



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JACQUES LACAN: GRAPH OF DESIRE (COMPLETE)

Paradigms of *Jouissance**

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translated by JORGE JAUREGUI

PARADIGM ONE: THE *IMAGINARISATION* OF *JOUISSANCE*

The first paradigm is the *imaginarisation* of *jouissance*. It specifies the consequences of the first movement in Lacan's teaching as regards the doctrine of *jouissance*, springing to life with the introduction of the symbolic as composing a dimension distinct from the analytical experience, and a register proper to existence.

As for *jouissance* these consequences remain concealed since the conceptual stage is engaged with determining the function of *parole* as giver of meaning, with the field of language backing its structure, and the exertions of history, namely the retroactive dynamism of subjectification, of re-subjectification, of facts and events. What dominates this first conceptual moment is communication conceived as inter-subjective and dialectical.

This overture fixed for a long time what was conjectured as being the base, the kernel, even the whole of Lacan's teaching.

What I call here communication, initially takes shape as evidence—in the analytical cure—of the fundamental, structuring

* "L'expérience du réel dans la cure analytique." Paris, Spring 1999.

character of the subject to subject rapport. In his essay on transfer¹—a text preceding his “Report to the Rome Congress” of 1953, Lacan qualifies what he ventures of dialectics in inter-subjectivity. Seemingly, inter-subjectivity is amended by the dissymmetry progressively introduced in the subject to subject rapport. The two subjects in function are not equivalent, since the subject-analyst actually listens, punctuates, interprets, and thereby decides on meaning. Whence the introduction to the instance of the capital Other, and to the absolute Other, a position endowed with properties distinct from those of the subject that doesn’t find here its correlate. Later on this Other becomes a place of *parole*, a place of language, a place of structure and a place of all the subject’s determinations. In brief, this is what appeared to be the capital contribution, the novation introduced by Lacan. The relation gets inscribed on the symbolic axis as follows:



This moment, in Lacan’s teaching, epitomizes the conceptualizing in question as staying equivocal. It is always inscribed between two poles, *parole* and language. On the side of *parole*, Lacan willingly develops, openly rectifies the inter-subjective. On the side of language, as in reprisal, he further emphasizes the autonomy of the symbolic over the fact that the signifying chain—as it operates in the Other—has its own demands, a logic of its own.

The initial development accounts for what is decipherable of the unconscious in the analytical cure. Thereupon as well the initial equivocal. During those early years of Lacan’s teaching, the unconscious looms sometimes as language and sometimes as *parole*. At times the stress is on the structure it comports, at times on the discourse it utters, enforces, to the extent that he would characterize the unconscious as subject.

What ensues from Lacan’s intervention on the corpus of Freudian elaboration? The effect is caesura, what he deems as

“the disentanglement brought about in the Freudian corpus between the technique of deciphering the unconscious,” accounting for this extraordinary montage, communicational and structural, “and the theory of instincts, indeed the theory of drives.”² Lacan privileges the deciphering as far as it retrieves on the symbolic, as it presumes the difference between signifier and signified and befits a communicational structure.

Whence the question of what becomes of the Freudian economical perspective, namely satisfaction? Within the unconscious formations something is ciphered and deciphered. Freud evinces this. Yet also, for Freud, something finds satisfaction in what is ciphered and deciphered. Lacan’s answer, conditioned by the privilege he bestows upon symbolic deciphering, is that the essential satisfaction is to be found in communication itself, as it delivers meaning. In Seminar V,³ satisfaction is attached to the Other’s ratification and recognition of the curious, astonishing, and sometimes devious linguistic formations that originate in the subject. The understanding, which eventually translates into witticism, by way of laughter, makes up for a satisfaction of the semantic order. Satisfaction can be illustrated as much on the side of the subject as on the side of the Other. On the subject’s side, it’s the imprisonment of meaning which effects suffering. So it accounts for the symptom as non-delivered meaning. The imprisonment in this structure is rendered as repression. Repressed meaning upholds the symptom, and when Lacan wielded the term of consciousness you have “even repressed from the subject’s consciousness”—the advent of satisfaction concomitant with the resurfacing of the certain meaning. On the side of the Other, it is admission, registration, validation of the subjective meaning that rounds off in recognition. Thus his attachment to the theme of recognition; to the extent that the desire of recognition goes with the subject’s deepest desire, is cogent insofar as this recognition wallows satisfaction within the communicational register.

To the question about the fate of the economic perspective

in this construct, the initial answer would be symbolic satisfaction. However, this answer does not permeate everything involved here in Freud. What of the drives, of libidinal investment, of its fixations, of the *fantasme*, of the superego as of the ego? The evidence of this objection finds out that the symbolic is not everything, since it leaves out the imaginary where a different register of satisfaction is accomplished. Vis-à-vis the symbolic satisfaction that stretches its dominion over the psychic assembly, what remains is imaginary satisfaction, which you may call *jouissance* proper.

In the first paradigm libido has an imaginary status. *Jouissance* as imaginary does not derive from *parole* nor from communicational language, it is not originated in the subject. *Jouissance* ascribes to the ego as imaginary agency. Lacan interprets the ego after narcissism and narcissism after the mirror stage, thus the Freudian proposition that posits the ego as reservoir of libido. In *Écrits* he contends that “narcissism envelops the forms of desire.”⁴

If you are to find the place of *jouissance* as distinct from symbolic satisfaction, you detect it on the imaginary axis *a-a'* where Lacan strives to accommodate all that in Freud is characterized as libidinal investment. He journeys through the Freudian body of work and designates as imaginary what does not conform to the symbolic satisfaction. *Jouissance* as such, imaginary *jouissance*, is not inter-subjective but intra-imaginary. It is not dialectical but is constantly described by Lacan as permanent, stagnant and inert. Even before his “Report to the Rome Congress” transference is considered as alien to the dialectics of analytical experience, and so deemed as belonging to the imaginary dimension, as appearing at a stagnant moment of dialectics and reproducing the permanent modes of object constitution. Similarly, in *La lettre volée*,⁵ the imaginary elements are characterized by their inertia, and are envisaged as mere shadows and reflections of what takes place within the symbolic dialectics.

The first paradigm stresses the disjunction between the signifier and *jouissance*. What was rightly construed then, namely

the split between the field of the ego and the field of the unconscious, is in fact the very strict disjunction between the signifier and *jouissance*. The signifier has a logic of its own, its own course, distinct as such, unraveled from adherences to *jouissance*. In the analytical experience, imaginary *jouissance* is sensitive to certain extrusions, when a failure, a fracture in the symbolic chain occurs.

A significant part in Lacan's *clinique* consists in reporting a certain number of phenomena with the fracture of the symbolic chain and with its emergencies of imaginary *jouissance*. Thus his reading of the "acting-out," according to Ernst Kriss' experience,⁶ is referred to as the emergence of an oral relation primordially re-trenched, that is, to an element inherent to imaginary *jouissance*. Again, Seminar IV,⁷ persistently furnishes evidence of transitory perversions in the analytical experience. Regularly considered as emergencies of imaginary *jouissance*, here the symbolic elaboration is at a miss, or recoils. Lacan's initial axiom on the superego should also be assigned to the same paradigm, as an obscene and feral figure. For him the superego is what springs from such symbolic failure and thereby characterizes imaginary *jouissance*.

In a general way when the symbolic chain breaks, objects, products, effects of *jouissance* soar from the imaginary. What in Freud is libidinal, is then referred to imaginary *jouissance* as obstacle, as barrier. Lacan represents these axes crosswise—imaginary *jouissance* stands as an obstacle or barrier vis-à-vis the symbolic development.

