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## Milanese Intuitions [2]

We will devote this encounter to the political unconscious, a stone put in our path by the turns of history, causing us to interrupt the laborious study we had undertaken on counter-transference\*. I will pursue my reflections, those I shared with you last time. The formula “The unconscious is political” that I used last time produced quite a splash – that is to say, it propagated waves within practice as well as within theory, although here “theory” is perhaps too big a word and must be put within quotation marks.

### *Reality staged by the structure*

Theory, when we try to produce it – theory in the present – is nothing more, at least for psychoanalysis, than a sinuous trail, a trail we blaze to try to catch up with what has already taken place and which is going forward on its own. Theory and practice in psychoanalysis are not symmetrical or parallel. There is in psychoanalysis, it cannot be ignored, a lagging of the theory that is not contingent, not accidental, but probably structural, at least as far as its elaboration is concerned. And this elaboration is of course in tension with the very knowledge it is supposed to elaborate. It would be fitting that this knowledge express the reality being accomplished according to a necessary order, in conformity with the proposition 7 of book II of Spinoza’s *Ethics: Ordo et conexio idearum* – the order and connection of ideas – *idem est* – are, is the same, since *ordo et conexio* are here reunited – *ac ordo et conexio rerum* – the same as the order and connection of things.

This is an essential proposal, the very ideal which inspires Lacan’s structuralism, on condition that the order and connection of signifiers replace the order and connection of ideas. This is what Lacan designated as the pure and simple combinatory of the signifier. This combinatory was supposed to define relations of necessity meeting, the same ones, in reality. That is the conception of knowledge we measure our efforts against, since it is the conception of a kind of knowledge that is not a representation of reality, but that should be identical to the very principle of the effective development of reality, identical to the principle of its production, of its *Wirklichkeit*.

According to this conception, the structure is neither an ordered description of reality, nor a theoretical model elaborated apart from experience. With respect to this, see Lacan’s criticism of Lagache, page 649 of the *Écrits*, a text that is for us a reference. Lacan claims to surmount the difference, the opposition, the contradiction he calls the antinomy of these two conceptions of structure, as description and as model, by introducing a third mode for structure by which it is produced within reality itself and determines its effects there. For Lacan, these effects are effects of truth, effects of jouissance, effects of subject, and the truth itself is an effect, the jouissance also and the subject as well.

It is in this direction that we must understand the proposal Lacan puts forth on this page, according to which the structure operates within experience as – I have already quoted this formula, which was particularly forceful at the time Lacan used it for the fantasy – “the original machine which puts the subject on the stage.” These terms

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must be explained. Machine is a word that designates a signifying articulation, combinatory and determinist, whose variations are strictly conditioned. Some years later, Lacan was to give an example that serves as a reference in his four discourses. The staging of the subject means, in fact, that the combinatory machine is in the wings, that it is not on display, that it is hidden, which makes us think it is at a distance. Its being hidden supposes it escapes any descriptive phenomenology, that it is not sufficient to let things be in order to get to it. The expression “staging the subject” carries an ambiguity that reflects the actual division of the subject. That is to say, the subject is staged, is an actor, not the director, and at the same time the subject is a spectator, reality is for him staged by the structure.

What does it add to qualify this machine as original? It is probable that Lacan means by this that it is not derived from anything anterior to it, but in the specifically genetic sense, which he criticizes on this page, and not in the combinatory sense. And original also means unique. This machine is specific to each subject, it must be reconstituted in the analytic experience for each subject. But it would probably be abusive to limit its validity or the inspiration of this proposal to the analytic experience *stricto sensu*, because the subject is not the individual. Lacan also talks about the subject of science, for example, and we can perfectly well consider that the discontent analyzed by Freud concerns the subject of civilization.

This is what we are confronted with when our attention is alerted as it recently was. We realize we are confronted with the original machine that stages the subject of civilization at the present time, and that this also conditions the analytic experience. And here we have what is mapped out, of an ambition constantly resumed, redrafted, to recompose this original machine out of what we know of its effects.

