

"The Unconscious is Political"

Milanese Intuitions 1 & 2

by

Jacques-Alain Miller

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Milanese Intuitions [1]

[Invited last May 12 to Milan for the creation of the Lacanian school of the Freudian Field in Italy, Jacques-Alain Miller improvised a talk on the theme chosen for this study day: "Psychoanalysts in the City." In the text that follows he pursues the theme for his Course in Paris three days later, after a six-week interruption for vacation.]

Politics, during the interval in which I did not give my class, reminded us it was still around.¹ The eruption came as a surprise. I have to admit that my taste for surprises can go even that far: I welcomed this one with a smile. For a brief moment. After which I realized to what extent the calculations of the experts could, like those of the multitude after all, prove false, to what extent they could be thwarted. How, with the evidence staring them in the face for so many years, these calculations could crumple and produce a mass effect, with certain traits of depression or panic, but also of defense and mania. A political mobilization followed and the psychoanalysts and a certain number of their associations were explicitly part of it.

Before that, we must admit, we were far from suspecting what was transpiring in the depths; we were laboriously studying counter-transference and the history of the analytic movement during the past half a century. It was in these circumstances that I accepted with pleasure the opportunity given me last Sunday to speak in Milan, on the occasion of the creation of the Freudian Field in Italy, on the theme "Psychoanalysts in the City", resuming the inspiration of the Seminar that Eric Laurent and I gave in Paris in 1996-97 entitled "The Other who does not exist and his ethics committees".

Improvising, I entertained in Milan some thoughts about things that concern us in psychoanalysis, and I do not want to bypass that moment. I am, then, going to share with you my Milanese intuitions and begin to develop them. They were about the relations between the unconscious and politics.

My departure point was a remark of Lacan's taken from his Seminar "La logique du fantasme", a remark that I found in a book, a sort of psychopathology of political life, which had just been published before I took off. This is the remark: "I do not say 'politics is the unconscious' but simply 'the unconscious is politics'".

The person who used this quotation purely and simply ruled out the second formula as abrupt and absurd. He accepted the first, but with restrictions. So we must give him credit for having grasped that the two formulas are not equivalent. It is not: if $A = B$, $B = A$. Yes, the author says, there is something of the psychic in politics, but in politics there is not only the unconscious, even if there is in it something of the unconscious, fantasies, dreams, blunders and torments...

¹ "The Disenchantment of Psychoanalysis, The Lacanian Orientation", course given under the auspices of the Department of Psychoanalysis of the University of Paris VIII, May 15, 2002; text established by Nathalie Georges, published with the authorization of J.-A. Miller.

What is the point of quoting Lacan if it is only to take the edge off his purport and extract from it such vacuity? We find fantasies, dreams, blunders and torments everywhere man is, in action and contemplation, in cultures and ways of doing, in State or society, alone or in a crowd. There is nothing left of Lacan when someone makes this kind of comment on his statements, when there is evidently in his formula a flash, which provokes at least an instant of surprise, before disappearing into the night where all cats are grey. We have in these remarks of Lacan's something worth hearing, and this is precisely what the comment I have referred to has amputated.

But, the *agalma* of this statement is a formula, "The unconscious is politics", and it must at least be remarked that this formula is within the competence of a psychoanalyst, while the other, which proposes a definition of politics, is more of a risk when it is pronounced by a psychoanalyst whose business is not to define politics. This is why Lacan says "I do not say [...], but simply [...]".

This is how I summarize the theme that our Italian colleagues proposed to treat: are the psychoanalysts in the City? This is up for discussion. In any case, psychoanalysis is in politics. That allowed me to find a thread in Milan to develop the theme under discussion. I will, then, pursue my reflections, in the order that they came to me in Milan.

First reflection: "politics is the unconscious"

"I do not say", says Lacan, who thus places his remarks within the empire of denegation, saying all there is to say when he says he does not say. Let's say that, from the logical point of view, Lacan recoils from transforming this statement into a thesis and he stresses that if it were a thesis, it would go further than the other.

Still, is it the thesis of no one, a thesis without a father? If this thesis had a father, it would be Freud, Freud who says something like this, that politics, at least when he writes about it, can be reduced to the unconscious. This is the thesis he put forth in *Group Psychology*, where he analyzes collective formations as unconscious formations, having the same identificatory signifier and the same cause of desire.

Thus politics can be reduced to the unconscious and that is why this thesis, even if it can be found in Freud, calls forth objections which are all of the type: there is more in politics than what belongs to the unconscious. As soon as we find ourselves in face of a reductionist thesis, the objections are variations on the theme "it is only partial, it is more complex, more extensive, etc". I evoked *Group Psychology*, but we could read *Civilization and its Discontents* and *Moses and Monotheism* in the light of the same thesis.

And we could take exception to this thesis by saying that it's not politics Freud is talking about, but still the unconscious, taking his examples from the field of politics. We must nevertheless remark that this field is structured by the instance of the father, that Freud broaches it within the paternal regime, and that is why the terms, the themes which organize his approach are identification, censorship, suppression, including the suppression of jouissance.

Second reflection: "the unconscious is politics"

This thesis qualified as abrupt, absurd, which this author thinks he can eliminate with a wave of the hand...! I left for Milan, exasperated by the offhandedness manifested with respect to this formula, which is more modest than the first since it proposes a definition of the unconscious. That's the way it is with Lacan, and it is much more reasonable. We know so little about what the unconscious is, it is so unrepresentable that it is implausible and very risky to define anything, taking the unconscious as a

departure point: on the contrary, it is always the unconscious which must be defined, because we do not know what it is. So it is never for Lacan the *definiens*, but always the *definiendum*. Take the formula “the unconscious is structured like a language”. This is a thesis that supposes we have at our disposal a definition of language and in effect Lacan uses the one that Saussure and Jakobson produced. There is of course not this “like” in the statement that I am commenting on today, so, what we need to ask is how we can define politics in such a way that saying the unconscious is politics makes sense.

What I found amusing was that after having fallen on this irritating comment, I opened a second recently published book, *La démocratie contre elle-même*, by a politician who has probably read Lacan, Marcel Gauchet, and I fell on a definition of politics: “Politics consists specifically in this: it is the place of a fracture in the truth”. Nice definition, both infiltrated with Lacanism and perhaps, underneath, with a sort of Merleau-Pontyism; “fracture” is a word this author is fond of and we also find him using, in a 1992 work, the expression “social fracture” taken up again in 1996 when it fell beneath the eyes of a French political figure who was able to go very far with this signifier...

