

THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN

BOOK VI

DESIRE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

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We are going to speak this year about desire and its interpretation.

An analysis is, it is said, a therapy; let us say a treatment, a psychological treatment which relates at different levels of the psyche, at first this was the primary scientific object of its experience, to what we call marginal or residual phenomena, dreams, parapraxes, witticisms, I stressed that last year, to symptoms.

On the other hand, if we get into this curative aspect of the treatment with regard to symptoms in the broadest sense, in so far as they manifest themselves in the subject by inhibitions, are constituted in symptoms and sustained by these symptoms, on the other hand this treatment which modifies structures, these structures which are called neuroses or neuropsychoses which Freud in reality first structured and qualified as neuropsychoses of defence.

The psychoanalyst intervenes in order to deal at different levels with these diverse phenomenal realities in so far as they bring desire into play. It is specifically under this rubric of desire, as signifying desire that the phenomena which I called above residual, marginal, were first of all apprehended in Freud, in the symptoms which we see described from one end to the other of Freud's thought, it is the intervention of anxiety, if we make of it the key point of the determination of symptoms, but in so far as such and such an activity which is going to enter into the operation of symptoms is eroticised, or to put it better: is namely caught up in the mechanism of desire.

Indeed, what does the very term defence signify in connection with the neuropsychoses, if it is not a defence against what? Against something which is not yet anything other than desire.

And nevertheless this analytic theory at the centre of which it is sufficient to indicate that the notion of libido is situated, which is nothing other than the psychological energy of desire, is something, if we are dealing with energy, in which, as I already indicated in passing, remember earlier the metaphor of the factory, certain conjunctions of the symbolic and the real are necessary for the notion of energy even to subsist. But I do not wish here, either to stop or to dwell too long on this.

This analytic theory therefore rests entirely on this notion of libido, on the energy of desire. But notice that for some time we see it more and more oriented towards something which those very people who sustain this new orientation, themselves articulate very consciously, at least the more aware of them who have borrowed it from Fairbairn, he writes frequently, because he continuously articulates and writes, particularly in the collection which is called *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* that the modern theory of analysis has changed somewhat from the axis which Freud first gave it by bringing it about or by considering that for us the libido is no longer 'pleasure-seeking', as Fairbairn expresses it, that it is 'object-seeking'.

This is to say that Mr. Fairbairn is the most typical representative of this modern tendency.

What this tendency orienting the function of the libido in function of an object which is supposed to be in some way predestined for it signifies, is something to which we have alluded a hundred times and whose incidences on analytic theory and technique I have shown you in a thousand forms, together with what I believed could often be pointed out in them in terms of practical deviations, some of which have dangerous consequences.

The importance of what I want to point out to you in order to allow you to approach the problem today, is in short this veiling of the very word desire which appears in the whole manipulation of analytic experience, and in a way the impression I would not say of renewal, I would say of bewilderment, that we produce by reintroducing it; I mean that instead of talking about libido or about the genital object, we talk about genital desire. It will immediately perhaps appear much more difficult for us to consider as obvious that genital desire and its maturation imply just by themselves this sort of possibility or of openness, or of the plenitude of realisation of love which seems to have become so doctrinal, from a certain perspective of the maturation of the libido; tendency and realisation, and the implication as regards the maturation of the libido, which appear all the same all the more surprising since they make their appearance at the heart of a doctrine which was precisely the first not alone to highlight, but even to explain, what Freud has classified under the title of debasement in the sphere of love, which means that if in effect desire seems to bring with it a certain quantum in effect of love, it is indeed very precisely, and very often of a love which presents itself to the personality as conflictual, of a love which is not avowed, of a love which even refuses to avow itself.

On the other hand, what if we also reintroduce this word desire there where we see being currently employed as affectivity, as a positive or negative sentiment, in what one can call a sort of disgraceful way of proceeding, forces which are still efficacious, and particularly by means of the analytic relationship, by means of the transference. It seems to me that by the simple fact of using this word, a cleavage will be produced which will of itself have something clarifying about it.

It is a question of knowing whether transference is constituted, no longer by an affectivity or by positive or negative sentiments which this term involves in a vague and veiled way, but it is a question, and here the desire that is experienced is named by a single one, sexual desire, aggressive desire with respect to the analyst, which will show itself to us right away and at first glance. These desires are by no means everything in the transference, and because of this very fact the transference must be defined by something other than by more or less confused references to the notion of positive or negative affectivity; and so that indeed if we pronounce the word desire, the final benefit of this full usage is that we will ask ourselves what desire is.

It is not a question that we will have to or be able to respond to. It is only that, if I were not caught up here by what I could call the urgent rendezvous that I have with my practical experiential requirements, I would have allowed myself some questions on the subject of the meaning of this word desire, in the company of those who have been the most qualified to valorise its usage, namely the poets and the philosophers.

I will not do this, first of all because the usage of the word desire, the transmission of the term and of the function of desire in poetry, is something which I would say, we will discover retrospectively if we pursue our investigation far enough. If it is true, because this will be the whole progress of my development this year, that the situation of desire is profoundly marked by, tied up to, riveted to a certain function of language, to a certain relationship of the subject to the signifier, analytic experience will carry us, at least I hope

so, far enough in this exploration for us to find enough time to be helped perhaps by the properly poetic evocation that can be made of it, and indeed also to understand more profoundly at the end the nature of poetic creation in its relationships with desire.

Only I would point out that the fundamental difficulties of the game of hide-and-seek that you will see to be at the basis of what our experience will show us, appear already in the fact for example that precisely one sees clearly in poetry how the poetic relationship to desire is poorly accommodated, as one might say, to the depiction of its object. I would say that in this regard figurative poetry - I am almost evoking the roses and lilies of beauty - always has something which only expresses desire in a particularly cold register; that on the contrary the law properly speaking of this problem of the evocation of desire, is in a poetry which curiously presents itself as that poetry which is called metaphysical and for those who read English, I will only refer here to the most eminent of the metaphysical poets in English literature, John Donne, so that you can refer to him in order to confirm the degree to which it is very precisely the problem of the structure of the relationships of desire which is evoked there in a celebrated poem, for example *The Ecstasy*, and whose title sufficiently indicates the first steps, the direction in which there is poetically elaborated at least on the lyrical plane, the poetic approach to desire when it itself is properly speaking sought and aimed at.

I am leaving to one side something which certainly goes much further in presenting desire, the work of the poet when it is supported by dramatic action. It is very precisely the dimension to which we will have to come back this year. I am announcing it to you already because we approached it last year; it is the direction of comedy.

But let us leave the poets there. I only mentioned them there as a sort of preliminary indication, and to tell you that we will rediscover them later more or less diffusely. I want to dwell more or less on what has been in this regard the position of the philosophers, because I think that it has been very instructive in terms of the point where the problem is situated for us.

I was careful to write for you up there these three terms: 'pleasure-seeking', 'object-seeking', in so far as they are seeking pleasure, in so far as they are seeking the object. This indeed is the way that it has been posed from the beginning for reflection and for morality - I mean theoretical morality, the morality which is announced in precepts and in rules, in the operations of philosophers, very especially it is said of moral philosophers (*éthiciens*). I pointed out to you already - notice in passing when all is said and done the foundation of every morality which could be called physical, as one could see the way in which the term has the same meaning, the way in which medieval philosophy speaks about the physical theory of love, precisely in the sense that it is the opposite of the ecstatic theory of love. The basis of every morality which has been expressed up to the present, up to a certain point in the philosophical tradition, comes back in fact to what could be called the hedonistic tradition which consists in establishing a sort of equivalence between these two terms of pleasure and object, in the sense that the object is the natural object of libido, in the sense that it is a benefit, when all is said and done, to admit pleasure to the rank of the goods sought by the subject, even indeed to refuse it once one has the same criterion of it, to the rank of sovereign good.

This hedonistic tradition of morality is something which is certainly not capable of ceasing, except by remembering that from the moment that one is in a way engaged in academic dialogue, that one no longer perceives its paradoxes, because when all is said and done, what is more contrary to what we will call the experience of practical reason, than

this supposed convergence of pleasure and the good?

When all is said and done, if one looks closely at it, if one looks for example at what these things involve in Aristotle, what do we see being elaborated? And it is very clear, things are very pure in Aristotle. It is undoubtedly something which only succeeds in realising this identification of pleasure and of the good within what I may call an ethic of mastery, or something whose flattering ideal, the terms of temperance or of intemperance, namely something which is associated with the subject's mastery with respect to his own habits. But the inconsistency of this theorisation is quite striking. If you re-read these celebrated passages which concern precisely the use of pleasures, you will see there that nothing comes into this moralising point of view which does not belong to the register of this mastery of a morality of the master, from the fact that the master can discipline, can discipline many things, principally involving, relative to, his habits, namely to the management and to the usage of his ego. But as regards desire, you see the degree to which Aristotle himself must admit, he is very lucid and very aware that what results from this practical and theoretical moral theorisation, is that the, the desires, appear very quickly beyond a certain limit which is precisely the limit of mastery and of the ego in the domain of what he calls precisely bestiality.

Desires are exiled from the proper field of man, if it is a fact that man is identified with the reality of the master; on occasion it is even something like perversions, and moreover he has in this regard a particularly modern conception of the fact that something in our vocabulary could express well enough by the fact that the master is not to be judged on this, which almost amounts to saying that in our vocabulary, he cannot be recognised as responsible.

These texts are worthwhile recalling. You will clarify things for yourselves by referring to them.

Opposed to this philosophical tradition, there is someone whom I would wish all the same to name here, to name as being in my eyes the precursor of this something which I believe to be new, which we must consider as new, in let us say the progress, the direction of certain relationships of man to himself, which is that of the analysis that Freud establishes.

It is Spinoza, because after all I think that it is in him, in any case with a very exceptional accent, that one can read a formula like the following: 'That desire is the very essence of man'. In order not to isolate the beginning of the formula from what follows, we will add: 'in so far as it is conceived from one of his affections, conceived as determined and dominated by any one of his affections to do something'.

One could already do a lot starting from there to articulate that which in this formula still remains, what I might call, unrevealed; I say unrevealed because of course you cannot translate Spinoza into Freud. He is all the same very singular, and I offer him to you as a very singular testimony, no doubt personally I have perhaps a greater propensity than someone else, and many years ago I spent a lot of time working on Spinoza. I do not think for all that that this is the reason why in rereading him from the point of view of my experience, it seems to me that someone who participates in the Freudian experience can find himself also at ease in the texts of the man who wrote *De Servitute Humana*, and for whom the whole human reality and its structures are organised in function of the attributes of the divine substance.

But let us also leave to one side for the moment this indication, provided we return to it. I want to give you a much more accessible example, one on which I will close this philosophical reference concerning our problem. I took it here at the most accessible level, indeed at the most popular way into it that you could have. Open the dictionary of the late charming Lalande, his *Vocabulaire de la philosophie*, which is always, I must say, in every kind of exercise of this nature, that of making a dictionary, always one of the most dangerous and at the same time one of the most fruitful things, to such an extent does language dominate all these problems. One is sure that in organising a dictionary one will always do something suggestive. Here we find the following:

Désir (Begehren, Verlangen): [it is not irrelevant to recall what desire articulates on the plane of German philosophy] a spontaneous and conscious tendency towards an end that you imagine. Desire is therefore based upon tendency of which it is a particular and more complex case. On the other hand it is opposed to will or to volition in so far as it superimposes:

1. the coordination of the tendencies, at least momentarily;
2. the opposition of the subject and the object;
3. the consciousness of one's own efficacy;
4. the thought of the means through which the willed-for end will be realised.

These reminders are very useful, only it should be remarked that in an article which is trying to define desire, there are two lines to situate it with respect to tendency and that this whole development is referred to the will. It is effectively to this that the discourse on desire in the dictionary is reduced, except that there is added on again: 'Finally, according to certain philosophers, there is also in the will a *fiat* of a special nature which is irreducible to the tendencies, and which constitutes liberty.'

It is striking to see coming over this philosophical author some air of irony or other in these last lines. As a note: 'Desire is the tendency to procure an emotion that has been already experienced or imagined, it is the natural will for a pleasure' (quotation from Roque). This term of natural will being very interesting as a reference. To which Lalande personally adds:

This definition appears too narrow in that it does not take into account sufficiently the anteriority of certain tendencies with respect to their corresponding emotions. Desire seems to be essentially the desire of an act or of a state without there being necessary in every case a representation of the affective character of this end.

I think that this means of the pleasure, or of something else. In any case, it certainly poses the problem of knowing what is in question, whether it is the representation of the pleasure, or if it is the pleasure.

Certainly I do not think that the task which is done by means of a dictionary, to try to circumscribe the signification of desire, is a simple task, all the more because you will not be able for the task either by means of the tradition to which it reveals itself as absolutely prepared. After all is desire the psychological reality, resistant to every organisation, and when all is said and done is it by the subtraction of the characteristics that are indicated as being those of the will that we can manage to approach what the reality of desire is?

We will then have the contrary of what has left us with the non-coordination of tendencies, even momentarily, the opposition of the subject and the object, would really be

withdrawn. Likewise we would be here in a presence, a tendency unaware of its own efficacy, without thinking of the words by which it will realise the desired end. In short, we are certainly here in a field in which in any case analysis has introduced certain more precise articulations, because within these negative determinants, analysis outlines very precisely the drive at the level, at its different levels, in so far as it is precisely the following. the non-coordination, even momentarily, of the tendencies, the phantasy in so far as it introduces an essential articulation, or more exactly an altogether characteristic species within this vague determination of the non-opposition of the subject to the object.

This year our aim here will be to try precisely to define what phantasy is, perhaps even a little more precisely than the analytic tradition up to now has managed to define it.

For the rest, the final terms of idealism, of pragmatism, which are implied here, we will only retain for the moment one thing: very precisely how difficult it seems to situate desire and to analyse it in function of purely objectal references.

We are going to stop here to enter properly speaking into the terms within which I hope to articulate for you this year the problem of our experience, in so far as they are specifically those of desire, of desire and its interpretation. Already the internal link, the link of the coherence in analytic experience between desire and its interpretation, presents in itself something which only habit prevents us from seeing how suggestive the interpretation of desire already is by itself, and something which seems to be linked in an internal fashion, it seems, to the manifestation of desire.

You know the point of view from which, I will not say we are beginning, we are continuing, because we did not come together yesterday, I mean that we have already spent five years trying to designate the features of the comprehension of our experience by certain articulations. You know that these features have come to converge this year on this problem which is perhaps the problem at which there converge underneath, these points, some distant from one another, whose approach I wish first of all to prepare for you.

Psychoanalysis - and we have gone along together for the last five years - psychoanalysis essentially shows us what we will call man's capture in the components of the signifying chain.

That this capture is no doubt linked to the reality (*fait*) of man, but that this capture is not coextensive with this reality in the sense that no doubt man speaks, but that in order to speak he must enter into language and into its pre-existing discourse. I would say that this law of subjectivity which analysis especially highlights, its fundamental dependence on language is something which is so essential that it brings all the psychologies together.

We are saying that there is a psychology which is served, in so far as we may define it as the totality of studies concerning what we could call in a broad sense a sensibility in so far as it is a function of the maintenance of a totality or of a homeostasis, in short, the functions of sensibility in relation to an organism. You see that here everything is implicated, not alone all the experimental data of psychophysiology, but also everything that can contribute in the most general order, the putting into operation of notions of form as regards the apprehension of the means for the maintenance of the constancy of the organism. A whole field of psychology is inscribed here, and personal experience sustains this field in which the research is carried on.


But the subjectivity that is in question, in so far as man is captured by language, in

so far as he is captured, whether he wishes it or not, and in so far as he is captured away beyond the knowledge that he has of it, is a subjectivity which is not immanent to a sensibility in so far as here the term sensibility means the couple stimulus-response, for the following reason. It is because the stimulus here is given in function of a code which imposes its order, if needs be must be translated into it.

I am articulating here the emission, and not of a sign as one could say at a pinch, at least in the experimental perspective, in the experimental testing of what I call the stimulus-response cycle. One could say that that it is a sign which from the external milieu forces the organism to respond, to defend itself. If you tickle the sole of a frog's foot, it notices a sign, it responds to it by a certain muscular relaxation.

But in so far as subjectivity is captured in language, there is the emission, not of a sign, but of a signifier, namely be sure to remember the following which appears simple: that something, the signifier which takes on value not as is said when one speaks in communications theory of something, which takes on its value in relation to a third thing, that this sign still represents quite recently, this can be read with three terms: they are the minimal terms, there must be a, the one who hears, after that a signifier is enough, there is no need even to speak about an emitter, it is enough to have a sign and to say that this sign signifies a third thing, that it simply represents. This is a false construction, because the sign does not take its value with respect to a third thing that it represents, but it takes on its value with respect to another signifier which it is not.

As regards these schemas which I have just put on the board:



I wish to show you, I would not say their genesis because you should not imagine that it is a question of a stage, even though something could be discovered here of a stage effectively realised by the subject, the subject must after all take his place here, but you should not see here a stage in the sense that it would be a question of a typical stage, of a stage of development, it is rather a question of a generating, and to be more explicit, of a logical anteriority of each one of these schemas with respect to the one which follows.

What is represented by this thing which we shall call D, because it begins from a capital D? It represents the signifying chain. What does that mean? This basic fundamental structure, subjects every manifestation of language to the condition of being ruled by a succession, in other words by a diachrony, by something which unfolds over time. We will leave to one side the temporal properties that are involved. We will have to come back to them perhaps at the appropriate time. Let us say that undoubtedly the whole fullness of temporal material, so to speak, is not at all applied here. Here things can be summarised in

terms of the notion of succession, with what this can already involve and imply in terms of the notions of scansion. But we have not even got that far yet. The single discrete, that is to say differential element, is the base on which there is going to be established our problem of the implication of the subject in the signifier.

This implies, given what I have just pointed out to you, namely that the signifier is defined by its relationship, its meaning, and takes on its value in relation to another signifier, from a system of signifying opposition, this develops in a dimension which also and at the same time implies a certain synchrony of signifiers.

It is this synchrony of signifiers, namely the existence of a certain signifying battery concerning which one can pose the problem of knowing what is the minimal battery. I tried to work at this little problem. It will not be taking you too far from your experience to know whether after all one can make a language with a battery which seems to be the minimal battery, a battery of four. I do not think that it is unthinkable. But let us leave this to one side.

It is clear that in the present state of affairs, we are far from being reduced to this minimum. The important thing is the following which is indicated by the dotted line which has come to intersect from the front to the back the line representing the signifying chain, by cutting it at two points, namely the way in which the subject has to enter into the operation of the signifying chain. The thing that is represented by the dotted line represents the first encounter at the synchronic level, at the level of the simultaneity of signifiers. Here we have what I call the point of encounter with the code. In other words, it is in so far as the child addresses himself to a subject whom he knows to be a speaking subject, whom he has seen speaking, who has penetrated him with relationships ever since the beginning of his awakening to the light of day; it is in so far as there is something which operates as the operation of the signifier, as the word-mill, that the subject has to learn very early on that there is here a path, a defile through which essentially the manifestations of his needs must stoop in order to be satisfied.

Here the second point of intersection is the point at which the message is produced, and it is constituted by the following: the fact is that it is always by a retroactive operation of the succession of signifiers that the signification is affirmed and made precise, namely that it is retroactively that the message takes shape from the signifier which is there ahead of it, from the code which is ahead of it, and which inversely it, the message, while it is being formulated at every instant, anticipates, draws on.

I indicated to you already what results from this process. In any case what results from it and what can be marked on the schema, is the following. It is that what is at the origin in the form of the birth of need, of the tendency, as the psychologists call it, which is represented here on the schema, here at the level of this Id which does not know what it is, which being captured in language, does not reflect itself by (*de*) this innocent contribution of language in which the subject at first becomes discourse. There results from this that even reduced to the most primitive forms of apprehension by the subject of the fact that he is in relationship with other speaking subjects, there is produced this something at the end of the intentional chain which I here called for you the first primary identification, the first realisation of an idea regarding which one cannot even say at this moment of the schema that it is a question of an ego ideal, but that undoubtedly the subject has here received the first sign, *signum*, of its relationship with the other.

The second stage of the schema can overlap in a certain fashion a particular

evolutionary stage, on the simple condition that you do not consider them as clearly distinguished. There are things clearly distinguished in evolution, it is not at the level of the stages of the schema that these caesuras are found here. These caesuras, as Freud remarked somewhere, are marked at the level of the judgement of attribution compared to simple nomination. This is not what I am talking to you about now, I will come back to it later.

In the first part of the schema and in the second, it is a question of the difference within an *infans* level of discourse, because it is perhaps not even necessary yet for the child to speak in order that already this mark, this imprint put on need by demand, already operates at the level of alternating wails. That may be enough.

The second part of the schema implies that even if the child cannot yet sustain a discourse, he knows all the same how to speak, and this comes very early. When I say knows how to speak, I mean that it is a question, at the level of the second stage of the schema, of something that goes beyond the capture in language. There is properly speaking a relationship in so far as there is an appeal to the other as presence, this appeal to the other as presence, as presence against a background of meaning; at this moment signaled by the *fort-da* which impressed Freud so vividly at a date that we can fix as 1915, having been called to one of his grandsons, who himself became a psychoanalyst, I mean the child who was the object of Freud's observation.

This is what makes us pass to the level of the second stage of the realisation of the schema, in this sense that here, beyond what the chain of discourse as existent articulates, beyond the subject and imposing on him, whether he wishes it or not, its form, beyond this apprehension, which one might call an innocent one of the form of language by the subject, something else is going to appear which is linked to the fact that it is in the experience of language that there is founded his apprehension of the other as such, of this other who can give him the answer, the answer to his appeal, this other to whom fundamentally he poses the question which we see in Cazotte's *Le diable amoureux*, as being the roar of the terrifying form which represents the apparition of the super-ego, in response to the one who has evoked him in a Neapolitan tavern: '*Che vuoi?* What do you want?' The question posed to the other of what he wants, in other words, from the place where the subject meets desire the first time, desire being first of all the desire of the other, the desire thanks to which he perceives, he realises, as being this beyond around which turns the fact that that the other will bring it about that one signifier or another will be or not be in the presence of the word, that the other gives him the experience of his desire at the same time as an essential experience because up to the present it was in itself that the battery of signifiers was there, in which a choice could always be made, but now in experience this choice appears as commutative, that it is within the power of the other to bring it about that one or other of the signifiers should be there, that there should be introduced into experience, and at this level of experience, the two new principles which have just been added to what was at first the pure and simple principle of succession implying this principle of choice. We now have a principle of substitution, because - and this is essential - it is this commutativity from which there is established for the subject what I call, between the signifier and the signified, the bar, namely that there is between the signifier and the signified this co-existence, this simultaneity which is at the same time marked by a certain impenetrability, I mean the maintenance of the difference, of the distance between the signifier and the signified.

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It is a curious thing, that the theory of groups as it is learned in the abstract study of sets, shows us the absolutely essential link between any commutativity and the very possibility of using what I call here the bar sign which is used for the representation of fractions.

Let us leave this to one side for the moment. It is an indication that is marginal to what we are dealing with.

The structure of the signifying chain from the moment that it has realised the appeal of the other, namely when the enunciating, the process of enunciating is superimposed, is distinguished from the formula of the enunciated, by demanding as such something which is precisely the capture of the subject, the capture of the subject which at first was innocent, but which here - the nuance is nevertheless there, it is what is essential - is unconscious in the articulation of the word.

From the moment that the commutativity of the signifier here becomes an essential dimension for the production of the signified, namely that it is in an effective and striking fashion in the consciousness of the subject, of the substitution of a signifier for another signifier, will be as such the origin of the multiplication of these significations which characterise the enrichment of the human world.

Another term also emerges, or another principle which is the principle of similarity, in other words which brings it about that within the chain, it is in relation to the fact that in the sequence of the signifying chain, one of the signifying terms will be or not similar to another, that there also operates a certain dimension of things which is properly speaking the metonymical dimension.

I will show you later that it is essentially in this dimension, in this dimension that there are produced the effects which are characteristic and fundamental of what can be called the poetic discourse, the effects of poetry.

It is therefore at the level of the second stage of the schema that there is produced something which allows us to place at the same level as the message, namely on the left hand side of the schema, that which the message in the first schema, the apparition of what is signified about the Other in opposition to the signifier given by the Other which it produces on the chain, the dotted one because it is a chain which is only articulated in part, which is only implicit, which here only represents the subject in so far as he is the support of the word.

I told you, that it is in the experience of the other *qua* other having a desire, that this second stage of experience is produced. Desire, starting with its apparition, its origin, is manifested in this interval, this gap which separates the pure and simple linguistic articulation of the word, from the thing which marks that the subject realises in it something of himself which only has import, meaning in relation to this production of the word and which is properly speaking what language calls his being.

It is between the avatars of his demand and what these avatars have made him

become, and on the other hand this exigency for recognition by the other which can be called exigency for love on this occasion, that there is situated a horizon of being for the subject of whom there is question, namely of knowing whether the subject can reach it or not. It is in this interval, in this gap that there is situated an experience which is that of desire, which is first of all apprehended as being that of the desire of the other, and within which the subject has to situate his own desire. His own desire as such cannot be situated elsewhere than in this space.

This represents the third stage, the third form, the third phase of the schema. It is constituted by the following: the fact is that in the primitive presence of the desire of the other as opaque, as obscure, the subject is without recourse. He is *hilfloss*, *Hilflosigkeit*. I use Freud's term, in French this is called the *détresse* of the subject. What we have here is the foundation of that which in analysis, was explored, experienced, situated as the traumatic experience.

What Freud has taught us by taking the path which allowed him to finally situate the experience of anxiety in its true place, is something which has nothing of this character which I consider to be diffuse in certain ways, of what is called the existential experience of anxiety. That if it has been possible to say by referring to philosophy that anxiety is something which confronts us with nothingness, these formulas are undoubtedly justifiable in a certain perspective of reflection, you should know that on this subject Freud has an articulated, positive teaching; he makes of anxiety something which is clearly situated in a theory of communication. Anxiety is a signal. It is not at the level of desire, even though desire must be produced at the same place where at first helplessness (*détresse*) originates, is experienced; it is not at the level of desire that anxiety is produced. We will take up this year attentively, line by line, the study of Freud's 'Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety'. Today in this first lecture the only thing I can do is to initiate for you some major points in order to be able to rediscover them subsequently, and namely the following. Freud tells us that anxiety is produced as a signal in the ego, on the foundation of which it as a signal is called on to remedy.

I know that I am going too quickly, that to talk to you about this would deserve a whole seminar, but I cannot talk to you about anything if I do not begin by showing you the outline of the journey that we have to take.

It is in so far therefore as there intervenes at this third stage the specular experience, the experience of the relationship to the image of the other in so far as it is fundamental to the *Urbild* of the ego that we are in other words going to rediscover a way of using in a context which will give it a completely different resonance, what we articulated at the end of our first year about the relationships between the ideal ego and the ego ideal, it is in so far as we are going to be led to rethink all that in the context of the symbolic action which I show you here to be essential.

You will see the use it can finally have. I am not alluding here only to what I said and articulated about the specular relationship, namely the confrontation in the mirror of the subject with his own image; I am alluding to the schema called O.....O', namely to the use of the concave mirror which allows us to think about the function of a real image itself reflected, and which can only be seen as reflected from a certain position, from a symbolic position which is that of the ego ideal.

What is in question is the following: in the third stage of the schema we have the intervention as such of the imaginary element of the relationship of the ego to the other as

being what is going to permit the subject to guard against this helplessness in relation to the desire of the other, by what? By something which is borrowed from the game of mastery which the child at a particular age has learned to handle in a certain reference to his counterpart as such.


The experience of the counterpart, in the sense that he is gaze, that he is the other who looks at you, that he brings into play a certain number of imaginary relationships among which in the forefront relationships of prestige, and also the relationships of submission and of defeat. It is by means of this in other words as Aristotle says, that man thinks. You must say that man thinks, you must not say that the soul thinks, but man thinks with his soul. You must say that the subject defends himself. This is what our experience shows us. With his ego he defends himself against this helplessness, and with this means that the imaginary experience of the relationship to the other gives him, he constructs something which is the difference between the flexible specular experience with the other, because what the subject reflects, are not simply games of prestige, it is not his opposition to the other in prestige and in pretence, it is himself as speaking subject, and this is why what I designate for you here as being this way out, this locus of reference by means of which desire is going to learn to situate itself, is the phantasy. This is why I symbolise the phantasy for you, I formulate it for you by means of these symbols, the S here. I will tell you in a little while why the S is barred, namely the subject as a speaker, in so far as he refers himself to the other as gaze, to the imaginary other.

Every time that you have to deal with something which is properly speaking a phantasy, you will see that it can be articulated in these terms of reference of the subject as speaking to the imaginary other. This is what defines the phantasy, every phantasy is articulated in terms of the subject speaking to the imaginary other.

This is why human desire is adjusted (*coapté*) not to an object, but to a phantasy. It is a fact of experience that analysis has articulated in the course of its experience.

Perversion, deviation, even delusion are articulated in an objectification which ties the imaginary and the symbolic together.

Let us illustrate our remarks, because it is a question of the relationships of the subject to the signifier, let us see the use that can be made of the schema in terms of communicating matters which are rather obscure.



This then was why I began with that. I am not saying that for all that I have made your experience any easier, that is the reason why now, in order to relax this experience, I would like to give you right away little illustrations. These illustrations, I will take one of them first of all and really at the simplest level because it is a question of the relationships of the subject to the signifier, the least and the first thing that can be required of a schema, is to see the way in which it can help in connection with the fact of commutation.

I remembered something that I had read once in Darwin's book on expression in men and in animals and which I must say, amused me a good deal. Darwin tells how a man called Sydney Smith who, I suppose must have been someone in the English society of his time, and about whom he says the following. Darwin poses a question, he says: 'I heard Sydney Smith at a soirée, saying quite calmly the following sentence "I hear that dear old Lady Cock has been overlooked"'. In reality 'overlook' means that the supervisor did not spot her, the etymological meaning. 'Overlook' is commonly used in the English language. There is nothing that corresponds to it in our current usage. That is why the knowledge of languages is at once so useful and so harmful, because it allows us to avoid making an effort, to make this substitution of signifiers in our own tongue, thanks to which we can manage to aim at a certain signified, because it is a question of changing the whole context in order to obtain the same effect in an analogous society. This could mean : *l'oeil lui est passé au-dessus* and Darwin marvels at the fact that it was absolutely perfectly clear to everyone, without the slightest doubt that that meant that the devil had forgotten her, I mean that he had forgotten to carry her into the tomb, which seems to have been at that moment in the mind of the listener her natural, even wished-for place. And Darwin really leaves the question open: How did he achieve this effect? says Darwin? You know, I am really unable to say.

However, we can be grateful to him for having marked the experience that he has there in a fashion that is particularly significant and exemplary of his own limitations in approaching this problem. That he took on the problem of emotions in a certain way, by saying that the expression of emotions is all the same involved, precisely because of the fact that the subject shows none, that he says this placidly, is perhaps taking things too far. In any case Darwin does not do it, he is really very astonished at this something that must be taken literally, because as always when we study a case, we must not reduce it by making it vague. Darwin says: everyone understood that the man was talking about the devil, even though the devil is nowhere mentioned, and what is interesting is that Darwin tells us that the shadow of the devil passed through the gathering.

Let us try now to understand it a little.

We are not going to delay on Darwin's own mental limitations, we will necessarily come to them all the same, but not immediately. What is certain, is that there is from the first approach something which is part of a striking knowledge, because after all there is no need to have posed the principles of the metaphorical effect, namely of the substitution of a signifier for a signifier, in other words there is no need to demand of Darwin to have had a premonition of them for him to have understood right away that the effect in any case comes first of all from the fact that he does not even articulate, from the fact that a sentence which begins when one says Lady Cock, normally terminates with 'ill'. 'I heard it being said all the same that things are not going too well,' therefore that the substitution of something which appears that what is expected is news about the health of the old woman, because when one is talking about old ladies it is always with their health that one is concerned, is replaced by something different, indeed by something which from a certain point of view is irreverent.

He does not say, that she is either at death's door, nor that she is quite well. He says that she has been forgotten.

Here then what intervenes in order that this metaphorical effect, namely in any case something other than that would mean if 'overlook' were expected? It is in so far as it is not expected, that it is substituted for another signifier, that a signified effect is produced which is new, which is neither along the line that one has tried, nor along the line of what is unexpected. If this unexpected had not precisely been characterised as unexpected, it is something original which in a certain way had to be realised in the mind of each person according to his own angles of refraction. In any case there is the fact that there is an opening up of a new signified by this something which ensures for example that Sydney Smith is on the whole thought to be a wit, namely does not express himself in clichés.

But why the devil?

If we refer to our little schema, it will all the same help us a good deal. The reason why one makes schemas is in order to make use of them. One can however arrive at the same result without them, but the schema in a way guides us, shows us very obviously what is happening there in the real, the thing that presents itself, is properly speaking a phantasy, and by what mechanisms? It is here also that the schema can go further than what is permitted, I would say, by a kind of naive notion that things are made to express something which in short would communicate an emotion as they say, as if the emotions in themselves did not pose so many other problems, namely what they are, namely if they themselves do not already have a need for communication.

Our subject, we are told, is perfectly placid, namely that he presents himself in a way in the pure state, the presence of his word being its pure metonymical effect; I mean his word *qua* word in its continuity as word, and in this continuity of word precisely he makes the following intervene. The presence of death in so far as the subject may or may not escape it, namely to the degree that he evokes this presence of something which has the closest relationship with the birth of the signifier itself, I mean that if there is here a dimension in which death, or the fact that there is no more, can be both directly evoked, and at the same time veiled, but in any case incarnated, become immanent in an act, it is indeed that of signifying articulation. It is therefore to the degree that this subject who speaks so easily about death, it is quite clear that he does not wish this lady particularly well, but that on the other hand the perfect placidity with which he speaks of it implies precisely that in this regard he has dominated his desire, in so far as this desire as in *Volpone*, can be expressed by the lovable formula: 'May you stink and die!'

He does not say that, he simply articulates serenely the level that this is worth to us each one in his turn which is here forgotten for a moment. But that, if I may put it this way, is not the devil, and the will come one day or other, and at the same time this personage, poses himself as someone who does not fear to meet on equal terms the one he is talking about, to put himself at the same level, under the influence of the same fault, of the same terminal legislation by the absolute master who is here made present.

In other words, the subject here reveals himself at the place of what is veiled by language as having this sort of familiarity, of fullness, of plenitude in the handling of language which suggests what? Precisely something on which I wish to terminate, because this is what was lacking in everything that I said in my development in three stages, for what is the mainspring, the highlight of what I wished to articulate for you to be complete.

At the level of the first schema we have the innocent image. It is of course unconscious, but it is an unconsciousness which is only asking to become knowledge. Let us not forget that in the unconscious this dimension of being conscious, even in French, implies this notion.

At the level of the second and of the third stage of the schema, I told you that we had a much more conscious use of knowledge, I mean that the subject knows how to speak and that he speaks. This is what he does when he calls the other, and nevertheless it is here properly speaking that the originality of the field discovered by Freud and which he called the unconscious is to be found, namely this something which always puts the subject at a certain distance from his being, and which means precisely that this being never rejoins him, and it is for this reason that it is necessary, that he cannot do otherwise than reach his being in this metonymy of being in the subject which is desire.

And why? Because at the level at which the subject is himself engaged, himself inserted into the word and because of that into the relationship to the other as such, as locus of the word, there is a signifier which is always lacking. Why? Because it is a signifier, and the signifier is specially assigned to the relationship of the subject with the signifier. This signifier has a name, it is the phallus.

Desire is the metonymy of being in the subject; the phallus is the metonymy of the subject in being. We will come back to this. The phallus, in so far as it is the signifying element subtracted from the chain of the word, in so far as it involves every relationship with the other, this is the final principle which means that the subject in everything, and in so far as he is implicated in the word, falls under the sway of something that develops with all its clinical consequences, under the name of the castration complex.

What is suggested by I would not say every pure, but perhaps more every impure usage of the words of the tribe, every kind of metaphorical unveiling, provided it is audacious and challenges what is always veiled by language, and what it always veils at the final term, is death. This always tends to give rise to, to make emerge this enigmatic figure of the missing signifier, of the phallus which appears here, and as always of course under the form that is called diabolical, the ear, the skin even the phallus itself, and if in this usage of the wager, the tradition of English wit, of this something contained which none the less does not dissimulate the most violent desire, but this usage is enough in itself to make appear in the imaginary, in the other who is there as a spectator in the small o, this image of the subject in so far as he is marked by this relationship to the special signifier which is called prohibition, here on this occasion in so far as it violates a prohibition, in so far as it shows that beyond the prohibitions which make up the law of languages, this is not the way to talk about old ladies.

Here all the same is a gentleman who intends to speak quite placidly and who makes the devil appear, and this is the point that our dear Darwin asks himself: 'How, in the name of the devil, did he do that?'

I will leave you with that today. The next time we will take up a dream in Freud, and we will try to apply our methods of analysis, and this will at the same time allow us to situate the different modes of interpretation.

Seminar 2: 19 November 1958

I would like first of all to set out the limits of what I want to do today, I mean in this particular lecture, to state what I will show you today, and first of all by tackling the example of the interpretation of a dream, as well as the use of what we have called conventionally for some time the graph.

Since I am not carrying on this discourse, if I can express myself in this way, simply above your heads, I would like there to be established through it a certain communication, as they say. I had some echo of the difficulties which you yourselves experienced the last time, namely at a moment which was far from being a novelty, and that the setting out again of this graph still constituted for some of you. For many however it remains, let us not yet say manageable because in truth this graph is not extraordinary, we constructed it together last year, namely put it together progressively, in a way you saw it being built up from the needs of a certain formulation centred around what I called the formations of the unconscious. There is no need to be surprised that you are not able, as some of you have remarked, to perceive that its usage is not yet univocal for you, because precisely a part of what we will have to articulate this year about desire will show us its usefulness, and at the same time will teach us to handle it.

First of all then it is a question of comprehension. It is even this which seems to create for a certain number in different degrees, perhaps even less than they themselves say, which seems to create difficulties.

In connection with this term comprehension, I would like to point out - I assure you that there is no irony intended - that it is a problematical term. If there are those among you who always understand in every circumstance and at every moment what they are doing, I congratulate them and I envy them. This does not correspond, even after twenty five years of practice, to my experience, and in fact it shows us well enough the dangers that it involves in itself, the danger of illusion in all comprehension, so that I do not think there is any doubt that what I am trying to show you, is not so much to comprehend what I am doing, as to know it (*le savoir*). It is not always the same thing, they may not even go together, and you will see precisely that there are internal reasons why they should not go together, namely that you can in certain cases know what you are doing, know where you are at, without always being able to understand, at least immediately, what is in question.

The graph is made precisely in order to be of use in finding your bearings, it is destined to announce something right away. I think today, if I have the time, that I will be able to begin to see for example how this graph, and I think only by this graph or of course by something analogous - it is not to the uniform in which it may be presented that you must attach yourselves - will appear to you very useful to distinguish - I am saying this to arouse your interest - to distinguish for example three things, in order to distinguish by their positions, their different situations, three things which I should say, one very frequently finds confused to the point that one slips without warning between one and the other: the repressed for example. We will have things to say, or simply to take the fashion in which Freud himself defines it. The repressed, desire and the unconscious.

Let us go over it again in baby steps before applying it, so that there will be no doubt that what is represented at least by what we will call the two stages, even though of

course, it is not even that which is the difficulty for many of you, these two stages do not correspond in any way to what habitually is presented to you at the level of what I could call the architectonics of the superior and inferior functions, automatism and the function of synthesis. It is precisely because you do not find it there that these two stages confuse you, and that is why I will try to re-articulate them for you, because it seems that the second stage of the construction, a stage which obviously is defined abstractly, because since this graph is a discourse, one cannot say everything at the same time, this second stage is not necessarily a second phase, creates difficulties for some.

I therefore take things up again. What is the aim of this graph? It is to show the relationships which are essential for us, even though we are analysts, of the speaking subject with the signifier.

When all is said and done, the question around which these two stages are divided, is the same for the speaking subject - it is a good sign - is the same for him and for us. I was saying just now: do we know what we are doing? Well in his case too does he know or not what he is doing when he speaks? Which means: can he effectively signify for himself his action of signification?

If is precisely around this question that these two stages are apportioned and regarding which I tell you right away, because this seems to have escaped some of you the last time, I tell you right away, in this connection you must realise that both function at the same time in the smallest act of speech, and you will see what I mean, and how far I extend the term act of speech (*acte de parole*).

In other words, if you think of the process of what happens in the subject, in the subject in so far as the signifier intervenes in his activity, you must think the following, which I had the opportunity of articulating for one of you, to whom I was giving a little extra explanation after my seminar, and if I underline it for you it is because my interlocutor pointed out to me what he had not perceived; what I am going to tell you, is namely for example the following: what you must consider, is that the processes in question start at the same time from the four points, delta, O, d and D, namely - you are going to see that this is the contribution of my lecture today - in this relationship respectively the intention of the subject, the subject *qua* speaking, the act of demanding and this which we will call by a certain name a little later on and which I leave here for the moment in reserve.

The processes therefore are simultaneous along these four paths: d-delta-I-S (. I think that this is well enough supported.

There are therefore two stages in the fact that the subject does something which is in relation to the dominant action, the dominant structure of the signifier. At the lower stage he receives, he undergoes this structure. This is particularly obvious. Pay careful attention to everything that I am saying, because there is nothing improvised in it, and that is why those who are taking notes are doing the right thing.

This takes on its value by being especially - not uniquely but especially - illustrated. I mean that it is there that it is especially comprehensible, but at the same time it is also this which at first may mean that you do not see all its generality, namely that this engenders a certain lack of understanding. You can say to yourselves right away: every time that you understand, that is where the danger begins. It is especially the case that this takes on its value in the context, I say the context of the demand, it is in this context that the subject in so far as he is here at this level, at this stage, the line of the intentionality of the subject, of

what we supposed to be the subject, a subject in so far as he has not become the speaking subject, in so far as he is the subject of whom one always speaks, of whom I would say, he is still spoken about, because I do not know that anyone has ever really properly made the distinction as I am trying here to introduce it to you, the subject of knowledge, to speak plainly the subject correlative to the object, the subject around whom turns the eternal question of idealism, and who is himself an ideal subject, has always something problematical namely that after all as has been pointed out, and as his name indicates, he is only supposed.

It is not the same thing, as you will see, for the subject who speaks, who imposes himself with complete necessity.

The subject therefore in the context of the demand, is the first and I might say unformed state of the subject we are dealing with, the one whose conditions of existence we are trying to articulate by this graph. This subject is nothing other than the subject of need, because this is what he expresses in the demand, and I do not need to go back over this again. My whole point of departure consists in showing how this demand of the subject is at the same time profoundly modified by the fact that need must pass through the defiles of the signifier.

I will insist no further on this because I am supposing it known, but in this connection I would simply point out the following to you: that it is precisely in this exchange which is produced between the primitive unconstituted position of the subject of need and the structural conditions imposed by the signifier, that there resides what is produced and what is represented here on this schema by the fact that the line D - S is unbroken up to O, while further on it remains fragmented; that inversely it is in so far as it is anterior to s that the so-called line of intentionality, on this occasion of the subject, is fragmented and that it is only unbroken afterwards, let us say especially in this segment, and even provisionally because it is secondarily that I will have to insist on that in this case, in so far as you do not have to take into account the line $O - O \diamond d - S(O) - s(O)$. (?)

Why are things this way? All the same I had better not delay forever on this graph, especially since we will have to come back to it.

In other words what is represented by this continuity of the line up to this point O which you know is the locus of the code, the locus where there lies the treasury of the tongue in its synchrony, I mean the sum of the thematic or taxematic elements, without which there is no means of communication between beings who are submitted to the conditions of language.

What is represented by the continuity of the line D - S up to the point O is the following: it is that it is this synchrony of the systematic organisation of the tongue, I mean that synchronically, and it is given here as a system, as a set within which each of these elements has its value *qua* distinct from the others, from the other signifiers, from the other elements of the system. Here we have, I repeat it for you, the starting point of everything that we articulate about communication. This is what is always forgotten in theories of communication, it is that what is communicated is not the sign of something else, and it is simply the sign of what is in the place where another signifier is not.

It is from the solidarity of this synchronic system *qua* established at the locus of the code, that the discourse of demand *qua* anterior to the code takes on its solidity, in other words, that in the diachrony, namely in the development of this discourse there appears

something which is called the minimal duration necessary for satisfaction, even for what is called a magical satisfaction, at least of refusal, namely the time to speak.

It is because of this relationship that the line of signifying discourse, of the signifying discourse of the demand which of itself, because it is composed of signifiers, must appear here and be represented in the fragmented form that we see subsisting here, namely in the form of a succession of discrete elements, separated therefore by spaces; it is in function of the synchronic solidity of the code from which these successive elements are borrowed that there is conceived this solidity of diachronic affirmation and the constitution of what is called in the articulation of the demand, the time of the formulation.

It is therefore before the code, or on this side of the code, that this line is presented as continuous. On the contrary what is it that this graph represents here by the fragmented line which is that of the intentionality of the subject? Let us observe that already the fact of affirming the context of the demand simplifies the supposed diversity of the subject, namely the thing that presents itself as essentially moving from moments, from variations of this point. You know that the problem of the continuity of the subject has been posed to the psychologists for a long time, namely why a being essentially given over to what one can call intermittency, not just of the heart as has been said, but of many other things, can pose itself and affirm itself as ego. This is the problem that is in question, and undoubtedly already the putting into play of a need in the demand is already something which simplifies this subject with respect to the more or less chaotic, more or less random interferences between the different needs.

What the apparition on this schema of the fragmented form which represents the first part of the line delta - I here up to this O, is something different, it is the retroactivity on this changeableness (*mouvance*) which is at once continuous and discontinuous, confused no doubt, we must suppose it to be that of the primitive form, of the primitive manifestation of the tendency. It is the retroaction on it precisely of the form of discrete elements which discourse imposes on it; it is what it will undergo too actively from discursivity, it is why in this line, it is on this side not of the code, but of the message itself that the line appears in its fragmented form. What is produced beyond, is something that I have already sufficiently underlined at other moments to pass quickly over it now, it is the following: it is the identification which results from it of the subject to the other of the demand in so far as she is all-powerful.

I do not think that I need to go back over the theme of the omnipotence now of thought, now of the word, in analytic experience, except to say that I pointed out how wrong it was to put it in the depreciated position that the psychologist usually takes in so far as he is always more or less, in the original sense of the term, a pedant, to attribute it to the subject when the omnipotence that is in question, is that of the other in so far as she disposes quite simply of the totality of signifiers.

In other words, to give the sense that we are not getting away from the concrete in articulating things in this way, I shall very expressly designate what I mean by that in the evolution, in the development, in the acquisition of language, in the child-mother relationships, to finally come to it, it is very precisely this: that this something that is in question and on which there reposes this primary identification that I designate by the segment $s(O)$, the signified of O, and which culminates in the first nucleus, as this is currently expressed in analysis in the writings of Mr. Glover, you will see this articulated: the first nucleus of the formation of the ego, the kernel of the identification in which this process here culminates, is a question of what is produced in so far as the mother is not

simply the one who gives the breast (*sein*) - as I told you – she is also the one who gives the sign (*seing*) of signifying articulation, and not only in so far as she speaks to the child as she obviously does, and well before she can presume that he understands anything of it, just as he understands things well before she imagines he does, but in so far as all sorts of the mothers games, the games of hide-and-seek for example which so quickly give rise in the infant to a smile, even to a laugh, are properly speaking already a symbolic action in the course of which what she reveals to him, is precisely the function of the symbol *qua* revelatory. In these hiding games she reveals to him how to make something disappear and to make it reappear, to make his own face disappear, or to make it reappear, or to hide the face of the child, and to rediscover it; she reveals to him the revelatory function. It is already a second degree function that we are dealing with.

It is in the midst of this that there are made these first identifications to what is called on this occasion the mother, the mother as all-powerful, and as you see, this has an import other than the pure and simple satisfaction of need.

Let us pass on to the second stage of this graph, the one therefore whose presentation the last day seems to have given rise for some of you to some difficulties. This second stage of the graph is something other than the subject in so far as he passes through the defiles of signifying articulation. It is the subject who assumes the act of speaking; it is the subject *qua* I, although here I must articulate some essential reservations.

After all, this I, is not something I will delay on, I am going to point out to you at the beginning, this I, although I alluded to it in some development, is not our business, it is nevertheless the I of the 'I think therefore I am'. Just realise that this is a parenthesis. All the difficulties that were submitted to me, were made in connection with the 'I think therefore I am', namely that this had no conclusive value because the I had already been put in the 'I think' and that after all there is only a *cogitatum*, it thinks, and why therefore would it be in that?

I think that all the difficulties here have arisen precisely from this non-distinction between two subjects, as I articulated it for you at the beginning, namely that more or less at the beginning I think that more or less wrongly one refers back in this experience which the philosopher confides to us, to the confrontation of a subject with an object, consequently with an imaginary object among which it is not surprising that the I does not prove to be an object among others. If on the contrary we push the question to the level of the subject defined as speaking, the question is going to take on a quite different import, as the phenomenology which I will simply indicate to you now is going to demonstrate.

For those who want references concerning this whole discussion about the I, the *cogito*, I remind you that there is an article I already mentioned by M. Sartre in '*Les Recherches Philosophiques*'.

The I that is in question is not simply the I articulated in the discourse, the I in so far as it is pronounced in the discourse, and which linguists call at least for some time, a shifter. It is a semanteme which has no use that can be articulated in function of the code, I mean in function purely and simply of the code as lexically articulatable. Namely that as the simplest experience shows, the I can never be referred to something which can be defined in function of other elements of the code therefore as a semanteme, but simply in function of the act of the message. The I designates the one who is the support of the message, namely someone who varies from instant to instant.

It is no more complicated than that, but I would point out that what results from it, is that this I is essentially distinct therefore from this moment, as I will make you see very quickly, from what one can call the true subject of the act of speaking as such, and this is even what gives to the simplest I-discourse, I would say always a presumption of indirect discourse, I mean that this I could very easily be followed in the very discourse by parenthesis: 'I who am speaking', or 'I say that', which moreover is made very obvious as other people have remarked before me, that a discourse which formulates 'I say that', and which adds on afterwards: 'and I repeat it', does not say in this 'I repeat it' something useless because it is precisely to distinguish the two I's which are in question, the one who had said that and the one who adheres to what the one who has said something has said. In other words again, I want simply, if other examples are necessary to make you grasp it, to suggest to you the difference that there is between the I of 'I love you', and the I of 'I am here'.

The I in question is particularly tangible, precisely, because of the structure that I am evoking, where it is fully hidden and where it is fully hidden is in these forms of discourse which realise what I shall call the vocative function, namely those which only cause the addressee to appear in their signifying structure and absolutely not the I. It is the I of 'Take up thy bed and walk', it is the same fundamental I which is rediscovered in any form of imperative vocative and a certain number of others. I put them all provisionally under the title of vocative, it is if you wish the evocative I, it is the I that I spoke to you about already during the seminar on President Schreber, because it was essential to show, I do not know if at that time I really achieved it, I did not even take it up again in what I wrote in my resume of my seminar on President Schreber; it is the I underlying the 'You are the one who will follow me' (*tu es celui qui me suivra*), on which I insisted to such an extent, and which you see moreover to be part of the whole problem of a certain future within the vocative properly speaking, the vocatives of vocation.

I recall for those who were not there, the difference that there is in French, it is a refinement which not every tongue allows to demonstrate, between 'You are the one who shall follow me' (*tu es celui qui me suivras*) and 'you are the one who will follow me' (*tu es celui qui me suivra*). This difference of the performative power of the *tu* in this case is effectively a real difference of the I in so far as it operates in this act of speaking which it represents and which is a question of showing once again and at this level that the subject always receives his own message, namely what is here to be avowed, namely the I in an inverted form, namely through the mediation of the form that it gives to the *tu*.

This discourse, the discourse therefore which is formulated at the level of the second stage, and which is the same discourse as always - we only arbitrarily distinguish the two stages - this discourse which as always is the discourse of the other, even when it is the subject who pronounces it, is fundamentally at this second stage an appeal to be that is more or less forceful, it always contains, and here again we have one of the marvellous homophonique equivocations that French contains, it always contains more or less a *soit*, in other words a *fiat*, a *fiat* which is the source and the root of what beginning from the tendency, becomes and is inscribed for the speaking being in the register of willing, or again of the I, in so far as it is divided into the two terms that have been studied of the one and the other, of the imperative, of the 'take up thy bed and walk' which I spoke about above, or in relation to the subject, of the setting up of his own ego.

You see now the level at which there must be placed the question, as I might put it, the one which the last time I articulated here in the form of the *Che vuoi?* This *Che vuoi?*, which is, as one might say, the response of the other to this act of speech of the subject, this

question responds, I would say that as always this response responds before the question to the following, to the redoubtable question in which my schema articulates this very act of speech. Does the subject, when he is speaking, know what he is doing? This is precisely what we are in the process of asking here, and it is as a reply to this question that Freud said no.

The subject, in the act of speaking, and in so far as this act of speaking of course goes well beyond just his word, because his whole life is captured in acts of speech, because his life as such, namely all his actions, are symbolic actions if only because they are recorded, they are subject to being recorded, they are often actions to register something, and after all, everything that he does as they say, is contrary to what happens, or more exactly just like everything that happens before the examining magistrate, everything that he does can be held against him, all his actions will be imposed on a context of language and that his very gestures are gestures which are never anything but gestures chosen in a pre-established ritual, namely in an articulation of language.

And Freud, to this: 'Does he know what he is doing'? replies 'No.' It is nothing else that is expressed by the second stage of my graph, namely that this second stage only takes on its importance from the question of the other, namely *Che vuoi?*, what do you want, that up to the time of that question we remain of course in a state of innocence and foolishness. I am trying here to prove that didactics do not necessarily pass by way of foolishness. Obviously I cannot base myself on you to demonstrate this I.

It is therefore where the second stage of the schema, with respect to this question and in the responses, articulates where there are placed the points of intersection between the true discourse which is maintained by the subject and what manifests itself as willing (*vouloir*) in the articulation of the word where these points of intersection are placed, this is the whole mystery of this symbol which seems to be so opaque for some of you.

If this discourse which presents itself at this level as an appeal for being, is not what it seems to be, as we know from Freud, and this is what the second stage of the graph tries to show us. At first sight one can only be surprised that you do not recognise it, because what did Freud say, what are we doing every day, if not the following. showing that at this level, at the level of the act of the word, the code is given by something which is not the primitive demand, which is a certain relationship of the subject to this demand in so far as the subject has remained marked by its avatars. That is what we call the oral, anal and other forms of unconscious articulation, and this is why it does not seem to me to give rise to much discussion. I am speaking quite simply about the admission of the premises that we situate here at the level of the code. The formula: the subject *qua* marked by the signifier in the presence of his demand as giving the material, the code of this true discourse which is the true discourse of being at this level.