#### *The unconscious is connected to the social bond*

I need to be more precise about a point I evoked last time when I quoted a remark of Lacan's with reference to a quotation that had been made of it: “I do not even say ‘politics is the unconscious’, but simply “the unconscious is politics.” I had indicated that this remark was taken from “La logique du fantasme” and I had quoted it without verifying the stenography of the seminar. Which I have since done. I wish now to add, before continuing, a few considerations on this point. First, because we find in the stenography the formula “unconsciousness is politics.” But I am in favor of correcting this stenography to read “the unconscious is politics.” The passage I had referred to is found within a sentence that I wish to pass on to you more completely. This is what Lacan said: “If Freud has written somewhere ‘anatomy is destiny’, there may come a moment, when we have come back to a healthy perception of what Freud discovered for us, when we will say: I do not even say, etc.” This complement shows that the matrix of Lacan's words is clearly one of Freud's formulas, and that Lacan opposes what Freud said in echo to the emperor Napoleon, and what Freud discovered for us, that is to say, what Freud really said. What Freud really said is not what Freud said. It is in fact the inspiration of all Lacan's teaching which is concentrated there. What Freud really did say is not that anatomy is destiny. It is not the anatomic body that Freud refers us to in order to try to explain the subjective difference of sexuation. Moreover, anatomy does not even determine hysteria, since, as Lacan points out in “Television,” hysterical conversion does not obey the anatomic partition.

Parallel to the anatomic body we could bring into question the living body and distinguish them. Of the living body inasmuch as it speaks and as speech conditions its jouissance, we might say that it determines destiny. But in this passage from his Seminar, Lacan operates a displacement from “anatomy is destiny” to the “unconscious is politics.” And he explains this by saying “What bonds men together, what opposes them, must be motivated by the logic we are trying to articulate” – and at that time, it was the logic of the fantasy. “The unconscious is politics” is connected to what bonds and opposes “men” in relation to one another, that is to say, the unconscious is connected to the social bond. It is this conception that, some years later in Lacan's teaching, would be put into a matheme by the cycle of discourses.

The unconscious is connected to the social bond – we introduce this gloss – precisely because there is no such thing as a sexual relation. We could go so far as to say that where there is a sexual relation, where the sexual bond is programmed, well then, there is no society.

Of course, we were enchanted to dream about the society of bees, or that of ants. Maeterlinck, when he did not make us dream of *Pelleas and Melisande*, enchanted us, during our childhood, by describing those societies that gave us a utopia, precisely because they were, because they are – what they were and what they are is precisely the same thing – societies without politics. It is societies without politics that furnished us with utopias. We might say that the theocracies tried to realize a society without politics, or else that ethnological structuralism presented us with societies possessing elementary structures of family relationships, which were for this reason apolitical, something that was contested later on.

Today it does not seem abusive to propose that there are no societies without politics, and that, correlatively, the unconscious is political. This is what Lacan was elaborating during those years. After having shown that the unconscious is produced within the relation of the subject to the Other, he continued by showing that it is produced within the relation to the Other sex, coming up against, on precisely this path, the absence of sexual relation and the interposition of the object *a*.

#### *“The rejected being” and the political demand of the Other*

This phrase of Lacan’s, – to be a bit more complete – is situated in this Seminar in the course of a reflection on the formula “being rejected,” “being spurned,” provoked by considerations on masochism that he borrows from Bergler’s work *Basic Neurosis*. Bergler introduces this status of the subject, “the spurned being,” with reference to the oral stage and he founds the “being spurned” – the being spurned, which would be the principle of behavior, of the attitude of certain subjects – on a “being spurned by the mother”; it would be the masochistic desire that the subject would create, at the level of the oral drive, which would permit him to bewail this injustice and find jouissance in it. “Being spurned,” which would constitute the motive for the complaint of the subject, would find its motive in the desire to be saved from being swallowed up by the maternal partner. This is what had held Lacan’s attention at the time, this finding jouissance in injustice which also discloses for Lacan Bergler’s hostility towards his patients, whom he stigmatizes as collecting injustices in order to complain of them – which is not absurd from the point of view of the phenomenology.

