The Lacanian Review

STILL LIFE?

Review acanian School

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A REAL SCIENCE OF LIFE?

PIPOL 9, the 5th European Congress of Psychoanalysis organized by the EuroFederation of Psychoanalysis (EFP), took place in Brussels on 13-14 July 2019, under the title "The Unconscious and the Brain: Nothing in Common." The congress director, Yves Vanderveken, assured the orientation of the preparatory work and of the congress itself (which gathered over 1,200 participants concerned with the practice of psychoanalysis in institutional settings) with the following compass: "Psychoanalysis proposes an ethical choice: to promise each one who wants to lend himself to it that he will not be compared or 'reeducated,' while proposing to him to tighten as much as possible the singular coordinates which found the irreconcilable of the contingency which is his own. So that he can orient himself in life from the logic that determines his always symptomatic mode of being, away from the illusions of identification." We bring to our readers two of the works presented at the plenary sessions of PIPOL 9, as well as the text of a presentation by Vanderveken, delivered in New York ahead of the event.

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Published in French in *Lacan* alyst practicing in Paris. He is EOL, and the NEL. He is a met *Lost in Cognition: Psychoanal* 1. Éric Laurent, *L'Envers d* freudien, 2016). b be elevated to the heights of

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THE ATOPIA OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

Antonio Di Ciaccia

n his article "On a Reform in Its Hole," a text of February 1969 that was sent to *Le Monde* but was not published, Lacan affirms that although the brain is the crossroads that constitutes the forced passage of the psychiatric event, "no formation is less suitable than the one of the neurologist."¹

In an ironically polemical way, he asks himself: does he want to say that the psychiatric event cannot be apprehended in another place if it is from another place? If it is above all from another place that claims us?

A couple of years before, in a conference held in the city of Lyon, Lacan located this "other place" by resorting to a jesting metaphor. It is found, he said, "somewhere in the brain, like a spider."² This spider that takes the brain is "the language apparatus."

"Now, what I say is that language is the condition for the unconscious."³ One student had argued the contrary, that the unconscious is the condition of language. Lacan contradicts this. Recusing the argument, however, Lacan offers a way out: "L would have been flustered if he had said that the unconscious was the logical implication of language: in effect, no unconscious without language. That could have been a step towards the root of the implication and of the logic itself."⁴ If his student had understood the thing, he could have anticipated it in his discovery mounted on "the subject that supposes my knowledge." Not only on the "subject that the signifier represents for an always other signifier" but also "the subject of jouissance."⁵

Lacan puts the accent on the logical implication but calls for prudence, especially "where the function might seem to operate thanks to what they call *parallelism*. Not so as to refute the famous psycho-physical parallelism which was, as we all know, shown to be bullshit a long time ago, but to suggest that the break should not be between the physical and the psychical, but between the psychical and the logical."⁶

Antonio Di Ciaccia is a psychoanalyst practicing in Rome. He is an Analyst Member of the School of the ECF and SLP and a member of the WAP.

^{1.} Jacques Lacan, "Di una riforma nel suo buco," La Psicoanalisi, no. 65 (2019).

^{2.} Jacques Lacan, My Teaching, trans. David Macey (London/New York: Verso, 2008), 33.

Anika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), xiii.
Ibid., xiii.

^{5.} Jacques Lacan, "Presentacion de las *Memorias de un neuropata*," Otros escritos (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 2013), 233.

^{6.} Jacques Lacan, My Teaching, op. cit., 32.

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The cut between the physical and the psychic is the error of Descartes. The cut passes between the psychic and the logical.

This means that it is a mistake, for example, to place in continuity communication as it appears in living beings, animals and even plants, and communication as it occurs in man. There is no continuity, there is discontinuity, as on the other hand Charles Yang affirms in the North American scientific journal *PNAS* in a 2013 article,⁷ referring to an article by Noam Chomsky.⁸

Therefore, human language is not simply communication. But the idea of Lacan, that language is situated beyond and that it is installed as a spider, where does it come from?

First of all, from his teacher Clérambault. The mental automatism is exactly that and it is only to calm the psychiatrist's anguish that he situates it somewhere in the cerebral convolution "that no one has ever seen,"⁹ comments Lacan.

In effect, "that the subject's biological substrate is implicated in analysis at its deepest level on no account implies that the causality it discovers can be reduced to a biological dimension here."¹⁰ In another place he recalls that it is in this way that the Freudian term "overdetermination" must be understood.

It should be added that when Lacan takes language as another place, he is specifying it with respect to a notion from Heidegger's brain, for whom language is the house of being and in its deferral inhabits man.¹¹

But well before Heidegger there is Aristotle. And in fact, it is with Aristotle that Lacan engages in a kind of discussion, a singular discussion on this very point.