This politician is, to begin with, a Lacanoid figure who defines politics as a field structured by S(A/), in which the subject undergoes, with pain, the experience that the truth is not one, that the truth does not exist, and that the truth is divided. And this is a definition of politics which retains all its virulence at the time in which we live, a moment that is, after all, on the whole a “post-totalitarian” moment – I put it in quotation marks –, within which we have been enclosed since 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which, it must be added, everyone did not applaud.

I do not necessarily validate this category, totalitarianism, which served a certain political propaganda during the twentieth century. Totalitarianism was a great hope; it enchanted the masses of the twentieth century, something that we who are of the twenty-first century have almost forgotten. It was the hope of mending the division of truth, of installing the reign of the One in politics, in conformity to the model of *Group Psychology*. At the level of this aspiration to concord, harmony and reconciliation, totalitarianism is perfect, taken as these terms resound in the discourse of President Schreber.

So, the triumph of democracy, which has the wind aft in the spirit of the times, at least in a good part of the globe, – obviously the case of China is a bit apart, and my attention has been drawn to the appearance there of a new pathology, death by overwork, in a region where the word “union” would be a new idea – does not generate the same enthusiasm and as a matter of fact a depressive effect does seem to be its marker; it comports this effect insofar as it implies consenting to the division of the truth, a division which takes the objective form of political parties engaged in an unresolvable contradiction, since the truth is fatally divided.

Which is what Mr. Gauchet says with a lyricism worthy of Merleau-Ponty: “From now on we know that we will inevitably encounter the other under the sign of an opposition without violence, but also irrevocable and irreparable. I will always find myself in face of not an enemy who wants my death, but a contradictor. There is something metaphysically terrifying in this pacified encounter” – I like this link between terror and pacification – “a war can be won”, he says, “whereas we never get out of this confrontation”.

From this comes the paradoxical idea that the pacification of the public space is accompanied by a private, intimate, subjective suffering, and that, at the same time we celebrate the virtues of pluralism, tolerance and relativism, we undergo the experience of a truth, I quote, “which is proposed only in the figure of dilaceration”. The approach of politics we find here, as a question of you or me, remains nevertheless to be reconsidered.

The definition of the unconscious by politics goes very deep in Lacan's teaching. "The unconscious is politics" is a development of "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other". This link to the Other, intrinsic to the unconscious, is what inspires from the outset Lacan's teaching. This is also true when it is pointed out that the Other is divided and does not exist as One.

"The unconscious is politics" radicalizes the definition of the *Witz*, of the witticism, as a social process that finds its recognition and satisfaction in the Other, as a community unified by the ring of a laugh.

Third reflection: the unconscious is political

The Freudian analysis of the *Witz* authorizes Lacan to articulate the subject of the unconscious to an Other, and to qualify the unconscious as transindividual. We can pass from "the unconscious is transindividual" to "the unconscious is political" from the moment that it appears that this Other is divided, that it does not exist as One.

Because of this, "the unconscious is politics" does not at all mean the same thing as "politics is the unconscious". "Politics is the unconscious" is a reduction, and when Lacan formalizes the discourse of the master, he says at the same time that it is the discourse of the unconscious, and thus he gives us the key to a great number of Freud's texts. Whereas "the unconscious is politics" is the contrary of a reduction, it is an amplification, it is the transport of the unconscious outside the solipsist sphere, to place it within the City, to make it depend on "History", on the discord of the universal discourse at each moment of the series which is effectuated by it.

Fourth reflection: the City does not exist

Today, we no longer have "the City". It is imaginary. We hear it as a metaphor for politics, but in the *Wirklichkeit*, historical effectiveness, politics, is not developed in the form of the City. The City is a residue nostalgia, it is also imaginary in the sense that we look for it today to find it in the television.

In Milan, in *La Repubblica* of the previous day, consecrated to a criticism of Mister Berlusconi who owns three of the six Italian television channels and orients the three he does not own as President of the Council, television was qualified as *agora*, modern *agora*, stressing to what extent it is crippled. The first move of the ancient *agora* would have been to ostracize Mister Berlusconi. At the same time, the journalist considered television as the place where a consensus is elaborated and propagated. This can only highlight the fact that the *agora* of the epoch of the market has nothing to do with the *agora* of ancient times, which was a place of social homogeneity, supposing the exclusion of those to whom the democratic privilege had been refused.

Not only does the homogenous City no longer exist but the Nation-State itself is shaken; challenged, it turns out to be porous, waning to the extent that some go so far as to prophesy its disappearance. Above and beyond the City, it is the Nation-State that is at stake, so that, rather than talking about psychoanalysts in the City, we should dare pose the question of psychoanalysts in "globalization", an approximate concept but one that is certainly more operative than that of City.

I was able to read, in Italy, in a work of Hans Magnus Enzensberger, a description of the astonishing characters that can be found in the Lower Bavarian countryside, which leaves the country bumpkin flabbergasted in the face of these new identities, a somewhat anticipatory poetic carnival that shows we are exceedingly far away from the homogenous space of the City.

“Globalization” is a term for the glimpse we can have of a social space in which nothing is still in its place, which we already perceived by opposing the ancient and new worlds, but here it is really the notion of place itself that is subtracted, what we amiably call losing one’s marks. When nothing is left in its place, it is the category of lack itself that tends to become obsolete, in accord with the example of the book that can “be out of place” only in a well-ordered library... And suppose “globalization” were the name of what makes that obsolete.

For that, we need a new reflection.

Fifth reflection: Freud and Queen Victoria

I shall recycle one of Lacan’s jokes, told at his Seminar. One day he had read Lytton Strachey’s *Queen Victoria*, and he got a laugh from his audience by situating Queen Victoria as the historical cause of Freud. He was thus tracing the link between the birth of psychoanalysis and the disciplinary society, the exacerbation of this society, which sustained powerful interdictions, censoring any utterance touching on sexuality, although this must be modulated because transgressive forms always existed but, precisely, as transgressions: the prohibitions remained in place.

It is sufficient, *a contrario*, to think of the banalization of the sexual spectacle today, which extends from the pornographic film to Ms. Catherine Millet’s book, in order to grasp that we are in another regime of sexuality: no longer the queen Victoria, but the queen Catherine!

This is not the first time that I emphasize the fact that the entire Freudian conceptual apparatus retains the mark of the disciplinary epoch: interdiction, repression, censorship... which is what permitted a junction between psychoanalysis and Marxism, in the form of Freud-Marxism or the 1968 style of contestation.