Lacan, in the very movement which produced the formula “the unconscious is politics,” makes a fundamental objection to Bergler, which rather well situates Lacan’s political position, which he promoted and gave force to in his teaching, and which was: but why then should one be accepted, rather than rejected? Why should one have to do what must be done in order to be accepted? Is it the case, by chance, that the table at which one should want to be accepted would always be benevolent? What is behind this is the metaphor of the *Symposium* and those who are not admitted to the banquet. This clearly situates the position of subversion that was Lacan’s and which, it must be recognized, is still today a current question.

At the time, the current question concerned what was taking place in a small region of South-east Asia, the Vietnam War. Lacan commented on what was at stake in the following way – which resounds and can still resound today when Asia has probably little by little fallen into step, but another zone of the planet, not yet! – “It is a question of convincing them that they are wrong not to want to be admitted into the benefits of capitalism.” At that time, what we found was that they preferred being rejected from it. It is with respect to this that Lacan invites us to reflect on certain significations – especially on the signification of “being rejected” – and it is in the midst of this that he introduces, without developing it, his “the unconscious is politics.”

What he adds, in its brevity, still susceptible to evoke an echo for us, is that one can only be rejected if one proffers oneself. This leads him to remind us, as a key to the neurotic position, the close relation of the subject to the demand of the Other. With respect to this demand, he says, we must suppose that there is for the neurotic, “a necessity and perhaps a benefit in being rejected.” Later on, perhaps Lacan would have talked about the jouissance of being rejected. This comports a very precise clinical indication, which is that you must think twice before having the ambition to force a subject not to be rejected, before considering that being admitted to the banquet of others is the best thing that can happen to him.

Lacan indicates that proceeding thus, having the prejudice that it is better to be admitted to what you consider as a benefit, adjusting the analytic operation to that, can give the analyst a persecutive function. This puts an end to what would consist in giving to what the analyst believes to be the principle of reality a primordial value, rather than considering as valid in itself the desire to be rejected – that is to say not to be submitted to the demand of the Other.

This is also indicative for the present moment of civilization where it is not the desire of the Other that is so present but rather the insistence of his demand, of his political demand in the form of democracy and the market considered as values that your welfare is dependent on. So that, what is presented as a preference, the preference to be rejected from the order of these benefits, becomes incomprehensible, or even monstrous. This is, at any rate, an indication of a position of reserve for the analyst, with respect to these master-signifiers of the specifically political demand of the Other. That is what I wished to add, to modulate within what I had attributed last time to Lacan’s remark, based on the quotation that I had gleaned in the work of an author.

### *The depreciation of psychoanalysis*

I had gotten to my eighth reflection concerning the depreciation of psychoanalysis. I had announced the resource that I had been able to find in *The Future of Success*, a book of Robert Reich’s, the political economist, who is one of those essayists that have laid stress on social narcissism in the epoch of globalization – the first, in the 1980s, was Christopher Lasch and his *Culture of Narcissism*. His idea is that mass anonymity enters into contradiction with the desire for celebrity induced by the object mass media – which leads to the major question of how to attract attention. “How can I attract attention?” is a question which is present in the motivations that we could recognize in the recent killer of Nanterre in France. He found in his act the occasion to realize Warhol’s words, “being famous for a quarter of an hour” managing at least once to have his name on television and in the newspapers.