Let's see these passages: Lacan, in a note attached to a lecture delivered at Naples, says: "The unconscious is not subliminal, weak clarity. It is the light that leaves no room for the shadow, nor for the outline to insinuate itself. It represents my own representation there where it lacks, where I am no more than a lack of subject."¹² The author of the m the *De Anima*.¹⁴ It is th from another intellect *kai poietikon*,"¹⁵ the sam

This active intellect the colors that are in p impassive and separate organ.¹⁶ These are the Plotinians to the Arab text of Aristotle in the

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Cf. Charles Yang, "Ontogeny and Phylogeny of Language," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 16 (April 2013).

Cf. Mark D. Hauser, Noam Chomsky, W. Tecumseh Fitch, "The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?," *Science* 298 (22 November 2002): 1569–1579.

^{9.} Jacques Lacan, My Teaching, op. cit., 25

^{10.} Jacques Lacan, "True Psychoanalysis and False," Hurly-Burly, no. 11 (2014): 17.

^{11.} Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, trans. Thomas Sheehan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

^{12.} Jacques Lacan, "La méprise du sujet supposé savoir", Autres écrits, (Paris: Seuil, 2001): 329-339.

^{13.} Plato uses the same metaphe

Cf. Jacques Lacan, Encore: C of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, ed 1998), 110: "naturally you

^{15.} Aristotle, De Anima, Book I

^{16.} Ibid., Book III.4.

^{17.} Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summ

^{18.} Cf. Jacques Lacan, "On a Qu Bruce Fink (Norton: Londo

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The author of the metaphor of light is Aristotle,¹³ the passage is found in the *De Anima*.¹⁴ It is there that Aristotle distinguishes the potential intellect from another intellect that he calls "cause and productive principle, *aition kai poietikon*,"¹⁵ the same as what the Scholastics will call *intellectus agens*.

This active intellect, I quote Aristotle, is like "the light [that] transforms the colors that are in potency, colors in act." It is an immortal, eternal, impassive and separate intellect. This intellect does not have a corporeal organ.¹⁶ These are the steps in which everyone will intervene, from the Plotinians to the Arab philosophers and, following the translation of the text of Aristotle in the twelfth century, the Scholastics. But also, Lacan.

Let's simplify. There are two tendencies: one that considers that the *intellectus agens* is a prerogative of God, it matters little whether Unmoved Mover or Christian God; the other that considers that *intellectus agens* is by right neither divine nor human, but universal. It is the position of Avicenna, partly also that of Averroes, who will take up among others Siger de Brabante and Roger Bacon, which is not, as we will see, the Bacon against which Lacan pits himself.

In this diatribe, Thomas Aquinas intervenes with his solution: in each man, one by one, there is oneness of the intellect, both active and passive. The active intellect is caused, in an analogical and homologous way, by the *intellectus agens* as function of God.¹⁷ In addition, the cause that provokes knowledge always comes from another place, even when it is perceived in a second logical time, in an intellect, unique and singular, for each human being.

Now, let's return to Lacan.

In this complex problematic, Lacan moves according to the motto, *festina lente*, or *more haste, less speed*.

For starters, despite naming a symbolic function with a religious term in the Name-of-the-Father, Lacan clearly separates what he calls the Other site from all religious nuance. That Other site is not reduced "to the imaginary form of a nostalgia for some lost or future Paradise." Lacan leads it back to that "locus of the unconscious"¹⁸ which Freud, taking up Fechner's expression, calls *ein anderer Schauplatz*, another scene.

17. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Question 79, Article 3.

^{13.} Plato uses the same metaphor but in another way.

^{14.} Cf. Jacques Lacan, Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, ed Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink, (New York/London: Norton, 1998), 110: "naturally you have never read De Anima (On the Soul), despite my supplications."

^{15.} Aristotle, De Anima, Book III.5, 430a10.

^{16.} Ibid., Book III.4.

Cf. Jacques Lacan, "On a Question Prior to Any Treatment Possible of Psychosis," in *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink (Norton: London/New York, 2006), 458.

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He then resumes the game with Aristotle. "Thank God," he says, "Aristotle was intelligent enough to isolate in the active intellect what is at stake in the symbolic function."19

Here is where Lacan arrives: language is the materialization of the symbolic and has a logical structure.

Aristotle is quite intelligent and not at all an imbecile that eats that Bacon—a game of words that amuses Lacan, "Pacon," Bacon.²⁰

But why is Francis Bacon an imbecile? Because he believed he could correct Aristotle, substituting the Aristotelian method of knowledge with his theory which combines the intellect with the induction of physical data, operating then by deduction through the syllogism.

Francis Bacon, with his Novum Organum of 1620, is the pioneer of empiricism. He entrusts himself to induction, but experimental verifications fail to reach a law.

