem in terms of defense mechanisms. In other words, the patient has a drive that is manifest in an attraction to others’ ideas but defends himself against the drive by thinking of himself as a plagiarist lest in fact he become one. The insufficiency of such an interpretation, according to Lacan, appears in the patient’s acting out a rejection of it by associating to his own search for his “favourite dish, [fresh] brains” (1977, p. 239/599).

For Lacan, “it is not his defence against the idea of stealing that makes him believe that he steals. It’s having an idea of his own that never occurs to him” (1977, p. 239/600). Hence, the idea of being a plagiarist is not a defense mechanism against a drive but rather a metonymy for his desire that is diverted through an entire metonymic chain. The food fantasy (search for fresh brains), then, suggests that the appropriate diagnosis here is not “obsessional neurosis” but rather a kind of “anorexia mentale” (1977, p. 240/601).

III

Where have we got with the transference?

But the issue of transference is far from exhausted, and Lacan returns to it again, taking as his starting point the work of Daniel Lagache, who has made a serious effort to study systematically this notion in Freud. Precisely by his effort at systematization, Lagache’s work has highlighted the incompleteness of most current discussions of the notion, particularly the extent to which the very loose signification of the term in popular usage, i.e., as “the positive or negative feelings that the patient has for his analyst” (1977, p. 241/602), has permeated serious psychoanalytic discussion. All of this leaves many subtle issues unresolved, probably because “at each of the stages at which an attempt has been made to revise the problems of the transference, the technical divergences that made such a revision a matter of urgency have left no place for a true critique of the notion itself” (1977, p. 241/603). It is perhaps worthwhile to examine some of these theories precisely to see not only their incompleteness but their noncomplementarity, and thus to be able to understand better that “they suffer from a central defect” (1977, p. 242/603).
The first of these incomplete, “partial” theories to be considered Lacan calls “geneticism.” We take him to mean that conception of transference that is based on the tendency “to ground analytic phenomena in the [psychosexual] developmental stages that concern them” (1977, p. 242/603). Such a theory is based on the assumption of a correlation between physiological development and the emergence of psychological drives. Moreover, given Freud’s hypothesis of an unconscious dimension of the ego, this theory postulates that in the ego’s unconscious, defenses may be erected against the exigencies of these drives. Hence these defense mechanisms may “reveal a comparable law of appearance” (1977, p. 242/603)—an “order of formal emergences” (1977, p. 243/605)—proper to the drives themselves. Such, at least, was Anna Freud’s hypothesis in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936), stimulated by, and finding some confirmation in, her work with children.

This perspective might have become fruitful if it had been focused on “the relations between development and the obviously more complex structures that Freud introduced into psychology” (1977, p. 242/604). Unfortunately, in practice it settled for a facile psychobiological concordism and a technique that contented itself with seeking to differentiate an earlier (“non-contemporaneous”) pattern as measured by its departure from a contemporary pattern that “finds in its conformism the guarantees of its conformity” (1977, p. 243/604).

The second of these incomplete, “partial” theories of transference to be considered is that which proceeds from the theory of object relations that has its origin in the work of Karl Abraham (1908), who added to Freud’s stages of early libidinal development (oral, anal, phallic, genital) more precise subdivisions, based not only on the sexual aims (i.e., actions) of a drive but on its sexual objects. For Abraham, the subject’s relation to his sexual objects is marked by corresponding stages of “love” ranging from “auto-erotism” in the earlier oral stage to full “object-love” in the final genital stage. In the genital phase, the subject ideally overcomes all traces of earlier stages, resolves the Oedipus and castration complexes, and transfers the feelings of affection or hostility which he entertains toward his patients onto the environment; he thus is ready for subsequent adaptation to society. It is in the elaboration of these different stages in terms of their relevance for character development that Abraham orchestrates differences between “genital” and “pregenital” characters.

Lacan challenges all this, finding much that “begs the question” (1977, p. 243/605). To begin with, the development of libido toward object love “can be explained as a finality that allows itself to be instinctual, in the sense that it is based on the image of the maturation of an inelaborable object, the Object with a capital O that governs the phase of objectality (to be distinguished, significantly, from objectivity by virtue of its affective substance)” (1977, p. 243/605). For Lacan, this assumption of a kind of biological final cause is without warrant.

Moreover, the resultant emphasis on the distinction between the “pregenital” character as an “amalgam of all the defects of the object relation” and the “genital” character as the paragon of integration where the “style of the relations between subject and object is one of the most highly evolved [sic]” (1977, p. 244/605–606) is wholly unsatisfactory. “And what has this absurd hymn to the harmony of the genital got to do with the real” (1977, p. 245/606)? The point seems to be that such a conception too easily overlooks the “barriers and snubs (Erniedrigungen) that are so common in even the most fulfilled love relation” and glamorizes the genital aspect of object relations to the point of confusing “the sublime” with the “perfect orgasm” (1977, p. 245/607), thus placing impossible burdens on the shoulders of “innocents” who cannot achieve it.

There is a third theory about the nature of transference that is likewise inadequate: “the notion of intersubjective introjection... in a dual relation” with the analyst (1977, p. 246/607). The principal focus of Lacan’s critique here seems to be Sandor Ferenczi (1909)—though he also mentions Strachey and Balint—for whom transference, though fundamentally a “dis-
placement," involves identification and even an introjection, or incorporation, of the other.

The "phantasy of phallic devouring, to which the image of the analyst is subjected" (1977, p. 246/608), would be a case in point. Now Lacan himself, who takes the phallus to be the signifier par excellence of desire (Chapter B), would be inclined to take this fantasy as an illustration of "the privileged function of the [signifier]-phallus in the mode of the subject's presence to desire" (1977, p. 246/608). But such an interpretation presupposes the "true relations of the analytic situation," i.e., the whole domain of language (the symbolic order) within which analysis takes place, as well as the function of desire in that situation.

When all this is left out of account by limiting the analytic situation to a strictly dual relation, the situation itself is "crushed" (1977, p. 246/608) and the possibility of a truly "symbolic" perspective eliminated. Since analysis as such does not effect any change in the "real," the only remaining register in which a strictly dual relation may be conceived is that of the "imaginary." But "if one confines oneself to an imaginary relation between objects there remains only the dimension of distance to order it" (1977, p. 246/608). If this distance is ideally reduced to zero (1977, p. 247/609), the result is obviously a kind of "mystical consummation" (1977, p. 246/608). If this distance is ideally reduced to zero, it would follow, as one work suggests, that to "be able to smell one's analyst" would be an "index of the happy outcome of the transference" (1977, p. 247/609).

At this point Lacan dialogues with an absent partner over a clinical case of "transitory perversion," about which the otherwise uninformed reader is forced to guess the details. He then returns to his theme: the problem of transference. For his "only purpose is to warn analysts of the decline that threatens their technique if they fail to recognize the true place in which its effects are produced" (1977, p. 249/612). If he criticizes the genetic conception of transference or the theory of object relations as inadequate (i.e., "partial"), this is not to say that they have no relevance to "properly analytic realities" (1977, p. 250/612) but only to deny that they define the "true place" in which the effects of technique are produced. The result is a failure on the part of analysts to grasp "their action in its authenticity" so that they end up forcing that action "in the direction of the exercise of power" (1977, p. 250/612). But this power, such as it is, is merely a substitute for "the relation to... being where this action takes place, producing a decline of its resources, especially those of speech" (1977, p. 250/612). We take this to mean that the "true place" where the effects of technique are produced, hence (presumably) where transference finds the source of its power, is in relation to being, which never has been taken sufficiently into account by analysts. This, then, would be the "central defect" from which these theories "suffer."

IV

How to act with one's being

Lacan concluded the previous section by referring to the level of "being where [analytic] action takes place" (1977, p. 250/612). We infer that this alludes to the domain of the Other, i.e., the symbolic order. He now echoes the word "being" but, initially at least, speaks of it as if it were the analyst's being that is at
We assume that the two uses of the word are not disconnected, but the connection is far from clear in the text (the text itself is particularly obscure). This assumption serves as an underlying working hypothesis in our effort to detect the unifying thread of this section.

To begin with, it was again Ferenczi (1909) who introduced the question about the being of the analyst when he “conceived of the transference as the introjection of the person of the doctor into the subjective economy,” i.e., the “absorption into the economy of the subject of all that the psychoanalyst makes present in the duo as the here and now of an incarnated problematic” (1977, p. 250/613). What “the psychoanalyst makes present in the duo” is what Lacan calls in Ferenczi’s name the psychoanalyst’s “being”—with this nuance, however, that we “distinguish from the interhuman relation, with its warmth and its allurements (leurre), that relation to the Other in which being finds its status” (1977, p. 251/613).

In any case, it “is certainly in the relation to being that the analyst has to find his operating level” (1977, p. 252/615). This means, first of all, that his purpose is not to bring “happiness” to the analysand, still less to share with the analysand some putative “happiness” of his own. It means, too, that the analyst’s task is not first of all to help the analysand to “understand” himself, nor even to teach the analysand to “think.” Rather, the “analyst is the man to whom one speaks and to whom one speaks freely. That is what he is there for” (1977, p. 253/616). Speaking “freely,” of course, does not necessarily mean that there is a great deal of “freedom in what [one] says” (1977, p. 253/616), though it does “open up on to a free speech [of a kind, i.e.], a full speech that is painful to [the analysand]” (1977, p. 253/616). Such an experience might prove quite troublesome to the patient if this “full speech” articulates “something that might be true” (1977, p. 253/616). But truth is what is at stake in the analysis—not as an abstract intellectualization but as a concrete dynamic grappling with the “unsayable.”

The analyst’s first task in all this is to listen (écouter) to what is spoken to him. For Lacan, the importance of the analyst’s “presence” in the analytic process consists in the fact “that this presence is first of all simply the implication of his listening, and that this listening is simply the condition of speech” (1977, p. 255/618). Having listened, the analyst also must hear (entendre) what is said beyond the spoken discourse. This may not necessarily mean, however, that he can understand (comprendre) what he hears, and if he does not, he will have nothing to say. Silence, however, is admittedly frustrating to the speaker, for his speech is, after all, a way of asking the analyst for something—at the very least, for a reply—that the analyst by his silence refuses. Such a request “is deployed on the [broader] field of an implicit demand, that for which he is there: the demand to cure him” (1977, p. 254/617). This introduces the whole issue of the role of the patient’s requests (i.e., “demands”) in the analysis.

