

Éric Laurent

Can Psychoanalysis Be Cured?

This provocative title introduces a difference between psychoanalyzing and curing¹. It is certain that psychoanalysis gained its acceptance in civilization on account of having presented itself as a therapeutic technique. Freud first ensured his acceptance in the stream of hypnotherapies, themselves developed in the wake of romanticism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Enlightenment Europe gave way to a stress on the body, its powers and mysteries, which romanticism put so much emphasis on. Whilst in our Latin countries, i.e., where Catholicism is the dominant religion, we are very fond of the soul and therefore of psychology too, in Protestant countries, in the countries of German romanticism, it is the somatic and psychosomatic therapies which occupy the place that the soul occupies for us. One only has to cross the Rhine to find no shortage of signs recalling the constant preoccupation of the German language countries with their somatic health. The least opportunity is seized to take a hot bath, no doubt because it is rather chilly there, but above all because a certain ideal of somatic health is at work. One encounters this difference again in the Europe of therapies. In the German language, the air is dominated much more by preoccupations with the psychosomatic than with the psychotherapies. These are the deep traces in civilization that Freud was part and parcel of.

Therapeutic psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis as science

If psychoanalysis established itself as something therapeutic, it ought nevertheless to be said that while Freud was still alive, difficulties arose putting the effective therapeutic powers of psychoanalysis into question for both psychoanalysts and others outside the field. Within psychoanalysis, during the famous “turning point of the twenties”, the emphasis was put on the therapeutic difficulties as such. The practitioners were discovering that their patients knew as much about the unveiling of the Œdipus and the sexual signification of symptoms as they did. This paved the way for therapeutic voluntarism on the Ferenczi model, Ferenczi being particularly sensitive to these difficulties. Freud responds to this difficulty within psychoanalysis in his recognition of the influence of the death drive. He also responds to the objections from outside psychoanalysis in his 1926 text on “The Question of Lay Analysis”. Here he marks especially the distinction between therapeutic psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis as a science, noting quite reasonably that psychoanalysis had therapeutic effects, that these effects were limited, and that no doubt something better would be found for many complaints, but that in any case psychoanalytic science appeared to him to be well-founded – he did not want therapeutic preoccupations to overtake scientific preoccupations. Therefore, the first sense of our title would be thus: to rid oneself of the concern for curing, in order to preserve psychoanalysis.

Freud showed himself to be quite ready to negotiate with the authorities on the safeguard for the therapeutic dimension on condition that his higher mission would not be renounced: the mission that he gave to psychoanalytic science. He constantly warned against strictly therapeutic ideology. He formulates it in a

1 [This paper originally bore the title, ‘Guérir de la psychanalyse’. The above title has been proposed by the author, TN.]

decisive way in his 1926 text, “I only want to feel assured that the therapy will not destroy the science.”² He also evokes the counterpoint to this therapeutic drift away from psychoanalysis. “[The representatives of the various mental sciences] must learn to understand analysis in the only way that is possible – by themselves undergoing an analysis.”³ The training analyst, the *lehranalytiker*, is not originally the trainer of therapeutic analysts but the analyst of these representatives from the human sciences. He has to have received a “careful education” to dedicate himself to whomsoever should choose psychoanalysis as a discipline for the study of civilization. Be sure to understand this paradox, it is not a matter of teaching psychoanalysis, but precisely of a type of treatment, one by one, with the aim of transmitting the contribution of psychoanalysis on civilization as such to others, something akin to a work transference. For the “careful education” of these analysts however, they will have to start out in the field of therapeutics. Freud therefore, is not in favor of the existence of two categories of analyst. “All this, however, requires a certain amount of freedom of movement, and is not compatible with petty restrictions.”⁴

We are familiar with the reception that Freud’s proposals had in the existing psychoanalytic societies. The opening to “non-doctors”, that is to say, the bringing to heel of the therapeutic aspect, would come to be rather poorly received. This ranged from the most point blank refusal from the Americans, to the grudging acceptance on the part of the English⁵, passing by way of the enthusiastic support from the Hungarians led by Ferenczi, albeit encumbered by his therapeutic activism. As concerns authorization, the Berlin Institute model went on to be imposed and transmitted in the Anglo-Saxon countries under an adapted form. The “non-doctor” had his place in the program in an exceptional or transitory capacity.