The first paradigm is rather equivocal since, on one side the imaginary is well what remains outside the capture of the symbolic, whereas on the other side Lacan invariably points out that the imaginary is at once dominated by the symbolic. You discern in his writings and his Seminars, a kind of tension between what persists as "an autonomy of the imaginary," with properties of its own, with its source distinct from language and parole, and right away an elusive tune coming from the symbolic ascendancy over the imaginary...the melody swells, roars, and becomes dominant.

The imaginary serves as material to the symbolic, it especially serves as material to the symptom; it is inserted into the symbolic, the symbolic acting upon it. In the beginning of Lacan's teaching, this idea is only detected under the guise of generic propositions. Accuracy is devoted to the signifying articulation and to its autonomy. A proviso, however, the notation over the imaginary elements as susceptible of symbolic recovery is inscribed. The *imaginarisation of jouissance*, an extraordinary exertion upon Freud's texts, comes with and is progressively outclassed by the transposition of the imaginary into the symbolic.

Lacan's initial, liberating gesture, came to accretion under the banner of the non-rapport of the imaginary and the symbolic. He highly disengaged the symbolic order in its autonomy, thereby instructing the analysts on the event of logic—bypassing all reference to body's *jouissance*—as to set up its rules, meet any axiom, and affect whatever all and everyone may say. This trait in concert with the purity of the symbolic evinces its non-rapport vis-à-vis the imaginary as the place which, in Freud, is called libido.

PARADIGM TWO: THE *SIGNIFIANTISATION OF JOUISSANCE*

This is the second movement in Lacan's teaching. Chronologically though it doesn't succeed the first one. It blends with it, bringing it somehow to completion; and then gradually imposes itself. Having the better of the first paradigm it will thoroughly dominate it. You witness a genuine conceptual rewriting that makes apparent the fact that all the terms that have been poured into the imaginary register, eventually recovered by the symbolic, are thoroughly symbolic terms.

The first paradigm organizes this huge imaginary reserve, and the second movement evinces the consistency and the symbolic articulation of what is imaginary. Transference, for instance, at first ascribed to imaginary *jouissance*, is now being shifted onto the symbolic axis. Drives are not only structured in terms of lan-

guage—Lacan starts transposing drives from a merely imaginary *jouissance*—they are also capable of metonymy, substitution and combination. The drive is written as of the symbolic subject, after the demand, after an eminently symbolic term. This sylloge ($\mathcal{S} \leftrightarrow D$) is a capital moment in the *signifiantisation* of *jouissance*. The Other's demand is inscribed in the formula of the drive, that is, the drive is re-transcribed in symbolic terms.

This is also the case with the *fantasme*. In the first paradigm the *fantasme* is the eminent ligature transiently articulating the *objet a* and the *objet a'*, which as well needs the Name-of-the-Father to superimpose the register that surmounts it. In Seminar V you can witness the displacement of the concept of transference, as it moves from the imaginary register to the symbolic register. In fact the *fantasme* cannot be but a scenario, therefrom the *fantasme* is always assimilated to a signifying chain. Whence the formula of the *fantasme* proceeds from the second paradigm, ($\mathcal{S} \leftrightarrow a$) and the image is a signifying image and is articulated with the symbolic subject. This writing has affixed to Lacan's teaching for a long time as the sign of the connection between the symbolic and the libidinal. It also determines the centering of the cure on the *fantasme* as the nodal linkage par excellence where the imaginary and the symbolic concentrate, as an essential *point de capiton* to both registers.



Within the same move is inscribed the displacement of the concept of regression, from the imaginary to the symbolic register. In the first paradigm regression is related to disintegration, to the deconstruction of the ego and its imaginary relations. Here, on the contrary, regression is evinced as endowed with a symbolic nature, that is achieved via the backlash of signifiers that had been earlier applied to former demands.

The meaningful momentousness of this paradigm corre-

sponds to the phallus; thus its status as image, already severed from the organ, which is displaced in order to privilege its symbolic status. The eventuality starts off in Seminar V, which was delivered during 1957-1958, and after "On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis."⁸ Here the phallus is portrayed as imaginary. Lacan effects the shift to get to "the phallus is a signifier." If you compare the axioms closely you find but one contradiction, as the phallic term is here dragged into the *signifiantisation* of imaginary *jouissance* that Lacan systematically applies to every term. Now he pursues it even further, culminating in the general demonstration that the selfsame libido is inscribed in the signifier. In Seminar VI,⁹ he presses the *signifiantisation* of *jouissance* to ascertain it as equivalent to the signified of an unconscious signifying chain, as the vocabulary is made up of the drive. This is what Lacan called desire. In this concept of desire is the *signifiantisation* of *jouissance* gaining accomplishment, realized and being effected. Certainly, it's a mortified *jouissance*, a *jouissance* translated into the signifier, *jouissance* such as the one that lies at the top of Lacan's graph where he will rewrite the trajectory from *jouissance* to castration. Over this trajectory the *signifiantisation* is consummated.

Yet again, where is the satisfaction? It's the satisfaction of desire. The modes of satisfaction attach to the signifier that bears the desire: there is near you a person, a function, an instance, which represents the signifier of the desire. Still there is another satisfaction that hooks to desire, as long as it flows like the signified under the signifier—it's the pure satisfaction over metonymy. Hence the notion of undoing the identifications that may hamper desire's free flowing, and especially the phallic identification. This still does not saturate Freud's corpus, since it does not answer the question as to what is the drive's satisfaction proper. It cannot answer it, for drive is there reduced to a signifying chain. Again, all that can be said about satisfaction is always uttered in symbolic terms.

What appears to be essential in the second paradigm is the

obliteration of *jouissance* by means of the signifier, and this is how it is conditioned by the erasure model which emphasizes, underscores the effect of sublimation, *Aufhebung*. This is repeated in the outline going from *jouissance* to castration: the signifier annuls *jouissance* restituting it as signified desire.

Vis-à-vis the first paradigm, this one responds to an inverse movement of reabsorption of *jouissance* into the symbolic, the imaginary still abiding in its own dimension. Where does *jouissance* stand then? *Jouissance* is basically apportioned between desire and the *fantasme*. Somehow it is desire, that is, signified of the unconscious demand. From this viewpoint *jouissance* can be written as follows: drive as unconscious demand assigned to a signifier, and desire assigned to the signified.

$$\frac{\mathcal{S}}{s} \longrightarrow \frac{(\mathcal{S}\langle\rangle D)}{d}$$

Actually *jouissance* is none other than the desire, which at the same time is dead desire. And this grants even more the second term where Lacan inscribes *jouissance*, namely the *fantasme* extorting life out of *jouissance*. This *fantasme* comports life, the living body via the insertion of the *objet a* as image included in a signifying structure, an image of *jouissance* captured in the symbolic. The *objet a* preserves its imaginary attributes and concentrates the peak of the libidinal attached to the living. On the side of the barred subject you have instead a being of death, since it is a solely signifying function.

PARADIGM THREE: THE IMPOSSIBLE *JOUISSANCE*

It's on account of Lacan pursuing the *signifiantisation* of *jouissance* to its very conclusion that the need of a third paradigm is set up. This change, this correction, this addition, this distinct paradigm, which is introduced in Seminar VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanaly-*

sis,¹⁰ can be termed as the paradigm of the impossible *jouissance*, that is, real *jouissance*. Lacan considered this Seminar as effecting a sort of scission. It constitutes a privileged reference as far as it bespeaks his third attribution to *jouissance*—assigned to the real.