As regards the message that he receives, this message - I already alluded to it several times - I gave it many forms, all of them, not without good reason, more or less slippery, since this is the whole problem of the analytic perspective, namely what is this message. I can leave it for today, and at this moment at least of my discourse, at the problematical stage, and symbolise it by a presumed signifier as such. It is a purely hypothetical form, it is an X, a signifier, a signifier of the Other because it is at the level of the Other that the question is posed of a different mark, of a part which is precisely the problematical element in the question concerning this message.

Let us sum up. The situation of the subject at the level of the unconscious, as Freud

articulates it, it is not I, it is Freud who articulates it, is that he does not know what he speaks with, one has to reveal to him the properly signifying elements of his discourse, and that he does not know either the message which really comes to him at the level of the discourse of being, let us say truly if you like, but I in no way object to really.

In other words, he does not know the message that comes to him from the response to his demand in the field of what he wants. You already know the response, the true response: it can be only one, namely the signifier of nothing other, which is specially deputed precisely to designate the relationships of the subject to the signifier.

I have told you, I want to express it all the same, why this signifier was the phallus. I would ask even those who are hearing it for the first time, to accept this provisionally. This is not the important thing, the important thing is that this is the reason why he cannot have the response because since the only possible response is the signifier which designates the relationships with the signifier, namely if it were already in question in the very measure that he articulates this response, he, the subject is abolished and disappears. It is precisely this which ensures that the only thing about it that he can be aware of, is this threat directly aimed at the phallus, namely castration or this notion of the lack of the phallus which, in both sexes, is this something at which analysis terminates, as Freud - as I pointed out to you - has articulated it.

But we are not here to repeat these basic truths. I know that it gets on some peoples nerves that for some time we have been juggling a bit too much with being and having, but they will get over that because this does not mean that on the way we have not harvested something precious, something clinical, something which even allows there to be produced within my teaching something with all the characteristics of what I would call the medical stamp.

It is now a question in the midst of all of this of situating what desire means.

We have said that there is therefore at this second stage also a synchronic treasury, there is a battery of unconscious signifiers for each subject, there is a message which announces the response to the *Che vuoi?* and it announces itself, as you can see, dangerously.

Even, I point this out in passing, as a way of evoking in you some vivid memories, what makes of the story of Abe lard and Heloise the most beautiful of love stories.

What does desire mean? Where is it situated? You can see that in the completed form of the schema, you have here a dotted line which goes from the code of the second stage to its message through the intermediary of two elements, d signifies the place from which the subject descends and \$ in front of o signifies – I said it already, therefore I repeat it - the phantasy.

This has a form, a disposition homologous to the line which, from O, includes in the discourse of the ego, the e in the discourse, let us say the person filled out with the image of the other, namely this specular relationship which I posed for you as being fundamental for the establishment of the ego.

There is here in the relationship between the two stages, something which deserves to be more fully articulated. I am not doing it today, not just because I do not have the time, because I am prepared to take all the time necessary to communicate what I have to say to

you, but because I prefer to do things in an indirect fashion, because it appears to me to be a likely way of making you experience its import. Even at this point you are not incapable of guessing how fruitful is the fact that it should be a certain reproduction of an imaginary relationship at the level of the field of the gap determined between the two discourses, in so far as this imaginary relationship reproduces homologously the game of prestige which is established in the relationship with the other. You are not incapable of sensing even now, but of course it is altogether insufficient to sense it. I mean simply before fully articulating it, to make you dwell for a moment on what is involved in the term desire, situated, planted within this economy.

You know that Freud introduced this term from the beginning of analysis. He introduced it in connection with dreams and in the form of the *Wunsch*, namely by right, something which is articulated on this line. The *Wunsch* is not in itself, all by itself desire, it is a formulated desire, it is an articulated desire.

What I would like to make you dwell on for a moment is the distinction which deserves to be drawn between what I am establishing and introducing this year, and which is called desire, and this *Wunsch*. You have of course read *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and this moment that I am talking to you about it marks the moment that we ourselves are going to begin speaking about it this year. Just as last year we began with the witticism, we are beginning this year with the dream. You have not failed to notice from the first pages, and to the very end, that if you think of desire in the form as I might say that you have to deal with it all the time in analytic experience, namely one that gives you a lot of work to do because of its excesses, its deviations, because, after all let us say it, most often because of its deficiencies, I mean sexual desire, that which by turns, even though in the whole analytic field there has always been brought to play on it a quite remarkable pressure to put it in the shade, a pressure that is increasing in analysis; you must therefore notice the difference, on condition of course that you really read, namely that you do not continue thinking about your own little affairs while your eyes are glancing through the *Traumdeutung*. You will see that it is very difficult to grasp this famous desire, which is supposed to be found everywhere in each dream.

If I take the inaugural dream, the dream of Irma's injection which we have already spoken about on several occasions, about which I wrote something, and which I will write something about again, and about which we could spend an excessively long time talking; remember what the dream of Irma's injection is; what does it mean exactly? It remains very uncertain, even in what happens. Freud himself, in the desire of the dream,

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in a way laterally, in a derivative way. It is a question precisely of knowing why, but in order to know why I wish simply for a moment to dwell here at those obvious things which the use and usage of language gives us, namely what does it mean when one says to someone, whether it is a man, or a woman, and which we must choose to be a man and this is going to involve a certain number of contextual references, what does it mean when one says to a woman: 'I desire you'? Does that mean, in accordance with the moralising optimism within analysis against which you see me waging war from time to time, does that mean: 'I am ready to grant to your being as much if not more rights than to my own, to anticipate all your needs, to think of your satisfaction: Lord, let your will be done in preference to my own?' Is that what it means?

I think it is enough to evoke this reference to provoke in you the smiles which happily I see spreading among the audience. Moreover no one, when one is using words appropriately, can make any mistake about what the aim of a term like this is, however genital that person may be.

The other response is the following: 'I desire', we can say to use words that are completely unsubtle, 'to go to bed with you'. It is much more true, you must admit, but is it all that true? It is true in what I would call a certain social context, and after all given the extreme difficulty of giving its exact outcome to this formulation: 'I desire you', one cannot find after all any better way to prove it.

Believe me: it is perhaps enough that this word is not bound to the immeasurable embarrassment and upset that statements which have a meaning involve, it is enough perhaps for this word to be only spoken within for you to grasp immediately that if this term has a meaning, it is a meaning that is much more difficult to formulate. 'I desire you', articulated within, as I might say, concerning an object, is more or less the following: 'You are beautiful', around which there is fixed, there is condensed all these enigmatic images whose profusion is called by me my desire, namely: 'I desire you because you are the object of my desire', in other words: 'you are the common denominator of my desires', and God knows, if I can put God into the affair, and why not, God knows what desire brings in its wake, is something which in reality mobilises, orientates in the personality, something quite different than that towards which by convention its precise goal appears to be ordered.

In other words, to refer to a much less poetically indefinite experience, it also seems that I do not need to be an analyst to evoke how quickly and immediately at this level, in connection with the slightest distortion as it is said of the personality or of images, how quickly and how prominently there emerges in connection with this implication in desire what can, what can most often, what by right appears to be prevalent there, namely the structure of phantasy.

To say to someone: 'I desire you', is very precisely to say to her - but this is not always obvious in experience, except for the courageous and instructive little perverts, big and little ones - is to say: 'I am implicating you in my fundamental phantasy'.

This is where, because I decided that this year I would not go beyond a certain time - I hope I will always stick to this - the trial of asking you to listen to me, it is here, namely well before the point where I thought I would conclude today, that I will stop. I will stop in designating this point of the phantasy which is an essential point, which is the key point around which I will show you the next day therefore how to situate the decisive point at which there must appear, if this term of desire has a meaning different to that of wish in the dream, where there must appear the interpretation of desire.

This point then is here, and you can see that it forms part of the dotted circuit the one with this sort of little tail which is found at the second stage of the graph.

I would simply like to tell you, as a way of whetting your appetite a little, that this little dotted line, is nothing other than the circuit within which we can consider that there turn - this is why it is constructed like that - it is because it turns, once it is fed at the beginning it turns within indefinitely - that there turn the elements of the repressed.

In other words, it is the locus on the graph of the unconscious as such, it is about

this, and about this alone that Freud spoke until 1915 when he concluded with the two articles which are called respectively: 'The Unconscious' and 'Repression'. This is where I will take things up again in order to tell you to what degree there is articulated in Freud in a fashion which supports, which is the very substance of what I am trying to make you understand about the signifier, namely that Freud himself well and truly articulates in the least ambiguous way something which means nothing is ever, nothing can ever be repressed except signifying elements. It is in Freud, the word signifier is all that is missing. I will show you unambiguously that what Freud is talking about in his article on the unconscious, concerning what can be repressed, is designated by Freud. It can only be signifiers.

We will see that the next time and therefore you see here two opposed systems. the system here in dots, we have said that it is this that is in question, it is the locus of the unconscious and the locus where the repressed turns round and round up to the point that it makes itself felt, namely when something of the message at the level of the discourse of being, comes to upset the message at the level of demand, which is the whole problem of the analytic symptom.

There is another system, it is the one which prepares what I call here the little platform, namely the discovery of the avatar, a discovery that because there had already been so much trouble getting used to the first system Freud gave us the fatal benefit of making the following step himself before his death, namely that Freud in his second topology had discovered the register of the other system in dots.....a little platform this is precisely what the second topology corresponds to. In other words, it is concerning what happens, it is in the measure that he is interested in what happens, at the level of the pre-discourse subject, but in function of this very fact that the subject who speaks did not know what he was doing when he spoke, namely from the moment that the unconscious is discovered as such, that Freud had, if you wish, to schematise things, sought out here at what level of this original place from where it speaks, at what level and in function of what, precisely in relation to an aim which is that of the culmination of the process in I, at what moment the ego is constituted, namely the ego in so far as it has to locate itself with reference to the first formulation, the first capturing of the Id in demand. It is also there that Freud discovered this primitive discourse *qua* purely imposed, and at the same time *qua* marked by its fundamental arbitrariness, that it continues to speak, namely the super-ego. It is there also of course that he left something open, it is there, namely in this fundamentally metaphorical function of language, that he left us something to discover, to articulate, which completes his second topology, and which permits to restore it, to re-establish it, to re-situate it in the totality of his discovery.

Seminar 3: 26 November 1958

I begin by keeping my promises. The last time I mentioned to you the article by Sartre called: *'La Transcendance de l'ego'*, an outline of a phenomenological description. This article is found in the sixth volume of *Recherches Philosophiques*, an excellent review which stopped publication with the outbreak of war and with the death of its editor, Boivin, pages 85 to 103.

The remark made by Freud that the assertion that 'all dreams have a sexual signification', more exactly 'require a sexual interpretation, against which critics rage so incessantly, occurs nowhere in my *Traumdeutung*. In the seven editions of this book' - this is naturally written in the seventh - 'it contradicts in a particularly striking way the rest of the content of what is found in it.' (*Gesammelte Werke II/III*, which contain the *Traumdeutung*, on page 402, cf SE V 397).

[The remainder of p.2 and some of p.3 are missing]

Many of you heard last evening the clinical report by one of our friends who is an excellent psychoanalyst, on the subject of the obsessional. You heard him speaking about desire and demand.

We are trying to highlight here, because it is not just a theoretical question, but is linked to the essentials of our practice, this question which is the one around which there is played out the problem of the structure of desire and demand, and which is something immediately applicable no doubt to clinical work, brings it to life, I would say makes it comprehensible. I would almost say that it is a sign, that when you see it handled too much at the level of understanding, you experience some feeling of its insufficiency, and it is true moreover, because the level of understanding is far from exhausting the principles of the structure that we are trying to penetrate, because it is on it that we are trying to work and the key around which we should make this distinction between demand and desire pivot, in so far as it immediately clarifies demand, but that on the contrary it situates in its correct place namely at its strictly enigmatic point, the position of man's desire. The key to all of this is the relationship of the subject to the signifier. What characterises the demand, is not just that it is a relationship of a subject to another subject, it is that this relationship is made through the mediation of language, namely through the mediation of a system of signifiers.

Because we are now tackling - as I announced to you - the question of what desire is, in so far as it is the foundation of the dream, and you know that it is not easy to know right away what this desire is, if it is the motor of the dream; you know at least that it is twofold, that this desire is first of all directed towards the maintenance of sleep, Freud articulated it in the most explicit manner, namely of this state in which reality is suspended for the subject. Desire is the desire for death, it is this also and at the same time, and in a perfectly compatible way, I would say in so far as it is often through the mediation of the second desire that the first is satisfied. The desire being that in which the subject of the *Wunsch* is satisfied, and this subject, I would like to put in a sort of parenthesis: we do not know what the subject is, and it is a question of knowing who is the subject of the *Wunsch*, of the dream.

When some people say the ego, they are mistaken. Freud certainly affirmed the

contrary. And when one says the unconscious, that means nothing. Therefore when I say: the subject of the *Wunsch* is satisfied, I put this subject in parenthesis, and all that Freud tells us, is that it is a *Wunsch* which is satisfied.

With what is it satisfied? I would say that it is satisfied with being, meaning with being that is satisfied. That is all we can say, because in fact it is quite clear that the dream does not bring with it any other satisfaction than satisfaction at the level of the *Wunsch*, namely what one might call a verbal satisfaction. The *Wunsch* is here content with appearances, and it is quite clear if we are dealing with a dream and moreover also the character of this satisfaction is here reflected in the language by which it has expressed it to us, by this 'satisfied with being' (*satisfait de l'être*) as I expressed myself just now, and in which there is betrayed this ambiguity of the word being (*être*) in so far as it is there, that it slides around everywhere, and that also by formulating itself in this way in the grammatical form of a reference to being, being satisfied, I mean: can it be taken for this substantial aspect? There is nothing substantial in being except the word itself, it is satisfied with being, we can take it for what being is, if not literally (*au pied de la lettre*).

When all is said and done it is indeed in effect something of the order of being which satisfies the *Wunsch*. In short it is only in the dream, at least on the plane of being, that the *Wunsch* can be satisfied.

I would almost like to do here something that I often do, give a little preamble if you wish, a backward glance, a remark which would allow you to wake up from something or other which involves nothing less than the whole history of psychological speculation, in so far as it is linked, in so far as modern psychology began by formulating, as you know, in terms of psychological atomism, here all the Everyone knows that we are no longer at that stage, at associationism as it is called, and that we have made considerable progress since we have begun to consider the demand for totality, the unity of the field, intentionality and other forces. But I would say that the matter is not at all settled, and it is not at all settled precisely because of Freud's psychoanalysis, but it is not at all seen how the mainspring of this settling of accounts, which is not really one, has operated in reality, I mean that its essence has been allowed to escape completely, and at the same time also the persistence of what has been supposedly reduced in it.

At the beginning it is true, the associationism of the tradition of the English school of psychology, where we have an articulated game and a vast misunderstanding, if I can express myself thus, where I would say the field of the real is noted, in the sense that what is in question is the psychological apprehension of the real, and where it is a question of explaining in short, not just simply that there are men who think, but that there are men who move around the world apprehending in it in a more or less appropriate fashion the field of objects.

Where therefore is this field of objects, its fragmented structured character? Where does it come from? Quite simply from the signifying chain, and I will really try to choose an example to try to make you grasp that there is nothing else in question, and that everything that is brought forward in the so-called structured theory of associationism to conceptualise the progressiveness of psychological apprehension from the emergence up to the organised constitution of the real is in fact nothing other than the fact of endowing from the outset these fields of the real with the fragmented and structured character of the signifying chain.

From then on of course it is perceived that there is going to be a mistake and that

there must be what one might call more original relationships with the real and for that one starts from the notion of proportionality, and one makes ones way towards all the cases in which this apprehension of the world is in some way more elementary, precisely less structured by the signifying chain, without knowing that this is what is in question, one goes towards animal psychology, one evokes all the stigmatic features thanks to which the animal can manage to structure his world and try to find in it the reference point.

One imagines when one has done that one has resolved in a type of theory of animated field, of vector of primordial desire, that one has reabsorbed these famous elements which were a first false apprehension of the grasp of the field of the real by the psychology of the human subject. One has simply done exactly nothing, one has described something else, one has introduced another psychology, but the elements of associationism quite completely survive the establishment of the more primitive psychology, I mean the one which seeks to grasp the level of the cohabitation of the subject with his *Umwelt*, with his entourage, in the sensori-motor field. It nevertheless remains that everything that is related, that all the problems given rise to in connection with associationism survive this perfectly well, that there has been no reduction at all, but a kind of displacement of the field of perspective, and the proof of this is precisely the analytic field in which all the principles of associationism continue to reign, because up to this nothing has stifled the fact that when we began to explore the field of the unconscious, we did it, we re-do it every day following on something which is called in principle free association, and up to the present in principle, even though of course it is an approximate, inexact term for designating analytic discourse, the perspective of free association remains valid and that the original experiments conceal word associations (*des mots induits*), and still have, even though of course they do not have any therapeutic or practical value, but they still keep their value in orienting the exploration of the field of the unconscious, and this of itself would be enough to show us we are in a field where the word reigns, where the signifier reigns.

But if this is still not enough for you, I will complete this parenthesis because I want to do it to recall to you on what the associationist theory is founded, and on the basis of this experience, what happens afterwards, what is coordinated in the mind of a subject at such a level, where to take up again the exploration as it is carried on in this first experimental relationship, the elements, the atoms, the ideas as they say, no doubt approximately, inadequately, this first relationship, presents itself, not without reason, in this form.

How, we are told, do these ideas make their entry at the origin? It is a question of relationships of continuity. Go and see, follow the texts, see what is spoken about, the examples on which it is based, and you will recognise perfectly that the continuity is nothing other than this discursive Combination on which there is based the effect that we call here metonymy. Continuity no doubt between two things which have arisen in so far as they are evoked in memory on the plane of laws of association.

What does that mean? This signifies how an event has been lived in a context which we could broadly speaking call a random context. A part of the event having been evoked, the other will come to mind constituting an association of continuity, which is nothing other than an encounter. What does that mean? That means in sum that it is broken up, that its elements are caught up in the same narrative text. It is in so far as the event evoked in memory is a narrated event, that the narration forms its text, that we can speak at this level about continuity.

A continuity moreover which we distinguish for example in a word-association experiment. One word will come with another: If in connection with the word 'cherry' I

evoke obviously the word 'table', this will be a relationship of continuity because on such a day there were cherries on the table. But a relationship of continuity if we speak of something which is nothing other than a relationship of similarity. Even a relationship of similarity, is also always a relationship of signifiers in so far as the similarity is the passage from one to the other by a similarity which is a similarity of being, which is a similarity of one to the other, between one and the other in so far as one being different to the other, there is some subject of being which makes them alike.

I am not going to go into the whole dialectic of the same and the other, with all its difficulties and the infinitely greater richness than there appears there at first glance. I refer those who are interested in this to *Parmenides*, and they will see that they will spend some time there before exhausting the question.

What I am simply saying here and what I want you to experience, is, because I spoke above about cherries, that in connection with this word there are other usages besides the metonymical usage, I would say precisely to serve a metaphorical usage, I can use it to speak about lips saying that these lips are like cherries, and give the word 'cherry' as a word-association in connection with the word 'lip'. Why are they linked here? Because they are both red, alike in some of their attributes. It is not just this, or because they both have the same form analogically, but what is quite clear, is that whatever is happening, we are immediately, and this can be sensed, in the quite substantial effect which is called the metaphorical effect. There is no kind of ambiguity whatsoever when I speak in a word-association experiment of cherries in connection with lips. We are on the plane of the metaphor in the most substantial sense that is included in this effect, this term, and on the most formal plane, this always presents itself as I have reduced it for you to a metaphorical effect, to an effect of substitution in the signifying chain.

It is in so far as the cherry can be put into a structural context or not in connection with the lip, that the cherry is there. At which point, you could say to me. the cherry can come into connection with the lips in a function of continuity; the cherry has disappeared between the lips, or she has given me a cherry to take on my lips. Yes, of course it can also present itself like that, but what is in question? It is a question here of a continuity which precisely is that of the narrative that I spoke about above, because the event in which this continuity is integrated, and which brings it about that the cherry is in fact for a short time in contact with the lips, is something which of course from the real point of view, should not deceive us. It is not that the cherry has touched the lips which is important, it is that it is swallowed; in the same way it is not the fact that it is held between the lips in the erotic gesture I evoked, it is that it is offered to us in this erotic movement itself which counts. If for an instant we stop this cherry in contact with the lips it is in function of a flash which is precisely a short exposure of the narrative, in which it is the sentence, or it is the words which for an instant suspend this cherry between the lips, and it is moreover precisely because this dimension of narrative exists in so far as it establishes this flash, that inversely this image in so far as it is created by the suspension of the narrative, effectively becomes on this occasion one of the stimulants of desire to the degree that in imposing a tone which is only here the implication of the language of the act, language introduces retrospectively into the act this stimulation, this stimulating element properly speaking which is arrested as such and which comes on this occasion to nourish the act itself through this suspension which takes on the value of the phantasy, which has an erotic signification in the detour of the act.

I think that this is sufficient to show you this agency of the signifier, in so far as it is at the basis of the very structuring of a certain psychological field which is not the totality

of the psychological field, which is precisely this part of the psychological field which to a certain degree is by convention within what we can call psychology, to the degree that psychology is constituted on the basis of what I would call a sort of unitary intentional or appetitive theory of the field.

This presence of the signifier, is articulated, is articulated in an infinitely more insistent, infinitely more powerful, infinitely more efficacious way in the Freudian experience, and this is what Freud reminds us of at every instant, it is also what tends to be forgotten in the most exceptional way, in so far as you want to make of analysis something which would go in the same direction, in the same sense as the one in which psychology has come to situate its interest, I mean in the sense of the clinical field, of an intentional field where the unconscious is supposed to be something like a kind of well, a borehole as one might say, parallel to the general evolution of psychology and which is also supposed to go by another way to the level of these most elementary tensions, to the level of the depths, in so far as there occurs something more reduced to the vital, to the elementary aspect of what we see at the surface which is supposed to be the so-called field of the preconscious or the conscious.

This, I repeat, is an error. It is very precisely in this sense that everything that we are saying takes on its value and its importance, and if some of you were able the last time to follow my advice and refer to the two articles which appeared in 1915, what were you able to read there? You were able to read and to see the following. that if you refer for example to the article *Das Unbewusste*, the point which is most tangible in it, to the point I would say against which in a superficial description in which it would be a question of something other than signifying elements, of things which those who understand absolutely nothing about what I am saying here, articulate and call every day an intellectualist theory. We will therefore go and put ourselves at the level of unconscious emotions, since Freud speaks about them, because of course it is naturally objected to all of this that instead of speaking about the signifier, this is not emotional life, this is not dynamic. I am of course far from wanting to contest this because it is to explain it in a clear fashion that I take this route to the level of the *Unbewusste*.

What do you see Freud articulating for us? He articulates for us very exactly the following. it is the third part of *Das Unbewusste*; Freud explains the following very clearly, that the only thing that can be repressed, he tells us, is what is called *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*. It is only this, he tells us which can properly speaking be repressed. This therefore means a representative, in the representation of what? Of the instinctual movement which is called here *Triebrengung*. There is no ambiguity possible in the text at this point. He tells us explicitly that the *Triebrengung*, itself in any case, is a concept and as such aims at what can even be called more precisely the unity of instinctual motion, and in this case there is no question of considering this *Triebrengung*, as either unconscious or as conscious.

This is what is said in the text. What does that mean? That simply means that we should take what we call *Triebrengung* as an objective concept. It is an objective unity in so far as we look at it, and it is neither conscious nor unconscious, it is simply what it is, an isolated fragment of reality which we will conceive of as having an incidence from its own action.

It is only all the more remarkable in my opinion that it should be its representative in the representation. This is the exact value of the German term, and only this representative of the drive that is in question, *Trieb*, can be said to belong to the

unconscious in so far as it precisely implies what I set out above with a question mark, namely an unconscious subject. I do not have to go much further here, I mean that you should begin to sense, it is precisely to specify what is this representative in the representation, and of course you see already, not where I want to get to, but where we necessarily get to, namely that the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*, even though Freud in his time and at the point that things could be said in scientific discourse this *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is strictly equivalent to the notion and to the term of signifier. It is nothing else, even though it is only being introduced, and of course the demonstration has, it seems to me, already been introduced, because otherwise what is the use of everything that I said above. This of course will always be further demonstrated, this is precisely what is in question.

That Freud on the contrary is opposed to this, is also articulated in the most precise fashion by himself. What does Freud say about everything that can be connoted under the terms of feelings, emotion, affect, which he himself reunites? He says that it is by a carelessness of expression which has, or which cannot, or which is not according to the context, some difficulties, like every carelessness, but there is a certain looseness when one says that it is unconscious. In principle, he says, it never can be, he formally denies it any possibility of an unconscious incidence.

This is expressed and repeated in a way which involves no doubt, no kind of ambiguity. Affect, as in talking about an unconscious affect, this means that it is perceived, but known; but known in what way? In its attachments, but not that it is unconscious, because it is always perceived, he tells us, simply it has gone and attached itself to another representation, which is not repressed. In other words, it had to accommodate itself to the context existing in the preconsciousness, which allows it to be considered by consciousness, which on occasion is not difficult, as a manifestation of its last context.

This is articulated in Freud. It is not enough for him to articulate it once, he articulates it a hundred times, and in every connection he comes back to it. It is precisely here that there enters in the enigma of what is called the transformation of this affect, of what proves in this connection to be particularly plastic, and that by which all the authors moreover once they approach this question of affect, namely every time they see it, have been struck, I mean to the extent that no one dares to touch the question, because what is altogether striking is that I who practice an intellectualist psychoanalysis, am going to spend the year talking about it, but that on the contrary you can count on the fingers of one hand the articles in analysis devoted to the question of affect, even though psychoanalysts are always full of it when they are talking about a clinical observation, because of course they always have recourse to affect. There is to my knowledge a single worthwhile article on this question of affect, it is an article by Glover which is spoken about a good deal in the writings of Marjorie Brierley. There is in this article an attempt to take a step forward in the exploration of this notion of affect which leaves something to be desired in what Freud said on the subject. This article is moreover detestable, like the whole of this book which, devoting itself to what are called the tendencies of psychoanalysis, gives a rather nice illustration of all the really impossible places that psychoanalysis is trying to lodge itself, in passing by morality, personalism, and other such eminently practical perspectives around which the blah of our epoch likes to spend itself.

On the contrary if we come back here to the things which concern us, namely to serious things, what do we read in Freud? We read the following: the affect; the problem is to know what becomes of it, in so far as it is disconnected from the repressed representation, and it thenceforth depends only on the substitutive representation which it is

able to become attached to.

To what is disconnected there corresponds this possibility of annexation which is its property, and which is the way the affect presents itself in analytic experience as something problematic, which ensures for example that in the living experience of a hysteric, it is from this that analysis starts, it is from this that Freud starts when he begins to articulate analytic truths; it is that an affect arises in the ordinary, comprehensible, communicable text of the everyday experience of a hysteric and the fact that this affect is there, which moreover seems to fit in with the totality of the text, except to a more exigent eye, this affect which is there is the transformation of something else, and it is something which deserves that we should dwell on it; of something which is not another affect, which might be supposed to be in the unconscious. This Freud denies absolutely. There is absolutely nothing like that, it is the transformation of the purely quantitative factor; there is absolutely nothing which at that moment is really in the unconscious this quantitative factor in a transformed form, and the whole question is to know how these transformations in the affect are possible, namely for example how an affect which is in the depths is conceivable in the restored unconscious text as being such and such, presents itself in a different form when it appears in the preconscious context.

What does Freud tell us? First text:

The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas (*Vorstellungen*) are cathexes - basically of memory traces - whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feeling. (SE 14 178; 10 277)

Such is the rule for the formation of affects.

It is also indeed the fact that as I told you, the affect refers to the quantitative factor of the drive, the one in which he understands that it is not just movable, mobile, but subject to the variable which constitutes this factor, and he again articulates it precisely in saying that its fate can be threefold. 'Either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into anxiety;' - this is what he writes in 1915, and one sees there the beginnings of a position which the article 'Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety' will articulate in the topology - 'or it is suppressed, i.e. it is prevented from developing at all.'

But in comparison with unconscious ideas (*Vorstellungs-repräsentanz*), he tells us, there is the important difference that unconscious ideas continue to exist after repression as actual structures in the system Ucs, whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing, writes Freud.

This is an altogether inevitable preamble before entering into the mode in which I intend here to pose the question connected with the interpretation of desire in the dream. I told you that for that I would take a dream from Freud's text, because after all it is still the best guide to be sure about what he intends to say when he speaks about the desire of the dream. We are going to take a dream which I will borrow from this article which is called *Formulierungen*, 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning', from 1911, which appeared just before the Schreber case.

I take this dream and the fashion in which Freud speaks of it and treats it, from this

article, because it is articulated there in a simple, exemplary, significant, unambiguous fashion and to show how Freud understand the manipulation of these *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*, in so far as it is a question of the formulation of unconscious desire.

What can be extracted from the totality of Freud's work concerning the relationships of this *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* with the primary process, is not open to any kind of doubt. If the primary process is entitled in so far as it is subject to the first principle, which is called the pleasure principle, there is no other way of conceiving the opposition which is marked in Freud between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, except by perceiving that what is given to us as the hallucinatory arousal in which the primary process, namely desire at the level of the primary process, finds its satisfaction, does not simply concern an image, but something which is a signifier, it is moreover a surprising thing that this was not noticed in other ways, I mean starting from clinical observation. It was never noticed in other ways, it seems, precisely to the degree that the notion of signifier was something which was not elaborated at the time of the great expansion of classical psychiatry, because after all in the massiveness of clinical experience, under what forms are there presented to us the major, problematic, most insistent forms in which there are posed for us the question of hallucination, if not in verbal hallucinations or in verbal structures, namely in the intrusion, the immixtion in the field of the real not of something indifferent, not of an image, not of a phantasy, not of what is often simply supposed to support hallucinatory processes?

But if an hallucination poses us problems which are proper to itself, it is because it is a question of signifiers and not of images, not of causes, not of perceptions, indeed of false perceptions of the real as people say it is. But at Freud's level there is no doubt about this and precisely at the end of this article,- to illustrate what he calls *der neurotischen Wahrung* (SE 12 225; GW 8 238), namely - it is a term to retain, the word *Wahrung* means to last; it is not very common in German, it is linked to the verb *wahren* which is a durative form of the verb *wahren*, and this idea of duration, of valorisation, because it is its most common usage: if the word *Wahrung* refers to duration, the most common usage which is made up of it, is value, valorisation - to talk to us about a properly neurotic valorisation, namely in so far as the primary process erupts into it, Freud takes as an example a dream, and here is this dream.

It is the dream of a subject who is mourning for his father, who had, he tells us, nursed him through a long and painful mortal illness.

This dream is presented as follows: 'His father was alive once more and he was talking to him in his usual way. But he felt it exceedingly painful that his father had really died, only without knowing it.' (SE 12 225) It is a short dream, it is a dream which as always, Freud tackles at the level of its transcription, because the essential of Freudian analysis is always based on the narrative of the dream, first of all in so far as it is articulated. This dream then was repeated insistently in the months which followed the death of his father, and how is Freud going to tackle it?

There is no doubt of course that Freud never thought at any time that a dream, if only because of this distinction that he always made between the manifest content and the latent content, in referring himself immediately to what can be called and which one does not fail to call at every instant in analysis by this term which has not, I think, an equivalent, of wishful thinking. It is this that I would almost like to give back some sound of equivalence with alarm. This just by itself should make an analyst suspicious, even

defensive, and persuade him that he is taking the wrong road.

There is no doubt that for a moment Freud teases this 'wishful', and tells us that it is simply because he needs to see his father and that that makes him happy, because it is not at all enough, for the simple reason that it does not seem at all to be a satisfaction, and that this happens with the elements and in a context whose painful character is sufficiently marked, to make us avoid this sort of precipitous step which I mention here to show that at the limit it is possible. When all is said and done I do not think that a single analyst could go that far when it is a question of a dream. But it is precisely because one cannot go so far when it is a question of a dream, that psychoanalysts are no longer interested in dreams.

How does Freud tackle things? We will stay with his text: 'The only way,' he writes in this article, right at the end, 'the only way of understanding this apparently nonsensical dream is by adding 'as the dreamer wished' or 'in consequence of his wish' after the words 'that his father had really died', and by further adding 'that he (the dreamer) wished it' to the last words. The dream-thought then runs: it was a painful memory for him that he had been obliged to wish for his father's death and how terrible it would have been if his father had had any suspicion of it!'

This leads you to give its weight to the fashion that Freud treats the problem. It is a signifier. These are things which are *clausulae* (?) and we are going to try to articulate on the linguistic plane what they are, the exact value of what is given here as permitting access to the understanding of the dream. They are given as such, and as the fact that putting them in place, their adaptation in the text, gives the meaning of this text.

Please understand what I am saying. I am not saying that this is interpretation, and in effect it is perhaps interpretation, but I am not saying it yet, I am suspending you at this moment where a certain signifier is designated as being produced by its lack. What is the phenomenon of the dream that is in question? It is by replacing it in the context of the dream that we accede right away to something which is given as being the understanding of the dream, namely that the subject finds himself in the familiar case, this reproach by which one reproaches oneself about someone who is loved, and this reproach leads us back in this example to the infantile signification of the death wish.

We are here therefore before a typical case where the term transference, *Übertragung*, is employed in the primitive sense that it is first used in the *Interpretation of Dreams*. It is a question of carrying forward something which is an original situation, the original death-wish on this occasion, into some different, current thing, which is an analogous, homologous, parallel wish which is similar in some fashion or other, and introduces itself to revive this archaic wish that is in question.

It is naturally worthwhile dwelling on this, because it is starting from there simply that we can first try to elaborate what interpretation means, because we have left to one side the interpretation of 'wishful'.

To complete this interpretation there is only one remark to be made. If we are unable to translate wishful thinking by *pensée désireuse*, *pensée désirante* it is for a very simple reason: it is that if 'wishful thinking' has a meaning, of course it has a meaning, but it is employed in a context in which this meaning is not valid. If you wish to test every time that this term is employed, the suitability, the pertinence of the term 'wishful thinking', you only have to make the distinction that 'wishful thinking' does not mean taking one's desire for reality, as it is put, it is the meaning that thinking in so far as it slides, as it bends,

therefore one should not attribute to this term the signification: taking one's desires for reality, as it is usually expressed, but taking one's dream for reality, on this one condition precisely that it is quite inapplicable to the interpretation of the dream, because this simply means on this occasion if my dream, is to this type of understanding of the dream, this simply means in this case that one has dreamed, in other words that one dreams because one dreams, and this indeed is the reason why this interpretation at this level is in no way applicable at any time to a dream.

We must then come to the procedure described as the adding on of signifiers, which presupposes the previous subtraction of the signifier; I am speaking about what is presupposed in Freud's text, subtraction being at that moment exactly the meaning of the term that he makes use of to designate the operation of repression in its pure form, I would say in its *Unterdrückung* effect.

It is then that we find ourselves brought to a halt by something which as such, presented for us an objection and an obstacle, which if we had not decided in advance to find everything good, namely if we had not decided in advance to believe, to believe as Monsieur Prévert says, one should all the same dwell on the following: that the pure and simple restoration of these two terms: *nach seinem Wunsch* and *dass er es wünschte*, namely that the son wished for this death of his father, the simple restoration of two *clausulae* from the point of view of what Freud himself designates to us as the final goal of interpretation, namely the re-establishment of unconscious desire, gives us strictly nothing because in that case what is restored? It is something that the subject knows perfectly well. During the extremely painful illness, the subject had effectively wished for his father's death as being the solution and the end of his torment and his pain, and effectively of course he did not show him, he did everything to hide from him, the desire, the wish which was in its context, in its recent experienced context, perfectly accessible to him. There is no need even in this connection to speak about preconsciousness but of conscious memory, perfectly accessible to the continued text of awareness.

Therefore if the dream subtracts from the text something which is in no way removed from the consciousness of the subject, if it subtracts it, it is, as I might say, this phenomenon of subtraction which takes on a positive value, I mean that this is the problem, it is the relationship of repression, in so far as without any doubt it is a question here of *Vorstellungs-repräsentanz*, and even a quite typical one, because if anything merits this term, it is precisely something which is, I would say in itself, a form empty of meaning 'as he wished', isolated in itself. This means nothing, this means 'as he wished', that we have previously spoken about, that he wished what? This also depends on the sentence which comes before, and this is the direction in which I want to lead you to show you the irreducible character of what we are dealing with compared to any conception which arises out of the sort of imaginary elaboration, even the abstraction of the objectal data of a field, when it is a question of the signifier and what is supposed to be the originality of the field which, in the psyche, in experience, in the human subject, is established by it and by the action of the signifier. This is what we have, these signifying forms which in themselves cannot be conceived of, cannot be sustained excepted in so far as they are articulated with other signifiers, and this in fact is what is in question. I know that I am here getting into something which would suppose a much longer articulation than anything we are dealing with. This is linked to all sorts of experiments which have been carried on with great perseverance by a school called the Würzburg school, called the school of imageless thought, and a kind of intuition that in the work of this school which was carried out in a completely closed little circle of psychologists, they were led to think without images these kinds of forms which are different to just signifying forms without a context and at the

nascent state, to the notion of *Vorstellung*, and very specially in connection with the problems which we are facing here make it worthwhile remembering that for two years Freud, and we have unambiguous proof of this, attended Brentano's classes, and that Brentano's psychology, in so far as it gives a certain conception of the *Vorstellungen* is indeed there to indicate the exact weight that the term *Vorstellung* could have taken on in Freud's mind, and not simply in my interpretation.

The problem is precisely of the relationship that there is between repression, if repression is said to apply exactly and as such to something that is of the order of the *Vorstellung*, and on the other hand this fact of something which is nothing other than the appearance of a new meaning which is different for us at the point that we are progressing to, which is different from the fact of repression, which is what we can call in the context, in the context of the preconscious, the elision of two *clausulae*. Is this elision the same thing as repression? Is it exactly its counterpart, its contrary? What is the effect of this elision? It is clear that it is an effect of meaning, I mean that in order for us to explain ourselves on the most formal plane, we should consider this elision, and I say elision and not allusion, it is not, to use everyday language, a representation (*une figuration*), this dream does not make allusions, far from it, to what has gone before it, namely to the relationships of the son to the father, it introduces something which sounds absurd, which has its import as signification on the manifest, quite original plane. It is indeed a question of a *figura verborum*, of a figure of speech, of terms, to use the same term which is the counterpart of the first, it is a question of an elision, and this elision produces a signified effect; this elision is equivalent to a substitution for the missing terms of a plane, of a zero, but a zero is not nothing and the effect in question could be qualified as a metaphorical effect. The dream is a metaphor. In this metaphor something new arises which is a meaning, a signified, a signified which is no doubt enigmatic, but which is all the same something that we have to take into account as being I would say one of the most essential forms of human experience, because it is this very image which for centuries put human beings, at one or other turn in their grief at their existence, on the more or less hidden paths which led them to the necromancer and what he gave rise to in the circle of incantation was this something called a shade, before which there happened nothing other than what happened in this dream, namely this being which exists there without one knowing how he exists, and before whom literally one can say nothing, because he of course speaks. But it does not matter, I would say that up to a certain point what he says is also what he does not say. We are not even told it in the dream, this word only takes on its value from the fact that the one who has called the beloved being from the kingdom of shades can tell him literally nothing of what is truly in his heart.

This confrontation, this structured scene, this scenario, does it not suggest to us in itself that we should try to situate its import? What is it? Has it this fundamental structured and structuring value that I am trying to define for you this year under the name of phantasy? Is it a phantasy? Are there a certain number of characteristics required in order that in such a presentation, in such a scenario, that in this scenario we should recognise the characteristics of phantasy?

This is a first question which unfortunately we can only begin to articulate the next time. You should understand that we will give it quite precise replies, which will allow us to approach the way in which effectively it is a phantasy, and the way it is a dream-phantasy, namely, I articulate it for you right away, a phantasy which has very particular forms, I mean that a dream-phantasy, in the sense that we can give a precise sense to this word phantasy, has not the same import as a waking phantasy, whether it is unconscious or not.

Here is a first point on which I will give a reply the next time, to the question that is posed here.

The second point, is in connection with and beginning from this, namely from this articulation of the function of phantasy, how we should conceive where there lies the incidence of what one can call, of what Freud called the mechanisms of the dream-work, namely its relationships on the one hand with the supposedly antecedent repression, and the relationship of this repression with the signifiers regarding which I have shown you the degree to which Freud isolated them and articulated the incidence of their absence in terms of pure signifying relationship.

These signifiers, I mean the relationships there exist between the signifiers of the narrative: 'He had died', on the one hand; 'he did not know it' on the other hand; 'in consequence of his wish' in the third place. We will try to position them to place them, to make them function on the lines, the paths of the chains which are called respectively the chain of the subject and signifying chain, as they are here posed, repeated, insisting before us in the form of our graph, and you will see both the use that can be made of this which is nothing other than the topological position of elements and of relationships without which there is no possible functioning of discourse, and how only the notion of structures which allow this functioning of discourse can also allow us to give a meaning to the fact that the two *clausulae* in question can be said up to a certain point, to be really the content, as Freud says, the reality, the *real verdrangten*, what is really repressed.

But this is not enough, we must also distinguish how and why the dream here makes use of these elements which without any doubt are repressed, but precisely there at a level at which they are not, namely where the immediately antecedent experience brought them into play as such, as *clausulae*, and where far from being repressed, the dream elides them; why? To produce a certain effect of what? I would say of something which is not so simple either because in short it is to produce a signification, there is no doubt, and we see that the same elision of the same wish may have according to different structures, quite different effects. In order simply to awaken a little, to stimulate your curiosity, I would like simply to remark to you that there is perhaps a relationship between the same elision and the same *clausula*, 'in consequence of his wish' and the fact that in other contexts which are not those of the dream, but of psychosis for example, this can culminate at the *méconnaissance* of death. The 'he did not know', or 'he did not want to know anything about it' being articulated simply differently with the 'he had died', or even in a still different context, have perhaps the interest of being distinguished at first sight, as the *Verwerfung* is distinguished from the *Verneinung*. In this instance this can culminate at so - called feelings of invasion, of eruption, or at these fruitful moments of psychosis where the subject thinks that he has before him effectively something much closer again to the dream image than we can even expect, namely that he has before him someone who is dead, that he is living with a dead person, and simply that he is living with a dead person who does not know that he is dead, and we could even say perhaps up to a certain point, that in quite normal life, the one that we live every day, it can happen perhaps more often than we believe, that we have in our presence someone who while having all the appearances of a socially satisfying behaviour, is someone who at the same time desires for example from the point of view of interest, from the point of view of what permits us to be in accord with a human being, is well and truly, we know more than one of them, from the moment that I point it out to you seek it out in your relationships, someone who is well and truly dead, and a long time dead, dead and mummified, who is only waiting for a little tip of something or other like it, to be reduced to that sort of woodenness which will bring about his end.

Is it not also true that in the presence of this something which after all is perhaps much more diffusely present than one thinks in subject-to-subject relationships, namely that there is also this aspect of half-death, and that what is half-dead in all sorts of living beings, is also something which leaves our conscience quite tranquil, and that a large part of our behaviour with our neighbours is something perhaps which we must take into account when we take on the charge of listening to the discourses, the confidences, the free discourse of a subject in the analytic experience, it produces perhaps in us a reaction much more important to measure, always much more present, effective, essential which in ourselves corresponds to this sort of precaution that we must take in order not to remark to the half-dead person that where he is, where he is in the process of speaking to us, he is half the prey of death, and this also because in our case intervening on this subject or taking such an audacious approach would also have some consequences for us, which are very precisely those against which we are defending ourselves the most, namely what is most fictitious, most repeated in us, namely also half death.

In short, you see, that rather than being answered the questions are multiplying, to the point that we arrive at the end of this discourse today, and without any doubt if this dream should bring you something about the question of the relationships of the subject to desire, it is because it has a value which should not surprise us, given that its protagonists, namely a father, a son, the presence of death, and as you will see, the relationship to desire. It is not by chance then that we have chosen this example and that we will have to exploit it again next

Seminar 4: 3 December 1958

The article by Glover in Brierley's book, *I.J.P.*, XX, July-October 1939 (namely No. 3 of Volume XX) - pp.299-308.

I left you the last day with a dream, this extremely simple dream, at least in appearance. I told you that we would work on it or in connection with it, in order to articulate the proper meaning that we give to this term of dream-desire, and the meaning of what an interpretation is.

We are going to take this up again. I think that on the theoretical plane it also has its value.

These days I have become immersed in re-reading, after having done it so many times, this *Interpretation of Dreams* which I told you was the first thing we were going to query this year in connection with desire and its interpretation, and I must say that up to a certain point I found myself making this reproach that it is a book, and this is well known, whose ins-and-outs are very badly known in the analytic community. I would say that this reproach, indeed like any reproach, has a kind of other aspect which is an aspect of excuse, because to tell the truth it is still not enough to have gone over it hundreds and hundreds of times in order to retain it, and I think that there is here a phenomenon - this has struck me more especially these days - that we are very familiar with. In fact everyone knows the way in which everything which concerns the unconscious is forgotten, I mean for example that it is very tangible, in a very significant way, and really inexplicable, without the Freudian perspective, how one forgets funny stories, good jokes, what are called witticisms. You are meeting some friends and someone makes a witty remark, or even tells a funny story, makes a pun at the beginning of the meeting or at the end of lunch, and then when you are having your coffee you say to yourself: what did that person on my right say just now that was so funny? And you cannot get hold of it. It is almost a stamp that what is precisely a witticism escapes to the unconscious.

When one reads or re-reads *The Interpretation of Dreams*, one has the impression I would say of a magical book, if the word magical did not unfortunately lend itself in our vocabulary to so much ambiguity, or even error. One really goes through *The Interpretation of Dreams* like a book of the unconscious, and that is why one has so much trouble, in holding together something which is so articulated. I think that there is here a phenomenon which deserves to be pointed out at this point, and especially the fact is that there is added to this the really almost senseless deformation of the French translation, and the more I go on the more I find that all the same one cannot really excuse its blatant inexactitudes. Some of you are asking me for explanations, and I refer immediately to the texts. There is in the fourth part of the chapter on dream-work, a section entitled 'Considerations of Representability' whose French translation from the first page is more than a tissue of inexactitudes, and has no relationship with the German text. That is confusing and upsetting. I will not go on about it.

Obviously all of this does not make the access of French readers to *The Interpretation of Dreams* especially easy.

To return to our dream of the last day which we began to decipher in a fashion

which did not perhaps appear very easy to you, but was all the same intelligible, at least I hope so. To see clearly what is in question, to articulate it in function of our graph, we are going to begin with a few remarks.

It is a question therefore of knowing if a dream interests us in the sense that it interested Freud, in the sense of the fulfillment of desire. Here desire and its interpretation is first of all desire in its function in the dream, in so far as the dream is its fulfillment. How are we going to be able to articulate it?

I am going first of all to put forward another dream, a first dream which I gave you and whose exemplary value you will see. It is really not well known, you have to go looking for it in a corner. There is there a dream whose existence is known to everybody. It is at the beginning of Chapter III which is entitled 'A Dream is the Fulfillment of a Wish,' and it deals with the dreams of children in so far as they are put forward as what I would call a first state of desire in the dream.

The dream that is in question is here, from the first edition of the *Traumdeutung*, and it is given to us at the beginning of his appellation before his then readers, Freud tells us, as the question of the dream. One must also see this aspect of exposition, of development in the *Traumdeutung*, which explains a lot of things for us, in particular that things may be put forward first of all in a sort of massive way, which involves a certain approximation. When one does not examine this passage very attentively, one remains at what he says about the direct, undeformed, non-*Enstellung*'d character of the dream; this simply designating the general form which ensures that the dream appears in an aspect which is profoundly modified with respect to its deeper content, its thought content, while in the case of the child it is supposed to be simple: here desire is supposed to go directly in the most direct fashion to what it desires, and Freud gives us several examples of it, and the first one of course naturally is worth retaining because it really gives us its formula.

My youngest daughter [this is Anna Freud] then nineteen months old, had an attack of vomiting one morning and had consequently been kept without food all day. During the night after this day of starvation she was heard calling out excitedly in her sleep. 'Anna F-eud *Erdbeer*' – [which is the childish way of pronouncing strawberries] - '*Hochbeer*' – [which also means strawberries] - '*Eir(s)peis*' – [which corresponds more or less to the word omelette] - and finally '*Papp*' [pudding].

And Freud tells us:

At that time she was in the habit of using her own name to express the idea of taking possession of something. The menu included pretty well everything that must have seemed to her to make up a desirable meal. The fact that strawberries appeared in it in two varieties [*Erdbeer* and *Hochbeer* – I have not succeeded in placing *Hochbeer*, but Freud's commentary indicates two varieties] was a demonstration against the domestic health regulations. It was based upon the circumstance, which she had no doubt observed, that her nurse had attributed her indisposition to a surfeit of strawberries. She was thus retaliating in her dream against this unwelcome verdict. (SE 4 130; GW 2/3 135).

I leave to one side the dream of his nephew, Hermann, which poses different problems. But on the contrary I am happy to draw attention to a little note which is not in the first edition because it was elaborated in the course of discussions, namely feedback from his pupils, to which Ferenczi contributed by bringing to the rescue the proverb which

says the following. 'Pigs dream of acorns and geese dream of maize', and in the text also Freud had then at that time also drawn attention to a proverb which, I believe, is not so much taken from the German context given the way maize is written: 'What do geese dream of? - Of maize.'; and finally the Jewish proverb: 'What do hens dream of? - Of millet'.

We are going to dwell on this, we are even going to begin by making a little parenthesis, because when all is said and done it is at this level that there must be taken the problem which I evoked last night in connection with Granoff's communication on the essential problem, namely the difference between the directive of pleasure and the directive of desire.

Let us go back a little on the directive of pleasure, and once and for all, as rapidly as possible let us dot the i's.

Obviously, this has also the closest relationship with the questions which are posed to me or which are posed in connection with the function which I give, in what Freud called the primary processes, to the *Vorstellung*. To state it quickly, this is only a detour, you must have a clear idea of this. the fact is that in a way by entering into this problem of the function of the *Vorstellung*, into the pleasure principle, Freud cuts things short, in short we could say that he is lacking an element to reconstruct what he perceived in his intuition. Indeed it must be said that what is proper to intuitions of genius is to introduce into thought something which up to then had absolutely not been perceived; we do not perceive at all what is original in this distinction of the primary process as being something separate from the secondary process. We can always go on thinking like that that it is something which is in a way comparable through the idea that it is in the internal agency in so far as in their synthesis, in their composition this has absolutely no role to play. The primary process signifies the presence of desire, but not just any desire, of desire where it presents itself as most fragmented, and the perceptual element that is in question, this is how Freud is going to explain things, is going to make us understand what is in question.

In sum remember the first schemas that Freud gives us about what happens when the primary process alone is in operation. The primary process, when it alone is in operation, culminates in hallucination, and this hallucination is something which is produced by a process of regression, of regression which he calls very precisely topical regression. Freud constructed several schemas of what motivates, of what structures the primary process. But they all have the following in common that they presuppose as their foundation, something which is for him the circuit of the reflex arc, a way of receiving and discharging something which is called sensation; a way of receiving and discharging something which is called motor activity.

On this path, in what I would call a terribly questionable way, perception is placed as something which accumulates, which accumulates somewhere on the side of the sensorial part, of the influx of excitation, of the stimulus from the external milieu, and being placed at this origin of what happens in the act, all sorts of other things are supposed to come afterwards, and namely it is there that he would insert the whole series of super-imposed layers which go from the unconscious passing through the preconscious and the rest, to end up here at something which passes or which does not pass towards motor activity. Let us see clearly what is in question every time he speaks to us about what is happening in the primary process. A regressive movement occurs. It is always when the door towards the motor activity of the excitation is for some reason or other barred, that there is produced something which is of the regressive order and that there appears a

Vorstellung, something which is found to give to the excitation in question a properly speaking hallucinatory satisfaction.

Here is the novelty that is introduced by Freud.

This is worthwhile literally above all if one thinks of the order, of the quality of articulation of the schemas that are in question, they are schemas which are put forward because of their functional value, I mean to establish - Freud states it expressly - a sequence, a succession which he underlines is still more important moreover to consider as a temporal sequence than as a spatial sequence. This takes on its value, I would say, through its insertion into a circuit, and if I say that in short what Freud describes to us as being the result of the primary process, is in a way that on this circuit something lights up. I will not make a metaphor of this, I will only say in substance what Freud draws from the explanation on this occasion, from the translation of what is in question, namely to show you on this circuit which always implicitly has homeostasis as its goal, the notion of reflexometry and to distinguish this series of relays and the fact that something is happening at the level of these relays, something which in itself takes on a certain value as a terminal effect in certain conditions, is something which is quite identical to what we see being produced in any machine whatsoever in the form of a series of bulbs, as I might put it, and the fact that one of these becomes active indicates precisely, not so much what appears, namely a luminous phenomenon, but a certain voltage, something which is produced moreover in function of a resistance and indicates at a given point the state of the whole circuit.

And therefore, let us say the word; this in no way corresponds to the principle of need, because of course no need is satisfied by a hallucinatory satisfaction. To be satisfied, need requires the intervention of the secondary process, and even of secondary processes because there is a great variety of them, which processes, can of course only be satisfied, as the name indicates with reality; they are submitted to the reality principle.

If secondary processes are produced, they are only produced because there have been primary processes. Only it is no less evident that this fencing off, that this separation makes instinct impossible no matter how one conceives it. It vanishes into thin air in this instance because look at the direction in which all the researches on instinct are going, and especially the most elaborate the most intelligent modern researches. What are they aimed at? To give an account of how a structure which is not just purely preformed - we are no longer at that point, let us not look at instinct like Monsieur Fabre, it is a structure which engenders, which sustains its own chain - how these structures outline, in the real, paths towards objects which have not yet been experienced.

This is the problem of the instincts, and it is explained to you that there is an appetitive stage of behaviour, of seeking. The animal at one of these phases, puts himself into a certain state where motor activity is expressed by an activity going in all sorts of directions. And at the second stage, at the second phase, there is a stage of a specialised release, but even if this specialised release finally culminates in a behaviour which disappoints them, namely if you wish to the realisation of the fact that they have got hold of some coloured cloths, it nevertheless remains true that they had detected these cloths in the real.

What I want to indicate here, is that hallucinatory behaviour is distinguished in the most radical fashion from a homing behaviour that the regressive investment, as one might say, of something which is going to be expressed by the illumination of a lamp on the

conducting circuits. This can at the limit illuminate an object that has already been experienced; if this object is perchance already there, it in no way shows its path, and still less of course if it shows it even when it is not there, which is what in effect is produced in the hallucinatory phenomenon, because at the very most the seeking-mechanism can begin from this, and this indeed is what happens. Freud also articulates it for us starting from the secondary process, which in sum fulfils the role of instinctive behaviour, but from another point of view is absolutely distinguished from it because due to the existence of the primary process this secondary process is going to be, Freud articulates it - I do not subscribe to all of this, I am repeating to you the sense of what Freud articulates - a behaviour that tests the reality of this *Wahrnehmung* first ordered as the effect of a bulb in the circuit. This is going to be a judgement behaviour; the word is put forward when Freud explains things at this level.