Through the articulation of the patient’s demands, “the whole past opens up right down to early infancy” (1977, p. 254/617), for it is only by making demands that the infant could have survived. This may be the sense of “analytic regression,” for “regression shows nothing other than a return to the present of signifiers used in demands” of a speech of long ago (1977, p. 255/618). That is why the analyst sustains the demand if he can, “not, as has been said, to frustrate the subject, but in order to allow the signifiers in which his frustration is bound up to reappear” (1977, p. 255/618).

What the analyst seeks, then, is the articulation of the patient’s demands. This is made possible by reason of the “primary transference,” which we take to mean transference to the therapist in terms of the “primary identification” with the omnipotent mother. In terms of this identification, the exigencies of the infant’s biological structure (i.e., his “needs”) cannot just be met by the mother in some concrete physical fashion, for the time comes in his development when the infant must separate from the mother and enter into the symbolic order, where the satisfaction of these needs must be filtered through the “defiles of
the structure of the signifier” (1977, p. 255/618). Hence:

Needs become subordinated to the same conventional conditions as those of the signifier in its double register: the synchronic register of opposition between irreducible elements [i.e., the binary pairs of distinctive phonemes], and the diachronic register of substitution and combination, [by] which language, even if it does not fulfil all functions, structures everything concerning relations between human beings [1977, p. 255/618-619].

Articulated in this fashion, these needs become “demands,” and it is with “all the articulations of the subject’s demand” that the analyst must deal in turn (1977, p. 256/619). In doing so, he is indeed identified with the omnipotent mother, whose task would be to attend to these articulations and discern the demand for love that lies within them all. Such presumably would be the situation that “explains the primary transference, and the love that is sometimes declared in it” (1977, p. 255/618).

To be sure, the analyst “must respond to [this demand] only from the position of the transference,” but what that might mean and how the transference itself is to be understood as an “identification with signifiers” (1977, p. 256/619) is far from clear at the moment. What is clear is that by engaging the patient in this fashion, the analyst “acts with his being,” that is, as grounded in the symbolic order, the unconscious Other in which all signifiers find their matrix of signification.

V

Desire must be taken literally

The transition from the previous section, with its discussion (however sinuous) of the analyst’s relation to being, to this, where the theme is “desire,” calls for an explanation—or at least for some educated guesswork. We have just seen in what sense the analyst finds his operating level in relation to being by dealing with the articulations of the subject’s demand(s). However, the fundamental driving force of the subject is not his demand(s) but the desire that lies beneath (or within, or behind, or beyond) this demand(s). Hence, there arises now the necessity of addressing explicitly the question of the role of desire in the treatment and its relation to the source of the treatment’s power.

When Lacan in his title to this section tells us that desire must be taken “literally” (à la lettre), we understand this in the sense that this same phrase was used in “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious” (Chapter 5), i.e., in terms of the linguistic structure of the unconscious. In other words, we may reasonably expect this section to address the question of desire in its distinction from demand and in relation to the whole role of language in psychoanalysis as Lacan conceives it.

As we know, desire plays a central role for Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), but the import of the word is not self-evident. Freud’s (1900b) word is Wunsch, which the Standard Edition translates as “wish,” with the implication that what is at stake is an individual, isolated act. The French equivalent would be voeu. In fact, however, the French have always translated Wunsch as désir, with the implication of a continuous force (Sheridan, 1977, p. viii). We follow the French (Lacan’s) usage here, though the reader should bear in mind the possible ambiguity that results.

Lacan begins his discussion by referring to the familiar dream of the butcher’s wife discussed by Freud:

I wanted to give a supper-party, but I had nothing in the house but a little smoked salmon. I thought I would go out and buy something, but remembered then that it was Sunday afternoon and all the shops would be shut. Next I tried to ring up some caterers, but the telephone was out of order. So I had to abandon my wish to give a supper-party [1900a, p. 147].

The reader will recall how this dream, presented to Freud as a challenge to his theory that dreams express the fulfillment of desire, becomes under Freud’s analysis the expression of the dream-
er's desire for an unfulfilled desire. This becomes clear when the
"salmon" in the dream is seen to be a substitute for "caviar," for
which the dreamer has a craving that she wishes to remain un-
gratified by her husband (1900a, p. 148). Let us begin by seeing
how desire functions here according to the laws of language (à la
lettre), by which signifiers are related to each other either by rea-
son of the substitution of one for the other (i.e., as metaphor) or
through the combination of one with the other (i.e., as metonymy)
(1977, p. 258/622).

In the present case, the salmon in the dream signifies the
friend's desire for salmon, which is seen by Freud as signifying
(by substitution) the dreamer's desire for caviar. The former,
then, is a metaphor for the latter. With regard to the desire for
caviar as signifier of the desire for an unsatisfied desire, the ca-
viar, by reason of its inaccessibility, serves as a displacement of
the unsatisfied desire, hence serves an expression of that desire
by metonymy (1977, p. 259/622). We see, then, how this dream
is elaborated according to a "linguistic structure" that Freud dis-
covered—even before Saussure—simply in the "signifying flow"
of associations, "the mystery of which lies in the fact that the
[conscious] subject does not even know where to pretend to be
its organizer" (1977, p. 259/623). The "organizer" obviously is
Other.

But to whom does the "signifying flow" reveal its meaning,"before the arrival on the scene of the analyst" (1977, p. 260/623)? After all, this meaning preexists in the flow prior to any
reading of the flow or deciphering of that meaning. Both read-
ing and deciphering suggest that a dream is made for the "rec-
ognition of desire" (yes, but recognition by whom?) that in turn
is a "desire for recognition" (yes, but recognition from whom?)
(1977, p. 260/623). Such questions are left unanswered, for the
moment at least, and instead Lacan takes us through a review
of Freud's analysis of the dream. He concludes by returning to
the role of desire in the dream, symbolized in this case by the
salmon. He finds in the salmon itself a convenient reminder of
the phallus, which, as we know, he takes to be the signifier par
excellence of desire, independent of the sex of the subject (1977,
p. 263/627).

But before we discuss the signifier of desire we must first
understand better "that which structures desire" (1977, p. 263/627). Given some understanding of what "need" means and of
how "demand" differs from it in articulating this need according
to the exigencies of the symbolic order, there remains a gap, an
"interval," between the two, insofar as there is a want-to-be that
transcends all satisfaction of physical need, transcends, too, any
particular articulation of need, i.e., any specific demand, so as
to remain unsatisfied even after any/every demand has been
met. Any demand is always addressed to some Other, i.e., to
someone, about something, through speech made possible by a
sharing of language with that Other. Whatever might be the
thing demanded, however, what is really sought in the demand
is the Other’s "love." But this Other suffers from want, too, and
cannot satisfy the subject’s want-to-be, even by his "love." For
the subject’s deepest want is not for the "love" (which we take
Lacan to mean here as mere "oblativity") but for recognition.
That is why the demand for "love," even if acceded to, cannot
satisfy desire. Under such circumstances, the subject may well
retreat to sleep, “where he haunts the limbo regions of being, by
letting it [Ca] speak in him” through his dreams (1977, p. 263/
627).

Desire, then, is a want-to-be in the subject that is unsatis-
ifiable either through gratification of his needs or acquiescence
to his demands. Taking this as a “premise,” Lacan now draws the
conclusion that “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (1977,
p. 264/628), though the step here is a big one. Mediating be-
tween premise and conclusion are the suppositions that desire,
as well as demand, must submit to the exigencies of the symbol-
ic order, and that this symbolic order is the Other, i.e., the “oth-
er scene” where the speech of analytic discourse is “deployed.” If
we accept these suppositions and try to understand the sense of
desire as “desire of the Other,” it should be noted first of all that
the Other that is spoken of here, in the sense of the unconscious
structured like a language, is to be distinguished clearly from the Other in the above sense of the generalized someone of whom a demand is made.

With that in mind, we are left to our own resources here to understand how the subject's desire is "desire of the Other." A full discussion of the matter would probably take account of such considerations as the following: Desire, since it must be channeled through the "defiles of the signifier," is "at the mercy of" (en proie de) language. It may thus be thought of as possessed by language and in that sense is desire of language, i.e., "of the Other" (subjective genitive). Furthermore (a variation of the preceding), desire may be "of the Other" (subjective genitive) insofar as the Other is thought of as the being of the subject that is "other" than his conscious ego, i.e., the subject's being insofar as this is in want-of-being, hence the dynamic, propelling dimension of his decentered self. We find some confirmation of such interpretations in the dream under discussion, for the "desire of the dream is not assumed by the subject who says 'I' in [her] speech. Articulated, nevertheless, in the locus of the Other, it is discourse—a discourse whose grammar Freud [began] to declare [as] such" (1977, p. 265/629).

From another point of view, however, desire may be "of the Other" (objective genitive) insofar as the being of which the subject is in want is the being of the Other that will fill out his own ineluctable finitude, restoring the illusion of plenitude that was shattered by entrance into the symbolic order. Again, desire may be "of the Other" (objective genitive) insofar as, given his finitude, the subject thinks he can achieve the self-awareness appropriate to him only in recognition by the Other that simulates, and in a measure restores, the radical affirmation of a primordial unity. It is this last sense that easily masquerades as the demand for "love" from the individual Other, as if the Other possessed a fullness that could complete the subject. Hence, we gain some sense of how delicate is the task of discerning the difference between desire and demand. We find some confirmation of this interpretation when we are told that "the subject has to find the constituting structure of his desire in the same gap opened up by the effect of the signifiers in those who come to represent the Other for him, in so far as his demand is subjected to them" (1977, p. 264/628).

But the distinction between demand and desire (and, by implication, need) remains difficult to grasp, desire being both "beyond" (au delà) and "on this side of" (en deçà) the demand that "evokes" it. We take this to be another attempt by Lacan to express the transcending quality of desire, the "absolute condition" of the subject's ineluctable want, expressed here provocatively as his "nothing." It is precisely this want that erupts when the infant is "born into language," so that henceforth the subject is in bondage to the laws of language in pursuing whatever will satisfy this want. It is in this sense, we presume, that desire "is, as it were, the mark of the iron of the signifier on the shoulder of the speaking subject" (1977, p. 265/629). Here we are taking desire à la lettre indeed.