The hope placed in the prevention of neuroses by the analysis of children was very quickly to give rise to a completely new category: child psychoanalyst. These were on the whole practitioners trained like Anna Freud or Melanie Klein, “non-doctors”. Furthermore, after the war, in Europe, Latin America, Brazil and the USA, a tacit pact developed. The obvious benefits brought by psychoanalysis and its therapeutic reach, testified to by a large number of doctors with a psychoanalytic training, were recognized by the de facto tolerance of the therapeutic activities of the psychoanalysts. University psychology too wanted to rush into the furrow Freud had opened up and to have the title and practice of university clinical psychologist recognized. Some psychologists joined the psychoanalytic societies, and the ranks of “non-doctors” were soon to be divided between psychologists who functioned as paramedics, and the rest. The problem that Freud was posing thus found an apparent practical answer. But is this addition a satisfying response to Freud’s question? It is necessary to preserve it within psychoanalytic societies in order to assure their necessary legitimization in the social organization of the desire to cure and thereby avoid the “petty restrictions” that never fail to arise, but it is not enough to fulfil our obligations to psychoanalysis.

The integration of psychoanalysis into civilization

For Freud, something else was at stake: the integration of psychoanalysis into civilization. Lacan first noticed that the system was functioning contrary to how Freud had pictured it: the system was allowing itself more and more to go down the therapeutic slope. The spontaneous ideology of the therapist was

2 S. Freud, “The Question of Lay Analysis”, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, Vol. XX (1925-26)*, Hogarth Press, 1959, p. 254 [P.F.L. 15, p. 359].

3 *Ibid.*, S.E. Vol. XX, p. 248 [P.F.L. 15, p. 351].

4 *Ibid.*, S.E. Vol. XX, p. 249 [P.F.L. 15, p. 352].

5 Jones gives his opinion as follows: “A non-doctor analyst can in many cases – but surely not all – conduct an analysis almost as well as a doctor, and consequently, with certain precautions and in a subordinate fashion, find his place in the psychoanalytic organisation.” Quoted in M. Schneider, “La question en débat”, which features in the appendix to the French translation of Freud’s paper: *La question de l’analyse profane*, Gallimard, Paris, 1985, p. 147.

becoming increasingly widespread: thinking that the individual is not the collective, that the individual is not the social, and other conceptions refusing to see that the Other, the social bond and identification are primary⁶. Far from assuring the bond between psychoanalysis and the social sciences, the class of “the best trained” analysts committed itself to assuring an extra-territoriality for psychoanalysis. Far from following the far-reaching movement of reorganization in the social sciences by way of the formalist models, far from following the “linguistic turn” of our century, the psychoanalysts were barricading themselves into a vague biological reference with no other consequence than that of allowing them a status of exception within the human sciences in the name of the biological fiction of the “drive” and a status of exception in medicine in the name of the unconscious. After having tried to redefine, within the framework of the IPA societies, from the study programs and existing hierarchies, syllabi open to human sciences and literary studies conceived as a collection of remarks about love and phallic adventures, Lacan concluded that all this was an impasse. The system would have to be recast for it to function.

Whereas Freud distinguished two levels of functioning, therapeutics and civilization, Lacan distinguishes three. In the founding act of his *École*, he isolates a first section that is to investigate pure psychoanalysis, this being the true problem of training analysis [*la psychanalyse didactique*]: how to define the analyst other than by a trait of the Ideal. The stake of the Pass would be deduced from this. The supervisions also come under the section for pure psychoanalysis, open to all once they have a practice entailing transference effects.

The section for pure psychoanalysis does not stand alone. It is connected to the second section: the section for applied psychoanalysis, “which means therapeutics and clinical medicine.” Lacan carefully distinguishes therapeutics and psychotherapy, underlining the fact that this practice is less developed in France than in the Anglo-Saxon countries⁷, but that there where the psychotherapeutic perspective prevails, it is effectively, “conformist in its aims, barbarous in its doctrine, a complete regression to psychologism, pure and simple.”⁸ On the other hand, as concerns the section for applied psychoanalysis, Lacan speaks about it completely differently and connects psychoanalysis to “therapeutic projects”. It is undoubtedly that, for Lacan, there is but one sole form of therapeutics and that, for him, psychotherapy does not exist.