When all is said and done according to Freud, human reality is constructed on a previous foundation of hallucination, which is the universe of pleasure in its illusions, in its essence, and this whole process is openly avowed, I am not even saying betrayed, is openly articulated in the terms that Freud continually makes use of every time he has to explain the series of borrowings into which the term is decomposed, and in the *Traumdeutung* at the level that he is speaking about the processes of the psychic apparatus, he shows this series of layers where there is imprinted, and it is not even imprinted, there is inscribed every time he speaks in this text and in all the others, it is terms like *niederschreiben*, and which recorded on the sequence of layers, are organised there. He articulates them differently according to the different moments of his thought. On the first layer for example it is by relationships of simultaneity; on others, piled up one on the other; on other levels they will be ordered.

These impressions, through other relationships, separate the schema into a series of inscriptions, of *Niederschriften* which are superimposed on one another in a word which cannot be translated by a sort of typographical space, which is how there ought to be conceived all the things which happen originally before arriving at another form of articulation which is that of the preconscious, namely very precisely in the unconscious.

This veritable topology of signifiers, because you cannot escape from it once you follow closely Freud's articulation, is what is in question, and in Letter 52 (6.12.96) to Fliess, one sees that he is necessarily led to presuppose at the origin a type of ideal *Wahrnehmungen* which cannot be taken as simple freshly taken *Wahrnehmung*. If we translate it literally, this topology does not reach a *Begriffen*, it is a term that he continually uses, a grasp of reality, it does not reach it at all by an eliminatory sorting out, by a selective sorting out, of anything that resembles what was put forward in the whole theory of instinct as being the first approximate behaviour which directs the organism along the paths of successful instinctual behaviour.

This is not what we are dealing with, but with a sort of real recurrent critique, with a critique of these signifiers evoked in the primary process, which critique of course, like every critique, does not eliminate the previous thing on which it is brought to bear, but complicates it, complicates it by connoting it with what? With indices of reality which themselves belong to the signifying order. There is absolutely no way of escaping from this accentuation of what I articulate as being what Freud conceives and presents to us as the primary process. You will see, provided you refer to any of the texts that Freud wrote, that at the different stages of his doctrine he articulated, repeated, every time he had to approach this problem, whether he is dealing with the *Traumdeutung* or with what is, in the introduction of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and subsequently with what he took up later

when he brought forward the second mode of presenting his topography, namely starting with the articles grouped around the psychology of the ego and the beyond of the pleasure principle.

You will allow me for a moment to image, by playing with etymologies, what is meant by this fresh way of looking at things which would lead a sort of ideal subject to the real; but the alternatives by which the subject brings the real into his propositions, *Vorstellungen*, here I decompose it by articulating it as follows: these *Vorstellungen* have a signifying organisation. If we wish to talk about them in terms other than the Freudian ones, in Pavlovian terms, we would say that they form part from the beginning, not of a first system of significations, not of something connected to the tendency of need, but of a second system of significations. They are like the lighting up of a bulb in a slot machine when the ball has fallen into the proper hole, and the sign that the ball has fallen into the proper hole Freud also articulates: the proper hole means the same hole into which the ball has previously fallen. The primary process is not directed towards the search for a new object, but for an object which is to be rediscovered, and this by means of a *Vorstellung* which is re-evoked, because it was the *Vorstellung* corresponding to a first pathway so that the illumination of this bulb entitles you to a prize, and there is no doubt about this, and that is what the pleasure principle is. But in order that this prize should be honoured, there must be a certain reserve of money in the machine, and the reserve of money in the machine on this occasion is pledged to this system of processes which are called the secondary processes. In other words, the lighting up of the bulb is only a satisfaction within the total convention of the machine in so far as this machine is that of the gambler, from the moment that he begins to gamble.

Staring with this, let us again take up Anna's dream. This dream of Anna is presented to us as a dream of desire in its naked form. It seems to me that it is quite impossible to evade, to elide in the revelation of this nakedness, the mechanism itself by which this nakedness is revealed, in other words the mode of this revelation cannot be separated from this nakedness itself.

I have the idea that we only know about this so-called naked dream by hearsay, and when I say by hearsay, that does not at all mean what some people quoted me as saying that in sum it was a question here of a remark about the fact that we never know that someone dreams except through what he tells us, and that in sum that everything which refers to the dream should be included in the fact, in the parenthesis of the fact that he reports it.

It is certainly not indifferent that Freud accords so much importance to the *Niederschrift* which constitutes this residue of the dream, but it is quite clear that this *Niederschrift* refers to an experience that the subject is telling us about. It is important to see that Freud is a long long way from retaining even for a single instant the nevertheless obvious objections which arise from the fact that a spoken narrative is one thing, and a lived experience is something else, and it is starting from there that we can connect the remark that the fact that he sets aside with such vigour, and even that he agrees with, that he explicitly makes the starting point of all his analysis even to the point of advising that it should be a technique of the *Niederschrift*, of what is there lying in the writings of the dream, shows us precisely what he thinks fundamentally about this lived experience, namely that there is everything to be said for approaching it in this way because he did not try of course, to articulate it; it is itself already structured in a series of *Niederschriften*, in a kind of palimpsest-writing as one might say.

If one could imagine a palimpsest where the different superimposed texts have a

certain relationship, it would still be a question of knowing which, with one another; but if you search for it, you would see that it is a relationship that is to be sought much more in the form of the letters than in the meaning of the text.

Therefore this is not what I am talking about, I am saying that on this occasion what we know about the dream, is properly speaking what we actually know about it at the moment that it is happening as an articulated dream, in other words that the degree of certainty that we have concerning this dream is something linked to the fact that we would also be much more sure what pigs and geese dream about if they themselves told us about it.

But in this original example we have more, namely that the dream discovered by Freud has this exemplary value that it is articulated aloud during sleep, which is something that allows no kind of ambiguity about the presence of the signifier in its actual text.

In this case it is not possible to throw any doubt on a phenomenon concerning the added-on character of what one might call information on the dream which might be taken by the word. We know that Anna Freud is dreaming because she articulates: '*Anna Freud, Er(d)beer, Hochbeer, Eier(s)peis, Papp*'. The dream images of which we know nothing on this occasion, find here an affix, if I may express myself in this way with the help of a term borrowed from the theory of complex numbers, a symbolic affix in these words where we see the signifier presenting itself in a way in a flocculent state, namely in a series of nominations, and this nomination constitutes a sequence whose choice is not indifferent because, as Freud tells us, the choice is precisely of everything which has been prohibited to her, *inter-dit*; of the things which when she demanded them she was told no, that she could not have them, and this common denominator introduces a unity into their diversity, without preventing us also from noticing that inversely this diversity reinforces this unity, and even designates it. It is in sum the unity that this series completely opposes to the special satisfaction of need, such for example of the desire imputed to the pig and the goose, the desire moreover, you only have to reflect on the effect that this would have if instead, in the proverb, of saying that the pig dreams of *Kukuruz* (of maize) we were to set about enumerating everything that the pig is supposed to dream about, you would see that this has a quite different effect, and even if one wished to claim that it was only an insufficient education of the glottis that prevented the pig and the goose from letting us know as much, and even if one could say that we could manage to make up for it by perceiving in both cases and by finding the equivalent if you wish of this articulation by detecting some quivering of their mandibles, it still remains that it would be very unlikely that the following would happen, namely that these animals would name themselves as Anna Freud does in the series. And even if we admit the pig is called Toto and the goose Bel Azor, even if something of that order occurred, it would turn out that they are naming themselves in a language which would evidently moreover, neither more or less evidently than in the case of man, but in the case of man that is seen less clearly, that this language has precisely nothing to do with the satisfaction of their needs because this is the name they would have in the farmyard, namely in a context of human needs and not their own.

In other words, I would like you to focus on the fact, and we said it above, that:

1. Anna Freud articulates that there is the mechanism of motor activity, and we would say in effect that it is not absent from this dream, because this is the way that we get to know it. But this dream reveals by the signifying structuring of its sequence that;
2. we would like to dwell in this sequence on the fact that at the beginning of this sequence

literally there is a message, which you can see being illustrated if you know how communication takes place inside one of these complicated machines of our modern era, for example between the front and the back of a plane. When one telephones from one cabin to another one begins by announcing what? One announces oneself, one announces who is speaking. Anna Freud at nineteen months, during her dream, announces, she says: 'Anna F-eud', and she goes on with her series. I would almost say that there is only one thing missing, after having heard her articulating her dream, it is that at the end she should say: 'over and out'.

Here we are introduced then to what I call the topology of repression, in its clearest, also its most formal and most articulated way, regarding which Freud underlines for us that this topology can in no way be considered, since it is that of another locus which had so struck him when reading Fechner, to the extent that one senses that this was for him a type of lightning bolt, of illumination, of revelation, but at the same time at the very moment that he talks to us at least twice, in the *Traumdeutung* about the *anderer Schauplatz*, he always underlines that it has nothing to do with another neurological locus. We are saying that this other locus is to be sought in the structure of the signifier itself. Now what I am trying to show you here, is that the structure of the signifier itself once the subject is engaged in it, I mean with the minimal hypotheses that are required by the fact that a subject enters into its game. I mean once the signifier is given and the subject is defined as that which is going to enter into the signifier and nothing else. Things are necessarily organised starting from this necessity, and all sorts of consequences are going to flow from this, that there is a topology which it is necessary and sufficient for us to conceive of as constituted by two superimposed chains, for us to account for it, but it is absolutely required in order that we should account for it, that there are these two superimposed chains, and it is towards this that we are advancing.

Here at the level of Anna Freud's dream, how do things appear? It is true that they appear in a problematic, ambiguous fashion, which permits, which makes it legitimate up to a certain point for Freud to distinguish a difference between children's dreams and adults' dreams.

Where is the chain of nominations which makes up the dream of Anna Freud situated? On the upper chain or on the lower chain? It is a question regarding which you have been able to notice that the upper part of the graph represents this chain in a dotted form, putting the accent on the element of discontinuity of the signifier, while we represent the lower chain of the graph as continuous, and on the other hand I told you that of course in every process the two chains are involved.

What does the lower chain mean at the level that we are posing the question? The lower chain at the level of demand, and in so far as I told you that the subject *qua* speaking took on this solidity borrowed from the synchronic solidarity of the signifier, it is quite obvious that it is something that participates in the unity of the sentence, of this something which has made people talk and which gave rise to so much discussion, about the function of the sentence as holophrase in so far that is as the holophrase exists. There is no doubt about it, the holophrase has a name: it is the interjection.

If you like, to illustrate at the level of the demand what the function of the lower chain represents, it is: 'Food!', or 'Help!'; I am speaking about universal discourse; I am not talking about the child's discourse for the moment. This form of sentence exists; I would even say that in certain cases it takes on a quite pressing and demanding value. This is what is in question, it is the articulation of the sentence, it is the subject in so far as this

need which of course must pass by way of the defiles of the signifier *qua* need, is expressed in a fashion which is deformed, but at least which is monolithic, except that the monolith that is in question, is the subject himself at this level which constitutes him.

What happens on the other line is quite different. What can be said about it is not easy to say, but for a good reason, which is that it is precisely what is at the basis of what happens on the first line, the lower one; but undoubtedly what we see, is that even in something which is given to us as being as primitive as this child's dream, Anna Freud's dream, something marks for us that here the subject is not simply constituted in the sentence and by the sentence, in the sense that when the individual, or the crowd, or the mob cries: 'Food!', one knows very well that in this case the whole weight of the message is on the emitter, I mean that it is the dominant element and one even knows that this cry just by itself is sufficient precisely in the forms that I have just evoked, to constitute this emitter, as being well and truly a unique subject, even if it has a hundred mouths, a thousand mouths. It does not need to introduce itself, the sentence introduces it sufficiently. Now all the same we find ourselves confronted with the following, that the human subject when he operates with language, takes himself into account, and to such a degree is it his primitive position that I do not know if you remember a certain text by Monsieur Binet, namely the difficulties that the subject has in going beyond this stage which I for my part find much more suggestive than any of the stages indicated by Monsieur Piaget, and this stage, I am not going to tell you about it because I do not want to get into details, appears as distinctive and consists in the fact that the subject perceives that there is something wrong with the sentence: 'I have three brothers, Paul, Ernest and me'. Up to a fairly advanced stage this seems to him quite natural, and for a very good reason, because to tell the truth everything about the implication of the human subject in the act of speech is there: the fact is that he takes himself into account in it, that he names himself in it, and that consequently this is what I might call the most natural the most coordinated expression. The child simply has not found the proper formula which would obviously be the following: 'We are three brothers, Paul, Ernest and me', except that we would be very far from reproaching him for giving it the ambiguities of the function of being and having. It is clear that a step must be taken in order that in sum what is in question, namely the distinction between the *I qua* subject of the enunciation and the *I qua* subject of the enunciating, can be made, because this is what is in question.

What is articulated at the level of the first line when we take the following step is the process of enunciation: in our dream of the other day: 'he had died'. But when you announce something like that, in which I would point out to you in passing, the whole novelty of the dimension that the word introduces into the world, is already implied, because to be able to say: 'He had died', this cannot be said otherwise than in a completely different perspective to that of the statement (*du dire*). 'He had died', means absolutely nothing (*ne veut absolument rien dire*); 'He had died', means: he no longer exists, therefore there is no need to say it, he is no longer there in order to say he is dead, he must already be a being supported by the word. But no one is being asked to perceive this, of course, but simply on the contrary the following, that the act of enunciating: 'He had died', usually requires in the discourse itself all sorts of reference points which are distinct from the reference points that are taken from the enunciation of the process.

If what I am saying there were not obvious, the whole of grammar would vanish. I am simply in the process of pointing out to you for the moment the necessity of using the future perfect, in so far as there are two reference points to time: a reference point to time concerning the act that is going to be in question: 'by that date I will have become her husband' for example, and it is a question of locating what is going to be transformed by

marriage into the enunciation; but on the other hand, because you express it in terms of the future perfect, it is the present point from which you speak from the act of enunciating which locates you. There are therefore two subjects, two Is, and the stage that the child must go beyond at the level of this test of Binets, namely the distinction between these two Is, seems to me to be something which has literally nothing to do with this famous reduction to reciprocity which Piaget considers to be the essential pivot as regards grasping how to use personal pronouns.

But let us leave this then to one side for the moment. What have we arrived at? To a grasp of these two lines as representing one which is referred to the process of enunciating, the other the process of the enunciation.

The fact that they are two, does not mean that each represents one function, but that every time we are dealing with the functions of language we should always discover this duplicity. Let us say again that not only are they two, but that they will always have opposing discontinuous structures, here for example for one when the other is continuous, and inversely.

Where is Anna Freud's articulation situated?

I am not going to tell you how this topology can be used, I mean I am not going to say just like that all at once because it might suit me, or even because I may be able to see a little bit further, given the fact that I was the one who constructed this contraption, and because I know where I am going, so that I should tell you: it is here or it is there. The fact is that the question arises: the question arises of what this articulation represents on this occasion which is the aspect under which the reality of Anna Freud's dream is presented to us, and that in the case of this child who was quite capable of perceiving the meaning of the sentence of her nurse - true or false - Freud implies it, and Freud supposes it, and quite correctly because of course, a child of nineteen months understands very well that her nurse has messed her about - there is articulated in what I called this flocculated form, this series of signifiers in a certain order, this something which takes its form from being stacked up, by being superimposed as I might say, in a column, from the fact of substituting for one another these things in so far as each one is a metaphor for the other, which it is then a question of making emerge, namely the reality of satisfaction *qua* prohibited (*inter-dite*) and we shall go no further with Anna Freud's dream.

We will nevertheless take the next step. So that once we have sufficiently begun to clarify this matter by asking ourselves now, because it is a question of the topology of repression, the way in which what we are beginning to articulate is going to help us when it is a question of an adult dream, namely how, what is the real difference between what we can clearly see to be a certain form which the child's desire takes on on this occasion in the dream, and a form which is undoubtedly much more complicated because it is going to give much more trouble, in any case as regards interpretation, namely what happens in an adult's dream.

In this matter there is no ambiguity in Freud. He has no difficulty with it, it is enough to read the usage and the function of what intervenes, it is in the order of censorship. Censorship operates very exactly in a way that I was able to illustrate during my previous seminar I do not know if you remember the famous story which we enjoyed so much, the one about: 'The King of England is an idiot, therefore everything is permitted,' says the typist who is caught up in the Irish revolution. But this was not what was in question. I gave you another application of it, namely what Freud says to explain

punishment dreams. We had very specially put forward the law: whoever says that the King of England is an idiot will have his head cut off, and as I told you: the following night I dreamt that I had my head cut off.

Freud also articulates even more simple forms. Because I have been persuaded to read Tintin for some time past, I will borrow an example from him. I have a way of breaking through the censorship by using my Tintinesque qualities, I can say aloud: anyone who says in my presence that General Tapiocca is not a better man than General Alcazar, will have to deal with me. Now, it is quite clear that if I articulate something like this, neither partisans of General Tapiocca, nor those of General Alcazar would be satisfied, and I would say that what is much more surprising, is that the least satisfied will be those who are the partisans of both.

Here then is what Freud explains to us in the most precise fashion: it is in the nature of what is said to confront us with a very very particular difficulty which at the same time also opens up very special possibilities. What is in question is simply the following: What the child had to deal with, was the prohibition (*inter-dit*), a saying, no. The whole process of education, some principles of censorship, go therefore to form this saying no, because it is a question of operations with the signifier in an inexpressible way (*en indicible*), and this also supposes that the subject perceives that the saying no, if it is said, is said, and even if it is not executed, remains said. Whence the fact that not saying it is distinct from obeying not to do it, in other words that the truth of desire is all by itself an offence against the authority of law.

So that the way out proposed to this new drama is to censure this truth of desire. But this censorship is not something which, however it is exercised, can be sustained with the stroke of a pen, because here it is the process of enunciating which is aimed at, and because to prevent it some foreknowledge of the process of the enunciation is necessary, and that every discourse destined to banish this enunciation from the process of enunciating is going to find itself offending more or less openly with its end. It is the matrix of this possibility which at this level, is given on our graph, and it will give you a lot of other matrices. The subject, because of the fact that he articulates his demand, is captured in a discourse in which he cannot but be himself constructed *qua* agent of enunciating, which is why he cannot renounce it without this enunciation, because that is to efface himself completely as a subject knowing what is in question.

The relationship to one another of these two lines of the process of enunciating and the process of the enunciation is quite simple, it is the whole of grammar, a rational grammar which is articulated in these terms; if you find it interesting I will tell you where and how, in what terms and in what context this has been articulated, but for the moment what we have to deal with is the following: it is the fact that we see when repression is introduced, it is essentially linked to the absolute necessity of the subject being effaced and disappearing at the level of the process of enunciating.

How, by what empirical paths does the subject accede to this possibility? It is quite impossible, even to articulate it if we do not see what the nature of the process of enunciating is. As I told you: every word begins from these points of intersection which we have designated by the point O, namely that every word in so far as the subject is implicated in it, is the discourse of the Other. That is the precise reason why at first the child is quite convinced that all his thoughts are known, it is because the definition of thought is not as the psychologists say, something like the beginning of an act. Thought is above all something which participates in this dimension of the unsaid which I have just

introduced by the distinction between the process of enunciating and the process of enunciation, but for this unsaid to subsist, naturally in so far as in order that it should be an unsaid it must be said, it must be said at the level of the process of enunciating, namely *qua* discourse of the Other, and that is why the child does not doubt for an instant that what represents for him this locus where this discourse is carried on, namely his parents, know all his thoughts. In any case this is his first movement, it is a movement which will subsist as long as he is not introduced to something new which we have again articulated here concerning this relationship of the upper line with the lower line, namely what keeps them outside grammar at a certain distance.

I do not need to tell you how grammar keeps a distance between sentences like 'I do not know whether he is dead', 'He is not dead, as far as I know', 'I did not know that he was dead', 'I was afraid that he was dead'. All these subtle taxemes which go from the subjunctive here to a *ne* that Monsieur Lebidoy calls in a fashion that is really incredible for a philologist who writes in *Le Monde*, the expletive *ne*. All of this is done to show us that a whole part of grammar, the essential part, the taxemes, are there to maintain the necessary gap between these two lines.

The next time I will project for you onto these two lines the articulations in question, but for the subject who has not yet learned these subtle forms, and it is quite clear that the distinction between the two lines is made well before. There are required conditions, and these form the basis of the interrogation that I am bringing before you today. This distinction is very essentially linked, like every time of course that you see that it is a question of something which is not a temporal reference point, but a tensional point, namely of a difference in tenses between these two lines, you can clearly see the relationship that there can be between this and the situation, and the topology of desire.

This is where we are. For a time the child is in sum entirely caught up in the interplay between these two lines. What is necessary here in order that repression may be produced? I would say that I am hesitating before committing myself to a path which after all I would like not to appear for what it nevertheless is, a path of concession, namely that I appeal to notions of development properly speaking, I mean that everything is implicated in the empirical process at the level at which this is produced, of an intervention, of an empirical and certainly necessary incidence, but the necessity to which this empirical incidence, this empirical accident, the necessity in which it comes to reverberate, which it precipitates in its form, is of a different nature.

In any case, the child perceives at a given moment that these adults who are supposed to know all his thoughts, and here precisely he is not going to go beyond this stage, in a certain fashion he will be able to reproduce later on the possibility which is the fundamental possibility of what we call in brief and rapidly the so-called elementary form of hallucination, that there appears this primitive structure of what we call this background of the process of enunciating, parallel to the current enunciation of the existence of what is called the echo of acts, the echo of expressed thoughts.

That the knowledge of a *Verwerfung*, namely of what, of what I am going to talk to you about now, has not been realised and which is what? Which is the following: it is that the child at a moment perceives that this adult who knows all his thoughts, does not know them at all. The adult does not know, whether it is a question in the dream of he knows or he does not know that he is dead. We will see the next time the exemplary signification on this occasion of this relationship, but for the moment we do not need to link up these two terms for the reason that we are not yet advanced enough in the articulation of what is going

to be affected in repression, but the fundamental possibility of what cannot but be the end of this repression if it is successful, namely not just simply that it gives to the unsaid the sign 'no', which says that it is not said, while at the same time letting it be said, but effectively the unsaid is such a thing, there is no doubt this negation is such a primitive form that there is absolutely no shadow of doubt that Freud puts the *Verneinung* which seems nevertheless to be one of the most elaborated forms of repression for the subject, because we see it in subjects who are highly developed psychologically, that all the same Freud puts it immediately after the primitive *Bejahung*, therefore it is indeed as I am in process of telling you, through a possibility, through a genesis, and even through a logical deduction that he proceeds, as I am proceeding for the moment before you, and not a genetic one. This primitive *Verneinung* is what I am telling you about in connection with the unsaid, but the 'He does not know' is the following stage, and it is precisely through the intermediary of this 'He does not know' that the other who is the locus of my word, is the lodging place of my thoughts, and that there can be introduced the *Unbewusste* into which there is going to enter for the subject the contents of repression.

Do not make me go further or faster than I am going. If I tell you that it is following the example of this other that the subject proceeds in order that the process of repression should be inaugurated in him, I did not tell you that it was an easy example to follow. Initially already I indicated to you that there is more than one mode because in this connection I mentioned the *Verwerfung* and that I made reappear there - I will articulate it again the next time - the *Verneinung*.

The *Verdrängung*, repression, cannot be something which is so easy to apply, because if fundamentally what is in question is that the subject should be effaced, it is quite clear that what is quite easy to show in this order, namely that the others, the adults, know nothing, naturally the subject who is entering into existence does not know that they know nothing, the adults, as everyone knows, it is because they have gone through all sorts of adventures, precisely the adventures of repression. The subject knows nothing about it, and it must be said that it is not easy to imitate them because for a subject to do away with himself as a subject, is a conjuring trick which is a little bit harder than many of the others that I present before you here, but let us say that essentially and in a fashion which is absolutely sure, if we have to rearticulate the three modes in which the subject wants to do it in *Verwerfung*, *Verneinung* and *Verdrängung*, the *Verdrängung* is going to consist in the following that to affect in a way which is at least possible, if not durable, the part of this unsaid which must be made disappear, the subject is going to operate in the way which I have called for you the way of the signifier. It is on the signifier, and on the signifier as such that he is going to operate, and this is why the dream that I put forward the last time, around which we continue to turn here even though I did not completely re-voke it in the seminar today, the dream of the dead father, and that is why Freud articulates in this connection that repression bears essentially on the manipulation, the elision of two *clausulae*, namely '*nach seinem Wunsch*', and 'he did not know that it was as he had wished', that it happened this way 'in consequence of his wish'.

Repression is represented in its origin, at its root as something which in Freud is articulated by: it cannot be articulated otherwise than as something which bears on the signifier.

I did not take you very far today, but it is a further step, because it is the step which is going to allow us to see what sort of signifier this operation of repression is brought to bear on. All signifiers are not equally breakable, repressible, fragile; that it was already on what I called two *clausulae* that it came to bear, already has an essential importance, all the

more essential in that it is going to allow us to delineate what is properly speaking in question when one talks first of all about dream-desire, and then about desire in itself.

Seminar 5: 10 December 1958

Anderer Schauplatz: GW 2/3 50-51; (SE 4 48);
GW 2/3 541 (SE 5 535)

I left you the last day on something which tends to approach to our problem, the problem of desire and its interpretation, a certain organisation of the signifying structure, of what is stated in the signifier as involving this internal duplicity of the enunciation; the process of the enunciation and the process of the act of enunciating.

I stressed for you the difference that exists between the I *qua* implicated in some enunciation or other, the I in so far as in the same way as some other, it is the subject of an enunciated process for example, which is not moreover the only word of enunciation either of the I in so far as it is implicated in all enunciating, but all the more in so far as it announces itself as the enunciating I.

This mode under which it introduces itself as the I of the enunciating, this mode under which it introduces itself is not indifferent, if it introduces itself by naming itself as little Anna Freud did at the beginning of the message of her dream.

I pointed out to you that there remains here something ambiguous, namely whether this I as the I that is enunciating is authenticated or not at this moment. I gave you to understand that it is not yet and this is what constitutes the difference that Freud proposes to us as being the one which distinguishes the dream-desire in the child from the dream-desire in the adult, the fact is that something is not yet completed, precipitated out by the structure, is not yet distinguished in the structure, namely this something whose reflection and trace I proposed to you elsewhere; a delayed trace because it appears at the level of a test which of course already presupposes conditions very defined by experience, which does not allow us to prejudge fundamentally how much of it is in the subject, but the difficulty which still remains for a long time for the subject of distinguishing this enunciating I from the I of the enunciation, and which is expressed by the belated failure in a test which chance and his flair as a psychologist made Binet choose in the form of: 'I have three brothers, Paul, Ernest and me.'

The difficulty that there is in the fact that the child does not see this enunciation as coming from elsewhere as he should, namely that the subject does not yet know how to deduct himself (*se décomposer*). But this trace which I marked out for you is something, an index, and there are others, this essential element which constitutes the distinction, the difference for the subject between the I of the enunciating and the I of the enunciation. Now I told you, that we take things, not by way of deduction, but by a way which I cannot say to be empirical because it was already traced out, it was already constructed by Freud when he told us that the dream-desire in the adult is a desire which is loaned to him, and which is the mark of a repression, of a repression which at this level he brings forward as being a censorship.

When he enters into the mechanism of this censorship, when he shows us what a censorship is, namely the impossibilities of a censorship, because this is what he stresses, this is what I tried to get you to focus your reflection on for an instant by telling you of a type of internal contradiction which is that of everything that is unsaid at the level of the

enunciating, I mean this internal contradiction which structures the ‘I am not saying that ...’.

I told you about it the last day in different humorous forms: anyone who says such and such a thing about such and such a person whose words must be respected, who must not be offended, will, I said, have to deal with me. What does this mean, if not that in putting forward this taking of sides which is obviously ironic, I am pronouncing, I find myself pronouncing precisely what should not be said, and Freud himself underlined sufficiently when he shows us the mechanism, the articulation, the meaning of the dream, how frequently the dream takes this path, namely that what it articulates as not to be said is precisely what it has to say, and that through which there passes what is effectively said in the dream.

This takes us to something which is linked to the deepest structure of the signifier. I would like again to dwell on it for a moment, because this element, this principle of ‘I am not saying’ as such, it is not for nothing that Freud in his article on the *Verneinung* places it at the very root of the most primitive phase in which the subject constitutes himself as such and constitutes himself especially as unconscious. The relationship of this *Verneinung* with the most primitive *Bejahung*, with the access of a signifier into the question, because this is what a *Bejahung* is, is something which begins to pose a question. It is always a question of knowing what is posited at the most primitive level: is it for example the couple good and bad according to whether we choose or we do not choose one or other of these primitive terms? Already we are opting for a whole theorisation, for a whole orientation of our analytic thinking, and you know the role that has been played by the terms of good and bad in a certain specification of the analytic path; they are certainly a very primitive couple.

I will pause for a moment on this unsaid and on the function of the not (*ne*) of the not in the ‘I am not saying’, before taking a further step because I think that this is the essential articulation. This sort of ‘not’ in the ‘I am not saying’ which ensures that precisely in saying that one is not saying it one says it, something which almost appears as a sort of proof by absurdity, is something at which we must pause by recalling what I have already indicated to you as being what one must call the most radical property of the signifier, and if you remember, I already directed your attention to an image, to an example by showing both the relationship that there is between the signifier and a certain type of index or of sign which I called the trace which already itself bears the mark of some kind of reverse side of a borrowing from the real.

I spoke to you about Robinson Crusoe and about the footprint, the trace of Friday’s footprint, and we dwelt a little while on the following: is this already the signifier, and I told you that the signifier begins, not with the trace, but with whatever effaces the trace, and it is not the effaced trace which constitutes the signifier, it is something which poses itself as being able to be effaced, which inaugurates the signifier. In other words, Robinson Crusoe effaces the trace of Friday’s footprint, but what does he put in its place? If he wants to preserve the place of Friday’s footprint, he needs at least a cross, namely a bar and another bar across it. This is the specific signifier. The specific signifier is something which presents itself as being itself able to be effaced and which subsists precisely in this operation of effacing as such. I mean that the effaced signifier already presents itself as such with the properties proper to the unsaid. In so far as I cancel the signifier with the bar, I perpetuate it as such indefinitely; I inaugurate the dimension of the signifier as such. Making a cross is properly speaking something that does not exist in any form of locating that is permitted in any way. You must not think that non-speaking beings, the animals, do not locate things, but they do not do it intentionally with something said, but with traces of

traces. We will come back when we have time to the practice of the hippopotamus, we will see what he leaves behind him for his fellows. What man leaves behind him is a signifier, it is a cross, it is a bar, *qua* barred, *qua* overlaid by another bar which indicates on the one hand that as such it has been effaced.

This function of the not, of the not in so far as it is the signifier which cancels itself, is undoubtedly something which just of itself would deserve a long development. It is very striking to see the extent to which the logicians, because they are as always too psychological, in their classification, in their articulation of negation, have left strangely to one side the most original one.

You know, or you do not know, and after all I have no intention of introducing you into the different modes of negation, I simply want to tell you that more originally than anything which can be articulated in the order of the concept, in the order of what distinguishes the meaning of negation, of privation, etc., more originally it is in the phenomenon of the spoken, in experience, in linguistic empiricism that we should find originally what is most important for us, and it is for that reason that I will dwell only on this, and here I cannot at least for a moment not take into consideration some researches which have the value of being experiential, and in particular the one made by Edouard Pichon who was as you know, one of our predecessors in psychoanalysis, who died at the beginning of the war from a serious heart illness, Edouard Pichon in connection with negation made the following distinction which you should at least have seen, have some notion about, have some idea about. He noticed something, he would have liked as a logician, obviously he wanted to be a psychologist, he tells us that what he is doing is a sort of exploration from words to thought.

Like a lot of people, he is open to illusions about himself, because luckily this is precisely the weakest part of his work: his pretension of going back from words to thought. But on the contrary he happened to be a wonderful observer; I mean that he had a sense of the stuff of language which means that he taught us far more about words than about thought. And as regards words, and as regard this usage of negation, it is especially in French that he dwelt on this usage of negation, and there he could not avoid making this discovery which is made by this distinction, which is articulated in this distinction that he makes between the forclusive and the discordant.

I am going to give you examples right away of the distinction that he makes between them. Let us take a sentence like: 'There is nobody here' (*il n'y a personne ici*). This is foreclosure, that anybody should be there is excluded for the moment. Pichon dwells on the remarkable fact that every time we have to deal with a pure and simple foreclosure in French, we must always use two terms: A *ne* and then something which here is represented by the *personne*, and which could be by the *pas*: *Je n'ai pas où loger* (I have nowhere to stay), *Je n'ai rien à vous dire* (I have nothing to say to you) for example.

On the other hand I notice that a great number of the usages of *ne* and precisely the most indicative here as always, those which pose the most paradoxical problems, always manifest themselves, namely that first of all a pure and simple *ne* is never, or almost never, used to indicate pure and simple negation, what for example in German or in English would be embodied in the '*nicht*' or the 'not'. The *ne* by itself, left to itself, expresses what he calls a discordance, and this discordance is very precisely something which is situated between the process of enunciating and the process of the enunciation.

To be clear and to illustrate right away what is in question, I am going precisely to

give you the example which Pichon in fact focused most on, because it is specially illustrative, it is the use of those *ne*'s that people who understand nothing, namely people who want to understand, call the expletive *ne*. I am saying this to you because I already began it the last time, I alluded to it in connection with an article on the so-called expletive *ne* which appeared in *Le Monde* and which appeared to me to be quite scandalous. This expletive *ne* which is not an expletive *ne*, which is a *ne* that is quite essential to the usage of the French tongue, is the one which is found in the sentence: *Je crains qu'il ne vienne* (I am afraid that he will come). Everyone knows that the *Je crains qu'il ne vienne* means: I am afraid that he will come and not I am afraid that he will not come, but in French one says: *Je crains qu'il ne vienne*.

In other words, French at this point of its linguistic usage lays hold, as I might say of the *ne* somewhere at the level as one might say of its straying, of its descent from the process of enunciating where the *ne* refers to the articulation of the enunciating, refers to what is called the pure and simple signifier in act. 'I am not saying that...' (*je ne dis pas que...*), 'I am not saying that I am your wife' for example, of the *ne* of the enunciation where it is, 'I am not your wife'. No doubt we are not here to work out the genesis of language, but something is implied even in our experience.

This is what I want to show you which in any case indicates for us the articulation that Freud gives of the fact of negation, implies that negation descends from the enunciating to the enunciation, and how could we be surprised at this because after all every negation in the enunciation involves a certain paradox, because it asserts something in order to assert it at the same time, let us say in a certain number of cases as not existing somewhere between the two, somewhere between the enunciating and the enunciation, and on this plane where the discordances are established, where something in my fear anticipates the fact that he may come, and hoping that he will not come, what can it do other than articulate this 'I am afraid that he will come' as a '*je crains qu'il ne vienne*', hooking on in passing as I might say, this *ne* of discordance which is distinguished as such in negation from the forclusive *ne*.

You will say to me: this is a phenomenon that is peculiar to the French tongue, you evoked it yourself just above in talking about the German '*nicht*' and the English 'not'. Of course, only the important thing is not that, the important thing is that in the English tongue for example where we articulate analogous things, namely that we perceive, and I am not able to demonstrate this to you because I am not here to give you a course on linguistics, that it is something analogous which is manifested in the fact that in English for example negation cannot be applied in a pure and simple fashion to the verb in so far as it is the verb of the enunciation, the verb designating the process in the enunciation; one does not say: 'I eat not...', but 'I don't eat...'

In other words, it appears that we have traces in the articulation in the English linguistic system of the following: it is that for anything that is of the order of negation, the enunciation is led to borrow a form which is modelled on the use of an auxiliary, the auxiliary being typically what introduces the dimension of the subject into the enunciation. 'I don't eat', 'I won't eat', or 'I won't go' which is properly speaking *je n'irai pas*, which does not simply imply the fact, but my resolution as a subject not to go, the fact that for every negation in so far as it is a pure and simple negation, something like an auxiliary dimension appears, and here in the English tongue models it on this something that essentially links negation to a sort of original position of the enunciating as such.

The second moment or phase of what I tried to articulate for you the last time, is

constituted by the following: that to show you by what path, by what way the subject is introduced to this dialectic of the other, in so far as it is imposed on him by the very structure of this difference between the enunciating and the enunciation, I brought you along a path which as I told you I made deliberately empirical. It is not the only one; I mean that I introduce into it the real history of the subject. I told you that the following step of the way in which at the origin the subject is constituted in the process of the distinction between this I of the enunciating and the I of the enunciation, is the dimension of knowing nothing about it (*n'en rien savoir*), in so far as he experiences, that he experiences in the fact that it is against the background of the fact that the other knows all his thoughts, because at the origin his thoughts are by nature and structurally this discourse of the other, that it is in the discovery that it is a fact that the other knows nothing about his thoughts, that there is inaugurated for him this way which is the one that we seek, the way by which the subject is going to develop this contradictory exigency of the unsaid and find the difficult path by which he has to bring about this unsaid in his being and become this sort of being with whom we have to deal, namely a subject which has the dimension of the unconscious, because this is the essential step that psychoanalysis makes for us in man's experience; it is the following: it is that after long centuries in which I would say in a way philosophy persisted more and more in taking always further this discourse in which the subject is only the correlate of the object in the relationship of knowledge, namely that the subject is that which is supposed by the knowledge of objects, this sort of strange subject about which I said somewhere or other that it might do as a Sunday philosophy because the rest of the week, namely during work of course everyone can completely neglect it, this subject which is only the shadow in a way and the understudy of objects, this something which is forgotten in this subject, namely that the subject is the subject who speaks. It is only from a certain moment that we can no longer forget it, namely the moment when his domain as a subject who speaks stands on its own, whether he is there or whether he is not there.

What completely changes the nature of his relationships to the object, is this crucial point of the nature of his relationships to the object which is precisely called desire. It is in this field that we are trying to articulate the relationships of the subject to the object in the sense that they are relationships of desire, because it is in this field that analytic experience teaches us that there is something to be articulated. The relationship of the subject to the object is not a relationship of need, the relationship of the subject to the object is a complex relationship which I am precisely trying to articulate before you. For the moment let us begin to indicate the following: it is because this relationship of the articulation of the subject to the object is situated there, that the object is found to be this something which is not the correlate and the correspondent of a need of the subject, but this something which supports the subject precisely at the moment at which he has to confront as one might say his own existence, which supports the subject in his existence, in his existence in the most radical sense, namely precisely in this that he exists in language, namely that he consists in something that is outside himself, in something that he can only grasp in its proper nature as language at the precise moment when he, as subject, must efface himself, vanish, disappear behind a signifier, which is precisely what one might call the panic point around which he must attach himself to something, it is precisely to the object *qua* object of desire that he attaches himself.

Somewhere, someone whom I will not immediately name today, in order not to confuse matters, someone quite contemporary, who is dead, has written: 'If one managed to learn what the Miser came to know, what the Miser lost when his money-box was stolen from him, one would learn a great deal.'

It is exactly what we have to learn, I mean learn it for ourselves and teach it to others.

Analysis is the first place, the first dimension in which one can respond to this statement, and of course because the miser is ridiculous, namely much too close to the unconscious for you to be able to support it, I will have to find another more noble example to help you to grasp what I mean.

I could begin to articulate it for you in the same terms as above as regards what concerns existence, and in two minutes you would take me for an existentialist, which is not what I desire. I am going to take an example in *La Règle du Jeu*, a film by Jean Renoir. Somewhere the character who is played by Dalio, who is the old character as he is seen in real life in a certain social milieu, and you must not think that it is even limited to this social milieu; he is a collector of objects, and more especially of music boxes. Remind yourselves, if you still remember this film, of the moment when Dalio, in front of a large audience, makes his latest discovery, a particularly beautiful music box. At that moment the character is literally in this position which we could call and which we should call exactly that of shame: he blushes, he effaces himself, he disappears, he is very embarrassed. He has shown what he has shown, but how could those present understand that we find ourselves here at this level, at this point of oscillation that we grasp, which shows itself in its extreme form in this passion of the collector for the object. It is one of the forms of the object of desire. What the subject shows is nothing other than the most important, most intimate point of himself. What is supported by this object, is precisely what he cannot unveil, even to himself, it is this something which is at the very edge of the greatest secret.

That is it; it is along this path that we should seek to know what his money box is for the miser. We must certainly take a step further to get quite to the level of the miser and that is the reason why the miser can only be treated by comedy.

But what is therefore in question, that by which we are introduced is the following: it is that what the subject finds himself committed to from a particular moment, is the following, it is to articulate his wish *qua* secret. How is the wish, how is what is in the wish expressed? In these forms of the tongue to which I alluded the last time, for which according to the tongue, different modes, different registers, different chords, have been invented. In this matter you must not always trust what the grammarians say. The subjunctive is not as subjunctive as it looks, and the type of wish - I am searching in my memory something which will be able in some way to give you an image of it, and I do not know why there has come back from the depths of my memory this little poem which I had some trouble in recomposing, indeed in re-situating:

Etre une belle fille
Blonde et populaire.
Qui mette de la joie dans l'air
Lorsqu'elle sourit,
Donne de l'appétit
Aux ouvriers de Saint-Denis.

This was written by someone who is a contemporary of ours, a discreet female poet, one of whose characteristics is that she is small and dark, and who no doubt expresses in her nostalgia to sharpen the appetite of the workers of Saint-Denis, something which can be strongly enough attached to one or other moment of her ideological reveries. But one cannot say either that this is her ordinary occupation.

What I would like you to dwell on for a moment in terms of this phenomenon which is a poetic phenomenon, is first of all the fact that we find in it something fairly important as regards the temporal structure. This perhaps is the pure form, I am not saying of the wish (*voeu*), but of what is wished (*souhaite*), namely of that which in the wish is stated as wished. Let us say that the primitive subject is elided, but this means nothing, she is not elided because what is articulated here, is the wished for, it is something which is presented in the infinitive as you see, and which if you tried to introduce yourselves into the interior of the structure, you will see that this is situated in a position, a position of being in front of the subject and determining her retroactively. It is not a question here either of a pure and simple aspiration, or of a regret; it is a question of something which poses itself in front of the subject as determining it retroactively in a certain type of being.

This is situated completely up in the air. It nevertheless remains that this is how what is wished for is articulated, giving us already something that it would be well to retain when we try to give a meaning to the sentence with which *The Interpretation of Dreams* concludes, namely that the indestructible desire models the present on the image of the past. This thing whose drone we hear as something which we attribute right away to the effects of repetition or of deferred action, is perhaps not certain if we look very closely at it, namely that if the indestructible desire is now modelled on the image of the past, it is perhaps like the donkey's carrot, it is always ahead of the subject, always producing retroactively the same effects.

This introduces us at the same time to the ambiguity of this enunciation through its structural characteristics, because after all what one might call the gratuitous character of enunciating this has some consequences which nothing prevents us from getting involved in, I mean that nothing prevents us from getting involved in the following remark, that this poetically expressed wish, entitled as it happens, since I referred to the text, *Voeu secret*, this then is what I discovered in my memory after some twenty-five or thirty years, in looking for something which would take us to the secret of the wish, this secret wish of course which is communicated, because this is the whole problem: how to communicate to others something which is constituted as secret? In reply: through some lie, because when all is said and done for those of us who are a little bit more clever than the others, this can be translated: 'As true as I am a beautiful blond popular girl, I want to make everybody happy and sharpen the appetite of the workers of Saint-Denis', and it is not said that every being, even one who is generous or poetic or even a female poet, is all that eager to make everybody happy. After all, why? Why, if not in phantasy, if not in phantasy and to demonstrate the extent to which the object of phantasy is metonymical, namely that it is happiness which is going to circulate like that? As regards the workers of Saint-Denis, they can put up with it. Let them divide things up among themselves, in any case there are already too many of them for one to know to whom one should address oneself.


With this digression I introduce you to the structure of the wish by way of poetry; we can now enter into it by way of serious things, namely by the effective role that desire plays, and this desire which we have seen, as might have been expected, that it should in fact have to find its place somewhere between this point from which we started by saying that the subject alienates himself essentially in the alienation of the appeal, of the appeal of need, in that he has to enter into the defiles of the signifier, and this beyond in which there is going to be introduced as essential the dimension of the unsaid, it must be articulated somewhere. We see it in the dream that I chose, this dream which is undoubtedly one of the most problematic of dreams in so far as it is a dream of the apparition of a dead person, this dream of the apparition of a dead person which Freud on page 433 of the *Traumdeutung* in

the German edition, page 381 and on page 382 of the *La Science des rêves* concerning the apparition of the dead, is very far from having yet given us their whole secret (SE V 430-1). Even though already he articulates a lot of things in it, that this is essential, and it is in this connection that Freud marked with the greatest accent right through this analysis of dreams in the *Traumdeutung*, the depths there are in what was the first approach to the psychology of the unconscious, namely the ambivalence of feelings with respect to those who are loved and respected. It is something moreover by which the dream which I chose to begin to try to articulate before you the function of desire in the dream, is again approached.

You can see that recently I have been re-reading the *Traumdeutung* in its first edition with certain goals in view, and that at the same time the last time I made an allusion to the fact that in the *Traumdeutung* one always forgets what is in it. I had forgotten that in 1930 this dream was added to it. It was first of all added on in a note a short time after its publication in the *Formulierungen*, and then in the 1930 edition it was added to the text. Therefore it is in the text of the *Traumdeutung*.

I repeat then, that this dream is made up as follows: the subject sees his father appearing before him, this father whom he had just lost after an illness which had been a long and painful one for him. He sees him appearing before him and he is pierced, the text tell us, with a profound sadness at the thought that his father is dead and that he does not know it; a formulation on whose character of absurd reasoning Freud insists, and of which he says: it is completed, it is understood if one adds that he had died 'in consequence of the dreamer's wish', that he did not know that it was in consequence of his wish of course that he had died.

This is what I inscribe on the graph, according to the following levels:



'He did not know', refers essentially to the dimension of the constitution of the subject, in so far as it is over against a useless 'he did not know' that the subject has to situate himself, and that here we have what precisely it is that we are going to try to see in detail from experience, that he has to constitute himself as not knowing, the only way out that is given to him in order that what is unsaid effectively takes on the import of the unsaid.

It is at the level of the enunciation that this is done, but there is no doubt that no statement of this kind can be made unless it is supported by the underpinning of an enunciating, because for any being who does not speak, we have the proof, that 'he had died' means nothing; I would say more: we have the test in the immediate indifference that most animals show towards remainders, towards the corpses of their fellows once they have

become corpses. In order that an animal should be attached to a dead person, the example of dogs is cited, it is necessary precisely that the dog should be in this exceptional position of showing that if he does not have an unconscious, he has a super-ego, namely that something has come into play which allows there to be something of the order of a certain delineation of signifying articulation. But let us leave that to one side.

That this 'he had died' already supposes the subject introduced to something which is of the order of existence, existence being nothing other than the fact that the subject from the moment that he establishes himself in the signifier can no longer be destroyed, that he enters into this intolerable concatenation which for him unfolds immediately in the imaginary, which means that he can no longer conceive himself, except as constantly re-emerging in existence.

This is not the construction of a philosopher, I have been able to observe among those who are called patients, and I remember one for whom one of the turning points of her internal experience, was a particular dream precisely where she touched without any doubt, and not at an indifferent moment of her analysis, something that was apprehended, grasped in a dream state, which was nothing other than a sort of pure feeling of existence, of existing as one might say in an indefinite fashion, and from the heart of this existence a new existence always re-emerged for her, and this extended for her inner intuition, as one might say, as far as she could see, existence being apprehended and felt as something which of its nature could not be extinguished except in order to emerge further on, and this was accompanied for her precisely by an intolerable pain.

This is something which is quite close to what the content of the dream gives us, because what indeed do we have? We have here a dream which is the dream of a son. It is always good to point out in connection with a dream, that the one who constructs it is the dreamer. One must always remember that when one begins to speak about the person in the dream.

What do we have here? The problem of what one calls identification is posed here in a particularly apt way, because in the dream there is no need for dialectic to think that there is some relationship of identification between the subject and his own dream fantasies.

What do we have? We have the subject who is there confronting his father, pierced by the deepest pain and before him we have the father who does not know that he is dead, or more exactly, because we must put it in the tense in which the subject apprehends it and communicates it to us, he did not know. I insist on this without being quite able to insist on it to the limit for the moment, but I always intend not to offer you approximate things which sometimes lead to obscurity, because this rule of behaviour also prevents me from putting things before you in any but an approximate way, and because I cannot immediately specify them, that naturally leaves some doors open. Nevertheless it is important, as regards the dream, for you to remember that the fashion in which it is communicated to us is always an enunciation: the subject gives us an account of what? Of another enunciation, but it is not at all sufficient to say that, of another enunciation that he presents to us as enunciating, because it is a fact that the subject tells us about the dream precisely in order that we should look for the key, the meaning, namely what he means, namely for something quite different to the enunciation that he reports to us, the fact therefore that this: 'he did not know', is said in the imperfect is quite important in this perspective. 'He did not know', in what I am enunciating to you, this for those whom the question of the relationships of the dream to the word by which we get to know about it, can approach in the drawing the first level of

splitting.

But let us continue. Here then is how things are divided up: from one aspect, from the aspect of what appears in the dream as subject, what? An affect, pain, pain about what? That he had died. And from the other aspect corresponding to this pain: 'He did not know', what? The same thing, that he had died.

Freud tell us that it is here there is found its meaning and implicitly its interpretation, and this seems to be quite simple. I have already pointed out to you often enough that it is not as a complement: 'in consequence of his wish':

pain (<i>douleur</i>)	■	he did not know
that he had died	•	that he had died

(In consequence of his wish)

But what does this mean? If we are, as Freud formally indicates that we should be, not simply in this passage, but in the one about repression that I asked you to refer to, we are at the level of the signifier, you should immediately see that we can make more than one usage of this 'in consequence of his wish'. He had died in consequence of his wish. Where does this take us? I think that some of you at least may remember the point that I formerly brought you to, that of the subject who having exhausted the way of desire in all its forms, in so far as it is not known to the subject, is the punishment of what crime? Of no other crime than that of having precisely existed in this desire, he finds himself brought to the point where he can make no other exclamation than this final but, this 'not to have been born', at which existence culminates when it has arrived very precisely at the extinction of his desire, and this pain which the subject feels in the dream, let us not forget that he is a subject of whom we know nothing more than this immediate antecedent that he has seen his father die in the torment of a long and agonising illness.

This pain is close by in the experience of this pain of existence when there is nothing else in him than this existence itself, and when everything in this excessive suffering tends of abolish this ineradicable term which is the desire to live.

This pain of existing, of existing when desire is no longer there, if it has been lived by any one, has been lived by the one who is far from being a stranger to the subject. But in any case what is clear, is that in the dream the subject knew this pain.

We will never know if the one who experienced it in the real knew or did not know the meaning of this pain, but on the contrary what is tangible, is that neither in the dream of course, nor certainly outside the dream before interpretation leads us to it, does the subject know that what he is assuming is this very pain as such, and the proof is that he can only articulate it in the dream in a faithful, cynical fashion, which corresponds absurdly to what? Freud replies to this, if we refer to the little chapter in the *Traumdeutung* where he talks about absurd dreams, especially in connection with this dream, and it is a confirmation of what I was trying to articulate for you here before rereading it, we will see that he specifies that if the feeling of absurdity is often linked in dreams to this sort of contradiction, linked to the structure of the unconscious itself, and which ends up in something laughable, in particular cases this absurd, and he says it in connection with this dream, is introduced into the dream as an element of what? As an element expressing a particularly violent repudiation of the meaning that is designated here, and in fact undoubtedly the subject can

see that his father did not know the wish, he, the subject had that his father should die in order to be done with his suffering. Namely that at this level the subject himself knows what his wish is. He may see or not see, everything depends on the point of analysis that he has got to, that this wish which was his in the past, that his father should die, and not for his father's sake, but for his, the subject who was his rival. But what he cannot see at all, at the point that he has got to, is that by assuming the pain of his father without knowing it, what is being aimed at, is to keep before him in the object this ignorance which is absolutely necessary for him, that which consists in not knowing that it is better not to have been born. There is nothing at the final term of existence, than the pain of existing; it is better to assume it as that of the other who is there and who continues to speak, as I the dreamer continue to speak, than to see being laid bare this final mystery which is nothing other, when all is said and done, than the most secret content of this wish, the one of which we have no element in the dream itself, except what we know by knowledge. What the content of this wish is, namely, the wish for the father to be castrated, namely the wish *par excellence* which at the moment of the father's death is turned back onto the son, because it is his turn to be castrated, namely something that must not be seen at any price, and I am not in the process of posing for the moment the terms of the point or the moment or the times when an interpretation should therefore be made, it would be easy already to show you on this schema that there is a first interpretation which is made right away. Your father is not at all concerned, he did not know, in consequence of your wish of enunciating the wish.

We are here at the level of what is already in the direct line of the subject's word, and it is a good thing that it is so, but it is necessary that a certain introduction by the analyst should be such that already something problematic is introduced into this remark which is of a nature to make emerge what up to then is repressed and in dots, namely that he had already died a long time ago in consequence of his wish, in consequence of the oedipal wish, and to make this as such emerge from the unconscious.

But it is a question of knowing, of giving its full import to this something which as above goes well above the question of what this wish is, because this wish to castrate the father with its reversal onto the subject, is something which goes well beyond any justifiable desire. If it is, as we say it is, a structuring necessity, a signifying necessity, and here the wish is only the mask of what is most profound in the structure of desire as such as the dream reveals it, it is nothing other, not than a wish, but than the essence of the 'in consequence of', of the relationship, of the necessary enchainment which prevents the subject from escaping from this concatenation of existence in so far as it is determined by the nature of the signifier.

This 'in consequence of', this is the point of what I want to point out to you, it is when all is said and done in this problematic of the effacement of the subject which on this occasion is his salvation in this final point where the subject should be destined to a final ignorance, the mainspring, the *Verdranqung*, this is the meaning into which I tried to introduce you right at the end the last time, reposes entirely, this sort of *Verdranqung* on, not the repression of something full, of something which is discovered, of something which is seen and which is understood, but in the pure and simple signifying elision, of the '*nach*', of the 'in consequence of', of that which indicates agreement or disagreement, accord or disaccord between the enunciating and the signifier, between what is in the relationship in the enunciation and what is in the necessities of the enunciating. It is in terms of the elision of a *clausula*, of a pure and simple signifier, that everything subsists, and that in the last analysis what is manifested in the desire of the dream, is the fact that he did not know.

What does the fact mean in the absence of any other signification that we have at our disposition? We will see only when we take a dream of someone whom we know better, because next time we will take one of Freud's dreams, the one which is quite close to this one, the dream that Freud had also about his father, the one he has when he sees him in the form of Garibaldi; there we will go further and we will really see what Freud's desire is, and those who reproach me here for not paying enough attention to anal erotism will get their money's worth. But for the moment let us stop here with this schematic dream at this dream of the subject's confrontation with death.