However that may be, the signifier par excellence of desire is the phallus, in a sense that will be given full orchestration in Chapter 8. It is to the theme of the phallus that Lacan now turns in order to elaborate further the role of desire in terms of this unique signifier, and we must do the best we can with it in tentative, make-do fashion. He broaches the issue by presenting a clinical vignette, the essential details of which are these: Lacan's patient is an obsessional male "of mature years," suffering from impotence with his mistress and ready to explain away the problem as a simple matter of "menopause." Persuaded, however, that the possible intervention of a third person into the dyad might salvage the situation, the patient suggests that his mistress sleep with another man "to see." The mistress then has a dream: "She has a phallus, she feels its shape under her clothes, which does not prevent her from having a vagina as well, nor, of course, from wanting this phallus to enter it." When she recounts this to the patient, he "is immediately restored to his virility and demonstrates this quite brilliantly to his partner" (1977, pp. 266-267/631).
Lacan's interpretation of this vignette is more than ordinarily opaque, but the general drift seems to be as follows. The mistress' dream, when reported to the patient, takes the form of a "discourse" that reveals to the patient her own desire both to "have" the phallus and to receive it. Realizing this, the patient is liberated from whatever it was that inhibited him. Fair enough, but how?

We are told that as a child the patient had experienced "the play of destruction exerted by one of his parents [i.e., his mother] on the desire [i.e., the phallus] of the other [i.e., his father]" (1977, p. 265/630). He therefore presumed that it was impossible for anyone "to desire without destroying [i.e., castrating] the Other" (1977, p. 265/630). In the analysis, indeed, the patient comes to see how he is on guard against the destructiveness of his own desire by manipulating the situation "so as to protect the Other" (1977, p. 265/630). Since his mistress represents for him the "castrating mother" (1977, p. 268/633), whose desire presumably will destroy him, i.e., take away his phallus, he is inhibited from responding to her desire out of fear of his own destruction/castration.

What removes this inhibition? The message of the mistress' dream to the effect that she "has a phallus" and therefore "will not have to take it from him" (1977, p. 268/633). In other words, the fear of castration (whether wisely or not, time will tell) is removed. Moreover, "having this phallus [does] not diminish her desire for it [i.e., for his]. And here it is his own want-to-be that [is] touched on" (1977, p. 268/633). For his own deepest want is to be the object of her desire, not simply by having the phallus but by being it for her (1977, p. 268/632)—if that were only possible.

Vignette concluded, Lacan returns to his principal theme: the role of desire in the direction of the treatment. The essential here seems to be to realize that "all the demands that had been articulated in the analysis . . . were merely transferences intended to maintain in place a desire that was unstable or dubious in its problematic" (1977, p. 271/636). Hence, the need to frustrate these demands in order to let the underlying desire show through; hence, too, the importance of analyzing the transference—and Lacan alludes (in highly condensed form) to some of the subtleties involved in such a procedure (1977, p. 270/635).

But the problem of demand has not been exhausted, and after alluding to it in terms of transference, Lacan turns it over again in terms of the formation of symptoms. Symptoms, he recalls from Freud, are "overdetermined," i.e., are attributable to more than one determining factor (1977, p. 271/636). What does that mean in terms of their formation?

We know well enough that for Freud there was an analogy between symptom formation and dreams, insofar as both involve the process of a "wish-fulfillment" (1899, p. 278). Later Freud would speak of the symptom as a formation that establishes a workable compromise between unconscious wish and need for defense (1916-1917, pp. 358-359). According to Lacan's linguistic model, however, we understand that symptoms, like condensation in the dream-work, are structured as metaphors. They thus arise out of a certain "interference" between (i.e., overlapping of) signifiers in the relationship they bear to their respective signifieds. But what of the "wish-fulfillment" character of the symptom? Here we are told that the "wish" in question is essentially a "particular demand." The "interference" that takes place is between the "effects" of this demand within the subject (in the form of signifiers, we presume) and "the effects of a position in relation to the other . . . that he sustains as subject" (1977, p. 272/637), and enacts through an unconscious fantasy. This fantasy, for Lacan, "is defined as an image set to work in the signifying structure" and "is that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing in so far as the very satisfaction of demand hides his object from him" (1977, p. 272/637). The point seems to be that there is an insurmountable tension between the unconscious fantasy promising fulfillment and the articulated demand that intrinsically fragments and displaces desire. Obscure as this is—and we really need the full text of the seminar on which all this is based to un-
understand it—it seems that Lacan here is underlining the role of the other subject in symptom formation. If so, the point is an important one that sorely needs elaboration.

For Lacan, fantasy assumes its role within the possibilities that the language-like structure of the unconscious permits. Thus, it is not to be “reduced” to mere “imagination,” still less to the “irrational,” for its function belongs to that strange realm that Freud referred to as “psychical reality” (1900, p. 620). It is the “existence” of such a realm that Lacan calls Freud’s “discovery,” characterized by the certainty (to put it in Hegelian terms) that “the real is rational” (we understand: “symbolizable through the signifying structures of the symbolic order) and “the rational is real” (we understand: enjoying its own level of “existence” as material aspects of language in dreams, symptoms, fantasies, etc.). Thus, “what presents itself as unreasonable in desire is an effect of the passage of the rational in so far as it is real—that is to say, the passage of language—into the real, in so far as the rational [i.e., the symbolic] has already traced its circumvallation there” (1977, p. 272/637).

However this may be, the fantasy (i.e., image) is to be distinguished from the signification conjoined with it that is structured by the signifying processes of the symbolic order. As indicated above, the signification is determined in part by the other to whom the demand is addressed. When this other, once generalized (hence capitalized as the “Other”), continues to expand until it elides with the very limits of being itself, the subject is forced to become aware of his own insatiable want that shines through any and every specific demand in the guise of desire, always dramatized by fantasy (1977, p. 273/638).

At this point Lacan becomes caught up in a polemic against the “present-day analyst,” which is soon highlighted by the notion of “identification” as it appears in Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921, pp. 105–110). His argument, however, is tortuous to follow, partly because of the sheer opacity of style, partly because of the hidden agenda to which only seminar members are privy, partly because any direct relationship to the problem of taking desire à la lettre is not immediately apparent. The general drift seems to be that it is dangerous for the analyst to encourage a process whereby he becomes a part of the patient’s fantasy by fostering the patient’s identification with his own ego, itself an image. This only results in further alienating the patient from his desire. Happily, Lacan comes out of the underbrush in time to bring the essay to a respectable close.

What is to be said, then, of “the direction of the treatment and the principles of its power”? Lacan enumerates the essentials of his position by noting in conclusion (1977, p. 275/640):

1. The “special powers” of the treatment consist in the power of speech itself.
2. The analyst’s task is not to “direct” the subject toward “full speech,” nor even toward a “coherent discourse,” but rather to help him to be free to attempt such things on his own.
3. Such freedom, however, is not tolerated easily by the subject.
4. The subject’s demands must not be gratified in the analysis—even the demand to be cured—however difficult such a stance may be for the analyst to maintain (1977, p. 276/641).
5. Instead, every effort must be made to help the subject recognize and acknowledge the thrust of his fundamental desire.
6. “Resistance” to this acknowledgment is ultimately attributable to “the incompatibility between desire and speech” (1977, p. 275/640), i.e., (we presume) to the incapacity of speech, always finite, to articulate adequately a desire that inevitably transcends it. Demands are articulable, but the full thrust of desire is not.

In sum, then, to take desire à la lettre is to see it clearly in distinction from both need and demand, and insinuating its way, usually under the guise of an image (fantasy), through the labyrinthine ways of the symbolic order, structured as it is by the “nets of the letter” (1977, p. 276/641), i.e., the laws of language. The consequences of this for the formation of the analyst are clear enough: “Since it is a question of taking desire, and it can only be taken literally [à la lettre], since it is the nets of the letter
that determine, overdetermine, its place as a bird of paradise, how can we fail to require that the birdcatcher be first of all literate \([\text{littéraire}]\) (1977, p. 276/641)? And no one offers us a better example of this than Freud himself.

**Map of the Text\(^1\)**

I. **Who analyses today?**

   A. Analysis is marked by the person of the analyst just as much as by the person of the analysand.

      1. Our concepts about countertransference are inadequate,
         a. especially if we talk of “an emotional re-education of the patient,”
         b. reflecting a loss of principle and an imposture that must be denounced.

      2. The failure to practice authentically results in the exercise of power.

   B. The psychoanalyst assuredly directs the treatment.

      1. But this does not mean directing the patient.
         a. Hence he must carefully avoid anything like the direction of conscience.
      2. Directing the treatment is quite different.
         a. It first entails making the subject use the analytic rule,
            i. which he cannot learn from being in “the analytic situation.”
         b. In explaining it the analyst reveals his own understanding of, and prejudices about, analysis.
            i. and this indicates the ambiguity inherent in the issue of direction.
         c. In this early stage of the treatment we make the patient overlook the fact that he is merely speaking,

\(^1\) As in Chapter 6, our subdivisions A, B, etc., correspond to Lacan’s numbers 1, 2, etc.

C. We will engage our subject from the side of the analyst.

   1. In this common enterprise, not only the patient, but also the analyst pays.
      a. He pays with words transformed to the level of interpretation,
      b. with his person as support for the transference,
      c. with his most intimate judgment as part of an action that goes to the kernel of being.

   2. I am not giving my opponents the right to accuse me of metaphysics,
      a. for they fail to question statements stressing the thesis that the analyst cures by what he is.
      b. But what is “being” doing here?

D. In cross-examining the analyst again, we see that he is less sure of his action the more he is caught up in his being.

   1. In interpreting what is presented to him in words and deeds, the analyst is his own oracle and articulates what he pleases.
      a. Well aware that he cannot measure the whole effect of his words,
         i. the analyst strives to parry their effect
         ii. by being always free in the timing, frequency, and choice of his interpretations.

   In the transference the analyst's freedom is placed outside of himself by the duplication to which he is subjected.

   1. Here lies the secret of analysis, for we must go beyond seeing it as a relation of two persons.

   2. Such a situation is conceived as one in which a “weak” ego is trained by a “strong” ego,
      a. despite avowals of a “cure from within,”
         i. for the subject's assent is forced.
3. In experiencing the transference every analyst must wonder at the least expected effects,
   a. although he is not responsible for them, as Freud stressed their spontaneity.
4. But today’s analysts think Freud fled from the commitment implied by the situation,
   a. and they throw countertransference feelings about to balance the transference.
5. The analyst’s silence is not the strategy of a poker player,
   a. for by it he introduces the dummy (le mort),
      i. and thereby the game becomes a four-handed game of bridge.
   b. The fourth player is the analysand’s unconscious, whose hand the analyst will try to force.
   c. But it matters where the analyst places himself, for his feelings have only one place—that of the dummy.