It must be noted, in effect, that the Lacanian Renaissance of psychoanalysis during the sixties and seventies is contemporary to the times described by Antonio Negri – who sleeps every night in prison, for having, in those days, been the inspirer of the Red Brigades. He attempts, in his most recent book, *Impero*, to give a doctrine to the international far-left and he notes, p. 333 of the French edition: “During the period of crisis in the 60s and 70s, the expansion of social protection and the universalization of discipline, both in the dominating and the dominated countries, created a new margin of liberty for the laborious multitude. In other words, workers used the disciplinary era in order to extend the social powers of work, etc.”

He underlines what the concept of liberation itself owed to the disciplinary forms of domination, and attempts to conceptualize what we might be after this society. What he calls *impero*, empire, is a regime which no longer proceeds by prohibition and repression and which, thus, renders transgression and the very idea of revolution and liberation problematic, Antonio Negri is the son of Deleuze and Guattari; he recycles their *Anti-Œdipe* written 30 years ago. We can find profit in what is after all a reading of Lacan.

That is the essential idea: that Lacan conceptualized psychoanalysis during the disciplinary epoch, but that he also anticipated the psychoanalysis of the imperial epoch, and this is what we tried to bring up to date with “The Other who does not exist”.

Sixth reflection: Lacan and the queen jouissance

Lacan had the historical role of bringing Freud up to date and preparing psychoanalysis for the new order that Mr. Negri calls *Impero*. If we take things as such, three phases can be distinguished:

— The first phase is that of the formalization of the psychoanalysis of the disciplinary epoch. It is founded on the formalization of the concept of the unconscious, starting with the algorithm of the sign; on the unifying formalization of the Œdipus complex, castration and repression through the concepts of the Name-of-the-Father and the metaphor; on the formalization of the libido through the concepts of desire and metonymy. This classical Lacan is Freud formalized.

— Then we have the transition during which Lacan achieves a subversion of Freud, via the subversion of the Name-of-the-Father, which he pluralizes and whose place he also alters by attributing the operation of repression not to interdiction but to the fact of language itself; *via* the subversion of the concept of desire linked to interdiction, a concept he replaces by that of *jouissance* — he places the accent on what fills the lack rather than on the lack itself; via the definition of the function of the object *a* that remains attached to the theme of the lack but in which what prevails is what comes to fill the lack .

— Finally we have the third phase of Lacan’s work in which the essential term is that of *jouissance*, a *jouissance* which has no contrary. Until then it was in tension with the repressive and mortifying signifier, and now the signifier has itself become an operator of *jouissance*; it was in tension with pleasure and it is precisely the opposition pleasure-*jouissance* that tends to dissolve now, not that all validity has been subtracted from it, but pleasure becomes one of the regimes of *jouissance*. The level of the drive, which, unlike desire, is not intrinsically articulated to a defense, is the level to which Lacan has attributed the property “the subject is always happy”, always happy... on the level of the drive that is, the only question being that of the mode of satisfaction, pleasurable, painful etc., while axiomatically, the drive is always satisfied.

This corresponds to the end of the disciplinary epoch. Everything is now an affair of arrangement. We no longer dream of what is outside. There is nothing but trajectories, arrangements and regimes of *jouissance*. The Borromean knot is already an effort to find a way out of a structure based on binary opposition and the disciplinary organization that this cleavage implies.

I should come back to this notion of the disciplinary society. The opposition between the disciplinary society and the society of control comes from Foucault and was defined by Deleuze. It indicates two regimes of mastery. The disciplinary society is the epoch in which there is an exteriority between the structures, the apparatus of repression and training on the one hand, and the subjugated on the other, and in which domination as such is salient, the indoctrination that permits a head-on opposition and a delineation of the figures of the oppressors. Resistance can then get its support from the forms of coercion. Foucault treated these structures one after the other — the prison, the asylum, the hospital, the school, the university — where “surveillance or punishment” supposes a clear delimitation of the “in” and the “out”.

This becomes of interest when we distinguish what, thirty years ago, was already being modified, that is to say that mastery was somewhat immanent to the social field, that the mechanisms of domination the Marxists could analyze were interiorized and the society of communication or information was transmitting fleetingly or invisibly; which produced the idea that, from now on, it is by flexible, transformable and fluctuating networks that a mastery which is no longer exterior can circulate — to the point that Negri gives us the formula of “autonomous alienation” to designate a mastery that is no longer external but internal, and for which the term of *extimate* is perfectly suitable.

Seventh reflection: the analytic cure in the epoch of globalization

I can reassure you: Negri’s book is not the new *Capital*, it is rather a great poem. A Spinozist, he describes

with pathos a world without operators, an empire which is no longer the imperialism of anyone, which is everywhere, nowhere, and at the same time without borders, without an exterior. It is very repetitive, rather a chant; Negri is the Dante of globalization...

So, the cure, of course, is marked by these times, which take their toll. Conceived first as a treatment distinct from medical treatment, it was proposed as an ideal of maturity and a norm of personality, and even Lacan spoke of the achievement of the personality and the effective realization of the Œdipus complex and castration. The effective realization of the Œdipus complex and castration – Lacan went so far as to speak of phallic disidentification – supposes, in effect, a norm and an ideal that operate. As long as Lacan was in this phase of his teaching, the pressing question on this point insisted on this sequence, no doubt refusing it as such, but nevertheless besieged, invested by the insistence of the norm and the ideal.

A second phase can be distinguished in the accomplished demedicalization of the cure. This is the moment at which the cure could be conceived as an experience, the place where something happens for you. We can compare this to the current doctrine concerning the edification of stores, such as those we see developing already in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, and New York, for which the new stores must be conform to the concept of *experientialization*, or the transformation of shopping into a unique and irreplaceable experience, without which everyone would just go do their shopping on the Web!

Lacan “experientialized” the cure before everyone, by putting the stress on the analyzing activity and the production of a new subject, and the pass crystallized that, with the end of the cure being conceived in the transgressive mode, as a passing beyond the fantasy.

There is now a third phase, specific to the regime of globalization. This appears at the end of the *Autres Écrits*, where the pass is resituated as a successful narrative that satisfies an audience, as a procedure. We all know that, in the Freudian Field, the products of the pass have been taken into a process of spectacularization. We have invited the Analysts of the school (the AE) to speak before the largest publics we were able to assemble on an international scale. We were criticized for this, but we do not want to go back on it! And there, if we follow Lacan — of course, everything is compatible, like in Italy, you have the pagan temple in the very place where the church is erected, it’s the Freudian unconscious realized! — the end of analysis is stripped of the pathos of the beyond, of transcendence, of the passage, and the accent is put on the changes in the regimes of *jouissance* that can be obtained in the cure. Because it is a question of the satisfaction of the drive, which has no contrary, which means that the reference here is the passage from one regime to another.