What does that mean? In summoning this shade, blood is going to flow, because it means that this dream means nothing other than that he is not dead. He may suffer in the place of the other. But behind this suffering, is the only lure onto which at this crucial moment he can still hold on to, precisely that of the rival, of the murder of the father, of imaginary fixation, and it is also here that we will take things up the next time, around the explanation of what I think I have sufficiently prepared by today's articulations: the elucidation of the following formula as being the constant formula of the phantasy in the unconscious: $\$ \diamond o$.

This relationship of the subject in so far as he is barred, cancelled, abolished by the action of the signifier, and who finds his support in the other, in that which defines for the subject who speaks, the object as such, namely that it is with the other that we try to identify, that we will very quickly identify, because those who attended the first year of this *Séminaire* heard it spoken about for a trimester, this other, this predominant object of human erotism, is the image of one's own body in the broad sense that we will give to it. It is here on this occasion in this human phantasy which is the phantasy of himself, which is no longer numbered, it is here that the subject maintains his existence, maintains the veil which ensures that he can continue to be a subject who speaks.

Seminar 6: 17 December 1958

I mentioned the last time the French grammar written by Jacques Damourette and Edouard Pichon (Editeur D'Artrey). What I said about negation, foreclosure and discordance is dealt with in two places in this grammar, in the second volume where there is assembled a whole article on negation, which fixes the data of foreclosure and discordance. This foreclosure which is so particularly embodied in the French language by its *pas, point* or *personne, rien, guère, ni*, which bear in themselves this sign of their origin in the trace as you see, because all of these, are words which designate the trace. This is where the action of foreclosure, the symbolic axis of foreclosure is rejected to in French, the *ne* being reserved for what it is more originally, discordance.

Negation in its origin, in its linguistic root, is something which spreads from the enunciating to the enunciation, as I tried to show you the last time. I tried to show you how it could be represented on this little graph that we are using.

We remained the last time at this putting into place of the terms, of the elements of the dream, that 'he did not know that he had died', and it was around this 'in consequence of', of the 'in consequence of his wish' that we designated the real point of incidence, in so far as the dream both marks the desire and carries it.

It now remains for us to continue to advance in order to ask ourselves how and why such an action is possible, and I had, in finishing, showed the way in which I intended to interrogate this function of desire as it is articulated in Freud, namely specifically at the level of unconscious desire. I intended to question it around this formula which is the one to which everything that we have shown about the structure of this dream, about what it consists in, namely about this confrontation, the subject is an other, a small o on this occasion, the father reappears alive in connection with the dream and in the dream, and is found to be in relationship to the subject, in this relationship whose ambiguities we had begun to question, namely that the one who ensures that the subject charges himself with what we have called the pain of existing, the one whose soul he has seen in its last agony, for whom he had wished death; wished death in so far as nothing is more intolerable than existence reduced to itself; this existence beyond everything which can sustain it, this existence sustained precisely in the abolition of desire.

And we have indicated that by sensing here that in this division, of what I would call intrasubjective functions, which ensures that the subject takes upon himself the pain of the other, rejecting onto the other what he does not know, which is nothing other on this occasion than the subject's own ignorance, the ignorance that it is precisely in the dream-desire that he desires to sustain himself, that he desires to maintain himself, and that here the desire for death takes on its full meaning which is the desire not to wake up, not to wake up to the message, which is precisely the one which is most secret, which is carried by the dream itself, and which is the following: that the subject through the death of his father is from now on wrongly confronted, with what the presence of the father protected him from up to then, namely with this something which is linked to the function of the father, namely this something which is there present in this pain of existing, this something which is the pivotal point around which there turns everything that Freud discovered in the

Oedipus complex, namely the X, the signification of castration. Such is the function of castration.

What does it mean to assume castration? Is castration ever really assumed? This sort of point against which have broken the last waves of what Freud called finite or indefinite analysis is what? And up to what point in this dream and in connection with this dream is the analyst not only right, but also in a position, potentially, to be able to interpret it?

It is at this point that at the end of what we were saying the last time about this dream, I had left posed the question: the three ways open to the analyst of reintroducing the 'in consequence of his wish', the way that accords with the word of the subject, is in accord with what the subject had wished, and which he remembered perfectly well, which is not at all forgotten, namely that 'in consequence of his wish' re-establishes there at the level of the upper line of 'in consequence of his wish', re-establishes there at the level of the hidden enunciation of unconscious memory, the traces of the Oedipus complex, of the infantile desire for the death of the father, which is the thing Freud tells us is the capitalist in every formation of the dream, this infantile desire finds its entrepreneur on this occasion in a current desire which has to express itself in the dream, and which is far from being always an unconscious desire.

Is not this 'in consequence of his wish' re-established at the level of the infantile desire, something which is found there in short in the position of going in the direction of the dream-desire, because it is a question of interposing at this crucial moment of the subject's life which is realised by the death of the father, because it is a question in the dream of interposing this image of the object and incontestably presents it as the support of a veil, of a perpetual ignorance, of a prop to what was in short up to then the alibi of the desire, because indeed the very function of the prohibition conveyed by the father, is indeed something which gives to desire its enigmatic, even unfathomable form, this something from which the subject finds himself separated, this protection, this defence when all is said and done, which is as Jones very well glimpsed, and we will see today that Jones had some very extraordinary perceptions from certain points of view about this psychic dynamism, this moral pretext never to be affronted in his desire.

Could we not say that the pure and simple interpretation of this oedipal desire is here something which in short attaches itself to some intermediary stage of the interpretation of the dream?

By permitting the subject to do what? Properly speaking this something whose nature you are going to recognise when it is designated as identifying with the aggressor. Is it anything other than the interpretation of oedipal desire, at this level and in these terms: that you had wished for the death of your father at such a date and for such a reason? In your childhood, somewhere in your childhood there is identification to the aggressor. Have you not typically recognised that this is essential, because it is one of the forms of defence? Is it not something which is put forward at the very place where the 'in consequence of his wish' is elided? Are the 'in consequence' and its meaning not essential for a full interpretation of the dream? There is no doubt about this, apart from the opportunities and the conditions which allow the analyst to get to this point, they will depend on the moments of the treatment, on the context of the response of the subject in dreams, because we know that in analysis the subject responds to the analyst, or at least to what the analyst has become in the transference, by his dreams.

But essentially, I mean in the logical position of the terms, is a question not posed to

the 'in consequence of his wish', to which we always run the risk of giving some over-hasty form, some over-hasty response, some premature response, some avoidance offered to the subject about what is in question, namely the impasse that he is put in by this fundamental structure which makes of the object of every desire the support of an essential metonymy, and something in which the object of human desire as such is presented in a vanishing form, and of which we can perhaps glimpse that castration is what we could call the final tempering.

Here then we are led to take up at the other end, namely at the one which is not given in dreams, to question more closely what is meant by, what is signified by human desire, and whether this formula, I mean this algorithm, this S confronted, put in the presence of, put face to face with the o, with the object, and in this connection we have introduced into these dream-images, and of the meaning which is revealed to us in them. Is it not something that we cannot attempt to test in the phenomenology of desire, as it is presented to us, curiously enough, of desire which is there, which is there since, which is at the heart of.....

Let us try to see in what form this desire presents itself to us analysts.

This algorithm is not going to be able to lead us together along the path of a questioning which is that of our common experience, of our experience as analysts, of the way in which in the case of the subject, in the subject who is not necessarily or always the neurotic subject regarding whom we have no reason to presume that on this point his structure is not included, because it reveals a more general structure. In any case there is no doubt that the neurotic finds himself situated somewhere along what represents the prolongations, the processes of an experience which for us has a universal value. This indeed in the point around which the whole construction of Freudian doctrine unfolds.

Before entering into a questioning about some of the ways in which this dialectic of the relationships of the subject to his desire have already been tackled, and in particular what I announced above about Jones' thinking, a thinking which remained unfinished and which, as you will see undoubtedly glimpsed something. I would like to refer to something taken from the most ordinary clinical experience, to an example which came to me fairly recently in my experience, and which seems to me to be rather appropriate to introduce what we are trying to illustrate.

It was the case of somebody who was impotent. It is not a bad thing to start from impotence in order to begin to question oneself about what desire is. We are sure in any case that we are at the human level. This was a young person who of course, like many people who are impotent, was not impotent at all. In the course of his existence he had made love very normally and he had had some liaisons. He was married and it was with his wife that it did not work. This is not to be described as impotence because it was precisely localised with respect to the object with whom the subject most wished to have sexual relationships, because he loved his wife. The term does not seem to be appropriate. So here more or less is what emerged at the end of a certain time of analytic work from the remarks of the subject.

It was not that he lacked absolutely all *élan*, but if he let himself be led on by it one evening, and however unrelated it was to the period of analysis he was currently living through, would he be able to sustain this *élan*? The conflict brought about by this lack (*carance*) which he had just gone through had taken matters to extremes. Had he any right to impose again on his wife some new trial, some new mishap in his attempts and in his

failures? In short, was this desire which could certainly be felt to be not at all absent, in terms of its presence and in the possibility of its being accomplished, was this desire legitimate? And without being able here to take the reference to this precise case any further, I cannot of course give you the history here for all sorts of reasons, including the fact that it is an analysis that is still in progress, and for many other reasons also, and this is always the problem about alluding to current analyses, I will borrow from other analyses this term which is quite decisive in certain evolutions sometimes leading to deviations, even to what are called perversions which have a greater structural importance, than what operates here openly, as one might say, in the case of impotence.

I will evoke therefore this relationship which from experience appears in certain cases, in the life of subjects, and which comes to light in analysis, an experience which can have a decisive function, but which, as in other places, reveals a structure, the point at which the subject poses himself the question, the problem. Does he have a big enough phallus?

From a certain angle, from a certain point of view, this question just by itself may entail in the subject a whole series of solutions, which by becoming superimposed on one another, by succeeding one another and by adding to one another, may draw him a long way from the field of the normal execution of that for which he has all the elements.

This big enough phallus, or more exactly this phallus which is essential for the subject, is foreclosed at a moment of his experience, and it is something that we rediscover in a thousand forms, not always of course obvious or manifest, latent, but it is precisely in the case in which as Monsieur de La Palice would say, this moment of this phase is open to view, that we can grasp it and touch it, and also understand its import.

We see the subject, I might say, more than once confronting, referring to this something which we must grasp there at the moment of his life, often at the turning point at the awakening of puberty, when he encounters its sign, the subject is then confronted with something which, as such, is of the same order as what we have evoked above: does desire find itself legitimated, sanctioned by something else, and in a certain fashion already what appears here in a flash itself in the phenomenology in which the subject expresses it, the phenomenology in which he expresses it, can be assumed under the following formula: does the subject have or not have the absolute weapon? Because if he does not have the absolute weapon, he is going to find himself drawn into a series of identifications, of alibis, of games of hide-and-seek which I repeat - we cannot develop its dichotomies here any further - can go very far.

The essential is the following: it is that I want to point out to you how desire finds the origin of its ups and downs from the moment that there is a question that the subject has it *qua* alienated in something which is a sign, in a promise, in an anticipation involving moreover as such a possible loss; how desire is linked to the dialectic of a lack subsumed into a moment which as such is a moment which is not there, any more than the sign on this occasion is a desire.

What desire has to confront, is this fear that it will not maintain itself under its present form, that as an artefact (*artifex*), if I may thus express myself, it will perish. But of course this artefact which is the desire that man feels, experiences as such, this artefact can only perish with regard to the artifice of his own speech. It is in the dimension of speech that this fear is elaborated, and is stabilised.

It is here that we encounter this term, so surprisingly and so curiously abandoned in analysis, which is the one that Jones put forward as a support for his reflections, and which is called *aphanisis*. When Jones dwells on, meditates on the phenomenology of castration; a phenomenology which remains as you can see in experience, and in publications, more and more veiled in modern psychoanalytic experience, Jones, at the stage of analysis at which he finds himself confronted with all sorts of tasks which are different from those given by modern experience, a certain relationship to the patient in analysis, which is not the one which has been since reoriented according to other norms to a certain necessity in the interpretation, the exegesis, the apologetics, the explanation of Freud's thought. Jones one might say, tries to find the method, the means of making it understood in connection with the castration complex, that what the subject fears he will be deprived of, is his own desire.

You must not be surprised that this term *aphanisis* which means that, a disappearance and specifically of desire, in Jones' text you will see that this is what is in question, that this is what he articulates, this term which serves him as an introduction because of a problem which worried the poor man a lot; it is the one about the relationships of the woman to the phallus, a question in which he never managed to find his bearings. Right away he uses this *aphanisis* to put under the same common denominator the relationships of man and of woman to their desire, which involved him in an impasse, because this is to overlook precisely that these relationships are fundamentally different and simply because this is what Freud discovered, by reason of their asymmetry with respect to the signifier phallus.

I think that I have already made you sense this well enough, for us to consider, at least provisionally today, that this is something that has been learned. So that the use of *aphanisis*, whether it is at the origin of the invention, or whether it is merely its consequence, marks in a way a sort of inflection which is short directs its author away from what is the real question, namely what is signified in the structure of the subject by this possibility of *aphanisis*? Namely does it not force us precisely towards a structuring of the human subject precisely as such, in so far as it is a subject for whom existence can be supposed and is supposed beyond desire, a subject who ex-sists, which sub-sists outside what is his desire.

The question is not of knowing whether we have to take into account objectively desire in its most radical form, the desire to live, the life instincts as we say. The question is quite different, it is what analysis shows us, shows us as being brought into play in the life of the subject; it is this very thing, I mean that it is not only that human life is sustained, which of course we are not doubting, by desire, but that the human subject takes it into account, as I might say, that he counts on this desire as such, that he is afraid if I may express myself in this way, that the *élan vital*, this beloved *élanvital*, this charming incarnation - we would be right here to talk about the anthropomorphism of human desire in nature - that precisely this famous *élan* with which we try to sustain this nature about which we do not understand very much, the fact is that when it is a question of himself, the human subject sees this *élan vital* in front of him, he is afraid that he will lack it.

Just by itself this clearly suggests all the same the idea that we would do well to have some structural exigencies, because after all it is a question here of something other than reflections of the unconscious (sic); I mean of this subject-object relationship which is imminent in the pure dimension of knowledge, and that once we are dealing with desire, as moreover is proved to us by experience, I mean Freudian experience, this is all the same going to pose us slightly more complicated problems.

In effect we can, because we started with impotence, go to the other extreme. If impotence fears neither potency nor impotence, the human subject in the presence of his desire also manages to satisfy it, he comes to anticipate it as satisfied. It is also very remarkable to see these cases where, when he is able to satisfy it, namely when he is not affected by impotence, the subject dreads the satisfaction of his desire, and it is most often that in his turn he dreads the satisfaction of his desire as making it depend in future precisely on the man or woman who is going to satisfy it, namely on the other.

The phenomenological fact is a common one; it is even the habitual text of human experience. There is no need to go to the great dramas which have been taken as the example and illustration of this problematic, to see how a biography throughout its whole duration spends its time unfolding in a successive avoidance of what has always been punctuated in it as the most pregnant desire.

Where is this dependence on the other, this dependence on the other which in fact is the form and the phantasy in which there is presented what the subject dreads, and which makes him deviate from the satisfaction of his desire? It is perhaps not simply what one could call the fear of the caprice of the other, this caprice which, I do not know if you are aware of it, is not very much related with the popular etymology, that of the Larousse dictionary which refers it to the goat (*chèvre*) and to the chameleon. Caprice, *capricio*, means shudder in Italian, from which we have borrowed it; is nothing other than the same word so beloved by Freud, which is called *sichstrauben*, to bristle up. And you know that throughout his whole work, it is one of the metaphorical forms in which for Freud there is incarnated at every turn, I am talking about the most concrete remarks, when he speaks about his wife, when he speaks about Irma, when he talks in general about the subject who is resisting, it is one of the forms in which he incarnates in the most tangible fashion his appreciation of resistance. It is not so much the way that the subject is essentially dependent, because he represents the other as such in terms of his caprice; it is precisely, and this is what is veiled, that the other does not mark this caprice with signs and there is not a sufficient sign of the goodwill of the subject, except the totality of signs in which he subsists, that in fact there is no other sign of the subject except the sign of his abolition as subject.

It is this that is written as follows: S (this shows you that in short as regards his desire man is not in the truth, because however little or however much courage he demonstrates, the situation escapes radically from him; that in any case this vanishing, this something which someone who after may last seminar called, when he was speaking with me afterwards, this umbilication of the subject at the level of his willing, and I accept very willingly this image of what I wanted to make you see in terms of the \$ in the presence of the object o, all the more so because it is strictly in conformity with what Freud designates when he speaks about the dream, the point of convergence of all the signifiers, in which the dream finally is implicated so much in what he calls himself the unknown, has not recognised that this *Unbekannte*, a very strange term for Freud to use, is precisely only this point by which I tried to indicate to you what constituted the radical difference of the Freudian unconscious, which it is not that it is constituted, that it is established as unconscious, simply in the dimension of the innocence of the subject with respect to the signifier which organises it, which is articulated in his place. It is that there is in this relationship of the subject to the signifier this essential impasse, this one, and I have just reformulated that there is no other sign of the subject than the sign of his abolition as subject.

You can well imagine that matters do not stop there, because after all if it were only

a question of an impasse as it is said, that would not take us very far. The fact is that it is precisely the property of impasses to be fruitful, and this impasse is only of interest in that it shows us what it develops in terms of ramifications which are precisely those in which effectively desire is going to become engaged. Let us try to see this.

This *aphanisis*, there is a moment to which it is necessary that in your experience, I mean this experience in so far as it is not simply the experience of your analysis, but also the experience of the mental modes in which you are led to think about this experience at the point of the Oedipus complex where it appears in a flash, which is when you are told that in the inverted Oedipus complex, namely at the moment when the subject glimpses the solution to the oedipal conflict in the fact of purely and simply drawing to himself the love of the more powerful one, namely of the father, the subject escapes, we are told, in so far as his narcissism is here threatened, in so far as he receives this love of the father which for him involves castration.

This is self-evident, because of course when one cannot resolve a problem, one considers it to be comprehensible, this is what ensures that usually it is not all the same as clear as it appears, that the subject links this moment of a possible solution, a solution all the more possible since in part it will be the way that is taken because the introjection of the father under the form of the ego ideal, is indeed something which resembles it. There is a participation of the so-called inverted function of the Oedipus complex in the normal solution, that there is all the same a moment that is highlighted in a series of experiences, of perceptions, especially in the problematic of homosexuality where the subject feels this love of the father as essentially threatening, as involving this threat which we will qualify, for want of being able to give it a more appropriate term, and after all this term is not all that inappropriate, in analysis terms have happily kept enough of their meaning and fullness in terms of their dense, weighty, and concrete character, for this to be when all is said and done what directs us. One can sense, one can pick up that narcissism is involved somewhere, and that this narcissism is involved at this moment of the Oedipus complex.

Above all this will be confirmed for us by the subsequent pathways of the dialectic, when the subject has been drawn along the paths of homosexuality. These are, as you know, much more complex of course than being a pure and simple summary exigency for the presence of the phallus in the object, but fundamentally it is concealed here.

It is not this that I want to get involved in. Only this introduces us to this proposition that to face up to this suspension of desire, at the very origin of the problem of the signifier, the subject is going to have before him more than one trick, if I can put things that way. These tricks are of course essentially concerned first of all with the manipulation of the object, of the *o* in the formula. This capture of the object in the dialectic of the relationships of the subject and the signifier should not be put at the origin of all the articulations of the relationship that I tried to perform with you these last years, because one sees it everywhere all the time. Is there any need to remind you of this moment in the life of little Hans where he asks himself about every object: does it or does it not have a phallus? It is enough first of all to have a child perceive this essential function in all its forms which can be clearly seen there. In the case of little Hans it is a question of the widdler, of the *Wiwimacher*. You know at what period and in what connection and at what moment, at the age of two, this question is posed for him in connection with every object, defining a sort of analysis which Freud incidentally indicates as a mode of interpretation of this form.

This of course is not a position which in any way only expresses the presence of the phallus in the dialectic. This gives us no information whatsoever, either about the usage, the

end which at one time I tried to make you see, or the stability of the procedure. What I want simply to point out to you, is that all the time we have evidence, that we are not going astray namely that the terms in question are indeed the following: the subject, and this because of his disappearance, his confrontation with an object, something which from time to time reveals itself as being the essential signifier around which is played out the fate of this whole relationship of subject to object, and now rapidly to evoke in what sense, in the most general sense, there is directed this incidence concerning the object, I mean the small o of our algorithm, from the point of view of what could be called instinctual specificity from the point of view of need.

We already know what happens in an impossible relationship, rendered impossible as one might say to the object by the presence, by the intervention of the signifier, in so far as the subject has to maintain himself there in the presence of the object. It is quite clear that the human object undergoes this sort of volatilisation which is what we call in our concrete practice the possibility of displacement, which does not simply mean the human subject, like all animal subjects, sees his desire being displaced from object to object, but that this very displacement is the point at which there can be maintained the fragile equilibrium of his desire.

After all, what is in question? It is a question I would say of envisaging from a certain point of view the prevention of satisfaction while still continuing to hold onto an object of desire. In a way it is again a mode as one might say of metonymically symbolising satisfaction, and here we are led straight away to the dialectic of the money box and the miser. It is far from being the most complicated one, even though one can scarcely see what is in question. The fact is that it is necessary that desire should subsist on this occasion, by a certain retention of the object as we say, bringing into play the anal metaphor. But it is in so far as this retained object is not itself the object of any other *jouissance*, that we can see that juridical phenomenology carries the traces of this retention of the support of desire: it is said that one has the enjoyment (*jouissance*) of a good; what does that mean, if it is not precisely that it is humanly quite conceivable to have a good which one does not enjoy, and that it is someone else who enjoys it? Here the object reveals its function of what one might call a pledge or even indeed a hostage of desire, and if you would like me here to bridge the gap with animal psychology, I will evoke what has been said in terms of ethology, by one of our more exemplary, one of our more graphic brothers. For my part I am very inclined to believe it. I recognised myself; I met myself, in someone who has just published a small book. I was not going to say it to you because this is going to distract you. This booklet has just come out; it is called *L'Ordre des choses*. Luckily it is a small book, written by Jacques Brosser, someone who up to this has been completely unknown, and it is published by Plon.

It is a kind of little natural history. That is how I interpret it for you. A little natural history geared to our time. I mean that:

1. It restores for us what is so subtle and so charming in the writings of Buffon, and which we no longer find in any scientific publication, even though all the same we could try this exercise now that we know much more about the behaviour, about the ethology of animals, than Buffon knew. In specialist journals it is unreadable.
2. What is said in this little book, you will see expressed in what I would call a very very remarkable style. You will read especially something in the middle which is called: 'parallel lives', the life of the cicada, the life of the ant.

I thought about this little book, because the author has this in common with me that for him the question of mammals has been resolved. Apart from man, who is an essentially

problematical mammal, you have only to see the role that the mammmæ play in our imagination, among mammals there is apart from man only one really serious mammal, and this is the hippopotamus. Every one agrees on this, if they are sensitive at all. The poet T.S. Eliot who has really bad metaphysical ideas, but who is all the same a great poet, at a first attempt symbolised the Church militant by the hippopotamus. We will come back to this later.

Let us return to the hippopotamus. What does this hippopotamus do? The difficulties of his existence are underlined for us. They are great, it seems, and one of the essential things, is that he protects the domain of his pasturage, because it is necessary all the same that in the long run he should have some resources in reserve. This is an essential point: therefore he maps out what one can call his territory delimiting it by a series of relays, of points which should sufficiently mark for those who ought to recognise it, namely his fellows, that this is his. This is to show you that I know very well that there are the beginnings of symbolic activity in animals. As you see, in the mammal it is a very specially excremental symbolism.

If in short the hippopotamus is found to protect his pasturage with his excrement, we find that the progress realised by man, and in fact this would really not have arisen, if we did not have this particular mediation of language, which comes from we know not where, but it is what causes to intervene here the essential complication, namely that it has led us to this problematic relationship with the object, that for man on his part it is not his pasturage that he protects with shit; therefore it is his shit that he protects as a pledge of the essential pasturage, of the pasturage which is essentially to be determined, and this is the dialectic of what is called anal symbolism, of this new revelation of the chymical wedding, if I can express myself thus, of man with his object which is one of the dimensions revealed to us by Freudian experience which was absolutely unsuspected up to then.

After all I simply wanted to indicate to you here the direction in which, and why there appears something in short which is the same question that in his polemic with Proudhon, Marx, without resolving it, and of which we are able all the same to give a little account (*époque*) by way of explanation, how it happens that human objects pass from having a use value to an exchange value. You should read this piece of Marx, because it is a good mental education. It is called *Philosophie de la misère, misère de la philosophie*. It addressed to Proudhon, and the several pages during which he mocks poor Proudhon, for having decreed that this passage from one to the other is brought about by a sort of pure decree of cooperators and it is a question of knowing why they have become cooperators and with what purpose in view. The way in which Marx savages him for a good twenty or thirty pages, without taking the rest of the book into account, is something that is healthy and educative for the mind.

Here therefore everything which happens to the object, of course, and the meaning of this volatilisation, of this valorisation which is also a *dévalorisation* of the object, I mean the extraction of the object from the field of pure and simple need, this is something which after all is only a reminder of the essential phenomenology, of the phenomenology of the good properly speaking, and picture this in every sense of the word good.

But let us leave this for the moment today simply in its initial stages. Let us simply say that from the moment that what is involved as object is the other, is others, is especially the sexual partner, this of course brings in its train a certain number of consequences. They are all the more tangible when we were dealing above with the social plane. It is quite certain here that what is in question is at the very basis of the social contract, in so far as it

has to take into account the elementary structures of thinking, in so far as the feminine partner in a form which is not all that obvious and which involves an exchange, is here, as Lévi-Strauss has shown us, an object of exchange. This exchange is not self-evident. In fact we could say that as an object of exchange, the woman is as one might say, a very bad bargain for those who carry out the operation, because all of this also engages us in what one might call this real mobilisation, of what is called the loan, the hiring of the services of the phallus. We are naturally putting ourselves here in the perspective of social utilitarianism, and this as you know, is not without its difficulties. And it is even from these that I started above.

That in this the woman undergoes a very disturbing transformation from the moment that she is included in this dialectic, namely as a socialised object, this is something about which it is very amusing to see how Freud can talk in the innocence of his youth, on page 192-193 of Vol. I of Jones. The way in which, in connection with the talk about the emancipation of women in Mill, whom as you know Freud translated at one time, as the request of Gomperz in which Mill discusses the theme of emancipation and concerning which in a letter to his fiancée herself he puts forward to her what a woman, a good woman, is for. This letter is highly entertaining, when one thinks that he was at the height of his passion, and it ends up with the fact that a woman should stay in her place and perform all the services which are no different from the famous: '*Kinder, Kirche, Kuche*'.

I think of this time when he eventually seemed to be willing to make himself the of his wife. And the text ends on a passage which I should read for you in English, because this text has never been published in any other language:

Law and custom have much to give women that has been withheld from them, but the position of women will surely be what it is: In youth an adored darling (an adorable little ornament, a heavenly piece of porcelain) and in mature years a loved wife. (Jones 1 193)

Here is something which is not at all without interest for us and which shows us the experience from which Freud began, and also helps us to see how far he had to go.

The other possible aspect, it is not for nothing that we have entered here into the social dialectic, the fact is that in face of this problematical position, there is another solution for the subject. The other solution for the subject, we have it also from Freud: it is identification, identification with what? Identification with the father, identification with the father why? I already pointed it out to you: in so far as he is the one who in some way is perceived as being the one who has succeeded in really overcoming this impossible bind, namely the one who is thought to have really castrated the mother, I would say who is thought, because of course he is thought, and because moreover there is here something which essentially presents itself. This is where the problematic of the father lies, and perhaps if I come back to insist so much on it today, it is because it is along the lines of something that was discussed last night as our scientific meeting, namely precisely the function of the father, the lordship of the father, the imaginary function of the father in certain spheres of culture.

It is certain that there is here a problematic which allows every sort of slippage as a possibility, because what must be seen, is that the solution prepared here is, as one might say, a direct solution: the father is already a type, in the proper sense of the term, a type present no doubt with temporal variations. We would not be so interested in the fact that such variations may not exist, except for the fact that we cannot conceive the thing in this

case otherwise than in its relationships with an imaginary function, by denying the relationship of the subject to the father, this identification to the ideal of the father, thanks to which perhaps when all is said and done, we can say that, on average, wedding nights succeed and turn out rather well, even though the statistics have never been done in a strictly rigorous fashion.

This is obviously linked to what is *de facto* given, but also to the imaginary data, and does nothing to resolve the problematic for us nor indeed of course for our patients and perhaps on this point we are indistinguishable, it does nothing to resolve for us the problematic of desire. We are going to see in fact that this identification to the image of the father is only a particular case of what we must now tackle as being the most general solution, I mean in the relationships, in this confrontation of \$ with the o of the object; the introduction in the most general form in the imaginary function; the support, the solution, the way to a solution which the dimension of narcissism offers to the subject, which means that human *eros* is engaged in a particular relationship with a particular image, which is nothing other than a particular relationship to his own body, and in which there is going to be produced this exchange, this inversion in which I am going to try to articulate for you the way in which the problem of the confrontation of \$ with the o appears.

It is on this point that we will take things up again, because it is already a quarter to two, after the holidays. I will take things up again on the 7th January, because today I was not able to advance things any further. You will see how in connection with this little o that we are going finally to have the opportunity of specifying in its essence, in its function, namely the essential nature of the human object in so far as I already introduced it for you at length in the previous seminars, every human object is fundamentally marked by a narcissistic structure, by this profound relationship with narcissistic *eros*.

How this human object *qua* marked by this, is found in the more general structure of the phantasy, to receive normally the most essential of the *Ansätzen* of the subject, namely neither more nor less than his affect in the presence of desire, this fear, this immanence in which I designated for you above the thing which of its essence maintains the subject at the edge of his desire? The whole nature of phantasy is to transfer it onto the object.

This we will see in studying, in taking up again a certain number of phantasies whose dialectic we have developed up to now, and even if it is only starting from a fundamental one, because it was one of the first to be discovered, from this phantasy: 'A child is being beaten', in which you will see the most essential traits of this transference of the affect of the subject, in the presence of his desire, onto his object *qua* narcissistic. Inversely what becomes the subject, the point at which he structures himself; why he structures himself as ego and ego ideal. This cannot after all be revealed to you, namely be seen by you in its absolutely rigorous structural necessity, except as being the return, the sending back of this delegation that the subject made of his affect, to this object, to that o, which we have never yet really spoken about, as being what is returned. I mean how he must himself necessarily pose himself, not as o, but as the image of o, the image of the other, which is one and the same thing as the ego, this image of the other being marked by this index, by a capital I, by an ego ideal in so far as it is itself heir to a first relationship of the subject, not with his desire, but with the desire of his mother, the ideal taking the place of that which, in the subject, was experienced as belonging to a desired child.

This necessity, this development, is that by which he comes to be inscribed in a certain tracing, formation of the algorithm which I can already write on the board to introduce it to you for the next time: I(o) (I) \diamond O o (S). In a certain relationship with the


other, in so far as he is affected by an other, namely of the subject himself, in so far as he is affected by his desire. This we will see the next time.

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.....This experience confronts us between that which in the subject we must call desire, and the function in the constitution of this desire, in the manifestation of this desire, in the contradictions which during treatments break out between the discourse of the subject and his behaviour. A distinction, which I say is essential, between desire and demand.

If there is something which not just the original data, the Freudian discourse, but precisely all the development of the Freudian discourse holds subsequently, namely the contradictions which are going to appear, it is above all about the problematic character that demand plays in it, because after all everything by which the development of analysis has been directed since Freud has granted more and more importance to what has been given different names and which in the final analysis converges towards a general notion of neurosis, of dependency, namely what has been hidden, what has been veiled behind this formula. It is indeed the accent put by a sort of convergence of the theory and its slippages, and its failures, and also of the practice, namely a certain conception concerning the reduction which is to be obtained by therapy. This indeed is what is hidden behind the notion of neurosis, of dependency.

The fundamental fact of the demand with its imprinting, restraining, oppressing effects on the subject who is there and of whom it is precisely a question of seeing whether with regard to this function which we reveal as being formative, according to the formation of the genesis of the subject, whether we are adopting the correct attitude, I mean the one which in the final analysis is going to be justified. Namely the elucidation on the one hand and the removal at the same time of the symptom. It is in fact clear that if the symptom is not simply something which we should consider as being the legacy of a sort of subtraction, of suspension which is called frustration, if it is not simply a sort of deformation of the subject, however he is envisaged, under the influence of something which is measured out in function of a certain relationship to the real - as I have said it is always to something real that an imaginary frustration is referred - if it is not that, if between what we discover effectively in analysis as its results, its consequences, its effects, indeed its lasting effects, its impressions of frustrations and the symptom there is something else, involving an infinitely more complex dialectic, and which is called desire; if desire is something which can only be grasped and understood at the most tightly knotted point, not from some impressions left by the real, but at the most subtle point where there is knotted together, for the real man, the imaginary and its symbolic meaning. Which is precisely what I tried to show. And this is why the relationship of desire to phantasy is expressed here in the intermediary field between the two structural lines of every signifying enunciation.



If desire is really here, if it is from here what we can call metaphorical phenomena begin, namely the interference of a repressed signifier on a patent signifier which constitutes the symptom, it is clear that one misses the whole point by not trying to structure, to organise, to situate the place of desire. This we began to do this year by taking a dream which I dwelt on for a long time, a singular dream, a dream which Freud highlighted on two occasions, I mean included secondarily in the *Traumdeutung* after having given it a particular and very useful place in the article: 'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning', desire and the reality principle, an article published in 1911. This dream is the one about the apparition of the dead father. We have tried to situate its elements on the double chain whose structural distinction I showed and articulated at length in what can be called the graph of the inscription of the elementary biological subject, of the subject of need, in the defiles of the demand. I set out for you how we should consider this fundamentally twofold articulation in so far as it is never a demand for some thing, in so far as in the background of every specific demand, of every demand for satisfaction, the very fact of language, by symbolising the other - the other as presence and as absence - as being able to be the subject of the gift of love that he gives by his presence, and by his presence alone, I mean in so far as he gives nothing else, namely in so far as precisely what he gives is beyond everything that he can give, that what he gives is precisely this nothing which is everything in the determination of this presence-absence.

We have articulated this dream by referring it in a didactic fashion to this duplicity of signs, to something which allows us to grasp in the structure of the dream the relationship which is established by this phantasy-production whose structure Freud tried to elucidate throughout the magisterial life of the *Traumdeutung*, and we are trying to see its function, for this son who is mourning for a father who was certainly loved, watched over until the end of his final agony, whom he resurrects in conditions which the dream articulates with an exemplary simplicity. namely that this father appears as he was when he was alive, that he speaks, and that before him the son is mute, dumbstruck, constrained, in the grip of pain - the pain, he says, of thinking that his father had died and that he does not know it. Freud tells us, it must be completed. He had died, in accordance with his wish. What was it that he did not know? That it was in accordance with his wish.

Everything therefore is here, and if we try to enter more closely into the construction, the structure of this dream, we notice the following: that the subject confronts himself with a certain image and under certain conditions. I would say that between what is

assumed in the dream by the subject, and this image to which he confronts himself, a distribution, a division is established which is going to show us the essence of the phenomenon.

We have already tried to articulate it, to circumscribe it as I might say, by dividing up on the signifying scale the signifying, characteristic themes. On the upper line, the 'he did not know', which is in its essence an essentially subjective reference which goes to the foundation of the structure of the subject. 'He did not know', as such, does not concern anything factual. It is something which involves the depths, the dimension of the subject; and we know that here it is ambiguous. Namely that what he did not know, we are going to see, is not solely and purely attributable to the one to whom it is implied, paradoxically, absurdly, in a way which involves contradictory reasoning, and even in a way which is nonsensical for the one who is dead, just as much as it in the subject. And he participates in this ignorance. This something precisely is essential.

Moreover, see how the subject situates himself in what I might call the suspension of the articulation of the dream. The subject himself, as he situates himself, as he assumes himself, knows as one might say, because the other does not know, the subjective position of the other. And here of being in default as one might say. That he is dead, of course, is a statement that after all cannot touch him. Every symbolic expression like this one, of the being dead, makes him subsist, preserves him when all is said and done. It is precisely indeed the paradox of this symbolic position: the fact is that there is no being to being, no affirmation of the being dead which in a certain fashion does not immortalise him. And this indeed is what is in question in the dream. But this subjective position of the being who is in default, this subjective lesser value, is not directed at the fact that he is dead, it is essentially directed at the fact that he is the one who does not know. This is how the subject situates himself before the other. In addition this sort of protection exercised with respect to the other which means that not only does he not know, but that at the limit I would say that he must not be told that, is something which is always found more or less at the root of every communication between people, what one can and what one cannot let him know. Here is something whose incidence you should always weigh every time you are dealing with an analytic discourse. There was some talk last night about those who could not speak, express themselves, about the obstacles, about the resistances that are properly speaking involved in discourse. This dimension is essential to relate this dream to another dream which is borrowed from the last page of Trotsky's *Journal* at the end of his stay in France at the beginning of the last war I think. It is a particularly moving dream. It is at the moment when, perhaps for the first time, Trotsky begins to experience in himself the first intimations of some diminution of the vital energy which was so inexhaustible in this man. And he sees appearing in a dream his companion Lenin, who congratulates him on his good health, and on his indomitable character. And the other, in a fashion which takes its value from this ambiguity that there always exists in dialogue, gives him to understand that perhaps this time there is something in him which is not now at the same level that his old companion had always known. But what he thinks about is how to spare this old companion who emerges in this way in such a significant fashion at a critical, decisive moment of his vital evolution. And wanting to recall something which precisely referred to the moment when even he, Lenin, had slackened in his efforts, he says, to indicate to him the moment when he died: the time when you were very very ill. As if a precise formulation of what was in question would by its very breath, dissipate the shade before whom Trotsky, in his dream at this decisive moment of his existence, maintains himself.

Now then, if on the one hand, in this division between the two forms that are confronted, ignorance is imposed on the other to whom it is imputed, how can we not see

that inversely there is something there which is nothing other than the ignorance of the subject himself who does not know. Not just what the signification of his dream is, namely everything that underpins it, in terms of what Freud evokes, namely his unconscious history, the old deadly wishes against his father, but much more that it is the nature of the very pain in which at this moment the subject participates, namely this pain - which in searching for its paths and its origin we have recognised as the pain that was experienced, glimpsed in the sharing of the fathers last moments - of existence as such, in so far as it subsists at the limit in this state where nothing more of it can be apprehended, the fact of the inextinguishable character of this very existence, of the fundamental pain which accompanies it when all desire has been effaced from it, when all desire has vanished from it.

It is precisely this pain which the subject assumes, but as being a pain which he also gives an absurd motive to, because he motivates it uniquely by the ignorance of the other, by something which when all is said and done if one looks very closely at it is no more a motive of what it accompanies as motivation than the emergence, the affect, in a hysterical crisis which is organised apparently from a context into which it is extrapolated, but which in fact is not motivated by it.

This pain, it is precisely by taking it on himself that the subject blinds himself to its proximity, to the fact that in the agony and in the death of his father it is something which threatens himself that he has lived through and from which he now separates himself by this image which is re-evoked, this image which attaches him to this something which separates and which calms man, in this sort of abyss or vertigo which opens up before him every time he is confronted with the final term of his existence. That is to say precisely what he needs to interpose between himself and this existence, namely on this occasion a desire. He does not cite just any support for his desire, just any desire, but the closest and the most urgent, the best one, the one which has dominated him for a long time, the one which has now struck him down. It has to be brought to life imaginarily for a certain time, because in this rivalry with the father, in what is there in terms of a foundation of power in the fact that after all he triumphs, because of the fact that the other does not know, while he does know, here is the slender footbridge thanks to which the subject does not experience himself as being directly invaded, directly overwhelmed, because the gap, the pure and simple confrontation with the anxiety of death which opens up before him, such that we know in fact that the death of the father, every time it occurs, is experienced by the subject as the disappearance - in a cruder language - of this sort of shield, of interposition, of substitution that the father is for the absolute master, namely for death.

One begins to see being outlined here a sort of which is constituted by what? The formula which I am trying to present to you as being the fundamental formula for what constitutes the support, the essential intrasubjective relationship in which every desire must as such be inscribed, is in this simplest form, the one which is inscribed here, this relationship separated out in the quadrilateral relationship, that of Schema L, that of the subject to the big Other in so far as this partially unconscious discourse which comes from the big Other comes to interpose itself in him. The tension $o \ o'$, that one can still in certain relationships call the tension of the image of o with respect to o' ; according to whether it is a question of the relationship $\$ \diamond o$ of the subject to the object, of the relationship of the image of o with respect to the Other, in so far as it structures this relationship. It is precisely the absent (?) which, as being characteristic of the relationship of desire to the relationship of the subject with the imaginary functions, which is expressed in the formula $\$ \diamond o$, in this sense that desire as such, and with respect to every possible object for man, poses for him the question of his subjective elision. I mean that in so far as the subject, in the register, in

the dimension of the word, in so far as he inscribes himself there *qua* demander, to approach this something which is the more elaborated, the more evolved object, that which more or less appropriately the analytic conception presents us as being the object of oblativity - this notion the difficulties of which I have often stressed, it is with this too that we are trying to confront ourselves, that we are trying to formulate in a more rigorous fashion - the subject, to the degree that as desire, namely in the fullness of a human destiny which is the destiny of a speaking subject, in approaching this object finds himself caught up in this sort of impasse which means that he himself can not reach this object, as object, except in some way by finding himself as subject, subject of the word, either in this lesion which leaves him in the darkness of trauma, in what is properly speaking beyond anxiety itself, or by finding himself having to take the place, to substitute himself, to subsume himself under a certain signifier which is found - I am purely and simply articulating it for the moment, I am not justifying it because it is our whole development which must justify it, and the whole of psychoanalytic experience is there to justify it - to be the phallus.

It is from this that by the fact that in every assumption of the mature position, of the position that we call genital, something is produced at the level of the imaginary which is called castration, and has its incidence at the level of the imaginary. Why? Because the phallus, among other things - it is only in this perspective that we can understand the whole almost infinite problematic that the fact gave rise to, and it is impossible to get out of otherwise - the question of the phallic phase for analysts, the contradiction, the Freud-Jones dialogue on this subject which is particularly pathetic, this whole sort of impasse into which enters when, rebelling against the over simple conception which Freud constructed of the phallic function as being the univocal term around which there pivots the whole concrete, historical development of sexuality in man and in woman, he highlights what he calls the defensive functions that are linked to this image of the phallus. When all is said and done both one and the other are saying the same thing, they approach it from different points of view. They cannot meet one another undoubtedly because of the lack of this central, fundamental notion, which requires that we should conceive the phallus as being, on this occasion, taken away, withdrawn as one might say, from the imaginary community, from the diversity, from the multiplicity of images that corporal functions come to assume, and isolated in the face of all the others in this privileged function which makes of it the signifier of the subject.

Here let us clarify still more our position and let us say the following. that in short on the two planes, which are the first immediate, apparent, spontaneous plane which is the appeal, which is the 'Help!', which is 'Food!', which is a cry when all is said and done, which is in any case something where, in the most complete fashion, the subject is for a moment identical with this need, all the same must articulate himself at the soliciting level of the demand, which it is found in the first relationship, in the experience between the child and the mother, a function of what is articulated and which will be of course more and more articulated in the relationship of the child to the mother, with everything which will be substituted for it from the totality of the society which speaks his own tongue. Between this level and the votive level, namely where the subject, throughout the course of his life, has to rediscover himself, namely has to discover what has escaped him because being beyond, outside everything, that the form of language more and more, and in the measure that it develops, allows to pass, allows to be filtered, rejects, represses that which at first tended to be expressed, namely from his need. This articulation at the second degree is that which as a being precisely shaped, transformed by his word, namely this attempt, this effort to pass beyond this transformation itself, this is what we are doing in analysis, and that is why one can say that just as everything that resides, of what must be articulated, at the soliciting level is there at O, as a predetermined account, pre-existing the experience of the

subject, as being that which in the other is open to the operations of language, to the first signifying homeland that the subject experiences in so far as he learns to speak.

What are we doing in analysis? What do we encounter, what do we recognise when we say that the subject is at the oral stage, the anal stage, etc., nothing other than what is expressed in this mature form whose complete element must not be forgotten: namely that it is the subject *qua* marked by the word and in a certain relationship with his demand; it is literally this that in one or other interpretation in which we make him sense the oral, anal or other structuring of his demand we do not simply make him recognise the anal character of the demand, we confront the subject with this anal or oral character, we are not interested simply in something which is immanent in what we articulate as being the demand of the subject, we confront the subject with this structure of his demand. And it is here precisely that the accentuation of our interpretation should balance, oscillate, vacillate. Because accentuated in a certain way we teach him to recognise something which as one might say, is at this superior, votive level, the level of what he wants, of what he wishes, in so far as they are unconscious. We teach him as one might say to speak, to recognise himself in what corresponds to at this level. But for all that we do not give him the answers. By maintaining interpretation entirely in this register of the recognition of the hidden unconscious signifying supports in his demand, we are doing nothing other if we forget what is in question, namely to confront the subject with his demand, we do not perceive that what we produce is precisely the collapse, the effacing of the function of the subject as such in the revelation of this unconscious vocabulary. We solicit the subject to efface himself and to disappear. And this is well and truly what happens in many cases. That is to say that in a certain apprenticeship that one can undergo in the analysis of the unconscious, in a certain fashion what disappears, what flees, what is more and more reduced is nothing other than this exigency which is that of the subject to manifest himself in his being beyond all of this; by bringing him back incessantly to the level of the demand one ends up indeed in some way - and this is what is called in a certain technique of the analysis of resistances - by purely and simply reducing what is his desire.

Now if it is simple and easy to see that in the relationship of the subject to the other, the response is made retroactively and somewhere other than here. something turns back on the subject to confirm him in the sense of the demand, to identify it on occasion to his own demand, it is also clear at the level at which the subject tries to situate himself, to recognise himself precisely in what he is beyond this demand that there is a place for the response; that this place for the response schematised there by S signifier of O barred, namely the reminder that the other is himself also marked by the signifier, that the other is himself also abolished in a certain fashion in the discourse, this is only to indicate a theoretical point and we will see later the form it must take. This form is essentially, precisely the recognition of what is castrated in everything which, because it is a living being, attempts to approach the living being as it is evoked by language. And of course it is not at all this level that we can at first reply.

But on the contrary, to respect, to aim at, to explore, to use what is already expressed beyond this locus of the response in the subject, and which is represented by the situation of the imaginary in which he himself establishes himself, maintains himself, suspends himself as if in a sort of position which undoubtedly participates from certain points of view in the artifices of defence, this indeed is what constitutes the ambiguity of so many manifestations of desire, of perverse desire for example.

It is the degree that something is expressed here that is the most essential point in which the being of the subject attempts to affirm itself. And this is all the more important to

consider because it is precisely there, at this very locus that there should be produced what we so easily call the completed object, genital maturation; in other words everything that will constitute, as Mr. Jones biblically expresses it somewhere, the relationships of man and woman, will find itself, because man is a speaking subject, marked by the structural difficulties which are those expressed in the relationship of the \$ with the o.

Why? Because precisely if one can say that up to a certain moment, a certain state, a certain time in development, the vocabulary, the code of demand can pass through a certain number of relationships, which involve an interchangeable object, namely food for the oral relationship, excrement for the anal relationship - to limit ourselves for the moment to these two when it is a question of the genital relationship it is quite evident that it is only by a kind of imprint, of prolongation, of this signifying fragmentation of the subject in the relationship in the demand that something can appear to us, and appears to us in effect, but in a morbid guise, in the guise of all these symptomatic incidences; namely the phallus. For a very good and simple reason, that the phallus is well and truly not this interchangeable object, that it only becomes it by its passage to the rank of signifier, and that everything that is involved in a complete genital maturation reposes on the fact that everything that, in the subject, should present itself as being here the completion of his desire is indeed to put matters clearly, something which cannot be demanded.

And the essence of neurosis, and what we have to deal with, consists precisely in the fact that what cannot be demanded on this level is precisely what the neurotic demands. Or the neurotic phenomenon, namely what appears in a more or less sporadic fashion in the evolution of all the subjects who participate in the structure of neurosis, consists precisely - one always discovers this structure - in the fact that what is of the order of desire is inscribed, is formulated, in the register of demand.

In the course of a re-reading of Mr. Jones that I was carrying out recently, I took up again everything that he wrote about ; what he brings forward at every moment from his very subtle, very direct experience is very striking.

I could relate cases of a number of male patients whose failure to achieve manhood - in relation to either men or women - was strictly to be correlated with their attitude of needing first to acquire something from women, something which of course they never actually could acquire.

'Why?' asks Mr. Jones. And when he says why in his article and in its context it is a real why, he does not know why, but he notes it, he punctuates it as a point on the horizon, an opening, a perspective, a point at which guide-rails are lacking.

Why should imperfect access to the nipple give a boy the sense of imperfect possession of his own penis? I am quite convinced that the two things are intimately related, although the logical connection between them is certainly not obvious. (The phallic phase, 580).

In any case not obvious to him.

At every moment we find these details in the most graphic phenomenology. I mean the necessary sequences through which a subject slips, in order to arrive at the full activity of his desire, the preliminaries which are necessary for him. We can reconstitute it, rediscover what I will call the labyrinthic pathways on which are marked the essential fact of the position that the subject has taken in this reference, in this relationship which is

structural for him, between desire and demand. And if the maintaining of the incestuous position in the unconscious is something which has a meaning, and which effectively has consequences, which are destructive in different ways of the manifestations of desire, of the accomplishment of the desire of the subject, it is precisely for no other reason than the following. It is that what the so-called incestuous position preserves somewhere in the unconscious, is precisely this position of demand.

The subject at a moment, it is said, and this is how Mr. Jones expresses it, has to choose between his incestuous object and his sex. If he wants to preserve one he must renounce the other. I would say that what he has to choose between and what he has to choose at this initial moment is between his demand and his desire.

Let us now take up, after these general indications, the path into which I want to introduce you to show you the common measure there is in this structuring of desire, and how effectively it finds itself implicated. The imaginary elements, in so far as they they must be inflected, they must be taken up in the necessary interplay of the signifying game, in so far as this interplay is determined by the double structure of the votive and the volitional.

Let us take the most banal, the most common phantasy, the one which Freud himself studied, to which he accorded a particular attention, the phantasy: 'A child is being beaten'. Let us take it up again now from the perspective that we are approaching in order to try to grasp how there can be formulated the necessity of the phantasy *qua* support for desire.

Freud, speaking about these phantasies as he had observed them in a certain number of subjects at the time, a majority of them being women, tells us that the first phase of the *Schlagfantasie* is restored, in so far as it comes to be re-evoked either in phantasies, or in the memories of the subject, by the following phrase: *Der Vater schlaqt das Kind*, and that the child who is beaten on this occasion is, with regard to the subject the following: 'The father is beating the child whom I hate'.

Here then we are taken by Freud to the initial point that is at the very heart of something which is situated in the most ... quality of love and of hate, the one which is directed at the other in his being. And in so far as this being on this occasion is subjected to the greatest fall from grace, in his symbolic valorisation by violence, by the paternal whim. The injury here, if it is called narcissistic is something which, in short, is total. It is directed in the hated subject, at what is demanded, beyond every demand. It is directed at the fact that he should be absolutely frustrated, deprived of love. The character of a subjective fall from grace which is linked for the child to his encounter with the first corporal punishment leaves different traces according to the diverse ways it is repeated. And anyone can observe in our own day, when great care is shown to children, that if it happens that a child who has never been beaten, becomes the object of some punishment, even if it is justified, at least relatively late in his life, one can hardly imagine the really shattering consequences that this experience has for the child at least at that moment. In any case, we can consider as given that the primitive experience is indeed what is in question, as Freud expresses it: 'Profound transformations have taken place between this first phase and the next.' In fact Freud expresses this second phase for us as follows:

The person beating remains the same (that is, the father); but the child who is beaten has been changed into another one and is now invariably the child producing the phantasy. The phantasy is accompanied by a high degree of pleasure, and has now

acquired a significant content, with the origin of which we shall be concerned later.

And with good reason.

Now, (therefore the wording runs:) I am being beaten by my father. [But Freud adds in connection with this phase, that it is] the most important and the most momentous of all. But we may say of it in a certain sense that it never had a real existence. It is never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a construction of analysis, but it is no less a necessity on that account.

I believe that we do not sufficiently weigh the consequences of such an affirmation by Freud. When all is said and done, because we do not encounter this most significant phase, it is all the same very important to see that the phase in question, because it culminates in a third phase, it is necessary that we should conceive of this second phase as and sought for by the subject. And of course this something which is sought, is of the greatest interest to us because it is nothing other than the formula for primordial masochism, namely precisely this moment that the subject is going to seek most closely her own realisation as a subject in the signifying dialectic.

Something essential, as Freud quite correctly says, has happened between the first and the second phase, namely other than this something in which she saw the other being cast down from his dignity as a subject set up as a little rival. Something has opened up in her which makes her perceive that it is in this very possibility of subjective cancellation that there resides her whole being *qua* existing being; and it is there, in having the closest brush with this abolition, that she measures the very dimension in which she subsists as a being subject to willing, a being who can express a wish.

What does the whole phenomenology of masochism show us, the material that we must all the same go looking for in masochistic literature whether we like it or not, whether it is pornographic or not? Let us take a famous novel, or a recent novel put out by a semi-clandestine publisher. What after all is the essence of the masochistic phantasy? It is the representation by the subject of something, of a slope, of a series of imagined experiences, whose bank, whose edge essentially consists in the fact that at the limit she is purely and simply treated as a thing, as something which at the limit is haggled over, is sold, is mistreated, is cancelled out as regards every kind of properly speaking votive possibility of grasping herself autonomously. She is treated like a phantasy, like a dog we could say, and not just any dog; a dog who is mistreated, precisely like an already mistreated dog.

This is the point, the pivotal point, the foundation of the supposed transformation in the subject who seeks to find where this point of oscillation, this point of equilibrium, this product of this barred S is, which is what he has to enter into if he enters, if once having entered into the dialectic of the word he must somewhere formulate himself as subject. But when all is said and done the neurotic subject is like Picasso, he does not search, he finds. Because this is how Picasso once expressed himself. A really splendid formula. And in fact there is a type of person who searches, and there is a type who finds. Believe me, neurotics, namely everything that is spontaneously produced from this embrace between man and his word, find. And I would point out that *trouver* comes from the Latin *tropus*, very precisely from what I speak about incessantly, the difficulties of rhetoric. It is very curious that the word which in the Romance languages designates *trouver*, contrary to what occurs in the Germanic languages where another root is used, is borrowed from the language of rhetoric.

