

Dominique Laurent : Teachings of the pass - Paradoxical Effects in the Pass : 25th
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« Les effets de formation en psychanalyse : ses lieux, ses causes, ses paradoxes »

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Teachings of the pass

Paradoxical Effects in the Pass Contribution to the subject of the AMP Congress by Dominique Laurent

If the end of analysis is conceived as a crossing of the fantasy, the function of the device is to verify and homologate this crossing. The cut is clean, the pass may even be assessed according to the measure of a *perfect pass*.

In the case where the end of analysis is conceived as a *savoir y faire* with the symptom, things are less clear. What the cartel recognizes is not so distinct, it is not possible to imagine a perfect *savoir y faire*. There are only particular forms of savoir y faire. Training as it is apprehended on the basis of results of the subject's own analysis gives full value to the particular knowledge of jouissance that the analysand discovers. The pragmatic perspective seems to allow for more vagueness in the terms of the outcome. This vagueness may shelter and promote the flourishing of misunderstandings inasmuch as pragmatics seem to distance themselves from any standard reference.

I will give an example right away. A relatively important symptom remains unchanged

during the whole analysis; the subject has learned to accommodate it; he presents this acquisition to the pass as a **savoir y faire** and requests it be recognized as such. Such a use raises a number of questions: can we admit that once an analysis is achieved, a major symptom should remain unhindered? Is its having become **ego-syntonic** sufficient to speak of identification to the symptom? Do these two notions overlap? Isn't this rather a source of confusion?

This is not the only one. The more we take into account the pragmatic perspective, the more the cartel is required to find its way among variegated forms of confusion. We could order these forms of confusion thus: they are mistaken interpretations of the functioning of the four terms inscribing discourse at the outcome of the experience. We shall therefore present some reflections elaborated from instances of confusion and paradoxical effects observed by cartel B6 of the AMP on the functioning of S1, S2, barred S and (a).

Confusion regarding S2

The knowledge obtained by the subject concerning his unconscious, when located in an extimate position relative to established knowledge, introduces a new dialectic tension in the relation to knowledge. These are the stakes of analytic training. However, a de-supposition of any knowledge in the Other as such may ensue as a paradoxical effect of this downfall of the supposed subject of knowledge.

Confusing these two perspectives may lead to a new reading of Lacan, one of the kind that Lacan qualified as **cynical** as early as 1960.

It produces a subject who believes in nothing beyond the knowledge acquired regarding his *sinthome*. All the rest is irrelevant for this subject whose sole orientation is the bronze law of his *jouissance* [1] and his **savoir faire**. When Lacan, in a later period of his teaching, conceives psychoanalysis as a questioning regarding the relations between life and *jouissance*, he introduces us to a pragmatics that might be assimilated to what is named **new hedonism** at the beginning of the 21st century. By the very movement whereby psychoanalysis produces the master-signifiers of the subject, it displaces his relation to established forms of knowledge. In this sense it turns him into a non-dupe. A non-dupe either regarding the knowledge that the university discourse turns into a fetish, or regarding the challenges-to-knowledge in the hysteric discourse. This is a productive aspect of the analytic experience.

However, psychoanalysis may lead the subject to be the non-dupe of the psychoanalytic discourse itself. The **non-dupes err** when they are no longer the dupes of the analytic discourse they serve. This leads them to consider knowledge on the very objects of psychoanalysis as superfluous. In such cases, at its best, analytic practice is deviated towards an automaton of *savoir-faire*; at its worst, towards a certain form of imposture. It is precisely for this reason that analytic training must lead the subject beyond this point.

For the supposed subject of knowledge Lacan located an unprecedented relation to knowledge, which results from the turning point reached by the subject in his treatment. The cynical version promises the generalized downfall of knowledge in the very downfall movement of the supposed subject of knowledge. Since no knowledge is on a par with that obtained in the treatment, what results is generalized idleness, the Sunday of life. As early as 1956 Lacan remarked the opposition between the practice of knowledge and its objects. This opposition may extend and become generalized.

The confusion between the downfall of the supposed subject of knowledge and the de-supposition of knowledge was perceived by the cartel in a number of cases. This upside-down dialectics of knowledge as produced by the treatment must be straightened back on its feet. Before analysis, the neurotic subject leaves it to the Other to determine him. Through the work of deciphering the unconscious the subject comes to know what determines him, i.e., he knows how he is involved in *jouissance* scenes connected to signifier networks. He can then raise his determinations to the level of the *matheme*. The Other is then struck with non-existence in the sense that thereafter, the subject's liberty is nothing but that of his determination. His relation to the world is radically upset. He no longer needs the Other to know it. Once reduced to a *matheme*, nothing is

now lacking to the subject.

It would be a mistake to conclude from this that knowledge as such has no other use. On the contrary, it is only from this crossing point that the subject may become a response from the real, which leaves under his responsibility not to ignore any determination of this real. In order to attain the lawless real, some idea of the said laws is necessary.