The third section takes up the project of the Freudian *lehranalytiker* again in a clear way, by adapting it to the situation in the sixties. The Freudian project was contemporaneous with a certain form of university and a particular kind of dropout from the system: the intelligentsia that constituted the first recruiting-ground for psychoanalysis. The students in the sixties were built differently. This section has to extract, starting with psychoanalytic publications, the principles of its practice that must attain a scientific statute, it has to instruct itself in the reorganization in the human and more widely “conjectural” sciences, and recall the contributions from psychoanalysis, be they of the order of knowledge or of ethics. In point of fact, it is a matter of recalling, in the whole field of culture, this indomitable contribution from psychoanalysis: the taking into account of subjective particularity, which goes beyond the respect for the rights of man.⁹

From this ensemble and this reconstruction of the Freudian project we can retain the elements between

6 We are following the movement of Lacan’s texts here. We are well aware that it could be objected that for the Lacan of the seventies, it is jouissance that is primary. The dialectic is imposed of starting from the Other in order to go to the other. Then, one travels the inverse path.

7 “...the Freudian message, in its radical thrust, goes far beyond the use to which it is put by practitioners of Anglophonic obedience. Even if one lends a hand in France, as elsewhere, to a practice mitigated by the unfurling of a form of psychotherapy associated with the needs of social hygiene,...” J. Lacan, in, “Preamble”, included in, *A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, Norton, New York, 1990, p. 103

8 *Ibid.*

9 See on this point the editorial of *Mental 2*.

which the analyst in training [*l'analyste qui se forme*] has to circulate. He is required to be able to respond to questions bearing on pure psychoanalysis, i.e., the end of analysis, the necessity of the supervisions, the adaptation of the treatment to the case, etc. He ought also, whether doctor or not, to be able to have a training in applied psychoanalysis, to be familiar with the indications for psychoanalysis and their limits, to be trained in the discipline of the clinical interview, in the necessity of knowing how to orient oneself in diagnosis and adapt the treatment to different therapeutic projects. Finally, he has to be able to answer for the ethic of the analytic act and its place among the actions and human institutions. An equilibrium has necessarily to exist, no one element should prevail in a destabilizing fashion leading to a loss of orientation in the different tasks of psychoanalytic action. Being in training [*Se former*] implies familiarizing oneself with this project and making oneself responsible for it.

To cure of science

Is the ultimate end of this project to center ourselves, straight and to the point, on psychoanalytic science? It would still be necessary for psychoanalysis to be a science. Freud maintained as such, even as he tempered his scientific optimism with the death drive. This reference found its translation on the therapeutic plane in the limits brought upon psychoanalytic action by the recognition of negative therapeutic resistance. This immediately led to incomprehension on the part of the therapists. Only Melanie Klein, through her particular relation to death, accepted it. By skipping over the death drive, Freud's scientism was transmitted to the 1940-55 generation. More precisely, in the fifties, scientism in psychoanalysis fractured when it was a question of giving a status to the advance of the "human sciences". Lacan thus proffered a version of the unconscious compatible with the advances of linguistics and the sciences that it brought to life around it. It is this alliance that he broke up between 1967 and 1969 with "Radiophonie". In 1969, Lacan elaborated the "four discourses" and turned psychoanalysis into a discourse, and not a science.

When, in 1969, during the Seminar *L'envers de la psychanalyse*, Lacan introduces the four discourses, when he says that psychoanalysis is a discourse, it needs to be understood thus: psychoanalysis is not a science. No more than the master has a science of power, no more than the university academic has a science of knowledge, no more than the hysteric has a science of desire. "Discourse" is a way of establishing a relation with the jouissance that cannot be without limits. All human training [*formation humaine*] says Lacan, implies a curb on jouissance. The discourse is approached as a bond, as a social bond, a human training. The term "human training" rests on the established usage of "formations of the unconscious" and thereby subverts the Aristotelian definition of the social bond, "man is a political animal." Starting from human training permits of sending Freud's speculations on the prehistory of the social bond, inspired by the Darwinism of his time, back to the mythical plane.

To say that the unconscious is the discourse of the master is to say in short that all power comes to the place of the ego ideal and that, at the same time, at the heart of the unconscious lies the superego. The very essence of the command, of moral conscience, comes from the fact that the superego is at once an interdiction and a push-to-crime, a command that is impossible to satisfy. At the heart of the unconscious lies the master-signifier, noted S_1 by Lacan, and the confrontation with jouissance. The "discourse of the master" yields a new version of Kojève's reading of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Here, Kojève gave a major place to the struggle for recognition of master and slave. These two terms find themselves subverted by the introduction of jouissance, noted *a*.