Let us pause for an instant at this third moment of the point where the subject has 'found'. This we have immediately. It is perhaps worthwhile dwelling on it. In the phantasy: 'A child is being beaten', what do we have? It is 'One' who beats. It is quite clear, and Freud insists on it. There is nothing to be done about it, she is asked: But who is beating? It is somebody or other. The subject is really evasive. It is only after a certain interpretative elaboration, when one has rediscovered the first phase that one can rediscover a certain paternal figure or image beneath this form, the form in which the subject has found her phantasy, in so far as the phantasy serves as a support for her desire, for her masturbatory performance. At that very moment the subject is perfectly neutralized. It is One. And what is beaten so much, it is no less difficult to grasp, is multiple. [German quotation] Several children, boys when it is a question of the girl, but not necessarily with an obligatory relationship between the sex of the child who is phantasised and the sex of the phantasised image.

The greatest variations, the greatest uncertainties also reign around this theme in which we know well that, from whatever angle it may be, o or o', whether it is i(o) or o, the child participates up to a certain point, because it is she who constructs the phantasy. But in fact the child never situates herself in a precise fashion, in an univocal fashion, in a fashion which is not precisely oscillating indefinitely.

But what we would like to put the accent on here, is something very close to what I called above the distribution between the intrasubjective elements of the dream. On the one hand in the sadistic phantasy, this one here, and in the phantasy that one can observe in their almost complete development.

I will ask where the accentuated affect is. The accentuated affect, just as in the dream it was referred to the dreaming subject, this form of pain is undoubtedly a sadistic phantasy, refers to the phantasised image, but of the partner. What is in suspense in the sadistic phantasy - and the sadistic phantasy, provided it is a little conscious and refined, is often very well able to dwell on it - is the expectation of the partner. It is the partner, not so much in so far as he is beaten, in so far as he is going to be, or that he does not even know how he is going to be. This extraordinary element to which I will return in connection with the phenomenology of anxiety, and in connection with which I will already indicate to you this distinction which is in Freud's text, but to which naturally no one has ever paid the least attention in connection with anxiety, between the nuances which separate the pure and simple loss of the subject in the night of subjective indetermination, and this something which is quite different and which is already the warning, the arousal as one might say of the subject before the danger, and which as such is articulated by Freud in 'Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety', where Freud introduces a still more astonishing distinction, because it is so phenomenologically subtle, that it is not easy to translate it into French, between *abgewarten* (?) which I will try to translate by undergo (*subir*) to be able to do nothing except to accept it, and *vorhergesehen* (?) which is to expect it. (tr: GW xiv 199; SE 20 166)

It is in this register, in this range that there is situated the accentuated affect in the sadistic phantasy, and in so far as it is attached to the other, to the partner, to the one who is face to face with us, little o on this occasion.

After all where is this subject who, on this occasion, is the prey to something which he lacks precisely to know where he is? It would be easy to say that he is between the two. I will go further, I will say that in the final analysis the subject is to such a degree, really between the two, that if there is one thing here to which he is identical, or that he illustrates

in an exemplary fashion, it is the role of that with which one strikes, it is the role of the instrument. It is to the instrument that he is here, in the last analysis, identical, because here the instrument reveals to us, and always to our stupefaction - and always with more reason to our great astonishment, except that we do not wish to see it - that it intervenes very frequently as the essential character in what we are trying to articulate as the imaginary structure of desire.

And this indeed is what is the most paradoxical, the most full of warning for us. It is the fact that in short it is under this signifier, here completely unveiled in its nature as signifier, that the subject manages to abolish himself in so far as he grasps himself on this occasion in his essential being. If it is true that with Spinoza we may say that this essential being is his desire.

And in effect it is to this same crossroads that we are led every time that the problematic of sexuality is posed for us. If the pivotal point from which we began two years ago, which was precisely that of the phallic phase in the woman, is constituted by this relay station to which Jones always comes back in the course of his discussion, in order to begin again from it to elaborate it, to really it. Jones' text on this subject has the value of being an analytical elaboration. The central point is the relationship between the hatred for the mother and the desire for the phallus. It is from this that Freud began. It is around this that he sees beginning the really fundamental, genetic character of the exigency for the phallus at the emergence from the Oedipus complex for the boy, at the entry into the Oedipus complex for the woman. This is the connecting point. Hatred for the mother, desire for the phallus. Which is the proper meaning of this *Penisneid*.


Now Jones, quite correctly, underlines the ambiguities which are met every time we make use of it. Whether it is a desire to have a penis with respect to an other, namely a rivalry, it is all the same necessary that it should present itself in an ambiguous way which shows us that it is beyond that its meaning must be sought. The desire for the phallus, means desire mediated by the mediating phallus. An essential role that the phallus plays in the materialisation of desire.

This leads us to pose, to introduce what we are going to have to develop subsequently in our analysis of the construction of phantasy, at a crossroads which is the following. namely that the problem when all is said and done is to know how there is going to be sustained this relationship of the signifier phallus in the imaginary experience which is hers, in so far as it is profoundly structured by the narcissistic forms which organise her relationships with her counterpart as such. It is between S as speaking subject, little o, namely this other which the subject has in herself. Little o, it is to this then that we have identified her today. It is the imaginary other, it is what the subject has in herself as 'drive', in the sense that the word drive is put in inverted commas, where it is not yet the developed drive, caught up in the signifying dialectic, where it is the drive in its primitive character where the drive presents one or other manifestation of need in the subject.

An image of the other, namely that in which, through the mediation of the specular reflection of the subject in situating her needs, is at the horizon something different, namely what I called at the beginning the first identification to the other, in the radical sense, the identification to the insignia of the other, namely the signifier of capital I over o. (?)

I am going to give a schema which those who followed the first year of my seminar will recognise. We have spoken about narcissism. I gave the schema of the parabolical mirror thanks to which one can make appear on a platform, in a vase, the image of a hidden

flower, lit up either from underneath, or from the plate, and which thanks to the property of spherical rays comes to be projected, to be outlined here as a real image. I mean to produce for an instant the illusion that there is in the vase precisely this flower.



It may appear mysterious to see that one can imagine that it is necessary here to have a small screen to receive this image in space. This is not necessary at all. I pointed out that this illusion, namely the sight of the setting up in the air of this real image, can only be perceived from a certain spatial field which is precisely determined by the diameter of the spherical mirror, mapped out with respect to the centre of the spherical mirror. Namely that if the mirror is narrow, it is necessary of course to place oneself in the field where the rays which are reflected from the mirror have recrossed its centre, and consequently in a certain expansion of a zone in space, to see the image.

The trick of my little explanation at the time was the following: it was to say, if anyone wants to see this image being produced, phantastically, inside the pot, or a bit to one side, it does not matter, to see it being produced somewhere in the space where there is already a real object, and if this observer is there, he can make use of the mirror. If he is in a symmetrical position with respect to the mirror, the virtual position of the one who is in front of the mirror will be, in this tilting of the mirror, to come to situate himself within the cone of visibility of the image which is to be produced here.

That means that he will see the image of the flower precisely in this mirror at the symmetrical point. In other words what is produced, if the luminous ray which is reflected towards the observer is strictly symmetrical with the visual reflection, of what is happening on the other side, it is because the subject virtually will have taken the place of what is on the other side of the mirror that he will see in this mirror the vase - which is to be expected because it is there - and on the other hand the real image, as it is produced at the place where he cannot see it.

The relationship, the interplay between the different imaginary elements and the elements of symbolic identification of the subject can be illustrated in a certain fashion in this optical apparatus, in a fashion that I do not think is untraditional because Freud formulated it somewhere in the *Traumdeutung*. He gives somewhere the schema of successive lenses in which there is refracted the progressive passage of the unconscious, of the preconscious. He was looking at analogous reference points, optical ones he says precisely.

It effectively represents this something which, in the phantasy, tries to rejoin its place in the symbolic. This consequently makes of S something other than an eye. It is only a metaphor. If it designates that it wishes to rejoin its place in the symbolic, it is in a

specular fashion, namely with respect to the other who, here, is the capital O. This mirror is only a symbolic mirror; it is not a question of the mirror in front of which the little child busies himself.

This means that in a certain reflection which is constructed with the help of words in the first learning of language the subject learns to regulate somewhere, at the right distance, the insignia with which he identifies himself, namely something which is inclined towards the other side, which corresponds to him in these first identifications of the ego. And that it is within this, in so far as there is already something at once preformed, open to fragmentation, but which only enters into this game of fragmentation, and in so far as the symbolism exists which opens up its field for him, it is within this that there is going to be produced this imaginary relationship in which the subject will find himself caught, and which, I pointed out, means that in the erotic relationship to the other, however complete, however advanced one supposes it to be, there will always be a point of reduction which you can grasp as extrapolations of the early erotic outline between the subjects. The fact is that there is a transformation of this first relationship of o to o' the image of o, of this fundamentally specular relationship which regulates the relationships of the subject to the other. There is a transformation of that, and a distribution between on the one hand the group of the fragmented elements of the body, those that we have to deal with in so far as we are a marionette and in so far as our partner is a marionette. But the marionette is only missing one thing, the phallus. The phallus is occupied elsewhere, in the signifying function.

This is why there is always, I am not saying at the heart ofwhich are always opposed, but which can be rediscovered at any moment of the interpretative of the situation. The subject, in so far as he identifies himself with the phallus in face of the other, fragments as himself in the presence of something which is the phallus. And to dot the i's I would say that between man and woman, I would ask you to dwell on the fact that in the most loving relationship between a man and a woman, to the very degree that desire takes desire finds itself on the part of the man beyond the loving relationship. I mean that in so far as the woman symbolises the phallus, that man finds in her the complement of his being. It is what I might call the ideal form.


It is precisely in the measure that man, in love, is really alienated, that this phallus, the object of his desire, which nevertheless reduces the woman in the erotic act to being an imaginary object, that this form of desire will be realised.

And this indeed is why there is maintained, at the very heart of the most profound, the most intimate loving relationship, this duplicity of the object on which I have so often insisted in connection with the famous genital relationship. I come back to the idea that precisely if the loving relationship is complete here, it is to the degree that the other will give what he does not have, which is the very definition of love.

On the other hand the relationship of the woman to the man, which everyone is happy to believe to be much more monogamous, is something which presents no less ambiguity, except that what the woman finds in the man, is the real phallus, and therefore as always her desire finds its satisfaction there. Effectively she finds herself in the right position and sees a relationship of satisfying *jouissance*.

But precisely it is in the measure that the satisfaction of desire appears in the real order that what the woman effectively loves, and not desires, is this being who is beyond the encounter with desire and who is precisely the other, namely the man in so far as he is

deprived of the phallus, in so far precisely because of his nature as a completed being, a speaking being, he is castrated.



Seminar 8: 14 January 1959

Because we have spoken a lot on the last occasions about desire, we are going to begin to tackle the question of interpretation. The graph should be of some use to us.

I want to introduce what I am going to say today about an example, namely about the interpretation of a dream, by some remarks on what results from the indications that Freud gives us precisely about the interpretation of dreams.

Here in fact is more or less the meaning of the remark of Freud that I am now concerned with. It is in chapter VI where he is interested in intellectual feelings about the dream. For example while the subject is reporting a dream, he has the feeling that there is something missing in it that he has forgotten, or that something is ambiguous, doubtful, uncertain. In all these cases, Freud tells us, what is affirmed by the subject in connection with the dream, in terms of its uncertainty, its doubtfulness, its ambiguity: namely it is either this or that, I no longer remember, I can no longer say, even its degree of reality, namely the degree of reality with which it was seen, whether it was something which is affirmed in the dream with such a degree of reality that the subject notices it, or on the contrary that it was a dream, all of this Freud tells us, in all these cases, should be taken as enunciating what Freud calls one of the latent thoughts of the dream.

What in short is said by the subject in a marginal note about the text of the dream, namely all the accents about tonality, that which in music is accompanied by annotations like *allegro*, *crescendo*, *decrescendo*, all of this forms part of the text of the dream.

I do not think that for the greater number of you whom I suppose to have already got to know the *Traumdeutung*, and the technique, that this is new. This is something really fundamental as regards the interpretation of a dream. Therefore I am only reminding you of it because I do not have the time to give the examples which are in Freud, and I refer you to the text of the *Traumdeutung*. You will see the use that Freud makes of this essential reminder.

He interprets the dream by integrating the feeling of doubt for example that there is in this dream at the moment that the subject recounts it, as one of the elements of the dream without which the dream could not be interpreted.

We begin then from the Freudian interpretation, and we ask the question of what this involves by way of implications. It is not sufficient to accept this fact, or this rule of conduct, as having to be religiously accepted as many of Freud's disciples did, without trying to see any further, putting their trust in the unconscious in some way. What does it imply that Freud should tell us: it is not only the tension of your unconscious (*sic*) that is there at the moment that your memory of the dream disappears, or on the contrary is placed under a certain rubric given a certain accent?

He says: this forms part of the latent thoughts of the dream itself. It is here therefore that what we have agreed to call the graph allows us to specify, to articulate in a more evident, a more certain fashion what is in question when Freud gives us a rule of conduct like this for the interpretation of dreams.

Here in effect is what we can say. What do we do when we communicate a dream, whether this is done inside or outside analysis? (We did not have to wait for analysis in order to be able to give to the enunciating of a dream a formula which specifies it among the totality of possible enunciations as having a certain structure with regard to the subject). Within what we can put forward in a discourse as an enunciation of events we can legitimately distinguish the following that among the enunciations concerning events, there are some which have a value that is altogether worthy of being distinguished with regard to the signifying register. They are enunciations that we can put under the general rubric of belonging to indirect discourse; they are the enunciations that concern the enunciations of other subjects; they involve the reporting of the signifying articulations of someone else. And many things are introduced because of this, including other enunciations, namely hearsay, I was told, someone or other testified that this or that has happened, which is the form, one of the most fundamental forms of the universal discourse, most of the things that we ourselves can talk about being part of what we have gathered from the tradition of others. Let us say therefore a pure and simple, factual, report of an enunciation for which we assume responsibility; and on the other hand this involving in a latent fashion the dimension of enunciating which is not necessarily highlighted, but which is highlighted once it is a question of reporting the enunciation of someone else. It could also be something of our own that we are dealing with. We can say that we have said such a thing, that we have given evidence before someone else, and we ourselves can even enunciate that we have produced an enunciation which is completely false. We can testify that we have lied.

One of the possibilities is the one which retains our attention for the moment. What are we doing in enunciating a dream? We are doing something which is not unique in its class, at least in the way that we are now going to have to define it. Because in a way it is interesting to underline what is the spontaneous attitude one has *vis-à-vis* a dream, before we get into disputes between experts - namely the dream has no meaning, it is a product of the decomposition of psychical activity, which is the so-called scientific position which was held during a fairly short period of history. (Freud himself pointed out that he was only rejoining tradition.) What we have put forward just now is already something considerable, namely that tradition never failed at least to pose concerning the dream, a question mark as regards its signification.

In other words, what we are enunciating in producing the enunciation of the dream, is something to which is given, in the very form in which we produce it from the moment that we recount our dream to someone else, this question mark which is not just any question mark, which presupposes that there is something beneath this dream, of which the

dream is the signifier. I mean, we can write this in our formalisation, that it is a matter of enunciating a which itself has an index of enunciating, which is itself supposed to take on a value, which is not of course factual, an event.

We must add a supplementary accent to it in order to recount it in a fashion and in a dimension which is purely descriptive. The attitude which remains spontaneous, the traditional and how ambiguous attitude of the little child who begins to tell you his dreams, who tells you, last night I dreamt. If one observes things, it is as if, at a certain moment, the child discovered the possibility of expressing these things, and to such a degree that very frequently one cannot really know, at the age that there begins this confiding activity of the child concerning his dreams, whether after all everything that he tells you is really something that he dreamt, or whether it is something that he brings to you because he knows that one dreams and that one can talk about dreams.

These dreams of the child have the character of bordering on confabulation, as you can see from your contact with a child. But precisely, if the child produces it like this, and tells it is this way, it is with this character of this little index e of enunciating, $E(e)$, something beyond. With this precisely he plays with you a game of questioning, of fascination. And in fact, the formula for every kind of reporting of a dream, whether it is within or outside analysis being the following, $E(e^E)$, which we will say is the general form of something which, therefore, is not particular to the dream, is that of the riddle.

Starting from there, what is signified by what Freud means? Let us look at it on our little graph which is proposed on this occasion as following, namely that if we suppose that the production of the dream To see how we are going to make use of this graph to project onto it the different elements of this formalisation. There can be several ways. The interest of the graph from the structural point of view, is that it is a structure which allows us to map out the relationship of the subject with the signifier, to the degree that necessarily, once the subject is caught up in the signifier - and it is essential that he should be caught up in it - this is what defines him, the relationship of the individual with the signifier. A structure and a network are imposed at that moment which always remain in some way fundamental.

Let us try here to see how we can distribute the different functions involved in the enunciating of the dream on the aforesaid graph in this case. What is in question, the pivotal point, what I would call the total enunciation, the dream in this fact that as a spontaneous creation it presents itself as something which in its first appearance has a character of relative totality, it is made up of a certain block. One says: 'I had a dream', and one distinguishes it from the other dream which followed and which is not the same. It has the character of this discourse, it is reflected in so far as nothing causes there to appear in it, at the moment we are having it, this fragmentation, this decomposition of the signifier about which we have all sorts of retroactive indices; that this fragmentation has its incidence in the function of every discourse.

But discourse, in so far as the subject maintains himself in it, suspends our choice at every instant, when we are delivering a discourse. If this were not the case, our way of communicating would be altogether more arduous.

This dream is presented to us as a whole. It is this enunciation which is produced, as I might say, at the lower level of the graph. It is a signifying chain which presents itself in a form which is all the more global because it is closed, because it presents itself precisely in the usual form of language, because it is something about which the subject has to make a

report, an enunciating, has to situate himself with respect to, has to transmit to you precisely with all these accents that he has to add to it of a greater or lesser adherence to what he is telling you. Namely that it is in short at the level of the discourse for the other, which is also the discourse where the subject assumes this dream, that there is going to be produced this something which accompanies the dream, and comments on it in a way from the position that has been more or less assumed by the subject. Namely that here, during the narrative of what has happened, he presents himself already within it as the enunciation of the dream. It is here, in the discourse which this subject assumes for you to whom he is telling it, that we are going to see appearing these different elements, these different accentuations which are always accentuations of greater or lesser assumption by the subject. 'It seems to me'. 'It appeared to me that at this moment that happened'.

At that moment it is just as if the subject were at the same time someone else, or was being transformed into someone else. This is what I called above accents; these different modes of assumption of the experience of the dream by the subject are situated here on the line which is that of the I of the enunciating, in so far as precisely *vis-à-vis* this psychical event he assumes it more or less in his enunciating.

What does that mean, except that what we have here is precisely that which on our graph is presented in the form of the fragmented, discontinuous line, that it shows you as being the characteristic of what is articulated at the level of the enunciating in so far as this involves the signifier. Because note this. If it is true that what justifies the lower line, the one on which at one time we placed this retroactivity of the code onto the message which at every moment gives the sentence its meaning - this phrasal unity is of different sizes; at the end of a long discourse, at the end of my seminar or at the end of all my seminars, there is something which retroactively closes the meaning of what I stated for you before but to a certain degree in each one of the parts of my discourse, in each one of the paragraphs there is something which is changed in shape.

It is a question of knowing what is the smallest degree that we must stop at in order that this effect which we call an effect of signification, in so far as it is something essentially new, which goes beyond what are called the usages of the signifier, constitutes a sentence, constitutes precisely this creation of signification brought about in language. Where does it stop? It stops obviously at the smallest possible unit, which is the sentence, precisely at this unit which on this occasion is presented here in quite a clear fashion in the report of the dream, in the form of the fact that the subject assumes it or does not assume it, either believes it or does not believe it, either reports something, or is doubtful about what he is telling us.

What I mean on this occasion, is that this line or loop of enunciating, is made up of sentence-fragments which can be shorter than the totality of what is being told. The dream, in connection with one or other part of the dream, brings an assumption by the subject, an enunciatory position (*une prise nonciative*) of a shorter range than the totality of the dream. In other words, it introduces a possibility of a fragmentation which is much shorter at the upper level of the graph than at the lower level.

This puts us on the track of what Freud implies in saying that this accent of assumption by the subject forms part of the latent thoughts of the dream. This is to tell us that it is at the level of enunciating and in so far as it implies this type of highlighting of the signifier which is implied in free association; namely that if the signifying chain has two aspects, one which is the unity of its meaning, the phrasal signification, the monolithism of the holophrastic sentence, or more exactly namely that a sentence may be taken as having a

single meaning, as being something which forms a signifier, let us say a transitory one, but which, while it exists, stands as such all by itself; and the other phase of the signifier which is called free association involves that each one of the elements of this sentence goes as far as is possible in terms of decomposition, stopping strictly at the phonetic element. Something can intervene which by getting rid of one of the signifiers implants there in its place another signifier which supplants it and it is in this that there lies the property of the signifier; it is something which refers to this aspect of the willing of the subject. Something, an incident, intersects with it at each moment which implies, without the subject knowing it, and in a way that is unconscious for him, that even in his deliberate discourse, beyond his intention, something intervenes in the choice of these elements whose effects we see emerging at the surface, in the most elementary form for example of a phonematic lapse, whether it is a question of a syllable that is changed in a word, which shows there the presence of another signifying chain, which can intersect with the first, and grafts onto, implants in it another meaning.

Freud indicates to us that that which, at the level of enunciating, at the apparently most developed level therefore of the assumption of the subject, at the point at which the I poses itself as conscious with respect to, we will not say its own production because precisely the riddle remains entire - from whom does this enunciation that we are talking about come? - the subject does not decide, if he says 'I dreamt' it is with its own connotation and accent which means that the one who dreamt is all the same something which with respect to him presents itself as problematic. The subject of this enunciating contained in the enunciation that we are dealing with, and with a question mark, was for a long time considered to be God before becoming the self of the subject. It is more or less with Aristotle

To return to this beyond of the subject which is the Freudian unconscious, a whole oscillation, a whole vacillation is produced which still leaves a permanent question about its otherness. And what the subject takes up from this afterwards, has the same fragmentary nature, has the same value of signifying element as what is produced in the spontaneous phenomenon of substitution, of the deranging of the signifier, which is what Freud on the other hand show us to be the normal way to decipher the meaning of the dream.

In other words, the fragmentation which is produced at the level of enunciating, in so far as enunciating is the assumption of the dream by the subject, is something which Freud tells us is on the same plane and of the same nature as the following, which the rest of his doctrine shows us to be the way of interpreting a dream, namely the maximum signifying decomposition, the spelling out of signifying elements in so far as it is in this spelling out that there will reside the highlighting of the possibilities of the dream, namely of these intersections, of these intervals that it leaves and which only appear to the degree that the signifying chain is related to, is recut, is intersected by all the other chains which in connection with each of the elements of the dream may be interlaced, intermingled with the first.

In other words it is to the extent, and in a more exemplary fashion in connection with the dream than in connection with any other discourse, it is to the degree that in the discourse of the subject, in the actual discourse, we allow to vacillate, we allow to be detached from the actual signification the signifier that is involved in this enunciating, it is in this way that we approach that which in the subject is called in the Freudian doctrine unconscious.

It is in the measure that the signifier is involved, it is in the possibilities of rupture,

in the points of rupture of this unconscious that there lies the thing we are tracking down, what we are there to look for, namely the essential thing that has happened in the subject which keeps (*maintenant*) certain signifiers in repression. And this something is going to allow us to follow precisely the path of his desire, namely this something in the subject which is maintained in this capture by the signifying network, must so to speak in order to be revealed pass through this mesh, be subject to this filtering, to this sifting of the signifier and which is what we have as our aim to replace and to restore in the discourse of the subject.

How are we able to do it? What does the fact that we are able to do it signify? I told you, desire is essentially linked, by the doctrine, by the practice, by the Freudian experience, in this position, it is excluded, enigmatic, or it is posed with respect to the subject as being essentially linked to the existence of the signifier, which is repressed as such, and its reinstatement, its restoration is linked to the return of these signifiers. But this does not mean that the reinstatement of these signifiers purely and simply enunniates the desire. What is articulated in these repressed signifiers, and what is always a demand, is one thing, the desire is something else, in so far as desire is something through which the subject situates himself, because of the existence of discourse, with respect to this demand.

It is not what he demands that is in question, it is what he is in function of this demand, and what he is in the measure that this demand is repressed, is masked. And this is what is expressed in an obscure fashion in the phantasy of his desire. It is his relationship to a being of which there would be no question if there did not exist demand, discourse, which is fundamentally language, but of which there begins to be question from the moment that language introduces this dimension of being, and at the same time conceals it from him. The reinstatement of the meaning of the phantasy, namely of something imaginary, comes between the two lines, between the enunciation of the intention of the subject, and this something in which in a decomposed fashion he reads that this intention is profoundly fragmented, cut up, refracted by language; between the two is this phantasy where he habitually suspends his relationship to being.

But this phantasy, more than anything else, is always enigmatic. And what does it want? The following: that we should interpret it. To interpret desire, is to reinstate something to which the subject can not accede all by himself. Namely the affect which designates at the level of this desire which is his - I am speaking about the precise desire that intervenes in one or other incident of the life of the subject, of the masochistic desire, of the suicidal desire, of the oblativ desire, on different occasions. What is at stake is that this thing which is produced in this closed off form for the subject, should by regaining its place, its meaning with respect to this masked discourse which is involved in this desire, regain its meaning with respect to being, confront the subject with respect to being, regain its true meaning, that which is for example defined by what I would call the positional affects with respect to being. This is what we call essentially love, hate, or ignorance, and many other terms still whose description and catalogue we should go through. In the measure that what is called affect is not this something which is purely and simply opaque and closed off which is supposed to be a sort of beyond of discourse, a kind of totality, of living kernel which comes straight down to us from some unknown heaven, but to the extent that affect is very precisely and always something which is connoted in a certain position of the subject with respect to being. I mean with respect to being in so far as that which is proposed to it in its fundamental dimension is symbolic, or rather that on the contrary that it represents an extremely deranging eruption of the real within this symbolic.

And it is very difficult not to perceive that a fundamental affect like that of anger, is

nothing other than that: the real which arrives at the moment that we have constructed a very nice symbolic framework, where everything is going well, order, law, our merit and our goodwill. One notices all of a sudden that things do not hang together. This is the normal operation of the affect of anger: everything appears fine on the bridge of the boats on the Bosphorus, but then there is storm which makes the sea rise. Anger is always a matter of making the sea rise.

And then again it is also something which refers to the intrusion of desire itself, and this is also something which determines a form of affect to which we will return. But affect is essentially, and as such, at least for a whole fundamental category of affects, a connotation characteristic of a position of the subject, of a position which is situated, if we essentially see the possible positions in this putting into operation, putting to work, activation of himself, with respect to the necessary lines that are imposed on him, as such, by his envelopment in the signifier.

Here now is an example. I took this example from one of Freud's descendants; it allows us to articulate properly what analysis is. And to proceed in a fashion which does not give rise to a particularly arbitrary choice, I took Chapter V of Ella Sharpe's *Dream Analysis*, in which the author takes as an example the analysis of a simple dream. I mean a dream that she takes as such, by pushing as far as possible its analysis to the limit. You know of course that in the preceding chapters she showed a certain number of perspectives, of laws, of mechanisms, for example the incidence of the dream in analytic practice, or even further the problems posed by the analysis of the dream, or of what happens in the dreams of people being analysed. The pivotal point of this book, is precisely the chapter in which she gives us a singular example of an exemplary dream in which she brings into play, into operation, she illustrates, everything which on the other hand she wants to tell us about the way analytic practice shows us how we should be effectively guided in the analysis of a dream and particularly this essential thing, which is the new thing that this practitioner contributes after the *Traumdeutung*, that a dream is not simply something which is revealed to have a significance (that is the *Traumdeutung*), but something which in the analytic communication, in the analytic dialogue, comes to play its current role, and not in the same way at one moment of analysis as at another, and that precisely the dream comes in an active, determined fashion to accompany the analytic discourse in order to clarify it, to prolong its pathways, that the dream is a dream when all is said and done which is meant not just for analysis, but often for the analyst.

Within analysis, the dream is found in short to be the bearer of a message. The author in question does not draw back. Any more than the authors who since then have had occasion to speak about the analysis of dreams.

It is a matter only of knowing what weight, what accent we will give to it. And as you know, I drew attention to it in my Royaumont report, it is not the least important question that is posed by the question of thinking with respect to dreams, that certain authors think that they can avoid it in so far as they see in it something like an activity; at least undoubtedly it is something .

I mean that the fact in effect that the dream presents itself as a material for discourse, as a material for discursive development, is something which, if we do not perceive that the unconscious is nowhere other than in the latencies, not of some psychic gap or other where it is supposed to be in an unconstituted state, but well and truly *qua* unconscious on this side of or - this is another question - immanent to the formulation of the subject, to a discourse about himself, to his enunciating. We will see how legitimate it is to

take the dream, as it has always been considered to be, as the royal road to the unconscious.

Here therefore is how things present themselves in this dream which the author presents us with. I will begin by reading the dream itself; I will show the way that problems are posed with regard to it. She gives us first of all a brief note on the subject about which we will have a lot to say. The whole chapter moreover should be re-read, criticised in order to allow us to grasp how what she enunciates is both more applicable to our reference points than to any other register, and at the same time how these reference points may perhaps allow us to orientate ourselves better.

That day the patient arrived at his session in certain conditions which I will remind you of later. It is only after some associations, which you will see are very important, that he remembers:

‘That reminds me [I will come back to these natural associations.] I do not know why I should now think of my dream last night’ he says, ‘it was a tremendous dream. It went on for ages and ages. I shall not bore you with it all for the simple reason that I cannot recall it but it was an exciting dream, full of incident, full of interest. I woke hot and perspiring.’

He says that he does not remember this infinitely long, vast dream, but what emerges, is the following: a fairly short scene that he is going to recount to us. ‘I dreamt I was taking a journey with my wife’. There is here a very nice nuance which is perhaps not sufficiently accentuated as regards the normal order of complements in the English tongue. I do not think however that I am making a mistake in saying that: ‘I was taking a journey with my wife around the world’, is something which deserves to be noted. There is a difference between ‘a journey around the world with my wife’, which would seem to be the normal French order of circumstantial complements and ‘I was taking a journey with my wife around the world’. I think that in this the sensitivity of the ear in English must be the same.

We arrived in Czechoslovakia where all kinds of things were happening. I met a woman on a road, a road that now reminds me of the road that I described to you in the two other dreams lately in which I was having sexual play with a woman in front of another woman.

At this point the author quite rightly changes the typeface, because it is an additional reflection: ‘So it happened in this dream.’

This time (he takes up the narration of the dream) my wife was there while the sexual event occurred. The woman I met was very passionate looking. [And here quite rightly we have a change of typeface, because it is a commentary, it is already an association.] I am reminded of a woman I saw in a restaurant yesterday. She was dark and had very full lips, very red and passionate looking. [The same expression, the same passionate aspect.] And it was obvious that had I given her any encouragement she would have responded. She must have stimulated the dream, I expect. In the dream the woman wanted intercourse with me and she took the initiative which as you know is a course which helps me a great deal. (And he comments:) If the woman will do this I am greatly helped. In the dream the woman actually lay on top of me; that has only just come to my mind. She was evidently intending to put my penis in her body. I could tell that by the manoeuvres that she was making. I disagreed with this, but she was so disappointed I thought that I

would masturbate her. (And here we have a further commentary:) It sounds quite wrong to use that verb transitively. One can say I masturbated and that is correct, but it is all wrong to use the word transitively. The peculiarity of the English verb is that it does not have the reflexive form that it has in the French tongue. When I say 'I masturbate,' in English that means *Je me masturbe*. This is quite correct, but it is quite incorrect, he remarks, to use the word transitively.

The analyst does not fail to react to this remark of the subject. And the subject in connection with it makes in fact some confirmatory remarks. He begins to give associations about his own masturbation. However he does not remain there.

Here is the enunciation of the dream. It should give rise to some interest for what we are going to say. I must say that it is a mode of presentation that in a certain way is quite arbitrary; I could by-pass it. Do not think either that this is the systematic way that I would advise you to rely on for the interpretation of a dream. It is only a matter of taking a step to show you what we are going to try to see, and to demonstrate.

Just as in Freud's dream, taken from Freud, the dream of the dead person that we spoke about, we were able to designate in a fashion which you could at the same time see was not without artifice, what the signifiers are of 'in consequence of the dreamers wish', that his son wished it, in the same way in a certain fashion one will see here, the point at which the dream-phantasy effectively culminates, 'I disagreed with this, but she was so disappointed I thought I would masturbate her', together with the remark that the subject immediately makes that it is quite odd to use the verb transitively..... . The whole analysis of the dream is going to show us that it is effectively in re-establishing this intransitivity of the verb that we find the true sense of what is in question.

What is she disappointed about? It seems that the whole text of the dream sufficiently indicates it: the fact that our subject does not really want to get involved even though he indicates that everything in the dream is there to stimulate him. Namely that he would normally be greatly helped in such a position. No doubt this is what is in question, and we will say that the second part of the sentence falls into what Freud articulated for us as being one of the characteristics of the formation of the dream, namely secondary elaboration, that is presents itself as having an understandable content.

Nevertheless the subject himself points out to us that this is not self-evident, because the very verb that he employs is one which he indicates to us does not sound proper when it is used in this way. In accordance with the very application of the formula that Freud gives us we should retain this remark of the subject as one which puts us on the path, on the track of what is in question. Namely the dream-thoughts. And that is where the desire is. In telling us that 'I thought' should involve as a consequence that the sentence should be reinstated in the following form: 'I thought she could masturbate' which is the normal form in which the wish would present itself: 'Let her masturbate if she is not satisfied'. The subject points out to us here with sufficient energy that masturbation concerns an activity which is not transitive in the sense of going from the subject to another person, but as he expresses it, intransitive. Which means in this case an activity of the subject on himself. He well and truly underlines it, when one says 'I masturbated' that means *Je me suis masturbé*.

It is a method of presentation, because the important thing is not of course to settle the subject, even though, I repeat, it is important to notice that here, already immediately, the first indication that the subject gives us is an indication in the sense of the rectification

of the signifying articulation.

What does this rectification allow us to do? It is more or less the following: everything that we are now going to have to consider, is first of all the coming into play of this scene, of this session. The author presents it to us by means of a description which is not necessarily a general description of the behaviour of her subject. She has even gone so far as to give us a little preamble about his psychical constellation. In short we will have to come back to this because what she has said in these preliminary remarks will be discovered in her results, and because we will have to criticise these results.

To go immediately to the essential, I mean to what will allow us to advance, we will say that she points out to us that this subject is an extremely gifted subject, and that his behaviour - we will see it better and better in the measure that we focus things. He is a subject of a certain age, already married, and practising at the Bar. And she tells us, it is worthwhile taking this in the very terms that the subject uses, that when the subject began his professional practice he developed severe phobias.

Briefly, what we are told about the mechanism of the phobia is limited to this. 'This meant,' she says, - and we have great confidence in her because she is one of the best analysts, one of the most intuitive and penetrating who ever existed - 'not that he dare not work successfully, but that he must stop working in reality because he would only be too successful.'

The note that the analyst puts in here, that it is not a matter of a love of failure that is in question, but that the subject stops, as one might say, before the immediate possibility of the highlighting of his abilities, is something which deserves to be remembered. You will see the use that we will subsequently make of it.

Let us leave to one side what, from the beginning, the analyst indicates as being something which can here be related to the father. We will come back to it. We need only know that the father died when the subject was three years old. And that for a very long time the subject did not refer to the father except precisely to say that he was dead. Something which, quite rightly, retains the attention of the analyst, in the sense that she understands by that, something quite obvious, that he did not want to remember at all that his father had lived. It seems to me that this can hardly be contested - and that when he remembers his father's life, she tells us that it was undoubtedly 'a startling moment'. It produces in him a sort of fright.

Very quickly the position of the subject in analysis will imply that the death-wishes that the subject might have had towards his father is the mainspring of his forgetting, and of the whole articulation of his desire, in the measure that the dream reveals it to him. We should understand however that nothing, as you are going to see, indicates to us in any way an aggressive intention in so far as it would be the origin of a fear of retaliation. It is precisely what an attentive study of the dream is going to allow us to specify.

In fact what does the analyst tell us about this subject? She tells us the following: 'That day, like every other day, I did not hear him coming upstairs.' Here, there is a very brilliant little paragraph about the extra-verbal production of the subject, and which corresponds to a certain observation. Namely all the little incidents in his behaviour that someone who has an eye knows how to spot. 'I never hear this man coming', she tells us. We understand in the context that one gets to her office by climbing a stairs. 'One patient comes up two stairs at a time and I hear just the extra thud'. The English word 'thud' has no

equivalent in French and means a dull muffled sound, the sound of a foot on the step of a stairs which is covered by carpet, and which becomes a little bit louder because he takes two steps at a time. 'Another hurries and I detect the hustle'. The whole chapter is like that and from a literary point of view it is something to savour. However it is nothing but a detour, because the important thing is what the patient does.

The patient's attitude is one of perfect correctness which is a little stilted and never changes. 'He always gets on the couch one way. He always gives a conventional greeting with the same smile, a pleasant smile, not forced or manifestly covering hostile impulses.'(130) Here the analyst's tact knows very well, there is nothing that reveals that such a thing exists. Nothing is left to chance, 'no clothes awry;.... no hair out of place.' He lies down, he puts one hand over the other across his chest and makes himself easy. And there is no sign of any immediate or upsetting event as for example that his maid did something just before he left to keep him late. One does not hear about this for a long time, right at the end of the session, or even at the next session. 'He talks the whole hour, clearly, fluently, in good diction, without hesitation and with many pauses. He speaks in a distinct and even voice for it expresses thinking and never feeling.'(130)

What must be thought about this distinction between thinking and feeling - of course all of us would be of the same opinion before a presentation like that, the important thing is obviously to know what this particular mode of communication signifies. Every analyst will think that there is in this subject something that he dreads, a sort of sterilisation of the text of the session, something must make the analyst desire to have something more alive in the sessions. But naturally the fact of expressing oneself like that must also have a meaning. And the absence of feeling, as she expresses it, is all the same not something which has nothing to do with the chapter, with the heading of feelings.

I spoke above about affect as concerning the relationship of the subject to being and revealing it. We should ask ourselves in this case how being can communicate along this path. It is more appropriate to ask this because indeed it is at this point, that the session opens. And the discordance there is between the way in which the analyst tackles this problem of this sort of before her, and the way in which, she notes it herself, surprises it, what sort of supplementary basis is to be given to the usual position of the analyst, precisely to appreciate what is special in this case. Because what begins to open up here we will see being opened up more and more up to the final intervention of the analyst and its stupefying result. Because it is stupefying not only that it should be produced, but that it should be reported as an exemplary interpretation from the point of view of its fruitfulness and satisfaction for the analyst.

That day the analyst is struck by the fact that in the middle of this picture which is distinguished by a severe rectitude, the subject's cautious bearing, something happens which she had never heard up to then. He arrives at her door, and just before entering he goes, hm, hm. It is still not a lot, it is the discreetest of coughs. She was a very impetuous woman, everything in her style indicates it; she was something like a primary school teacher before being an analyst and it is a very good starting point for the penetration of psychological facts: and she is certainly a woman of very great talent. She hears this little cough as if it were the arrival of the dove into Noah's ark.

This cough is a harbinger. Somewhere behind there is the place where feelings are alive. 'I would never talk to him about it, because if I said a word he would just smother everything.' It is the classical position in such a case, never to make a remark to the patient, at a certain stage of his analysis, when you think you know what he is at, about their

physical behaviour, their way of lying down, of buttoning or of unbuttoning their coat, everything that involves the attitude of reflex motor activity on their own behaviour in so far as it can have the value of a signal, because this profoundly touches something belonging to the narcissistic register.

This is what distinguishes the power, the dimension of analysis in so far as it extends, as it spreads over everything belonging to the vocal register; the fact is that the same rule does not apply at all to something like a little cough, because even though it is only a cough, and independently of the fact that this does not give the impression of being a purely somatic event, it belongs to the same register as those 'hm, hms', those grunts, which certain analysts sometimes use decisively, and which can have the effect of restarting somebody. The proof, is that to her great surprise this is the first thing that the subject talks to her about. He says to her very exactly, in his customary even and deliberate voice:

I have been considering that little cough that I give just before I enter the room. The last few days I have coughed I have become aware of it, I don't know whether you have. Today when the maid called me to come upstairs I made up my mind I would not cough. To my annoyance, however, I realised I had coughed just as I had finished. It is most annoying to do a thing like that, most annoying that something goes on in you or by you that you cannot control, or do not control. One would think some purpose is served by it, but what possible purpose can be served by a little cough of that description is hard to think. (131)

The analyst advances with all the prudence of the serpent and says back to him: 'What purpose could be served?' 'Well, it is the kind of thing that one would do if one were going into a room where two lovers were together.' He tells how he did something similar in his childhood before going into the room where his brother was with his girlfriend. He coughed before going in because he thought that they might be embracing, and that it would be better if they stopped beforehand, and that way they would feel less embarrassed than if they had been surprised.

So she replies: 'And why cough before coming in here?'

That is absurd, he says, because naturally I should not be asked to come up if someone were here. There is no need for a cough at all that I can see. It has, however, reminded me of a phantasy I had of being in a room where I ought not to be, and thinking someone might think I was there, and then I thought to prevent anyone from coming in and finding me there I would bark like a dog. That would disguise my presence. The 'someone' would then say 'Oh, it's only a dog in there.'

'A dog?' the analyst replies prudently.

'That reminds me', continues the patient easily enough, 'of a dog rubbing himself against my leg, really masturbating himself. I'm ashamed to tell you because I did not stop him. I let him go on and someone might have come in. (The patient then coughed).' And it is at this point that he begins his dream.

We will take this up the next time, but already there is something we do not see namely that here the very memory of the dream came immediately after a message which in all probability - and moreover the author of course is quite sure of it, and will bring it into the analysis of the dream and give it a role of first importance - This little cough was a message, but it is a question of knowing of what. But it was on the other hand, in so far as

the subject had spoken about it, namely in so far as it introduced the dream, a second degree message. Namely in the most formal and not unconscious fashion. A message that it was a message, because the subject did not simply say that he coughed.

Had he even said: 'I coughed' this already would have been a message. But in addition he says: 'I coughed, and that means something', and immediately afterwards he begins to tell us stories which are particularly suggestive. This obviously means. I am here. If you are doing something that amuses you, and if it would not amuse you that this should be seen, it is time to put an end to it.

But we would not see precisely what is in question if we were not also to take into account what is brought along at the same time. Namely something which is presented as having all the appearances of a phantasy. First of all because the subject presents it as such, and as a phantasy developed in his childhood, and also because perhaps if the phantasy is with respect to another object, it is quite clear that nothing realises it better than this phantasy, the one he speaks to us about when he says: I thought of concealing my presence - I would say as such, as the presence of my being seen, me the subject, in a room - very precisely by doing something which it is quite obvious is designed to draw attention to him, namely to bark.

This indeed has all the characteristics of the phantasy which best fulfils the forms of the subject in so far as he finds himself adorned by the effect of the signifier. Namely by the use that the child makes of what presents itself as being already natural signifiers because they serve as attributes for something which it is a question of signifying. The child calls a dog 'bow-wow'. In this case we are involved in a phantasy-activity. It is the subject himself who attributes the 'bow-wow' to himself. If in fact he signals his presence here, in fact he signals it precisely in so far as in the phantasy - this phantasy being quite inapplicable - it is by its very manifestation, by his very word that he is supposed to make himself other than he is, to remove himself even from the domain of the word, to make an animal of himself, to absent himself, to literally naturalise himself. No attempt will be made to verify that he is there because he will have made himself, presented himself, articulated himself well and truly in the most elementary of signifiers as not being there. There is nothing there, but literally, there is no person. It is really, literally, what the subject announces in his phantasy: in so far as I am in the presence of the other I am nobody. It is the 'where is he' of Ulysses and the Cyclops.

These are only elements. But what we are going to see in pushing the analysis further, is what the subject by associating to his dream which is going to allow us to see how things appear, namely in what sense, and how he is not a person. There are some correlates on the side precisely of the other whom it is a question of warning here; namely who happen to be in this case, as in the dream, a woman. This relationship with the woman as such, is certainly not a matter of indifference in the situation. What it is going to allow us to articulate concerning the something that the subject is not, does not wish to be, cannot be, as you will see, is something which will direct us as we have said towards the most fundamental of the symbols that concern the identification of the subject. If the subject absolutely wishes that, as everything indicates, his feminine partner should masturbate herself, should look after herself, it is undoubtedly so that she will not pay attention to him. Why he does not want her to pay attention to him, and how he does not wish it, is also what the normal end of the time which is assigned for this session today will not allow us to articulate, and what we will put off till the next time.

Seminar 9: 21 January 1959

We stopped the last day right in the middle of the analysis of what Ella Sharpe calls the singular, unique dream to which she devotes a chapter on which the ascending part of her book converges, then afterwards the complements that she adds. Her book has the originality of being an important book on dreams, written after thirty years of general analytic experience.

Let us consider that these seminars of Ella Sharpe represent experiences which refer to the preceding thirty years.

This dream, which was the subject of one of her patient's sessions, is an extremely interesting dream. And the developments that she gives, the connection that she establishes not only between what are properly speaking the associations of the dream, even the interpretation, but the whole message of the session in its totality - she is to be commended for this because it indicates her great sensitivity to the direction, to the sense of analysis.

It is all the more striking to see that this dream - whose terms I will recall - she interprets it as you will see line by line as she ought - is interpreted by her in the sense of a desire linked to a wish for omnipotence in her patient. This we will see in detail. It may be justified or not, but already you must be thinking that if this dream interests us it is from this angle here where I tried to show you the ambiguity, and the lure of this unilateral notion; what is involved in this wish for omnipotence, in terms of the possibilities, the perspectives of power, what can be called the neurotic wish.

Is it always a question of the omnipotence of the subject? I introduced here this notion. It is quite obvious that the fact that the omnipotence in question is the omnipotence of discourse in no way implies that the subject feels himself to be its support and its depository. That if he is dealing with the omnipotence of discourse, it is through the mediation of the other that he proffers it. This is forgotten, particularly in the orientation that Ella Sharpe gives to her interpretation of the dream. And to begin with the end - you are going to see how we will probably not manage to complete it in this lesson because there is a whole world beneath a work as elaborated as this; all the more of a world when one perceives that when all is said and done almost nothing has been said, even though every day this is the very terrain on which we operate.

I will begin therefore by indicating what is going to appear at the end. We will see in detail how she remonstrates with her patient on the subject of his omnipotent wish. And his aggressive omnipotent wish, Ella Sharpe underlines. It is this patient, all of whose coordinates she certainly does not give us, but who is found to have in the foreground major difficulties in his profession - he is at the Bar; difficulties whose neurotic character is so evident; which she defines in so nuanced a fashion because she specifies that it is not so much a question of failure as of a fear of being too successful.

She had underlined, in the very modulation of the definition of the symptom, something which deserved to retain us by the distinction, the obvious subtlety of the nuance that is introduced here into the analysis. The patient therefore, who has other difficulties

besides those appearing in his work, who has, she herself indicates them, difficulties in the totality of his relationships with other subjects - relationships which go beyond his professional activities, which may specially express themselves in games, and particularly in the game of tennis as we will see in the indications that she subsequently gives us about some other sessions - she points out the difficulty he has in doing what would be necessary for him when he is winning a set or a game, to corner his opponent, to drive him back into a corner of the court so as to put the ball in the other corner where he is not going to reach it.(cf 146)

It is the type of example of the difficulties which this patient undoubtedly has. And the fact that symptoms like that can be highlighted by the analyst lend no little support to confirming that in the patient it is a question of a difficulty of manifesting his potency, or more exactly his power. She will intervene therefore in a certain fashion, will find herself in fact overjoyed at a certain number of reactions which are going to follow, which is really going to be the high point where she is going to point up, where she desires - really in the sense that we define it - one could almost point out that what she is aiming at is precisely what we would localise in a certain reference with respect to demand. As you will see this is precisely it. Only she interprets this desire in a certain fashion, in the sense of an aggressive conflict. She puts it on the plane of an essentially and profoundly dual reference of imaginary conflict.

I will also show how she justifies tackling things from this angle. Only here I pose the question: can we consider as a sanction for the suitability of this type of intervention two things which she herself is going to declare exist. The first, following the first outline of her interpretation of the dual type, of the type of interpretation of the aggressivity of the subject founded on a return, on a transference of the omnipotent wish. She notes something striking, bewildering in an adult subject, that the subject brings her this result that for the first time since he was a tiny boy he had wet the bed.(147) We will come back to this in detail, to point out where the difficulties are posed. And in the few days which followed this session that she chose because the subject reported a very fine dream, but also a dream which occurred at a crucial moment of the analysis, on the tennis court, where precisely he happens to have the problems which are well known to all tennis players who have the opportunity to observe the way that they put their capacities to work, and from whom also there escapes sometimes the final recompense of a superiority they know they have, but that they are not able to demonstrate, his usual partners, with that sensitivity to difficulties, the unconscious impasses which when all is said and done are the stuff of this character game, the ways in which there occurs between the subjects the fencing of dialogue, of mocking, of joking, of gaining the upper hand, tease him as usual about the lost game, and he gets angry enough to get hold of his opponent around the neck and cornered him in a corner of the court and warned him never to tease him again.

I am not saying that there is no basis for the direction, the order in which Ella Sharpe pushes her interpretation. You will see that, on the basis of the finest dissection of the material, the elements that she uses are situated, are established for her. We will also attempt to see what a priori ideas, what preconceived ideas, often based - after all an error never emerges except from a certain lack of truth - based on something else that she does not know how to articulate, even though she gives us - and this is what is precious in this observation - the elements of it, of the other register - but she does not dream of handling the other register.

The centre, the point at which she is going to bring her interpretation to bear, at a lower degree of complexity - you will see here what I mean, even though I think I am

saying enough about it, for you to understand - by putting it on the plane of the imaginary rivalry of a power struggle she leaves to one side something that is now in question, by properly speaking making a selection in her own text.... It is her text which is going to show us, I think in a striking fashion, what she allows to be lost and what manifests itself with such coherence to be in this case what is in question in this analysed session - and the dream which is its centre - so that we should obviously try to see whether the categories which I have been proposing for a long time and whose map, whose topological schema, I have tried to give in this graph that we use, whether we will not manage all the same to centre things better.

I remind you that we are dealing with a dream in which the patient is taking a journey with his wife around the world. He arrives in Czechoslovakia where all sorts of things are going to happen to him. He stresses that there was a whole world of things before this little moment that he is going to recount fairly rapidly - because this dream only occupies one session.

It is only the associations that he gives. It is a very short dream to recount. And among the things which happen, he meets a woman on a road which reminds him of the one which he had already described twice to his analyst, when something happened, 'sexual play' with a woman in front of another woman. This happens again, he adds, in this dream. And he continues

This time my wife was there while the sexual event occurred. The woman I met was very passionate looking and I am reminded of a woman I saw in a restaurant yesterday. She was dark and had very full lips, very red and passionate looking, and it was obvious that had I given her any encouragement she would have responded. She must have stimulated the dream, I expect. In the dream the woman wanted intercourse with me and she took the initiative which as you know is a course which helps me a great deal.

He repeats by way of commentary:

If the woman will do this I am greatly helped. In the dream the woman actually lay on top of me, that has only just come to my mind. She was evidently intending to put my penis in her body. I could tell that by the manoeuvres she was making. I disagreed with this, but she was so disappointed I thought that I would masturbate her.(132-133)

Immediately after this remark which can only really be understood in English: 'It sounds wrong to use that verb transitively. One can say ' I masturbated and that is correct'. We will subsequently see in the text another example which shows that when one employs 'to masturbate' it is a question of masturbating oneself. This primitive reflexive character of the verb is sufficiently striking for him to make this remark which is properly speaking a philological one. And it is obviously not for nothing that he makes it at this moment.

I have said, that in a certain fashion we could complete if we wished to proceed as we have done for the preceding dream, complete this sentence in the following fashion by reinstating the signifiers that have been avoided - we will see that what follows will confirm it -: 'She was very disappointed not to have my penis (or a penis) that I thought 'She should masturbate' and not 'I should'. Let her masturbate.'

You will see in what follows what it is that allows us to complete things in this way.

After this we have a series of associations. It is not very long, but it amply suffices for our meditation. There are almost three pages, and in order not to weary you, I will only take them up again after having given the dialogue of the patient which follows the dream.

Ella Sharpe wrote this chapter for a pedagogical purpose, she draws up the catalogue of what the patient in fact brought to her. She is able to show those whom she is teaching, the material in which she is going to make her choice, firstly for the interpretation of what she has before her, secondly what she is going to transmit to the patient of this interpretation, indicating, insisting herself on the fact that the two things are far from coinciding because what there is to be said to the patient is probably not at all everything that is to be said on the subject. From what the patient provides her with there are things that are good to say and things which are not.

Since she finds herself in a didactic position, she is going first of all to draw up an account of what is to be seen, of what is to be read in this session.

‘1. The cough.’(136)

The last time I told you what was in question. It is a question of this little cough which the patient gave that day before coming into the room; this little cough in which Ella Sharpe, given the way in which the patient behaves himself, so contained, so controlled, so manifestly defensive, which she is far from accepting in the first place as a defence of the order: a defence against his own feelings, sees something which comes from a presence which is more immediate than this attitude in which everything is reflected on, where nothing reflects.

And indeed it is to this that this little cough refers us. It is something on which others would perhaps not have dwelt. However little it is it is something which makes her hear in it the introduction, literally like an olive branch after some earthquake or other. And she says to herself, let us respect it.

Now, precisely it is just the contrary that happens. It is the patient himself who says it to her. He gives a long discourse on the subject of this little cough. I pointed out the last time, and we are going to come back both to the way in which Ella Sharpe understands it, and how to my way of thinking it should be understood.

Here in effect is how she herself analyses what she learns from the patient, following on this little cough. Because the subject is far from immediately bringing forward the dream. It is after a series of associations which have come to him after the remark which he himself made about this little cough, that it had escaped from him and that no doubt it meant something. That he had even said to himself that he would not do it again because it is not the first time that this had happened to him. After having climbed the stairs which she does not hear him climbing because he is so discreet, he gives this little cough. He uses the word himself, and he questions himself about it. We are now going to take up what he said in the perspective of the way that Ella Sharpe herself records it. She draws up a catalogue of what she calls: ‘Ideas concerning the purpose of a cough.’(136)

Here is how she records it.