Paradox about the barred Subject

The perspective of the *matheme* is not Lacan's last word to address the end of the treatment. In one of his earliest texts on the pass, **hystorization** is the term he chooses to refer to the reduction of the analytic operation transmitted in the procedure of the pass.

This perspective is different from that of the writing of a *matheme*. This is to say that the point of arrival is not a *matheme* but rather a *hystory* supported by *mathemes*. By using the term *hystorization*, Lacan points at the dimension of fiction, of a narrative necessary to pinpoint a position of *jouissance* connected to master-signifiers. It must also be understood that psychoanalysis permits to elaborate a response where the master's knowledge was impotent in answering the question of the hysteric subject. Lacan summons it at the end of the treatment for every neurotic subject, even though he had believed that the crossing of the fantasy had delivered the hysteric of her master-signifier. This chicane may lead to confusion.

We might say that, in a way, the term **hystorization** shatters the expressions **crossing of the fantasy** and **downfall of the supposed subject of knowledge**, and causes the emergence of a kind of hysteric functioning as a question addressed to the locus of established knowledge.

A question remains, however. In another sense, this **hystorization** is a species of purified hysteria, a question after the question. We might say that for the analyzed subject it is a matter of un-completing the Other. This perspective supposes a relation to the Other which is relieved from the adherences of meaning with which the subject endowed the Other. The good use of this "question-in-abeyance" [du reste de question] could be to articulate the finitude of the treatment with the interminable aspect of training.

Paradox about S1

The experience of the pass hardly teaches enough on the precise status of the relation of the analyzed subject to the master-signifier. The fact that in the cure the subject separated himself from his master-signifiers may generate confusion. The canonic terms that characterize this kind of confusion may be summarized under the signifier **anarlist**. The subject thus produced might extend his new disbelief to the set of possible master-signifiers.

However, Lacan warned against the fact that the treatment produces a new use of the S1 function, rather than its disappearance. The discovery by the subject of the contingency of the value of the variable S1 and the unveiling of the *jouissance* attached to it still do not abolish the function. That is the reason why analysts have to give testimony not only to the fact that they are no longer dupes to a certain number of discourses, but also that they remain the dupes to the discourse they serve. The desire of the analyst is perhaps a way in which Lacan could name this perspective before he wrote it as a discourse.

We are no longer in the era of **anarlists**, but can it be said that we have left our confusion behind us? The temptation of solitude, even of separation from, or avoidance of, a community that will assess the merits or faults in each one's work can still be found in a certain number of analysts. This solution is a dead-end to the treatment of the function S1. Analysts must take into account the necessity for this function in order to allow the existence of live and admissible commentary of the conceptual articulation in the corpus of Lacan's teaching. This perspective is unrelated to bearing effects or to political manoeuvres aiming at the leadership of the group. It aims in the direction of the political dimension, which is one of the three axes according to which we locate the

coordinates of the experience. Perhaps we are not using the device well enough in order to bring subjects to better formulate in their testimony their relation to the master-signifier, i.e. to the political as such in their testimony. Even when we can't get to know the fate of the function S1 beyond signifier production, it is however easier to perceive in certain treatments, in contrast, the focussing and the effects of master-signifiers quilting the subject.

Paradox about jouissances

From the moment the doctrinal accent is laid on the drive, it is easier to grasp a number of occurrences found in testimonies. There is the case of the subject for whom drive circuits are not constituted into signifier networks. There is the case of the subject whose way of not wanting to know about the object animating him consists in speaking about another object. There is also the subject who highlights in the object that which is perceived in its imaginary dimension at the expense of unconscious deciphering. This amounts to forgetting that the law of deciphering is a satisfaction that must wear itself out to its end, in other words $S(\bar{A})$. Conversely, it occurs that a subject can be fascinated by effects of meaning, by the unconscious machinery, without this being geared to the treatment of jouissance proper. In order to make sure there is an object cause it is necessary to verify that both aspects -deciphering and bodily jouissance - hold at the same time. In other words, no deciphering is possible unless an object drawn out from the body functions as the ballast of the trajectory.

One of the paradoxes resulting from emphasizing jouissance as assembled to the drive is that the other side of jouissance, the one firmly linked to the phallus, remains in the dark.

Perspective

The device of the pass procedure has already undergone modifications reinforcing the nature of agent of some of its constitutive elements. Let us remember the accent laid on the responsibility of the secretariat in awarding or refusing permission to enter the procedure. We can also recall that the cartels act as agents, in that they may speak up in order to interpret the paradoxical effects observed in treatments as a result of doctrinal emphases. This is a renewed reading of the cartels in the third position regarding the analytic link, a point of extimity to analysis.

The comments of the cartels would thus not come to a halt with the sole comment of the treatment of the passant, but would rather address the entire School. In this sense, they would participate together with the AE's to the analysis of the experience.

Paris, June 25, 2002

Notes

1- loi d'airain: name given by the German socialist Lassalle to a theory of production costs which restricts the worker's salary to a life-sustaining minimum (Translator's note, taken from the Larousse Dictionary)

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