Robert Reich’s idea is that there is an economy of attention, a demand for attention and an offer of attention, so a market of artificial attention. It is within this register that he inscribes psychoanalysis, including what he tells us about its increasing spread in the United States, because, from his position he does not need to make a difference between psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and any other term beginning with “psy.” He thus delineates the development of an entire sector of specialized activities in the service of attention. Which permits him to create a category that includes both private gym teachers, “personal trainers,” “personal shoppers” – those who do the shopping for you when you don’t have the time –, and the entire set of spiritual and psychological counselors. He isolates the sector of attention givers, and includes within them domestic personnel, baby-sitters, etc. It is as an economist that he creates this category, and he indicates that it is one of the two sectors that are growing most quickly in today’s society, the other being creative workers. He prophesizes that, in the future, at least in the United States – but for him the United States portends what less developed societies will become – anyone who does not have what it takes to become a creative worker will probably find themselves working in the sector of specialized attention givers. He says: Your children, if they are not creators, innovators, will find

themselves in this sector, which is promising but at the same time doomed to disqualification. If the economy is growing within essentially two sectors, the creators and the attention givers, the attention givers are those who do not manage to get into the other sector. It is also growing, but in the direction of an increasing disqualification. We can however be reassured by the fact that he places psychoanalysts and psychologists among the highly qualified workers, but he still includes them in the same category as butlers and baby-sitters.

This analysis is not ill-willed, its target is not essentially psychoanalysis. It is a study of the new working conditions within the framework of the new economy – moreover it was followed in a few months by the burst bubble of the new economy. It is more precious for not being polemical. It gives the impression of a depreciation of psychoanalysis by the fact that psychoanalysis is not apprehended from the place of a desire for truth but from that of a demand for personal attention. It is a depreciation, but at the same time we know that something was modified within the classical dynamics of the analytic cure. It is this modification that Robert Reich conceptualizes, in his own way. Certainly, it is not the ultimate truth of psychoanalysis, but it is useful for relativizing the attention we give to the minute internal differentiations that fragment the analytic milieu but that disappear before the eye of the economist. This is the sign under which we find the analytic act lodged. It is blatant that, within this classification, the activity of the psychoanalyst, the psychotherapist or the psychologist appears as being closer to baby-sitting than to medicine. There is, still and all, an effect of truth that surfaces there despite the reservations we might have, of course, concerning the classification itself.

### *The machine of the not-all*

Ninth reflection – I'll name it thus: the bubbles of certainty. We must continue to look at ourselves in such a way that we are exotic for ourselves. This probably belongs to social phenomenology, but it is really from such elements that we have to try to reconstitute the original machine of today's civilization.

The father. It is easy to see what still attaches psychoanalysis to the myth of the father, and to see that society, in the process of modification at this epoch of globalization, has ceased to live under the reign of the father. Why not say it in our own language, the structure of the all has given way to that of the not-all: the structure of the not-all implies precisely that there be nothing left that serves as a barrier, that is in the position of what is forbidden. The forbidden appears as contradictory with the movement of the not-all. The structure of the not-all is what is described at the social and political level by Antonio Negri as *impero*, as the empire that develops precisely without meeting up with a limit. This is what corresponds for us to the structure of the not-all, deported to the level of what we can no longer call a social organization.

We should not be surprised to find here the not-all; this not-all was introduced by Lacan in his text “L'Étourdit,” in which he responds precisely to Deleuze and Guattari's *L'Anti-œdipe* – as indicated at the end of the text – by reconceptualizing what the authors had tried to apprehend. The function of the father is in effect linked to the structure that Lacan discovered in masculine sexuation. A structure that comprises an all with a supplementary and antinomic element that poses a limit, and which allows the all to be constituted precisely as such, which poses the limit and thus allows for organization and stability. This structure is the very matrix of the hierarchical relation.