F. The analyst should take his bearings, not from his being, but from his want-to-be (manque à être),
1. or else he will fail to understand his action on the patient in its four-sidedness.
2. Today’s analysts presume a relation to reality,
   a. and measure the patient’s deviations from it in the authoritarian way educators have always done.
   b. They maintain this relation by relying on didactic analysis at a price,
      i. without realizing that their own responses to the problems of humanity addressed to them are sometimes parochial,
      ii. while making light of their own experience by claiming that analysis provides a simple means for “measuring up to reality.”
3. This precarious notion is propped up by the American concept of “the autonomous ego”:
   a. as a standard to measure the real;
   b. as an organization of disparate functions that buttress a sentiment of inferiority;
   c. as autonomous because sheltered from conflict.
   d. But it solves the problem of the analyst’s being
      i. by offering a team of unequal egos to guide the Americans on their way to happiness.

G. If the analyst dealt only with resistances, he would be cautious with interpretation.
1. For his interpretation will be heard as spoken by a transference-figure.
   a. This can be useful if the analyst interprets this effect;
      i. otherwise it amounts to mere suggestion.
   b. The analyst reassures himself by relying on his ego and his own sense of reality,
      i. and thus enters an aggressive relationship between an “I” and a “me” with his patient.
3. To those who thus recast analysis, I ask: “Who is the analyst?”
   a. “He who interprets, profiting from the transference?”
   b. “He who analyses it as resistance?”
   c. “Or he who imposes his idea of reality?”
   d. This troublesome question leads to another: “Who is speaking?”
      i. Bluntly answered: the ego (moi).
II. What is the place of interpretation?

A. I have not replied to all the novice's questions, but have assembled the current problems involving the direction of the treatment.

1. In speaking of the lesser place held by interpretation in contemporary psychoanalysis, we always approach its meaning with embarrassment, witnessed by authors' efforts to detach it from every other mode of verbal intervention.

B. Some kind of transformation in the subject is being evaded here,

1. which escapes thought as soon as it becomes fact.
   a. No criterion suffices to show where interpretation acts, unless one radically admits a notion of the function of the signifier,
      i. which allows us to see how words affect the subject.

2. Interpretation makes it possible to translate the signifiers of unconscious repetitions.
   a. This in turn is made possible by the function of the Other, in relation to which the missing element appears.

3. The signifier's importance in situating analytic truth appears highlighted by its absence in Glover,
   a. who finds interpretation everywhere, even in a medical prescription,
   b. and who, perhaps unknowingly, says the formation of the symptom is an inexact interpretation on the subject's part.

C. Interpretation produces something new through the different ways the signifier brings about the emergence of the signified.

1. Interpretation is not based on any assumption of divine archetypes,
   a. but on the fact that the unconscious has the radical structure of a language,
F. In this perspective, the transference serves as the analyst's security.

1. Delaying interpretation until the transference is formed, he now interprets to reduce the transference, and the field of combat becomes an assumed relation to reality.
2. Thus interpreting the transference is reabsorbed into a “working through,” and becomes a mode of revenge for the analyst's earlier timidity.
3. The analyst now pressures the patient with insistence in the name of strengthening his ego.

G. Freud follows an inverse order,
1. by first determining the patient's position in reality.
2. Hegel's procedure shows the reversal of positions between the belle âme and the reality it accuses.
   a. The question is not one of adapting to reality,
   b. but of showing that the ego is implicated in constructing reality.
   c. The path ends here, for the transference shows that something other is at stake than the relations between the ego and the world.
3. Freud immediately realized that the principle of his power lay in the transference.
   a. In this respect it did not differ greatly from suggestion.
   b. Yet this power offered a solution to the problem only if he did not exercise it,
      i. for only then could it develop fully as transference.
   c. From that moment he no longer addresses the one he holds in his proximity.
4. Popularization has robbed of its boldness Freud's conception of interpretation.

a. In his exposure of a drive (different from instinct), we fail to see that the drive implies the advent of a signifier.

H. Pardon me if I must cite well-known examples rather than my own cases in order to preserve anonymity.
1. The Rat Man is not cited as a case cured by Freud,
   a. for his analysis is not unconnected with his tragic death.
2. Freud made his fundamental discoveries about obsessional neurosis in the context of a direction of the treatment,
   a. which has the following order:
      i. an initial righting of the subject's relations with the real,
      ii. the development of the transference,
      iii. interpretation.
   b. In reversing this order, have we lost Freud's horizon?

I. The ritualization of Freud's discoveries reveals a basic confusion.
1. A case from Schmideberg and Kris will serve as an example.
   a. Here the concern about plagiarizing was checked against evidence and interpreted in terms of the patient's wanting to plagiarize as a defense against being a plagiarist.
      i. This interpretation is erroneous because it assumes that defense and drive are from the same world.
   b. Instead, what is important is that the patient steals nothing:
      i. for having an idea of his own never occurs to him;
ii. here “fresh brains” functions as metonymy, suggesting a diagnosis of “anorexia mentale,”
iii. since the patient refuses the intellectual rivalry common to his father and grandfather.

2. There is thus nothing in common between Kris’s progress down from the surface and the subject’s progress.
a. There is no topographic priority in Freud’s method.
b. Freud sets out to right the subject by using the subject’s words.
i. Therefore, it is erroneous to appeal to “objective” evidence about plagiarizing (which, in any case, is always a relative matter).
c. The idea that what is on the surface is superficial is dangerous.
i. For another topology is needed to avoid being misled as to the place of desire.

III. Where have we got with the transference?
A. We turn to Lagache’s account of the work on transference.
1. He introduces structural distinctions essential for the critique of its function,
a. such as his distinction “between the need for repetition and the repetition of need.”
b. Such work indicates to what extent only partial aspects are discussed.
c. It shows, too, to what extent the ordinary use of “transference” is tied to vulgarity,
i. as when it means the enumeration of the patient’s positive or negative feelings for the analyst.
2. On the question of where we are with the transference, neither agreement nor illumination exists in our scientific community,
a. regarding the effect of the relation to the analyst on early infatuation and on the transference neurosis.

b. These ambiguities persist because the technical diversions urging revisions of the transference leave no room for a true critique.

B. The notion of transference is so central to the analytic action that it serves as a measure for the partiality of three established views:
1. that is, we judge these theories by how they handle the transference.
2. As a group these theories fail to complement one another, confirming the impression that they suffer from a central defect.

C. The first, geneticism, generally grounds analytic phenomena in developmental stages.
1. It is linked to a technique focused on the analysis of defenses.
a. This link is based only on a historical point of view.
2. Its beginnings lie in Freud’s notion of an unconscious ego,
a. with the mechanisms of defense grouped under its function.
b. Anna Freud tried to insert them into the stages of sensorimotor and intellectual development.
i. But nothing emerged from this that shed light on technique.

D. More prominent is the second theory, that of object relations.
1. It has its origin in Abraham’s concept of the part-object,
a. which is linked to the partial aspect that he detached from the transference,
i. and which he transformed into terms of the ability to love.
2. There are two equations here.
a. Sexual transference is at the foundation of object love.
b. Transference capability is the index of the patient's relation to the real.
   i. But "this merely begs the question."
3. In this view the image of a maturing object operates as an instinctual final cause.
4. Such a view leads to a dichotomy between pregenital and genital character structure,
a. which makes the pregenital character the sum of all kinds of object-relations defects,
b. while a simplistic notion governs the movement from pregenital to genital character.
c. But this does not keep the ego from remaining independent of its objects.

E. If the collector's activity demonstrates the object relation, perhaps the rule is found not in this dichotomy but in some impasse constitutive of desire.
1. The form of the fragmented object is not necessarily a pathological factor.
2. What does the "absurd hymn" to the genital have to do with the real?
a. How can we forget that Freud forged the oedipal drama to explain the barriers common to love?
b. The sublime in sublimation should not be confused with the perfect orgasm.
c. Souls tender by nature are now burdened with coping with the delirious "normality" of the genital relation.
d. The uninformed reader might think our art was employed to treat sexual retardation.
   i. Yet we have made no contribution to the physiology of sex, nor was there much to learn.
F. The third theory is that of introjection established in a dual relation.
1. This kind of relation is also called identification with the analyst's superego or terminal narcissistic trance.
   a. The fantasy of phallic devouring tallies with a conception of treatment as a dual relation.
   b. This illustrates the special place of the phallus in signifying desire,
      i. but in an experience that is blind and without direction.
2. Given a misunderstanding of symbolic incorporation, nothing but the imaginary is recognized in analysis,
a. for any sort of real consummation is excluded.
b. In limiting oneself to an imaginary relation between two objects, one leaves only the dimension of distance to structure it.
   i. This leads to insurmountable contradictions about how much is too far or too close,
      (a) resulting in an obsession about rapprochement.
   ii. Distance then regulates all technical parameters.

G. Misconceptions have eroded analytic practice.
1. We have heard of such wild analyses that an index of transference resolution was found in the ability to smell one's analyst.
a. The latter is a consequence of carrying over the development of the analytic situation into the real.
   i. For smell is the only dimension in which one can reduce the distance between two objects to zero,
   ii. although odors can be useful, as an example suggests.
2. In the example, the fantasy of the phallic mother took the form of a phobia and then was transposed into a perversion.
a. In harassing the patient toward the real situation, the analyst was situated in the permanence of a castrating intervention.
b. This raises the question of a boundary between analysis and reeducation when the process is guided predominantly by an eliciting of real effects.

H. My intention is not to deprecate this work,
1. but to warn analysts that their technique will decline if they do not recognize the true location of its effects.
   a. They do not flag in trying to define that place, and their experience is not always fruitless.
      i. Genetic research, direct observation, and object relations are relevant.
      ii. Specifically, the notion of the transitional object has an explanatory role in the genesis of fetishism.
2. As analysts fail to grasp their action in its authenticity, they end up making it an exercise of power.