That is the meaning of *das Ding*, which Lacan brings in from Freud's text, as a sort of *Witz*. This term is not structured as are his mathemes. It signals in its distinctive feature, *unheimlich*, that you not are dealing with a symbolic term. What does *das Ding*, the Thing, mean? It means that satisfaction, the true one, the one related to drive, *Befriedigung*, is not to be found either in the imaginary nor in the symbolic but outside of what is being symbolized; the actual satisfaction belongs to the register of the real. It comports that the symbolic as well as the imaginary relation, namely the whole architecture of Lacan's big graph, which accommodates two levels, is in fact set up against real *jouissance* as though holding back the real *jouissance*.

This conveys a profound switch in the line of speculation, which implies a substitution of the defense against repression. Repression is a concept that belongs to the symbolic and conditions the very notion of deciphering. Whereas the notion of defense indicates a primary orientation of being, a defense that already exists even before the conditions of repression as such are formulated.

In *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* the stress is focused on an area external to this montage, as though determining the montage. You are dealing with a barrier; not the imaginary one but the barrier the real opposes to both the imaginary and the symbolic. Lacan depicts two others, both adjacent to the real, essential barrier: the symbolic—the law—which says, “you must not” or “you cannot,” and the imaginary, which he describes apropos of Antigone as the emergence of beauty impeding the attainment of the Thing, before the thwart towards the Thing. You have a symbolic and an imaginary barrier, but they are both conditioned by this symbolized withdrawal outside the Thing.

Discontinuity has more of a mark here than in the previous paradigms. A fracture actually comes off. *Jouissance* proceeds onto the real and asserts itself there—outside the system. If its main feature is its absoluteness, this is what allowed for Lacan to develop a substitution term system capable of going with it.

This paradigm is subject to a model different than that of erasure—of the signifier as leading to *Aufhebung*. Instead it is akin to the model of the vase borrowed from Heidegger. A vase is a cultural devise that comes to add to reality. Yet paradoxically enough, it at once introduces depletion, and by the same token it introduces the possibility of being filled. This particular property singles out the Thing as equivalent to the annulment that constitutes castration. It inscribes the reduction of *jouissance* to an empty place and can be written as equivalent to the barred subject, yet it will furthermore introduce the possibility of filling it up and the notion of a forever inadequate supplement. It inaugurates an extraordinary litany of terms, which Lacan progressively enumerates in his *Ethics...* imaginary elements, symbolic elements. Any symbolic term can come to fill up this place provided it is severed from the system, endowed with absoluteness.

Lacan enjoys exposing Kant's ethics, a symbolic *énoncé* par excellence, which admits nevertheless the annulment of *jouissance*. On one side it is the reverse of *das Ding*—of *jouissance*; on the other it is identical to *das Ding* because it affects the same mute, blind, absolute trait peculiar to *das Ding*. This term substitutes for *das Ding*'s mute truth, mute precisely because it is outside of the symbolic. The mother, which is the object par excellence, protected by the Oedipical barrier, takes the place of *das Ding*. Science responds to the imperative of *das Ding* because of its absoluteness, because it always returns to the same place. Basically you are being introduced to a list of substitute objects, all sorts of them, even the most absurd. It's Jacques Prévert's match boxes, the chest of drawers in lieu of the vase model.

In the third paradigm ingression to *jouissance* renders force mandatory. And this means *jouissance* is appraised outside the system, thus *jouissance* is inaccessible, structurally inaccessible, if not through transgression. Whence the eulogy to heroism and to a whole party of heroes who then start assailing the Seminars. Antigone looms as passing the barrier of the city, the law, the barrier of beauty, in order to reach the territory of horror that comports *jouissance*. Lacan writes a fantastic symphony over the heroism of *jouissance*, where as though uplifted, heroism resigns the symbolic and imaginary purr to attain the tearing of *jouissance*. This paradigm epitomizes a deep disjunction between the signifier and *jouissance*. It gets back something from the first one where you had this disjunction because *jouissance* was imaginary. Here some of the disjunction is retrieved because *jouissance* is in the real. This is the kind of loop ensued by Lacan's teaching.

You can discern the opposition between libido transcribed as desire, positioned amidst signifiers, and libido as *das Ding* looming outside any signifier as well as of any signified. The contraposition between pleasure and *jouissance* is capital. The pleasure principle appears as though a natural barrier to *jouissance*; so the opposition between the homeostasis of pleasure and the consecutive excesses of *jouissance* is set up. At the same time you are dealing with the antagonism between what belongs to the register of goodness—on the pleasure's side—and what the ever evil *jouissance* comports. *The Ethics* calls in the Sadean *jouissance* as the quintessence of this paradigm. It also entails an opposition between what on one side is delusive—the side of pleasure, of the signifier, of the imaginary and of semblance—and what, on the other, is real.

Yet, if the unconscious is defined as being structured like a language, as being the discourse of the Other, you may here run into hot water. To the extent the unconscious does not include *jouissance* as outside the symbolized, it's somehow what cannot speak. *The Ethics* posits that, at the level of the unconscious, the

subject tells a lie over *das Ding*, that there is a sort of primal deceitfulness over *jouissance* that reflects, that is the comment on this fundamental severing disjunction between the signifier and *jouissance*. What Freud termed as defense is this primeval lie itself, the structural lie the subject conveys to the place of *jouissance*. The actual clinical treatment is not developed in *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*. However, the symptom, formerly ascribed to repression, is in there ascribed to defense. Lacan refers the symptom to the necessarily and structurally disharmonic character of the relation to *jouissance*. The symptom is the way in which the subject enunciates that *jouissance* is bad, that is, the symptom positions itself exactly on the barrier standing between the signifier and *jouissance* and reverberates *jouissance*'s radical disharmony vis-à-vis the subject.

This paradigm takes account of the fact that desire and the *fantasme* do not saturate what *jouissance* adds up to, thereby it has to reject *jouissance* outside the symbolic and the imaginary in the real. Here *jouissance* is on the side of the Thing. What then is the Thing? As a term, it is an Other of the Other. It's what in relation to the signifying apparatus of the Other, stuffed as it is with what has been translated from the imaginary, constitutes the Other. It doesn't have the signifying structure of the Other, it's the Other of the Other inasmuch as it lacks in the Other. Lacan's assessment of *jouissance* as the Thing is equivalent to the barred Other. It's what turns *jouissance* into the Other of the Other, in the sense of what is missing—of lack—in the Other.

$$\longrightarrow \begin{array}{c} J \equiv S \\ a \end{array}$$

In a way, to isolate the Thing as outside the symbolic sets up an impasse. Lacan will put this impasse to work along his Seminars, now exerting himself on thinking the rapport between the signifier and what is left outside the symbolic. How? He henceforth por-

trays *jouissance*, which here emerges under the auspices of the Thing, outside the symbolic, as object. Thus the advancement of the *objet a*. A new covenant between *jouissance* and the Other cannot be enacted if you side with the Thing, with massive *jouissance*.

PARADIGM FOUR: NORMAL *JOUISSANCE*

In Los Angeles,¹¹ I cautiously dubbed the fourth paradigm the fragmented *jouissance*, though I can stretch it up to normal *jouissance*. Let me refer the fourth paradigm to Seminar XI, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*.¹²

There is an extraordinary antithesis between *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* and Seminar XI; in the latter Lacan arranges a new covenant between the symbolic and *jouissance*. In *The Ethics* you have a layout of *jouissance*'s massiveness as though positioned in a place normally out of reach. It calls for transgression, for a forcing, in an abyssal place, transgression being the only way to access it. In Seminar XI *jouissance* appears fragmented in *objets a*. It is not located in an abyss, it is in a little hollow: "the *objet a* is simply the presence of a hollow, a void." There is no accessibility to *jouissance* through heroic transgression, but by means of drive rethought, by means of drive as it follows a course that returns.

