Chapter 6

On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis

Overview

This essay first appeared as an article in La Psychanalyse (1958b), and summarizes the work of the first two terms of the seminar of 1955-1956. Though its composition follows that of "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious" (Chapter 5), its thought represents a slightly earlier level of development. As such, it is Lacan’s most direct address to the problem of psychosis, where paranoia is taken to be the paradigm of psychosis and Daniel Paul Schreber’s account of his personal experience (1903a) to be the paradigmatic case of paranoia. Reduced to its simplest terms, this essay attempts to explain the origin of psychosis in the light of Lacan’s general theory of the linguistic structure of the unconscious. In his explanation, Lacan designates a mechanism distinct from "repression," which he calls (with textual warrant from Freud) "foreclosure," i.e., "repudiation" (Verwerfung) of a fundamental signifier. The essay gravitates toward this notion as toward its principal pole.

1
Towards Freud

The essay begins with an introductory section that takes a global swipe at traditional approaches to the problem: “Half a century of Freudianism applied to psychosis leaves its problem still to be rethought, in other words, at the status quo ante” (1977, p. 179/531). Before Freud, Lacan claims, psychology was victimized by a heritage of scholasticism, which left it trammeled in “an abstract theory of the faculties of the subject” (1977, p. 179/531). Under the circumstances, this theory could not be counterbalanced by subordinate attention to affect. At best, it settled for a naive conception of the perceiving subject (percepiens) and implied a naive conception of the perceived object (perceptum) as well, “for even if the alternations of identity of the percepiens are admitted, its function in the constitution of the unity of the perceptum is not discussed” (1977, p. 180/532).

With this allusion to the role of the perceiving subject in “constituting” the unity of the perceived object, we are reminded of a language (at least) and a conception (perhaps) that Merleau-Ponty developed in his Phenomenology of Perception (1945). For whatever value it may have in trying to find a sense in Lacan’s text, let us recall the drift of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion. Starting from the phenomenology of the late Husserl, with its focus on the world of lived experience (Lebenswelt), Merleau-Ponty analyzes our presence in the world through the mediation of our perceiving body. Thus, our embodied consciousness and the world of our experience are seen to be intimately correlated with each other. “The thing, and the world, are given to me along with the parts of my body, not by any ‘natural geometry’, but in a living connection comparable, or rather identical, with that existing between parts of my body itself” (1945, p. 205). Accordingly, one might say that the thing is not so much “given in perception” as “internally taken up by us, reconstituted and experienced by us in so far as it is bound up with a world, the basic structures of which we carry with us, and of which it is
merely one of many possible concrete forms" (1945, p. 326).

Thus, Merleau-Ponty can speak of a genuine “communion” between man and what he perceives:

As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue such as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into its mystery, 'it thinks itself within me'... Every perception takes place in an atmosphere of generality and is presented to us anonymously.... So, if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive [1945, pp. 214-215].

This pre-predicative communion with the things encountered in the world is characteristic of the psychotic as well as of the normal person, and Merleau-Ponty is, of course, well aware of the need to account for the difference between hallucination and “true” perception (1945, pp. 334-345). How Merleau-Ponty deals with this issue is another matter, which need not concern us here, so let us be content with this much recollection of his thought and return to Lacan’s text itself.

Whether or not Lacan is suggesting a phenomenological solution to the problem of polarity between subject and object in perception is not at all clear. What is clear is that he challenges the simplistic notion of a subject-object dichotomy that lies at the base of so many theories of psychotic hallucination. “All of them, ingenious as they are in declaring, in the name of a manifest fact that a hallucination is a perceptum without an object end up asking the percipients the reason for this perceptum, without anyone realizing that in this request, a step has been skipped, the step of asking oneself whether the perceptum itself bequeathed a univocal sense to the percipients here required to explain it” (1977, p. 180/532). Lacan seems to be suggesting, then, that, given the conception of hallucination as a “perceptum without an object,” there may be another dimension to consider in explain-
daughter recounts how in the corridor of her dwelling place she met a man (the rather inconsequential lover of a neighbor with whom both mother and daughter had had a falling out). This man, she thought, called after her the offensive word "Sow!" A simplistic interpretation no doubt would claim that this perceptum was merely projected by the perceiving subject by reason of her own impulse to call him "Pig!" But Lacan is not satisfied with this and presses her to say what she, for her part, murmured in the man's presence immediately prior to his alleged epithet. Her reply: "I've just been to the pork butcher's..." (1977, p. 182/534). Aha!

What is the import of this apparently innocuous remark? We are told that the woman had recently separated from her husband and his family (her mother had disapproved of the marriage anyway). She was convinced that her in-laws were going to "cut her into pieces." But this is precisely what happens to the poor unfortunate things that end up at the pork butcher's! Her remark reflects, then, the anxiety about being "cut into pieces" (like a sow) at the butcher's. This remark is uttered in the man's presence as a kind of strophe, to which (after a hiatus that waits for a response) the antistrophe is heard: "Sow!"

Now it is important to note that the patient herself, though she was aware that her remark was "allusive," was "perplexed as to which of the two present [herself or the man] or the one absent person [the mother] was being alluded to" (1977, p. 182/535). The remark in itself, then, had a certain ambiguous anonymity to it, indicated by the subject "I," functioning here as a "shifter," at least until the disparaging antistrophe gave determination to the discourse, which thus "came to realize its intention as rejection in hallucination" (1977, p. 183/535). Of course, this opens up enormous questions to which we must return, but the point for now seems to be that much more goes into the constitution of the hallucination here than the projective activity of the "unifying subject" (1977, p. 183/536). Some elemental pattern gives structure to the discourse, determines its antiphonal format, correlates the signifiers of the strophe (pork butcher's) and antistrophe ("Sow!"), etc.—and all this goes on independently of the conscious, speaking subject.

It is clear, then, that if we are to understand the nature of psychosis, we must begin by understanding the relation between the subject and the signifier. Such, at least, has been the way that Lacan himself has taken: in the beginning, his doctoral thesis on paranoia (1932) led him to "the threshold of psychoanalysis" (1977, p. 184/536); more recently, in his seminar of 1955-1956, he followed Freud's (1911c) advice to reexamine the Schreber case, and his structural analysis of the phenomena of Schreber's Memoirs (1903a) led him back once more to the same issue (1977, p. 183/536). All of this, then, "makes it incumbent on us to define this process [of psychosis] by the most radical determinants of the relation of man to the signifier" (1977, p. 184/537).

The advantage of the Schreber case as paradigm for the study of psychosis is that it makes an examination of the psychotic process in these terms possible. "But we do not have to have reached that stage to be interested in the variety of verbal hallucinations to be found in Schreber's Memoirs" (1977, p. 184/537), for quite clearly they do not fit into the categories according to which they are "classically classified," in terms of their "involvement in the perceptum." Rather, we recognize their relation to the perceptum, i.e., "the differences that derive from their speech structure, in so far as this structure is already in the perceptum" (1977, p. 184/537).

Now to speak in linguistic terms: "Simply by considering the text of the hallucinations, a distinction arises... between code phenomena and message phenomena" (1977, p. 184/537). The code phenomena are those elements of the hallucinatory text that are so interrelated as to form a linguistic system to which Schreber can give the name "basic language" (Grundsprache), "specified in expressions that are neological in form... and usage" (1977, p. 184/537). This system is not only self-contained but self-promulgating: "Hallucinations inform the subject of the forms and usages [of] the neo-code" (1977, p. 184/
537), where the “forms and usages” communicated are essentially a set of signifiers rather than something signified. Thus, “these messages are regarded as being supported by beings whose relations they themselves state in modes that prove to be very similar to the connexions of the signifier” (1977, pp. 184-185/538): “Do not forget,” writes Schreber, “that the nature of the rays is that they must speak” (1903a, p. 130). In other words, the Nervenanhang (annexation of nerves) and the Gottesstrahlen (rays of God) “are simply the joining together of the words (paroles) that they support,” with the result that “there is the relation here of the system to its own constitution as signifier” (1977, p. 185/538). Such, then, are the code phenomena to which Lacan refers.

But there are message phenomena, too, i.e., “interrupted messages, by which a relation is sustained between the subject and his divine interlocutor, a relation to which the messages give the form of a challenge or endurance test” (1977, p. 186/539). Thus Schreber tells us:

“My nerves are influenced by the rays to vibrate corresponding to certain human words; their choice therefore is not subject to my own will, but is due to an influence exerted on me from without. From the beginning the system of not-finishing-a-sentence prevailed, that is to say the vibrations caused in my nerves and the words so produced contain not mainly finished thoughts, but unfinished ideas, or only fragments of ideas, which my nerves have to supplement to make up the sense. It is in the nature of nerves that if unconnected words or started phrases are thrown into them, they automatically attempt to complete them to finished thoughts satisfactory to the human mind [1903a, pp. 216-217].

For example, the fragment “now I will. . . myself. . .” elicits the complementary phrase “face the fact that I am an idiot”

Lacan points out that the interruption occurs “at the point at which the group of words that one might call index-terms [or shifters] ends,” i.e., those terms in the code that indicate the position of the subject on the basis of the message itself, “after which, the properly lexical part of the sentence, in other words that which comprises the words that the code defines by their use... , remains elided” (1977, p. 186/540).

What is the import of all this? Apparently to call our attention to the essentially linguistic structure that underlies Schreber’s hallucinatory text and thereby underscore the importance of exploring carefully “the relation of man to the signifier.” Thus, Lacan concludes this part of his discussion by observing that one is struck “by the predominance of the function of the signifier in these two orders [i.e., code and message] of the phenomena, not to say urged to seek what lies at the bottom of the association that they constitute[.] of a code constituted by messages [about] the code, and of a message reduced to that in the code which indicates the message” (1977, pp. 186-187/540). As the section concludes, it is important to note only that it was the Freudian experience that led Lacan in the direction indicated here, and he proposes to examine what that experience introduces into the question.

II

After Freud

Yet if we look at the record of what theorizing has been done about the problem of psychosis since Freud’s contribution, it has all followed a single fundamental scheme, “namely, how can the internal be transmitted to the external?” The answer (uncritical enough): through the “all-powerful” capacity of the percipiens for “affective projection” (1977, p. 187/541)—even though the objections to such an explanation are “overwhelming” (1977, p. 188/541). And this, despite the fact that Freud (1911c, pp. 62-66), in exploring—a propos of Schreber—the different ways of “presenting the switching of the relation to the
other in psychosis,” by using “the form of a grammatical deduction,” “namely, the different ways of denying the proposition, ‘I love him,’” “expressly dismisses the mechanism of projection as insufficient to account for the problem, and enters at that point on a very long, detailed and subtle discussion of repression” (1977, p. 188/541–542).

Later texts of Freud, according to Lacan, have been misused to support a theory of affective projection by the percipiens. For example, his essay “On Narcissism” (1914a) is interpreted to suggest that the percipiens is “entitled to inflate and deflate a dummy reality” (1977, p. 188/542). With the structural theory of the '20s and the emergence of a conception of the ego as agency of adaptation, mediating between conflicting demands of id, superego, and external world, one found it still easier to conceive of the ego as a percipiens with a “synthesizing function,” and psychosis as somehow the failure of the ego in its task of adaptation. Psychosis, then, would result from a “loss of reality” on the part of the ego (1977, p. 188/542), leaving the ego under the sway of the id. Little did it matter that in his essay “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis” (1924b), Freud called “attention to the fact that the problem lies not in the reality that is lost, but in that which takes its place” (1977, pp. 188–189/542). The common interpretation prevailed: “the store of accessories is inside, and they are taken out as required” (1977, p. 189/542). It is thus that Katan (1950), for example, can interpret Schreber’s hallucinatory phantasmagoria as a “curtain interposed by the operation of the percipiens between the tendency [of instinctual temptation] and its real stimulant” (1977, p. 189/542).