The extraordinary formula “there is no sexual rapport” is inscribed within this framework, and it signs the definitive obliteration of the norm. We are free of what had kept psychoanalysis rooted in the disciplinary epoch: there is nothing but *jouissance*. That is what happens in globalization, where we have been for some time. The space of sexual invention opened up at this level, that of norm-less creativity, which today renders inaudible the themes of maturation and achievement. This is obviously congruent with the inclusion of *jouissance* in human rights, the juridification of *jouissance*.

And this must be connected to the promotion of the Lacanian writing of *sinthome*, a new name to indicate the symptom that has no contrary or no longer has one, the subject being, as such, doomed. It must be said that the symptom appears as the regime inherent to *jouissance*, the subject – or rather the living being who speaks – experiencing it necessarily as such.

There are more reflections to come.

Eighth reflection: The depreciation of psychoanalysis

This concerns the depreciation of psychoanalysis such as we find it in this epoch. It must be said, in spite of all. The operators also are aware of it; their act is threatened by depreciation, as psychoanalysis is besieged by psychotherapy. How are we going to classify that? If we have recourse to a particularly astute American economist, psychoanalysts will be put into the class of “attention givers”, those who pay attention to, in which we find psychotherapists, but also baby sitters, butlers, private gym instructors, etc. It is certain that this is a class in expansion, but this growth goes along with a certain disqualification. This achieves a certain depreciation of the position of the analyst.

(to be continued...)

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Jacques-Alain Miller

Milanese Intuitions [2]

We will devote this encounter to the political unconscious, a stone put in our path by the turns of history, causing us to interrupt the laborious study we had undertaken on counter-transference*. I will pursue my reflections, those I shared with you last time. The formula “The unconscious is political” that I used last time produced quite a splash – that is to say, it propagated waves within practice as well as within theory, although here “theory” is perhaps too big a word and must be put within quotation marks.

Reality staged by the structure

Theory, when we try to produce it – theory in the present – is nothing more, at least for psychoanalysis, than a sinuous trail, a trail we blaze to try to catch up with what has already taken place and which is going forward on its own. Theory and practice in psychoanalysis are not symmetrical or parallel. There is in psychoanalysis, it cannot be ignored, a lagging of the theory that is not contingent, not accidental, but probably structural, at least as far as its elaboration is concerned. And this elaboration is of course in tension with the very knowledge it is supposed to elaborate. It would be fitting that this knowledge express the reality being accomplished according to a necessary order, in conformity with the proposition 7 of book II of Spinoza’s *Ethics: Ordo et conexio idearum* – the order and connection of ideas – *idem est* – are, is the same, since *ordo et conexio* are here reunited – *ac ordo et conexio rerum* – the same as the order and connection of things.

This is an essential proposal, the very ideal which inspires Lacan’s structuralism, on condition that the order and connection of signifiers replace the order and connection of ideas. This is what Lacan designated as the pure and simple combinatory of the signifier. This combinatory was supposed to define relations of necessity meeting, the same ones, in reality. That is the conception of knowledge we measure our efforts against, since it is the conception of a kind of knowledge that is not a representation of reality, but that should be identical to the very principle of the effective development of reality, identical to the principle of its production, of its *Wirklichkeit*.

According to this conception, the structure is neither an ordered description of reality, nor a theoretical model elaborated apart from experience. With respect to this, see Lacan’s criticism of Lagache, page 649 of the *Écrits*, a text that is for us a reference. Lacan claims to surmount the difference, the opposition, the contradiction he calls the antinomy of these two conceptions of structure, as description and as model, by introducing a third mode for structure by which it is produced within reality itself and determines its effects there. For Lacan, these effects are effects of truth, effects of jouissance, effects of subject, and the truth itself is an effect, the jouissance also and the subject as well.

It is in this direction that we must understand the proposal Lacan puts forth on this page, according to which the structure operates within experience as – I have already quoted this formula, which was particularly forceful at the time Lacan used it for the fantasy – “the original machine which puts the subject on the stage.” These terms

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must be explained. Machine is a word that designates a signifying articulation, combinatory and determinist, whose variations are strictly conditioned. Some years later, Lacan was to give an example that serves as a reference in his four discourses. The staging of the subject means, in fact, that the combinatory machine is in the wings, that it is not on display, that it is hidden, which makes us think it is at a distance. Its being hidden supposes it escapes any descriptive phenomenology, that it is not sufficient to let things be in order to get to it. The expression “staging the subject” carries an ambiguity that reflects the actual division of the subject. That is to say, the subject is staged, is an actor, not the director, and at the same time the subject is a spectator, reality is for him staged by the structure.

What does it add to qualify this machine as original? It is probable that Lacan means by this that it is not derived from anything anterior to it, but in the specifically genetic sense, which he criticizes on this page, and not in the combinatory sense. And original also means unique. This machine is specific to each subject, it must be reconstituted in the analytic experience for each subject. But it would probably be abusive to limit its validity or the inspiration of this proposal to the analytic experience *stricto sensu*, because the subject is not the individual. Lacan also talks about the subject of science, for example, and we can perfectly well consider that the discontent analyzed by Freud concerns the subject of civilization.

This is what we are confronted with when our attention is alerted as it recently was. We realize we are confronted with the original machine that stages the subject of civilization at the present time, and that this also conditions the analytic experience. And here we have what is mapped out, of an ambition constantly resumed, redrafted, to recompose this original machine out of what we know of its effects.