Stimmung, the affective coloration of these two Seminars, is absolutely opposed. In *The Ethics*, *jouissance* is connected to horror; you must go through sadism in order to understand what's going on. When positioned in the place of *jouissance* there happens an appalling corporeal fragmentation, and one only death is insufficient for Lacan to give account for, he added a second one. In Seminar XI the rapport model to *jouissance* is art, the painting, the peaceful contemplation of the art object. As Lacan says, the work of art calms people, it comforts them, it favors them. Compare the two Seminars and you detect a sort of inverse itinerary. In *The Ethics* it's the pleasure principle, homeostasis, all those sym-

bols and images that do for the pleasure principle, till you progressively meet with sadistic fragmentation. Contrarily, in *The Four Fundamental Concepts*, you start with the fragmented body of partial drives, with the erogenous zones that are autonomous and self-centered. Thus integration is actually achieved over drive *jouissance*; an automatic *jouissance* attained by means of drive's normal course, by means of its coming and going, and without transgression.

What is then altered from one paradigm to the other? Lacan refutes this cleavage between the signifier and *jouissance* in this fourth paradigm. He forges a covenant, a tight articulation between the signifier and *jouissance*. Seminar XI revises the fundamentals on which his "Report to the Rome Congress" was based.

What is the aim of the mechanism of alienation and separation, with all this gear Lacan infers from the set theory? What's going on here? The matter deals with a tight articulation of the symbolic and *jouissance*. The case is that *jouissance* is not a plus in this respect, rather it fits the signifier's function—it is akin to the signifier. Alienation though responds to separation. Strictly speaking alienation is a symbolic exertion. The outcome necessarily entails an effect of *jouissance*, separation, thus integrating here the signifier and *jouissance*.

Now you attempt a conceptual analysis, in Freudian terms, of what Lacan calls alienation. Alienation imports the coupling of two concepts: identification and repression. Identification supposes a signifier exemplifying the subject, a somehow absorbent signifier—within the Other—to which the subject becomes identified; yet, at once, it remains an empty set. Therefore the split: on one side the subject remains an empty set and is represented as signifier, on the other it joins on with repression. In a signifying chain... S_1, S_2 , repression means that one goes underneath the other—the one representing the subject.

Separation involves Lacan's own way of retranslating the function of drive as though responding to identification and re-

pression. There, where the empty subject was, the lost object turns up, the *objet a*. Whereas in *The Ethics* a terrible transgression is requisite in order to achieve *jouissance*, in *The Four Fundamental Concepts* separation implies the normal functioning of drive as far as it accounts for the emptiness resulting from identification and repression. This presumes the superimposition of the structure of the subject to that of *jouissance*. The same way the subject accounts for a lack-in-being, drive may be defined as including a gap or a little hollowness.

The unconscious in Seminar XI varies from its earlier representations. Starting with his first paradigm, Lacan always positioned the unconscious as an agency, a chain, a regular formation. Now in Seminar XI he repositions the total unconscious over discontinuity, and not only on discontinuity, which is compatible with the signifying ordering, he expressly describes the unconscious as a rim, “something that opens and closes.” Why choose to highlight what actually opens and closes? Actually it renders the unconscious homogeneous to an erogenous zone. Lacan describes the unconscious with accuracy as an anus or as a mouth, on the modality of the erogenous zone. He does so, precisely to illustrate the structural affinity between the symbolic unconscious and the functioning of the drive, “something in the apparatus of the body is structured in the same way as the unconscious.” Here he models *jouissance* over the subject itself. He introduces somehow in miniature, and in the drive itself, the model of the vase. This is the kind of hollow you deal with in the drive, the same Heideggerian vase from *The Ethics*; it is the hollow created by the signifying annulment coming to be filled—always inadequately—by an object. Again, in this fourth paradigm, libido is this very object.



The myth of lamella constitutes a new definition of libido. No longer as desire, signified, nor as *das Ding*, massive *jouissance* outside the signifier is only reachable via transgression; it's the libido as organ, as lost object and matrix of all lost objects. Separation, is in fact the recuperation of the libido as lost object. With his apparatus Lacan will demonstrate that the libido responds to a signifying lack proper, which follows from the articulation of identification and repression.

What creates a small difficulty here is that actually, this lost object is a loss independent of the signifier, a natural loss. Libido, as lost object, "represents what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction." Thus contends Lacan, after the amoeba, the fact of us being individualized and the fact of sexed reproduction, amounts to a loss of life.

The hollow is brought in as a loss and condoned as a natural loss. Lacan constantly has recourse to this device. For instance, when elaborating the mirror-stage, he ascribed it to a pre-maturation in childbirth, again to a natural lack. Here, you discern dissymmetry: since you have a signifying lack, \mathcal{S} ; the lack is then articulated to a natural lack, to a loss naturally effected.

In this paradigm *jouissance* is restarted into a new mechanism via the coupled exertions of alienation and separation. Whereas in *The Ethics* stress falls upon an invariable place as far as mechanisms, combinations and glissades of the signifier, and fluctuations of the imaginary are concerned, Seminar XI represents a recovery of Lacan's main ambition: the recovery of *signifiantisation* by other means. Yet, this implies a rupture vis-à-vis the original ternary inasmuch as *jouissance*, instead of appearing as irreducible to the symbolic, instead of simply being reduced to a signifier, is at the same time singularized as such and inscribed in the functioning of a system.

The conjunction of alienation and separation presupposes a discreet substitution, thus the intrinsic difficulty befalling the

actual conjunction—in *Position de l'inconscient*.¹³ Alienation delivers only one subject over the signifier; reduced to a lack its only substance is the empty set. Here, for a substance susceptible of *jouissance* you are at a loss, there is none. In order to introduce separation and an *objet a* as an answer to the lack of signifier, you have to substitute the subject for a living body, a sexed body. Still you need to address the properties of the sexed body, particularly its mortality, its rapport with the Other sex, its individuality, and through the same token what in Lacan is translated as a loss of life, which implies as such the existence of the subject's body. Thereupon the drive objects can be introduced as though repairing, filling this loss of life.

Henceforth, *jouissance* was apportioned under the guise of the *objet a*, that is, a farther modest, reduced and manageable instance than the Thing. The *objet a* is the small change as for the Thing. In *Le Transfert*¹⁴ Lacan highlights the *agalma* in transference: be there something like the object that is a hidden and determinant element devoid of consistency, being, nature, statute, signifying structure. This is what he looks for in his Seminars IX and X.¹⁵ In *L'identification* he moves towards the *signifiantisation* of the Freudian identification, drawing it out from the imaginary, stressing the structure of the signifier. In *L'angoisse*, he counters with the statute, value and weight of the *objet a*, which he disengages as gaze, and that he will pursue by superposing "The Mirror Stage"¹⁶ to *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*.¹⁷

This paradigm plays up the *objet a* as an element of *jouissance*. It makes the Thing an element, a multiple element. From its inception the *objet a* is fairly ambiguous. It embodies and reproduces the Thing—it is the elementary figure—yet it is subordinated to the Other. Thus the *objet a* mediates between the Thing and the Other as though in the *objet a* the Other of the signifier forced upon the Thing its own structure. The *objet a* performs a *signifiantisation* of *jouissance*, though here the case is not with the signifier. Lacan gives up the notion of the signifier of *jouissance*.

The very essence of *jouissance* seems to turn against the eventuality of being pinned down in a signifier term. Instead of a signifier of *jouissance*—symbolized as Φ —he introduces the *objet a*. This *objet a*, no doubt, is an element of *jouissance*, as such substantial, which does not observe the law of representing the subject for another thing—it belongs in another structure—and is nevertheless endowed with a signifying attribute, namely the fact of appearing as an element. Precisely this elementary character of the *objet a* is what materializes its inscription to the symbolic order.