IV. How to act with one's being.
A. The question of the analyst's being arose early in the history of analysis.
1. It was introduced by Ferenczi in 1909.
   a. He saw transference as introjection of the analyst, no longer as support for a repetition compulsion, maladaptive behavior, or fantasy,
   ii. but as a taking in of all that the analyst makes present in the here-and-now dyad,
   iii. arriving at the extreme conclusion that the completion of the analysis is reached only when the doctor tells the patient of his own feeling of abandonment.
B. Is this the price one must pay for seeing the subject's want-to-be as the key to the analytic experience?
1. With the exception of the Hungarians, only the British have described the patient's gaping abyss.
2. Ella Sharpe reveals the neurotic's true concerns.
   a. Her reading list abounds in works that give a central place to the veiled phallus as signifier.

C. Again, the British have most rigorously defined the completion of analysis by the subject's identifying with the analyst.
1. Whether this be with his ego or superego is unclear.
   a. It helps to master Freud's structure of the subject by distinguishing the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real.
2. Melanie Klein's dialectic of fantasy objects is in a theory based on identification with these objects.

D. To help the troubled patient it seems the analyst should be free of pathology.
1. Thus one imagines that the psychoanalyst should be a happy man, since it is happiness that one asks from him.
   a. We do not refuse to promise happiness in a time when its extent has become complicated by politics.
      i. But the progress of humanism hasn't solved the puzzles of happiness either.
2. The analyst has to grasp his operating level in the relationship to being.
   a. What his training analysis offers to this end is not to be calculated as just a function of the problem his analyst has resolved.
      i. There is a kind of unhappiness that goes along with being that should not be eliminated by schools and false shame.
   b. An ethic remains to be formulated to integrate the Freudian conquests over desire,
      i. so that the question of the analyst's desire would be highlighted.

E. Decadence marks analytic speculation.
1. Because they understand a pile of things, analysts imagine understanding as an end in itself and "a happy end."
a. But the physical sciences show that the greatest successes don't imply that “one knows where one is going.”

b. It is frequently better not to understand in order to think.
   i. And one can travel a great distance in understanding without the least thought resulting.
   ii. Thus the behaviorists renounced understanding but used what we understand without understanding it.

2. The notion of oblativity gives a sample of our thought in the area of morality.
   a. But this is the uncomprehended fantasy of an obsessional,
      i. where all is offered for the other, my counterpart,
      ii. without recognizing there the anxiety the Other inspires by not being my counterpart.

F. We do not pretend to teach psychoanalysts to think.
   1. They learned this from psychologists,
      a. and repeat that thought as an attempt at action.
      b. Freud partakes of this too, although he is a bold thinker
         i. whose action completes itself in thought.
   G. What does it mean to say the analyst is the person to whom one speaks freely?
      1. All that one can say regarding the association of ideas is psychologistic dressing.
         a. In what he says in analysis the subject does not show much liberty,
            i. because his associations open on to a full word that is painful for him.
      2. There is nothing more fearful than saying what might be true,
         a. for if true it would become so absolutely.
            i. And God knows what occurs when doubt is no longer possible.

b. Is progress toward truth the procedure in analysis?
   i. Although accused of intellectualization, I try to preserve the unspeakable in analysis.

3. That the unspeakable is beyond the discourse that our hearing accommodates is clear to me,
   a. provided I take the path of listening and not of sounding,
      i. certainly not of tapping the resistance, tension, and discharge in which is re-formed a stronger ego.
   b. Listening does not force me to understand.
      i. What I listen to is always a discourse, even when it is an interjection.
   c. What I listen to without doubt I find no fault with.
      i. If I understand none of it, or if I understand something, I am sure to deceive myself.
      ii. Because I keep silent I frustrate both speakers.

4. If I frustrate the analysand, it is because he is asking something of me—to respond.
   a. But he knows this would just be words, and he can get these from anyone.
   b. He's not even sure he'd be thankful for good words, still less bad ones.
   c. To be sure, his asking appears on the field of an implicit demand:
      i. that he be healed, that he be revealed to himself, that he become an analyst.

H. The patient's demand is a radical one.
   1. Macalpine rightly seeks in the analytic rule alone the motive force for transference.
   2. Asking serves as an intermediary to open the past all the way to early infancy,
      a. for the subject could not have survived without asking.
3. By this path analytic regression occurs—
a. not that the subject makes himself a child, for
   this is not the usual regression.
b. Regression is the return to the present of signifiers
   used in prescribed demands.

I. This is how we understand the love declared in pri-
   mary transference.
   1. For the lover gives what he does not have,
      a. and the analyst does not even bestow this noth-
         ing.
   2. The primary transference is often a shadow,
      a. but this shadow dreams and reproduces its re-
         quest,
         i. even when there is nothing left to request.
   3. Some say the analyst gives his presence,
      a. but this is implied by his hearing
         i. which "is simply the condition of speech."
      b. His presence will be noted later,
         i. most acutely when the subject can only stay
            silent in the face of the shadow of asking.
   c. Thus the analyst is the one who carries the asking
      i. not to frustrate the subject
      ii. but so that the signifiers which retain his
          frustration may reappear.

J. Therefore it is proper to recall that the primary identifi-
   cation is produced in the oldest asking,
   1. elicited by the omnipotent role of the mother
      a. in such a way that need satisfaction now hangs
         on the signifying chain,
         i. which fragments and filters it through the
            signifying network.
   2. In this way needs become subject to the same condi-
      tions as language:
      a. the synchronic register, as opposition between
         irreducible elements;
      b. the diachronic register of substitution and com-
         bination.

c. By these means language structures interhuman
   relations entirely.

3. Thus we see Freud vacillate about the relations be-
   tween the superego and reality.
   a. The superego does not ground reality,
      i. but it traces its paths.

K. We need look no further for the source of identification
   with the analyst.
   1. It is always an identification with signifiers.
   2. Analysts interested in frustration only maintain a
      stance of suggestion,
      a. which "reduces" the subject to restate his request.
      b. This surely is how emotional reeducation is to be
         understood.
   3. People conceive analysis in a way that reduces the
      basis of symptoms to fear and of treatment to sug-
      gestion.

V. Desire must be taken literally.
A. In the dream Freud recognized desire, not drives,
   1. even in the dream presented to disprove that the
      dream is an expression of a desire.
      a. In that dream the desire for caviar signifies the
         desire to have an unsatisfied desire,
      b. and the desire for smoked salmon is substituted
         for the desire for caviar.

B. The dream reveals a structure common to so-called
   unconscious mechanisms,
   1. in which desire is unconsciously marked by lan-
      guage.
      a. We are dealing with the opposition between sig-
         nifier and signified, where the powers of lan-
         guage begin,
         i. whose laws are those of substitution (meta-
            phor) and combination (metonymy).
      b. In this dream, substitution of salmon for caviar
         is a metaphor of desire.
c. The desire for caviar is a metonymy, concealing the desire for an unsatisfied desire.

C. Freud's work on dreams is not a psychology.
1. His interest lies only in the elaboration, the linguistic structure of the dream, which he discovers in a signifying flow that is not organized by the subject, since as desirer he is subject to it.

D. The dream is created for the recognition of desire through interpretation.
1. The desire for recognition stimulates the dream's elaboration.
   a. But such recognition does not come during sleep, and when the dream is equivalent to conscious demand, I awake.

E. Those who dismiss the dream have found more direct ways to lead the patient to "normal desires"; the patient with thwarted needs responds negatively, or else symptoms reappear—repetition compulsion, we say.

F. One even reads that the ego produces the dream, thus showing how important it is to go back to Freud.
   a. The desire of his hysteric for caviar is the desire for gratuitous, unsatisfied needs; she has everything, but satisfaction of real needs is not enough for her.

G. Freud provides a key with his passing remark about hysterical identification, by means of which the dreamer identifies with her friend.
   a. Her friend had requested to dine with the dreamer and her husband.
   b. But the dreamer also desires to thwart her friend's desire as well as her husband's interest in her friend.
   a. Thus her desire is to have (by identification) an unsatisfied desire.

H. The woman now identifies herself with the man as the object of his desire.
1. and the salmon stands for this desire of the Other.
   a. But since the salmon is inadequate, the dreamer must give up the search for her desire.
   b. Psychoanalysts also give up on desire, reducing it to a demand.
   c. But the salmon remains as a metaphor for the phallus.
      i. The phallus as signifier provides the ultimate identification with the desire of the Other.
      ii. This is as far as Freud got, i.e., to the castration complex and penis envy.

I. Desire appears in the interval that demand carves on this side of itself.
1. insofar as the articulating subject makes the want-to-be appear in his appeal to the Other.
   a. who is asked to give what he himself lacks, namely, what is called love—or he can respond with hate or ignorance.
      i. These feelings are evoked by any demand insofar as it goes beyond need.
      ii. But the subject is deprived of love insofar as the need articulated in his demand is satisfied.

2. The satisfaction of need crushes the demand for love,
   a. forcing it to be expressed in dreams where being speaks in the subject.

J. The child is disturbed when the Other (mother) confuses its needs with her ministrations.
1. Thus the child fed most with love is the one who refuses food.
   a. His rejection of her demand indicates that she requires a desire outside him.