To be sure, “the structures revealed by Freud continue to sustain, not only in their plausibility, but also in the way they are manipulated, the would-be dynamic forces with which psychoanalysis today claims to direct its flow” (1977, p. 190/544). But this does not mean that the structures (and the notions involved in them) are easily—or correctly—understood. Here Lacan refers to the following notions: “the equivalence . . . of the imaginary function of the phallus in both sexes . . ., the castration complex found as a normative phase of the assumption by the subject of his own sex, the myth of the murder of the father rendered necessary by the constituent presence of the Oedipus complex in every personal history . . . the profoundly dissident character of the notion of drive in Freud” (including the disjunction between tendency, direction, and object) with all that this implies for the “conceptual systematic” that began with Freud’s “sexual theories of childhood” (1977, pp. 189–190/543). Easily understood or not, however, nothing is to be gained by sacrificing such notions in favor of “an educative naturism that has no other principle than the notion of gratification and its obverse, frustration” (1977, p. 190/544).

But let us be more precise and consider one commentator on the Schreber case in particular, Ida Macalpine, whose work deserves attention, if only because her “critique of the cliché that is confined in the factor of the repression of a homosexual drive . . . to explain psychosis, is masterly,” pointing out, as she does, that homosexuality is less a “determinant” of paranoia than a “symptom” of it (1977, p. 190/544). She overlooks the fact, though, that if Freud places an emphasis on homosexuality, it is first of all to show that homosexuality conditions grandiosity in delusion and, even more essentially, to indicate the “mode of otherness in accordance with which the metamorphosis of the subject operates, in other words, the place in which his delusional ‘transferences’ succeed one another” (1977, p. 190/544). But to acknowledge this would be to recognize the importance for Freud of the Oedipus complex in the paranoiac process, something that Macalpine refuses to admit.

The point is crucial. Instead of appealing to the Oedipus complex for an explanation of the genesis of psychosis, Macalpine appeals to a nooedipal “phantasy of procreation, which is observed in children of both sexes, even in the form of phantasies involving pregnancy” (1977, p. 191/545). Her argument in brief is this:

[Schreber’s psychosis is] a reactivation of unconscious archaic procreation fantasies concerning life, death, immor-
tality, rebirth, creation, including self-impregnation, and accompanied by absolute ambisexuality expressed in doubt and uncertainty about his sex. Homosexual anxieties were secondary to the primary fantasy of having to be transformed into a woman to be able to procreate. These fantasies are best described as somatic hallucinations and hypochondriacal delusions. They led to Schreber's system centering on creation and the origin of life, whether by God or the sun, sexually or parthenogenetically [Macalpine and Hunter, 1955, p. 395].

Now Macalpine feels the need “to link this phantasy to a symbolic structure” (1977, p. 191/545). But she looks for this structure in a set of “ethnographical references” rather than in the “symbolic articulation that Freud discovered at the same time as the unconscious, and which, for him, is, in effect, con-substantial with it: it is the need for this articulation that he signifies for us in his methodological reference to the Oedipus complex” (1977, p. 91/546). Without such a linkage between fantasy and symbolic structure, the fantasy remains in the purely imaginary order, isolated and alone. For “no imaginary formation is specific, none is determinant either in the structure, or in the dynamics of [the] process” (1977, p. 191/546).

This neglect of the role of the symbolic order in the psychotic process is not unique to Macalpine. On the contrary, it continues to grow in psychoanalysis as analysts continue to explain the difference between neurosis and psychosis in terms of the ego's relation to reality. Now, one issue serves "as the bridge across the frontier of the two domains" (1977, p. 192/546). What is this issue? The text here is ambiguous but we take it to be the relation to the other. After all, it is this that lies at the basis of the whole phenomenon of transference. In the neurotic, early conflicts in relationships with the other are conceived of as reemerging through the process of transference, so much so that the ability to form a transference (and thereby relate in some way to the other) is taken to be characteristic of the neurotic and a confirmation of the earlier conflicts. In the psychotic, conflicts in relationships with the other are conceived of as so early or so severe that the patient withdraws his libidinal interest from the outside world and directs it narcissistically to himself. Thus arises the notion of the psychotic as withdrawing from an unbearable world and of “loss of reality” as the hallmark of psychosis (see Macalpine and Hunter, 1955, pp. 20-21). That is why the formation of a transference in the psychotic would be, according to this hypothesis, impossible. Now, if psychoanalysis is conceived as essentially the analysis of the transference, and if the formation of a transference is impossible for the psychotic, then obviously “psychoanalysts claim to be able to cure psychosis in all cases where a psychosis is not involved” (1977, p. 192/547).

However, if “[i]t is clear that psychoanalysis is possible only with a subject for whom there is [an other]” (1977, p. 192/527), then there is indeed a bridge possible between the psychotic patient and the psychoanalyst. But what does this bridge cross over? Certainly not a wasteland, but rather the great “river” (1977, p. 192/547) of the unconscious, which we take to be the symbolic order as Freud experienced it.

III

With Freud

We come here to a more precise disengagement of the nature of Freud's experience. Essentially it is an experience of “thought” processes that affect us but lie beyond the thought processes we are normally conscious of as thought. Indeed, it is striking that this "dimension... should never have been thought" (1977, p. 192/547) to the extent of being appropriately put into words before Freud, even though there has always been ample evidence (e.g., the experience of desire, boredom, confinement, revolt, prayer, sleeplessness, panic, and the like) to testify to its influence not only on the individual but also on the social level of human life. But perhaps the grandiosity of conscious thought that feels sufficient unto itself would have been "unable to toler-
ate this possible competition" (1977, p. 193/548).

In any case, this is the dimension "in which Freud discovered that, without thinking about it, and without anyone being able to think he thinks about it better than anyone else therefore, it thinks (ca pense)" (1977, p. 193/548). It is in these terms that Freud "announces the unconscious to us: thoughts which, if their laws are not quite the same as those of our everyday thoughts, ... are [nonetheless] perfectly articulated" (1977, p. 193/548). This "dimension," or "Other Place" ("Elsewhere": Allleurs), Freud calls, taking the term from Fechner, ein anderer Schauplatz, "another scene" (1900a, p. 48; 1900b, pp. 50-51; see also 1887-1902, p. 244), and Lacan calls simply the "Other" (1977, p. 193/548).

How does it function in relation to the subject? As a kind of discourse, bits of which emerge into our conscious life "in certain privileged moments, in dreams, in slips of the tongue or pen, in flashes of wit" "whose syntax Freud first sought to define" (1977, p. 193/549). Lacan situates this syntax in his "schema L" (presented in this essay as a simplification of the earlier version that appeared in "The Seminar on the Purloined Letter" [1966, p. 53]). The French editor of the Écrits calls attention to how the dual relation between the ego and its objects (which reflect its form) creates an obstacle between the subject (S) and "the locus of its signifying determination [i.e., the Other]" (1977, p. 332/904). The Other, then, would be "the locus from which the question of [the subject's] existence may be presented to him" (1977, p. 194/549). For the question that the Other poses is indeed about the subject's existence (polarized, to be sure, by questioning about "his sex and his contingency in being"). The analyst discerns this question in "the tensions, the lapses, the phantasies" of the patient's conscious discourse, and it is precisely "by means of elements of the particular discourse" that the "question is articulated in the Other." "It is because these phenomena [of the conscious discourse] are ordered in the figures of this discourse [of the Other] that they have the fixity of symptoms, are legible and can be resolved when deciphered" (1977, p. 194/549). We take this to mean that symptoms experienced on the level of the conscious subject are to be relieved by discerning their place as signifiers within the structures of the discourse of the Other.

The question as it emerges from the Other is a genuine putting of the subject into question. It arises from the discrete arrangement of unconscious signifiers in a way that is most unlikely — yet at the same time most likely, too: "most unlikely, since their chain is found to survive [subsister] in an alterity in relation to the subject as radical as that of as yet undecipherable hieroglyphics in the solitude of the desert"; yet "most likely, because there alone their function of inducing the signification into the signified by imposing their structure on it may appear quite unambiguously" (1977, p. 194/550).

Freud's experience of this unconscious Other is altogether different from that of Jung. For Jung, the Other finds expression in "protomorphic proliferations of the image," i.e., a series of images that remain on the level of fantasy (hence in the order of the imaginary), to be interpreted by a kind of divination (i.e., "mantic") on the part of the analyst. What Freud found wanting in this kind of divination was "the directing function of a signifying articulation" (1977, p. 195/550) following the spare pattern of its own internal law. In their words, Jung's conception of the Other, according to Lacan, remained too much bound to the order of the imaginary; it took too little account of the symbolic order as such. But it is this, the symbolic order, that specifically characterizes man as man.

Let us come, now, to a closer examination of the "questioning of the subject in his existence" by the Other, which follows the basic pattern of schema L. This schema has a "combinatory structure" (i.e., implies many elements that may be considered in varying combinations), which is seen in greater detail in schema R. The latter schema, then, is an expanded version of the former.

The text here is extremely obscure, and the interpretation of it that we offer is, at best, only plausible. The posing of the
question by the Other implies “the three signifiers in which the Other may be identified in the Oedipus complex” (1977, pp. 195-196/551), i.e., the ego ideal, mother, and father. These are the signifiers of relation (between the child and mother), of love (mother), and of procreation (father), or, according to schema R, the triad I-M-F. The fourth term, then, is the subject who is being questioned, but who is separated from this polarity in the Other by the bar that splits the subject into conscious and unconscious fields. This occurs “in the mode of death,” because (we assume) this splitting takes place through the event of castration, which in its own way is a kind of death, insofar as it defines the subject’s limits as Being-unto-death. The subject becomes “the true subject to the extent that this play of the signifiers will make [him] signify” (1977, p. 196/551), i.e., fill up the lacunae in his conscious discourse.

This play of the signifier is not inert but dynamic, since it is animated by the figures of the subject’s past “that the denomination of signifying Others involves in the contemporaneity of the Subject” (1977, p. 196/551). And the subject enters into this play, marked, indeed, by the sign of death and is in that sense a “dummy (mort), but it is as a living being that he plays [the game out]; it is in his [everyday] life that he must take up the suit (couleur) that he may bid” (1977, p. 196/552).

So far, so good—but now we come to schema R. It looks innocent enough: two complementary right triangles form a square—one triangle (the lower) representing the symbolic order, the other (upper) triangle representing the imaginary order, with a shaded area intruding upon the latter and indicating the order of reality. Without going any further, we notice that one-half of the square is given to the symbolic order while the remaining half is composed of the order of the imaginary and reality, suggesting the close narcissistic connections between reality and the imaginary as well as their subordination to the symbolic order.

Fair enough! But now Lacan packs into the diagram all the complex relationships of his entire system, including elements of it that he has not yet explained in the texts he has selected for the consumption of English-speaking readers. Patience! Let us try to gain a general sense of it, trusting that Lacan’s use of it in interpreting Schreber’s Memoirs will warrant the tortuous effort to understand the diagram now. We follow here the French editor’s explanatory note (1977, pp. 333-334/905-906):

1. Triangle I is bound by the ego (e) and specular image (i) together with the subject’s (S) identification with the phallus as imaginary object (φ — small phi, not capital phi as in the English translation); this constitutes the register of the imaginary.

2. Triangle S, the register of the symbolic, is bound by the signifier of the primordial object, the mother (M); by the Name-of-the-Father (F) in the locus of the Other (O); and by the ego ideal (I), where the child is marked through symbolic identification.

3. The field of reality (R) (champ de la réalité [1966, p. 553]), framed by both the imaginary and the symbolic, includes the solid line (i-M) where objects (o) are found, and the dotted line (e-I) where imaginary identifications are situated (α').

With this said, two final remarks about the schema are in order. First, for all its condensation of elements that precede the resolution of the oedipal situation, the relations shown by the schema strictly speaking should not be called “preoedipal” but at most “pregenital,” because it is only in the “retroaction of the Oedipus complex,” i.e., by reason of the Oedipus complex’s being already resolved, that they can be talked about at all (1977, p. 197/554). Second, the “phallocentrism” suggested by the schema need not alarm us. For the phallus is not a physical organ in this conception, but rather an image that functions as the signifier of desire, playing a role for the subject insofar as he is “entirely conditioned by the intrusion of the signifier” (1977, p. 198/555). Such an understanding of the phallus throws a new light on the old question about the “primary or secondary nature of the phallic phase” (1977, p. 198/555).