In Seminar XI, *jouissance* responds to the subject's signifying alienation under the guise of the object. This is what Lacan calls separation. The *objet a* has the elementary structure of the signifier and is together substantial, whereas the signifier is material and not substantial. There is a signifying material, yet there is a substance of *jouissance*, and this is what makes for the difference between the *objet a* and the signifier.

PARADIGM FIVE: DISCURSIVE *JOUISSANCE*

The elaboration of Lacan's four discourses belongs to the paradigm I term discursive *jouissance*—I detected it in Seminars XVI and XVII, as well as in *Radiophonie*.¹⁸ With Lacan discourse is alienation and separation unified, put together, and this grants his statement from *L'envers de la psychanalyse*, "there is a primal relation from knowledge to *jouissance*,"¹⁹ to be read as—there is a primal relation from the signifiers to *jouissance*.

Prior to the fifth paradigm there's always been, first the description of structure, of the articulation of the signifiers, of the Other, of the dialectics of the subject, and then in a second movement the question dealt with finding how the living being, the organism, libido, were captured by the structure. The innovation brought with the notion of discourse is the idea that the relation signifier/*jouissance* is primal and underived. Here Lacan underscores the value of repetition as repetition of *jouissance*.

“The signifier represents the subject for another signifier,” sums up symbolic alienation. However what discourses introduce is that the signifier represents a *jouissance* for another signifier. Yet the axiom does not work adequately because it gets muddled with the first one, hardening the rationale. You may argue that with the signifier rendering *jouissance* the signifier overpasses *jouissance*, the same way that when representing the subject it overpasses it too—it remains the empty set aside. “The signifier represents *jouissance* for another signifier,” reproduces the rapport between subject and signifier. Lacan sums it up in *Écrits*²⁰ “Our definition of the signifier (there is no other definition) is: that which represents the subject for another signifier.”

The axiom is explicitly Lacanian though it can be traced to Charles Sanders Peirce. He defined the sign as what represents something for someone. Lacan altered it by making apparent the support he found under the form, “the signifier, unlike the sign, represents the subject for another signifier.” So it effects the evaporation of the addressee and again prompts the emergence, somehow instead and under the guise of the signifying Other, of the system agency—signifiers chained to other signifiers.

Now you look into the formal difference between the two axioms, Lacan’s appears as professedly paradoxical; the term to be defined, that is the signifier, reappears in the definition itself—a signifier is that which represents the subject for another signifier. The phrase is circular. Question is, what value grants the circularity, the definition of the signifier through the signifier via the subject, especially if you refer it to Peirce’s, formally accurate definition of the sign? I say Peirce’s definition befits the sign inasmuch as the sign is one, that it impends in the form of a unity termed the symbol outside the system, and that it is therefore susceptible of absolute value as it separates from whom decodes it.

The ground for Lacan introducing the signifier via a circular definition lies in the essential structure of the signifier, in its binary form. You don’t think the signifier by itself—or, if you


prefer, to think it, to launch it, to posit it by itself contravenes its natural logic. The binary is already swayed provided it is a signifier, its subjective representation value meant for another signifier. You have here the inception of a chain, of repetition. For if two is the minimum, the maximum is the countless number of signifiers. In the twofold way that develops this binary S_1 is a set of signifiers referred to by the other signifier, itself unique. While playing with the homophony, Lacan will call it *essaim* (the French for swarm). Again, as to S_1 as unique, the other signifier is allotted with the multiplicity gathered in a set. So he extricates the Knowledge signifier—not unique but multiple—from the Master signifier.

In the above mentioned text from *Écrits* all signifiers represent the subject for an other signifier that doesn't represent it. And this ensnares the initial axiom: a signifier represents the subject for another signifier. You can here consider the set containing all the signifiers representing the subject, leaving the other signifier as conspicuous for it already contravenes the circularity of the initial axiom. This version allows for a signifier of exception, that is, to bestow upon S_2 the value of the capital S, of the barred Other, namely a signifier at once supplementary as to the set of signifiers that represent the subject, while being inscribed as minus in the same set.


To sum up. $S_1 S_2$ is the structure of language reduced to the signifier in the unconscious, plus the following question: what sort of subject belongs to this structure? This circular and paradoxical definition of the signifier comports a consonant definition of the subject. Subject is what is conveyed by means of a signifier for another signifier. The fact that no identifying representation is ever complete allows for the representation to repeat itself.

You can go as far as to say that if the subject is represented it's to the extent that it is never presented, that it is never in the present. It is never but represented. The formula, inscribed in Lacan's discourses under the form $S1$, a representant of \mathcal{X} , contends that the subject is represented and, at the same time, remains

forever, in its structure, non-representable. Lacan did not hesitate to couple the accomplished, which is in the adjective represented or articulated, and then the impossible, which is in the non-articulated or the non-representable. To represent the non-representable leads the signifier towards its repetition. Repetition comports the failure in thoroughly achieving the representation in question.



A second paradox adds up, namely the one related to alienation. The emergence of the subject, even in its non-representativeness, is due to its being represented by a signifier. As for Lacan the signifier makes the subject manifest only to petrify it. So he inscribes S_1 in the set that includes it and where feigns—in an invisible way—the empty set that is there, in this set. This empty set is what remains after the delation of the signifier. That is, when S_1 is written as a set to an element you have the representation of the subject. Yet, surreptitiously, you have its lack-in-being, which is there concealed and would show up if you delete this S_1 .



Only when a signifier is inscribed does the set come into existence. The signifier makes the subject emerge, yet together it embeds the subject in the representation it bestows, its constitutive emptiness avoided in the very act. Where does the subject come from? After what sort of raw matter is the signifier starting the subject? Lacan often alludes to this substance, but does not deal with it in the *Position de l'inconscient*. "A being, the being still

sans parole.” Previous to the launching of the signifying apparatus, you have the agency, still mysterious, of an early being where the apparatus will be inscribed—whose signifier is to become a barred subject. The agency is prompted by alienation on the subject’s side. Nothing in the signifier will directly affect separation, since separation functions over a lack, which in the body means loss of life. The signifier is the cause of the subject; without the signifier there wouldn’t be a subject in the real. The subject is in the real always as discontinuity or a lack, its configurations affecting the empty set.

S is inflected under modes of truth never to turn up in any depiction of the real; for truth is inflected over the discontinuities of the real, within the modalities of death. Thus the signifier affects the real, a somehow pathetic or pathological incidence: mortification. It also looms as desire. In “The Agency of the Letter...,”²¹ desire is dead desire, whereas in Freud it’s precisely the signifying death which, unlike need, confers indestructibility to desire. It’s the signifying death, the mark S of desire that effects desire’s ingress into a kind of cybernetic or electronic memory. Thus the chain of repetition is a chain of dead desire, and *jouissance* as such, as emotion, as affection of the body, cannot be inscribed in this configuration. In “The Subversion of the Subject...” *jouissance* is a lack in the Other, that is, at first excluded from the Other’s signifying construct *jouissance* cannot be said, and consequently the antinomy between the signifier and *jouissance*—between the barred subject and *jouissance*—is emphasized.

In “The Subversion of the Subject...” Lacan attempts for the last time to chart the statute of *jouissance* in terms of signifier and signified—always asserting *jouissance* as lacking in the Other. However, he endeavors to exert the scheme of the signifier and the signified on *jouissance* as of the phallus. He devises a complex mechanism to articulate the signification of *jouissance* as forbidden, lacking, barred, mortified, with the signifier of *jouissance* that cannot be annulled. So he discerns between $-\phi$ and Φ , two signify-

ing statutes of *jouissance*, $-\phi$ as signification and Φ as signifier.