The psychoanalytic experience of the interpretation of the unconscious allows one to consider that the second signifier, noted S_2 , which interprets the first, is of the order of knowledge or of the sexual *meaning*

that ends up by settling in *knowledge*. Just as Freud threw light on *jouissance* linked to the master signifier, Lacan throws light on *jouissance* linked to knowledge. The proof of this is that this knowledge engenders a social bond too, like the master signifier. This bond “in the name of knowledge” will be the “university discourse”. It includes the university of course, but also bureaucracies in the most general sense.

The bond engendered in the name of the subject divided by desire will take on the name of “hysteric’s discourse”. In the hysteric’s discourse, in her provocation-evasion with the master, another term is introduced besides that of “impossible”, namely, “impotence”. The master is impotent to satisfy her through the knowledge about desire that he produces. It is a happier question since phallic impotence presents a comic dimension. Lacan will be able to write his “discourses” with four letters, two modalities and a direction of permutation. History, which has permitted the successive revelation of the different discourses, uncovers a permutational synchrony.

Generalized bureaucracy

Psychoanalysis’s contribution to the political sciences and the interpretation of the social bond is not limited to the Church and the Army as we too frequently have the impression when reading the literature. Before getting to the Lacanian writing of the discourses, we ought not to forget an intermediary link, the analysis of bureaucracies that Lacan undertook. He pursued the Freudian operation on a conception of bureaucracy derived from that of Alexandre Kojève. Kojève professed a doctrine that we might call “generalized bureaucracy”. Lacan added the grain of sand of *jouissance*, with surprising consequences.

What is a bureaucracy in this sense? We have forgotten to what extent the development of these organizations as an instrument of management was generalized in the period of the world’s reconstruction that followed the Second World War. We often limit the phenomenon to the establishment of a bureaucracy necessary for the functioning of the welfare state. Many other bureaucracies sprang up and were established to manage ever-larger social groups both nationally and internationally. There were bureaucracies intended to manage the economy, the diverse reconstruction, the plans made to foil crises. Next, there were the bureaucracies of financial industry: the banks, essential to the crisis-prevention system. To this should be added the domain that would change scheme with the new functions of the welfare state: insurance. Internationally, a whole new field opened up with the new international institutions. First, the military pacts, of course. Next, the United Nations and all their dependencies. Then the whole European project, which assumed various forms, from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) up to the European Economic Community (EEC). Post-Stalinist Russia would itself become a bureaucracy, consumed by multiple bureaucracies in competition. In America, the multinationals achieved unheard of degrees of integration. We will leave it there.

The ownership of the means of production was, for some, the radical discriminant that rendered the phenomenon heterogeneous. Contrary to this, Alexandre Kojève read it as the very realization of the Hegelian vision of History on a new scale. In the previous century, Hegel had situated the place of Enlightenment bureaucracy with regard to civil society. He gives it the place of a new clericalism of civil servants of the universal. Kojève considers that the post-war situation confirms the advent of bureaucracies in a world where it is no longer only the clerk but also the warrior who have disappeared in the modern technological army. The church and the army have indeed disappeared in their genuine particularities, and it is the extension of the bureaucratic form that is the essential element of civilization, even more, we might add, than the technology that is an instrument of it. He immediately learnt a practical lesson for himself. This sage par excellence was reabsorbed into the bureaucracy of international negotiations at the heart of the French administration. From the moment that he had the certitude that the end of history had arrived, it only remained to negotiate what it could be in order to bring about the universal homogenous state.

Lacan adopts and criticizes the Kojévian perspective on bureaucracies. At the very least, he accepts the essential form of the social bond that they establish and the necessity of giving an account of them in psychoanalytic theory beyond the repetitious commentaries on the “society of brothers”. He analyses it starting from a particular bureaucracy, of which Freud had only seen the premises, even though he made the blueprint for it: the International Psycho-Analytic Association (only in its English title can it be properly said).