First of all this little cough brings thoughts of lovers being together. What had the patient said? The patient, having spoken about his cough, and asked the question

‘What purpose can it serve?’ says ‘Well, it is the kind of thing that one would do if one were going into a room where two lovers were together. If one were approaching such a place one might cough a little discreetly and so let them know they were going to be disturbed. I have done that myself when, for example, my brother was with his girl in the drawing room. I would cough before I went in so that if they were embracing they could stop before I got in. They would not then feel as embarrassed as if I had caught them doing it.’(131)

It is not a matter of indifference to underline in this connection, that first of all the cough, as the patient shows, and we do not doubt it because everything that follows has developed it for us, the cough is a message. But let us immediately note something which already appears in the fashion in which Ella Sharpe analyses things, the fact is that she does not grasp, that she does not highlight - this may appear to you a little finical, a little scrupulous as a remark, but nevertheless you are going to see that it is from this order of remark that I am going to introduce that everything else is going to follow, namely what I called the lowering of level which will mark Ella Sharpe’s interpretation - that if the cough is a message, it is evident - it emerges from Ella Sharpe’s very text - that what is important to note is that the subject did not simply cough, but precisely - it is she who underlines it to her great surprise - the fact that the subject should say, it is a message.

This she elides, because she indicates in her catalogue of what she has bagged - we have not yet got to what she is going to choose and this will depend on what she has recognised. Now it is clear that she elides something which she herself has explained to us, the fact that in the first place there is of course the cough, but that the subject - this is the important point about this cough-message, if it is a message - speaks about it by saying ‘what is its purpose? What does it introduce?’. The subject, exactly, begins by saying about this cough - he says it literally - that it is a message. He signals it as a message. And still more, in this dimension where he announces that it is a message he poses a question: What is the purpose of this message?

This articulation, this definition that we are trying to give of what happens in analysis, by not forgetting the structural texture of what rests on the fact that what happens in analysis is above all a discourse, which is here without going into any particular refinement of it, being properly speaking disarticulated, analysed. And we are going to see what its importance is. I would even say that up to a certain point we are able from now on to begin to locate ourselves on our graph. When he poses this question: what is this cough?, it is a second degree question about the event. It is a question that he poses starting from the other, because also it is in the measure that he is in analysis that he begins to pose it; that he is into it I would say in this case - it can be seen in Ella Sharpe’s surprise - much further than she herself imagines, a little like the way in which parents are always behind on the subject of what children understand or do not understand. Here the analyst is behind as regards the fact that the patient has for a long time understood the game, namely that it is a matter of questioning oneself about the symptoms of what happens in analysis, about the smallest snag which gives rise to a question. In short, this question in connection with ‘it is a message’, is indeed here with its interrogative form in the upper part of the graph. I am putting in the lower part in order to allow you to locate where we are. It is precisely this part which I defined in another connection by saying that it was the level of the discourse of the Other.



Here in the measure that it is indeed the analytic discourse into which the subject enters. And it is literally a question about the other who is in him, about his unconscious. It is at this level of articulation which is always pressing in each subject, in so far as the subject asks himself 'But what does it want?', but which here is in no doubt about the distinction between the first verbal plane of the innocent enunciation, in so far as an enunciation that is made within analysis is not innocent. And that here the locus to which this interrogation points is indeed the one where we place what should finally be the shibboleth of analysis, namely the signifier of the Other in so far as he himself is marked by the signifier, but which is precisely what is veiled to the neurotic, and veiled to the precise extent that he is not aware of this incidence of the signifier on the other, and that in this case not only does he recognise it, but that what he is questioning himself about is far from being the response, it is the questioning. It is effectively: 'What is this signifier of the Other in me?'

In a word let us say at the outset of our presentation that he is far, and with reason, from having recognised the power of being able to recognise that the other is castrated anymore than himself. For the moment simply he is questioning himself about this innocence or learned ignorance which is constituted by the fact of being in analysis, about the following: what is this signifier, in so far as it is signifier of something in my unconscious, as it is signifier of the Other?

In Ella Sharpe's progress this is elided. What she is going to enumerate are ideas concerning the cough. This is how she takes things. Of course they are ideas concerning the cough, but they are ideas which already say a lot more than a simple mere chain of ideas which, as we know, is specifically located here on our graph. Namely that already something is being delineated.

She says to us, what does this little cough contribute? It brings first of all thoughts of lovers being together. I have read for you what the patient said. What did he say? He said something which cannot it seems to me be in any way summarised in this fashion, namely that this brings the idea of lovers being together. It seems to me that in listening to him the idea that he brings is that of the person who arrives as a third among these lovers who are together. He arrives as a third in not just any way because he arranges things so that he will not arrive as a third in too embarrassing a fashion.

In other words it is very important, from the first, to point out that there are three persons, putting them together involves variations in time, and coherent variations, namely that they are together while the third is outside. When the third has entered, they no longer are. This is obvious.

You can be certain that if it requires, as it is going to require two seminars to cover the material that this dream and its interpretation brings, a week of meditation to get to the bottom of what the patient brings us, the analysis may appear to be something insurmountable, especially as things will not fail to expand and we will be quickly swamped. But in reality this is not a valid objection at all for the good reason that to a certain degree in this schema which is already taking shape, namely that when the third is outside the two are together, and that when the third is inside the two are no longer together, I am not saying that all of what we are going to see in this connection is already there, because it would be a little simple, but we are going to see this being developed, being enriched, and in a word becoming involuted on itself as a *leit-motif* that is indefinitely reproduced and by enriching itself at every point of the plot, constitutes the whole texture of the totality. And you are going to see which.

What does Ella Sharpe next point to as being the consequence of the cough?

- a) He tackled ideas concerning lovers who are together;
- b) Rejects a sexual phantasy concerning the analyst.

Is that something which accounts for what the patient has brought? The analyst had posed him the question ‘And why cough before coming in here?’(131) just after he had explained what its purpose was if it was lovers who were inside. He says:

It is absurd because naturally I have no reason to ask myself that question, I should not be asked to come up if someone were here, and I do not think of you in that way at all. There is no need for a cough at all that I can see. It has, however, reminded me of a phantasy I had of being in a room where I ought not to be.

It is there that what Ella Sharpe is aiming at stops. Can we say that there was here rejection of a sexual phantasy concerning the analyst? It seems that there was absolutely no rejection, but that there was rather an admission. Certainly a roundabout admission, an admission by the associations which are going to follow. One cannot say that in the proposition of the analyst concerning this subject, that the subject purely and simply rejects, that he is in a position of pure and simple negation.

This seems on the contrary very typically the type of the appropriate interpretation, because this is going to involve everything that is going to follow and what we are going to see.

Now precisely this question of the sexual phantasy which is being pursued on the occasion of this entrance into the analyst’s office where the analyst is supposed to be alone, is something which is indeed in effect what is in question, and regarding which I think it is going to appear rather quickly that there is no need to be a great scholar to clarify it.

The third element that these associations bring is, Ella Sharpe tells us, the phantasy: the phantasy of being where he ought not to be and barking like a dog to put people off the scent. It is a metaphorical expression which is found in the English text: ‘To put people off the scent’.(136)

It is never a matter of indifference that one metaphor should be used rather than an other one, but here there is no trace of a scent in what the patient tells us. We have no reason to settle the question of whether or not it is repressed. I am saying that because the scent is the icing on the cake in some forms of analysis. Let us be satisfied here with what

the patient tells us.

In connection with the questioning that the analyst has addressed to him, he says to her: this reminds me of the phantasy I had of being in a room where in fact - this conforms to the analysts summary - I had no reason to be. Or more exactly where I ought not to be. And thinking someone might think I was there.

There is a double structure; the reference to the subjectivity of the other is absolutely constant. It is on this that I am going to put the accent because this is incessantly what is in question and it is here and here alone that we can centre where the desire it.

This is what is evaded all the time in the account given by Ella Sharpe, and in the way in which she is going to take into account the different incidence of tendencies.

He says then 'I thought someone might think'.

I had this phantasy that someone might think that I was there, and then I thought to prevent anyone from coming in and finding me there I would bark like a dog. That would disguise my presence. The someone would then say, 'Oh it's only a dog in there'.(132)

The paradoxical character of this phantasy of the subject very probably calls up - he says himself that the memories are those of late childhood, of adolescence. The incoherent, even absurd character of certain phantasies is nonetheless perceived with all its value, namely as being worth something, and as such retained by the analyst.

She tells us then, in the sequence of associative ideas that come to her, that it is a phantasy of being where he should not be, and barking like a dog to put people off the scent. This is correct, except that if he imagines that he is where he ought not to be, the purpose of the phantasy, the meaning of the phantasy, the obvious content of the phantasy is to show that he is not where he is. It is the other phase. A very important phase because as we are going to see, this is going to be the characteristic, the very structure of every subjective affirmation on the part of this patient, and that to cut in under such conditions by telling him that at such a point he is in a situation where he had wished to kill his counterpart, and that this is the reversal and the revenge is certainly to take sides, and to take sides in conditions where the chances of both error and success, namely of effectively making the patient adopt in a subjective fashion what you have settled on, are particularly obvious. And this is what gives this text its interest.

If on the other hand we can see that this is to highlight what is announced here in its structure, namely the meaning of what has already appeared in the phantasy, namely that he is not where he is, and we are going to see the meaning that this has perhaps, perhaps this can also lead us, as we shall see, to a quite different interpretation.

In any case, he does not assume just any ego in order to make himself not be where he is. It is of course more than clear that from the point of view of reality this phantasy is not sustainable, and that to start barking like a dog in a room where one ought not to be, is not the best way to escape attention. Let us of course leave to one side this sentence whose only value is to make us notice that we are not here in the comprehensible, but in the imaginary structure, that after all one hears things like that during a session, and one is content after all to believe that one understands because the patient appears to understand. I have told you that what is proper to every affect, to this whole margin, this accompaniment,

these fringes of internal discourse, at least especially as we can reconstitute it when we have the feeling that this discourse is precisely not a discourse that is as continuous as one believes, the fact is that the continuity is in effect and principally by means of the affect. Namely that the less motivated the affects are, the more - it is a law - they appear comprehensible to the subject.

This is not for us a reason to follow him, and that is why the remark that I made there, however evident it may appear, has all the same its importance. What we have to analyse, is the phantasy, without understanding it, namely by rediscovering in it the structure that it reveals. Now, what does it mean this phantasy? Just as above the important thing was to see that the subject was saying in connection with his cough, it is a message, it is important to perceive that this phantasy has really no meaning, the totally unreal character of its eventual efficacy. It is that the subject by barking says quite simply 'It's a dog'? Here too he makes himself other, but this is not the question. He does not ask himself what is this signifier of the other in him. He constructs a phantasy there - and that is all the same precious enough when it comes to us for us to perceive what we are being given. He makes himself other with the help of what? Of a signifier precisely. The barking here, is the signifier of what is not. He is not a dog, but thanks to this signifier the result for the phantasy is perfectly well obtained, he is other than he is.

I am going to ask you here, because we have not exhausted what is brought forward in simple association to the cough, there is a fourth element that we will see later, and in connection with this, namely on this occasion with the function of the signifier in the phantasy - because it is clear that the subject considers himself as being sufficiently covered by this phantastical barking - to make a parenthesis.

I am no longer talking to you about the dream, but about a certain elementary little clinical remark. At the end of a recent scientific communication I alluded to the fact that I wanted to bring this to your attention here.

It must be said that in such an abundance of material, what is there to be taught is so immeasurable compared to what is taught, namely what is so tiresomely repeated, that really some days I feel myself crushed to a ridiculous degree by the task that I have undertaken.

Let us take up this 'It's a dog'. I want to draw your attention to something about child psychology, to what is called genetic psychology. One tries to construct, with this child that one wishes to understand, this psychology which is called genetic, and which consists in asking oneself how this little darling who is so stupid begins to acquire his ideas. And then one asks oneself how the child proceeds. Primitively his world is supposed to be autoerotic, objects are supposed to come later.

I hope, please God, that you all have, if not directly the experience of children, at least enough patients who are able to tell you the story of their little child to see that there is nothing that is more interested in objects, in the reflection of objects than a tiny little child. Let us leave this to one side.

For the moment it is a matter of your perceiving how there comes into play in him the operation of the signifier. I mean that we can see in the child, at the source, at the origin of his grasp on the world which is offered to him and which is above all the world of the voice, a world where people speak to him, which is obviously a rather stupefying confrontation, how he is going to enter into this world.

I already alluded to something which people can notice provided they simply have an attentive ear, and do not necessarily find confirmed the preconceived ideas with which they may begin to approach the child. A friend remarked to me recently that having himself taken on the task of looking after his child to whom he devotes a lot of time, he had never spoken about a dog except as a dog. And he did not fail to be a little bit surprised at the fact that the child, who had perfectly well noted what had been named by the primitive nomination of the adult, began to call it a 'bow-wow'. Other people who may on occasion talk to me in a way that I would not say is directly illuminated by the projects for investigation that I give them, but solely because of my teaching, have pointed out to me something else that not only does the child limit to the designation of the dog this 'bow-wow' which is something which is primitively chosen in the dog among all his characteristics - and how could we be surprised at it, because the child is obviously going to begin already by qualifying his dog, but indeed before being able to handle any kind of attribute, he begins by bringing into play what he can say about him, namely that by which the animal presents itself as itself producing a sign which is not a signifier. But notice that here it is by the approach, by the chance that is presented to him by what there is in what is manifested, precisely the presence of an animal, something which is isolated enough to furnish its material, something which is an emission of the larynx, that the child lays hold of this element. As what? As something which, because it replaces the 'dog' which he has already perfectly understood and heard to the point of being able both to direct his regard towards the dog when one names the dog, and towards an image of this dog when one says dog, and replaces it by a 'bow-wow', which is to construct the first metaphor. So that it is here that we see beginning, and in a fashion which is in the closest conformity to the true genesis of language, the operation of predication.

It has been remarked that in the primitive form of language what plays the function of adjective are metaphors. This is confirmed here in the subject, except that we do not find ourselves here before some mysterious primitive operation of the spirit, but before a structural necessity of language which requires that in order that something should be engendered in the order of the signified, there must be the substitution of a signifier for another signifier.

You will say to me: what do you know about it? I mean why do you affirm that the essential is the substitution of 'bow-wow' for dog. First of all I would say to you that it is a common observation - and it was brought to me not too long ago - that from the moment that the child has been able to call a dog 'bow-wow', he will call 'bow-wow' a whole lot of things which have absolutely nothing to do with a dog, therefore immediately showing by this that what is in question is indeed effectively the transformation of the sign into a signifier which one puts to the test of all sorts of substitutions with respect to that which at that moment has no further importance whether it is other signifiers or units of the real. Because what it in question is to put the power of the signifier to the test.

The high point of this is marked in this decisive moment at which the child - it was about this that I made the remark at the end of the scientific communication that I was speaking about - declares with the greatest authority and the greatest insistence: the dog goes 'miaow', or the cat goes 'bow-wow'. An absolutely decisive point because it is at this moment that the primitive metaphor, which is constituted purely and simply by signifying substitution, by the exercise of signifying substitution, engenders the category of qualification.

You should understand what I am saying, we can in this case formalize that if you

wish, and say that the step, the progress that is accomplished consists in the fact that first of all a monolinear chain is established which says: 'Dog' = 'bow-wow', that what is in question and what is demonstrated in the clearest fashion by the fact that the child superimposes, combines one chain with another, is that he has managed to make cross over with respect to the chain, the dog goes 'bow-wow', the chain, the cat goes 'miaow'; that in substituting the 'miaow' for the 'bow-wow' he is going to bring into play the possibility of the crossing over of one chain with another, namely of a redivision of each one of the chains in two parts, what will provisionally be fixed and what no less provisionally will be mobile, namely of something of the chain which will remain, around which will turn what can change in it.

$$\frac{S' \cdot S}{S \cdot S'}$$

In other words it is only from the moment at which there is associated the S of the cat, in so far as it is signified by this sign with the S, the 'bow-wow' signifier of the dog. And that this supposes that underneath - and to begin with there is no underneath - the child links the two lines, namely that the signified of 'bow-wow', the dog, produces S the 'miaow' signifier of the cat. Only from the moment that this exercise has been accomplished, and the importance that the child gives to this exercise is quite evident and demonstrated by the fact that if the parents are tactless enough to intervene, to correct him, to reprimand him, or to chide him for saying such stupid things, the child has very lively emotional reactions, in a word he cries because he knows well what he is in the process of doing, as against the adults who think that he is being stupid.

Because it is only from that moment on, and in accordance with the formula which I already gave of the metaphor which consists very essentially in the following: it is that something at the level of the upper line is displaced, is elided, with respect to something which in the lower line of the signified is also displaced. In other words, it is to the degree that from the point of view of the graph (*scaf*) from the moment that this game has been introduced, the 'bow-wow' can be elided, that there comes in the underpinnings of the enunciating about the dog - that this enunciating becomes properly a signifying enunciating, and not a simple imitative connection with respect to reality. Whether the dog is indicated or named amounts to the same thing. But literally the fact that when the qualification, the attribution of a quality to the dog is given to him, that is not on the same line, it is on the one of quality as such. There are those who go 'bow-wow', there are those who go 'miaow', and all those who make other noises are implicated here in the verticality, in height, in order that there should begin to be born from the metaphor the dimension of adjective.

You know that it is not just yesterday that these things have been seen. Darwin had already dealt with them, except that for lack of the linguistic apparatus things remained very problematic for him. But it is a phenomenon that is so general, so essential, so functionally dominant in the development of the child that even Darwin who was inclined rather towards naturalist explanations did not fail all the same to be struck by the following. It was quite funny all the same that a child whose intelligence was already so remarkable that he could isolate the quack from the duck - this is how it is in Darwin's text, the cry of the duck that the child takes up is put in phonetic form - that this quack is referred by him to a whole series of objects whose generic homogeneity is sufficiently noted by the fact that if I remember properly there were among these objects wine and a *sous*. I am not too sure

what this *sous* designates, whether it designates a penny or something else. I have not verified what that meant in Darwin's day, but it was a coin because Darwin in his embarrassment does not fail to remark that this coin had the stamp of an eagle in the corner.

It may appear that the explanation which would unify the relationship of the quack to a general species of flying creatures on the pretext that an image as ambiguous as that of an eagle with open wings on a coin is something which we could consider as having to be homogenised by the child to his perception of the duck. Obviously that of wine, of liquid, would still create a problem. Perhaps we could simply think to ourselves there is some relationship between wine, something which would be let us say the liquid element in so far as the duck paddles in it.

We see in any case that what is once again in question is much more designated as marked by the passage of the signifying element as such; here let us admit it in the contiguity of perception if we want to admit in effect that the liquid quality is what is in question when the child applies to it the quack of the duck. You can see that it is in any case in the register of the signifying chain that we are able to grasp the fundamental thing that is established in the child in his grasp of the world as a world structured by the word.

He is not one either to look for the meaning or the essence of birds, of fluid or of *sous*. The fact is that he finds them literally by the use of nonsense. Because when all is said and done if we have the time we will pose ourselves questions about what nonsense is technically. I mean non-sense. In the English tongue it is a specific *genre*. The English tongue has two outstanding example of nonsense, specifically Edward Lear a writer of nonsense which he defined as such, and Lewis Carroll among whose works you at least know I think *The Adventures of Alice in Wonderland*.


I must say if I had to recommend a book as an introduction to someone who was going to be a child psychiatrist or a child analyst, rather than any one of the books of Mr. Piaget, I would advise him to begin by reading *Alice in Wonderland*, because he would grasp effectively something which I have the best of reasons for thinking, given everything that we know about Lewis Carroll, to be something which is based on a profound experience of children's jokes, and which effectively shows us the value, the incidence, the dimension of the operation of nonsense as such.

Here I can only begin this indication. I began it in parenthesis, and in connection with the: 'It is a dog' of our subject. I mean, from the formulated, signifying fashion in which one should interpret the phantasy that is outlined here and whose title you will easily note here I think in the term phantasy; I mean that in this phantasy: It is a dog, only a dog.

You will rediscover what I gave you as being the formula of the phantasy, namely that what the subject appears to elide is not himself in so far as there is another one there. An imaginary other, o. A first indication of the suitability of this schema for helping you locate the validity of the phantasy as such.

I come to the fourth associative element which Ella Sharpe gives us in this case. Dog again brought the memory of a dog masturbating - the intransitive use naturally.(cf.136) It is a question of a dog who is masturbating, as the patient told it, namely that as immediately after the schema a dog 'That reminds me of a dog rubbing himself against my leg, really masturbating himself. I'm ashamed to tell you because I did not stop him. I let him go on and someone might have come in.'(132)

Is the connotation of this as an element to be put in the sequence of the chain by the analyst, namely: the memory of a dog that is masturbating, something which should completely satisfy us here? I do not believe so. Because this element allows us to advance again a little further into what is in question in this message bringing the dream. And to show you the first loop which was gone through by the associations of the patient, and to show you the place that it is, I would say that nothing is more obvious on this occasion than the associative line. It is precisely what I am drawing here for you in dots.



in so far as it is in the enunciating of the subject; these broken signifying elements are going to pass into ordinary and normal speech by these two points that have been mapped out of the message and the code, and the message and the code being here something of a quite different nature than the partner who speaks the same tongue who is in question in the term of the other O.

And what we see here in this associative line that has been travelled, is precisely first of all the fact that we have got there in the form; it is a question of the signifier of the other who is in me. That is the question. And what the subject in this connection begins to unwind here is nothing less than to pass by this point here to which we will come back subsequently, then here at d, at the level where there is the question of his desire.

What is he doing by giving this little cough, namely at the moment he enters a place where there is something that he does not know anything about; a sexual fantasy (*fantaisie*) involving the analyst... What shows itself by pushing his own phantasy, namely he himself there, if he were at the place of the other he would first of all think of not being there. Or more exactly of being taken for someone other than himself. And now we arrive at what? Very exactly at what happens. The scene here is all of a sudden exposed, developed by the patient. What happens is what: this dog in so far as it is himself he is not there. Here this dog is no longer phantastical, but well and truly this time in reality it is an other, no longer a signifier in any way, but an image, a companion in this room, and a companion all the more obviously close to him, assimilated to him, that it is against his own leg, to the patient that the dog comes to masturbate.

What is the schema of what happens at this moment? It is essentially founded on the fact that the other, here the animal *qua* real, and which we know to have a relationship to the subject because the subject took care previously to inform us of it, he could imaginarily be this animal on condition that he takes on the signifier barking. This other who was present is masturbating. He shows him something, very precisely by masturbating. Is the situation determined here? No, as the patient himself tells us, there is the possibility that someone might enter, and then what shame, the situation would no longer be sustainable. The subject would literally disappear with shame before this other witness of what is happening.

In other words, what is articulated here: show me what I must do, on condition that the other in so far as he is the big Other, the third, is not there. I look at the other who I am,

this dog, on condition that the other does not come in, otherwise I would disappear with shame. But on the contrary this other that I am, namely this dog, I look on him as an ego-ideal, as doing what I am not doing, as an ideal of potency as Ella Sharpe will later say, but undoubtedly not in the sense that she intends because precisely that has nothing to do with the words. Here it is to the degree precisely that the dog is not himself a speaking animal that he can here be the model and the image, and that the subject can see in him what he desires to see, namely that he is shown what he should do, what he can do, and this in so far as he is out of sight of the other, the someone who might come in, and of the one who speaks.

And in other words, it is in so far as I have not yet gone to my analyst that I can imagine her, namely Ella Sharpe the poor woman, showing me by masturbating, and I cough in order to warn her that she has to take up a normal position.

It is in this game between the two others, the one who does not speak that one imagines, and the one to whom one is going to speak, that he is asked to be careful lest the confrontation should happen too quickly, lest the subject should begin to disappear. This is the point, the level. Where all of a sudden the memory of the dream is going to emerge. Well we will take up the dream the next time so that we can see that the interest of what the dream and the phantasy is going to show us is very precisely that it is the contrary of this phantasy that is forged in the waking state whose features we have today been circumscribing.

Seminar 10: Wednesday 28 January 1959

This research, this exercise which we are carrying out is to show you how in the use that we already make in our experience, practically, of the notion of desire, we presuppose without knowing it a certain number of relationships, of coordinates which are the ones that I am trying to situate by showing you that they are always the same, that it is therefore important to recognise them, because by failing to recognise them thinking always slips a little more to the right, a little more to the left, gets attached to coordinates that are badly defined, and that this is not without giving rise to problems in the way interpretation is practised.

Today I am going to continue the analysis of the dream that I chose in Ella Sharpe precisely for its exceptionally well elucidated character. And we are going to see things from these two aspects. the degree to which what she says, and the sharp, subtle, remarkable things that she says in this observation of the session in which the dream is analysed and the two sessions which follow - what is most remarkable in it is that it is something which is so well inscribed in the categories whose usage I am trying to teach you, that it is thanks to this that one can give to these elements all their value - and the degree to which by failing precisely to distinguish the originality of these elements, she manages to reduce in some way their importance, allows their colour and their features to fade a little, by mixing them, by reducing them to more impoverished, more summary notions which prevent her from getting everything that she could from what she has in her hands.

But here and now, to fix if you wish in your minds something which is destined to take shape always more precisely and a little better, I think that you are beginning to glimpse what the two stories of the graph mean. In sum this route of analytic enunciating which returns on itself in so far as it is I would say liberated by the principle, the rule of free association, tends towards what? To highlight as far as possible what is included in every discourse, a signifying chain of everything that each one knows *qua* fragmented, namely of interpretable elements.

And these interpretable elements, *qua* fragmented, appear precisely in the measure that the subject tries to reconquer himself in his originality, to be beyond what demand has fixed.

has imprisoned in him in terms of his needs. And in so far as the subject, in the expression of his needs, primitively finds himself caught up, moulded in the necessities which are proper to the demand, and which are essentially founded on the fact that already the form of the demand is altered, alienated by the fact that we must think in this form of language, it is already in the register of the other as such, in the code of the other that it must be inscribed.

It is at that level that there is produced the primitive separation, the primitive distance of the subject with respect to something which in its roots is his need, but which cannot, when it arrives, be the same thing, because it is going to be reconquered at the arrival, but only conquered beyond the demand, only in something realised by language, in

the form of the subject who speaks, and that this something which is called what the subject wants is something which is referred to the fact that the subject is going to constitute himself as being in a relationship that is no longer in a way immanent, completely included in his living participation, but on the contrary as declaring, as being, and therefore in a certain relationship to being.

In this interval - it is between language which is purely and simply questioning (*guesitif*), and language which is articulated, in which the subject responds to the question of what he wants, in which the subject constitutes himself with respect to what he is - it is in this interval that there is going to be produced this something which is going to be called specifically desire. And this desire, in this double inscription of the graph, is something which has some homology with this desire in so far as it is situated somewhere in the upper part of its coordinates, and the function that the ego has in so far as this discourse of the other corrects itself, and that the appeal to the other for the satisfaction of a need is constituted with respect to the other in what I sometimes called the full word, the committed word, in a relationship such as the following in which the subject constitutes himself with respect to the other, when he says to the other, 'You are my master, you are my wife', this relationship which takes the ego and which establishes it with respect to an object in order to return here in the form of a message.

There is some homology between this relationship in which the ego is captured in the discourse of the other and the simple fact that someone speaks about me as me, about himself as himself; there is something articulated in a fragmentary way, which requires a deciphering of a special order of desire. Just as the ego is constituted in a certain imaginary relationship to the other, so also desire is established, is fixed somewhere in the discourse of the other, halfway to this discourse, in which the subject by his whole life tends to complete himself in something in which his being halfway declares itself.

Desire is a reflection, a return in this effort by which the subject situates himself somewhere before what I designate for you as phantasy - namely the relationship of the subject *qua* evanescent, in so far as he vanishes in a certain relationship to an elective object, the phantasy always has this structure; it is never simply an object relation. The phantasy is something which cuts, a certain vanishing, a certain signifying fainting of the subject in the presence of an object. The phantasy satisfies a certain accommodation, a certain fixation of the subject, something which has an elective value. The electivity of this value, is what I am trying to show you this year with the help of a certain number of examples.

In this opposition of the subject to a certain object there is something which is implicit in the phantasy, in as much as it is the preface, the prelude to the dream enunciated by the subject. I think I already gave you a sense of it the last time.

The subject arrives and begins to speak about his cough, a message about a message, about this cough which is given as a mysterious warning before going into a room where two others might be, two others who might be making love, to warn them that it is time to separate. On the other hand, in the associations, we see that this cough is something which is very close to a phantasy which he gives right away. Namely that he imagined in an old phantasy that if he were somewhere, and did not want to be found there because he ought not to be in this somewhere, he could bark like a dog, and everyone would say, oh, it's a dog.

The barking reveals itself, as being the signal by which the subject profoundly

absents himself from the place where he is, signals himself as being other. And the correlation of the cough with the fact that a couple of others among whom a third association shows us that the subject is also included - because this dog whom he has been in order to bark, namely to make himself other than he is, we see now that in a third memory, this time of a real event, he tells us that this dog is a dog which came to masturbate against his leg: and what would have happened if the two of them had been surprised? In short we see being outlined something which, from the structural order, is essential.

When the two who are within a certain enclosure are confronted there face to face with one another in a properly imaginary relationship which means that what is in question is fairly well marked by the fact that this dog masturbates against his leg, this dog on this occasion, by the very phantasy in connection with which he is introduced, is himself also imaginary, the one who shows himself masturbating, so that he is not absent from the couple of lovers.

But what is essential is not simply to describe that the subject's identification, as one might expect, is everywhere. It is just as much with the subject who is outside, and who announces himself, as with the subject who is inside and who is caught up in the relationships of the couple with what it involves in terms of common imaginary fascination. Either the two elements of the imaginary, dual couple remain joined in the common fascination here of the act, between embracing, intercourse and the specular fascination; either they remain joined and the other should not be there, or the other shows himself and then the others separate and break up.

It is the structure which it is important to highlight. It is what alters the problem, because when all is said and done what does the subject tell us: that he gave a little cough before going into his analyst even though it is clear that if he has been asked to come up it is because there was nobody else there, because she is all alone; that besides these are not the things, he says, which I would allow myself to think about in connection with you. However this indeed is the problem.

The subject by coughing, namely on the one hand by carrying out this act whose signification he himself does not know because he poses the question of its signification, in making himself by this cough like the dog with its bark other than he is he does not himself know what is this message, and nevertheless he announces himself by this cough. And in announcing himself what does he imagine? What does he imagine there is inside the room for this cough that he signals for us as being in this case an impulse, a compulsion, something which annoys him because it overcame him - it is he himself who signals it, and I highlighted in this connection how striking it is that Ella Sharpe thought that in this connection she should not speak about it, that the subject was not conscious of it and that he should not be made conscious of it, even though it is he himself who introduces these questions, who says that it is a message, about what I do not know, but it is very clear - what does he imagine there is inside, what is the object that is there while he is outside, and announces himself in this fashion which alienates him, by this message which he does not understand? By this message whose association with the dog's bark is there to show that it is to announce himself as another, as someone other than himself that this condition manifests itself.

And notice that after making this loop, a first circuit in which he speaks to us first of all about his cough as a message, then of this phantasy in which he imagined himself to be a dog, we have pointed out in reality the linking of himself with a dog in a room, having in a

way traced this passage in an indefinite, ambiguous fashion because he passes consecutively through something which reflects his desire, then embodies his phantasy, he comes back after having completed the loop somewhere. Because from that moment he is going to change register.

At the very moment that my last lecture ended, the subject, the analyst tells us, coughs again, he gives a little cough, as if he were punctuating.(132) After this little cough he tells the dream which I already read.

What I want to tell you is what, starting from this, and in this dream, in connection with this dream, our aim is going to be. I told you that what is manifested in the dream about the relationship of desire to phantasy is manifested with an accentuation which is exactly the opposite of the one which was given in the phantasy which came in the associations. There what was accentuated was that the subject himself barks. He barks, it is a message, an announcement. He announces himself as essentially other. It is on the plane of a relationship which disguises him in so far as he barks like a dog that he does not understand why he proceeds in this way, that he should put himself in the position either of not being there, or if he is there of announcing himself as an other, and in such a way that the others at that moment, namely what is there to be seen, separate, disappear, no longer show what is there to be shown.

The enigma, is obviously what he imagines. The enigmatic character being well underlined by the fact that in effect what can he have to announce, desire to announce for him to give this cough at the moment that he enters his analyst's office? What is veiled is that aspect of the relationship with this object x who is on this occasion I would not say his analyst, but what is in the room.

In the dream what we are going to see being put completely in the foreground, is something which is here. It is an imaginary element as we are going to see, which is not an indifferent one. And as you might expect, being in a dream it is marked by a certain function. What I have taught you about dreams would have no meaning if this function were not a signifier-function. We know well that what belongs to this aspect of the relationship in the phantasy of the subject, is also something which must have a complex function, not be just an image, but something signifying. But this remains veiled, enigmatic for us. We cannot articulate it as such.

All that we know, is that from the other side of the relationship, the subject has announced himself as other. Namely as a subject marked by the signifier, as a barred subject. In the dream, it is the image that we have, and what we do not know, is what is on the other side, namely: what is he, in this dream, namely what Ella Sharpe, in her interpretation of the dream, is going to try to articulate for him.

We now take the associations connected with the dream. Immediately after the subject has made this remark which concludes the dream, about the usage of the verb 'to masturbate' which he had used in a transitive sense, and regarding which he points out that he should have used it intransitively in order to use it in a correct fashion, that having said: 'She was so disappointed I thought that I would masturbate her.'

It is obviously something else that is in question, either it is a question of the subject masturbating himself - this indeed is what the analyst thinks, and this is what she is going to suggest to him immediately by underlining what the subject himself has remarked, namely that the verb should have been used intransitively. In this connection the subject remarks

that in effect that it was very rare for him to masturbate anybody. He only did it once with another boy. 'That is the only time I can remember.' And he continues: 'The dream is in my mind vividly. There was no orgasm. I see the front of her genitals, the end of the vulva.' And he describes something large and projecting hanging downwards like a fold on a hood. 'Hoodlike it was, and it was this that the woman made use of in manoeuvring' (it is the term that he had used in the dream). 'The vagina seemed to close around my finger. The hood seemed strange.'(133)

The analyst replies: 'What else do you think of - let the look of it be in your mind.'
The patient replies:

I think of a cave. There is a cave on the hillside where I lived as a child. I often went there with my mother. It is visible from the road along which one walks. It's most remarkable feature is that it has an overhanging top to it which looks very much like a huge lip.(134)

Something like the grotto of the cyclops at Capri where the coast is littered with things like that: a cave with a part of it projecting forward. In this connection he makes a very remarkable association.

There is some joke about the labia running crosswise and not longitudinally, but I don't remember how the joke was arranged, some comparison between Chinese writing and our own, starting from different sides, or from bottom to top. Of course the labia are side by side, and the vagina walls are back and front, that is one longitudinal and the other crosswise. I'm still thinking of the hood', he says.

These jokes, which in English are a sort of part of the cultural heritage, are well known, they are generally in the form of limericks. The limerick is something which is very important and revealing. I am only mentioning that. I searched in a fairly large collection of some three thousand limericks. This limerick certainly exists, I saw others which were close to it. I do not even know why the theme of China seems precisely to be considered - there was this sort of inversion of the written line - evoked, every time something comes close to a certain assimilation, and at the same time an opposition between the line of the genital slit and that of the mouth, which is transversal, with also what is supposed to be behind the line of the genital slit in terms of the transversality of the vagina.

This goes to show that all of this is very very ambiguous. The closest thing to it, and something which is amusing because of the fact that one cannot see why especially China should come into this association, is the following, limerick 1381 of a work on limericks (English quotation):

There was a young woman from China
who thought her mouth was her vagina
She covered her enormous clitoris with rouge
And put lipstick on her labia minora (?)

This loses its spice in translation, but it is pretty remarkable that it is in any case something which is extremely close to what we are dealing with, and its author underlines for us that the superpositioning of two images, one which is here an image of the mouth, the other which is a genital image, is very essential .

What am I going to call attention to here? It is in connection with something with

regard to which analytic thought slips right away towards imaginary elements, namely the assimilation of the mouth to the vagina, the mother's womb considered as the primitive element of engulfing or of devouring - and we have all sorts of different testimonies from ethnology, folklore, psychology which show this primitive relationship, as being that of container to contained, that the child may have with respect to what one can call the maternal image.

Does it not seem to you that at this level something deserves to be retained of which I would say that it has quite the same accent as the point that I stopped you at the other time when it was a question of the big and the small giraffe. It was not simply the element between the small and the big, between the mother and the phallus; these elements were what little Hans made of them; one could sit on them, crumple them up; they were symbols, they were already in phantasy things transformed into paper.

One could say in a fashion that is more nuanced, more interrogative, more subject to confirmation, but let us say to punctuate what we are dealing with that this is not nothing, that it is not invalid to introduce there something concerning this very remarkable represented imaginary element which is in the dream and which was depicted for us as something very precisely described, 'the fold on a hood'. This is not nothing. It is something which already has a certain structure, which covers, which caps, which is also dreaded; and the finger introduced - 'to close round' - into this element, this sudden fright is also something which gives us something quite precise as an image, something which should not be lost in a simple general structure of envelopment or of devouring or of swallowing up. It is already put into a certain relationship, precisely with the subject's finger. And I would even say that this is the whole question. Does he or does he not put his finger there? It is certain that he puts his finger there and that he does not put anything else, in particular that he does not put there his penis, which is there present; that this relationship with what has enveloped, gloved the hand is something which is here quite prevalent, put forward, pushed forward at the outcome of the representativity as Freud says to designate the third element active in the dream-work (*Traumarbeit*).

It is a question of knowing what we should make of this. Whether we should immediately resolve it into a series of readymade, preformed significations, namely everything that one is going to be able to put under that heading, ourselves introduce into this kind of conjurers hat everything that we are used to finding in it, or whether we should dwell on this, respect it as something which has here a specific value.

You must see, when I say specific value, provided you have a little bit more than book-knowledge about what a phantasy-life like this can be, that after all that it is quite appropriate that we should not lose this in the very general notion for example of the interior of the mother's stomach of which there is so much talk in phantasies.

Something which is so well developed in the dream deserves to be dwelt on. What we have here before us, is certainly not the interior of a uterus, it is overhanging, this edge which is projecting. And moreover, because she is extremely subtle, Ella Sharpe underlines further on, in a passage which we may subsequently have to encounter, that we are before something remarkable. It is a projection, she says, and immediately afterwards in the passage she announces it is equivalent to a penis.(144)

This is possible, but why hurry one's self. All the more because she also underlines at this moment that it is difficult to make of this projection something linked to the presence of the vagina. It is sufficiently accentuated in the dream, and by the very manoeuvre to

which the subject lends himself, I would say substitutes for himself by putting his finger there and not his penis. How could one not see that very precisely this something is localised as one might say in this phantasy which is in effect, as the subject articulates it, something which has the closest relationship with the front and back walls of the vagina; that in a word for a doctor whose profession it is to practice medicine - which was not the case of Ella Sharpe who was a teacher of literature, and this gave her great openings into psychology - it is a prolapse, something which happens in the wall of the vagina in which there occurs this projection of the front wall more or less followed by projections of the back wall and which at a still further stage makes the tip of the cervix appear at the genital orifice. It is something extremely frequent which poses all sorts of problems for a surgeon.

This is not what is in question. Naturally there is here something which brings into play immediately the question and the phantasy of the phallic woman, it is so true that I remembered for your benefit - I was not able to verify the passage (it is a fact that is well enough known for it not to be new for some of you) that Queen Christina of Sweden, the friend of Descartes, who was a tough woman like all the women of that epoch - one could not insist too much on the influence on history of the women of that marvellous half of the eighteenth century. Queen Christina herself one day saw appearing at the orifice of the vulva the tip of a uterus which, without us knowing the reasons for it, happened at that moment of her existence to gape open in a quite characteristic case of uterine collapse (or prolapse).

It was then that giving way to a gross flattery her doctor fell at her feet saying: 'It is a miracle, Jupiter has finally rendered to you your true sex'. Which proves that the phantasy of the phallic woman does not date from yesterday even in the history of medicine or of philosophy.

This is not what is in the dream, nor should it be understood - the analyst remarks on it later in the observation - that the subject's mother for example had a prolapse. Although why not because in the articulation of her understanding of what is happening the analyst remarks that the subject very probably saw all sorts of things from underneath, that some of his imaginings make us think that there could have been, that there even must have been, in order that her interpretation should be coherent, something analogous, namely a certain apprehension from underneath the skirt of the genital organ (and of that of his mother). But why not go in this direction?

But that is not it. We will be much more entitled to do it in this sense than the analyst herself, in so far as in a little while she is going to pass necessarily by way of this supposition. For our part we have not yet got there. I point out simply that once there is question of references to images of the body - they are going to be brought into play in the interpretation - one would not be precise, why would one not distinguish the haunting memory, or the desire, or the fear of returning into the maternal womb, and the relationship very especially with the vagina which after all is not something of which, as can be seen clearly in this simple explanation, the subject could not have some direct or indirect apprehension.

What I simply wish to underline here, after having marked the special accent of this image of the dream, is that in any case something retains us. It is the fact that the subject associates it right away with something of a quite different order, with this poetic or verbal game which I gave you an example of and not simply to amuse myself - it is to give an idea of the extremely rigorous literary style; it is a *genre* which has the strictest of laws - and it does not matter whether it is a joke or a limerick, bearing on a story defined literally, and

itself bearing on a game concerning writing. Because what we have not found in the limerick that we dug up, is something that the subject affirms that he has heard. It was in referring to the different direction of lines of writing in our way of writing and the Chinese that he evokes at that moment something which is not all that obvious in this association: namely precisely something which puts him on the track of a link between the orifice of the genital lips and the lips of the mouth.

Let us take it that this link as such belongs to this symbolic order. What are more symbolic are the lines of Chinese characters, because it is something which is there, which designates to us that in any case this element here in the dream is an element which has a signifying value, that in this sort of adaptation, of assimilation, of accommodation of desire in so far as it constructs itself somewhere in relation to a phantasy which is between the signifier of the other and the signified of the other - because that is the definition of phantasy - in so far as desire has to accommodate itself to it.

And what am I saying there if not expressing in a more articulated fashion what our experience is when we are seeking to focus what the desire of the subject is. It is that, something which is a certain position of the subject face to face with a certain object in so far as he puts it in an intermediary position between a pure and simple signification, a thing assumed, clear, transparent for him, and something else which is not a phantasy at all, which is not a need, which is not a pressure, a rope (*filin*), but something which is always of the order of the signifier *qua* signifier, something closed, enigmatic. Between the two there is a thing which appears here in the form of a representation which is tangible, extremely precise, imaged. And the subject, warns us by his very associations: this is what is significant.

What am I going to do now? Am I going to go into the way in which the analyst interprets? I must therefore let you know all the material that we have.

What does this analyst say at that moment as she continues: 'What else do you think of?' She replies to the fact that the subject takes up after having coughed, comes back to the hood. 'I'm still thinking of the hood.' 'Yes, how now?', says the analyst.

A funny man, he says, at one of the earliest golf courses I remember. He said he could get me a golf bag cheaply and the material would be motor hood cloth. (At this point he gives an imitation after having said:) It was the accent I remember. Imitating him like that reminds me of a friend who broadcasts impersonations which are very clever, ('broadcast' is the important word), but it sounds swank, to tell you as swanky as telling you what a marvellous wireless set I have. It picks up all stations with no difficulty. ... My friend has a splendid memory, he says. She remembers her childhood too, but mine is so bad below eleven years. I do remember, however, one of the earliest songs we heard at the theatre and she imitated the man afterwards.

It is a typical English music hall song which goes as follows: 'Where did you get that hat, where did you get that tile?' The tile designates more particularly what is called in this case a topper, a top hat. It can also signify simply lid, or *galurin*.

My mind, he continues, has gone to the hood again and I am remembering the first car I was ever in. (But at that time of course it was not called a car but a motor, because the subject is fairly old.)

Well! The hood of this motor was one of its most obvious features. It was strapped back when not in use. The inside of it was lined with scarlet. And he continues: The peak of speed for that car was about sixty. (He speaks about this car as if he were speaking about the life of a car, as if it were human). I remember I was sick in that car, and that reminds me of the time I had to urinate into a paper bag when I was in a railway train as a child. Still I think of the hood.(134-135)

We are going to stop here in the associations. They do not go very far yet, but I want all the same to counterpoint what I am bringing you here with the way in which the analyst begins to interpret this. ‘The first thing of importance’ she says, ‘is to find the cardinal clue to the significance of the dream.’ She says quite rightly: ‘We can do that by noting just the moment when it came to the patient’s mind.’ (138) And then she begins to speak about the dog which masturbated against his leg, about the moment when just before he spoke about the dog to say that he himself imitated this dog, then the cough, then the dream from which he awoke perspiring.

‘The deduction,’ she says, ‘concerning the significance of the whole dream is that it is a masturbation phantasy.’(138) I am in complete agreement with this.

That is of first importance, we agree with her completely. ‘The next thing to notice,’ she says, ‘in connection with this masturbation phantasy is the theme of potency.’ She does not understand it in the sense of sexual potency, but in the sense of potency in the most universal meaning of the term, as she would say further on, of omnipotence.

He is travelling round the world. It is the longest dream he has ever had. (This is what the subject says). It would take a whole hour to relate. Correlate with that his deprecation of swank regarding his friends impersonations which are broadcast for the whole world (the analyst adds), ‘and his own wireless which picks up every station. Note his own imitation of the man whose accent had attracted him, a strong colloquial accent, and incidentally he said with regard to this man he had once been a butcher.

‘Impersonation here, whether via friend or himself, has the significance of imitating a stronger or better known person.’ Is she wrong here? ‘This is again a further clue to the meaning of the masturbation phantasy, that is, a phantasy in which he is impersonating another person, one of immense power and potency.’ (139) Here therefore is what is held by the analyst to be self-evident. Namely that the simple fact of these mimed incarnations intervening more or less in connection with - the masturbation phantasy being supposed to be at the root of what happens - the very fact that the subject excused himself for swanking, for boasting, for pushing himself too much, signifies that we have a phantasy of omnipotence which should be put in the foreground.

And is this something that we can subscribe to right away? Once again I would simply ask you here to notice that the least that can be said is that there is perhaps some confusion in saying that it is a matter of an omnipotence that is wished for, or more or less secretly assumed by the subject, even though it seems that this subject, if we keep to the first approach of the dream, its manifest content in this case is rather on the contrary to reduce, to minimise. And the analyst herself underlines it on another occasion about the hood. The analyst is in fact so much further on than her own interpretation under the influence of a certain apprehension of that, of this reduced aspect of the subject in his whole presence in this phantasy, that she always says that he saw or perceived that when he was a tiny child.

In fact what do we see? We see rather the subject making himself small. In the presence of this kind of vaguely testicular appendix which at the very most he dares approach with a finger which he should perhaps cap, cover, protect, in any case distancing from himself and from the proper exercise of his potency, in any case sexual potency, this signifying object, it is perhaps going a little far, and it is always the same confusion, to confuse the omnipotence imputed to the subject as even more or less denied, with what is on the contrary quite clear on this occasion, the omnipotence of the word.

But the fact is that there is a world between the two because it is precisely in contact with the word that the subject is in difficulty. He is a lawyer, he is very talented, he is seized by the most severe phobias every time he has to appear, to speak. We are told at the beginning that his father died when he was three years old, that the subject had the greatest trouble in bringing him to life a little bit in his memories; but what is the only memory which remains absolutely clear for him. There has been transmitted to him in the family that the last word of his father had been: 'Robert must take my place'.(127) In what sense is the death of the father dreaded? Is it in so far as the father is dead or in so far as the dying father spoke, said, 'He must take my place. Namely be where I am, where I am dying?'

The difficulty of the subject with respect to the word, this distance which means that he uses the word precisely to be elsewhere, and that inversely there is nothing harder for him than not just speaking, but making his father speak - that was only recently reached and it was a startling moment for him the analyst tell us to think that his father spoke - it is not something which at least ought to encourage us to accentuate for him more than for someone else this division between the other *qua* speaking and the other *qua* imaginary. Because to be honest, is there not a certain prudence required at this level.

The analyst finds a confirmation of the omnipotence of the subject in the immense character of the dream. The immense character of the dream we can only know about it from the subject. It is he who tells us that he has had a tremendous dream, that there was a huge story beforehand, that there was a whole tour around the world, a hundred thousand adventures which would take an enormous time to tell, that he not going to bore the analyst with. But when all is said and done the mountain gives birth to a little story, to a mouse. If there is here also a notion of something which is indicated as a horizon of omnipotence, it is a narrative but a narrative which is not told. The omnipotence is always on the side of the other, on the side of the world of the word as such. Should we right away see the subject in this case as in terms of what is supposed, and what will immediately be implied in the thinking of the analyst, as being the structure of the subject, not alone this phantasy as omnipotent, but with the aggressivity that this involves?

It is at this that we should first of all stop to situate precisely what I am in the process of trying to get you to notice, namely the partiality that sometimes appears to occur in the interpretations in the measure that there is ignored a difference of plane which, when it is sufficiently accentuated in the structure itself, must be respected. It is on this condition alone that we know that this difference of plane exists.

What is the question that is posed immediately afterwards, says the analyst, it is 'why this phantasy of extreme power?' The answer is given in the dream. He is going around the world. I would put as commensurate with this idea the actual memory that came to him when he was describing the hood in the dream which was so strange, for it brought out not only the fact that he was describing a projection, a fold of a hood, but that the hood was also overhanging like the lip of a cave. So that

we get directly the hood and lips of the vulva compared with the great cave on the hillside to which he went with his mother. Hence the masturbation phantasy is one associated with immense potency because he is dreaming of compassing mother earth, of being adequate to the huge cave beneath the protruding lips. That is the second thing of importance.(139)

You see how the analyst's thinking proceeds on this occasion. Incontestably you cannot avoid sensing a leap here. That there is a relationship because of the association, this is demonstrated, between this memory of the child where he himself was covered, as they say, and the one that is in question, mainly the signifying value of the phantasy that I would call the prolapse phantasy, this of course is not to be excluded. That the subject should be considered by this very fact as being the classical subject as I might say, of the oedipal relationship, namely the subject who raises himself to the level of this embracing of the mother which here becomes the very embracing of mother earth of the whole world, there is here something which seems to me to be a step that is taken too quickly, especially when we know the way, beside this classic, grandiose, schema of the oedipal hero, in so far as he shows himself to be able for the mother, the degree to which opposed to this schema we can see the fact that separated out so well from a phase of the evolution of the child, namely the moment when very precisely the integration of his organ as such is linked to a feeling of inadequacy - contrary to what the analyst says - as regards what would be in question in an enterprise such as the conquest or the embracing of the mother. Effectively this element can play a role, plays an incontestable role, manifested in an altogether immediate way in a great number of observations concerning precisely this narcissistic relationship of the subject to his penis in so far as it is considered by him to be more or less insufficient, too small.

There is not only the relationship with his counterparts, the masculine rivals, coming into play. Clinical experience shows us on the contrary that the inadequacy of the penis with respect to the feminine organ which is supposed to be quite enormous with respect to the masculine organ, is something too important for us to go so quickly here.

The analyst continues:

Next I would draw your attention to the associations concerning lips and labia. The woman who was a stimulus for the dream had full red passionate lips. In the dream he had a vivid picture of the labia and the hood. The cave had an overhanging lip. He thinks of things longitudinal like labia and then of crosswise things - where I would now suggest the mouth as compared with vulva. (This without commentary.) He thinks, moreover, of the first motor he was in and of its hood and of the scarlet lining in that motor. He then thinks immediately of the speed of the car, and says the peak of its speed was so many miles an hour, and then speaks of the life of the car and notices that he talks of a car as if it were human.' (From that,) I should deduce that the memory of the actual cave which he visited with his mother also acts as a cover memory. I would deduce that there is projected onto the motor with its scarlet lined hood this same forgotten memory and that the peak of speed has the same significance as the projection in the genitals in the dream - it is the peak of the hood. I infer there is an actual repressed memory of seeing the genitals of someone much older than himself; of seeing them when he was tiny and I infer this from both the car and the cave and going around the world in conjunction with the immense potency required. The peak, the hood, I interpret as the clitoris.'(140)

Here all the same, a little like the way I said above that the mountain announced by

the dream gave birth to a mouse, there is something analogous to be seen in what I would almost call the mumblings of the analyst.

I am willing to accept that this peak of speed is identifiable with the hood, but if it is really something so pointed, so enormous, how can it be associated with a real memory, experienced in childhood. There is all the same some exaggeration in concluding so daringly that it is a question here for the subject of a screen memory concerning an effective experience of the feminine genital organ in so far as it is a question of the clitoris. This indeed in effect is what nevertheless the analyst resorts to in mentioning at that moment as a key element the fact that his sister is eight years older than him, and the references he made to the woman's voice and to the voice of the impersonated man, which are alike by imitation. 'Considering that the reference to her is in connection with male impersonation, I deduce that at least when he was very tiny he saw her genitals, noticed the clitoris and heard her urinate.' She has to however immediately afterwards further evoke, considering all the work in analysis so far done, that 'in addition there was some babyhood situation in which he had a quite definite opportunity of seeing his mother's genitals.'

All the details suppose that in his memories, in these images, that he would have been at that moment lying on the floor, when he saw something or other.

I am going all the same to punctuate for you hear something which will indicate to you at least where I want to get to in these criticisms in which I am teaching you to look for, to spell out as one might say the sense in which a certain number of inflections in the understanding of what is presented to us are going, which are not destined I believe to increase its likelihood, nor indeed above all, you will see this when we get to it, give it its proper interpretation.

I must all the same make my position clear. I mean tell you where I am trying to get to, what I intend to say in opposition to this tunnel within which the thinking of the analyst is engaged. And you will see that these interpretations are in this regard extremely active, even brutal, suggesting that the root of the question is the aggressive character of his own penis. You will see that it is his penis *qua* aggressive organ, *qua* an organ which brings into play the dangerous and deleterious character of the water that it emits, namely the urination which you have seen evoked in this case, and to which we will have occasion to come back, since the analyst obtains an effect which we need not be surprised at in that an adult subject, and one who is rather old, wet his bed the following night. But let us leave this to one side.

What I mean is the following: I believe that this dream, if I may anticipate a little what I believe I am going to be able to demonstrate for you by continuing this painful and slow work of line by line analysis of what is presented to us.

Where is the question posed in what can be called the fundamental phantasy of the subject in so far as it is presentified? The subject imagines something, we do not know what, concerning his analyst - I will tell you what the analyst herself thinks about the point reached in the transference. This transference is at that moment a transference of a clearly imaginary type. The analyst is focused, centred as something which is essentially, with respect to the subject, in the relationship of an other ego. The whole rigid, measured, attitude of defence, as the analyst very well senses it, in the presence of Ella Sharpe, is something which indicates a very tight specular relationship with the analyst. And contrary to what Ella Sharpe says, it is very far from being an indication that there is no transference. It is a certain type of transference from a dual imaginary source.

This analyst, in so far as she is the image of him, is in the process of doing what? This imposes itself already. It is quite clear that what the subject warns her against by his little cough, is that she is dreaming of masturbating. This is what she is thought to be in the process of doing. But how do we know it? We do not know it immediately, and this is very important. How could we know it? it is to the degree that in the dream the matter is then quite clear because it is precisely what the subject is saying: namely that there is someone masturbating. The analyst recognises quite correctly that it is a question of the subject masturbating, that it is he who is dreaming. But that the dream is the manifested intention in the subject of masturbating her - adding that this is an intransitive verb - is enough to put us on the track of the following: that the signifying phantasy that is in question is that of the close link between a male and female element taken along the theme of a sort of enveloping. I mean that the subject is not simply captured, contained in the other. In so far as he masturbates her, he masturbates himself, but also he does not masturbate.