The unconscious is connected to the social bond

I need to be more precise about a point I evoked last time when I quoted a remark of Lacan’s with reference to a quotation that had been made of it: “I do not even say ‘politics is the unconscious’, but simply ‘the unconscious is politics.’” I had indicated that this remark was taken from “La logique du fantasme” and I had quoted it without verifying the stenography of the seminar. Which I have since done. I wish now to add, before continuing, a few considerations on this point. First, because we find in the stenography the formula “unconsciousness is politics.” But I am in favor of correcting this stenography to read “the unconscious is politics.” The passage I had referred to is found within a sentence that I wish to pass on to you more completely. This is what Lacan said: “If Freud has written somewhere ‘anatomy is destiny’, there may come a moment, when we have come back to a healthy perception of what Freud discovered for us, when we will say: I do not even say, etc.” This complement shows that the matrix of Lacan’s words is clearly one of Freud’s formulas, and that Lacan opposes what Freud said in echo to the emperor Napoleon, and what Freud discovered for us, that is to say, what Freud really said. What Freud really said is not what Freud said. It is in fact the inspiration of all Lacan’s teaching which is concentrated there. What Freud really did say is not that anatomy is destiny. It is not the anatomic body that Freud refers us to in order to try to explain the subjective difference of sexuation. Moreover, anatomy does not even determine hysteria, since, as Lacan points out in “Television,” hysterical conversion does not obey the anatomic partition.

Parallel to the anatomic body we could bring into question the living body and distinguish them. Of the living body inasmuch as it speaks and as speech conditions its jouissance, we might say that it determines destiny. But in this passage from his Seminar, Lacan operates a displacement from “anatomy is destiny” to the “unconscious is politics.” And he explains this by saying “What bonds men together, what opposes them, must be motivated by the logic we are trying to articulate” – and at that time, it was the logic of the fantasy. “The unconscious is politics” is connected to what bonds and opposes “men” in relation to one another, that is to say, the unconscious is connected to the social bond. It is this conception that, some years later in Lacan’s teaching, would be put into a *matheme* by the cycle of discourses.

The unconscious is connected to the social bond – we introduce this gloss – precisely because there is no such thing as a sexual relation. We could go so far as to say that where there is a sexual relation, where the sexual bond is programmed, well then, there is no society.

Of course, we were enchanted to dream about the society of bees, or that of ants. Maeterlinck, when he did not make us dream of *Pelleas and Melisande*, enchanted us, during our childhood, by describing those societies that gave us a utopia, precisely because they were, because they are – what they were and what they are is precisely the same thing – societies without politics. It is societies without politics that furnished us with utopias. We might say that the theocracies tried to realize a society without politics, or else that ethnological structuralism presented us with societies possessing elementary structures of family relationships, which were for this reason apolitical, something that was contested later on.

Today it does not seem abusive to propose that there are no societies without politics, and that, correlatively, the unconscious is political. This is what Lacan was elaborating during those years. After having shown that the unconscious is produced within the relation of the subject to the Other, he continued by showing that it is produced within the relation to the Other sex, coming up against, on precisely this path, the absence of sexual relation and the interposition of the object *a*.

“The rejected being” and the political demand of the Other

This phrase of Lacan’s, – to be a bit more complete – is situated in this Seminar in the course of a reflection on the formula “being rejected,” “being spurned,” provoked by considerations on masochism that he borrows from Bergler’s work *Basic Neurosis*. Bergler introduces this status of the subject, “the spurned being,” with reference to the oral stage and he founds the “being spurned” – the being spurned, which would be the principle of behavior, of the attitude of certain subjects – on a “being spurned by the mother”; it would be the masochistic desire that the subject would create, at the level of the oral drive, which would permit him to bewail this injustice and find jouissance in it. “Being spurned,” which would constitute the motive for the complaint of the subject, would find its motive in the desire to be saved from being swallowed up by the maternal partner. This is what had held Lacan’s attention at the time, this finding jouissance in injustice which also discloses for Lacan Bergler’s hostility towards his patients, whom he stigmatizes as collecting injustices in order to complain of them – which is not absurd from the point of view of the phenomenology.

Lacan, in the very movement which produced the formula “the unconscious is politics,” makes a fundamental objection to Bergler, which rather well situates Lacan’s political position, which he promoted and gave force to in his teaching, and which was: but why then should one be accepted, rather than rejected? Why should one have to do what must be done in order to be accepted? Is it the case, by chance, that the table at which one should want to be accepted would always be benevolent? What is behind this is the metaphor of the *Symposium* and those who are not admitted to the banquet. This clearly situates the position of subversion that was Lacan’s and which, it must be recognized, is still today a current question.

At the time, the current question concerned what was taking place in a small region of South-east Asia, the Vietnam War. Lacan commented on what was at stake in the following way – which resounds and can still resound today when Asia has probably little by little fallen into step, but another zone of the planet, not yet! – “It is a question of convincing them that they are wrong not to want to be admitted into the benefits of capitalism.” At that time, what we found was that they preferred being rejected from it. It is with respect to this that Lacan invites us to reflect on certain significations – especially on the signification of “being rejected” – and it is in the midst of this that he introduces, without developing it, his “the unconscious is politics.”

What he adds, in its brevity, still susceptible to evoke an echo for us, is that one can only be rejected if one proffers oneself. This leads him to remind us, as a key to the neurotic position, the close relation of the subject to the demand of the Other. With respect to this demand, he says, we must suppose that there is for the neurotic, “a necessity and perhaps a benefit in being rejected.” Later on, perhaps Lacan would have talked about the jouissance of being rejected. This comports a very precise clinical indication, which is that you must think twice before having the ambition to force a subject not to be rejected, before considering that being admitted to the banquet of others is the best thing that can happen to him.

Lacan indicates that proceeding thus, having the prejudice that it is better to be admitted to what you consider as a benefit, adjusting the analytic operation to that, can give the analyst a persecutive function. This puts an end to what would consist in giving to what the analyst believes to be the principle of reality a primordial value, rather than considering as valid in itself the desire to be rejected – that is to say not to be submitted to the demand of the Other.

This is also indicative for the present moment of civilization where it is not the desire of the Other that is so present but rather the insistence of his demand, of his political demand in the form of democracy and the market considered as values that your welfare is dependent on. So that, what is presented as a preference, the preference to be rejected from the order of these benefits, becomes incomprehensible, or even monstrous. This is, at any rate, an indication of a position of reserve for the analyst, with respect to these master-signifiers of the specifically political demand of the Other. That is what I wished to add, to modulate within what I had attributed last time to Lacan’s remark, based on the quotation that I had gleaned in the work of an author.

The depreciation of psychoanalysis

I had gotten to my eighth reflection concerning the depreciation of psychoanalysis. I had announced the resource that I had been able to find in *The Future of Success*, a book of Robert Reich’s, the political economist, who is one of those essayists that have laid stress on social narcissism in the epoch of globalization – the first, in the 1980s, was Christopher Lasch and his *Culture of Narcissism*. His idea is that mass anonymity enters into contradiction with the desire for celebrity induced by the object mass media – which leads to the major question of how to attract attention. “How can I attract attention?” is a question which is present in the motivations that we could recognize in the recent killer of Nanterre in France. He found in his act the occasion to realize Warhol’s words, “being famous for a quarter of an hour” managing at least once to have his name on television and in the newspapers.