The not-all is not an all that includes a lack, but on the contrary a series in development without limit and without totalization. This is why the term of globalization is a vacillating term for us, since it is precisely a question of there being no longer any all and, in the current process, what constitutes the all, and what constitutes a limit is threatened and staggers. What is called globalization is a process of detotalization that puts all the “totalitarian” structures to the test. It is a process by which no element is provided with an attribute it can be assured of by

principle and forever. We do not have the security of the attribute, but its attributes, its properties, its accomplishments are precarious. The not-all implies precariousness for the element.

We can see every day, in fact, what used to be respect for tradition giving way to the attraction of the new, and this phenomenon, abundantly described, is staged for us by the machine of the not-all. To take an example that is revealing, at least for those for whom it is familiar, the Catholic Church in the United States is undergoing a veritable martyrdom. A cardinal, a prince of the Church, was summoned to the court to answer questions – the kind of questions in American trials that you might have an idea of from Erle Stanley Gardner or Perry Mason novels. You know how the questions are phrased. There must be no allusions; no speeches must be made, no speeches are asked for. The questions asked are short and factual and follow one on the other. You must give a yes or no answer just to the question that is asked, and then the lawyer will lead you by the nose. Well, the aptly named Cardinal Law of Boston, two weeks ago, was called on to give answers to these questions. I found on Internet the entire transcription of this interrogation, which was absolutely disconcerting for those who have some attachment to tradition. And the pluck to require of the Catholic Church the transparency of its operations, and the renewed distrust, including on the part of American Catholics, with respect to the role played by a potentate living in a microscopic state near Italy. There we have a sign of the times when we see multi-secular practices surrounded by a universal respect becoming today strictly undecipherable and thrust aside, rejected by the spirit of the times.

This really gives us the feeling there is an original machine staging plays of an entirely unprecedented type such as the one played by Cardinal Law humbly responding to the questions of the District Attorney: last name, first name, explain what a cardinal is, explain what a diocese is, etc. We have not yet gone that far in the old Europe, but we see in this what promises to be irresistible in this original machine.

By a certain short-circuit, admitting that the machine that is staging what we call globalization is the not-all, signifies, for Lacan, who relates it to feminine sexuation, that we can refer to this structure what we observe of the rise in society of values said to be feminine, those of compassion, of the promotion of listening practices, of the politics of proximity, all of which must from now on affect political leaders. The spectacle of the world may be becoming decipherable, more decipherable if we relate it to the machine of the not-all.

Obviously, we propose the practice of listening as political only in case of the absence of response. To listen becomes itself the response within the silence of the master. This is the political usage of intersubjective communication, namely that you will never receive a message other than the one you have sent. This is also why we cry over the traditional element, which was already grasped half a century ago, namely that the virile is under attack, and we observe, at least in the developed societies, a certain popularity problem for the war-mongers. This is of course correlative to a call for authority, to the return of order, to a desperate appeal to the reign of the master-signifier, which is in the process of being abolished. In any case, we can observe the tension between the functioning of the machine of the not-all that exacerbates the nostalgia for the master-signifier and this appeal to the master-signifier, all the more exacerbated as it appears as detached from the rest, and all the more insistent as it appears clearly as supplementary.

Within the social not-all, on the contrary, the signifier does not come to us in organized blocks, it tends to be presented in discontinuous fragments, for example under the form of instant information, so Americans study information overload. What we call information is the way the signifier gets to us, no longer organized but discontinuous, essentially fragmentary, with an effort to try to add to it an organization that is constantly in the process of being undone. From this we have what even Robert Reich can spot as a pathology of disorientation.

*The pluralized S<sub>1</sub> and the subject without bearings*

This is why sociologists have discerned, in face of the overdose of information, the subjective strategies that consist in withdrawing within the limits of zones of certitude. Descriptively, this is quite strong – it was already foreseen in the promotion of the postmodern by Lyotard, who generalized its concept. He had already characterized it in the past by the deconstruction of the great filters of knowledge, that is to say the traditions, the consecrated authorities, what he called the meta-narratives, the stereotypes: these are the various organizations of the signifier, which are the diverse forms of the discourse of the master, and which had the merit of operating a simplification and a formalization of reality, of diffusing models of coherency, models of coherent behaviors under the authority of jurisdictions recognized as competent.