I mean that the fundamental image that is in question, which is presentified there by the dream, is of a sort of sheath, a glove. They are moreover in fact the same words. Sheath (*gaine*) is the same word as vagina (*vagin*).

Here are two linguistic encounters which are not without signification. There would be a lot to say from the linguistic point of view about the sheath, the glove, the scabbard (*fourreau*), because I think there is here a whole chain of images which it is extremely important to locate, because they are much more constant you will see, and present, not just in this particular case but in many other cases.

What is in question is that the imaginary, signifying person is something in which the subject sees in a way, enveloped, captured, every sort of possibility of his sexual manifestation. It is with respect to this central image that he signifies his desire and that his desire is in a way stuck.

I am going to try to show it to you because I must do a little more to justify the following notion: in the sequence of associations there is going to appear an idea which crossed the subject's mind, the analyst tells us, during the recent associations. The subject in the course of his duties must go to a place where the king and queen are to be present. He is haunted by the idea of having a breakdown in the middle of the road, and by this of blocking the passage of the royal motor car. The analyst sees here once more the manifestations of the omnipotence dreaded by the subject for himself, and even goes so far as to see in it - we will see this in detail the next time - the fact that the subject had the opportunity, during some primitive scenes of intervening in this fashion, of stopping something, the parents, during this primitive scene.

What on the contrary seems to me to be very striking, is precisely the function of the car to which we will return. The subject is in a car, and far from separating anything by this stopping - he no doubt stops the others; we know well that he stops everything because this is what is in question; that is why he is in analysis; everything stops, he stops the others, the royal, parental couple on this occasion in a car and well and truly in a single car which envelops them like the hood of his car, which he evoked by his associations, reproducing the character of the covering cave.

We are at the time when Melanie Klein is beginning to show the relationship between it and sexual consumption (*consomption*). There was some of it in his childhood. But where was he? He was in bed, and you will see him severely restricted by pins put in

the sheets. There are other elements which also show us the subject in his pram with a harness and straps.

The question for the subject, as it is presented to us here, is the following: in the very measure that he is bound, that he himself is stopped, he can enjoy his phantasy precisely, and participate in it by this supplementary activity, this derived, displaced activity, which is compulsive urination. In the very measure that he was bound at this moment even this sort of supplement, of false *jouissance* which this urination gives him that we note so frequently precisely in subjects in relationship to the proximity of parental intercourse. At that moment he becomes what? Precisely this partner whom he tells us needs so much for him to show her everything, and that it is necessary that he must do everything, that he must feminise himself. In so far as he is impotent, as one might say, he is male. And that this has compensations on the level of ambitious potency, is something we will come back to it the next time, but in so far as he is liberated he feminises himself.

It is in this sort of game of hide-and-seek, this double game, of the non-separation of the two aspects in him of femininity and masculinity, in this type of unique, fundamentally masturbatory phantastical apprehension, that the apprehension of sexual desire remains for him that the problem lies; and I hope to show the next time the degree to which we are justified in orienting our interpretations in this sense to allow the subject to take a step forward.

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We have come then to the moment of trying to interpret this dream of Ella Sharpe's subject. An undertaking naturally which we can only attempt, moreover in a purely theoretical way, as a research exercise, because of the exceptionally well-developed character of this dream which occupies, according to Ella Sharpe whom we trust on this point, a crucial point in the analysis.

The subject, who had a tremendous dream which would take hours to recount, which he says he has forgotten, that there only remains this event which happens on a road in Czechoslovakia on which he find himself because he had undertaken a journey around the world with his wife. I even underlined that he said: 'A journey with my wife around the world.' He found himself on a road and what happens there is that he is in short involved in sexual events with a woman who, I point out, appears in a certain fashion which is not said in the first text of the dream. The subject says: I see at the same time that she is above me, she was doing everything she could to get my penis.(cf 133) This is an expression which we will have to come back to later on.

Of course says the subject, I did not agree with this at all, to the point that I thought that she was so disappointed that I should masturbate her. He makes a remark here on the fundamentally intransitive nature of the verb 'to masturbate' in English, which we as well as the author have already taken an interest in - even though the author did not accentuate less directly its basis on what was a sort of grammatical remark by the subject - by remarking that it was a question of course of a masturbation of the subject.

We highlighted the last time the value of what appears even less in the associations than in the development of the image of the dream: namely that is formed by this fold, this pinned hood like the fold of a hood of which the subject speaks. And we have shown that undoubtedly the recourse to the stock of images taken into consideration by the classical doctrine, and which are obviously derived from experience, when they are brought into play in a way as so many separate objects, without locating their function very well in relation to the subject, tends perhaps towards something which can be forced, regarding which we underlined the last time the paradoxes that there can be in the too hasty interpretation of this singular appendix, of this protrusion of the feminine genital organ as being already the sign that what is in question is the mother's phallus.(144)

And also moreover something like this does not fail to encourage another leap in the analysts thinking, so true is it that an imprudent step can only be rectified, contrary to what is said, by another imprudent step, that error is much less erudite than is believed because the only chance of saving oneself from an error is to commit another one which compensates for it.

We are not saying that Ella Sharpe erred completely. We are trying to articulate better modes of direction which would have been able to permit a more complete accommodation. This is subject to every reservation of course because we will never have the crucial experience.

But the next leap that I spoke about is that what is in question is again much less the phallus of the partner, of the partner in this case imagined in the dream, than the phallus of the subject. This we know; we admit the masturbatory nature of the dream, matched by many other things in all that appears afterwards in the statements of the subject. But this phallus of the subject, we are already led to consider it as being this instrument of destruction, of aggression, of an extremely primitive type, as it emerges from what could be called imagery. And it is in this sense that the thinking of the analyst, Ella Sharpe in this case, is already oriented. And even though she is far from communicating all her interpretation to the subject, the point on which she is immediately going to intervene is in this sense that she tells him, it is after having pointed out to him the elements that she calls omnipotent - according to her interpretation what appears according to her in the dream is: secondly masturbation, thirdly this masturbation is omnipotent in the sense that it is dealing with this boring and biting organ which is the subjects own phallus.(146)

It must be said that there is here a real intrusion, a real theoretical extrapolation on the part of the analyst, because in fact nothing, either in the dream or in the associations, gives any kind of basis for bringing immediately into the interpretation this notion the subject has that the phallus here intervenes as an organ of aggression, and that what might be dreaded would be in a way the return, the retortion of the aggression that is implied on the part of the subject.

One cannot help underlining here that it is hard to see at what moment the subject passes from these intrusions to the analysis of what she had effectively before her eyes and which she senses with such detail and finesse. It is clear that it is a question of theory. It is enough to read this formula to perceive that after all nothing justifies it except something that the analyst does not tell us. But again she has sufficiently informed us, and with enough care, about the antecedents of the dream, about the patient's case in its broad details, for us to say that there is undoubtedly here something which constitutes a leap.

That this might have appeared necessary is indeed after all something that we will willingly concede to her, but it also appears necessary to us, it is on this point that we pose the question and that we are going to try to take up this analysis again, not in a way to substitute for the imaginary equivalents, for the interpretations in the sense that it is understood properly speaking, something which is a given and should be understood like that.

It is not a question of knowing at one or other moment what each element of the dream means on the whole. On the whole one can only say that these elements are more than correctly judged. They are based on a tradition of analytic experience at the time Ella Sharpe is working. And on the other hand they are certainly perceived with great discernment and with great finesse. That is not the question. It is to see whether the problem cannot be clarified by being formulated, articulated in a fashion which better links the interpretation with this thing on which I am trying to put the accent for you here, namely the intersubjective topology, which in different forms is always the one which I am trying here to construct before you, to reinstate in so far as it is the very one of our experience: that of the subject, of the small other, of the big Other, in so far as their places should always, at the moment of every phenomenon in analysis, be marked by us if we wish to avoid this sort of tangle, this knot which has been really entwined like a thread which no one can unknot and which forms, as one might say, the daily stuff of our analytic explanations.

We have already gone through this dream under many forms and we can all the same begin to articulate something simple, direct, something which is even not at all absent from the observation or which can be extracted from this reading that we have carried out. I would say at the stage of what precedes, what the subject brings, and of the dream itself, there is a word which with everything that we have here in terms of a vocabulary in common seems to be the one which comes first, and it cannot be ruled out that at that time it may have come to Ella Sharpe's mind. It is not at all a question of bringing into play a notion which was not within her range? we are in the English *milieu* which is dominated at that time by discussions such as those being developed for example between people like Jones and Joan Riviere whom we already brought up here in connection with her article: 'On Womanliness as a Masquerade'. I spoke to you about it in connection with the discussion concerning the phallic woman (or phase) and the phallic function in feminine sexuality.

There is a word that he gives importance to at a particular moment, which is the moment which is really necessary for Jones to enter into the understanding of what is indeed the most difficult point to understand, not simply to bring into play, in analysis, namely the castration complex. The word that Jones uses is the word *aphanisis*, which he introduced in an interesting fashion into the analytic vocabulary, and which we must not at all consider as being absent from the English *milieu*, because it makes a great deal of it.

Aphanisis means disappearance, in so far as he understands it in that way. And what he means by that we will see further on. But for the moment I am going to make a quite different use of it; what is really an impressionistic use for what is really there all the time throughout the material of the dream, its surrounds, the behaviour of the subject, everything that we have already tried to articulate in connection with what is presented, with what is proposed to Ella Sharpe.

This very subject who, before presenting himself to her in a fashion which she so finely describes, with this sort of profound absence which of itself gives her the feeling that there is no remark of the subject, nor any of his gestures which is not entirely thought out, and that nothing corresponds to anything connected with feeling. This subject who is so cautious, who moreover does not announce himself, who appears, but who once he appears is more elusive than if he were not there; this subject who himself has put to us in the preliminaries of what he brought forward about his dream, this question which he posed in connection with his little cough. And this little cough is given in order to do what? To make something which must be there at the other side of the door disappear. We do not know what. He says it himself: in the case of the analyst, what is there to make disappear? He evokes in this connection the warning given in other circumstances, in another context, that it is a question of them separating, of disuniting, because the situation might be embarrassing if he entered. And so on.

In the dream we are in the presence of three characters, because it must not be forgotten that his wife is there. Once the subject has said it he does not speak about it any more. But what exactly happens with the sexual partner, the one in fact whom he evades. Is it all that sure that he is evading her? What follows in what he says proves that he is far from being completely absent; and he put his finger, he tells us in this sort of protruding, inside-out vagina, this sort of prolapsed vagina on which I laid stress. Here again questions are posed and we are going to pose them. Where is what is at stake, where is the important thing in this scene? That which in so far as one can pose this question in connection with a dream - and we can only pose it in so far as the whole Freudian theory obliges us to pose it - what will be produced immediately afterwards in the associations of the dream, is

something which involves this friend, mediated by a memory which came to him concerning the hood that constitutes the feminine sexual organ of someone who on a golf course offered him something in which his clubs could be put, and whom he found to be a really funny person. He speaks about him with a kind of amused pleasure. And one can clearly see what is happening around this real character. He is really the sort of person who makes you ask where he came out of.

This is the way he speaks about him. With that face, and that glibness what could he have been. Maybe a butcher, he says. God knows why he says a butcher. But the style and the general atmosphere, the ambience of impersonation in connection with this character - immediately afterwards he is going to start imitating him - shows that here it is a question of

This moreover is the way that the notion of imitation is introduced, and the association with his friend who impersonates men so well, who is so talented, and who exploits that talent by broadcasting. And in this connection the first idea that comes to the subject is that he is talking too much about her, that he seems to be boasting by speaking about a relationship with somebody so remarkable, to be 'swanking'. I checked the English word that he uses: it is quite a new word, that can almost be considered to be slang, and that I have tried to translate here by *la ramener*. He uses it to say: I feel guilty to be swanking like that. In a word he disappears, he makes himself very small, he does not want to take too much space on this occasion.

In short, what forces itself on us the whole time, what recurs as a theme, as a *leit-motif* in all the discourse, the remarks of the subject, is something for which the term *aphanisis* appears to be here much closer to 'to make disappear' than 'to disappear'. It is something that is a perpetual game in which we sense that in different forms something - let us call this if you wish the object of interest - is never there.

The last time I insisted on this. It is never where it is expected, it slips from one point to another in a sort of conjuring trick. I am going to insist on it again, and you are going to see where this will take us, what is the essential, the characteristic at every level of the confrontation before which the analyst finds herself.

The subject cannot put anything forward without immediately, in some way, subtilising what is essential in it as one might say. And I would point out that in Jones also this term *aphanisis* is a term which is open to a critique which would end up with a denunciation of some inversion of perspective.

Jones remarked in his subjects that with the approach of the castration complex what he senses, what he understands, what he sees in them, is the fear of *aphanisis*, of the disappearance of desire. And in a way what he tells us, is that castration - he does not formulate it this way because he does not have the apparatus - is the symbolisation of this loss.

We have underlined what an enormous problem it is to see in some genetic perspective, how a subject, let us presuppose in his development at some moment or other, at a sort of animal level of his subjectivity, begins to see the tendency being detached from itself in order to become the fear of its own loss. And Jones makes of *aphanisis* the substance of the fear of castration.

Here I would point out that it is exactly in the opposite sense that things should be

taken. It is because there can be castration, it is because there is the interplay of signifiers implied in castration, that in the subject there can be elaborated this dimension in which he can be afraid, alarmed, about the future possible disappearance of his desire.

Let us note carefully that if we give to something like desire a full meaning, the meaning of tendency, at the level of animal psychology, it is difficult for us to conceive of it as something altogether accessible in human experience. The fear of the lack of desire is all the same a step which has to be explained. To explain it he tells you. the human subject in so far as he has to inscribe himself in the signifier finds there a position from which effectively he puts in question his need in so far as his need is caught up, modified, identified in demand. And in that way everything can be very satisfactorily conceptualised, and the function of the castration complex in this case, namely the way in which this taking up of a position by the subject in the signifier implies the loss, the sacrifice of one of his signifiers among others, is what we are leaving to one side for the moment.

What I want simply to say, is that the fear of *aphanisis* in neurotic subjects corresponds, contrary to what Jones believes, to something which should be understood in the perspective of an insufficient formation, articulation, of a partial foreclosure of the castration complex. It is in so far as the castration complex does not protect the subject from this sort of confusion, distraction, anxiety which manifests itself in the fear of *aphanisis* which we see effectively in neurotics. And this is something we are going to be able to check in connection with this case.

Let us continue, and let us come back to the text itself, to the text of the dream, and to these images that we spoke about the last time, namely the presentation of the feminine sexual organ in the form of this prolapsed vagina.

In the images of the subject, this sort of scabbard, this sort of bag, or sheath, which creates such a strange image here that one cannot all the same - even though it is not at all a unique and exceptional case, but not one which is frequently met with, which has not been described in a very well-defined way in the analytic tradition. Here one can say that in the very image which is employed in the signifying articulation of the dream - namely what does this mean between the characters who are present - the image even takes on its value from what happens, from what it is used for.

In fact what we see is that the subject, as he says, is going to put his finger in it. He will not put his penis in it. Certainly not. He will put his finger in it. He turns outside-in, he re-ensheaths, he re-invaginates what is devaginated here, and it is just as if what happens here is a conjuring trick. Because when all is said and done he puts something instead of what he should put there. But also he shows that something can be put there. And although something can effectively be suggested by the form of what is presented, namely the feminine phallus, everything happens as if - this phallus which is in effect in question in the clearest fashion ('to get my penis') - we were entitled to ask what the subject is in the process of showing us because much more than an act of copulation it is a question here of an act of exhibitionism. This happens let us not forget in front of a third person. The gesture is there, the gesture is already evoked of the conjurer performing what is called in French, *le sac à l'oeuf*. Namely this woollen sack in which the conjurer alternately makes the egg appear and disappear, makes it appear when it is not expected, and shows that it has disappeared when one expected to see it. One also says 'the bag of the eggs'(sic) in English.

The gesture, what one might call the showing that is in question is all the more

striking because in the subject's associations, what we have seen is very precisely always to give a warning at the moment that he appears, so that nothing is going to be seen of what was there before, or again to have himself taken, as he says in his phantasy, for a dog by barking, so that people would say there is nothing there except a dog. Yes, always the same conjuring away without our knowing what it is that is conjured away. And undoubtedly it is above all the subject himself who is conjured away. But the dream points out to us, and allows us to specify that in any case if we seek to specify what is localised in the dream as being what is at stake in this conjuring away, it is certainly the phallus, the phallus that is in question: 'To get my penis'.(133)

And we are I would say so habituated, so hardened to this by analytic routine, that we scarcely stop at this datum of the dream. Nevertheless the choice by the subject of 'to get' to designate what the woman is trying to do here - it is a verb that is used in a very polyvalent way. It is always in the sense of obtaining, of gaining, of capturing, of seizing, of joining to one's self. It is a question of something that is broadly speaking obtained in the general sense. Naturally we understand this with the note and the echo of *femina curem et benim (ou penim) devorem*, but it is not so simple.

Because after all what is being questioned in this case is something which when all is said and done is far from belonging to this register. And also the question, whether in effect it is a matter in any form at all, real or imaginary, of obtaining the penis, the first question to be asked is namely: this penis where is it? Because it seems to be self-evident that it is there. Namely that on the pretext that what has been said, that the subject in the account of the dream said that she was manoeuvring 'to get my penis', it seems to be believed that because of this it is there somewhere in the dream. But literally, if one looks at the text carefully, there is absolutely nothing to indicate it.

It is not enough that the partner's imputation is given there for us to deduce that the subject's penis is there, is sufficient in a way to satisfy us on the subject of this question: where is it? It is perhaps completely elsewhere than at the place where this need that we have to complete things in a scene where the subject is supposed to evade It is not so simple. And from the moment that we pose this question we clearly see in effect that it is here that the whole question is posed, and that it is also from there that we can grasp what is the singular discordance, the strangeness that is presented by the enigmatic sign that is proposed to us in the dream. Because it is certain that there is a relationship between what is happening and a masturbation.

What does that mean, what does that underline for us in this case? It is worthwhile picking it up in passing. Because even though it is not elucidated, it is very instructive. I mean even though it is not articulated by the analyst in her remarks. Namely that the masturbation of the other, and the masturbation of the subject are the same thing, that one can even go pretty far, and say that everything that is in the grasp of the other by the subject himself which resembles a masturbation, effectively supposes a secret narcissistic identification which is less that of body to body than of the body of the other to the penis. That a whole part of the activities of caressing - and this becomes all the more evident because it takes on a character of a more detached, a more autonomous, a more insistent pleasure, bordering even on something which is called more or less correctly on this occasion a certain sadism - is something which brings into play the phallus to the degree that as I have already shown you it is already profiled imaginarily in the beyond of the natural partner. That the phallus is involved as signifier in the relationship of the subject to the other, means that it appears there as something which can be sought in this beyond of the embrace of the other with which there begins, there takes hold every kind of typical

form more or less accentuated in the sense of perversion.

In fact, what we see here, is that precisely this masturbation of the other subject is completely different from this taking of the phallus in the embrace of the other which would allow us to make strictly equivalent the masturbation of the other and the masturbation of the subject himself, that this gesture whose meaning I showed you, which is almost a gesture of verifying that what is there is undoubtedly something that is very important for the subject, it is something that has the closest relationship with the phallus, but it is something also which demonstrates that the phallus is not there, that the 'to get my penis' that is in question for the partner is something which slips away, which escapes, not simply through the subject's will, but because of some structural accident which really is what is in question, what gives its style to everything that comes back in the sequence of the association, namely also that this woman whom he tells us about who behaves herself so remarkably in the fact that she impersonates men perfectly, that this sort of unbelievable trickster whom he remembers years afterwards, and who offers him with an incredible glibness something which remarkably is again one thing for another, to make a covering for something with a covering which is made for something else, namely the cloth that is meant to make a hood for a car, and to make what? To allow him to put his golf clubs in it. This sort of tricky gentleman, this is what will come back again.

Everything has always this character, whatever element is in question, that it is never quite what presents itself that is in question. It is never with the real thing that we are dealing. Things present themselves always in a problematic form.

Let us take what comes immediately afterwards, and what is going to play its role. The problematic character of what insists in front of the subject immediately continues, and by means of a question which emerges in connection with, which is going to arise from childhood memories. Why the devil did he have at another moment another compulsion than the one he had at the beginning of the session, namely the cough, namely cutting his sister's straps.

I dislike thinking it was a compulsion; that why the cough annoys me. I suppose I cut up my sister's sandals in the same way. I have only the dimmest memory of doing it. I don't know why nor what I wanted the leather for when I had done it. I thought I wanted the strips to make something useful but I expect something quite unnecessary.(135)

To my way of thinking it was very useful, but there was no serious reason for it.

Here again we find ourselves before a sort of flight within which still another flight is going to follow, namely the remark that he suddenly thinks of the straps that tied back the hood of the motor car. Or 'rather' that makes him think of the straps that one sees a child fastened in by in a pram.

And at that moment in a curious fashion, in a negative fashion, he introduces the notion of pram. He thinks that there was no pram in his family. 'But of course nothing could be more silly, he says himself, to say there was no pram in our house. There must have been one because there were two children.'

Always the same style of something which appears under the form of something that is missing, and which dominates the whole style of the subject's associations. The following step, directly linked to this one is what? 'I suddenly remembered I meant to send

off letters admitting two members to the Club. I boasted of being a better secretary than the last and yet here I am forgetting to give people admission to enter the Club.’(135-136) In other words, I did not write to them. And linked on immediately, and indicated in inverted commas in Ella Sharpe’s text even though she does not make much of it, because for an English reader these lines do not even need to be put in inverted commas, the citing of a sentence which is found in what is called the General Confession, namely one of the prayers from *The Book of Common Prayer*, from the book of prayers for everybody which form the foundation of the religious duties of people in the Church of England.

I should say that my relations with *The Book of Common Prayer* do not date from yesterday and I will only evoke here the very beautiful object which was created twenty or twenty five years ago in the surrealist community by my friend Roland Penrose who made use of *The Book of Common Prayer* for the initiates of the circle. When one opened it, on each side of the inner cover there was a mirror.

This is very instructive, because this is the only fault that one can find with Ella Sharpe for whom undoubtedly this text was much more familiar than for us, because the text of *The Book of Common Prayer* is not exactly the same as the quotation that the subject gives from it. ‘We have left undone those things which we ought to have done’ instead of ‘We have undone those things we ought to have done’ (as the subject says). It is a small thing, but afterwards there is missing a whole sentence which is in a way the counterpart in the text of the prayer of the General Confession ‘and we have done those things which we ought not to have done’.(136,142)

The subject does not feel any need at all to confess this. For the good reason that when all is said and done it is really always a question for him of not doing things. But doing things is not his business. This indeed is what in fact is in question, because he adds that he is quite incapable of doing anything at all, for fear of being too successful, as the analyst has underlined for us.

And then, because it is not the least important thing, this is what I want to get to, the subject continues the sentence: ‘There is no good thing in us’. This is a pure invention by the subject, because in *The Book of Common Prayer* there is nothing like this. There is: ‘And there is no health in us’. I think that the ‘good thing’ that he put in instead is indeed what is in question. I would say that this good object is not there, this indeed is what is in question, and it confirms for us once again that it is a question of the phallus.

It is very important for the subject to say that this good object is not there. Again we find the term: it is not there. It is never where one expects it. And it is undoubtedly a good thing which is for him something of extreme importance, but it is no less clear that what he tends to show, to demonstrate is always one and the same thing, namely that it is never there. There where what? There where one could get it, make off with it, take it. And it is indeed this which dominates the totality of the material that is in question.

That in the light of what we are going to advance here, the bringing together of the two compulsions, that of the cough and that of having cut strips of leather from his sisters sandals, seems less surprising - because it is really the most common type of analytic interpretation; the fact of cutting the strips of leather which hold together his sisters sandals has a relationship that we will be satisfied here, like everybody else, to approximate in general to the theme of castration. If you take up Mr. Fenichel, you will see that braid cutters are people who do this in function of their castration complex (Fenichel 349). But how can we say, except by weighing each case precisely, whether it is the retortion of

castration, the application of castration to a subject other than themselves, or on the contrary the taming of castration, the carrying out on an other of a castration which is not a real castration, and which therefore shows itself to be not so dangerous as that; the domestication as one might say, or the lessening in value, the devaluation of castration, in the course of this exercise; all the more because when braids are cut it is always possible, conceivable, that the aforesaid braids will grow again, namely give reassurance against castration.

This is naturally all that the sum of analytic experience allows to be developed from this subject, but which in this case only appears to us as hiding But there is no doubt that there is a link here with castration.

But now what is in question, if we force ourselves not to go more quickly, and to sustain things at the level where we have sufficiently indicated them, namely that here castration is something which forms part as one might say, of the context of the report, but that nothing allows us up to the present to bring into play in as precise a fashion as the analyst has done the indication of the subject postulated on this occasion in order to articulate something as being a primitive aggressive intention turned back against himself. But after all what do we know about it. Is it not much more interesting to pose, to ceaselessly renew the question: where is this phallus? Where is it in effect, where must it be conceived of?

What we can say, is that the analyst is going very far, is pushing things a good deal in saying to the subject it is somewhere very far back in you, it forms part of an old rivalry with your father, it is there at the principle of all your primordial omnipotent wishes, it is there at the source of an aggression whose retortion you are undergoing in this case. Since there is nothing properly speaking which allows there to be taken from the text something which is articulated in this way.

Let us try for our part, after all, to ask ourselves the question a bit more daringly than we would naturally tend to.

We cannot, it seems, propose in connection with a printed, written observation like this, something which we would demand of one of our pupils. If it was one of my pupils I would speak about it much more severely. I would say what possessed you to say something like that? In such a case I would ask the question: where is the countertransference element?

Here it would seem to be rash to pose such a question about the text of an author who after all is someone to whom we have every reason to accord the greatest trust at that date, namely Ella Sharpe. I smiled at myself when I asked myself that question because it really seemed to me a little bit exorbitant. But one is never wrong when all is said and done to be a little bit too daring in this way. It may happen that this is the way that one will find what one is looking for. And in this case I searched before I found. I mean that I had read in an almost distracted way the first pages of this book. I mean that as always one never reads well, and nevertheless there was there something extremely fine.

Immediately after having spoken about the dead father, about this father whom she cannot manage to bring to life in the subject's memory, but which she has managed to move a little bit recently: you remember how startled the subject was that his father must at one time have spoken - immediately afterwards she remarks that it is the same difficulty as regards herself, namely 'He has no thoughts about me' (126). There was already there

something which should have held our attention. 'He feels nothing about me'. He cannot believe in that. It must be said that it is disturbing. That the subject is not aware of it as such, does not mean that there is no manifestation of it, because there is 'a dim stirring of anxiety of some kind' on one or other occasion. This is where I had badly remembered something that is expressed here. But when one reads that one thinks that it is a general dissertation of the kind that he sometimes addresses to the analyst.

I think' she says, this indeed is what is in question, that the analysis might be compared to a long-drawn-out game of chess and that it will continue to be so until I cease to be the unconscious avenging father who is bent on cornering him, checkmating him, after which there is no alternative to death.(127)

This curious reference to chess on this occasion, which really is not implied by anything, is all the same what deserves on this occasion to hold our attention. I would say that at the time I read this page I effectively found it to be very nice, because I did not immediately dwell on its value in the transference order. I mean that during the reading what that gave rise to in me was: that's very fine.

One should compare the whole development of an analysis to a game of chess. And why? Because what is most beautiful and what stands out most in the game of chess is that it is a game which can be described as follows: there are a certain number of elements which we will characterise as signifying elements. Each one of the pieces is a signifying element. And in short in this game which is played by means of a series of answering moves founded on the nature of the signifiers, each one having its own move characterised by its position as signifier, what happens is the progressive reduction of the number of signifiers which are involved. And one could after all describe an analysis in that way: that it is a question of eliminating a sufficient number of signifiers so that there only remain in play a reduced number of signifiers so that one can sense properly where the position of the subject is within them.

Because I subsequently came back to it I believe in effect that this can take us a good way. But what is important is the following: it is that Ella Sharpe - effectively everything that I know or came to know from other sources about her work indicates it - effectively has this conception of analysis, that there is in her interpretation of analytic theory this kind of profound highlighting of the signifying character of things. She put a stress on metaphor in a way which is absolutely not out of harmony with the things that I am explaining to you. And all the time she knows how to highlight what is properly speaking this element of linguistic substitution in symptoms, which means that she brought it to bear in her analysis of literary themes which constitute an important part of her work. And all the technical rules that she gives share also in something which is quite profoundly marked by a kind of experience, of apprehension of the interplay of signifiers as such.

So that the thing which, in this case, one can say that she overlooks, I would say are her own intentions which are expressed in this register, on the plane of the word of which there is question in the forefront of this observation, of cornering. She brings 'cornering' in here for the first time. It is only in the sessions following the interpretation that she gave of this dream that we will see the same word appearing in the discourse of the patient, and I will tell you later in what connection.

This is why, as you already know, I pointed out to you what also happened two sessions later. Namely how impossible he finds it to corner his partner also in a game, the game of tennis, to corner him in order to put in the final shot, one that the chap would not

be able to reach. What is in effect in question is the following that it is on this plane that the analyst manifests herself. And I am not at all in the process of saying that the subject perceives this.

It is of course understood that she is a good analyst. She says it in all sorts of ways.

It is a case in which you will have noticed, she says to the students, that I said very little, or that I was silent. Why, she says? Because there is absolutely nothing in this subject which does not indicate to me in all sorts of ways that his claim to want to be helped means exactly the contrary, namely that above all he wants to remain sheltered, and with his little covering, the hood of the car over him.

The hood, is really a quite fundamental position. She senses that. Everything that happens in connection with the memory of the pram which is effaced, is all the same the fact that he was pinned into his bed, namely pinned down. Moreover it seems that he has very specific notions about what the fact of being tied down can provoke in a child, even though there is nothing particular in his memory which permits him to evoke it, but undoubtedly this bound position is very important for him.

Therefore she is far from allowing this countertransference element to appear, namely something which would be too interventionist in the game. An aggressive move in this game of chess. But what I am saying, is that because she senses so well the import of this notion, this aggressive exercise of the analytic game, she does not see its exact import, namely that what is in question is something which has the closest relationship to the signifiers.

Namely that if we ask where the phallus is, it is in this direction that we should search for it. In other words, if you wish, in the quadrangle of the schema of the subject, of the other, of the ego *qua* image of the other, and of the big Other this is what is in question: the place from where the signifier as such can appear. Namely that this phallus which is never where we expect it, is there all the same. It is there like the purloined letter, where one least expects it, and there where nevertheless everything designates it.

To express it as the metaphor of chess really allows us to articulate it, I would say that the subject does not want to lose his queen, and I will explain. In the dream it is not the subject who is there looking at the phallus. This is not where the phallus is. Because in effect for this subject - as the analyst dimly perceives it through a veil in her interpretation the subject has a certain relationship with omnipotence, or simply with potency, with power. His power, in this case the phallus, what he must preserve at all costs to keep out of the game because in the game he could lose this phallus, is here represented in the dream quite simply by the person that one would least think represents it, namely his wife who is there and who has, far from being the apparent witness that she is - because in fact it is nowhere indicated that this function of seeing is something which is essential .

In this subject as in many other subjects, and I would ask you to retain this because it is such an obvious clinical fact that one is absolutely stupefied that it is not a commonplace in psychoanalysis, the feminine partner *qua* other is precisely what represents for the subject what is in a way most taboo in his potency, and also who is at the same time found to dominate the whole economy of his desire. It is because his wife is his phallus that I would say that he makes this kind of tiny lapse that I noted for you in passing, namely 'taking a journey with my wife around the world' and not 'around the world with my wife' (132).

The accent of omnipotence is put on 'around the world', by our analyst. I think that the secret of omnipotence in this subject is in the 'with my wife', and that what is in question is that he should not lose that, namely that he does not perceive precisely that this is what is to be put in question, namely to perceive that his wife on this occasion is the analyst.

Because when all is said and done this is what is in question. The subject we would say does not want to lose his queen, like those bad chess players who imagine that to lose the queen is to lose the game, even though to win at chess means when all is said and done to arrive at what one calls an end game, namely with the subject the simplest and most reduced facility for displacement and the minimum of rights - I mean that he has not the right to occupy a space which is put in check by another - and with that to find the advantage of the position.

On the contrary it is greatly to ones advantage on occasion to sacrifice ones queen. This is what the subject does not want to do under any circumstances because the signifier phallus is for him identical with everything that happened in the relationship with his mother.

And it is here that there appears, as the observation clearly allows to transude the inefficient and defective character of what the father was able to contribute in this case. And of course we come back to something, back to an already known aspect of the relationship of the subject to the parental couple. The important thing is not that. The important thing is effectively to accentuate this very hidden, very secret relationship of the subject to his partner, because it is the most important thing to highlight at the moment that he appears in analysis. In the analysis where in short the subject, by his discreet coughing, warns his analyst about what is happening inside if perchance she had, as it happens in the dream, turned her bag or her game inside out, that she should put it away before he arrives because to see that, to see that there is nothing but a bag he stands to lose everything.

This is the prudence that the subject demonstrates and which in a way maintains, in a tight bond with all the pram-pinned position of his childhood, the subject in a relationship with his desire which can only be phantastical, namely that it is necessary for him to be himself tied into a pram or something else and well and truly held and tightly wrapped so that there can be elsewhere the signifier, the image of an omnipotence that is dreamt of.

And this is also the way that we must understand the capital role of omnipotence for him, this whole story and this observation about the automobile. The automobile, this problematic instrument of our civilisation, whose relationship everyone can clearly see on the one hand with power (the horsepower, the speed, the peak of speed), and everyone obviously talks about phallic equivalence, the equivalence of a power to help the impotent. But on the other hand everyone well knows it's extremely coupling, feminine character also. Because it is not for nothing that an automobile is spoken of as feminine, that we give this car on occasions all sorts of little nicknames which also have the character of a partner of the opposite sex. Well this automobile on this occasion, about which he makes such problematic remarks: namely, 'strange how one speaks of the life of a car as if it were human'.(135)

These of course are banalities, but it is very curious that this automobile, is so obviously this thing in which there is reproduced this sort of signifying ambiguity which ensures that it is both what protects him, what binds him, and envelops him, that which in

relation to him has exactly the same position as the projecting hood in the dream - it is moreover the same word which is used in the two cases - as in the dream this bizarre sexual protuberance on which he finds himself putting his finger, as on the other hand - I well underlined something that I translated badly. I should not have said 'streaked with scarlet', but 'lined with scarlet'. But what does the analyst tell us? The analyst has made no mistake here. The moment, she tells us, that she made her decisive intervention is not the moment that she began to put him on the path of his aggression, with as a result for the subject moreover a very curious manifestation that one could call psychosomatic, whose character she does not quite pick up, that namely instead of the cough, the following day he had a little colicky pain before entering.

God knows whether he tightened his for that, but as I said above he has everything to lose at the moment of entering the psychoanalyst's office for the following session. But Ella Sharpe's own interpretation appears to be very illuminating. It is at the second session after this interpretation when the subject tells her that he again had had a colicky pain on leaving the session the last time. He then talks to her about what? He says,

I was unable to use my car because the garage man had not finished with it. I was not able to be angry with him because he is so kind that it is impossible to blame him, he is very very good. And then the car is not a necessity. (And he adds with an accent of imitation,) but all the same I really want it, I like it, I love it.(cf 146)

And she makes no mistake. For the first time, she says, I was able to deal with the libidinal wishes. Here it is a question of libido. We are therefore in complete accord with her. If I am doing a critique of Ella Sharpe, it is because I find her at every point, in this observation, to be admirably sensitive. She understands the importance of that, namely what is present in the life of a subject as desire properly speaking, desire being characterised by its non-motivated character - he has no need of this car; the fact that he declares his desire to her, that it is the first time that she hears such a discourse, is something which presents itself as unreasonable in the discourse of the subject.

She tells us that she hops on it, namely that she underlines it for him. It is a curious thing, here we have something like a kind of wobble of the projector. While she was always so good at telling us what she said to the subject, even the most daring things, the most risky things, here we do not know exactly what she said to him. It is very annoying. What she tells us, is that she was really overjoyed to have the opportunity of telling him: there you are admitting that you desire something. But what it is she might have told him, we will never know.

We know simply that she might all the same have told him something rather oriented in the sense of what she had told him before, to explain why it is precisely after what she told him that the following day the subject came to tell her, not quite content, a bit dissatisfied that that night he had wet the bed.

We cannot consider that this is, as I told you already, in itself a symptom, which, however transitory it may be, and however significant it may be of the fact that a blow had been delivered which certainly had its effect, is all the same something which absolutely confirms us in what I could call the sense of the proper direction of the statement if there is a statement (*dire*). Namely that if we have the notion about this thing that enuresis represents, it is certainly what I would call the personal implementation of the penis.

But again it is not when all is said and done a genital implementation. It is precisely

the penis as real which very frequently intervenes as an echo - this is what clinical work shows us in the case of children - of the sexual activity of the parents; it is to the degree that the subjects, whether masculine or feminine children, are in a period when they are very profoundly interested by the sexual relations of the parents that there occur enuretic manifestations which on occasion are the bringing into play on the plane of the real of the organ as such. But the organ as such, as real, no longer as signifier, which is indeed something which shows us that on this occasion Ella Sharpe's intervention had in effect a certain import.

Is this import appropriate? This is of course what remains to be looked at more closely. It is quite clear that what follows, namely the arrival, the emergence, certain reactions which the subject seems to regard with a certain feeling of satisfaction, and which is the fact that when he is playing he no longer allows his companions to tease him, namely that he caught one of them around the neck and held him in a strangle hold in a corner with sufficient force for him not to want to start again, can in no way be considered as something which is really along the line of what is to be obtained.

Let us not forget all the same that if there is something the subject is to be allowed, namely to corner the other in a game, this is absolutely not the same thing as 'cornering him' by the throat about this game. This is precisely an inadequate reaction, one which does not render him for a moment any more capable of cornering him in the game, namely where relationships with others occur, the other as the locus of the word, as locus of the law, as locus of the conventions of the game. It is precisely this which is found to have failed because of this slight lowering of the act of analytic intervention.

I think that today we have pushed things fairly far. The next time I will give the last seminar of what is grouped here around the literary analysis of desire and its interpretation, and I will try to gather for you in some formulae how we should conceive of this function of the phallic signifier in its most general form in connection with the relationship and the fashion in which the subject situates himself in desire. I will try to collect around these notions that I am trying to articulate here with the help of the graph the function which we should very precisely give to the phallic signifier.

I will also try to show you where exactly there is situated, how in terms of mapping things out in our exercise of analysis you can try to situate the phallic signifier in this schema. In a word, and to give you something which is borrowed from the work of a writer to whom I already alluded here, Lewis Carroll, I will show you what Lewis Carroll says somewhere more or less in the following terms: he thought that he had seen a garden gate - this famous gate of paradise of the interior of the maternal womb around which there are currently centred, or even engulfed all the analytic theories - which could be opened with a key. He looked more closely and perceived that it was a double rule of three. The next time I will show you what this rule of three is.

Seminar 12: Wednesday 11 February 1959

I announced the last time that I would finish this time the study of this dream that we have particularly well gone into from the point of view of its interpretation, but I will be obliged to devote one more session to it.

I recall rapidly that it is this dream of a patient, a lawyer who has great difficulties in his job. And Ella Sharpe approaches him prudently, the patient having every appearance of being cautious, without it however being a question of rigidity, in his behaviour. Ella Sharpe did not fail to underline that everything that he recounts comes from thinking, never from feeling. And at the point that we are at in the analysis, he has a remarkable dream which was a turning point in the analysis and which is briefly reported to us. It is a dream that the patient concentrates in a few words even though it was, he says, a tremendous dream, so tremendous that if he remembered it, it would take hours to relate it.

There emerges from this something which to a certain degree presents the characteristics of a repeated dream, namely a dream that he already had. Namely that somewhere in this journey that he had taken as he says, with his wife around the world - and I underlined that - at a point that is in Czechoslovakia - it is the only point on which Ella Sharpe will tell us she did not obtain enough light because she did not question the patient about what the word Czechoslovakia signifies; and after all she regrets it because after all we may have some ideas about this Czechoslovakia - sexual play takes place with a woman, in front of his wife. The woman with whom this sexual play takes place is someone who is presented as being in a superior position in relation to him. On the other hand it does not immediately appear in his account, but we discover in his associations, that it is a question for her of manoeuvring, 'to get my penis'.

I pointed out the very special character of the verb 'to get' in English. 'To get', is to obtain, in all the possible fashions of the verb *obtenir*. It is a much less limited verb than *obtenir*. It is to obtain, to catch, to grasp, to finish off. And 'got' if the woman got my penis, that would mean that she has it.

But this penis comes so little into play that the subject tells us that the dream ends with this wish that before the disappointment of the woman he thought that she should masturbate herself.

And I explained to you that what was in question here obviously is the key meaning, the secret meaning of the dream. In the dream this manifests itself by the fact that the subject says: 'I thought I would masturbate her.' In fact there is a real exploration of something which is interpreted in the observation with a great deal of insistence and of care by Ella Sharpe as being the equivalent of the hood.

When one looks at it closely this something deserves to hold our attention. It is something which shows that the feminine organ is here a sort of inside-out, or prolapsed vagina. It is a question of a vagina, and not of a hood. And everything continues as if this pseudo masturbation of the subject was nothing other than a sort of verification of the absence of the phallus.

This is the sense in which I said that the imaginary structure, the manifest articulation of the should at least oblige us to delimit the character of the signifier. And I pose in short the question of whether by a more prudent method, one that could be considered as being more strict, we might not arrive at greater precision in the interpretation, on condition that the structural elements which we have committed ourselves to getting to know are sufficiently brought into the picture in order precisely to differentiate what the meaning of this case is.

And we are going to see that in doing this - we are going to see that as always the most particular cases are the cases which have the most universal value, and what this observation shows us is something which should not be neglected, because it is a question of nothing less than of specifying, on this occasion, this character of signifier without which one cannot give its real position to the function of the phallus (which remains at once always so important, so immediate, so central in analytic interpretation) instead of finding ourselves at every moment of its management in impasses whose most striking point is expressed, betrayed by the theory of Mrs. Melanie Klein who as we know has made the object phallus the most important of objects.

The object phallus is introduced into Kleinian theory, and into its interpretation of experience, as something she says, which is the substitute, the first substitute which enters the experience of the child - whether it is a question of a little girl or of a boy - as being a more convenient, more manageable, more satisfying sign. This is something to provoke questions about the role, the mechanism How are we to conceive this outcome of an altogether primordial phantasy as being that around which there is already going to be organised this profoundly aggressive conflict which puts the subject in a certain relationship with the body of the mother as container. In so far as from this container he covets, he desires - all the terms are unfortunately always used with difficulty, namely they are juxtaposed - he wishes to extract these good and bad objects which are there in a sort of primitive mixture within the body of the mother. And why the privilege accorded to this object phallus within the body? Undoubtedly if all of this is put to us with the great authority, the style of description so clear-cut, in a sort of dazzlement caused by the determined character of the style, I would almost say not open to any discussion, of Kleinian statements, one cannot fail also to pull oneself up after having heard it affirmed, and ask oneself at each moment: what is she aiming at?

Is it effectively the child who testifies to this prevalence of the object phallus, or on the contrary is it she herself who gives us the signal of the character as having the meaning of phallus? And I must say that in many cases we are not illuminated about the choice that must be made as regards the interpretation.

In fact I know that some of you are asking yourselves where this sign of the phallus must be placed in the different elements of the graph around which we are trying to orientate the experience of desire and its interpretation. And I have some echoes of the form taken by the question for some of you: what is the relationship between this phallus and the Other, the big Other that we speak about as being the locus of the word?

There is a relationship between the phallus and the big Other, but it is certainly not a relationship beyond, in the sense that the phallus would be the being of the big Other even though someone posed the question in those terms. If the phallus has a relationship to anything, it is much more with the being of the subject. Because, I believe that this is the new, important point that I am trying to get you to grasp in the introduction of the subject

into this dialectic which is the one that is pursued in the unconscious development of different stages of identification, through the primitive relationship with the mother, then with the coming into play of the Oedipus complex and of the operation of the law.

What I highlighted here is something which is at once very tangible in the observations - especially in connection with the genesis of perversions - and which is often veiled in what one links with the signifier phallus. The fact is that there are two very different things according to whether it is a question for the subject of being this phallus with respect to the other, or indeed by some ways, principles or mechanisms which are precisely those that we are going to take up in the subsequent evolution of the subject, but which are already, these relationships, installed in the other, in the mother. Precisely the mother has a certain relationship with the phallus, and it is in this relationship with the phallus that the subject has to valorise himself, has to enter into competition with the phallus.

It is from there that we began two years ago when I began to revise this relationship.

What is in question about the function of the signifier phallus with respect to the subject, the opposition of these two possibilities for the subject with respect to the signifier phallus to be it or to have it, is here something which is an essential distinction. Essential in so far as these incidences are not the same, that it is not from the same moment of the relation of identification (identificatory) that being and having come, that there is between the two a real line of demarcation a line of discernment, that one cannot be it and have it, and in order that the subject should in certain conditions manage to have it, it is in the same way necessary that there should be a renunciation of being.

Things in fact are much less simple to formulate if we try to stick as closely as possible to the dialectic that is in question. If the phallus has a relationship to the being of the subject it is not to the pure and simple being of the subject, it is not with respect to this subject who is supposed to be the subject of knowledge, the noetic support of all objects, it is to the speaking subject, to a subject in so far as he assumes his identity and as such, I would say - this is why the phallus plays its essentially signifying function - that the subject at once is it and is not it.

I apologise for the algebraic character that matters are going to take, but we have to learn to fix ideas because for some people there are questions which arise.

If in our notation something presents itself - and we are going to come back to it later - as being the barred subject in front of the object ($\$ \diamond o$), namely the subject of desire, the subject in so far as in his relationship to the object he is himself profoundly put in question - and that it is what constitutes the specificity of the relationship of desire in the subject himself; it is in so far as the subject is in our notation the barred subject that one can say that it is possible in certain conditions to give him the phallus as signifier. This in so far as he is the speaking subject.

He is and he is not the phallus. He is it because it is the signifier in which language designates him, and he is not it in so far as language - it is precisely the law of language on another plane - takes it away from him. In fact things do not happen on the same plane.

If the law takes it away from him, it is precisely to arrange things, it is because a certain choice is made at that moment. The law when all is said and done introduces into the situation a definition, a redistribution, a change of plane. The law reminds him that he

has it or that he does not have it. But in fact what happens is something which is played out entirely in the interval between this signifying identification and this redistribution of roles. The subject is the phallus, but the subject, of course, is not the phallus.

I am going to put the accent on something which the very form of the operation of negation in our tongue will allow us to grasp in a formula in which there occurs the slippage that concerns the use of the verb to be. One can say that the decisive moment, the one around which there turns the assumption of castration is the following. Yes, one can say that he is and that he is not the phallus, but he is not without having it (*il n'est pas sans l'avoir*).

It is in this inflection of, it is not that he does not (*de n'être pas sans*) it is around this subjective assumption which is inflected between being and having that the reality of castration operates. Namely that it is in so far as the phallus, as the penis of the subject, in a certain experience, is something which has been put in the balance, which has taken on a certain function of equivalence or of standard in the relationship to the object, that it takes on its central value and that up to a certain point one can say that it is in proportion to a certain renunciation of his relationship to the phallus that the subject enters into possession of this sort of infinity, of plurality, or allness of the world of objects which characterises the world of man.

You should carefully note that this formula, whose modulation, accent, I would ask you to hold onto is found in other forms in every tongue. *Il n'est pas sans l'avoir* has a clear correspondent. We will come back to it in what follows.

The relationship of the woman to the phallus and the essential function of the phallic phase in the development of feminine sexuality is articulated literally in the different, opposing form which suffices to distinguish clearly this difference of starting points of the masculine subject and the feminine subject with respect to sexuality.

The only exact formula, the one which allows us to get out of the impasses, the contradictions, the ambiguities around which we turn concerning feminine sexuality, is that she is without having it (*c'est qu'elle est sans l'avoir*). The relationship of the feminine subject to the phallus, is to be without having it. And it is to this that she owes the transcendence of her position; and this is what we will come to. We will manage to articulate concerning feminine sexuality and this relationship which is so particular, so permanent, on whose irreducible character Freud insisted, and which is expressed psychologically in the form of *Penisneid*.

In sum we would say, to push things to the limit and to make them clearly understood, that for man his penis is restored to him by a certain act which at the limit one could say deprives him of it. It is not exact, this is to make you open your ears wide. Namely that those who have already heard the preceding formula should not degrade it into the second accent that I give it.

But this second accent has its importance because it is here that there is made the junction first of all with the developmental element from which one usually starts, and which is the one that I am going to try to revise now with you by asking ourselves how we can formulate with the algebraic elements that we make use of, what is in question in these famous first relationships of the child with the object - particularly with the maternal object, and how starting from there we are able to conceive how there comes about the junction with this privileged signifier that is in question and whose function I am trying to situate

here.

The child, in what is articulated by the psychiatrists, specifically Mrs. Melanie Klein, has a whole series of first relationships which are established with the body of the mother conceived, represented here in a primitive experience which we grasp badly from the Kleinian description: the relationship of symbol and of image... And everyone knows that this is what is in question in the Kleinian text: the relationship to the symbol form. Even though it is always an imaginary content which is put forward here.

In any case we can say that up to a certain point something which is symbol or image, but which undoubtedly is a sort of one - we find here almost an opposition which tallies with philosophical oppositions, because what always constitutes the operation of the famous Parmenides between the one and being - we can say that the experience of the relationship to the mother is an experience entirely centred around an apprehension of unity and of totality.

All the primitive progress that Melanie Klein articulates for us as being essential to the development of the child is that of a relationship of a fragmentation to something which represents outside himself, both the totality of all those fragmented, broken-up objects which seem to be there in a sort not of chaos, but of primitive disorder, and on the other hand which will progressively teach him to grasp from these relationships of these different objects, of this plurality in unity of the privileged object which is the paternal object, to grasp the aspiration, the progress, the path towards his own unity.

The child, I repeat, grasps the primordial objects as being contained in the body of his mother, this universal container which is presented to him and which is supposed to be the ideal locus as one might say of his first imaginary relationships.

How can we try to articulate this? There are obviously here not two terms, but four terms. The relationship of the child to the body of the mother, which is so primordial, is the framework in which there come to be inscribed these relationships of the child to his own body which are those which for a long time I tried to articulate for you in terms of the notion of the specular affect - to the degree that this is the term which gives the structure of what one can call the narcissistic affect. It is in so far as from a certain moment the subject recognises himself in an original experience as separated from his proper image, as having a certain elective relationship with the image of his own body, a specular relationship which is given to him either in specular experience as such, or in a certain relationship of transivist captivation (*castration transtif*) in games with the other close to him in age, very close and which oscillates within a certain limit, which cannot be superseded, of motor maturation - it is not with just any type of little other (here the word little meaning the fact that it is a question of little friends) that the subject can have this experience, these games of prestige with the other his companion; age here plays a role on which I insisted at one time.

The relationship of this with an *eros*, the libido, plays a special role; here there is articulated the whole measure in which the couple of the child to the other who represents for him his own image come to be juxtaposed, to interfere, to be made dependent on a larger and more obscure relationship between the child in his primitive endeavours - the tendencies coming from his needs - and the body of the mother in so far as it is effectively in effect the object of primitive identification. And what happens, what is established, lies entirely in the fact that what happens namely the unconstituted form in which there appears the first wails of the child, the cry, the appeal of his needs, the fashion in which there are

established the relationships of this still unconstituted primitive state of the subject with respect to something which is presented then as a one at the level of the other, namely the maternal body, the universal container, is what is going to regulate in an altogether primitive fashion the relationship of the subject in so far as he is constituted in a specular fashion, namely as ego - and the ego is the image of the other - with a certain other which must be different from the mother (in the specular relationship it is the little *ousus*?).

But as you are going to see, it is a question of something completely different, given that it is in this first quadripartite relationship that there are going to be made the first accommodations of the subject to his own identity. Do not forget that it is at that moment, in this most radical relationship that all the authors, of one accord, place, situate the locus of psychotic or parapsychotic anomalies of what one can call the integration of such and such a term of autoerotic relationships of the subject to himself on the frontiers of the body image.

The little schema that I formerly made use of and which I recently recalled, the one of the famous concave mirror, in so far as it allows it to be conceived that there can be produced, on condition that one places one's self at a predetermined favourable point - I mean within something which prolongs the limits of the concave mirror from the moment that one makes them pass through the centre of the spherical mirror - something which is imaged by the experience that I brought to your attention at that time, the one which provokes the appearance - which is not a phantasy, but a real image - which can be produced in certain conditions which are not very difficult to produce; the one which is produced when one gives rise to a real image of a flower within a perfectly existing vase thanks to the presence of this spherical mirror, provided one looks at the totality of the apparatus from a certain point.

It is an apparatus which allows us to imagine what is in question, namely that it is in so far as the child identifies himself with a certain position of his being in the powers of his mother that he realises himself. It is indeed on this that the accent of everything that we have said about the importance of the first relationships concerning the mother is brought to bear. It is in so far as he integrates himself in a satisfying manner into this world of insignia which all the behaviours of the mother represent. It is from there, to the degree that he will situate himself here in a favourable fashion that there can be placed, either within himself, or outside himself, or lacking to him as one might say, this something which it is hidden from himself: namely his own tendencies, his own desires; that he will be able to be from the first relationship in a more or less faulty, deviated relationship with his own drives.

It is not too complicated to imagine this. Remember what it was I made the explanation of narcissism turn around: a manifest, crucial experience described a long time ago, the famous example put forward in the *Confessions of St. Augustine*, that of the child who sees his milk-brother in possession of the maternal breast. *Vidi ego et expertus sum zelantem parvulum; nondum loquebatur et intuebatur pallidus amaro aspectu conlactaneum suum*, which I translated as: 'I have seen jealousy in a baby and know what it means. He was not old enough to talk, but whenever he saw his milk brother at the breast, he would grow pale with envy.' *Amaro* has a different accent to the French *amer*; one could translate it by poisonous, but that does not satisfy me either.

Once this experience is formalised you are going to see it appearing with all its absolutely general import. This experience is the relationship to his own image which, to the extent that the subject sees his counterpart in a certain relationship with the mother as ideal primitive identification, as the first form of the one, of this totality of which following

on explorations concerning this primitive experience analysts take so much into account that they only speak about totality, about the notion of the conscious awareness of totality, as if by focusing on this aspect we should begin to forget in the most persistent way that precisely that which experience shows us is pursued to the most extreme limits of everything that we see in the phenomena: the fact is that in the human being there is no possibility of acceding to this experience of totality; that the human being is divided, torn, and that no analysis restores this totality to him because precisely something else is introduced into its dialectic which is precisely what we are trying to articulate because it is literally imposed on us by experience, and in the first place by the fact that the human being, in any case, cannot consider himself as any more in the final analysis than as a being in whom there is something missing, a being - whether it is male or female - who is castrated. That is the reason why it is to the dialectic of being, within this experience of the one that the phallus is essentially referred.