K. Thus we state a principle:
1. Desire is an effect of discourse that passes needs through the defiles of the signifier,
2. and the Other is the locus (as the other scene) of the deployment of speech:
   a. therefore “man’s desire is the desire of the Other.”
3. Signifiers structure those representing the Other, too, as having a gap.
   a. The conscious speaker is other than the discourse of the Other which structures the dream and masks desire.
L. Desire appears both beyond and on this side of demand.
1. As needs are articulated they are pruned from the subject’s life.
   a. Demand highlights the subject’s lack of being, under the forms of love, hate, and ignorance.
2. Desire is less than the negation contained in discourse;
   a. it is a furrow, a mark created by language, originating in symbolic castration.
M. The function of the signifier of the phallus is the key to completing analysis.
1. The case of an impotent obsessional illustrates this.
   a. Its key lies in his partner’s dream,
      i. which shows her having a phallus but wanting it too,
      ii. thus allowing him to feel safe from castration and to be the phallus for her.
N. We should orient the place of desire in directing the treatment by reference to the effects of demand.
1. People today see just these effects as the power of the treatment.
   a. We do not give in to the patient’s demand for intercourse,
      i. since the genital act has its place in the unconscious articulation of desire.
      ii. Why then do we treat other demands differently?
2. The subject’s demand originates in the Other as the locus of speech and is first of all a message to himself.
   a. Spontaneous speech has a double meaning, concealing the subject’s desire
   b. and showing how the subject is split by language.
3. Regression in analysis concerns only the signifiers of demand.
   a. By reducing these signifiers to drives or needs we only appear to reduce desire.
   b. Identification with the other (the patient with the analyst) is also a form of regression.
4. In one’s training analysis it must be seen that all demands were merely transferences maintaining a desire.
   a. This is necessary for assuming the direction of an analysis.
   b. To maintain this framework of the transference, frustration is required.
   c. The subject’s resistance to suggestion is his desire keeping the analysis on the right track.
O. Symptoms, like dreams and parapraxes, are overdetermined.
1. This is possible only in a linguistic framework.
2. Unconscious fantasy “is defined as an image set to work in the signifying structure.”
   a. Fantasy supports the subject on the plane of his vanishing desire.
   b. This allowed Freud to confirm Hegel’s “the rational is real and the real is rational.”
P. The neurotic’s position on desire marks his response to demand.
1. In his fantasy his demand becomes absolute.
   a. The relation between unconscious fantasy and action awaits illumination by analysis.
2. For the analyst of today the transference is defined by the distance between the fantasy and the adaptive response.
   a. But the norm for adaptation is the analyst's demands.
Q. Thus the patient of the contemporary analyst ends up with a purely imaginary identification.
1. The appeal for love is to be distinguished from Freud's third mode of identification,
   a. in which the object is indifferent.
   b. But as object of incorporation the analyst can hardly be indifferent.
2. The patient is further alienated by identifying with the analyst's strong ego.
R. The cunning principle of power is "the power to do good."
   1. But here it is only a question of truth, not power.
   2. The direction of the treatment relies on the means of speech, the subject's freedom, and the incompatibility between desire and speech.
3. The analyst is tempted to respond to demand,
   a. especially the demand to cure,
   b. but instead must utilize silence and the allusive power of interpretation.
S. Since desire must be taken literally, the analyst must first of all be literate.
   1. Freud's own literary style must be studied,
      a. for it reveals his desire
         i. as he fearlessly faced life's one meaning, "that in which desire is borne by death."
         ii. He unveiled the signifier of desire: the phallus, whose symbolic castration splits the subject.

Notes to the Text

The four-sidedness or fourfold division (écartelé, "quartered") appears to continue the bridge game metaphor and suggests that the analyst's action on the patient must always be viewed in the context of the ego/subject distinction proper to each of them (we recall Lacan's earlier statement about the "game for four players" [1977, p. 139d-e/429]).

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) founded the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig (1879) and made scientific introspection into a methodology.

The subject imputes being to the analyst, thus making him more than he is, and enabling his interpretive words to return to the place of the Other of the transference, from where it affects subsequent responses of the ego/subject pair engaged in analysis.

The word "place" recurs now in a series of statements beginning with whether the analyst places himself on the right or the left of the patient (1977, p. 230a/589). The analyst is forced to count on the intelligences that must be in the place (la place) dubbed on occasion the healthy part of the ego (p. 232a/591). Section II begins with the question, "What is the place [la place] of interpretation?" (p. 232/592) and goes on to speak of the less important place (la moindre place) held by interpretation in current psychoanalysis (p. 232/592). In his note 9 to the text (of p. 234b) Lacan speaks of the essential function of place (de la place) in the structure of the signifier (p. 280e/594). He speaks of the necessity for another kind of topology if we are not to be misled regarding the place (la place) of desire (p. 240h/601). All appear to do with his notion of the topological structure of the subject, ego, and signification, which awaits further elaboration.
the issue of castration in which his being is in question. Lacan later explicitly discusses having versus being the phallus (p. 268b/632) and want-to-be in relation to castration (p. 268e/633).

231i/591 The aggressivity of the “I and me” relationship recalls the permanent war of “you or me” of the dual relation of ego to ego (1977, p. 138d/428).

232b/591 The “Q.E.D.” translates “C.Q.N.R.P.D.” (ce qui nous ramène au problème du départ, or “that which brings us back to our original problem”).

232e/592 The impersonal, pseudo-universal answer given by the impatient (“an animal of our species”) to the question, “Who is speaking?” is less honest (if less annoying) than the answer: the ego (tautological in that ego speaks to ego in this kind of analytic relation).

232i/592 Devereux (the author in question, cited in Lacan’s footnote) uses gestalt concepts in speaking of the patient’s experience as comparable to jigsaw puzzle fragments that begin to suggest a pattern that gradually seeks closure; interpretation provides this closure.

233c/593 Unconscious repetitions are diachronic insofar as they are uniquely structured in the history of the individual; the signifiers that compose their interpretation are drawn from the preexisting synchronic structure of language. It is in the presence of the Other, in the recesses of the structure of language (made present in the unconscious dimension opened by the analyst’s silence), that there emerges the missing element rendering possible a translation of the symptom.

233e/593 Phlogiston was the hypothetical physicochemical principle of combustion, regarded in the eighteenth century as a material substance present in combustible objects. The theory was refuted by Lavoisier.

233f/593 Jakob Boehme (1575–1624) was a German mystic (influenced by Paracelsus), one of whose major works is De Signatura Rerum (Signature of All Things [1651]).

234d/595 The translation should read: “Interpretation becomes here an exigency of the weakness to which we must offer help” (“L’interprétation devient ici une exigence de la faiblesse à laquelle il nous faut venir en aide”).

236b/597 The belle âme projects internal conflict onto the world and then proceeds to denounce it. Lacan earlier wrote: “The moi, the ego, of modern man, as I have indicated elsewhere, has taken on its form in the dialectical impasse of the belle âme who does not recognize his very own raison d’être in the disorder that he denounces in the world” (1977, p. 70d/281).

236d/597 The translation should read, “it is the face of Tiresias with which we question ourselves before the ambiguity in which his verdict operates” (c’est la figure de Tiresias dont nous nous interrogeons devant l’ambiguïté où opère son verdict). The reference to Tiresias, the blind seer in Oedipus Rex, suggests the inevitable revelation of the oedipal structure (and thus the symbolic order) in which we are all participants. Tiresias was blinded by Athena after he saw her bathing, but he was then given the gift of prophecy.

237e/598 Lacan earlier commented on how Freud’s epitaph elevated the case to the beauty of tragedy (1977, p. 89d/303).

237f/598 Instead of the English “that Freud made the fundamental discoveries,” the French text reads “that is situated the horizon where the fundamental discoveries gave themselves up to Freud” (“que se situe l’horizon où à Freud se sont livrées les découvertes fondamentales”).

239b/599 To translate cerelles fraîches by “cold brains” rather than “fresh brains” is to lose some of the metonymy’s vigor: the patient wanted fresh—i.e., new—brains to compensate for his anorexia mentale.

239e/600 Rather than “in the very relation that it makes of it,”
which is obscure, we translate “in the very report that he makes of it” (dans le rapport même qu’il en fait).

239/600 The Jakobson reference (1956) was discussed earlier (see note 148b). Lacan puns on cervelle fraîche and rafraîchir.


240c-d/601 The familiar anorexic patients appear to be the referents of “the thin virgins” with “[t]heir symbolically motivated refusal.”

241c/602 The triad of frustration, aggression, and regression appeared earlier in the “Discourse at Rome” (1977, p. 41ff./429).

243a/604 The Kris paper (discussed just now by Lacan, pp. 238ff./599ff.) has a footnote near the end of the presentation of the case of the plagiarist in which Bibring’s approach is described as singling out “a patient’s present patterns of behavior and arriving, by way of a large number of intermediate patterns, at the original infantile pattern” (1951, p. 24). On the following page Kris titles a new section of his paper, “Planning and Intuition.” Criteria for success, beyond mention of the patient’s publishing and finding satisfaction in his home life and career, are not discussed. Those listed by Lacan are typical of his American critique.

243d/605 The relation between “object” and “reality” is assumed.

243e/605 Geneticism is based on an order of formal changes emerging in the subject, while the object relations position is based on formal changes in the object.

244g/606 We may try to understand this phrase in the following way: to put oneself in the limelight, to expose one’s private parts by bragging and spelling out this “parade” of genital satisfaction.

245/606 In the paper cited by Lacan, Abraham (1908) writes:

The excessive value [the collector] places on the object he collects corresponds completely to the lover’s overestimation of his sexual object. A passion for collecting is frequently a direct surrogate for a sexual desire; and in that case a delicate symbolism is often concealed behind the choice of objects collected. A bachelor’s keenness for collecting often diminishes after he has married; and it is well known that interest in collecting varies in different periods of life [p. 67].

Such variation is incompatible with the fixity of the pregenital-genital antinomy.

245g/607 The translation might better read “delirious normality” (normalisme délirant) rather than “delusional normality.”

246e/608 Again, the translation should read “the wrong route effectively practiced” (la fausse-route effectivement pratiquée).

246f/608 We read the French du signifiant phallus as two nouns of apposition, “of the signifier-phallus” rather than “of the signifying phallus.” Speech is crushed in the dual relation because, as an essentially imaginary relation, it excludes the Other (the symbolic order and the signifying network).

246h/608 Lacan appears to be saying that in the dual-relation model of analysis the objects are related to one another only in the imaginary order, as image to image, and this kind of relating is essentially a spatial one. He describes this somewhat in a later seminar:

Vision is ordered according to a mode that may generally be called the function of images. This function is defined by a point-by-point correspondence of two unities in space. Whatever optical intermediaries may be used to establish
their relation, whether their image is virtual, or real, the point-by-point correspondence is essential. That which is of the mode of the image in the field of vision is therefore reducible to the simple schema that enables us to establish anamorphosis, that is to say, to the relation of an image, in so far as it is linked to a surface, with a certain point that we shall call the ‘geometrical’ point. Anything that is determined by this method, in which the straight line plays its role of being the path of light, can be called an image [1964, p. 86].

Rather than “double-Dutch,” an easier translation for chinois is “involted.”

Alfred Jarry (1873–1907) was a French author of farces, surrealistic verses, and scatological stories.

The exhibitionism underlying the patient’s anxiety at being teased for his height is incorrectly seen as inverted in the voyeurism, and this has implications for (not “to”) the diagnosis (impliquée . . . au diagnostic).

Alas, we who have not been Lacan’s pupils can only guess at his meaning here: the phobic object appears in order to take the place of, or make up for (supplier), the lack in the Other insofar as this lack means the Other cannot fill the lack in oneself. By avoiding the phobic object this lack is never faced; but the phobic object’s general presence (to be avoided) continually signifies the substitution (metaphorically) of the phobic object for the lack. The fetish is an object (metonymically) perceived in the place of castration instead of the absent phallus.