This construct signals the transcription of the libido in terms of desire not saturating its Freudian attributes. Desire, even agile desire, the kind that creeps everywhere and intrudes its bizarreness and oddities to everyone, is by definition dead desire. Notwithstanding the transcription of a certain number of attributes from the libido in terms of desire, what is left is *jouissance*, the leftover of libido once it has been transcribed in terms of desire. It is *jouissance* as impossible, outside the symbolized, that Lacan attempts to retrieve in the signifier as Φ . The notion of signifier of *jouissance* somehow turns Φ into the symbol of *das Ding*, as a signifier rendered absolute. Thus he seeks to insert *jouissance* in the signifying system. If *jouissance* can be termed as forbidden, it can however be read in-between lines. It implies the outlining of the metonymy of *jouissance*; perhaps not only the barred subject, the subject-in-lack, is conveyed by the signifier, but also *jouissance* as lost object. This paradigm stands equivalent between the subject and *jouissance*. Therefore I allowed myself to alter, in Lacan's defining proposition, the term *jouissance* for that of subject.

The being, prior to the launching of the signifying system, is a being of *jouissance*—a body affected by *jouissance*. Lacan unambiguously states in *L'envers de la psychanalyse* that *jouissance* is the inserting point of the signifying apparatus. Up to that moment, the inserting point was never mentioned as such, and this fact constrained to a surreptitious substitution: that of the body in lieu of the subject. In there, you had a rather autonomous functioning, self-contained, belonging to the symbolic order. Beyond and in opposition to any notion of the autonomy of the symbolic, the signifier is the apparatus of *jouissance*. The renouncement, which occurs in the fifth paradigm, leads Lacan to abjure the autonomy of the symbolic. The signifying chain conveyed the barred subject, truth, death, desire; presently, the signifying chain, what it conveys, is *jouissance*.

What sort of primary rapport are you dealing with in here?

The rapport is double. On one side, there is annulment, mortification of *jouissance*, but this time conceived as loss of *jouissance*, entropy envisaged as effect of the signifier. The loss though is not considered as coming from the sexed nature itself, as in the fourth paradigm, but as a loss entirely signified. Lacan previously ascribed the cleavage to a vital pre-maturation, that is, to a natural lack, which entailed the splitting embodied in “The Mirror Stage...,” and then he signified this gap. Here, what in the fourth paradigm appears as a natural loss of life, looms as an effect of the signifier. The axioms vary around this signifying loss of *jouissance*. On the other side, this primary rapport responds to a supplement of *jouissance*. To the *objet a* as *plus-de-jour*, as supplement of the loss of *jouissance*. Lacan acknowledges his breaking with the terms of the third paradigm. In *L’Envers...* “This is not articulated as a forcing or transgression.” “You don’t transgress, slipping away is not transgression.” “Transgression is a lewd word.”


Which term does he use in opposition to transgression? Signifying repetition, pure and simple, is what accounts for repetition of *jouissance*.

In *L’envers...* signifying articulation is addressed as repetition or as knowledge. Formerly, signifying repetition was a prerequisite to its own signifying representation and to the division of the subject, which always leaves part of the subject as non-representable, whereas here repetition appears as necessary to *jouissance*. Thus it is based on a return of *jouissance*, repetition points towards *jouissance*. Accordingly the position over the subject is reversed and the signifier will represent *jouissance*. At once the representation is not exhaustive, it fails, thereby paving the way for repetition. In Seminar XVII, the stress is on the signifier as the mark of *jouissance*—the master signifier celebrates an irruption of *jouissance*—yet it also introduces a loss of *jouissance* and brings about a supplement of *jouissance*. Lacan posits entropy as the cause of an accretion in *plus-de-jour*, meaning a *plus-de-jour* to be retrieved. He then states that *plus-de-jour* accretes out of a loss.

From then on *jouissance* is not attained via transgression but is essentially effected by way of entropy, of the loss brought about by the signifier. Thus Lacan is able to assert knowledge as a means of *jouissance*—which entails surrendering the autonomy of the symbolic order—in a double sense: as possessing the effect of loss, and as producing a supplement, *plus-de-jour*. He declares truth as being the sister of *jouissance*. If this is so, then truth is inseparable from the effects of language and is especially bound to barred *jouissance*, to *jouissance* as forbidden, that is, truth appears in lieu of what has been annulled, mortified. Truth is the sister of forbidden *jouissance*, or as Lacan says, truth is impotence's little sister. When he argues that truth is the sister of *jouissance*, he is aiming at $-\phi$, the corollary of the signifying annulment. Phallic *jouissance*—exemplary, perfect, paradigmatic—is forbidden, whereas what supersedes it, *jouissance* of the *plus-de-jour*, is the accretion of the entropic loss. The difference between $-\phi$ and *objet a*, between lack and its supplement, is what conditions and encourages repetition. It's the basis of *encore*, of repetition as the essential form of the signifier.

The signifier, the symbolic order, the big Other... all this dimension is unthinkable unless it is connected to *jouissance*. This gives a new value to metonymy, since in lieu of the subject you have now lost *jouissance*. And it brings a suspicion of formalism upon the praxis Lacan once had with the signifier. His scheme made of alpha, beta, gamma, was not supposed to be connected to *jouissance*, it was intended to show an autonomous logic of the signifier, unaffected by the body, even transcending the body. Here you witness a return to the body, as though the rationale is reinvested and galvanized with the rapport to the body.

Lacan reviews the end of analysis encompassed in the relation of the subject to *jouissance* and the change that ensues. It's not the same to envisage this relation as *fantasme* than to think it as repetition. There is an acute shifting between the two positions, for repetition will lead him to a new assessment on the symptom.



To conceive the relation to *jouissance* by way of the *fantasme* conveys the notion of a screen you are prompted to cross over. Ultimately, the crossover of the *fantasme* is an alternative to the paradigm of transgression. It's transgression harnessed in analysis as the end of analysis, enticing you to proceed toward emptiness, subjective destitution, the fall of the subject-supposed-to-know and the assumption of the being of *jouissance*. The outcome is invested with the form and structure of an effect of truth, even if this effect of truth is the evanescence of a destitute truth, sister of impotence.

Quite different is to envisage the relation to *jouissance* by way of repetition. Somehow it represents a developed form of the *fantasme*, as the *fantasme* itself is like repetition's condensed version. Repetition is what deserves to be called symptom. For the symptom implies a repetition of *jouissance*, a constancy that is not condensed in the fundamental *fantasme*, an extended and everlasting steadiness which is not subjoined in the *fantasme*. In Lacan's latest teaching the symptom comports the temporal development of this relation to *jouissance*, which is not inclined towards transgression. Yet, in *L'envers...* Lacan hints at the notion of *faufilement*, slipping away; elsewhere he calls it the knowhow of the symptom. The knowhow is a sort of slipping away, its value lies in completely differing from a crossover transgression. The question is whether repetition is at a standstill or whether you are dealing with a new usage of repetition.