However that may be, “Freud revealed this imaginary function of the phallus . . . to be the pivot of the symbolic process
that completes in both sexes the questioning of the sex [on the level of conscious discourse] by the castration complex [as it emerges through the discourse of the Other]" (1977, p. 198/555). But this symbolic process implies a signification that rests upon a metaphor, "in particular, the paternal metaphor" (1977, p. 198/555), according to which the signifier, the Name-of-the-Father, serves as metaphor for the symbolic order.

The point here seems to be that whereas Macalpine, in making her case against the Oedipus complex as decisive for the genesis of psychosis, considers the critical factor to be a non-oedipal fantasy of procreation "in which the procreative function of the father would be eluded" (1977, p. 198/555), Lacan, for his part, insists that the paternal function (and by implication the whole Oedipus complex) is indeed crucial for an understanding of psychosis but through a symbolic paternity, i.e., in the notion of paternity as embedded in the symbolic order itself. In other words, even in those cultures where the role of the real father may have been misunderstood, there is still a place assigned to the function of a father. "It is certainly this that demonstrates that the attribution of procreation to the father can only be the effect of a pure signifier, of a recognition, not of a real father, but of what religion has taught us to refer to as the Name-of-the-Father" (1977, p. 199/556).

"Of course, there is no need of a signifier to be a father, any more than to be dead, but without a signifier, no one would ever know anything about either state of being" (1977, p. 199/556). It is only through signifiers that these states enter into the discourse that characterizes properly human life. And the allusion to death here is not without its import, for, according to Freud, the symbolic father that establishes the Law is the mythical father slain by his sons, so that "the symbolic Father is, in so far as he signifies this Law, the dead Father" (1977, p. 199/556). At any rate, it is with this symbolic father that the Oedipus complex is concerned, and in reference to this father that the phallus plays its own symbolic role.

And it is by taking the role of the symbolic father as a starting point that Lacan undertakes now to explain the nature of Schreber's psychosis. For the symbolic father plays a crucial role in structuring normal development, and it is in contrast to this that the psychotic process is to be explained.

Lacan sees the role of the symbolic father in the development of the subject as essentially metaphorical in nature—hence, the formula: "paternal metaphor" (1977, p. 199/557). For metaphor involves substitution, i.e., of one signifier (S) for another (S') in which the suppressed signifier (S') comports its own signification (x). The result is that the substitute S gains a new, far richer signification, beyond what it has originally, by reason of a compound suppression of which it is now the signifier.

Now the "paternal metaphor" also involves a substitution, for normally when the subject arrives at the oedipal stage, the symbolic father (i.e., the "Law" or "Name-of-the-Father") intervenes in the mother-infant dyad in such a way as to replace (i.e., substitute for) the infant's desire of the mother. This desire of the mother comports in turn its own signified for the subject, i.e., being the phallus for the mother. Hence, the Name-of-the-Father involves the suppression of the desire of the mother and the phallus as signifier of this desire in the subject's unconscious (O). (We recall, in French nom and non are homophones.)

This is the pattern of normal development. But what if for some reason the Name-of-the-Father is in default and there is an "inadequacy of the signifier itself" (1977, p. 200/557)? Freud (1925b), for his part, speaks of a fundamental affirmation (Bejahung) that precedes and makes possible all negation (Verneinung), since negation implies something already somehow affirmed in order for it to be denied. The "inadequacy of the signifier" in Lacan's terms would consist in the default of precisely this fundamental affirmation. It is this default that he calls "foreclosure," thus translating Freud's term Verwerfung. "We will take Verwer-
fung, then, to be the foreclosure of the signifier" (1977, p. 201/558), where the "signifier" is the Name-of-the-Father. The result is a "mere hole" in the Other, the symbolic order, "which, by the inadequacy of the metaphoric effect will provoke a corresponding hole at the place of the phallic signification" (1977, p. 201/558), i.e., in the signifying function of the phallus in the unconscious.

It is only in terms of such a conception as this that it is possible to conceptualize Schreber's psychosis. This is what Lacan will try to show in terms of "the most advanced form of delusion of which [Schreber's] book is an expression" (1977, p. 201/559).

Now, the most striking thing about Schreber's delusional system is the fact that it is based on "the power of creation attributed to speech, of which the divine rays (Gottesstrahlen) are the hypostasis" (1977, p. 202/559). Given Schreber's own intellectual background, this is a paradox indeed—all the more reason for him to believe "that something must have happened that does not proceed from his own mind" (1977, p. 202/560).

If we follow the sequence of phenomena described by Schreber in Chapter XV (1903a, pp. 204–215), we can see how some of these phenomena (e.g., the "miraculous creations") may be conceived as a kind of "fringe effect" of the signifier which has "remained silent" in the subject (i.e., the "Name-of-the-Father" as foreclosed), but which "projects from its darkness a gleam of signification on to the surface of the real" (1977, p. 203/561), i.e., the "imaginary real"—the real as the subject fantasizes it. Here there emerges an interesting trio that warrants closer scrutiny: Creator (i.e., God), Creature (i.e., the hallucinated creations), and Created (i.e., the subject, Schreber).

We have already said a word about the Creature. Let it suffice for the moment—we shall return to the matter below. As to the Creator, "this God... lowers himself into beings who appropriate disconnected identities" (1977, p. 203/561), yet "withdraws ever further...[by] a withdrawal that can be intuited from the increasing slowness of his speech" (1977, p. 204/562). Indeed, we could regard such a God as "suited above all for emptying the places... in which the murmur of words is deployed, if Schreber did not take care to inform us in addition that this God is foreclosed from any other aspect of the exchange" (1977, p. 204/562). In other words, Schreber's God, his "unique Other," is related to the Created (subject) essentially by means of speech. As to the Created (subject), he in turn resorts to "words" "to elude... the traps set by the alarming inanity of his Lord," and thus "prevents his fall only by the support of his Word (verbe) and by his faith in speech" (1977, p. 205/563). The subject's relation to God, then, is likewise achieved through means of speech.

How, then, can we conceptualize the relation between these three members of the trio, using, for example, the parameters of schema R? Let us suppose that the Created subject holds the place of I (the ego ideal) and assumes the position F left vacant by the absence of the Law, i.e., by default of the Name-of-the-Father. Where, then, would we locate the Creator? Presumably at point M, the primordial symbolization of the mother, where the divine liegen-lassen would take place through the absence that opens up by reason of the foreclosure of the symbolic father, i.e., through a kind of "hole dug in the field of the signifier" (1977, p. 205/563).

And what of the Creatures of speech? For Lacan, they occupy the place of the child that Schreber so much wanted but was denied. As such, they may be conceived as "circumventing" this "hole dug in the field of the signifier." "It is around this hole, in which the support of the signifying chain is lacking in the subject... that the whole struggle in which the subject reconstructed [himself] took place" (1977, p. 205/564).

But all this concerns the symbolic order. A word should be said now about the imaginary order, for already with the "hole dug in the field of the signifier" "there had opened up for him in the field of the imaginary the gap that corresponded in it to the defect of the symbolic metaphor" (1977, p. 206/564). This gap could be filled only through the process of Entmannung (emasculation)—a notion that seems to make Ida Macalpine uncomfortable. To be sure, there is a certain ambiguity involved in regarding "the transformation of the subject into a woman (Verweiblichung)"
as the equivalent of castration and Macalpine is perfectly right in calling attention to the fact (1977, p. 206/564). But she fails to see that this ambiguity is grounded in the structure of the subject as such. For on the imaginary level the very thing that leads the subject to accept transformation into a woman is precisely what makes him forfeit the inheritance of his virility: the vocation to become the spouse of God, the object of God's desire—in other words, the phallus for God. That is why Lacan can say that "it is not by being foreclosed from the penis, but by having to be the phallus [for God] that the patient is [dedicated] to become a woman" (1977, p. 207/565). After all, the problem of being/having a phallus is, for Lacan, as proper to a woman as to a man.

It is curious—is it not?—that "it was in his mother's apartment, where he had taken refuge, that the subject had his first attack of anxious confusion with suicidal raptus" (1977, p. 207/566). This suggests that his psychotic regression is intimately related to the fact that "the identification...by which the subject assumed the desire of the mother" is somehow or other "shaken" (1977, p. 207/565). As a result, "incapable as he is of being the phallus that the mother lacks, he is left with the solution of being the woman that men lack" (1977, p. 207/566). We take this to mean that by becoming the spouse of God, through whom the salvation of men will be mediated, he eventually becomes the woman that mankind lacks. This, then, would be the meaning of the famous fantasy that is usually seen "as belonging to the incubation period of his second illness, namely the idea 'that it would be beautiful being a woman submitting to copulation'" (1977, p. 207/566).

Does all this add up to homosexuality in Schreber? In point of fact, the Menschenspielerei ("Men's little games") that one would expect to follow from such an attitude never materialized for Schreber, since in his fantasy world other men became "as divested as him of any phallus" (1977, p. 207/566). There is no evidence, then, of any homosexual "acting out" on Schreber's part. On the contrary, he came to conceive of his feminization as a form of Versöhnung ("expiation," "propitiation") that should be understood more radically, perhaps, in the sense of Sünder, i.e., of "sacrifice" for the sake of his destiny to save mankind (1977, p. 208/566). What deserves emphasis, it would seem, is not homosexuality but the megalomania manifest in Schreber's delusion.

For Freud, "the reconciliation" in question was an intrapsychic accommodation within Schreber himself, according to which Schreber's "ego found compensation in his megalomania while his feminine wishful phantasy made its way through and became acceptable" (1911c, p. 48). But this interpretation, where megalomania is seen as a balm to homosexual wishes, seems to run counter to what Freud says later in the same study, where paranoia is taken to be basically a "fixation at the stage of narcissism" (1911c, p. 72), i.e., infantile megalomania-developmentally before the stage of homosexual wishes. The discrepancy is to be explained, no doubt, by the fact that Freud's subsequent precisions about the nature of narcissism (1914a) were at this point still in a stage of gestation.

Delusion apart, what is to be said of the subject himself through all of this? The fact is that he underwent a kind of death. He tells us that, in a state described in the clinical records as "catatonic stupor," he recalled even having read his own obituary in a newspaper. Other phenomena that he describes, such as "a leprous corpse [escorting] another leprous corpse," suggest a duality that implies "the subject's regression...to the mirror stage" overcast by the shadow of death. There is even a suggestion of his body as dis-integrated, *a sort of sump for fragments detached from the identities of his persecutors* (1977, p. 209/568). The relevance of all this for the problem of homosexuality is admittedly beyond question, but the matter must be explored very cautiously, for "the use of this term in interpretation may produce serious damage, if it is not illuminated with the symbolic relations that...were determinant here" (1977, p. 209/568).

What, indeed, are the "symbolic relations that...were de-
terminant here”? They are manifest, we are told, “in the form in which the imaginary structure is restored” (1977, p. 209/568). Recall that when the triadic relationship that normally characterizes the symbolic order (according to schema R) has been disrupted by the “hole dug in the signifier,” there is a corresponding disruption in the triadic relationship that characterizes the imaginary order, i.e., between the mother, the infant (ego ideal), and the phallus as signifier of desire. In Schreber’s case, as we have already seen, this disruption consisted in the fact that the “identification . . . by which the subject assumed the desire of the mother” was somehow “shaken” with the result that instead of being the phallus that the mother lacked he had to become “the woman that men lack” (1977, p. 207/569).

Now, this shattered structure is “restored” under two aspects that Freud himself distinguished. The first of these aspects is Schreber’s transsexualist experience before the mirror, where “nothing, he says, in the upper part of his body, seems to him incapable of convincing any possible lover of the female bust” (1977, p. 210/569). The second of these two aspects is the fantasy of a correlation between this “feminization” of the subject and “divine copulation” (1977, p. 210/569). In the latter, Freud saw somehow an allusion to the notion of death, for the German suggests that the “‘soul-pleasure’ (Seelenwollust) of the feminized subject bears some relationship to the ‘bliss’ of souls after death (Seligkeit),” inasmuch as there appears to be a semantic affinity between the two words involved. For his part, Lacan, though admitting, of course, that “the letter manifests itself in the unconscious” (1977, p. 211/570), suggests that the “agency” of the letter in the unconscious “is much less etymological . . . than homophonie,” since the unconscious “is concerned more with the signifier than with the signified” (1977, p. 210/569).