André Breton (1896–1966) was the founder of the surrealist movement and the first in France to publicize the work of Freud. Lacan was one of his numerous well-known friends, and he apparently had a significant influence on Lacan’s thought and style. See Anna Balakian (1971).

In his “Introduction au discours sur le peu de réalité” (1924), Breton imagines donning a suit of armor in order to discover a little of the consciousness of a fourteenth-century man. He then writes:

O eternal theatre, you require, not only in order to play the role of another, but even to suggest this role, that we disguise ourselves with its likeness, that the mirror before which we pose return us to a foreign image of ourselves. The imagination has every power, except that of identifying ourselves despite our appearance to a character other than ourselves [pp. 8–9; our translation].

In the section “Colloquy of Armours” the question is put: “Can a being be present to a being?” (p. 10). Later Breton reflects:

The duly established prior existence of this bouquet which I am going to inhale or this catalogue which I am perusing ought to be sufficient for me: alas, it is not. It is necessary that I reassure myself about its reality, as we say, that I make contact with it [p. 11; our translation].

Reflecting later on language, he writes:

Words are subject to grouping themselves according to particular affinities, which generally have the effect of re-creating at each instant the world according to its ancient model. Everything happens in that case as if a concrete reality existed outside the individual, as if this reality were unchangeable . . . . The mediocrity of our universe, doesn’t it depend essentially on our power of enunciation? [pp. 21–22; our translation].
In the *Georgics* (I, 146) Vergil wrote: *Labor omnia vincit improbus* (*Indomitable labor conquers all*). *Improbuss* has the sense of restless persistence. Vergil also used *improbuss* to refer to “bold Aeneas.”

The true place is the symbolic order.

It is not “the relation to the being” but “the relation to being” (*la relation à l'être*) that is at stake. Also, the discourse, rather than informing, “rules there” (*qui y règne*).

In his article Ferenczi (1909) writes:

The practical significance and the exceptional position of the kind of introjections that have as their object the person of the physician, and which are discovered in analysis, make it desirable that the term “transferences” given to them by Freud be retained. The designation “introjection” would be applicable for all other cases of the same psychical mechanism [p. 53, fn. 14].

Ferenczi does, however, support a linguistic reading of the unconscious:

The fact that a transference on the ground of such petty analogies strikes us as ridiculous reminds me that Freud in a category of wit showed the “presentation by means of a detail” to be the agent that sets free the pleasure, i.e., reinforces it from the unconscious; in all dreams also we find similar allusions to things, persons, and events by the help of minimal details. The poetical figure “pars pro toto” is thus quite current in the language of the unconscious [pp. 42-43].

This of course describes the process of displacement or metonymy (more specifically, synecdoche).

Louis de Saint-Just (1767–1794) was a political leader of the French Revolution and ideologue of the perfect state based on Spartan rigor. He was executed by guillotine.

In the Schreber paper Lacan contrasts *physi* as object of science “in its ever purer mathematization” with *antiphysis*, “the living apparatus that one hopes is capable of measuring the said physis” (1977, p. 179/531).

In the paper on aggressivity Lacan noted the use behaviorists make “of categories introduced into psychology by psychoanalysis” (1977, p. 9/102).

The word “doughty” is used to translate *rude*; “fierce” or “rugged” would do as well.

Full speech is *pénible* (“laborious”) for the subject; see the earlier discussion of empty versus full speech (1977, pp. 45–46/254).

The “unsayable aspect” of analysis admits of several interpretations. One is the radical disparity between the articulation of demands made to another and the underlying desire that can never be adequately expressed in words: that is, the gap that splits the subject because he speaks, making the simple satisfaction of needs no longer possible because the satisfaction becomes mediated by the Other in demands.

The distinctions (made more precisely in the French) are between listening (*notre écoute*) of which auscultation is a form (as the act of perceiving sounds which arise within organs of the body), and hearing (*entendement*), which ordinarily implies understanding (although it does not necessarily follow hearing). The word “opisthotonos” refers to a spasm in which the trunk is arched with the head and posterior bent back. Lacan appears to be criticizing the approach of Wilhelm Reich, especially as presented in his *Character Analysis* (1933).

Only the subject is transitive perhaps in the sense
that the subject intends certain goals and demands certain objects. The French words *demander* and *la demande* have been translated into English as “demand,” and we have followed this translation for the sake of consistency. It should be noted, however, that the words usually carry the less imperative meaning “request” or “ask for.”

255a/618 The word “prescription” can be read in several ways, as referring to the regulation or ritualization of demands (or of needs articulated in requests), or as referring to requests which have been already inscribed in the unconscious (in the sense of prescribed).

255b/618 The primary transference may refer to the early stage of infatuation in the transference mentioned earlier (1977, p. 241/602). Michael Balint (to whom Lacan refers frequently in the *Écrits*) describes primary transference in terms of “pregenital” or “primary object-love” leading to both love and hate (1951, p. 154).

257a/620 For “damp squib” the French text has “wet firecracker” (*pétard mouillé*).

257/621 Lacan here begins to structure the dream analysis in terms of “the laws” of substitution (metaphor) and of combination (metonymy), which he will soon get to (on the following page). Here he distinguishes two registers: one in which “a desire [is] signified by a desire,” as, for example, “the desire to have an unsatisfied desire is signified by [the] desire for caviar”—this is the register of metonymy or displacement; in the other register, “one desire [is] substituted for another,” as, for example, the desire for smoked salmon substitutes for the desire for caviar—this is metaphor.

258b/621 The “mark of language” anticipates the later phrase, “the mark of the iron of the signifier on the shoulder of the speaking subject” (1977, p. 265/629).

The focus here appears to be on the resistance of “the bar” separating signifier and signified (1977, pp. 149, 152/497, 500), which Lacan takes up in the very next paragraph. The “bar” as language’s “mark” specifies the Freudian unconscious by instituting the primary repression that follows upon symbolic castration, that is, the impossibility of being the phallus if one is to enter the symbolic order and be subject to the law of the Father. The phallus as signifier of desire becomes a kind of ultimate signified that slides under all discourse expressive of desire. The following essay, “The Significance of the Phallus” (Chapter 8), develops the links between the phallus as signifier, the mark of the signifier, and the bar.

258f/622 This difficult sentence may have an obvious sense: metaphor, as the substitution of one signifier for another (which then becomes the signified of the first), indicates the movement of the subject (not “from the subject” [*sujet]*) to a new meaning of desire, a new direction (sens) taken by the signifier.

259/622 The desire for caviar becomes the metonymy of the desire for an unsatisfied desire by association with the dreamer’s words to her husband, begging him not to give her a caviar sandwich every morning, allegedly so that she could continue teasing him about it. The “want-to-be” in which the metonymy is situated is the absence created by her words, but more radically (Lacan goes on to say) the absent phallus. Desire itself (and, specifically, in this case the desire of the hysterics to have an unsatisfied desire) is the metonymy of the “want-to-be” by association with the absent phallus and with the symbolic castration of wanting-to-be the phallus, the signifier of the desire of the Other. Desire as such proceeds out of this radical finitude or lack and seeks to cover it by generating an endless metonymic chain of substitute signifiers, an endless displacement of the original desire to be the phallus.
The *Traumdeutung* is "mantic" insofar as it foreshadowed Saussure's discoveries in linguistics.

The word *dérivation* contains the word *rive* ("bank" or "shore") and connotes diversion, shunting, or branching of water from its proper course. The "channel of desire" thus shunted is later described as "the furrow inscribed in the course" (1977, p. 265/629). To become aware of his own movement in the signifying chain, the subject must be able to get some orienting feedback by switching out of it.

Lacan spoke earlier of how the desire for recognition dominates the desire that is to be recognized (1977, p. 141/431).

Here the English text can seriously mislead the reader. The French text reads: "the elaboration of the dream is nourished by desire; why does our voice fail to finish, for recognition." Instead, the English has "out of recognition," for *de reconnaissance*. Recognition "reabsorbs" the other (and the other word, desire) insofar as it always has to do with the desire of the other; desire seeks to be recognized as the desire (desired object) of the other.

We read this paragraph as saying that if my dream (as a desire for recognition) comes to rejoin (*vient à rejoindre*) or is on the same level of discourse as my (consciously articulated) demand to be recognized by the other as the object of his request, then there is no necessity for the dream to articulate further.

Instead of "A negative therapeutic reaction, I would say," the French has "we will say" (*dirons-nous*), in obvious sarcasm.

The English is misleading about the painter; the text should read, "a painter who makes a fuss about him . . . over his interesting face" ("un peintre qui lui fait du plat . . . sur sa bobine intéressante"). Freud (1900a, p. 147) makes it clear that the painter was chatting with the husband, not the wife.

The English is grossly misleading: to be certain that the needs are gratuitous they must *not* be satisfied (*ne pas les satisfaire*).

Jean Gabriel de Tarde (1841-1904) was a French sociologist whose social theory distinguished between innovative and imitative persons.

Instead of "in each particular case," "in this particular case" is preferred as the translation of *dans le particulier*.

The husband's desire—thwarted in the dream—is his interest in his wife's friend.

"The appeal of the patient" can more simply be stated as "The call (*L'appel*) of the patient" on the telephone.

The point seems to be that the dreamer wonders if her husband is no longer satisfied with her (for she may have become just a slice of backside for him) and instead is turning to her friend, with whom, as object of his desire, she now identifies. In analyzing the dreamer's unsatisfied desire, Freud wrote: "The process might be expressed verbally thus: my patient put herself in her friend's place in the dream because her friend was taking my patient's place with her husband and because she (my patient) wanted to take her friend's place in her husband's high opinion" (1900a, pp. 150-151).

Once again desire is associated with a cavity (channel, furrow)—this time an "interval" which demand digs on this side of itself (*en deçà d'elle-même*). This "interval" or gap appears insofar as the subject manifests his want-to-be, his deficiency with his appeal to the Other (who shares the deficiency). The paragraphs here are as dense as any in the *Écrits*, but the point, simply put, seems to be that any articulation of a need is addressed to another for a response and above all expresses a desire to be recognized by the other (who, in turn, also desires recognition).
satisfaction of the need serves to highlight what by contrast remains as surplus in the demand, namely, the desire for recognition. The frustrated expression of desire reemerges in dreams.

Translation error has “confuses his needs” instead of “confuses its ministrations” (confond ses soins).