One might wish that, in this period of the deconstruction of the filters of knowledge, by some miracle, schools be capable of operating this simplification and this formalization of reality, even though all the apparatus supporting them have been fissured, stricken, besieged, or are at least declining. What the sociologists have discerned is that globalization is accompanied by individuation. What is impaired is the mode of living together, the social bond that exists under the form of unfixed, dispersed subjects, and which induces, for each one, both a social duty and a subjective imperative to invent.

It's the very effective formula "living my own life" – my own life precisely by its difference from the others – that highlights the decadence, the decline of the collective organization of models, and places the subject in face of a demand – that he takes as his own – to invent and enhance his own individual style of life. It is the epoch we had called "of the Other who does not exist," when what Bourdieu had tried to recompose as the mechanisms of distinction already belonged to another epoch. Today the mechanisms of distinction he evokes are blurred; he presents us a simplified world, almost the world of his childhood.

It is at this moment that we find in Lacan's teaching, as he both defined and then questioned what he called the S<sub>1</sub>, the central signifier of identification. He defined the master-signifier in his matheme for the discourse of the master. This matheme comports as its central agent the master-signifier, which is pre-postmodern. It is the discourse of the pre-postmodern master:

$$\frac{S_1}{\mathfrak{S}} \rightarrow \frac{S_2}{a}$$

So, the first movement, isolating this central signifier. But as soon as he had isolated it, he pluralized it, multiplied it, leading us to hear in the expression S<sub>1</sub> the value *essaim*\*, in order to say that there is not just one. There are several, and nothing assures on the contrary that they are other than chaotic, even if the swarm travels in a group. A constellation of signifiers rather than the unicity of the master-signifier.

And then, next to this matheme of the discourse of the master, he traced the first lines for the matheme of the capitalist discourse, a modification of the discourse of the master, in which it is the barred subject that is put in the place of this S<sub>1</sub>:

$$\frac{\mathfrak{S}}{S_1}$$

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\* [Translator's note] "Swarm" in English. The pronunciation of S<sub>1</sub> and *essaim* are homophonic in French.

This is not so much a promotion of hysteria as it is the promotion of the subject without guidelines. It is in function of this original machine that we can observe, as the sociologists do, the constitution of limited zones of certainty that, on a small scale, give us these guidelines.

### *The bubbles of certainty*

We can of course explain that the structure of the not-all is abstract and that, in fact, in reality, that is not the way it happens, because, in effect, the machine of the not-all comports the ever more insistent constitution of micro-totalities whose multiplication, and the investment of the subjects that are taken into it, translate the presence of this machine. Micro-totalities that offer, within the not-all, pockets, shelters, a certain degree of systematicity, stability, codification, and that permit the restitution of mastery, but at the cost of an extreme specialization. A very restrained field of signifiers must be chosen, a very restrained field of knowledge in which mastery can be restituted.

I found an example, which seems to me to be very indicative, in a study that was published two years ago concerning a phenomenon observed in Japan and which is called there “the *otaku* effect.” It figures in an article that I only know second hand, which is quite difficult to find and which is called “The *Otaku* Answer to Pressing Problems of the Media Society.”