But this is a digression.

To be sure, the “act of divine fecundation” would not take place by means of “an obscure passage through the organs” but “through a spiritual operation” by which a “new spiritual humanity” may be engendered and the “creature of the future” re-deemed. The fantasy emerges as a kind of parody of a situation in which two “ultimate survivors” of “some human catastrophe,” capable of repopulating the earth, would face the enormity of their procreative power.

Such fantasies are the way in which the disruption in the imaginary order is “restored,” situated as they are around a “hole” there, where the “soul-murder” that the subject has undergone through the foreclosure of the symbolic order has “installed” his symbolic “death” (1977, p. 211/570). Is the “hole” thus conceived simply “the effect in the imaginary order of the vain appeal made in the symbolic order to the paternal metaphor” (1977, p. 211/571)? Or is it more like the subject’s scrambling effort to cancel the “elision” of the phallus that has taken place, by somehow reintroducing it into the gap that is opened up in “the subject’s regression . . . to the mirror stage” mentioned above (1977, p. 211/571)? In any case, the phallus is at stake here in the relationship between the infant and his mother as the primordial Other.

Lacan tries to schematize the complex process that transpires here with a diagram (schema I), which admittedly suffers from the limitations endemic to any effort to “formalize the intuitive” (1977, p. 212/571). We take it for what it is worth, realizing that, like the other schemata, it is less important than “the analysis on which it is based” (1977, p. 214/574).

The essential here is to realize that schema I is merely a magnification of schema R after it has been distorted by psychotic disorganization. In terms of the symbolic order, we have already seen that in the foreclosure of the (Name-of-the) Father a “hole” is dug in the field of the signifier (represented in schema I by the hyperbola). Around this hole, one side, the ideal of the subject’s ego begins to slide toward the place of the absent symbolic father so as to take the place of the Other, with resultant “alienation of speech.” Around the other side of the hole (hyperbola), the mother’s primordial place is preempted by the creative power of God (“the divine other”). Corresponding to this in the field of the imaginary there is another hole (hyperbola)
that is dug when the phallus is "elided"—not simply repressed as
signifier of desire but eliminated, so to speak, yet nonetheless
somehow reintroduced in disguised form around the edge of the
hole. This occurs under the guise of the subject's transvestite
jouissance, by which the subject contemplates himself in his spec-
ular image as his own primary love object on the one hand,
and, on the other, under the guise of the "future of the creature,"
i.e., the feminization by which he becomes the phallus for God.
Stretched between these two hyperbolas is the field that may be
called the subject's "reality" (1977, p. 213/573). (As for details of
schema I, the reader will find some help in the Notes.)

Remark here how Lacan sees all of this polarized around
the function of language. As Lacan sees it, Freud's whole effort
to interpret Schreber's Memoirs, relying as he does only on a
written document (not simply as a record of the case but as a
specimen of its terminal state), suggests that for him the only
thing that matters—"the only organicity that is essentially rele-
vant to this process"—is whatever "motivates the structure of
signification" (1977, p. 213/572). Thus, in terms of schema I, as
soon as the ego ideal preempts the place of the Other in the ab-
sence of the symbolic father, the result is "alienation of speech"
(1977, p. 212/572), which has an "effect," as by "induction," on
the imaginary order (1977, p. 213/572). One specimen of this
might be the instance where the lower God's hallucinated epi-
thet, Luder!, may be taken to suggest "lure," a kind of "imperti-
nent" commentary by the Other on the siren quality of the im-
aginary order.

Through all of this the subject has his own criteria for "real-
ity," but two forms of the "real" to which he clearly relates are his
wife, whom he continues to love through his psychosis, and the
readers for whom he writes his monograph. It follows, then,
that the subject's relation to certain others conceivably may be
quite normal even though his relation to the Other may be un-
balanced—a kind of anomaly that has been called (with some
warrant) "partial delusion" (1977, p. 214/574).

The heart of the matter, then, remains the function of the
signifier, for "it is in man's relation to the signifier that this dra-
ma [of madness] is situated" (1977, p. 214/574). When all is said
and done, our task is to "listen to the speaker, when it is a ques-
tion of a message that does not come from a subject beyond lan-
guage, but from speech beyond the subject" (1977, p. 214/574).
For it is in such speech that "the very law of the signifier is arti-
culated: . . . 'All Nonsense [i.e., the irrational] is abolished!' "
(1977, p. 214/574). It is because of man's exposure in his very
being to this law that Lacan can say that "it would not be man's
being if it did not bear madness within itself as the limit of his
freedom" (1977, p. 215/575).

Post-scriptum

Lacan brings his paper to a close with a summation that re-
states his thesis. His purpose is clear enough: as the title sug-
gests, it is to address the "question preliminary to any possible
treatment of psychosis," namely, how to designate "the defect
that gives psychosis its essential condition, and the structure
that separates it from neurosis" (1977, p. 215/575). As we have
seen, that defect for Lacan consists in the "foreclosure of the
Name-of-the-Father in the place of the Other, and [thereby] the
failure of the paternal metaphor" (1977, p. 215/575). This fore-
closure is the result of some "accident" in the register of the Oth-
er. This Other is the locus of what Freud called the "uncon-
scious"—a "memory" whose nature remained for Freud an open
question to the end. Lacan suggests an answer to that question,
namely, that this "memory" is the "signifying chain" (into which
the infant is initiated through the Fort! Da! experience) that "de-
velops in accordance with logical links whose grasp on that
which is to be signified . . . operates through the effects of the sig-
ifier, [described by Lacan] as metaphor and metonymy" (1977,
p. 215/575)—in other words, the symbolic order.

Before proceeding, Lacan cannot forgo the opportunity for
a few polemical thrusts. After pointing out the nonmystical qual-
ity of Schreber's relationship with God, he refuses to accept the allegedly "ineffable nature of lived experience" as a reason offered by "science" for not talking about it. For how is it "ineffable" if "it (of) i.e., the Other, speaks in any "lived experience"? And the structure of subjectivity is indeed discernible if only we realize that "what is analysed is identical with what is articulated" (1977, p. 216/576). Furthermore, the conception of psychosis suggested here is perfectly compatible with what is called good order," without going so far as the psychiatrist (or even psychoanalyst) does who trusts "his own compatibility with that order to the extent of believing that he is in possession of an adequate idea of the reality to which his patient appears to be unequal" (1977, p. 216/576). This sort of thing, after all, does not tell us very much about the "foundations of psychosis." Nor is an appeal to the "transference mechanism" very illuminating either, for no matter how skillfully the theory is elaborated, in practice it is conceived "as a relation that is purely dual in its terms" (1977, p. 216/577), i.e., without any reference to the Other. And if transference is taken as "a phenomenon of repetition," what is being repeated in paranoid persecution? It is too easy to say: some kind of "paternal inadequacy," and then go scrambling through an abundance of biographical material in clinical cases to confirm such a hypothesis (1977, p. 217/577).

No, the question must be approached in "structural terms." The heart of the matter is this:

For the psychosis to be triggered off, the Name-of-the-Father, verworfen, foreclosed, that is to say, never having attained the place of the Other, must be called into symbolic opposition to the subject.

It is the lack of the Name-of-the-Father in that place which, by the hole that it opens up in the signified, sets off the cascade of reshapings of the signifier from which the increasing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, to the point at which the level is reached at which signifier and signified are stabilized in the delusional metaphor [1977, p. 217/577].

But how in fact can the Name-of-the-Father be called by a subject to a place "in which it has never been" (1977, p. 217/578)? By an encounter with some specific concrete father-figure, denoted by Lacan as simply "A-father." The essential, though, is that the Name-of-the-Father "constitutes the law of the signifier" (1977, p. 217/578). It would be a mistake, then, to be distracted by the so-called "environmental co-ordinates of psychosis" either in terms of the mother ("from the frustrating mother to the smothering mother") or of the father (his "paternal inadequacy," etc.). It is all too easy to reduce such matters "to the rivalry between the two parents in the subject's imaginary order" (1977, p. 218/578). Rather, what is significant with regard to the mother is "not only... the way in which [she] accommodates herself to the person of the father, but also... the place that she reserves for the Name-of-the-Father in the promulgation of the law" (1977, p. 218/579). And reciprocally, the father's role in the family constellation must be understood in terms of his relation to the law: "The father's relation to this law must be considered in itself" (1977, p. 218/579), independently of any personal characteristics he may have in the concrete.

This, then, is the way that Lacan—in contrast to all the rest of "the most inspired authors" who have commented on Freud's analysis of the Schreber case—interprets "the pre-eminence that [Freud] accords to the transference of the relation to the father in the genesis of psychosis" (1977, p. 219/580). The contrast is particularly sharp in the case of Niederland (1951). The latter properly calls attention to the "delusional genealogy, constructed with the names of Schreber's real ancestors..., to show in their convergence on the name of God (Gott) an important symbolic chain by which the function of the father can be manifested in the delusion" (1977, p. 219/580). But Niederland fails to discern "the agency of the Name-of-the-Father" here and thus misses the true import of the delusion. When he then tries to explain "the role of the paternal function in the triggering off of delusion," he focuses his attention on what for Lacan is "the subject, rather than the signifier" (1977, p. 220/580).

It does not work. For Niederland sees the occasion of Schreber's psychosis to be his "assumption of paternity," i.e., "when
Schreber is called upon to assume a prominent ‘father’ role as Senatspräsident, the conflicts of libidinal and aggressive origin that had been repressed for 32 years break through, and he falls ill on the very date his father died” (Niederland, 1974, p. 111). The fact is, however, that there was at the same time a nonassumption of paternity, i.e., the failure of Schreber’s effort to beget a physical child—a situation that found its parallel in the precipitating factor of Schreber’s first illness, i.e., a nonassumption of “paternity” in the form of “the failure of his candidature for the Reichstag” (1977, p. 220/581). Niederland’s thesis is inconsistent, then. The problem is that it focuses on Schreber as subject in his relation to paternity, whereas, if Niederland had shifted the focus instead to the “signifier of paternity” as such, i.e., the Name-of-the-Father in the locus of the Other, the inconsistency would have dissolved. This is precisely what Lacan, with his thesis about “primordial foreclosure (Verwerfung) that dominates everything with its problem” (1977, p. 220/581), has done.

At any rate, when, through foreclosure, the hole dug in the field of the signifier finally opened up for Schreber, Flechsig was not big enough to fill it—such, at least, is the way that Freud understands how the subject was precipitated into psychosis (1977, p. 221/582). This hole in the signifier consisted in the bankruptcy of the Name-of-the-Father, i.e., the bankruptcy of that signifier which “in the Other, as locus of the signifier, is the signifier of the Other as locus of the law” (1977, p. 221/582).

If all this sounds novel, the fact is that such a conceptualization of psychosis in no way goes “beyond Freud” but rather attempts to do no more “than to restore access to the experience that Freud [himself] discovered” (1977, p. 221/582).

Map of the Text

I. Towards Freud.
   A. The application of Freudianism has not advanced our thinking regarding psychosis.

2 In Chapters 6 and 7, Lacan has indicated subdivisions in his major sections by a series of Arabic numerals. Our subdivisions A, B, etc., correspond to Lacan’s numbers 1, 2, etc.

1. Before Freud the psychological discussion of psychosis was founded in scholastic philosophy.
2. Contemporary science is free from this metaphysical concoction,
   a. but we practitioners are not.
3. Our theory of knowledge is fixed in theoretical abstractions of faculties,
   a. which remain deaf to pleas for concreteness,
   b. and uncorrected by a recourse to affect,
      i. since we retain an univocal idea of the subject.