Robert Reich’s idea is that there is an economy of attention, a demand for attention and an offer of attention, so a market of artificial attention. It is within this register that he inscribes psychoanalysis, including what he tells us about its increasing spread in the United States, because, from his position he does not need to make a difference between psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and any other term beginning with “psy.” He thus delineates the development of an entire sector of specialized activities in the service of attention. Which permits him to create a category that includes both private gym teachers, “personal trainers,” “personal shoppers” – those who do the shopping for you when you don’t have the time –, and the entire set of spiritual and psychological counselors. He isolates the sector of attention givers, and includes within them domestic personnel, baby-sitters, etc. It is as an economist that he creates this category, and he indicates that it is one of the two sectors that are growing most quickly in today’s society, the other being creative workers. He prophesizes that, in the future, at least in the United States – but for him the United States portends what less developed societies will become – anyone who does not have what it takes to become a creative worker will probably find themselves working in the sector of specialized attention givers. He says: Your children, if they are not creators, innovators, will find

themselves in this sector, which is promising but at the same time doomed to disqualification. If the economy is growing within essentially two sectors, the creators and the attention givers, the attention givers are those who do not manage to get into the other sector. It is also growing, but in the direction of an increasing disqualification. We can however be reassured by the fact that he places psychoanalysts and psychologists among the highly qualified workers, but he still includes them in the same category as butlers and baby-sitters.

This analysis is not ill-willed, its target is not essentially psychoanalysis. It is a study of the new working conditions within the framework of the new economy – moreover it was followed in a few months by the burst bubble of the new economy. It is more precious for not being polemical. It gives the impression of a depreciation of psychoanalysis by the fact that psychoanalysis is not apprehended from the place of a desire for truth but from that of a demand for personal attention. It is a depreciation, but at the same time we know that something was modified within the classical dynamics of the analytic cure. It is this modification that Robert Reich conceptualizes, in his own way. Certainly, it is not the ultimate truth of psychoanalysis, but it is useful for relativizing the attention we give to the minute internal differentiations that fragment the analytic milieu but that disappear before the eye of the economist. This is the sign under which we find the analytic act lodged. It is blatant that, within this classification, the activity of the psychoanalyst, the psychotherapist or the psychologist appears as being closer to baby-sitting than to medicine. There is, still and all, an effect of truth that surfaces there despite the reservations we might have, of course, concerning the classification itself.

The machine of the not-all

Ninth reflection – I'll name it thus: the bubbles of certainty. We must continue to look at ourselves in such a way that we are exotic for ourselves. This probably belongs to social phenomenology, but it is really from such elements that we have to try to reconstitute the original machine of today's civilization.

The father. It is easy to see what still attaches psychoanalysis to the myth of the father, and to see that society, in the process of modification at this epoch of globalization, has ceased to live under the reign of the father. Why not say it in our own language, the structure of the all has given way to that of the not-all: the structure of the not-all implies precisely that there be nothing left that serves as a barrier, that is in the position of what is forbidden. The forbidden appears as contradictory with the movement of the not-all. The structure of the not-all is what is described at the social and political level by Antonio Negri as *impero*, as the empire that develops precisely without meeting up with a limit. This is what corresponds for us to the structure of the not-all, deported to the level of what we can no longer call a social organization.

We should not be surprised to find here the not-all; this not-all was introduced by Lacan in his text "L'Étourdit," in which he responds precisely to Deleuze and Guattari's *L'Anti-œdipe* – as indicated at the end of the text – by reconceptualizing what the authors had tried to apprehend. The function of the father is in effect linked to the structure that Lacan discovered in masculine sexuation. A structure that comprises an all with a supplementary and antinomic element that poses a limit, and which allows the all to be constituted precisely as such, which poses the limit and thus allows for organization and stability. This structure is the very matrix of the hierarchical relation.

The not-all is not an all that includes a lack, but on the contrary a series in development without limit and without totalization. This is why the term of globalization is a vacillating term for us, since it is precisely a question of there being no longer any all and, in the current process, what constitutes the all, and what constitutes a limit is threatened and staggers. What is called globalization is a process of detotalization that puts all the "totalitarian" structures to the test. It is a process by which no element is provided with an attribute it can be assured of by

principle and forever. We do not have the security of the attribute, but its attributes, its properties, its accomplishments are precarious. The not-all implies precariousness for the element.

We can see every day, in fact, what used to be respect for tradition giving way to the attraction of the new, and this phenomenon, abundantly described, is staged for us by the machine of the not-all. To take an example that is revealing, at least for those for whom it is familiar, the Catholic Church in the United States is undergoing a veritable martyrdom. A cardinal, a prince of the Church, was summoned to the court to answer questions – the kind of questions in American trials that you might have an idea of from Erle Stanley Gardner or Perry Mason novels. You know how the questions are phrased. There must be no allusions; no speeches must be made, no speeches are asked for. The questions asked are short and factual and follow one on the other. You must give a yes or no answer just to the question that is asked, and then the lawyer will lead you by the nose. Well, the aptly named Cardinal Law of Boston, two weeks ago, was called on to give answers to these questions. I found on Internet the entire transcription of this interrogation, which was absolutely disconcerting for those who have some attachment to tradition. And the pluck to require of the Catholic Church the transparency of its operations, and the renewed distrust, including on the part of American Catholics, with respect to the role played by a potentate living in a microscopic state near Italy. There we have a sign of the times when we see multi-secular practices surrounded by a universal respect becoming today strictly undecipherable and thrust aside, rejected by the spirit of the times.

This really gives us the feeling there is an original machine staging plays of an entirely unprecedented type such as the one played by Cardinal Law humbly responding to the questions of the District Attorney: last name, first name, explain what a cardinal is, explain what a diocese is, etc. We have not yet gone that far in the old Europe, but we see in this what promises to be irresistible in this original machine.

By a certain short-circuit, admitting that the machine that is staging what we call globalization is the not-all, signifies, for Lacan, who relates it to feminine sexuation, that we can refer to this structure what we observe of the rise in society of values said to be feminine, those of compassion, of the promotion of listening practices, of the politics of proximity, all of which must from now on affect political leaders. The spectacle of the world may be becoming decipherable, more decipherable if we relate it to the machine of the not-all.