Lacan would first reveal its stable Freudian group structure constructed on the dead father¹⁰, the irony of the affair being that the place of the father is immortalized above all in the fact that he is no longer understood and that the sense of what his teaching really means has been lost. He is left to an infinite jouissance of psychoanalysis, and no-one can any longer either elucidate his comments, nor say what his work is about. Bureaucratic reason then leaves the field open to the competition between equals under the democratic mask of the society of brothers. All bureaucracies operate in the name of a knowledge, and have done so since the most ancient times, since the mandarin, throughout all the clericatures. The originality of psychoanalysis resides in the fact that the position of knowledge in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis operates in a particular fashion. The psychoanalyst can very well content himself with exhibiting a non-knowing, if he is surrounded by the bureaucratic seriousness that is appropriate. So it is that, “This situation accounts [...] for the apparent ease with which what have to be called nullities get established in leading positions in existing societies. [...] ...it is that this nullity (of knowledge) is recognized by everybody, an everyday object, if I can put it like that, for the subordinates and common currency of their appreciation of their Superiors.”¹¹ The radical formulation of what was first pinpointed as a chiasmus between the two types of functioning of knowledge for psychoanalysis is stated in 1967 as the supposed subject of knowledge, which functions in the analytic treatment to the point that it accommodates itself very well to the practitioner’s non-knowing, if he does not make a major blunder.

Lacan then indicates the return effect that this analysis entails for knowledge such as it functions in the other bureaucracies: “The induced effect of structure privileged in this way is further illuminated if one adds to it the function of the supposed subject of knowledge in the Church and in the Army. A study for whoever would like to undertake it: it would go a long way.”¹² We must be sure to give full prominence to this indication. It is a matter of constructing a theory of Freudian groups [*foules freudiennes*], beyond Œdipal identification. As is often the case when Lacan indicates a path in this way¹³, this study will be undertaken by Lacan himself and this will furnish the writing of the discourses in general. More particularly, we should be sure here to adopt the use of the writing of the university discourse in order to decipher the functioning of bureaucracies. In this discourse, knowledge is in the place of agent and plays the same role as in the Lacanian analysis of psychoanalytic bureaucracy in 1956. In 1969, Lacan explicitly considers the Soviet Union as the triumph of the university discourse. So it is that he gives its *matheme* to the Brejnev event. Brejnev whose appointment in 1964 as first secretary to the Central Committee, then in 1966 as General Secretary, would be fatal, heralding a glaciation that led to the explosion at the end of the eighties and the destruction of the bureaucracy itself. It was the fatal promotion of a zero that thereby caused a dramatic fall in the temperature of the regime’s functioning, leading to its downfall.

10 In the text that he considers as the preface to his proposition on the psychoanalyst of the School, “Situation de la psychanalyse et formation du psychanalyste en 1956” J. Lacan, *Écrits*, Seuil, Paris, pp. 459-491.

11 J. Lacan, “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, *Analysis*, No. 6, 1995, p. 6.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

13 Jacques-Alain Miller has shown several examples of this type in Lacan’s teaching.

Psychoanalysis is a way of obtaining jouissance [une façon de jouir]

Let us move on to the hysteric discourse. The hysteric discourse is a way of obtaining jouissance, not from a knowledge, and not from a text. The hysteric obtains jouissance from a not-knowing [*jouit d'un non-savoir*], she obtains jouissance from the provocation to knowledge and its epidemic, hence the existence of these major epidemic phenomena to constantly remind us, even though hysteria has completely disappeared from the psychiatric nomenclature. In the US itself, where the DSM triumphs, it is no longer possible to diagnose someone as hysteric. The diagnosis of hysteria leads to a lawsuit for injury to the subject, to her credibility, or, if it is a man, to his sexed being. But, on the other hand, at the level of epidemics, the term “hysteria” is conserved. Diana’s funeral was an extraordinary demonstration that even in the most pragmatic country in Europe the force of a hysterical epidemic was present and palpable. Likewise, when the Queen celebrated her jubilee. In the United States, after September 11th and the deaths from the anthrax bacillus, a hysterical epidemic struck tens of thousands of teenagers in the American secondary schools who felt a suspicious itching. They called upon health institutions across many States. It was a question of large red patches that came up at school and disappeared when they got back home. The phenomena lasted a certain time, until the anguish subsided. It then occurred to someone in charge that this must be a hysterical epidemic. Here we can see the character of the social bond as discourse in hysteria. No need for an institution, no need for a committee of hysteria, no need to name the hysterics through a process of selection. The community produces itself de facto and what the human social bond is can be seen in all its force in this discourse.