B. We have retained a simplistic view of the relations between the perceiver and the perceived.
1. In this view variations in the perceived are correlated with differences in sense registers of the perceiver.
   a. This diversity of register is overcome as long as the perceiver is a match for reality.
   b. In the same way we approach insanity by relying on scholastic categories.
2. Most psychological positions look inside the perceiver to explain hallucinations,
   a. and thereby overlook whether the perceived in a hallucination structures meaning for the perceiver.
3. The verbal hallucination is not reducible to a particular sensorium, nor to a perceiver who might give unity to it.
   a. The verbal hallucination is not intrinsically auditory,
   b. nor is the act of hearing itself a single register,
      i. since it can attend to either meaning or sound.
   c. It doesn't help to view the hallucination as an objectification of the perceiver,
      i. since he is subject to the influence of the other,
      ii. especially in paranoid projection.
4. The crucial point is that consciousness does not account for a hallucinated statement because:
   a. the chain forces itself on the subject,
   b. with the reality of temporal duration,
   c. in an equivocal manner, thus challenging a supposedly unifying consciousness.

C. A clinical example of a folie-a-deux illustrates these aspects of the verbal hallucination.

1. The hallucinated response “Sow!” from a man follows the patient’s comment, “I’ve just been to the pork butcher’s…”
   a. The man represents the angry camp of her husband’s family
      i. who threatened to chop her to pieces.
   b. Her anxiety about the fragmented body experience remains beyond awareness
   c. and finds its confirmation in the angry retort,
      i. which offers her as object for the butcher’s knife.

D. The irruption of the signifier into the real is most clearly seen in the case of the broken signifying chain.

1. The ambiguity of the perceived signifier awakens an otherness in the perceiver,
   a. which the classical view of the unifying subject reduces to imaginary effects,
   b. so that we must learn about hallucinations from the text of a madman.

E. If we avoid reducing the perceived to qualities of the perceiver, we find in the structure of the perceived a linguistic distinction between code and message.

1. In Schreber’s Memoirs the code includes the voices using the Grundsprache
   a. in neologistic expressions
   b. and in messages called autonyms, which are self-reflexive,
      i. and which challenge the notion of a distinct “metalanguage.”

   c. The anticipatory effect of the signifier has nothing to do with intuition,
      i. and is reduced to mere repetition when the voices deal with thoughts and feelings (that is, with variations in the perceiver).

2. Messages are interrupted in a challenging manner
   a. at the point where code-terms define the position of the subject,
   b. while the content of the message is elided.

3. The signifiers function in such a way that code and messages are reflexively related.
   a. This gives rise to a topology of the subject as structured by the signifier,
   b. which must form the basis of any neurological investigation,
      i. following Freud’s influential work on dreams.

II. After Freud.

A. The contribution Freud made regarding psychosis has ended in a decline.

1. Current conceptions boil down to a simplistic question: How to make the internal pass into the external?
   a. The subject is treated as an indestructible perceiver in psychosis,
      i. rather than including an unconscious register.
   b. The perceiver is viewed as determining his perception (assumed to represent reality)
      i. by means of affective projection.

2. The mechanism of projection is used in an uncritical way,
   a. which fails to distinguish, e.g., between types of jealousy.
   b. Freud presents the shifting of the relation to the other in psychosis by means of the substitution of signifiers,
i. and sets aside projection as not sufficient to account for the problem,
ii. while hinting at the notion of foreclosure.

B. Even Freud’s paper on narcissism has been used to reinforce the notion of the perceiver constructing the perceived.
1. This construction operates by means of investing or deinvesting objects with libido.
   a. Freud’s view of unconscious identifications with the other as constituting the ego is taken as support for its synthesizing function,
   b. and has led to the promotion of the idea of “loss of reality,”
      i. although Freud’s concern was with what takes its place.
2. The view persists that what is inside is placed outside as needed.
   a. Thus Katan views Schreber’s hallucinations as following the defense against instinctual temptation.

C. Projection of a tendency is viewed as a response to regression.
1. The withdrawal of a tendency from its object is called regression,
   a. without distinguishing types of regression.
2. The very mention of Freud’s concepts causes bewilderment
   a. to those who view psychoanalysis as reeducation.

D. Only those who stand outside this group are rigorous, like Macalpine.
1. She rightly criticizes the cliché of repressed homosexuality as the explanation for paranoia.
   a. In Schreber the idea began in an earlier waking thought about being a woman.
      i. The form of this thought reveals that it was narcissistically enhancing.

2. But she ignores how Freud related the homosexual issue to grandiosity and to transference figures,
   a. and how he referred to the Oedipus complex.
3. She replaces it with a fantasy of procreation,
   a. which she links to a symbolic structure
   b. based on anthropological evidence.
4. But an image has no impact except as part of a signifying articulation,
   a. which Freud designates by the Oedipus complex.

E. Macalpine cannot be blamed for this misunderstanding of the symbolic order.
1. This misunderstanding flourishes among psychoanalysts
   a. who separate neurosis from psychosis in terms of the ego’s “responsibility for reality.”
   b. A bridge between the two appears is the notion of transference,
      i. but without an appreciation of the meaning of the “other.”

III. With Freud.

A. It is striking that thinkers have not been able to articulate the structure of the unconscious.
1. Its effects have become necessary parts of collective organizations,
   a. and are evident in dream-thoughts.

B. Schema L signifies the relation between the subject and the Other.
1. The Other here is the discourse of the unconscious,
   a. and the origin of questioning regarding the sex and existence of the subject.

C. This questioning is articulated in discrete signifiers.
1. The signifying chain exists as radically other to the subject,
   a. but also as imposing an unambiguous signification.
2. The separations opened in the real world by the signifier follow gaps in the world
a. to such an extent that we wonder if in this case the signifier follows the law of the signified.
b. This is not true at the level where the existence of the subject or of the world is questioned.

D. Our experience of the unconscious Other, according to Freud, is not a function of natural forms.
1. The Jungian school appears to rely on these forms, a. but they are useful only for disclosing imaginary relations.
2. Freud rejected this position because it neglected the structure of the signifying chain.
   a. This chain follows its own internal law,
   b. which structures the material phonemes
   c. and without which man could not even sustain himself in the imaginary order.

E. Schema L leads to a structure governed by varying combinations of terms.
1. This structure is composed of a tetrad and two trinities.
   a. The tetrad consists of the subject and three signifiers (relation, love, procreation)
      i. The subject enters their play as dead (barred).
      ii. The signifiers structure the three agencies of ego, reality, and superego.
   b. The imaginary triad of specular image, fragmented body, and phallus corresponds to the symbolic triad of mother, child (or ego ideal), and Name-of-the-Father.
2. The imaginary order opens up a gap which allows the subject to imagine himself as mortal, a. but his “symbiosis with the symbolic” makes this action possible,
   b. and the “symbiosis with the symbolic,” in turn, could not take place without this gap.

F. Schema R is a conceptual visualization of this double triad.

1. The lines conditioning the object in the field of reality are also indicated by a quadrangle.
   a. One of its corners gives meaning to the object relations approach by viewing the ego ideal in terms of the child as desired object of the mother.
   b. This has reference not to a preoedipal but to a pregenital stage,
      i. in which the child identifies himself as his mother’s phallus,
      ii. and which was much debated in terms of the phallic phase.

G. For Freud, the phallus completes the symbolic process wherein castration situates sex.
1. Our culture mystifies this symbol so that it is even obscured in psychoanalytic circles, a. and has become a part-object.
2. Its signification is evoked only by the paternal metaphor.
3. By resorting to heliolithism, Macalpine situates procreation in a preoedipal culture, a. and thereby evades the paternal function.
   b. But however paternity is attributed, it is always as a function of recognizing the signifier of paternity.
   c. This signifier is linked to death.

IV. Schreber’s way.
A. The paternal metaphor evokes the signification of the phallus.
1. The structure of metaphor induces a new signification.
2. In the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father this new signification is the repressed phallus.
3. In psychosis an inadequate signifier responds to the appeal to the Name-of-the-Father.
4. Freud referred to this inadequacy as foreclosure.
   a. It involves the absence of the judgment of attribution.
b. So that where the Name-of-the-Father is called for there is only a hole,
   i. with a corresponding hole below the bar in the metaphor.
   ii. This hole or damage Schreber relates to "soul-murder."
   iii. and the suggestion of incest is a sign of the failure of the paternal metaphor, the Oedipus complex, the symbolic order.

B. Recognition of the unconscious brings with it surprise.
   1. We are struck by how Schreber's delusion attributes creative powers to speech,
      a. although creation from nothing is shocking to thought.
   2. Schreber's thoughts sharply contrast with his cultured background,
      a. and their intrusiveness is proof for Schreber that they do not come from his own mind,
         i. contrary to what psychiatrists say about projection.

C. We can now follow the sequence of themes in Schreber's Chapter XV.
   1. Schreber's hand is kept in the game of forced thinking by a dramatic stake,
      a. which is the threat of God's abandonment.
   2. When his replies cease in "thinking-nothing," belowing and the call for help occur,
      a. showing his subjective tearing from God and from the signifying chain from which he hangs suspended.
      b. The appearance of sounds and miraculous creations show his effort to illuminate the real through representations.
      c. These hallucinations suggest "the trio of Creator, Creature, and Created."

D. The Creator is one-in-many and many-in-one.

1. He enters beings who steal "disconnected identities,"
   a. and their capture in Schreber's body threatens God's integrity.
   b. Yet God lets them expand despite their name speech,
      i. whose homophones are striking.

2. God's withdrawal is reflected in his speech
   a. and in his aloofness from men.
   b. With the abolition of personal identity, only verbiage will survive.

3. The miraculous creatures are not messengers of the symbolic order but imaginary representations.
   a. Schreber prevails not through representations but through his words and the order of the world.

E. We can resituate the subject in schema I in terms of the symbolic triad of schema R (I-M-F).
   1. The Created I is located in F,
      a. now empty of the Law of the Father,
      b. and is defined solely in relation to the mother in M,
         i. since the symbolic father has been foreclosed,
         ii. and the Creator takes a "let-lie" position.
   2. By stretching point I of schema R back to the now foreclosed point F, schema I is developed.
      a. The line I to M culminates in the Creatures of speech,
         i. who occupy the place of Schreber's unborn child, the point I of schema R,
         ii. and this line skirts the hole in the field of the signifier made by the foreclosing of the Name-of-the-Father.
   3. Schreber's struggle is around this hole
      a. where he lacks the support of the signifying chain,
      b. and where his imaginary sexualization is ironically recognized.
F. The gap in the imaginary order that corresponds to the defect in the symbolic order can only find its resolution in emasculation.

1. The acceptance of this emasculation goes through different stages in Schreber,
   a. although the term is not acceptable to Macalpine,
   i. who seems to shy away from castration, as if real castration were at stake.
   ii. But she rightly notices the ambiguity of equating becoming a woman with castration.

2. The ambiguity of subjective structure confounds being and having the phallus.
   a. Thus Schreber is dedicated to become a woman in order to be the phallus,
   i. along the lines of the symbolic parity between Mädchen (girl) and phallus,
   (a) which is based on their function in social and symbolic exchange.

When the identification with his mother (as her phallus) is shaken, Schreber moves toward becoming a woman.

1. Here lies the meaning of his intercourse fantasy,
   a. and not in having intercourse with imagined figures of men.

2. He becomes reconciled to becoming a woman,
   a. in the service of grandiosity,
   b. and not of homosexuality, as Freud incorrectly states.

H. Freud would have grasped the true cause of the reversal in Schreber if he had realized that Schreber as subject had died.

1. There is external evidence supporting this,
   a. in the form of a topographical regression to the mirror stage.

2. The homosexuality must be seen in terms of symbolic relations.

1. The symbolic determination of the homosexuality is spelled out in the restored imaginary structure.
   1. This structure has two aspects.
      a. Transvestism is linked with feminization,
      b. as also is divine copulation and eventual feculation.