Obviously, we propose the practice of listening as political only in case of the absence of response. To listen becomes itself the response within the silence of the master. This is the political usage of intersubjective communication, namely that you will never receive a message other than the one you have sent. This is also why we cry over the traditional element, which was already grasped half a century ago, namely that the virile is under attack, and we observe, at least in the developed societies, a certain popularity problem for the war-mongers. This is of course correlative to a call for authority, to the return of order, to a desperate appeal to the reign of the master-signifier, which is in the process of being abolished. In any case, we can observe the tension between the functioning of the machine of the not-all that exacerbates the nostalgia for the master-signifier and this appeal to the master-signifier, all the more exacerbated as it appears as detached from the rest, and all the more insistent as it appears clearly as supplementary.

Within the social not-all, on the contrary, the signifier does not come to us in organized blocks, it tends to be presented in discontinuous fragments, for example under the form of instant information, so Americans study information overload. What we call information is the way the signifier gets to us, no longer organized but discontinuous, essentially fragmentary, with an effort to try to add to it an organization that is constantly in the process of being undone. From this we have what even Robert Reich can spot as a pathology of disorientation.

The pluralized S₁ and the subject without bearings

This is why sociologists have discerned, in face of the overdose of information, the subjective strategies that consist in withdrawing within the limits of zones of certitude. Descriptively, this is quite strong – it was already foreseen in the promotion of the postmodern by Lyotard, who generalized its concept. He had already characterized it in the past by the deconstruction of the great filters of knowledge, that is to say the traditions, the consecrated authorities, what he called the meta-narratives, the stereotypes: these are the various organizations of the signifier, which are the diverse forms of the discourse of the master, and which had the merit of operating a simplification and a formalization of reality, of diffusing models of coherency, models of coherent behaviors under the authority of jurisdictions recognized as competent.

One might wish that, in this period of the deconstruction of the filters of knowledge, by some miracle, schools be capable of operating this simplification and this formalization of reality, even though all the apparatus supporting them have been fissured, stricken, besieged, or are at least declining. What the sociologists have discerned is that globalization is accompanied by individuation. What is impaired is the mode of living together, the social bond that exists under the form of unfixed, dispersed subjects, and which induces, for each one, both a social duty and a subjective imperative to invent.

It's the very effective formula "living my own life" – my own life precisely by its difference from the others – that highlights the decadence, the decline of the collective organization of models, and places the subject in face of a demand – that he takes as his own – to invent and enhance his own individual style of life. It is the epoch we had called "of the Other who does not exist," when what Bourdieu had tried to recompose as the mechanisms of distinction already belonged to another epoch. Today the mechanisms of distinction he evokes are blurred; he presents us a simplified world, almost the world of his childhood.

It is at this moment that we find in Lacan's teaching, as he both defined and then questioned what he called the S₁, the central signifier of identification. He defined the master-signifier in his matheme for the discourse of the master. This matheme comports as its central agent the master-signifier, which is pre-postmodern. It is the discourse of the pre-postmodern master:

$$\frac{S_1}{S} \rightarrow \frac{S_2}{a}$$

So, the first movement, isolating this central signifier. But as soon as he had isolated it, he pluralized it, multiplied it, leading us to hear in the expression S₁ the value *essaim**, in order to say that there is not just one. There are several, and nothing assures on the contrary that they are other than chaotic, even if the swarm travels in a group. A constellation of signifiers rather than the unicity of the master-signifier.

And then, next to this matheme of the discourse of the master, he traced the first lines for the matheme of the capitalist discourse, a modification of the discourse of the master, in which it is the barred subject that is put in the place of this S₁:

$$\frac{S}{S_1}$$

* [Translator's note] "Swarm" in English. The pronunciation of S₁ and *essaim* are homophonic in French.

This is not so much a promotion of hysteria as it is the promotion of the subject without guidelines. It is in function of this original machine that we can observe, as the sociologists do, the constitution of limited zones of certainty that, on a small scale, give us these guidelines.

The bubbles of certainty

We can of course explain that the structure of the not-all is abstract and that, in fact, in reality, that is not the way it happens, because, in effect, the machine of the not-all comports the ever more insistent constitution of micro-totalities whose multiplication, and the investment of the subjects that are taken into it, translate the presence of this machine. Micro-totalities that offer, within the not-all, pockets, shelters, a certain degree of systematicity, stability, codification, and that permit the restitution of mastery, but at the cost of an extreme specialization. A very restrained field of signifiers must be chosen, a very restrained field of knowledge in which mastery can be restituted.

I found an example, which seems to me to be very indicative, in a study that was published two years ago concerning a phenomenon observed in Japan and which is called there “the *otaku* effect.” It figures in an article that I only know second hand, which is quite difficult to find and which is called “The *Otaku* Answer to Pressing Problems of the Media Society.”

It recounts what was observed in Japan. These categories can of course be considered as suspect, but they are not for as much less indicative. It concerns a certain aspect of the behavior of adolescents, or grown-up adolescents – we no longer know where adolescence stops in fact – who become fanatics of a very limited zone of the new technologies. They become complete specialists of what appears to be an entirely futile phenomenon of the mediatic society or certain types of Mangas or comics, or else of an idol – an actor, a model, etc. – or of some technology generally more or less linked to computers, or of video games, about which they accumulate as complete a knowledge as possible, always abreast with the latest rage. Outside of this, the complete disinterest they show in their contemporaries is remarkable, to the extent that it can be said that in Japan they no longer look people in the face. “An *otaku* prefers to stay alone in order to pursue his hobby in peace. He devotes himself obsessively to one unique sector of interest. The objects of his passion belong generally to pop culture.” We also have military objects – this is Japan. “The essence,” says the sociologist in question, a certain Grassmuck, “the essence of the *otaku* life-style has nothing to do with a specific argument, but is linked to his way of being in relation with a theme.” The category that seems to be in use in Japan is not constructed with reference to the theme of one’s interest, but to the manner of relation to this theme. “The *otaku* has a monomaniac personality. His strategy is to gather information reserved to just one section of human knowledge and to push aside all the rest. The *otaku* looks for a tiny zone of knowledge that he wishes to know everything about.”

This is generalized to all kinds of behaviors induced by the society of information, the media society, which consist in wanting to know totally at each moment what is “in” and what is “out.” This has also spread to France in magazines, which point out to you the “in” and the “out,” so that you know from one point to another how to find your way through the crowd.