The notion of *plus-de-jouir* brings in something fresh about *jouissance*. *Jouissance* as *das Ding* means a place outside the symbolized and also an identity. As such it differs from imaginary and symbolic variations. When *jouissance* is posited as the *objet a* of

drive, there is the oral object, the anal object, the scopic object, the vocal object, and eventually, just for the sake of complication, nothingness. Yet, if *jouissance* is posited as *plus-de-jouir*, as that which fills—though never accurately—the loss of *jouissance*, as that which gives *jouissance* and at the same time preserves the *manque-à-jouir*, then the list of *objets a* spreads out. The objects of sublimation are included in the *objets a*. The notion of *plus-de-jouir* serves to expand the register of the *objets a* beyond those that can be termed as natural, into the sphere of industry, culture, sublimation, everything potentially able to fill $-\phi$, without exhausting it, of course. These trivial *objets a* abound in society, inducing desire and occluding, if only for an instant, the *manque-à-jouir*; repetition does not stop. *Jouir*, certainly, but only in small quantities. Lacan calls them *lichettes*, little bits of *jouissance*. Modern society is full of substitutes of *jouissance*, in fact petty trifles. The little bits of *jouissance* set the tone for a lifestyle and for a *mode-de-jouir*.

A division between the body and *jouissance* becomes all the more apparent: the products of industry and culture give the body its nourishment as to *jouissance* and *manque-à-jouir*. In Seminar XVII Lacan suggests a cut between libido and nature. And it is precisely this cut that brings up a connection between libido and culture. In the four discourses, he inscribes the signifying couple, the barred subject and the *objet a*, and then rotates each element counterclockwise. In there the *objet a* functions as a kind of signifier. *Jouissance* is then reduced as much as possible to the functioning of a signifier, yet it isn't one. The couple alienation-separation becomes a rapport of cause and effect. Firstly, the signifier is the cause of *jouissance*, entailing *jouissance* as goal of the signifier. Secondly, the signifier emerges from *jouissance*.

The fifth paradigm is entirely conditioned by the rapport: of the signifier and *jouissance*, of knowledge and *jouissance*. A rather primitive rapport but certainly a tight one. Lacan strives to disclaim everything concerning the non-rapport between *jouissance* and the signifier. By doing so he contends that the introduction of

the signifier depends on *jouissance*, and that without the signifier *jouissance* is unthinkable. There is a primitive circularity between the signifier and *jouissance*.

PARADIGM SIX: THE NON-RAPPORT

In the sixth paradigm, which I take from Seminar XX, *Encore*,²² a reversion with regard to Lacan's progression takes place, notwithstanding the fact that it presses forward with the arguments of the fifth paradigm. Here he argues that, "the signifier is the sign of the subject." The axiom somehow infers a return to Peirce. I get back to this canonical definition, the only one Lacan considered sound, in order to test it up to its limits. Lacan begins with the fact of *jouissance*, whereas the starting point was previously the fact of language and the fact of the word as communication addressed to the Other. In relation to language, to the word, to its supporting structure, the question was the securing of the living organism, and with discursivity he went as far as to posit an original rapport between signifier and *jouissance*. I was tempted myself to put forward a transcription in terms of representation: the signifier represents *jouissance*.

Lacan actually dismantles his conceptual apparatus, and then, in his late teaching, he endeavors to assemble a new conceptual construct with the fragments of the old one.

In *Encore* he questions the very concept of language, which he deems unoriginal and derivative, in relation to what he terms *lalangue*, which is the word prior to its grammatical and lexicographic systematization. And he questions as well the concept of the word, not anymore conceived as communication but as *jouissance*. Up to this stage *jouissance* was always derivative as to the signifier, even though he set it up to an original rapport. In the sixth paradigm, language and its structure, formerly reckoned as a primary given, appear as secondary and derivative. *Lalangue* is the word disconnected from the structure of language which now

looms as subordinated to this first exertion and is severed from communication. At this juncture, Lacan is able to venture a primary rapport between *jouissance* and this notion of the word and *lalangue*; he calls it *jouissance* of the blablabla. He even envisages as semblances the concept of language, the ancient concept of the word as communication, the big Other, the Name-of-the-Father, the phallic symbol. All these terms are reduced to a clutching function among elements deeply disjointed.

The sixth paradigm is essentially grounded on the non-rapport, on the disjunction of the signifier and the signified, of *jouissance* and the Other, of man and woman as there's no such thing as a sexual rapport. It's verily the seminar of non-rapports. All the terms that insured some sort of conjunction—the Other, the Name-of-the-father, the phallus—and were deemed primordial, even transcendental since they conditioned all experience, are now diminished to the status of mere connectors. In lieu of transcendental terms of structure, which belong to an autonomous dimension anterior to and conditioning experience, there is the supremacy of praxis. In lieu of the transcendental structure, there is pragmatism, a sort of social pragmatism. The paradigm, adjusted by disjunction, can be sketched by way of two Eulerian orbits whose intersection is marked as empty.



As such, the empty intersection is apt to be filled with a certain number of terms: substitutes connecting agents between the two sets. These intercepts can be themselves of a different kind and belong to two main registers. Either they proceed from routine—a rather deprecating appellation standing for tradition—or they derive from invention; or if you are optimistic over what takes place in front of you, from the experience of binding. Nowadays

the debate, in particular that which concerns the sexual bond, revolves around routine and invention.

Lacan's sixth paradigm allows for the location of the place where routine and invention interact. With the scheme I thematize as such the concept of the non-rapport that Lacan sets in motion: there's no such a thing as a sexual rapport. In *Encore* it's really amazing how far he stretches the concept of the non-rapport. The concept should be confronted with the notion of structure. Actually, a multitude of rapports is instituted by way of the structure: it's called articulation. Indeed, articulation, illustrated over the minimum structural S_1 - S_2 , is the formulation of a plurality of rapports reckoned as real under the species of the necessary—of what doesn't cease to be written. *Encore* brings forward a different sort of relation that restricts the privilege of the structure. The non-rapport upsets everything that is acknowledged as a given notion under the umbrella of the structure: the articulation S_1 - S_2 insofar as it effects as signified, the Other provided it prescribes the conditions of experience, as well the paternal metaphor, nodal articulation of the Freudian Oedipus which belongs to the order of the structure—of the un-thought rapport as it doesn't cease to write itself of all necessity.

A certain number of rapports, which structuralism canonized, are challenged by the question: are they polluted by the non-rapport, that is, made of routine and invention? It even questions, in Lacan's late teaching, whether it is relevant to work on *jouissance* from the word, from meaning. It is a clear indication of the limits of psychoanalytic discourse vis-à-vis the ascendancy of the non-rapport.

Lacan was able to discern what psychoanalysis meant at its inception, when Freud invented it, and what it became subsequently, as invention gave way to routine. At the midcourse of the history of psychoanalysis he endowed routine with challenging and occluding the connecting effects to invention. If for the next fifty years, by way of his own invention, psychoanalysis has been buoyed

up with fresh impetus, why dim the fact that Lacan's reinvention is itself progressively occluded by the routine usage. The task now consists in reinstating invention.

By positing *jouissance* as its starting point, this paradigm furthers a return to the Thing, and in doing so attempts to abate the Thing to the status of the pliable *objet a*.

The starting point here is not: there is no such thing as a sexual rapport, but again...a there is...there is *jouissance*.


Lacan's inaugural point of departure, in 1952, is the assertion "There is psychoanalysis." It exists, it works. From this perspective psychoanalysis provides a satisfaction resulting from the fact of talking to someone and from the certain number of mutating effects coming from there. You talk for someone—psychoanalysis evinces it—and by virtue of talking for someone, ensue effects of truth that deeply modify the subject. Here the rapport with the Other appears as inaugural, initiatory, given.

His arrival point is "psychoanalysis doesn't work," and to ask himself why it doesn't. To start out from the evidence that "there is *jouissance*" is quite a different matter. There is *jouissance*, insofar as it is a property of the living body, that is, of a definition that relates *jouissance* but to the living body. Psychoanalysis is only feasible on a living body, a living body that talks. The "that talks" is for Lacan, in *Encore*, what deserves to be qualified as mystery. In other words, it's through the body. "Isn't it precisely what the psychoanalytic experience presupposes, the substance of the body, provided it defines itself only through what *se jouit*?"