It is the impasse of experimentalism. Lacan finds that the solution is the articulation between Aristotle and Galileo.

Here Lacan is going to graft what tradition already indicated as the Other place, under the form of intellectus agens, with modern science, not under the form of the syllogism but under the form of the matheme. Galileo says in 1623: "the book of nature [...] is written in mathematical language."²¹ We have here a crossroads, not cerebral, but conceptual.

So, this Other place can be declined not as a collective or mythical divine unconscious, but as a Freudian unconscious: "another place where the moment of truth must sound."22 Indeed "Starting with Freud, the unconscious becomes a chain of signifiers that repeats and insists somewhere (on another stage or in a different scene, as he wrote), interfering in the cuts offered it by actual discourse and the cogitation it informs."23 This is how Lacan writes.

However, Lacan will scold Aristotle for not being intelligent enough on another point: namely, not having understood that "to think that speech (une parole), even his own, by designating the nous that is based only on language, concerns jouissance."24 Recognizing this fact, says Lacan, is possible, however, only thanks to the Christian revelation. So, putting Aristotle in the cross enough himself, becau but did not see. It goe symbolic, but a matter

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- 29. Jacques Lacan, "Joyce the
- 30. Plato, Theaetetus, 149a, bu
- 31. Jacques Lacan, "Méprise....
- 32. Jacques Lacan, "Note to th

^{19.} Jacques Lacan, Encore, op. cit., 119.

^{20.} Jacques Lacan, "Joyce the Symptom," trans. A.R. Price, The Lacanian Review, no. 5 (2018): 14. This is given as "rasher Bacon" in this English translation. The French original, "Pacon," combines Plato with Francis Bacon but is homophonous with "pas con," "no jerk.

^{21.} Galileo Galilei, Il Saggiatore (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2002)

Jacques Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," in Écrits, op. cit., 675.

^{23.} Ibid., 676.

^{24.} Jacques Lacan, Encore, op. cit., 112.

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^{27.} Ibid., 15. 28. Jacques Lacan, Encore, op.

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Aristotle in the crosshairs, Lacan said that he had not been intelligent enough himself, because he had had in his hands what he could have seen but did not see. It goes without saying that the word is not a matter of the symbolic, but a matter of jouissance.

At this point Lacan asks: where does language come from? and answers, "I have no idea, I'm under no obligation to know everything."25

And he reiterates his not knowing anything even when, with a play on words, he identifies the Aristotelian nous with the knot. "A knot of what to what, I say not, for want of knowing as much, but I exploit how, trinitied, LOM hasn't been able to stop writing as much since he was first brought filth into the world."26

Actually, a third term completes the Cartesian dualism, res extensa and res cogitans: namely, the res gaudens, the enjoying substance. This allows Lacan to correct Aristotle: man does not think with his soul, that is, with the form of the body, but "speaks with his body."27

Lacan operates a shift: from think (ca pense) to speech (ca parle). But where he speaks (*ca parle*) he enjoys (*ca jouit*).

"Where it speaks, it enjoys, and it knows nothing."28

Not universal thought but the singular of a word that is jouissance of the body. At this point Lacan coins the term parlêtre, the new name of the unconscious: "budge up [unconscious] and let me squeeze in then."29

My title includes the term "atopia." It is the definition that Socrates gives to himself: "the strangest of men."30 Lacan uses it for Socrates and then uses it little but always referring it to the function of the psychoanalyst, since "it is precisely in practice, in the first place, that the psychoanalyst must be equated with the structure that determines it, not in its mental form [...], but in its position as a subject inscribed in the real."³¹ This is equivalent to saying that, if the psychoanalyst is the artificer of the transferential unconscious, he must be able to incarnate something of the real.

To the Other site of the unconscious responds the analyst's atopia. In fact, it is to the analyst that Lacan assigns the task of completing Aristotles's Organon, which, he says, is barely "sketched."32 Complete it with a new one. Not with the Novum Organum of Francis Bacon, but with another one, which, as Lacan suggests in 1973 in the Italian Note, is yet to be written.

Translated by Isolda Alvarez

29. Jacques Lacan, "Joyce the Symptom," op. cit., 14.

Jacques Lacan, *My Teaching, op. cit.*, 33.
Jacques Lacan, "Joyce the Symptom," *op. cit.*, 14.

^{27.} Ibid., 15.

^{28.} Jacques Lacan, Encore, op. cit., 95.

^{30.} Plato, Theaetetus, 149a, but also Symposium, 215 a, and elsewhere.

^{31.} Jacques Lacan, "Méprise...", op. cit.

^{32.} Jacques Lacan, "Note to the Italian Group", trans. Russell Grigg, Analysis no. 7 (1997).