What kind of Viator? : 3rd May 2016 : Rik Loose See here http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=12045

or $\underline{www.LacanianWorksExchange.net}$ /author by date or authors a-z

http://www.amp-nls.org/page/gb/49/nls-messager/0/2015-2016/2515

References at the end


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NLS Minute 21
Towards the XIVth Congress of Psychoanalysis of the NLS [New Lacanian School of Psychoanalysis]
Discreet Signs in Ordinary Psychoses. Clinic and Treatment 2nd & 3rd July 2016
Dublin, Ireland



[[] [SEP]

The Subject of Ordinary Psychosis - What Kind of Viator? Rik Loose Ireland [1]

SEP

Towards the very end of the first lecture from seminar XXI, Lacan says that it is necessary to be a dupe which he equates to sticking to structure (Lacan, 1973-74). Before that in the same lecture he said that those who are not duped refuse to be caught within the space of the "speaking-being".

There are many ways of not being duped and one is the one of the wayfarer. Lacan indicates in this lecture that, for those who consider what happens between life and death is nothing more than just a journey towards the "promised land", structure will not stick. Those subjects, Lacan says, live the life of the viator. Viator is a very interesting word. A *viator* is someone who travels and roams the lands. However, there is an old Latin meaning to the word (that surely Lacan was familiar with) and that is the viator as a kind of civil servant of the legal court: someone who is an administrator to the magistrate of the court, someone who is ultimately in the service of the law. In the very same context Lacan says that we find structure between life and death. However, that is, of course only half the story, because between life and death we also find the *jouissance* of living bodies.

This *jouissance* is entangled with structure and it is this very structure that guarantees that the subject is duped in terms of *jouissance*. It is possible to override this entanglement by procuring the *jouissance* effects that certain objects and gadgets can provide. Why would one do that? Overriding the entanglement between structure and *jouissance* means that one does not need to be the dupe of being a speaking-being. In other words, one does not need to pay the price of being desiring which, as Lacan indicates, is always disturbing.

This is, in a sense, what Freud was aiming at in Civilization and its Discontent when he said that addiction is a social symptom. Desire, being connected to the Other, can be avoided by administering a *jouissance* independently of the Other. It is here that we can establish a connection between ordinary psychosis and addiction. The entanglement between jouissance and structure is of a very fragile, precarious nature in ordinary psychosis, which can show-up in the three "externalities" of the social, the body and the subjective that J.-A. Miller proposed. These fragile connections can be supported by a myriad of singular inventions and/or universal (imaginary) identifications which may prevent a complete disconnection and which can take very subtle and discreet forms. Sometimes these inventions and identifications pertain to one externality and on other occasions they have a function in relation to more than one. For example, piercing and tattooing can regulate the experience of a perplexing irruption of *jouissance* by quilting it to the body and it can also form a vehicle for an imaginary identification with others via the universal of style or fashion which can allow the psychotic to (re-)connect to the Other. Addicts are viators par excellence; they skid over structure with *jouissance* by giving the magistrate in the court short shrift. However, the difficulty is this: how to decide whether the magistrate of the court was given short shrift by the subject or whether the place of the magistrate of the court is empty? To put this question differently: when is addiction as a social symptom an administration of jouissance pursued independently of the Other because being subjected to the Other may be too boring or anxiety provoking and when is it a management of the *jouissance* of the body by way of a substitute for the missing Name-of-the-Father? In the latter case the subject is disconnected from the Other not

just through the skidding over structure with *jouissance* but also on the basis of foreclosure. It is not easy to distinguish between these two, because the disconnection due to foreclosure is hidden behind the pursuit of *jouissance* independently of the Other, and perhaps more importantly, the real of the body, one way or another, requires a symptomatic treatment. What we have to go by then is how signifiers in the discourse of the patient treat the *jouissance* of the Other. For example, addicted subjects often say they are bored. The use of the word boredom can relate the desire for another *jouissance* object (because the objects available are never really it) but it can also function as a kind of screen-affect hiding an Other who is persecutory or threatening.

SEP!

Lacan, J. (1973-1974). The Seminar, Book XXI, The Non-Dupes Err. Miller, J.-A. (2013). Ordinary Psychosis Revisited, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, nr 26.: Available here https://www.mediafire.com/?1343r2fwhshenic

NLS Congress 2016 Dublin, 2nd and 3rd July 2016

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References:

Towards the very end of the first lecture from Seminar XXI, Lacan says that it is necessary to be a dupe which he equates to sticking to structure (Lacan, 1973-74). Seminar XXI: 1973-1974: Les non-dupes errent : begins 13th November 1973 : Jacques Lacan or here http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=807

[Note: It may be that the first lecture has not been translated by Cormac Gallagher. From Seminar XXI: 20th November 1973: p2 of Cormac Gallagher's translation: When what is at stake is being dupe, is that no so, it is not a matter on this occasion of being the dupe of my ideas, because these four little letters are not ideas. They are not even ideas at all, the proof, is that it is very, very difficult to give them a meaning. Which does not mean that... one cannot make something of them.]