It recounts what was observed in Japan. These categories can of course be considered as suspect, but they are not for as much less indicative. It concerns a certain aspect of the behavior of adolescents, or grown-up adolescents – we no longer know where adolescence stops in fact – who become fanatics of a very limited zone of the new technologies. They become complete specialists of what appears to be an entirely futile phenomenon of the mediatic society or certain types of Mangas or comics, or else of an idol – an actor, a model, etc. – or of some technology generally more or less linked to computers, or of video games, about which they accumulate as complete a knowledge as possible, always abreast with the latest rage. Outside of this, the complete disinterest they show in their contemporaries is remarkable, to the extent that it can be said that in Japan they no longer look people in the face. “An *otaku* prefers to stay alone in order to pursue his hobby in peace. He devotes himself obsessively to one unique sector of interest. The objects of his passion belong generally to pop culture.” We also have military objects – this is Japan. “The essence,” says the sociologist in question, a certain Grassmuck, “the essence of the *otaku* life-style has nothing to do with a specific argument, but is linked to his way of being in relation with a theme.” The category that seems to be in use in Japan is not constructed with reference to the theme of one’s interest, but to the manner of relation to this theme. “The *otaku* has a monomaniac personality. His strategy is to gather information reserved to just one section of human knowledge and to push aside all the rest. The *otaku* looks for a tiny zone of knowledge that he wishes to know everything about.”

This is generalized to all kinds of behaviors induced by the society of information, the media society, which consist in wanting to know totally at each moment what is “in” and what is “out.” This has also spread to France in magazines, which point out to you the “in” and the “out,” so that you know from one point to another how to find your way through the crowd.

I cannot judge the pertinence of this description for Japan, and we can also consider that it is not necessarily well constructed for the present state of civilization in France, but there is nonetheless something in psychoanalysis that can be conceptualized as an *otaku* response. There is something of the *otaku* life style in the analytic associations, in the Societies and Schools of psychoanalysis. We could even say that the analytic experience itself is something of an *otaku* response – the analytic experience as a search for certainty, and also because the relation in itself such as it is established within the analytic framework restitutes to the subject a zone of certainty.



Analysis puts uncertainty to work, but this is within the framework of a less hypothetical certainty – which gives as a result the extreme valorization of the framework that we observe in the IPA, the extreme although indefinable valorization of the framework. We can perhaps observe the same thing with Lacan in the definition of the analytic discourse, which is presented as a transformation, a version\* of the discourse of the master, that is to say, as a bubble of certainty to which the subject is all the more attached for being plunged into the social structure of the not-all.

We must undoubtedly add that if psychoanalysis is a bubble of certainty, at the same time it radiates through society because it is put to work in advertising and it has taught politics how to manipulate the truth. It really did teach politicians that truth is an effect, which gave birth to the “spin doctors,” to the experts in the manipulation of the truth. We could moreover observe very recently in France the extraordinary promotion of a marketing specialist, become Prime Minister – this is a first – , who was apparently chosen just for that. By the same token, we must recognize that the extensive spread of listening practices, which submerges psychoanalysis, is the result of the prolific radiation of psychoanalysis today.

### *Psychoanalysis in the epoch of globalization*

Tenth reflection: psychoanalysis in the epoch of globalization. We shall attempt to look rapidly at how the modifications of our clinical practice are related to the epoch of globalization and this machine of the not-all that is behind it.

Classical clinical practice, such as we learned it and taught it, had as its pivot the Name-of-the-Father and was directed with consideration for the positions of the subject with respect to the Name-of-the-Father. It is in this practice that different modalities of desire were distinguished – the unsatisfied, impossible, anticipated desire, etc. – or different modes of defense. Our classical clinical practice responded essentially to the structure of masculine sexuation, to the structure of the all and of the antinomic element. This is what permitted us to have these airtight, rigid, powerful classifications, which founded the notion of Lacanism for generations.

We might say that contemporary clinical practice, the practice we have been confronted with for years already, balances to the other side, towards the side of the not-all. This clinical practice of the not-all is the one in which we find flourishing the pathologies described as centered on the relation to the mother or on narcissism, but which were attributed to the pre-Oedipal register when we disposed of the previous hierarchy, and which have in a way taken their independence. To qualify this as pre-Oedipal is obviously too narrow.