The mother’s ignorance in confusing overfeeding with recognition is unforgiven (n’est pas pardonné), not “unforgivable.” The English continues to be more difficult than the French, which does not present the child as “demanding” from the mother, but rather asks n’exige-t’il pas que la mère . . . . (“doesn’t he require that the mother . . . .”). Lastly, “the way lacking to him toward desire” (la voie qui lui manque vers le désir) is less ambiguous than “the way towards the desire that he lacks.”

This most Lacanian of laconic phrases (“man’s desire is the desire of the Other”) has a number of related significations: (1) man’s desire à la Kojève (1939), is for another desire as its most humanizing object; (2) man’s desire is to be the object of the other’s desire, i.e., to be the phallus as the signifier of the other’s desire; (3) the Other as unconscious is the true locus of man’s desire; (4) the Other as symbolic order mediates man’s desire, transposing what is sought on the level of (physiological) need to the specifically human level of discourse.

The gap (biance) appears to be the same as “the split . . . which the subject undergoes by virtue of being a subject only insofar as he speaks” (1977, p. 269i/63+).

The dream presents itself as a fait accompli, a finished story; the verb denoting action in the dream is in the indicative, not optative, mood.

Desire can be said to ex-sist in the dream insofar as it is displaced into the metonymic chain of signifiers, and this manner of ex-sistence or standing outside of itself is in its form of distortion (Entstellung).

The text again becomes dense as Lacan grapples with the relationship between need, demand, and desire and the role of language. He seems to say that desire has two ways of emerging in demand: (1) as surplus (“in the beyond of demand”) insofar as the articulation and determination of biological needs highlight by contrast what desire is after (i.e., recognition); (2) as the unexpressed element in the unconditional demand for the other’s presence and absence which falls “on this side of” the demand (dans son en-deçà), rather than “within the demand.” The three Buddhist figures of love, hate, and ignorance (mentioned earlier in the “Discourse at Rome” [1977, p. 94/309]) typify responses to demands and call attention to the basis of desire in fundamental lack. The demand for love is motivated by this lack insofar as desire as negativity (undetermined being which becomes determined by negating other beings) seeks the recognition of another desire. Hate seeks to negate the other in the struggle to the death for recognition. And the unsaid (and unsayable) goes unrecognized (or ignored) in the demand either because speech is always inadequate to desire or because the other’s response fails to recognize what is expressed.

Desire as the action of the signifier stops when “the living being” (the body) becomes a sign, apparently in the tomb, thus stopping the action of the signifier in speech. The moment of cut (coupure) appears related to death, on which desire “is borne” (1977, p. 277/642). This is prefigured by the symbolic castration of the phallus which, when repressed, becomes the signifier of signifiers making possible the entrance into the symbolic order.

Osiris was killed and cut to pieces by his brother; his sister-wife Isis succeeded in piecing together
his body, finding all the fragments except his penis. Osiris then became god of the dead and of agriculture.

Lacan here offers the signifier of the phallus as solution to Freud's final difficulties (see 1977, p. 263a/627).

We can read the Other in terms of the parents—first as father, then as mother. It is with the desire of the mother to destroy the father that the patient identified, hence "his powerlessness to desire without destroying the Other."

This obscure paragraph appears to be describing the obsessional's ability to so distinguish the symbolic order verbally that he practically gets rid of it and is left with the narcissistic juggling of ego and fantasy objects of attachment.

In three-card monte three cards are placed face down on a table and the dealer deftly shifts their positions, showing one face (e.g., the Queen of Spades) to bettors and returning it face down to continue switching the cards' positions. The object is to guess which of the three is the previously exposed card.

The point seems to be that the analysis touches or affects her (not "effects her") in her unconscious position as the patient's mother, as supported by Lacan's later use of commère ("godmother" or familiar term of endearment for "partner") (p. 267b/631).

The fable seems to be the notion that repressed homosexuality exists in everyone.

The impossibility seems to be that the patient desires his mother to have a phallus (and thereby not be castrated and not be castrating toward him), but he also desires to be the phallus for his mother. From this impossibility flows the metonymic chain of his symptoms: sexual impotence, blaming the menopause, urging his mistress to take a different sexual partner, his notion of repressed homosexuality, and his virile response to her dream. All of these are displacements of the original desire concerning the phallus and his own fear of castration.

Desire (and therefore one's being as lack) is constituted by the difficulty of being in continual displacement.

Earlier Lacan discussed how psychoanalysts reduce desires to demands and then convert them to be in conformity with their own demands (p. 262g/626)—in other words, for them the power of the treatment lies in the power of suggestion.

The Latin prescription reads, "normal coitus, with repeated dose."

The text should read, "to his wife or to his master." The French tu es ("you are" in familiar or intimate form) equivocates tuer ("to kill").

The murderous desire shows through the above articulation addressed to wife or master but also, as unsaid, thereby transcends it. It is "on this side of" another articulation as follow-up to the first, a counterdependent retort which posits a static relationship fixing the speaker in his given role with his true unconscious desire remaining repressed. Only a speech that would lift the mark of repression (structured by the homophony of the subject's own words) would enable the subject to be absolved of his repressed desire. The text should read "would give him back to his desire" (qui le rendrait à son désir). The word "prohibition" does not appear in the French text, which instead has marque, suggestive of the bar separating signifier from signified and the condition of possibility for repression. This repression or mark of the signifier splits the subject as speaker from himself (as signified), from his unconscious desire (which can never be adequately articulated), and from others (who are also split by being subjected to the law of the signifi-
er). We recall Lacan's question in "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious": "Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier concentric or ex-centric, in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified?" That is, it is a matter "of knowing whether I am the same as that of which I speak" (1977, p. 165e-f/516-517).

Lacan wrote earlier: "For regression shows nothing other than a return to the present of signifiers used in demands for which there is prescription" (1977, p. 255a/618).

The phrase "desire is a source of subjection" translates le désir est assujettissant, repeating the earlier phrase, "Desire merely subjects what analysis makes subjective" ("Le désir ne fait qu'assujettir ce que l'analyse subjective") (p. 260a/623). Desire can compel the subject only through signifiers (and man is a subject only by being subject to the laws of language).

The "all-powerful signifier of demand" seems to be "the genital act" mentioned earlier (1977, p. 269c/633).

Freud (1921) wrote that "identification has appeared instead of object-choice, and... object-choice has regressed to identification... the ego assumes the characteristics of the object" (pp. 106-107).

The French text reads "that is to say, [opens] the way in which are designated the identifications which in stopping this regression punctuate it" ("soit la voie où pourront être dénoncées les identifications qui en stoppant cette régression, la scindent").

Scybalum is a hardened fecal mass. The belief about it being noxious may refer to a medieval conception.

Overdetermination is possible because the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary, not rigidly fixed in a one-to-one correspondence.

The point may be that a kind of static results from the discrepancy of a determinate demand for a specific object with the indeterminate relationship to the other (which sustains an unconditional demand for love).

Fantasy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

The real is rational insofar as it can be symbolized, and the rational, symbolic order is real as the materiality of language.

The "paradox of desire" may have to do with the subject's inability to recognize himself in his discourse because he is implicated in it not as subject but as signifier (the spoken about "I" recedes from the "I" that enters the spoken discourse—recall the theme of excentric circles [1977, p. 165/516]). Precisely because desire is articulated in discourse, it remains fundamentally inarticulable. This will be the major theme of the final essay.

The position of the neurotic marks with its (not "his") presence the subject's response to demand, to, that is, the signification of his need.

The fantasy, existing at a level distinct from that of the conscious articulation of demand, seeks to absolutize the demand and calls attention in the subject to the gap of his desire.

This is an appeal for a kind of psychohistory which understands the relation between the unconscious fantasy and action. The last sentence is confusing: "all that," referring to the preceding phrases, "gives him [not "it"] a quasi-experimental access"—that is, "all that, together with whatever experience the analyst calls acting-out, gives him a quasi-experimental access" ("tout cela auquel l'expérience de ce que l'analyste appelle l'acting out, lui donne un accès quasi expérimental").

The analyst interposes himself (s'interpose) into the patient's fantasy (by telling the patient his behavior
relates to him in the transference?).

The Other in this instance is the analyst.

To introduce himself into the fantasy is a necessary consequence of taking the path that betrays him.

Circe was an island magician who changed Odysseus' sailors into pigs. The sense seems to be that the analyst, by imposing himself on the patient's fantasy, becomes a victim of the imaginary order, diverts the authentic manifestation of desire, and causes the treatment to become sidetracked and fragmented.

Freud (1921) wrote: "There is a third particularly frequent and important case of symptom formation, in which the identification leaves entirely out of account any object-relation to the person who is being copied... The mechanism is that of identification based upon the possibility or desire of putting oneself in the same situation" (p. 107).

We take "indifferent" here as ironic: The analyst can hardly be an indifferent object in a treatment resolution based on incorporation.

The ego is the metonymy of desire perhaps as its displaced point of reference (displaced from the subject) and as its substitute narcissistic object.

The French text reads: "That speech has all the powers, the special powers of the treatment" ("Que la parole y à tous les pouvoirs, les pouvoirs spéciaux de la cure"). Instead of "shepherded," the French has canalisé, ("it is toward this that the subject is directed and even canalized"), thus complementing previous images of desire as channel, furrow, etc.

The only surprise is the unusual clarity of these propositions.

Hercules killed the centaur Nessus for trying to rape his second wife, Deianira. Before dying Nessus told her that his blood would serve to restore Hercules' love. Later she sent him a tunic smeared with the blood of Nessus. When Hercules put it on, it stuck to him, burning him to the point that it led to his building his own funeral pyre.

The horizon of being which has become "disinhabited" by modern analysts would seem to be the unconscious. The raised finger apparently refers to Leonardo's painting of St. John the Baptist in the Louvre—a naked, sensuous, smiling St. John, with affinities pointing to other paintings of St. John cast in the accoutrements of Bacchus. The point may be that the analyst must be silent to the patient's demands in order to hear the expressions of unconscious desire.

The artificial river in Mauriac is apparently a reference to his novel Le Fleuve de feu (1923).

The sense of il se mire, translated by "he saw himself reflected," is better expressed as "the ways in which he looked at himself in feeling, domination, and knowledge." To say desire "belongs to being" may be misleading, and a better translation of c'est de l'être might be "it is a matter of being," i.e., a matter of being the phallus.