Wrong it is now translated <u>here http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Book-21-Les-Non-Dupes-Errent-Part-1.pdf</u>

Seminar XXI: 13th November 1973: p17 of Cormac Gallagher's translation: It is necessary to be a dupe, namely to stick, to stick to the structure.

- Before that in the same lecture he said that those who are not duped refuse to be caught within the space of the "speaking-being".

Seminar XXI: 13th November 1973: p13 of Cormac Gallagher's translation: Well then, that is the point of what I have to say to you, considering the difference, the difference that is... pinpointed from the fact that there are non-dupes. If the non-dupes are those (ceux où celles) that refuse to be captured by the space of the speaking being, if they are those who keep their hands free of it, as I might say, there is something that we must know how to imagine, which is the absolute necessity that results from it, not wandering but error.

Namely, that as regard everything that is involved in life and at the same time in death, there is an invention (imagination) that cannot but [p14 Gallagher] support all those who want to be non-dupes in structure. It is this that their life is only a journey.

- Lacan indicates in this lecture that, for those who consider what happens between life and death is nothing more than just a journey towards the "promised land", structure will not stick. Those subjects, Lacan says, live the life of the viator Seminar XXI: 13th November 1973: p14 cont of Cormac Galagher's translation: Life is that of the viator. Those who in this lower world – as they say – are in a foreign land.

The only thing that they do not notice, is that simply by bringing out this function of foreigner, they give rise at the same time to the third term, the third dimension, the one thanks to which they will never get out of the relationships of this life, unless it is to be then still more duped than the others, by this locus of the other that with their Imaginary they nevertheless constitute as such.

The idea of genesis, of development, as they say, of what is supposed to be some norm or other, thanks to which a being which is only effects, precisely, will be commanded by something or other that no one is capable of defining, which is called development. And that is why, by wanting to reduce analysis, one fails, one makes the complete error, the radical error as regards what is involved in what the unconscious uncovers.

- . In the very same context Lacan says that we find structure between life and death. However, that is, of course only half the story, because between life and death we also find the *jouissance* of living bodies.

Seminar XXI: 13th November 1973: p14 btm of Cormac Galagher's translation There is something that Freud says to us, and here it is unambiguous: *Und* (it is the final paragraph of the *Traumdeutung*) *Wert des Traums für die Kenntnis der Zukunft?*. [The Interpretation of Dreams: 1st November 1899 (published as 1900): Sigmund Freud: Information here: p621 of James Strachey's translation: SE Vol V: Very rarely does the complexity of a human character, driven hither and thither by dynamic forces, submit to a choice between simple alternatives, as our antiquated morality would have us believe.


And the value of dreams for giving us knowledge of the future? There is of course no question of that. It would be truer to say instead that they give us knowledge of the past. For dreams are derived from the past in every sense. Nevertheless the ancient belief that dreams foretell the future is not wholly devoid of truth. By picturing our wishes as fulfilled, dreams are after all leading us into the future. But this future, which the dreamer pictures as the present, has been moulded by his indestructible wish into a perfect likeness of the past.]

And this why it is very nice. Because people believe that in writing this, Freud is making an allusion to the famous divinatory value of dreams. But can we not read it differently? Namely, to say to us, and the value of the dream for the knowledge

(connaissance) of what is going to result from it in the world, from the discovery of the unconscious, to see, whether, by chance, a discourse ensured that in a more and more widespred way, it is known – it is known – what the end of Freud's paragraph says, namely that this future held by the (p15 of Gallagher) dreamer to be present, is *gestaltet*, structured by the indestructible demand in so far as it is always the same: *zum Ebenbild*. Namely, that if you wish, I am going to put something for you here:

Which is supposed to be this journey, namely this development, like that, punctuated between birth and death.

What does Freud indicate to us from the emergence of the unconscious? It is that at whatever point one is at of this so-called journey, the structure, of something that I am sketching here, it does not matter: the structure, namely, the relationship to a certain knowledge, the structure, for its part never lets go. And the *desire*, as it is wrongly translated, is strictly always the same throughout life.



Simply the relationships of a particular being in his emergence, in his emergence into a world where already it is this discourse that reigns, his desire is completely determined from the beginning to the end.

- Freud was aiming at in *Civilization and its Discontent* when he said that addiction is a social symptom

Civilization and its Discontents: 1929: Sigmund Freud: available http://archive.org/details/CivilizationAndItsDiscontents