When we show interest in everything that comes under the heading of addictions, we can clinically observe the frenzy of the not-all, of the pathologies which highlight precisely the without-limits of the series. We can observe at the same time the lesser effectiveness of the paternal metaphor and the pluralization of the  $S_1$ s, even their pulverization, so that, for some years already, we have recognized the crisis of our classifications. Let us just consider the category of perversion, to which we are attached by the teaching we received and distributed, by the very powerfulness of this category: we are forced to say it is a category that has undergone a massive social rejection. It is assimilated to a stigma. We cannot extirpate from the category of perversion the fact that it refers to a norm, that it belongs to a former regime where norms and ideals ruled the roost.

Of course, we object – Lacan says perversion is the norm of desire. But the very terms in which the diagnosis is given, the category itself, have ceased to be operatory. And moreover, Lacan indicated other paths to us for

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\* TN: We must hear in “version” both the usual sense and the more unusual sense of “turning around” as for a fetus. Reference to the quarter of a turn in the passage from one discourse (of the Four) to the other.

approaching contemporary clinical practice as the practice of the not-all. He gave us the path of the knot. It is not that the knot in itself is exalting, but the knot is effectively a means of responding to the structure of the not-all, since this clinical practice gives us an indefinite series of arrangements beginning with three circles of string. The ternary RSI can be distinguished and opposed to the former airtight, discontinuous repartition between neurosis, perversion and psychosis.

Before, we had a combinatory clinical theory, centered on the Name-of-the-Father (to go a bit quickly), and whose states were discontinuous, which gave us clearly distinct categories. It is obvious that – not that it is invalid – referring clinical practice to the knot undoubtedly gives us arrangements that are different but in continuity with one another. We have lost the security of the discontinuous and the clearly distinct, and the result is that the symptom, rather than what we called the clinical structure, which was a class, has become the elementary unit of clinical theory. The symptom has become the elementary unit of clinical theory and practice and, after all, the symptom, what Lacan called the *sinthome* at the end of his teaching, is the Lacanian version of the fragmentation of clinical entities that we find in the DSM. It is not the same fragmentation, but it is the same movement of deconstruction of the entities that can be observed in Lacan's second clinical theory.

We first operated with a clinical theory centered on identification. Lacan's first clinical theory was a theory of identification: in analysis, I learn to tell my story truthfully, that is to say, I elaborate an identification that permits me to be truthful. And the end of the analysis depends on the satisfying elaboration of a new identification, which passes through a disidentification, etc –, but the central category is identification.

Lacan's second clinical theory was centered on the fantasy, that is, once again, on a story, but this time a story conceived as an unconscious scenario and centered on the relation of the subject to the stump of *jouissance* that completes his constitutive lack.

Well, Lacan's last clinical theory has as its pivot-term the symptom, and in this theory, the absolute, the substance, is *jouissance*. To go back to the reference to Spinoza I had introduced in the beginning, it is really *Deus sive natura, sive jouissance*. That is, there is *jouissance*, to the detriment of truth and meaning. At that moment, it is no longer a question of there being a cure at the end of the analysis, nor is it a question of a traversing, it is only a question of the passage from one regime of *jouissance* to another, from a regime of suffering to a regime of pleasure.

What can be said of psychoanalysts in the epoch of globalization can be discovered through the pass. If it is clear what the translation of this is in terms of what the machine of the not-all stages, the pass means that we are led to suppose a disconnection between being an analyst and the practice of analysis. Those that Lacan wished to consecrate as Analysts of the School, had necessarily to be of the School, since this was a definition of the analyst independent of analytic practice, and which tries in this way to solve the problem of preserving the analytic core of practice in a world where the analyst tends to be dissolved within attentional practice.

It is probably within this context that we must conceive analytic training. At the same time this training turns out to be difficult to determine because we must, from now on, conceive it outside of any ideal to be attained, outside of the very problematics of the ideal and the norm. This means that training tends to be understood as the communication of a life-style rather than as an access to the realization of an ideal.

*Translated by Thelma Sowley*