This previous starting point implies disjunction between *jouissance* and the Other. The privilege he confers on *jouissance* installs the non-rapport between *jouissance* and the Other. Here, disjunction means non-rapport. The Other of the Other arises under the modality of the One. Lacan could have emphasized the One as being the actual Other of the Other. When you reflect on the Other of the Other, you perceive the Other, and then the Other of the Other, somehow above and guaranteeing the former.



Now, is there really such a guarantee?



No, there isn't such a guarantee. Here, the other of the Other appears below, and not above, under the modalities of the One.



Jouissance as the starting point leads back to a One alone, detached from the Other. It's the Other that appears as the Other of the One.



One

What concerns Lacan in this Seminar is the disclosure of everything that in *jouissance* is *jouissance* One, that is, *jouissance* without the Other. The very title of the Seminar, *Encore*, should be homophonically inferred as *en-corps*, in-the-body. Here, the body occupies the center of the stage rather than repetition as in *L'envers de la psychanalyse* where *jouissance* is wedded to knowledge. It implies the rediscovery, in psychoanalysis, of what succeeds today

in the social binding, modern individualism, and the ambiguity that results in everything that is rapport and community. The conjugal bond, for instance, where even those who are deemed conservative, who revere routine as well as tradition, yield to the invention of new forms of rapport sponsored by political consensus. *Jouissance* envisaged as a starting point constitutes the true foundation of what ensues as extension, even insanity, in contemporary individualism.

So Lacan declines *jouissance* One. The same way that at the start he persisted in establishing *jouissance* as essentially imaginary, he contends that *jouissance* is basically One—that it can do without the Other. To locate the place of *jouissance* without idealism, means to find it—as the cynic perceives it—in the body itself. Thus all effective *jouissance*, material *jouissance* is One, that is, *jouissance* of the body. It's always the body as such that *jouit*, by any means whatsoever.

Another version of *jouissance* One consists in its being especially concentrated on the phallic part of the body. A dialectics between *jouissance* of the body proper and phallic *jouissance* is certainly possible, that is specialized. Lacan highlights phallic *jouissance* as another figure of *jouissance* One, of the One-*jouissance*. To him phallic *jouissance* goes with the idiot, the loner, set up in with the non-rapport to the Other. Thus Lacan pins down *jouissance* One, much as it is masturbatory *jouissance*. A third figure of the One-*jouissance* is the *jouissance* of the word. Eventually the word is connection to the Other, provided it is a conveyor of communication. Yet, in Lacan, *jouissance* of the word is but a device of the *jouissance* One, that is, severed from the Other. *Jouissance* of the word imports the word as *jouissance*, it doesn't



One

J one - body
 \ phallic
 \ speech

purvey communication to the Other in its essential phase. Thus the meaning of the blabla—the lowest degree in the debasement of *parole*—entails that the aim of the word, from the perspective of *jouissance*, is not recognition, comprehension: it's but a modality of *jouissance* One.

There is a body that talks. There is a body that *jouit* in different ways. The place of *jouissance* is always the same, the body. It can *jouir* via masturbation or by simply talking. Now it talks, the body is not in that sole fact bound to the Other. It is only adhered to its *jouissance* proper, to its *jouissance* One. The short session in psychoanalysis gives account of this fact. Retrospection is not effected by the complex elaboration of signification and the resolution of the enigma, but through the apprehension of the word as a specific mode of satisfaction of the talking body.

Fourthly, Lacan will get to implicate sublimation, his rendition precluding the Other. This is an amazing feat, since what was essential in Freud's elaboration—he invented the term—was precisely the recognition by the Other. Lacan has certainly dealt with the connection. Sublimation only achieves completion in the Other's satisfaction. In *Encore*, however, his account forestalls the Other and sublimation is advanced as egress of the word of *jouissance*, of the solitary word. "When left to itself, the speaking body sublimates with all its might." Sublimation finds its genuine foundation in the place of *jouissance* One.

So *jouissance* One, the One-*jouissance* shows up as *jouissance* of the body proper. It isn't sequential, it's intermittent. At times Lacan appeals to the connections between the different *jouissances*: He opposes, defines them, one in relation to the other. Yet, lucidly, *jouissance* One looms as *jouissance* of the body proper, phallic *jouissance*, *jouissance* of the word, sublimatory *jouissance*. In all cases *jouissance* is not in rapport with the Other. As such, it is *jouissance* One. It's the reign of the One-*jouissance*.

The *Jouissance* of the Other becomes extremely problematic after the preceding construct. You're not even sure it exists.

In any case, if it exists, it's not at the same level as a *jouissance* One. *Jouissance* One is the real, whereas *jouissance* of the Other appears already as a mootable construct.

In the scope of *jouissance* of the Other, it's sexual *jouissance*, the *jouissance* of a body Other endowed with a different sex. When you start from the signifier, from communication regulated over the *mot d'esprit*, the Other is the Other subject answering back to you. In this case ratification is brought in by the code, the place of the signifier. Yet, when you start from *jouissance*, the Other is the Other sex. At the take off, the reclusive *jouissance* One is fundamentally a-sexed, in such a way that up to now, for Lacan, the rapport to the Other was originary, structural. Structure denaturalized the world, yet at the same time it surreptitiously naturalized it, so as to appear out of question, *as a priori*. Now, from the perspective of *jouissance*, the rapport to the Other turns up as problematic and derivative.

The proposition that "there is no such a thing as sexual rapport" becomes somehow inescapable. It means that *jouissance* belongs to the register of the One, being *jouissance* One, whereas sexual *jouissance*—*jouissance* of the body of the Other sex—has the privilege of being specified by an impasse, that is by a disjunction and by a non-rapport. As for Lacan *jouissance* does not fit the sexual rapport. *Jouissance* as such is One, being inherent to the One, and it's unable by itself to establish a rapport to the Other. There is no such a thing as a sexual rapport implies that *jouissance* is essentially idiotic and solitary.

The concept of the non-rapport, which rules the sixth paradigm, restricts the concept of structure. When, for instance, Lacan attempts to devise the Oedipus complex as a metaphor, as mathemes, he stresses the fact that the structure is something written, that it doesn't cease to write itself, and that it presents a kind of necessity which imposes itself on everything that is, on everything that exists, on the phenomena. Somehow the structure is an aprioristic form, encompassing given categories, already present and

unfalsifiable, which isn't cancellable. When disengaged, the structure always looms as omnipotent. Its limits are to be detected in the sexual *jouissance* of the Other as sexed being: in there, you find a relation open to contingency, to encounter, a relation detached from necessity.

Encore inquires into everything that is removed from necessity. What doesn't derive from necessity turns you more demanding with regard to necessity while exploring what is on the contrary open to routine and invention: transcendental structure gives way to pragmatism. Transcendentalism connotes the conditioning of experience, the boundaries to all possible experience—and with a Kantian emphasis present in Lacan in his title, "On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis." You are much more demanding about what is necessary, and about what isn't. The structure includes hollows wherein there is place for invention, for the new, for autonomous connectors.

In the eighteenth century, during the Enlightenment, people were fascinated cataloging other people's sexuality, how *jouissance* and the Other were articulated according to different modalities. Since then, on the rebound of such freedom, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have fabricated a globalized routine, canonized the leftovers of tradition and attempted to cast a shape on it.

Instead, you live the re-opening of this empty intersection. Irresistibly, transcendentalism gives way to pragmatism—which doesn't entail the end of the structure and that everything is semblance. There is the real, yet today it's harder to isolate and circumscribe what is structure and what is real.

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