2. Schema R can be redrawn as schema I in order to depict the psychotic outcome.
   a. From the image of the creature Schreber (between i and e), there curves a line to transvestite (narcissistic) pleasure and to anticipated identification as God's spouse.
      i. This line skirts a hole, the absent phallus where soul-murder installs the death of the subject.
   b. The asymptotic line between the two curves joins the delusional ego at e to the divine other (who takes the place of his mother) at M.
      i. The real lies between the narcissistic image at i and the ego ideal at I
         (a) which takes the place of the Other and thereby alienates speech.
   c. The schema materializes how the signifier induces in the imaginary the overturning of the subject,
      i. as illustrated in the end-of-the-world experience,
      ii. and as suggested by the hallucinated expression Luder!,
         (a) which includes the notion of "lure," or imaginary capture.
   d. The field R of reality is restored for the subject as an islet of consistency,
      i. but it has a subordinate role as both cause and effect,
ii. and is rendered habitable only because the imaginary and symbolic orders have been reshaped.
e. The discussion of our place in o and the role of loving husband in o' remains undeveloped,
i. except to note that such relations are compatible with an unbalanced relation to the Other.
3. Macalpine's position would be strengthened by a misunderstanding of the symbolic order's role in schema I.
a. Reason is right to study madness,
   i. for this drama is situated in the human being's relation to the signifier,
   ii. involves a word beyond the subject,
   iii. and is the limit of human freedom.

V. Post-scriptum.
A. The Other is the unconscious locus of a memory which is the object of a question.
   1. To this question responds the signifying chain,
      a. which begins in the Fort! Da! experience,
      b. and which grasps the being of beings
      c. through metaphor and metonymy.
   2. The essential defect of psychosis is an accident in this register,
      a. which is termed "foreclosure"
      b. and involves the failure of the paternal metaphor.
B. The signifier of the Other is absent in the Memoirs.
   1. The intimate form of address is absent in Schreber's relationship to God,
      a. which appears as a mixture rather than a union of being to being,
      b. and which shows none of the joy and presence of the mystical experience.
   2. Science and contemporary thought decline to say anything about mysticism,
      a. but in stressing the ineffable they ignore the fact that it (ca) speaks,
      b. while science too shares in social psychosis,
         i. despite the psychiatrist's notion of reality.
C. The psychosis is set in motion when the foreclosed Name-of-the-Father is summoned "into symbolic opposition to the subject."
   1. The hole created by the lack of this signifier attracts a cascade of images
      a. until the signifier-signified relations are restabilized in the delusion.
   2. The Name-of-the-Father is summoned by A-father,
      a. who takes up a third position relative to the ego (o) and objects (o').
D. In the principle of this foreclosure, the Name-of-the-Father stands for the symbolic triangle, since it constitutes the law of the signifier.
   1. In psychosis the key family variable is not the mother but her respect for the father's word,
      a. although his own relation to the law is also important.
   2. What matters is the Name-of-the-Father as signifier in relation to the symbolic order,
      a. and not specific names as such,
      b. nor the mere assumption of paternity.
   3. To Schreber, his father was an unacceptable representative of the law,
      a. and Flechsig failed to fill the void of the foreclosure,
         i. which was the precipitating transference factor.
      b. The result is an angry, eroticized condemnation of the paternal signifier,
         i. and a symbol of our age.
   4. In all of this we are not trying to go beyond Freud,
      a. but rather to get back to his discovery.
The Latin text reads: “With care I dedicate this, which I have taken pains with for thirty-three years in the same place, to Saint Anne, the guardian spirit of the place, and to the youth who followed after me there.” The reference is to Saint Anne’s Hospital in Paris where Lacan trained and continued to conduct clinical teaching.

A Greek term with a long history, physis essentially means nature, natural objects, or the law of nature; antiphysis, therefore, is what is over against nature.

A useful overview of the kind of baggage that psychology still carries is provided by Kurt Lewin in “The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology” (1931).

In his session of January 11, 1956, of his seminar on the psychoses, Lacan makes reference to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945), and specifically to his chapter on “The Thing and the Natural World.”

Lacan discussed this type of folie-à-deux in his 1932 doctoral dissertation.

For a discussion of shifters, index-terms, and auto-onyms, see Barthes (1964, pp. 22–23).

The allusiveness of “I’ve just been to the pork butcher’s...” consists in its implicating the daughter as victim (without the speaking ego’s awareness), the man as representative of the husband’s murderous camp, and the mother as delusional protector—the phrase “oscillates” among them until it conjures up the retort “Sow!,” which definitively fixes the meaning with rhythmic finality.

The unspeakable object that is rejected “in the real” appears to be the corps morcelé, the patient’s body in bits and pieces. The word “Sow!” comes in its place, detached from her (elle, not from “it”). Rather than the “cursing” of the strophe, the French maugrément can be translated as “fretting,” more congruent with the patient’s statement, especially if it is viewed as unconsciously expressing anxiety about bodily fragmentation.

The symbol “irrealizes” by transposing things from the real to the symbolic order, by rendering their brute facticity absent and enabling us to deal with their symbolic presence. Compare related expressions, such as “the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing” (1977, p. 104/319).

The signifier conveys meaning on both conscious and unconscious levels and, when the perceiver asents to it, he resonates with it on many levels.

Instead of “But his departure from the phenomenon” for mais ce départ du phénomène, we translate “But a start from the phenomenon.”

Instead of “or rather, the differences,” the French reads, à savoir bien plutôt les différences, “namely, [to recognize] indeed rather the differences.”

Barthes (1964) defines metalanguage as “a system whose plane of content is itself constituted by a signifying system” (p. 90), that is, its message is another code.

The signifier Nervenanhang serves as a specific example: its initially enigmatic meaning of “nerve-annexation” is a void replaced by the significance of this meaning as chain of signifiers, “simply the joining together of the words” noted in the earlier paragraph 185a.

There is a curious process here: to the extent that the voices concern themselves with variations in the percipients, they become inane and repetitive, like Schreber’s consciousness.
Schreber (1903a) discusses the memory-thoughts in Chapter XII (p. 165).

A misprint in the English text has “he will pause” instead of “we will pause” (nous nous arrêterons).

Eco (1976) writes: “Pierce defined the index as a type of sign causally connected with its object” (p. 115); in this case, the pronouns get their meaning from the speaker speaking them, but it is the message that informs us of the meaning.

Instead of a semicolon, the French text has a colon after “the association that they constitute,” with what follows clearly defining this association; in addition, “messages on the code” is clumsier than “messages about the code” (messages sur le code).

The “neuraxis” is the cerebrospinal axis.

Possibly misleading connotations are suggested by the English translation’s use of “an opaque id” for un Ça opaque which is perhaps best left as “an opaque Ça.” The frequent use of ça parle by Lacan for the utterance of the unconscious makes clear that he is referring here to the complex structure of the unconscious (which a notion of subject as ego fails to take into account when we are dealing with psychosis).

The perceiver’s correlative is, strictly speaking, the perceived, the perceptum assumed to be the representation of reality.

To present the shifts in the relation to others, Freud’s exposition relies on the effect of the substitution of signifiers, rather than on a simple projection of “inner” feelings “outside.”

The “tooothing stones” appear to include the notion of foreclosure, implied in Freud’s text: “It was incorrect to say that the perception which was suppressed internally is projected outwards; the truth is rather, as we now see, that what was abolished internally [innerlich Aufgehobene] returns from without” (1911c, p. 71).

Schreber’s literary creation, as in the case of the perceptum, follows certain laws of language and therefore cannot be accounted for simply as a projection.

Instead of “what problem would he still erect,” we prefer the impersonal “what problem would still be erected” to translate quel problème ferait-il encore. The “couple” seems to be the junction of a tendency and its object, the withdrawal of the tendency to be regression, and the projection of the tendency “in reality” to be a response to the regression (répond de la régression, not “is a response from the regression”).

The poles of “nature and nurture” are suggested by “development and entourage.” The English text fails to say “the mention of features” (la seule mention des traits). The references to the phallus are elaborated in Chapter 8 of Lacan (1977). The French effet de dédoublement is better translated as “the effect of splitting,” rather than “the effect of duplication.” Last but not least, rather than “the disjunction of principle,” we prefer “the disjunction in principle” for la disjonction de principe.

We can note how Freud encloses in quotes his use of “frustration” (Versagung) (1911c, p. 62; 1911d, p. 298).

The French text does not say “This process began at an early stage” but rather “This process was engaged for a long time (“Ce procès est dès longtemps engagé”). The hypnopompic lies on the threshold of sleep and wakefulness; a tomography is a plane x-ray. The narcissistically enhancing quality of the idea lies in its being “beautiful.”

Lacan is stating that for Freud the homosexuality was integral to the grandiosity of being God’s spouse, and also reflects a relationship to the transference figures of Flechsig and God, his brother and his father.

Glover (1932) has written: “Nevertheless in the Schre-
ber paper [of Freud] no direct mention was made of the aggressive impulses and the mechanism of paranoia was described mainly in terms of libidinal conflict and related to repression of the inverted Oedipus situation" (p. 302). Macalpine and Hunter (1955), who elsewhere refer to Glover's paper (p. 371), write that Freud interpreted Schreber's illness as being the result of conflict over unconscious homosexuality, "having its origin in the boy's inverted Oedipus situations, i.e., his homosexual attachment to a father figure" (p. 10).

191b/545 The patient was an obsessional (1977, p. 100/315).

191c/545 Macalpine and Hunter (1955) believe "that the primary disturbance is not interpersonal but intrapersonal" (p. 22); their clinical discussion regarding the interpretation of homosexuality follows on pp. 23–26, 410–411.

191f/545 Hysteria is denounced by Macalpine and Hunter (1955), who write: "It is doubtful whether hysteria or anxiety hysteria is an adequate diagnosis today, other than as a non-specific assessment of temperament and omnibus label for milder cases of mental disturbance" (p. 385).

191g/546 Rather than "This is because no..." (for C'est qu'aucune), we translate "The fact is that no..." Anxiety about one's sex reinforces the place of the Oedipus complex which is a result "opposite" to the one Macalpine sought.

192d/547 The river is a reference to the Other. Regarding Mídas, see note 173d in Chapter 5.

192f/547 The relationship between conscious thinking and unconscious thought is a frequent theme in the Ecrits (e.g., 1977, p. 166/517–518). The reference to the Odyssey appears to allude to Telemachus, son of Odysseus and Penelope, thinking in his father's absence of his mother's unwelcome suitors consuming their supplies.

193/548 The pun encompasses a great deal: Baudelaire is viewed as the founder of the symbolist movement in poetry; Les Fleurs du mal (1857) was condemned as obscene.

194a/549 It is the form of the ego that is reflected in objects, as in paranoiac knowledge (discussed earlier [1977, p. 17/111]).

194b/549 Lacan again makes his basic distinction between the level of the perciens (the anxious ego) and that of the perceptum (the articulated question).

194d–e/510 There are gaps between discrete signifiers in the signifying chain, and here Lacan appears to wonder if they are patterned after the gaps in the world created when objects are named and transposed into the symbolic order as individual identifiable entities—gaps between objects, between different experiences of the same objects, between different orders in the world—living and nonliving; human and natural; the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. In any case, the world cannot provide the pattern for the kind of questioning that extends to the existence of the world itself and even beyond its order.

195b–c/550 In the next essay (1977, p. 233/593), Lacan equates Jung's approach with that of Boehme as an attempt to read the signatura rerum, as if nature as articulable were the foundation for the symbolic order. These imaginary forms, says Lacan, are useful only in divining (as a "mantic") structures of the ego. See Jung's Symbols of Transformation (1912).

195g/551 Rather than "if he is taken away," we prefer "if it is taken away," referring to the place of the Other (Car être-l'en); without the symbolic order, man could not even live in the imaginary order. Whether animals (who do live in the imaginary order of seduction and captivation) also relate to the Other is unclear, since our principal means of access to the Other is through
the “sporadic sketches of neurosis” (limited to the human condition). Thus, rather than “but only that it appears otherwise than in the sporadic sketches of neurosis,” we translate “but only that it [i.e., the relation to the Other] does not appear to us except in the sporadic sketches of neurosis,” for “mais seulement qu’elle ne nous apparait pas autrement que dans de sporadiques ébauches de névrose.”

Although the precise meaning is uncertain, we prefer as a translation not “in its position as fourth term in the topology,” but rather “in its topology as tetrad” for dans sa topologie de quaternaire.