I cannot judge the pertinence of this description for Japan, and we can also consider that it is not necessarily well constructed for the present state of civilization in France, but there is nonetheless something in psychoanalysis that can be conceptualized as an *otaku* response. There is something of the *otaku* life style in the analytic associations, in the Societies and Schools of psychoanalysis. We could even say that the analytic experience itself is something of an *otaku* response – the analytic experience as a search for certainty, and also because the relation in itself such as it is established within the analytic framework restitutes to the subject a zone of certainty.

Analysis puts uncertainty to work, but this is within the framework of a less hypothetical certainty – which gives as a result the extreme valorization of the framework that we observe in the IPA, the extreme although indefinable valorization of the framework. We can perhaps observe the same thing with Lacan in the definition of the analytic discourse, which is presented as a transformation, a version* of the discourse of the master, that is to say, as a bubble of certainty to which the subject is all the more attached for being plunged into the social structure of the not-all.

We must undoubtedly add that if psychoanalysis is a bubble of certainty, at the same time it radiates through society because it is put to work in advertising and it has taught politics how to manipulate the truth. It really did teach politicians that truth is an effect, which gave birth to the “spin doctors,” to the experts in the manipulation of the truth. We could moreover observe very recently in France the extraordinary promotion of a marketing specialist, become Prime Minister – this is a first – , who was apparently chosen just for that. By the same token, we must recognize that the extensive spread of listening practices, which submerges psychoanalysis, is the result of the prolific radiation of psychoanalysis today.

Psychoanalysis in the epoch of globalization

Tenth reflection: psychoanalysis in the epoch of globalization. We shall attempt to look rapidly at how the modifications of our clinical practice are related to the epoch of globalization and this machine of the not-all that is behind it.

Classical clinical practice, such as we learned it and taught it, had as its pivot the Name-of-the-Father and was directed with consideration for the positions of the subject with respect to the Name-of-the-Father. It is in this practice that different modalities of desire were distinguished – the unsatisfied, impossible, anticipated desire, etc. – or different modes of defense. Our classical clinical practice responded essentially to the structure of masculine sexuation, to the structure of the all and of the antinomic element. This is what permitted us to have these airtight, rigid, powerful classifications, which founded the notion of Lacanism for generations.

We might say that contemporary clinical practice, the practice we have been confronted with for years already, balances to the other side, towards the side of the not-all. This clinical practice of the not-all is the one in which we find flourishing the pathologies described as centered on the relation to the mother or on narcissism, but which were attributed to the pre-Oedipal register when we disposed of the previous hierarchy, and which have in a way taken their independence. To qualify this as pre-Oedipal is obviously too narrow.

When we show interest in everything that comes under the heading of addictions, we can clinically observe the frenzy of the not-all, of the pathologies which highlight precisely the without-limits of the series. We can observe at the same time the lesser effectiveness of the paternal metaphor and the pluralization of the S_1S , even their pulverization, so that, for some years already, we have recognized the crisis of our classifications. Let us just consider the category of perversion, to which we are attached by the teaching we received and distributed, by the very powerfulness of this category: we are forced to say it is a category that has undergone a massive social rejection. It is assimilated to a stigma. We cannot extirpate from the category of perversion the fact that it refers to a norm, that it belongs to a former regime where norms and ideals ruled the roost.

Of course, we object – Lacan says perversion is the norm of desire. But the very terms in which the diagnosis is given, the category itself, have ceased to be operatory. And moreover, Lacan indicated other paths to us for

* TN: We must hear in “version” both the usual sense and the more unusual sense of “turning around” as for a fetus. Reference to the quarter of a turn in the passage from one discourse (of the Four) to the other.

approaching contemporary clinical practice as the practice of the not-all. He gave us the path of the knot. It is not that the knot in itself is exalting, but the knot is effectively a means of responding to the structure of the not-all, since this clinical practice gives us an indefinite series of arrangements beginning with three circles of string. The ternary RSI can be distinguished and opposed to the former airtight, discontinuous repartition between neurosis, perversion and psychosis.

Before, we had a combinatory clinical theory, centered on the Name-of-the-Father (to go a bit quickly), and whose states were discontinuous, which gave us clearly distinct categories. It is obvious that – not that it is invalid – referring clinical practice to the knot undoubtedly gives us arrangements that are different but in continuity with one another. We have lost the security of the discontinuous and the clearly distinct, and the result is that the symptom, rather than what we called the clinical structure, which was a class, has become the elementary unit of clinical theory. The symptom has become the elementary unit of clinical theory and practice and, after all, the symptom, what Lacan called the *sinthome* at the end of his teaching, is the Lacanian version of the fragmentation of clinical entities that we find in the DSM. It is not the same fragmentation, but it is the same movement of deconstruction of the entities that can be observed in Lacan's second clinical theory.

We first operated with a clinical theory centered on identification. Lacan's first clinical theory was a theory of identification: in analysis, I learn to tell my story truthfully, that is to say, I elaborate an identification that permits me to be truthful. And the end of the analysis depends on the satisfying elaboration of a new identification, which passes through a disidentification, etc –, but the central category is identification.

Lacan's second clinical theory was centered on the fantasy, that is, once again, on a story, but this time a story conceived as an unconscious scenario and centered on the relation of the subject to the stump of *jouissance* that completes his constitutive lack.

Well, Lacan's last clinical theory has as its pivot-term the symptom, and in this theory, the absolute, the substance, is *jouissance*. To go back to the reference to Spinoza I had introduced in the beginning, it is really *Deus sive natura, sive jouissance*. That is, there is *jouissance*, to the detriment of truth and meaning. At that moment, it is no longer a question of there being a cure at the end of the analysis, nor is it a question of a traversing, it is only a question of the passage from one regime of *jouissance* to another, from a regime of suffering to a regime of pleasure.

What can be said of psychoanalysts in the epoch of globalization can be discovered through the pass. If it is clear what the translation of this is in terms of what the machine of the not-all stages, the pass means that we are led to suppose a disconnection between being an analyst and the practice of analysis. Those that Lacan wished to consecrate as Analysts of the School, had necessarily to be of the School, since this was a definition of the analyst independent of analytic practice, and which tries in this way to solve the problem of preserving the analytic core of practice in a world where the analyst tends to be dissolved within attentional practice.

It is probably within this context that we must conceive analytic training. At the same time this training turns out to be difficult to determine because we must, from now on, conceive it outside of any ideal to be attained, outside of the very problematics of the ideal and the norm. This means that training tends to be understood as the communication of a life-style rather than as an access to the realization of an ideal.

Translated by Thelma Sowley