To say “discourse of psychoanalysis” is above all else to say that psychoanalysis is a way of obtaining jouissance [*une façon de jouir*]. It is a way of obtaining jouissance from the unconscious with the twofold aspect that this entails: firstly, this discourse opens an access to jouissance, and secondly, it is a limit to this jouissance since it passes by way of the unconscious “structured as a language”. Thus, it is a very strong thesis: psychoanalysis is a discourse, it is a way of obtaining jouissance. It fits with the previous thesis that psychoanalysis is not a science. It allows one to state that science is “trivial” [*futile*]¹⁴. How can one dare to say this when at each moment science is threatening death, when we will end up destroying our planet and our species thanks to these lethal techniques that we are endlessly perfecting? Science is trivial because it does not tell us where to obtain jouissance. Science is trivial because in fact it only scares people off. It does not manage to indicate the path toward jouissance. This means that science leaves the discourse of the master, the discourse of the hysteric and the university discourse intact. Certainly, there was a time, with Galileo, when there was a hope that science would not be trivial. Galileo made the church tremble with his knowledge. Those days are over. Today one can be scientific and fundamentalist, like in Pakistan. In general, the scientists have a watered-down and universal Buddhism, the same that Lévi-Strauss predicted at the end of *Tristes tropiques*. This is the current state of the belief in the “God of philosophers and the learned.” Science will overcome neither the master nor university bureaucracy. As for the hysteric, she only profits from it all the more. Psychoanalysis, which is not a science but which indicates a way of obtaining jouissance, is less trivial [*futile*].

To obtain jouissance from the unconscious is not so straightforward. The living being can obtain jouissance from many other things. Drugs for example are a short-circuit of jouissance that does not necessitate any unconscious whatsoever. To obtain jouissance from the unconscious is to obtain jouissance from an *appareillage*¹⁵ that is not the nervous system. It is an *appareillage* that has its own topology, its own

14 J. Lacan, “Introduction à l’édition allemande des *Écrits*”, *Autres écrits*, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 554.

15 [The noun *appareillage* may be rendered in English as “fitting-out” or “kitting-out”, but one would lose the essential reference to “apparatus”, TN.]

consistence, and which the human being uses like an apparatus [*dont l'être humain jouit comme d'un appareil*]. Here, Lacan indicates the fundamental reason why humanity cannot be cured of psychoanalysis. When Lacan makes of the unconscious an apparatus of jouissance, when he says that jouissance proceeds by way of the *appareillage* of the unconscious, he designates the fundamental reason why humanity cannot be cured of the apparatus that psychoanalysis has unveiled. It is a symptom of civilization, he tells us in "La troisième", even though religion, no doubt, will get the upper the hand. Psychoanalysis is something which humanity cannot be cured of but which it wants to be cured of. It could be said that there is a will to be cured of psychoanalysis that is neither a simple negative therapeutic reaction nor a misrecognition of psychoanalysis. There is a will in civilization to be cured of psychoanalysis, to silence it, just as science has managed to silence the messages that used to come to us from above. There are, within psychoanalysis, among the psychoanalysts, those who would like to get to the end of the malaise that the existence of psychoanalysis creates. It may be said that the efforts, within psychoanalysis, to absorb psychoanalysis into other discourses, have never stopped: first into medicine, then into general psychology (Hartmann), and finally in general neurology. They each betray a will to kill analytic knowledge, to kill this hitherto unheard of desire to treat "meaning with the means of science", as Lacan tells us in the "Note italienne". The will to kill this desire also passes through the vague attempts to absorb psychoanalysis into the current movement of knowledge where everything has "tipped over into course-credits [*unités de valeur*]". We have recently taken an additional step: now it is the baccalaureate + 2', bac + 3', bac + 4', bac + x'. Whatever you learn, it is of no importance, it is only worth its price on the labor market. Since either way there are too many of you, it is not worth very much. The functioning of this knowledge reduced to quantitative grading can find itself satisfied with the will to reduce psychoanalysis to a calibration through evaluation scales. So it is that what was at one moment given to be the IPA's best school of psychoanalysis on the east coast of the United States, at Columbia, is now devoted to the elaboration of evaluation scales that seem really to have been of psychoanalytic inspiration.

To finish, saying that psychoanalysis is not a science but a symptom in civilization is to tie our lot to the desire to cure of this symptom. Civilization will not be cured of psychoanalysis, regardless of what it may want or search for, including the success of clinical psychology. At the same time, this desire to be cured of psychoanalysis will remain like a thorn in the side. To cure of psychoanalysis is the will to cure mankind of itself, to transform it, to end up with a mankind that would no longer have any kind of unconscious. This is the hope of all those who want to cure us of psychoanalysis: to enter into a post-human era.

Translated by Adrian Price