The tetradic structure of schema L (transformed now into the more detailed schema R) consists of three signifiers, each of which may belong to a corner of the schema: “relation” belonging with I, the child or ego ideal; “love” with M, the mother as primordial object; and “procreation” with F, the Name-of-the-Father (the French text does not use quotation marks). The fourth term, the subject, enters only as barred, as signified, as absence in words—“the mode of death.” He becomes “the true subject” when he speaks and enters the play of the signifiers, which make him signify (not “make it signify,” for aa le faire signifier).

Rather than “in each particular part,” for dans chaque partie particulière, we translate “in each particular case,” and again later “over and above each case,” for au-delà de chaque partie.

Since there is apparently only one symbolic triad (I-M-F), the plural “symbolic triads” is a misleading translation of le ternaire symbolique.

Instead of “rather than merely depending on them,” it seems to make more sense to see these lines which circumscribe the field of reality as “indeed far from merely depending on it,” that is, on reality (bien loin d’en seulement dépendre).

In the extremities of the segment going from the subject (S) to the primordial object (M) are others the subject desires to have (the first of whom, in the imaginary order, is the reflection in the mirror), while in the extremities of the segment going from the subject (S) to the ego ideal (I) are others the subject desires to be like (again, the first of whom is the ego). Their “reality” is in large measure a function of how much or how little the subject is identified with the imaginary phallus. It may be helpful to visualize the dynamic interrelations among the four terms (at each corner of schema R) by means of arrows: (1) beginning at the upper left corner going from the subject to the mother, with the subject desiring to be the object of her desire, and from the mother to the phallus as object of her desire; (2) from the phallus to the ego ideal as imaginary identification; (3) from the symbolic father to the ego ideal as symbolic identification; (4) from the father to the mother as object of his desire and from the mother to the symbolic father, affirming the place of “the Name-of-the-Father” and thereby making the symbolic identification possible. Without the relationships expressed in (3) and (4) the conditions of possibility for psychosis are established.

For additional details, see the Notes to the Text of Chapter 8 (p. 283/687).

The paternal metaphor, in which the Name-of-the-Father is substituted for the desire of the mother, gives the phallus its status of repressed signifier of the other’s desire, and gives the subject the capacity to imagine himself as independent. De Waelhens (1972) writes:

...the subject cannot abandon himself to or be swallowed up in the lack that he is. He will therefore imagine himself as being that which fills up...
all lack, and particularly the lack of the mother, that is to say, the phallus. To be that which annuls the lack of the mother protects the subject from all abandonment, from all separation from his mother, to the point of making abandonment or separation (imaginarily) impossible. This is what the psychoanalytic language means when it speaks of the child as the penis of the mother.

However, it is all too clear that such an identification, no matter how advantageous at the start, must eventually be surmounted, under penalty of the most radical failure. For how else could that which fills up all lack succeed in recognizing itself as subject of lack, a lack which is the only entry into negativity and desire? For, as long as he remains in the position just described, the subject cannot accede to either negativity or desire, since desire is recognition of lack and an appeal to the other to be recognized by him as subject of this lack [p. 126].

The x is the putting-into-question of the meaning of the original signifier as it now relates to the substitute signifier. The s is the added meaning that results, the product of the relation of signifiers. A more detailed attempt to explicate Lacan's notion of metaphor (including the "paternal metaphor") appears in Muller (1979).

The "O" stands for "Other" (in French, "A" for Autre). We understand that the phallus, with whom the infant identifies as the object of the mother's desire, has been barred so that, with primary repression established, it is now an unconscious signifier of the desire of the other.

Since later (p. 201c/558) the Name-of-the-Father is "called for" (est appelé), we translate not "the appeal of" but "the appeal to the Name-of-the-Father" (l'appel du Nom-du-Père).

For a definition and references to foreclosure in Freud, see Laplanche and Pontalis (1967, pp. 166-169).

In his paper on "Negation," Freud (1925b) wrote:

Thus the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed . . . .

The function of judgement is concerned in the main with two sorts of decisions. It affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality [pp. 235-236].

Freud (1887-1902) writes: "Thus what is essentially new in my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times over, that it is registered in various species of 'signs'" (p. 173). The transcription of perceptual signs (Pept.-s) is "the first registration of the perceptions" (p. 174). He goes on to say: "A failure of translation" from one registration to another "is what we know clinically as 'repression'" (p. 175).

But foreclosure is another matter entirely, Lacan stresses, and he gives us a clue when he writes: "It is on the signer, then, that the primordial Bejahung bears. . . . We will take Verwerfung, then, to be foreclosure of the signer" (1977, p. 201/558). Lacan provides a more detailed discussion in his as yet untranslated 1954 essay "Response to the Commentary of Jean Hippolyte" (1966, pp. 381-399), where he writes of the effect of foreclosure as "a symbolic aboli-
tion" (p. 386) which is precisely “opposed to the primordial Bejahung and constitutes as such that which is eliminated” (p. 387; our translation). Foreclosure “cuts short” from manifestation in the symbolic order what would otherwise be affirmed in the Bejahung that is “the primordial condition for something in the real to come to offer itself to the revelation of being, or, to use the language of Heidegger, to be let-be” (p. 388). This “inaugural affirmation” that lets-be, Lacan states, is the meaning of Freud’s Einbeziehung ins Ich (as discussed in his paper on “Negation” [1925b]) while the correlative Ausstossung aus dem Ich “constitutes the real as the domain of what subsists outside of symbolization” (p. 388). This is why castration, in the case of the Wolf Man, foreclosed “from the very limits of the possible,” comes to appear “in the real,” in the hallucination of the nearly severed finger (p. 388).

In all of this Lacan appears to be positing (with warrant from Freud’s texts), an epistemology radically based on semiotics. He writes that “it is only through the symbolic articulations entangling it to an entire world that perception receives its character of reality” (p. 392). Perception, as Freud wrote to Fliess, is registered in memory under the species of “signs” (Zeichen); thus for Lacan it is “the symbolic text that constitutes the register of recollection” (p. 392). Secondary repression presumes the unconscious symbolic text that has already been established through affirmation (Bejahung): it is the absence of this affirmation in foreclosure that results in a “hole,” a “symbolic abolition,” a failure symbolically to register the import of castration.

The hole “at the place of the phallic signification” appears to be the absence of the repressed phallus as unconscious signifier, the failure of the Name-of-the-

Father to intervene and lead to the oedipal shift from imaginary identification with the phallus to its going below the bar (as depicted in the final term of the paternal metaphor on p. 200/557).

The comma after “misunderstanding” is a misprint.

Schreber’s being as subject hangs suspended from his efforts to reply and thereby prevent God from withdrawing. The text omits “which” before “certainly seems to be” (qui semble bien être). The “unspeakable void” in (a) would then be God’s absence and the subject’s own concomitant annihilation.

Schreber’s “subjective tearing” (le déchirement subjectif) is from God or from the signifying chain from which he hangs suspended as subject. The sounds of the signifiers, and perhaps the shape of the mouth involved in making them, suggest the gaping abyss of separation.

A misprint has “or manifestations” for “of manifestations” (de manifestations).

It would seem that the delusional representations are not signifiers but anticipations of meaning, desperate attempts to make the real accessible on the part of the subject identified with the phallus and for whom the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed. Neither the phallus nor the Name-of-the-Father (the symbolic order itself) functions in a truly signifying manner, so that what illumination arises on the level of the real comes from the imaginary order, and is therefore ephemeral.

Instead of “both times” we read “the two times” for les deux temps, referring to the events described in the preceding (c) and (d).

Instead of “which subjectively creates it,” we prefer “who . . . ,” referring to Schreber.

Schreber (1903a) writes that “the filaments aiming at my head and apparently originating from the sun or
other distant stars do not come towards me in a straight line but in a kind of circle or parabola" (p. 315). The cited text is in Section IV, not V, of the Postscripts.

In his notion of continuous creation, the French philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), conceived of God as the only true cause and creative agent, who wills that things happen in accordance with so-called natural causes; this active willing is continuous, and is therefore a continuous creation of what takes place. His Augustinian brand of Platonism was criticized by the empiricist Locke. These two tendencies—idealism and empiricism—constitute, of course, one of the classic polarities in the history of philosophy.

The "place in F" is not vacated by the Law, but is rather "left empty of the Law" (laissée vacante de la Loi). Rather than saying the absence "appears to be denuded," we prefer "appears to be laid bare" (parait se dénuder). In the absence of the Law of the Father, the ego ideal is shaped solely in reference to the desire of the mother.

The line does not "end" but rather "would culminate" (culminerait) in the Creatures of speech where it balloons out from its ends in I and M in schema I (1977, p. 212/571). The child is not "rejected in the hopes" of Schreber, but rather "denied to" his hopes (refusé aux espoirs).

In antiphrasis the contrary of what is meant is said. The absence (due to foreclosure) of symbolic castration by the Law of the Father leads Schreber to repeat, in the real, the castration involved in the delusional Entmannung, but without the salutary effect of symbolic castration, for he does it in order to be the phallus, which is incompatible with having it.

Lacan's use of "reasonable compromise" (un compromis raisonnable) can be based, not on vernunftig, which doesn't appear in our German text, but on aus Verunstigung (out of a basis of reason) (Schreber, 1903b, p. 177), that is, on an "a priori" basis (since the World-order demanded the Entmannung) Schreber felt he must be "reconciled" to the thought of being transformed into a woman ("mich mit dem Gedanken der Verwandlung in ein Weib zu befreunden").

The first-century work The Satyricon, attributed to Petronius, is viewed by some as a take-off on Homeric themes from the Odyssey, but here the hero Encolpius ("the Crotch") is relentlessly pursued by Priapus (the phallic divinity) into struggles with lust and impotence. After one impotent episode Encolpius exclaims: "I no longer recognize myself at all. That part of my body with which I once was an Achilles is dead and buried" (p. 157). He then rejects the razor in favor of a verbal rebuke of the offending organ, for being "cold as ice," "too scared," having "screwed [its] crinkled length against my crotch, so cramped along my gut, so furled and small, I could not see to cut at all" (pp. 162-164). This passage is echoed by Schreber's words in the beginning of Chapter XIII, when he notices the portentous changes in his body: "In the immediately preceding nights, my male sexual organ might actually have been retracted had I not resolutely set my will against it" (1903a, p. 176). Lacan quotes The Satyricon at the beginning of Part III of the "Discourse at Rome" (1977, p. 77/289), using the same quote with which Eliot (1922) begins The Waste Land.

Rather than "never a question," the text should read: "Or will she believe perhaps that it was ever a ques-
tion of real castration...?" ("Ou croirait-elle peut-être qu'il se soit agi jamais d'une castration réelle...?").

206g/565 The clause following the colon in the second sentence should read: "which requires that that which borders at the imaginary level on the transformation of the subject into a woman must be precisely that which makes him forfeit any inheritance from which he could legitimately expect the attribution of a penis to his person" ("laquelle comporte que cela qui confine au niveau imaginaire à la transformation du sujet en femme, soit justement ceci qui le fasse déchoir de toute hoirie d'où il puisse légitimement attendre l'affectation d'un pénis à sa personne").

207b/565 The patient is not "doomed" but rather "dedicated" to become a woman (voué à devenir une femme).

207c/565 Fenichel (1949) wrote of one of his patients, a male transvestite: "In his perverse practices this patient represented not only a phallic girl but also a phallus pure and simple. . . . The equations, 'I am a girl' and 'my whole body is a penis' are here condensed into the idea: 'I = my whole body = a girl = the little one = the penis' " (p. 304).

The English text should read: "to whom [Fenichel] it [the symbolic parity] gives the theme for an essay of some merit" ("à qui elle donne le thème d'un essai méritoire").

207f-h/566 The solution can also be read as being the woman "mankind" lacks (qui manque aux hommes). Lacan appears to posit an intermediate stage in which Schreber's feminization involves sexual contact with men who, however, turn out to be penisless, so that Schreber then saves the day by becoming reconciled to the status of being God's spouse. In his Memoirs, however, Schreber indicates no overt interest in sexual contact with men but stresses, early in Chapter XIII: "Nothing of course could be envisaged as a further consequence of unmanning but fertilization by divine rays for the purpose of creating new human beings" (1903a, p. 177). The meaning of the fantasy, then, would lie not in an assumed reference to sexual contact with men, but in its anticipation of fertilization by God. The transition would then go from being his mother's phallus to being the phallus for mankind to being God's phallus.

208a/566 Niederland (1974) points out that himmachen means not only "make" but also "defecate," and he stresses the anal-sadistic nature of Schreber's concerns (p. 45).

208c/567 The French text has "compromise of reason" (compromis de raison), and refers back to the earlier discussion (see note 206c).

208d/567 Rather than "an alliance of nature," we prefer "an alliance likely to satisfy" (une alliance de nature à satisfaire).

208e-fl In developing the theme of the homosexual wish, Freud (1911c) writes:

It was impossible for Schreber to become reconciled to playing the part of a female wanton towards his doctor; but the task of providing God Himself with the voluptuous sensations that He required called up no such resistance on the part of his ego. Emasculation was now no longer a disgrace... By this means an outlet was provided which would satisfy both the contending forces. His ego found compensation in his
megalomania, while his feminine wishful phantasy made its way through and became acceptable. The struggle and the illness could cease [p. 48].

Freud goes on to say, however, after his discussion of repression and projection, that in conjunction with "the sexual overvaluation of the ego" (p. 65), "the majority of cases of paranoia exhibit traces of megalomania, and that megalomania can by itself constitute a paranoia. From this it may be concluded that in paranoia the liberated libido becomes attached to the ego, and is used for the aggrandizement of the ego" (p. 72). Freud describes this as a return to the stage of narcissism "in which a person's only sexual object is his own ego" (p. 72).

In his "On Narcissism: An Introduction," Freud (1914a) unequivocally gives the pivotal focus to the ego as narcissistic love object (pp. 74–75). This early narcissistic phase is apparent in the overvaluation parents show toward "'His Majesty the Baby'"—the "centre and core of creation," "as we once fancied ourselves" (p. 91). Narcissism later appears as displaced onto the ego ideal: "This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego . . . . What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal" (p. 94). It would seem, then, that for Schreber, becoming the spouse of God plays the pivotal role as his ego ideal, and that the homosexual concerns are subordinate.

The sense is that after writing his 1914 paper on narcissism, Freud would not have missed "mangé" the real basis of the change in Schreber from indignation to acceptance of the Entmannung. The basis was that between these two phases the subject was dead, thereby giving a free hand to the narcissistic elaborations of the imaginary order, culminating in the grandiose delusion of becoming God's spouse.

Rather than "as a 'leprous corpse leading to another leprous corpse,'" we translate "as a 'leprous corpse escorting another leprous corpse'" ("comme d'un 'cadavre lépreux conduisant un autre cadavre lépreux'").

For another approach to the relationship between bodily fragmentation and psychotic discourse, see Deleuze's (1979) comparison of the work of Antonin Artaud and Lewis Carroll.
and I as being on the same axis (which they are in schema R and schema I), the axis of the ego. Point e, then, is determined with reference to point i and is that unification of the fragmented body which is accomplished by the installation of the specular image as idealized form (the first identification), which is how the ego is defined, while point I is determined with reference to point M or F, depending on whether the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed or not, and consists of the later symbolic or imaginary identifications through which the ego is refashioned. See the French editor's discussion of this schema (1977, p. 334/906-907).

The relevant passage in Freud (1911c) occurs on page 30, not page 3, as in Sheridan's note (1977, p. 224).

Rather than "we are here beyond the world," which is misleading, we translate "we are here in a beyond-the-world" ("nous sommes ici dans un au-delà du monde").

Rather than "in which" for dont, we translate "about which, of course, God could not commit himself...".

This paragraph describes the left curved line of schema I, branching from "the image of the creature" (i.e., Schreber) to the specular image at i and the ego at e, circumventing the hole in the imaginary where the signifier of the phallus is foreclosed (this parallels Lacan's earlier description of the right curve on p. 205/563). The hole depicts the death of the subject as foreclosed from the symbolic order. The transformation of schema R into schema I can be pictured by cutting out the opposite corners (φ[S] and F[O]) (the phallus/subject and Father/Other referents of schema R) and stretching points i and e to the left while also stretching points M and I to the right.

Rather than "in order to resolve it," we prefer "in order to cancel it [the elision]." for pour la résoudre. The phallus is reintroduced as a lack insofar as the subject identifies himself as the phallus (and therefore as not having it). He cannot utilize the phallus as signifier but identifies with it in an imaginary manner as is concretized in his alienating absorption with his transvestite mirror image. What he was for his mother he will now try to be for God.

The graphics of schema I in the French text are much clearer: the interior is marked by vertical lines, so that the diagonal line of the double asymptote from e to M stands out sharply; also point o (a) ("is addressed to us") is clearly over to the right near M, and is therefore consistent with schema R. The asymptotic line (which is approached but never touched by either curve) and the structure of the hyperbola have mathematical properties we will leave for the mathematicians to explore. Freud's (1911c) use of "asymptotic" occurs on p. 48.

The sense is that Freud caught the role of the signifier by using only a written document, which was the evidential witness to, as well as the product of, the terminal state of psychosis.

The "induction effects" may refer to the process whereby, for example, a magnetizable object becomes magnetized when in a magnetic field, or other similar electromotive and electromagnetic effects of one field on another. The foreclosed signifier of the Name-of-the-Father brings about a corresponding overturning of the subject, the gap in one system corresponds to the gap in the other.

The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (1971), offers as derivation for "lure," levere, leverere, levere; reference is made to the Old French leurre, leurre, and loivre. The word is probably of Teutonic origin, and the reader is referred to the Middle High
German *ludor* and the Modern German *luder*, whose meaning includes “bait” or “lure.”

It is not just the “staggered shift,” but the “unwedging” (*découpage*) of the fields of the imaginary and the symbolic that distorts reality.

The French text describing the relation to the other “in so far as it is similar to him” is *en tant qu’à son semblable*, indicating the other as “counterpart,” which is the word used in earlier essays with reference to aggressive and competitive relations (see Chapters 1 and 2).

It is our exposure to (and therefore possible foreclosure of) the symbolic order that defines both our being and our potential for madness.

The French text does not say “the being and the existent,” but rather “the being of the existent” (*l'être de l'étant*), or even, to be more explicitly Heideggerean, “the being of the being.”

Rather than “the mark of negative features,” the French text reads “marks it with negative features” (*la marque de traits négatifs*). The “opposition” is between Schreber’s experience marked by voracity, disgust, and complicity, and mystical experience, illuminated by presence and joy. Schatzman (1974) misses the point when he compares Schreber’s experience with shamanistic mysticism (p. 5).

Instead of “to disarm the effort that it expends,” the French text says the exact opposite: “to disarm the effort from which it excuses itself” (“pour désarmer l'effort dont elle se dispense”).

In the lengthy sentence, “I will not deny . . . ,” Lacan says he has seen enough to question by what criteria this modern man would dissuade Lacan from situating him in social psychosis. The Pascal quote appears in an earlier chapter (1977, p. 71/283).

The absence of the Name-of-the-Father “sets off” the cascade, but the French is more precise in saying it “lures” or “entices” (*amorce*) the cascade of reshaped signifiers.

The French for “A-father” is *Un-père*.

Rather than “in some relation based on the imaginary dyad,” we translate “in some relation which has as base the imaginary couple” (“dans quelque relation qui ait pour base le couple imaginaire”). This suggests the triad of schema R (*o-o*’-O) (1977, p. 197/553) in which A-father would be situated at F. The phrase “eroticized aggression” or its equivalent is repeatedly used to describe the axis S-M (*p. 197d/553*, p. 219f/580) and suggests the combination of narcissistic love object and rivalrous identification with the other that the mirror stage gives rise to (some discussion of this appears in Chapters 1 and 2). The English translation inverts “reality-ideal” (for *idéal-réalité*) while the French (and the English follows here) appears to invert the relation between o’ and o (*le couple imaginaire a-a’*); o’ would correspond on schema R with the axis on which ego (e) and ego ideal (I) are located, while o would be on the axis of love object (*i* and M) and reality (the solid line linking *i* and M, the segment denoting objects). The translation, rather than “that interests the subject in the field of eroticized aggression that it induces,” can read “who interests the subject in the field of eroticized aggression that he induces,” referring back to A-father.

In the French, “environmental” is in quotes.

The question, “Whom do you love most . . . ?” is used by Freud in his discussion of the Rat Man (1909b, p. 238).

The meaning of the “other way around,” that is, the love and respect of the father by which he puts the mother in her place, may refer to how the Name-of-the-Father intervenes between child and mother to
put an end to the imaginary dyad in which one is phallus for the other.

De Waelhens (1972) gives a clear illustration of how a mother fails to reserve such a place. Speaking of mothers of psychotic patients, he writes, drawing on the work of Aulagnier-Spaïrani (1964): “These women neither recognize nor comprehend the law as such. That which replaces the law—for themselves and for the others upon whom they attempt to impose it—is their own caprice” (p. 63). De Waelhens then presents Aulagnier’s analogy of a card game. These mothers understand only a form of “solitaire,” which is played without partners and without rules.

The cards which are normally only symbolic instruments through which a game can be played between myself and others, a game in which the very fact of cheating means that I understand the rules, become in this case an end in themselves. One no longer needs to know, in order to play, that the King is higher than the Queen, nor that the established order determines the value: to play such “solitaire” there is no need to understand the symbolic value of the signs—the signs by themselves suffice, and one can, in each instance, make a new law. It is a law which has no need of any symbolic support, and which only depends on the arbitrary choice of the one who plays [p. 63].

This suggests the “fundamental absence of law in the arena in which these subjects [the mothers] locate themselves” (p. 63).

The dishonest behavior is transparent to the children. Referring to his own work, Lacan says the consequences that may be expected “from it in [not “in their”] investigation and technique are to be judged elsewhere” (“Les suites qu’on en peut attendre dans l’examen et la technique…”).

An excellent summary of the Schreber material is provided by Meissner (1976).

Rather than “grasping in it the chain,” we translate “grasping there the chain” (d’y saisir la chaîne).

Schreber wrote:

“…I want to say by way of introduction that the leading roles in the genesis of this development, the first beginnings of which go back perhaps as far as the eighteenth century, were played on the one hand by the names of Flechsig and Schreber (probably not specifying any individual member of these families), and on the other by the concept of soul murder [1903a, p. 22].

Lacan appears to be calling attention to the names as signifiers, the Name-of-the-Father in particular, and the link between the foreclosed signifier and the hole in the signified (the meaning of soul-murder?), so that Flechsig’s name stands for his father’s and reveals the void of the foreclosure. Lacan might have added Schreber’s reference to Hamlet ("in Hamlet’s words, there is something rotten in the state of Denmark—that is to say, in the relationship between God and mankind") (1903a, p. 203). Actually—a minor point—the words were spoken by Marcellus (in Act I, Scene iv). Indeed, Lacan (1959) does provide us with an analysis of Hamlet, in which he discusses the inverse of foreclosure, namely the hole in the real caused by someone’s death, and sees mourning, like psychosis, triggering a swarm of images to fill the hole. The original mourned object is the phallus, given up in the resolution of the Oedipus complex: “Indeed, the ‘something rotten’ with which poor Hamlet is confronted is most closely connected with
the position of the subject with regard to the phallus" (p. 49). For further elaboration, see Muller (1980).

Rather than “the third position, to which the signifier of paternity is called,” we read “the third position, where the signifier of paternity is called for” (“la position tierce où le signifiant de la paternité est appelé”).


The French text says the exact opposite: “the preceding considerations do not leave me here unprepared” (“les considérations qui précèdent ne nous laissant ici sans vert”).

Jacques Prévert (1900-1977) was a popular French writer of poems, screenplays, and plays, and was also involved in radio, television, and documentary films. Lacan quotes him earlier (1977, p. 64/275).

The first words of the sentence appear to be elided, so that we read: “This is the term in which” (Terme où). The English translation omits a pronoun, so that we read: “the failure of the signifier which in the Other” (c’est-à-dire du signifiant qui dans l’Autre).