But here we have then this image of the small other, this image of the counterpart, in a relationship with this totality that the subject has ended up by assuming, and not without delays. But it is indeed on this, around this that Melanie Klein makes pivot the evolution of the child. It is the moment called the depressive phase which is the crucial moment, when the mother as totality was realised at a moment. It is with this first ideal identification that we are dealing.

And face to face with this what do we have? We have the conscious awareness of the desired object as such, namely that the other is in the process of possessing the maternal breast. And it takes on this elective value which makes of this experience a crucial experience on which I would ask you to dwell as being essential for our formalisation.

To the extent that in this relationship with this object which on this occasion is called the maternal breast, the subject becomes aware of himself as deprived, contrary to what is articulated in Jones - every privation he says somewhere (and it is always in terms of the discussion of the phallic phase that this is formulated) engenders the sentiment of frustration - (it is exactly the contrary), it is in the measure that the subject is imaginarily frustrated, that he has here the first experience of something which is in front of him in his place, who usurps his place, who is in this relationship with the mother which should be his own, and in which he senses this imaginary gap as frustration - I say imaginary because after all there is nothing to prove that he is himself deprived; an other can be deprived, or he can be looked after in his turn - that there comes to birth the first apprehension of the object; in so far as the subject is deprived of it.

It is there that there begins, that there opens out something which is going to allow this object to enter into a certain relationship with a subject regarding which we do not know effectively whether it is an *s* to which we should add the index *i*, a sort of passionate self-destruction adhering absolutely to this pallor, to this decomposition which is shown to us here by the literary paintbrush of the one who tells us about it, namely St. Augustine, or whether it is something which already we can conceive of as being properly speaking an apprehension of the symbolic order, namely what does this mean; namely that already in this experience the object should be symbolised in a certain fashion, take on a full, signifying value, that already the object in question, namely the mother's breast, not only can be conceived of as being or not being there but can be related to something else which can be substituted for it. It is starting from there that it becomes a signifying element.

In any case Melanie Klein, without realising the import of what she is saying at that moment, takes this option by saying that there can be something better there, namely the

phallus. But she does not explain to us why. This is the point which remains mysterious. Now, everything depends on this moment at which there is born the activity of a metaphor which I pointed out to you as being so essential to uncover in the development of the child. Remember what I told you the other day about these particular forms of the activity of the child before which adults are at once so disconcerted and awkward; the one in which the child not satisfied to have begun to call 'bow-wow', namely by a signifier that he has invoked as such, what you have persisted in telling him is a dog, begins to decree that the dog goes 'miaow' and the cat goes 'bow-wow'. It is in this activity of substitution that there lies the whole role, the mainspring of symbolic progress. And this is much more primitive of course than when the child articulates it.

What is in question, is in any case something which goes beyond this emotional (*passionnelle*) experience of the child who feels himself frustrated, namely precisely the one we can formalise by saying that this image of the other is going to be substituted for the subject in his destructive passion, in this case in his jealous passion, and to find itself in a certain relationship to the object in so far as he is also in a certain relationship with the totality which may or may not concern him.

But it is to the extent that the object can be substituted for this totality, to the extent that the image of the other can be substituted for the subject, that we enter properly speaking into symbolic activity, into what makes of the human being a speaking being, into what is going to define all his subsequent relationship to our object.

$$\frac{i(o)}{\$} \diamond \frac{o}{I}$$

This having been said, in the case that we are dealing with, how can distinctions that are so fundamental, which remain of such a primitive character, help us to orientate ourselves? I mean to create the discriminations which allow us precisely to extract the maximum profit from these facts which are given in the experience of the dream and of the particular subject whose case we are analysing.

Let us see whether we ought at every instant propose to ourselves to closely grasp this relationship to desire, this relationship called desire, this relationship to the object in so far as it is relationship of human desire, and whether it is always required that we should find there this relationship to an object in so far as the subject proves to be at the limit abolished there. If S in relation to o is the formula of desire, and if all of this is inscribed in this fourfold relationship which ensures that the subject, in the image of the other, namely in the successive identifications which are going to be called ego, finds to substitute for himself a form for this fundamentally pallid, fundamentally anguished thing which is the relationship of the subject in desire.

What do we find in the different symptomatic elements which are brought to us here in this observation? We can take from many angles this material which is brought to us by the patient. Let us take it as far as possible from the angles which are most distinct, from the symptomatic angle.

There is a moment when he tells us that he used to cut the thongs, the straps of his sister's sandals. This comes during the analysis of the dream, that is to say after a certain number of interventions, which are no doubt minimal but nevertheless not nothing, by Ella

Sharpe his analyst; simple responses made him come little by little, one thing following on another, after the hood - the fact that the hood is the form of the feminine genital organ in the report of the dream - after the hood of the car, the straps that were used to fix, to tie back this hood, then the straps that he used to cut at a certain time from his sisters sandals, without still being able to account for the objective which he was no doubt pursuing, which seemed quite useful to him even though he cannot really show in any way the necessity for this.

These are very exactly the same terms that he uses about his own car which, in a session following on this session of dream interpretation, he tells the analyst the garage had not given back to him - and which he does not dream of making an issue of and which is something which he does not need, is something he would like, even though it was not a necessity. He says that he likes it.

Here it seems are two forms of the object with which the subject has of course a relationship whose singular character he himself articulates; namely that in the two cases it does not answer any need. And it is now we who are saying it. We are not saying, modern man does not need his car - even though everyone who looks at it carefully perceives that it is only too obvious. Here it is the subject who says it: I do not need my car, but I like it, I desire it. And as you know it is here that Ella Sharpe seized with the action of a hunter before her prey, the object of the search, tells us that she intervened with great energy, without telling us, which is a curious thing, the terms in which she did so.

Let us begin to describe a little the things that are in question. And because I wanted to start from what was the most simple, the most easily locatable thing in an old equation; the thongs, or the straps is the o. There was a time where he made a collection of these straps.

Let us oblige ourselves to follow a little our own formulae, because if we set them up it is in order that they should be of some use to us. The image of o, it is quite clear that here it is his sister about whom not much has been said, because nobody doubts how complex it is to bring up the slightest thing when it is a question of explaining what we are dealing with.

His sister is the elder; she is eight years older than him. This we know, it is in the observation. She does not make great use of the fact that she is eight years older than him, but what is certain is that if she is eight years older than him, she was eleven years old when he the subject was three years old at the time that he lost his father. A certain taste for the signifier has the advantage of making us do some arithmetic from time to time. It is not something that is unwarranted because there is absolutely no doubt that in their earliest years children are continually doing it concerning their age and their relative age. The rest of us, thank God, forget that we have passed fifty, we have reasons for that, but children are very attached to knowing their age. And when one makes this little calculation one perceives something that is very striking: it is that the subject tells us that he only begins to have memories after the age of eight or eleven.(134)

This is in the observation. Not a lot is made of it, but it is not simply a kind of random discovery that I am giving you here, because if you now read the observation, you will see that it goes much further than this: namely that it is at the very moment that this is brought to our notice by the subject - I mean that he had a bad memory for anything below eleven years - that he talks immediately afterwards about his girlfriend who is very gifted, a girl who is very clever at impersonating, namely at imitating anybody and particularly men,

in a brilliant fashion because she is used by the BBC.

It is striking that he talks about that just at the moment that he is speaking about something that seems to be of another register, namely that below eleven years there is just a black hole. We have to believe that this is not unrelated to a certain relationship of imaginary alienation of himself in this sisterly personage. i(o), is indeed his sister and this can explain a lot of things for us, including the fact that he will afterwards elide the existence in his family of a pram, of a baby carriage. On that level it is the past, it is his sister's business.

Again, there is a moment that he caught up as one might say once again with this sister, namely that he has come to meet her at the same point that he left her concerning an event that is crucial. Ella Sharpe is right to say that the death of the father is crucial. The death of the father left him confronted with all sorts of elements except one which would probably have been very precious for him in order to surmount the different captivations.

Here in any case it is the point which of course is going to be a little bit mysterious for us, because the subject himself underlines it: why these straps? He does not know. Thank God we are analysts and we can easily guess what is there at the level of the \$ I mean that it can be required that we should have a little idea about what is there, because we know other observations. It is something which obviously has a relationship not with castration - if castration were well assimilated, well recorded, assumed by the subject, there would not have been this little transitory symptom; but at that moment it is all the same indeed around castration that this revolves - but that we have no right, for the present, to extrapolate, and

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \underline{\text{His sister}} & \diamond & \underline{\text{the straps}} \\ \$ & & x \end{array}$$

which is I here. Namely that which is related to something regarding which for the present we can allow ourselves to suspend a little our conclusions. If we are in analysis, it is precisely to attempt to understand a little and to understand what it is about, namely what is the I of the subject, his ideal, this extremely particular identification on which I already indicated the last time it would be well to dwell.

We are going to see how we can specify it in a relationship that he has with respect to something more evolutionary. This must be something referring to the actual situation in the analysis, and concerning the relationship with the analyst.

So let us begin again to pose ourselves the questions concerning what the situation is at present. There would be many ways to pose this problem because in this case one can say that all roads lead to Rome. One can start with the dream, and from this mass of things that the subject contributes as material in reaction to the interpretations that the analyst makes of it. We agree with the subject that the essential thing is the car. The car and the straps, they are obviously not the same thing. There was something which meanwhile had evolved. The subject had taken up positions; he himself had made reflections about this car, and reflections which are not without their trace of irony: it is funny the way one speaks of a car as if it were something human. I do not have to insist on it. One senses, I already pointed it out the last time that the obviously symbolic character of the car has its importance.

It is certain that in the course of his existence the subject found in this car an object more satisfying it seems than the straps. For the simple reason that he still understands nothing about the straps while he is all the same capable of saying that obviously the car does not serve to satisfy a need, but that he is very attached to it. And then he operates it, he is the master of it. He feels fine inside his car.

What are we going to find here at the level of the image? At the level of the image of o we find things which are evidently different according to whether we take things at the level of the phantasy and of the dream, or at the level of what one could call the phantasies of the dream and of the daydream. In the daydream, which has its own value, we know what the image of the other is. It is something *vis-à-vis* which he has taken up particular attitudes. The image of the other, is the couple of lovers, which on the pretext on not disturbing, note, he never fails to disturb in the most effective fashion, namely calling on them to separate.

The image of the other, is this other of which everyone will say - remember this curious phantasy which he says he had again not long ago -oh, there is no need to check who is in the room, it is only a dog. In short, the image of the other, is something which leaves in any case very little room for sexual union, which requires either separation, or on the contrary something which is really quite out of place, an animal phallus, a phallus which is completely outside the limits of the game. If there is a phallus, it is a dog's phallus.

This situation, at you see, seems to have progressed in the direction of disintegration. That is to say that if for a long time the subject was someone who took his support from a feminine identification, we observe that his relationship with the possibilities of union, the fact of embracing, of genital satisfaction, presents itself in a way which in any case leaves wide open, the problem of what the phallus is doing there. It is very certain in any case that the subject is not at ease. The question of double or single is there. If it is double it is separated, if it is single it is not human. In any case it does not work out so well.

And as regards the subject in this case there is one thing quite clear: we do not have to ask ourselves like in the other case what he is or where he is. It is quite clear, there is no longer anybody. It really is the *Outis* which we noted in other circumstances. Whether it is the dream, where the woman does everything 'to get my penis', where literally there is nothing in fact - one can do everything one wishes by hand, even indeed show that there is nothing up ones sleeve, but as regards him nobody, and as regards his phantasy, that is namely what is there in this place where he should not be: in effect there is no one. There is no one, because if there is a phallus, it is the phallus of a dog who masturbated in a place where he would have been very embarrassed if anyone had entered. In any case not him.

And here what is there at the level of I? One could say, it is certain that there is Ella Sharpe, and that Ella Sharpe is not unrelated to all of this. Ella Sharpe is warned in advance by a little cough to reverse the formula, not to put her finger either between the tree and the bark. That is to say that if she is in the process of doing something more or less suspect to herself, she has to cover herself before the subject arrives. It is necessary, in a word, that Ella Sharpe should be completely protected from the subject's blows. This is what I described the last time, referring myself to Ella Sharpe's own comparison of analysis considered as a game of chess, as the subject not wanting to lose his queen.

He does not want to lose his queen because no doubt his queen is the key to all of this; and all of this can only hold together because it is on the side of the woman that

nothing should be changed. Because it is on the side of the woman that omnipotence lies. The strange thing, is that Ella Sharpe senses this idea of omnipotence and recognises it everywhere to the point of telling the subject that he believes himself to be omnipotent. On the pretext that he had had a tremendous dream, even though he is not capable of saying any more than this little bit of adventure which happens on a road in Czechoslovakia.

But it is not the subject who is all powerful. What is all-powerful is the other. And this indeed is why the situation is to be specially dreaded. Let us not forget all the same that we are dealing with a subject who is unable to plead. He is unable, and it is all the same something very striking.

The key to the question is the following: is it or is it not true that the subject cannot manage to plead because the other, in the position and place of whom we place ourselves every time we have to plead, for him is someone who must not be touched. In other words the other him, and in this case it is the woman, the other must not in any case be castrated. I mean that the other carries in herself this signifier which contains all the values. And this indeed is where the phallus must be considered - I am not the only one; read page 272 of Melanie Klein about the evolution of the little girl; she says very well that the signifier phallus primitively concentrates on itself all the tendencies that the subject was able to have in all the orders, oral, anal, urethral, and that even before one can speak about the genital already the signifier phallus concentrates in itself all the values, and specially the instinctual values, the aggressive tendencies that the subject may have developed.

It is entirely in the measure that the subject cannot bring the signifier phallus into play, where the signifier phallus remains inherent in the other as such, that the subject finds himself in a state which is the state of breakdown which we see. But what is altogether striking is that here, as in every case where we find ourselves in the presence of a resistance of the subject, this resistance is that of the analyst.

Because effectively if there is something which Ella Sharpe prohibits herself severely in this case - she does not know why, but it is certain that she admits as such that she prohibits it to herself - it is to plead. In this case where precisely there is presented a barrier to be overcome which she could overcome, she forbids herself to overcome it; she refuses to allow herself this because she is not aware that what the subject is taking so many precautions against, is not - as she thinks - something which could concern a supposed paternal aggression - the father is dead, well and truly dead for a long time, and it was extremely difficult to reanimate him a little bit within the analysis; it is not to encourage the subject to use the phallus as a weapon that is in question, it is not a question of his homosexual conflict; it is not that he proves himself to be more or less courageous, aggressive in the presence of people who tease him while he is playing tennis because he is not able to play the final shot; this is not at all what is in question. It is on this side of that moment where he must consent to perceive that the woman is castrated.

I am not saying that the woman is not the phallus, which she shows quite ironically in the dream phantasy, but that the other as such, because of the very fact that he is in the other of language, is subjected to this: as regards the woman, she is without having it (*est sans l'avoir*). Now this is precisely what cannot be admitted by him in any case.

For him she should not be without having it, and this is why he does not want her at any price to put it at risk. His wife is outside the interplay of the dream, do not forget. She is the one who in appearance does not play any role there. It is not even underlined that she is looking. It is there, as I might say, that the phallus is protected. The subject himself does

not even have to put the phallus at risk because it is entirely in play in a corner where nobody would dream of looking for it. The subject does not go so far as to say that it is in the woman, and nevertheless it is indeed in the woman that it is.

I mean that it is to the extent that Ella Sharpe is there. It is not particularly inappropriate that she is a woman. It could even be quite appropriate if she perceived what should be said to the subject, namely that she is there as woman, and this poses questions, for the subject to dare to plead his case before her. It is precisely what he does not do. It is precisely what she perceives that he does not do, and it is around this that turns the critical moment of the analysis.

At that moment she encourages him to use his phallus as a weapon; she says, this phallus is something which has always been extremely dangerous, do not be afraid, this indeed is what is in question, it is 'a biting and a boring thing'.(146)

There is nothing in the material which gives us an indication of the aggressive character of the phallus. And it is nevertheless in this sense that she intervenes by her word. I do not think that this is the best thing to do. Why? Because the position the subject has, and which according to all appearances he has kept, which he will keep in any case all the more after the intervention of Ella Sharpe, is precisely the one he had at a moment of his childhood which indeed is the one which we are trying to specify in the phantasy of the cut straps, and everything which is attached to it in terms of identifications to his sister and of the absence of prams. It is something which appears, you will see it if you re-read the associations very attentively. It is something that he is sure he has experienced: it is himself tied down, pinned in bed. (141) It is himself in so far as he has certainly been contained, maintained in positions which are not unrelated to what we can presume, to some repression of masturbation, in any case to some experience which was linked for him to the first approaches of erogenous emotion, and which we have every reason to think was traumatic.

This is the sense in which Ella Sharpe interprets it. Everything that the subject produces, is something which must have played a role, she says, in some primal scene, with his parents coupling. There is no doubt that he interrupted this coupling, either by his cries, or by some intestinal trouble. It is here that she even rediscovers the proof that this little colicky pain which replaces the cough when he is going to knock is a confirmation of her interpretation.

This is not certain. The subject, whether he is small, or to the extent that something occurs as an echo as a transitory symptom in the course of analysis, releases what he has within his body. That is what a colicky pain is. This does not for all that settle the question of the function of this incontinence. This incontinence, as you know, will be reproduced at the urethral level, no doubt with a different function. And I already said how important it was to notice the echo character of the presence of the parents in the process of consummating the sexual act in every kind of enuretic manifestation.

Let us be careful here, it is important not to give always a univocal finality to what can in effect have certain effects, to be subsequently used secondarily by the subject as constituting in effect a whole intervention on interparental relationships.

But here the subject, quite recently, namely at a time quite close to this dream in analysis, had a quite special phantasy, which in this case Ella Sharpe makes a great deal of to confirm the notion of this relationship with parental union. It was that he was afraid one

day that he would have a breakdown in his famous car, really more and more identified with his own person, and to have it blocking, neither more nor less, the way that the royal couple had to pass - as if it were there as an echo for us of the chess game. But every time you find the king think less of the father than of the subject.

In any case this phantasy, this little anxiety that the subject manifests: provided he himself must also go to this little inaugural function where the royal couple - we are in 1934, the English crown is not a queen with a little consort, it is indeed a king and a queen who are going to find themselves blocked there by the subject's car.

What we should be satisfied purely and simply with saying in this case, is: here is something which renews imaginarily, phantastically, purely and simply, an aggressive attitude of the subject, an attitude of rivalry comparable indeed to what one can give to the fact of wetting his bed. It is not certain. If this should awake some echo in us, it is all the same that the royal couple are not just in any condition: he is going to find himself in his car, stopped, exposed to view. It seems that what is in question in this case is all the same something which is much closer to this desperate search for the phallus which is nowhere, and which it is a question of finding, and which one can be very sure that one can never find. Namely that if the subject is here in this hood, in this protection constructed for a long time around his ego by the hood of the car - it is also the possibility of escaping with a peak of speed, a burst of speed - the subject is going to find himself in the same position in which we have formerly heard reverberating the laughter of the Olympians: it is Vulcan who captures Mars and Venus in one net. And everyone knows that the laughter of the assembled gods on this occasion still resonates in our ears and in the verses of Homer.

Where is the phallus? It is still indeed the major source of the comic; and after all let us not forget that this phantasy is above all a phantasy about a notion of incongruity much more than anything else. It accords in the closest fashion with the same fundamental situation which is going to give its unity to the dream and everything that is around it, namely an *aphanisis* not in the sense of the disappearance of desire, but in the proper sense that the word deserves if we make of it the substantive *aphanisos* and which is not so much to disappear, as to make disappear.

Quite recently a talented man, Raymond Queneau, put as an epigraph to a very fine book, *Zazi dans le metro, ho plasas efanisen*: the person who has done this has carefully dissimulated his sources.

This indeed is what is in question when all is said and done. The *aphanisis* that is in question here, is the concealment of the object in question, namely the phallus. It is in so far as the phallus is not put in, that the phallus is reserved, that it is preserved, that the subject cannot gain access to the world of the other. And as you will see, there is nothing more neurotogenic not than the fear of losing the phallus, or the fear of castration - this is the altogether fundamental mainspring - but than not wanting that the other should be castrated.

Seminar 13: Wednesday 4 March 1959

I think that we have taken the structural analysis of the model dream which is found in Ella Sharpe's book far enough for you to see at least the contribution this work makes to the goal we are trying to reach, namely what we should consider desire and its interpretation to be.

Even though some people have said that they were not able to find the reference to Lewis Carroll that I gave the last time I am surprised that you did not remember the double rule of three, because that was where I finished in connection with the two stages of the more or less fetishistic relationship of the subject to the object, what was finally expressed as

$$\left(\frac{i(o)}{\$} \diamond \frac{O}{I} \right) \text{Capita!}$$

the ideal identification which I intentionally left open for the first of the two equations, the one of the straps of his sister's sandals. The one where instead of the I we have an x.

I do not think that anyone of you failed to see that this x, as might be expected, is the thing called the phallus. But the important thing is the place where this phallus was. Precisely at the place of I, of the primitive identification, of the identification to the mother, precisely at that place where the subject does not want to deny the phallus to the mother. The subject wants, as the doctrine has always taught us, wants to maintain the mother's phallus. The subject refuses the castration of the other.

The subject, as I told you, does not want to lose his queen, since there was question of a game of chess. He does not want, on this occasion, to put Ella Sharpe in any other position than that of the idealised phallus which is the one he warns her about by a little cough before coming into the room in order to make the disappear so that he does not, in any way, have to bring them into play.

We will perhaps have occasion this year to come back to Lewis Carroll; you will see that it is a question literally of nothing else in the two great Alice books: *Alice in Wonderland* and *Journey through the Looking Glass*. These two Alices are almost a poem of phallic avatars. You can start reading them now, to prepare yourselves for something that I may be led to say about them.

One thing may have struck you in what I told you about the position of this subject with respect to the phallus, which is what I underlined for you: the opposition between being and having. When I told you that it was because for him it was a question of being that was posed, that he would have had to be it without having it - which is the way that I defined the feminine position - you could not have heard this being and not being the phallus, without it giving rise in you to an echo which really even imposes itself right through this case of the 'to be or not to be' which is still so enigmatic, which has become almost a joke, which gives us the style of Hamlet's position and which, if we go through

this door will only bring us back to one of the most primitive themes of Freud's thought, of this something in which there is organised the position of desire, where there is demonstrated the fact that from the first edition of the *Traumdeutung* the theme of *Hamlet* was promoted by Freud to an equivalent rank to that of the oedipal theme which appeared then for the first time in the *Traumdeutung*. We know of course that Freud had been thinking about it for some time, but only from letters that were not destined for publication. The Oedipus complex makes its first appearance in the *Traumdeutung* in 1900. *Hamlet* at that time is also published in 1900 in the form that Freud left it afterwards, but in a note, and it was in 1914 that it passed into the body of the text.

I think that the theme of *Hamlet* can help us to reinforce this sort of elaboration of the castration complex. How is the complex articulated in the concrete, in the development of the analysis?

The theme of *Hamlet*, after Freud, was taken up on several occasions. I probably will not make the rounds of all the authors who took it up. You know that the first one was Jones. Ella Sharpe also put forward a certain number of things about *Hamlet* which are not uninteresting, Shakespeare's thought and Shakespeare's work being right at the centre of her formation. We may have an opportunity to come back to it.

It is a question today of beginning to decipher this field. By asking ourselves what Freud himself meant by introducing *Hamlet*, and what has been demonstrated by what is subsequently said in the work of other authors.

Here is Freud's text which it is worthwhile reading at the beginning of this research. I am giving the French translation.

After having spoken about the Oedipus complex for the first time, and it is not superfluous to point out here that he introduced the Oedipus complex into *The Interpretation of Dreams* in connection with dreams of the death of persons of whom we are fond, namely in connection with what this year served us as a point of departure and a first guide for highlighting something which presented itself first of all quite naturally in this dream which I chose because it was one of the simplest referring to a dead person; this dream which served to show us how here was established on two lines of intersubjectivity which are superimposed, reduplicated with respect to one another, the famous 'He did not know', that we placed on one line, the line of the position of the subject - the paternal subject in this case being what is evoked by the dreaming subject - namely the somewhere where there is situated, in a form that is in a way incarnated by the father himself, and at the place of the father in the form of 'He did not know', precisely the fact that the father is unconscious and incarnates here the image, the very unconsciousness of the subject, and of what? His own wish, of his death-wish against his father.

Of course he is aware of another wish, a sort of benevolent wish, calling for the consolation of death. But precisely this unconsciousness which the subject has about his oedipal death-wish is in a way incarnated in the image of the dream in this form that the father should not even know that the son had a benevolent death-wish for him.

'He did not know,' says the dream absurdly 'that he had died.' This is where the text of the dream stops. And what is repressed for the subject, which is not unknown to the phantastical father, is the 'according to his wish' which Freud tells us is the signifier which we should consider as repressed.

Another of the great creations of tragic poetry, [Freud tells us] Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, has its roots in the same soil as *Oedipus Rex*. But the changed treatment of the same material reveals the whole difference in the mental life of these two widely separated epochs of civilisation: the secular advance of repression in the emotional life of mankind. In the *Oedipus* the child's wishful phantasy that underlies it is brought into the open and realised as it would be in a dream.

He had in effect insisted a good deal on the fact that oedipal dreams are here in a way like the offspring, the fundamental source of the unconscious desires that always reappear, and the *Oedipus* (I am speaking about the *Oedipus* of Sophocles or the Greek tragedy) as the construction, the elaboration of what always emerges from these unconscious desires. This is how, literally, things are articulated in *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

In *Hamlet* it remains repressed; and - just as in the case of neurosis - we only learn of its existence from its inhibiting consequences. [German quotation.] Strangely enough, the overwhelming effect produced by the more modern tragedy has turned out to be compatible with the fact that people have remained completely in the dark as to the hero's character. The play is built up on Hamlet's hesitations over fulfilling the task of revenge that is assigned to him; but its text offers no reasons or motives for these hesitations and an immense variety of attempts at interpreting them have failed to produce a result. According to the view that was originated by Goethe and is still the prevailing one today, Hamlet represents the type of man whose power of direct action is paralysed by an excessive development of his intellect. (He is 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought'). According to another view, the dramatist has tried to portray a pathologically irresolute character which might be classed as neurasthenic. The plot of the drama shows us, however, that Hamlet is far from being represented as a person incapable of taking any action. We see him doing so on two occasions: first in a sudden outburst of temper, when he runs his sword through the eavesdropper behind the arras.

You know that this was Polonius, and that it was at the time that Hamlet is having with his mother a conversation which is far from being crucial because nothing in this play ever is, except its fatal ending where in a few moments there is piled up in the form of corpses everything which was delayed up to then by the complications of the action.

And secondly in a premeditated and even crafty fashion, when, with all the callousness of a renaissance prince, he sends the two courtiers [these are Rosencrantz and Guildenstern who represent the kinds of false friends], to the death that had been planned for himself. What is it, then, that inhibits him in fulfilling the task set him by his father's ghost?

You know that the play opens on a platform before the castle in Elsinore with the apparition of this ghost to two guards who soon let Hamlet know about it.

The answer, once again, is that it is the peculiar nature of the task. Hamlet is able to do anything - except to take vengeance on the man who did away with his father and took that father's place with his mother, the man who shows him the repressed wishes of his own childhood realised. Thus the loathing which should drive him on to revenge is replaced in him by self-reproaches, by scruples of conscience, which remind him that he himself is literally no better than the sinner whom he is to punish. Here I have translated into conscious terms what was bound to remain unconscious in Hamlet's mind. (SE 4 265)

This first contribution by Freud is presented with this type of balanced precision which, I may say, keeps us on the right path in order to situate, to maintain Hamlet in the place where he has put him. That is quite clear here. But it is also with respect to this first outline of Freud's perception that there should be subsequently situated all the digressions and the embroiderings that have been imposed on it - sometimes as you will see in a rather distant way.

The authors according precisely to the advance of analytic exploration centring their interest on points which moreover are sometimes quite validly found in *Hamlet*, but to the detriment of this sort of rigour with which Freud situates it from the beginning. And I would say that at the same time, and this is the characteristic which is the least exploited, the least questioned, everything here is something which is found to be situated on the plane of scruples of conscience. Something which in any case cannot be considered as being only an elaboration.

If it is presented to us as being what takes place, the way in which one can express on the conscious plane what remains unconscious in the soul of the hero, it seems that we are quite right to ask how it can be articulated in the unconscious. Because one thing that is certain, is that a symptomatic elaboration like a scruple of conscience is not all the same in the unconscious. If it is in consciousness, if it is constructed in some way by defensive methods, we must all the same ask ourselves what corresponds in the unconscious to the conscious structure.

This therefore is what we are in the process of trying to do. I will finish the little that remains of Freud's paragraph. He does not take long in any case to throw what will be a bridge across the abyss of *Hamlet*. It is in fact quite striking in effect that Hamlet remained a complete literary enigma up to Freud. This does not mean that it is not still one, but there is this bridge. This is true for other works. The *Misanthrope* is the same kind of enigma.

'The distaste for sexuality ... fits in very well with this' (symptom) 'the same distaste that was destined to take possession of the poets mind more and more ... and which reached its extreme expression in *Timon of Athens*.' I am reading this passage to the end, because it is important, and in two lines opens the way for those who subsequently tried to organise the whole of Shakespeare's work around the problem of personal repression. This effectively is what Ella Sharpe tried to do; which is indicated in what was published after her death in the form of 'An Unfinished Paper', in her Hamlet which first appeared in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* and which is something like an attempt to take the whole evolution of the work of Shakespeare as signifying something which I believe that by wanting to give it a certain schematic form Ella Sharp certainly did something imprudent, and in any case something which can be criticised from the point of view of method, which does not exclude that effectively she discovered some valuable things.

For it can of course only be the poets own mind which confronts us in Hamlet. I observe in a book on Shakespeare by Georg Brandes (1896) a statement that Hamlet was written immediately after the death of Shakespeare's father (in 1601), that is under the immediate impact of his bereavement, and, as we may well assume, while his childhood feelings about his father had been freshly revived. It is known, too, that Shakespeare's own son who died at an early age bore the name of Hamnet, which is identical with Hamlet. (SE 4 264-266)

I think we will finish here with this passage which shows to what point Freud already by his simple indications takes very far the things that the authors have since been

engaged in.

Here I would like to tackle the problem in the way that we are able to do it beginning from the data which I put forward before you from the beginning of this year. Because I think that these data allow us to reassemble in a more synthetic, in a more striking form the different principles of what is happening in Hamlet, to simplify in a way this multiplicity of agencies with which we often find ourselves confronted in the present situation. I mean which gives some character or other of reduplication to analytic commentaries on whatever observation we are dealing with when we see taken up simultaneously for example in the register of the opposition between the unconscious and defence, then afterwards of the opposition between the ego and the id, and I think of everything that can be produced when the agency of the superego is added to it, without these different points of view ever being unified, which sometimes give to these works a sort of vagueness, a sort of overloading which is not something which is designed to be of use to us in our experience.

What we are trying to grasp here are guides-lines which, by allowing us to resituate these different organs, these different stages of the mental apparatus that Freud has given us, allow us to resituate them in a way that takes into account the fact that they are semantically superimposed on one another, in a partial way. It is not by adding them to one another, by making of them a sort of unity and totality that one can make them function normally.

It is if you wish by bringing to them the more fundamental skeleton map that we are trying to construct in such a way that we will know what we are doing with each one of these orders of reference when we bring them into play.

Let us begin to spell out this great drama of Hamlet. However evocative the text of Freud may have been, I must all the same recall what we are dealing with. We are dealing with a play which opens a short time after the death of the king who was, his son Hamlet tells us, a very admirable king, the ideal king and father, and who has died mysteriously. The version of his death that has been put about is that he was stung by a serpent in an orchard (the orchard which is again interpreted by analysts). Then very quickly, a few months after this death, Hamlet's mother marries her brother-in-law, Claudius, this Claudius who is the object of the execration of the central hero, Hamlet, and the one who bears not alone the motives of rivalry that Hamlet may have had in his regard, Hamlet who in short was barred from the throne by this uncle, but also everything that he glimpses, everything that he suspects about the scandalous character of this substitution. What is more, the father who appears as a ghost to tell him in what conditions of dramatic betrayal there took place what the ghost tells him, was well and truly an assassination. Namely - it is in the text and it has not failed either to exercise the curiosity of analysts - that there was poured into his ear while he was asleep, a poison mysteriously named hebenon. Hebenon which is sort of made-up, constructed word - I do not know whether it is found in any other text. People have tried to give it an equivalent, a word which is close to it and which designates it in the fashion that it is ordinarily translated, that is by *jusquiane*.

It is quite certain that this assassination through the ear would not in any way satisfy a toxicologist, but gives lots of material for interpretation to the analyst.

Let us look right away at something which appears to us as something striking, I mean if we start from the criteria, the articulations that we have highlighted. Let us use these keys, however specific their emergence may have seemed to you. They were

constructed for a very particular, very specific purpose, but this does not exclude, and this is one of the clearest aspects of analytic experience, that the particular is what has the most universal value.

It is quite clear that what we highlighted by writing the 'he did not know that he had died' is undoubtedly something quite fundamental. In the relationship to the Other as such, the ignorance in which this other is kept about a particular situation is something absolutely original as you well know because you have learned even that one of the revolutions that occurs in the soul of the child is the moment that the child, after having believed that all his thoughts - 'all his thoughts' is something that should always urge us to be very cautious, I mean we are the ones who call them thoughts. As regards the experience of the subject, the thoughts are everything that exists - everything that is known by his parents, his slightest internal movements are known - he perceives that it is possible for the other not to know. It is indispensable to take into account this correlation of: not knowing in the other, with precisely the establishment of the unconscious. The one is in a way the opposite of the other. And it is perhaps its foundation. Because in effect this formulation is not enough to establish them but indeed there is something which is quite clear, and which serves us as a guide, which is that in the drama of Hamlet we are going to try to give some body to this historical notion, which is all the same a little bit superficial, in the atmosphere, in the style of the times, that we are dealing with some modern construction or other; compared to the status of the ancients these are poor degenerates; we are in the style of the 19th century.

It is not for nothing that Georg Brandes is quoted here. And we will never know whether Freud at this epoch, even though it is probable, knew Nietzsche. But this, this reference to the moderns, may not satisfy us. Why should the moderns be more neurotic than the ancients? In any case it is begging the question.

What we are trying to see, is something which will take us further than this begging of the question, or this explanation by the explanation: things are going badly because things are going badly. What we have before us is a work whose fibres, whose first fibres, we are going to begin to separate.

The first fibre, the father here knows very well that he has died, died in consequence of the wish of the one who wanted to take his place, namely Claudius who is his brother-in-law (or his brother?). The crime is undoubtedly hidden from the centre stage, for those who are on the stage. This is an absolutely essential point, without which of course the drama of Hamlet would have nowhere to situate itself or to exist. And this is what is highlighted in Jones' accessible article *The Death of Hamlet's Father*, namely the essential difference that Shakespeare has introduced compared to the primitive saga in which the massacre of the one who in the saga bears a different name, but who is the king, takes place before everybody in virtue of a pretext which concerns in effect his relations to his wife. This king too is butchered by his brother, but everybody knows it. Here, in Hamlet, the thing is hidden, but, this is the important point, the father knows it, and he is the one who comes to tell it to us 'There needs no ghost, my lord,' - Freud quotes it on several occasions because it has become a proverb - 'there needs no ghost, my lord come from the grave to tell us this' (*I v 125*). And in effect if it is a question of the oedipal theme we ourselves already know a good deal about it. But it is clear that in the construction of the theme of Hamlet we have not yet got to the stage of knowing it. And there is something significant in the fact that in the construction of the fable, it should be the father who comes to say it, that he the father knows it.

I think that there is here something quite essential. And it is a first difference in the

fibre between the situation, the construction, the first fundamental elaboration of the drama of Oedipus. Because Oedipus does not know. Once he knows the whole drama is unleashed which leads to his self-punishment, namely his liquidation of the situation. But the oedipal crime is committed by Oedipus in the unconscious. Here the oedipal crime is known, and it is known by whom? By the other, by the one who is in effect its victim, and who has risen in order to make it known to the subject.

In short you see the path along which we are advancing, in a method which might be called one of comparison, of correlation between the different fibres of the structure, which is a classical method, one which consists in an articulated whole - and nowhere is there more articulation than in the domain of the signifier. The very notion of articulation, as I ceaselessly underline, is consubstantial with it. After all one only speaks about articulation in the world because the signifier gives a meaning to this term. Otherwise there is nothing but continuity or discontinuity, but never articulation.

We are trying to see, to grasp by a sort of comparison homogenous fibres in one or other phase, of *Oedipus* and of *Hamlet*, in so far as Freud brought them together, which is going to allow us to conceptualise the coherence of things. Namely, how, in what measure, why, it is conceivable that in the very measure that one of the keys of the keyboard is found in a sign opposed to the one where it is in the other of these two dramas, a strictly correlative modification is produced. And this correlation is what should put us before the articulation of the sort of causality that is in question in these dramas. It is to begin with the very idea that it is these correlative modifications which are the most instructive for us, which allow us to gather together the resources of the signifier in a manner which is more or less usable by us. There must be a relationship which is graspable and finally notable in a quasi-algebraic fashion between these first modifications of the sign of what is happening.

If you wish, on this top line, of 'he did not know', here it is 'he knew that he had died'. He had died in accordance with the murderous wish, that of his brother, which had pushed him into the grave. We are going to see what the relationships are with the hero's drama.

But before launching ourselves in a fashion that is always overhasty along the line of the superimposition of identifications, which is in the tradition: there are some concepts, and the most useful are the least elaborated, and God knows what has been done with identifications. And Claudius when all is said and done, what he has done, is a form of Hamlet, is Hamlet's desire. This is easy to say because to situate Hamlet's position *vis-à-vis* this desire we find ourselves in the position of having to bring into play here all of a sudden scruples of conscience. Namely something which introduces into the relationships of Hamlet to this Claudius a double, profoundly ambivalent position which is that of a rival but a rivalry which one really senses is a singular one, a second degree rivalry, the one who in reality has done what he did not dare to do. And in these conditions he finds himself surrounded by some mysterious protection which has to be defined.

In the name of scruples of conscience it is said? With reference to what is imposed on Hamlet, and which is all the more imposed on him after the first encounter with the ghost, namely literally the command to avenge the ghost, in acting against the murderer of his father Hamlet is full of all sorts of feelings. He has been dispossessed, a feeling of usurpation; a feeling of rivalry; a feeling of vengeance; and more than all these the express order of his father whom he admired more than anybody. Surely everything in Hamlet is in agreement for him to act, and he does not act.

Obviously it is here that the problem begins, and that the way to advance must be accompanied by the greatest simplicity. I mean that always what causes our downfall, what makes us go astray, is to substitute ready-made keys for the solution of the question. Freud tell us: it is a question here of the conscious representation of something which must be articulated in the unconscious; what we are trying to articulate, is to situate somewhere and as such in the unconscious what is meant by a desire.

In any case, let us say with Freud that there is something wrong from the moment that things are engaged on in such a way. There is something wrong with Hamlet's desire. Here is the path that we are going to choose. This is not easy because we are not much further along the road than the point that people have always got to.

Here we must take Hamlet, his behaviour in the tragedy, as a whole. And because we have spoken about Hamlet's desire, we must notice something which has not escaped analysts naturally, but is not perhaps of the same register, of the same order: it is a question of situating what there is in Hamlet in terms of which for us is the soul, the centre, the touchstone of desire. It is not exactly that. Namely Hamlet's relations to what is the conscious object of his desire.

Here, the author refuses us nothing. We have something in the play which acts like a barometer for Hamlet's position with respect to desire. We have it in the most obvious and clearest fashion in the form of the Ophelia character.

Ophelia is very obviously one of the most fascinating creations which has been proposed to human imagination. Something which we can call the drama of the feminine object, the drama of desire, of the world which makes its appearance at the dawn of civilisation in the form of Helen. It is remarkable to see it at a point which is perhaps also a high point, incarnated in the drama and the misfortune of Ophelia. You know that it was taken up in many forms of aesthetic, artistic creation, either by poets, or by painters, at least in the Pre-Raphaelite period, to the extent of giving us these finical paintings in which the very terms of the descriptions that Shakespeare gives of this Ophelia in her dress floating in the river into which she had allowed herself to slip in her madness because the suicide of Ophelia is ambiguous.

What happens in the play is, immediately, correlatively in short to the drama - it is Freud who points this out to us - we see this horror of femininity as such. Its terms are articulated in the most proper sense of the term. Namely, what he uncovers, what he highlights, what he brings into play before the very eyes of Ophelia as being all the possibilities of degradation, of variation, of corruption, which are linked to the evolution of a woman's very life in so far as she allows herself to be drawn into all the actions which little by little make a mother of her. It is in the name of this that Hamlet rejects Ophelia in the fashion which appears in the play extremely sarcastic and extremely cruel.

We have here a first correlation of something which marks well the evolution and the an evolution and a correlation as essential for something which carries the case of Hamlet into its position with respect to desire. Notice that here immediately we find ourselves confronted in passing with a wild analyst, Polonius, Ophelia's father who immediately puts his finger on it: Hamlet's melancholy comes from the fact that he wrote love letters to his daughter and that he, Polonius, not failing in his duty as a father, made his daughter give a sharp reply. In other words our Hamlet is love-sick.

This caricatural character is put here to represent for us the ironic accompaniment of

the easy option that is always provided by the external interpretation of events. Things are structured altogether differently as everyone knows. It is of course a question of something which concerns the relations of Hamlet to what? Essentially to his act. But of course the profound change of his sexual position is altogether capital, but it has to be articulated, to be organised just a little differently. It is a question of an act which must be performed, and he depends on it in his position as a whole. And very precisely in this something which is manifested right through this play, which this play makes of this fundamental position with respect to the act which in English is a much more commonly used word than in French, it is what in French is called *ajournement*, *retardement*, and which is expressed in English by procrastinating, putting off until tomorrow.

This in effect is what is in question. Our Hamlet, right through the play procrastinates; it is a question of knowing what is meant by each of the different procrastinations of the act every time he has an opportunity for it, and what is going to be determining at the end in the fact that he is going to actually accomplish this act. I believe that in any case there is something to highlight here. It is precisely the question of what is signified by this act which is proposed to him.

The act which is proposed to him has nothing to do, when all is said and done, and this is sufficiently indicated in what I pointed out to you, with the oedipal act of a revolt against the father. The conflict with the father, in the sense that it is creative in the psyche. It is not the act of Oedipus, in so far as the act of Oedipus sustains the life of Oedipus, and makes of him the hero he is before his downfall, as long as he knows nothing, which makes *Oedipus* conclude in a dramatic way. For Hamlet, it is that he is guilty of being. He cannot tolerate being. Before the drama of *Hamlet* even begins Hamlet is aware of the crime of existing. And it is starting from this beginning that he must choose. And for him the problem of existing starting from this beginning is posed in terms which are his own: namely the 'to be or not to be' which is something which engages him irredeemably in being as he very clearly articulates it.

It is precisely because for him the oedipal drama is open at the beginning, and not at the end, that the choice between being and not being is proposed. And it is precisely because there is established this either/or, that he is in any case taken up into the chain of the signifier, into something which means that he is in any case the victim of this choice.

I will give Letourneur's translation which I think is the best one.

To be, or not to be - that is the question.
 Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
 The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
 Or to take arms against a sea of troubles
 And by opposing end them. To die, to sleep –
 No more, and by a sleep to say we end
 The heartache and the thousand natural shocks
 That flesh is heir to. (III, i)

I do not think these words are meant to leave us unmoved.

To die, to sleep -
 To sleep - perchance to dream. Aye, there's the rub,
 For in that sleep of death, what dreams may come
 when we have shuffled off this mortal coil

This 'mortal coil' does not quite mean *envelope*. It is this kind of tortion of something rolled around us.

must give us pause. There's the respect
That makes calamity of so long life.
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely
The pangs of despised love, the laws delay,
The insolence of office and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin? (III i 56ff)

What Hamlet finds himself confronted with in this 'to be or not to be', is the encountering of the place taken by what his father has said to him. And what his father has said to him *qua* ghost, is that he had been surprised by death 'in the blossoms of my sin' (I v 76). It is a matter of encountering the place taken by the sin of the other, the unpaid sin. The one who knows is on the contrary, contrary to Oedipus, someone who has not paid for this crime of existing. Moreover the consequences for the following generations are not negligible. The two sons of Oedipus thought only of butchering one another with all the vigour and the conviction that could be wished for, while for Hamlet it is completely different. Hamlet can neither pay in his own place, nor leave the debt unpaid. In the last analysis he must have it paid, but in the conditions in which he is placed the blow passes through himself. And it is by the very weapon after a grim drama which we will have to greatly expand on, that Hamlet is wounded by, only after he Hamlet has received a deathly wound, that he can strike the criminal who is within his reach, namely Claudius.

It is this community of knowing, of the fact that the father and the son both know, which is here the mainspring which creates the whole difficulty of the problem of the assumption of this act by Hamlet. And the paths by which he can rejoin it, which will make possible this act which in itself is impossible, in the very measure that the other knows, it is by roundabout ways which will finally make it possible for him to accomplish what must be accomplished, it is these paths which should be the object of our interest because these are what will be instructive for us. Because this is the real problem, which it was a question of introducing today. It is necessary that I should take you in a way to the end of things, I mean to how finally, and by what ways, Hamlet manages to accomplish his act. Let us not all the same forget that if he manages to do it, if Claudius is finally struck down, it is nevertheless a botched piece of work. It is nothing less than after having run through the body of someone who has certainly, as you will see, plunged into the abyss, namely the friend, the companion, Laertes, after his mother has poisoned herself by mistake with the very cup which should have served her as a backup murder weapon if the tip of the poisoned foil did not wound Hamlet, it is after a certain number of other victims, and not before he himself has been mortally wounded that he can deliver his blow. There is all the same something here which should pose a problem for us.

If effectively something is accomplished, if there was in the last resort a sort of rectification of desire which made the act possible, how was it accomplished? This is precisely what holds the key, which ensures that this play of genius has never been replaced by a better one. Because in short what are these great mythical themes which the creations of poets tackle throughout the ages if not a kind of long approximation which ensures that the myth by circumscribing its possibilities in the closest possible way ends up by entering

properly speaking into subjectivity and psychology. I maintain, and I would maintain unambiguously - and I think I am in accord with Freud in saying it - that poetic creations engender rather than reflect psychological creations. This diffuse map of something which is vaguely outlined in this primordial relationship of rivalry between father and son is something which here gives all its prominence and is the true heart of this play *Hamlet*. It is in the measure that something is equivalent to what has been lacking - to what has been lacking precisely because this original, initial, situation is distinct from Oedipus - namely castration, precisely because of the fact that in the play things are presented as a kind of slow zig-zag progress, this slow coming to birth by roundabout ways of the necessary castration, in the very measure, and in the very measure that this is finally realised, that Hamlet makes emerge the final action in which he dies and in which things were taken to such an extent of not being able to the others, the Fortinbras, always ready to collect the inheritance, would come to succeed him.

Seminar 14: Wednesday 11 March 1959

Since the last time then we have been dealing with *Hamlet*. *Hamlet* does not come in here by chance, even though I told you that it was introduced at this point by the formula of being and not being which came to me in connection with Ella Sharpe's dream.

I was lead to re-read a part of what has been written about *Hamlet* on the analytic plane, and also of what was written before. The authors, at least the better ones, have obviously not neglected what was written before. And I must say that we have gone a good distance, despite the fact that I got a little lost from time to time, although not without some enjoyment, and the problem is to gather together what is in question in view of your particular goals.

Our precise goal being to give, or to give again its meaning to the function of desire in analysis and analytic interpretation. It is clear that this should not give us too much trouble because I hope to make you see, and I am making my statement here right away, I believe that what distinguishes the tragedy of *Hamlet Prince of Denmark*, is essentially that it is the tragedy of desire. *Hamlet* which - we cannot be absolutely sure, but according to the most rigorous studies - was first presented at London during the Winter season of 1601; *Hamlet* of which the first quarto edition, this famous edition which was almost what could be called a pirate edition at the time, namely that it was not done under the control of the author, but borrowed from what were called [actors copies], booklets used by the prompter. This edition - it is interesting all the same to know these little bits of literary history - was unknown until 1823, when a few filthy copies were found - ones which had been handled a good deal, probably taken to the performances. And the Folio edition, the great edition of Shakespeare, only began to appear after his death in 1623, preceding the great edition in which the plays are divided into acts. Which explains why the division into acts is much less decisive and clear in Shakespeare than elsewhere.

In fact it is not believed that Shakespeare intended to divide his plays into five acts. This is important because we are going to see how this play is divided. Winter 1601, is two years before the death of Queen Elizabeth. And in effect one may think approximately that *Hamlet*, which is of capital importance in the life of Shakespeare, reduplicates as one might say the drama of this joining up of two epochs, two aspects of the poets life, because the tone changes completely when James I comes to the throne, and already something is hinted at as one author says, which breaks the crystalline charm of Elizabeth's reign, of the virgin queen, she who makes a success of those long years of miraculous peace after what constituted in the history of England, as in many countries, a period of chaos into which it will promptly return with all the drama of the puritan revolution.

In short, 1601 already announces the queen's death, which one could not fail to foresee, with the execution of her lover, the Earl of Essex which takes place in the same year as the play *Hamlet*.

There is a point in evoking these reference points, since we are not the only ones to have tried to resituate *Hamlet* in its context. What I am telling you here is something that I have not seen stressed by any analytic author. These are nevertheless the kind of basic facts

which are important.

To tell the truth, what has been written by analytic authors cannot be said to have been enlightening. And today I will not put forward my criticism of what a certain line-by-line interpretation of *Hamlet* has directed itself towards. I mean, I am trying to rediscover one or other element, without in fact one being able to say otherwise than that the more the authors insist the further we get from the comprehension of the totality, from the coherence of the text.

I must also say that Ella Sharpe, whom I esteem greatly, in this respect, in her essay which it is true is unfinished, which was discovered after her death, greatly disappointed me. I will mention it all the same because it is significant. It is so much along the line that we are trying to explain regarding the tendency which we see being taken by analytic theory, that it is worth highlighting it. But we will not begin with it.

We will begin with Jones' article, which appeared in 1910 in the *American Journal of Psychology* which gives us a date and a monument, and it is essential to have read it, it is not easy to get hold of it nowadays. And in the little reedition that he made of it Jones has I think added on something else, some complements to his theory of *Hamlet* in this article: 'The Oedipus Complex as an Explanation of the Hamlet Mystery'.

He adds as a subtitle: 'A study on motive'. In 1910 Jones tackles the problem which was masterfully indicated by Freud as I showed you the last time in this half-page in which one could say that when all is said and done everything is already there, because even the points on the horizon are marked, namely the relationships of Shakespeare with the meaning of the problem which is posed for him: the signification of the feminine object. I believe that we have here something that is absolutely central. And if Freud points us to *Timon of Athens* on the horizon this undoubtedly is the path that Ella Sharpe tried to take. She made the whole of Shakespeare's work into a sort of vast cyclothymic oscillation by showing in it the ascending plays, namely the ones that could be seen as optimistic, the plays in which aggression is directed outwards, and those in which aggression turns back onto the hero or the poet, those of the descending phase. Here is how we can classify Shakespeare's plays, and sometimes even date them.

I do not believe that we have here something entirely valid, and we are going to remain for the moment at the point that we are at, namely first of all at *Hamlet* in order to try - I will perhaps give some indications about what follows it or what precedes it, *Twelfth Night*, and *Troilus and Cressida* because I think it is almost impossible not to take them into account, they greatly clarify the problems that we are first going to introduce with the text of *Hamlet* alone.

With the grand style of documentation which characterises his writings - there is in Jones a solidity, a certain sweep of style in the documentation which distinguishes his contributions to a high degree - Jones gives a sort of summary of what he very correctly calls, the mystery of *Hamlet*. There are two possibilities, you are either aware of the dimensions that this question has taken, or you are not aware of it. For those who are not aware of it, I am not going to repeat here what is in Jones article. Inform yourselves about it one way or another.

I have to tell you that the mass of writings on *Hamlet* has no equivalent. The abundance of the literature is something unbelievable. But what is still more unbelievable, is the extraordinary diversity of interpretations which have been given to it. I mean that the

most contradictory interpretations have followed on one another, have unfolded throughout history, setting up the problem of the problem: namely why is everybody trying so hard to understand something; and they give the most extravagant, the most incoherent, the most diverse results. One cannot say that this goes very far. We will have to come back to it in what I am going to rapidly recall about the aspects of this explanation that Jones summarises in his article.

Almost everything has been said, and to go to one extreme, there is a *Popular Science Monthly*, which must be some sort of popular magazine dealing with medical matters, which published something in 1860 called *The Impediment of Adipose*. At the end of *Hamlet* we are told that Hamlet is 'fat and scant of breath', and in this journal there is a whole development about Hamlet's adipose.

There is a certain Vining who in 1881 discovered that Hamlet was a woman disguised as a man, whose aim throughout the whole play was to seduce Horatio; and it was to touch Horatio's heart that Hamlet manufactured his whole story. All the same it is a good enough story. And at the same time we cannot say that it has absolutely no echo for us. It is certain that Hamlet's relationships with people of his own sex are all the same intimately interwoven with the problem of the play.

Let us come back to serious things, and recall with Jones that these efforts of criticism are grouped around two aspects. When there are two aspects in logic, there is always a third aspect, contrary to what is believed, the third is not all that much excluded. And it is obviously the third which in this case is interesting.

The supporters of the two aspects were not lightweights. For the first aspect there are those who have in short questioned Hamlet's psychology. These are obviously the ones who have the primacy, who must be given pride of place in our esteem. Here we encounter Goethe, Coleridge who in his *Lectures on Shakespeare* took up a very characteristic position which I think Jones could have taken a little more into account. Because it is a curious thing that Jones, above all launched into an extraordinarily full commentary of what had been done in German, material that had proliferated and was even prolix.

The positions of Goethe and Coleridge are not identical. They have however a very close relationship which consists in putting the accent on the spiritual form of Hamlet's character. In general, let us say, that for Goethe it is action paralysed by thought. This as you know has a long line of descendants. It has been recalled, and not of course in vain, that Hamlet had lived rather a long time in Wittenberg. And this term, referring the intellectual and his problems to an excessive attendance at Wittenberg presented with good reason as one of the centres of a certain style of formation of young German students, is something which has had a long posterity. Hamlet is in short the man who sees all the elements, all the complexities, the motives in the game of life, and who is in short suspended, paralysed in his action by this knowledge. It is properly speaking a Goethean problem, and it has had profound repercussions, especially if you add to it the charm and seduction of Goethe's style and person.

As regards Coleridge, in a long passage that I have not time to read for you, he takes the same line, with a much less sociological, a much more psychological character. There is something in my opinion which dominates here in the whole passage from Coleridge which I would like to recall. 'I must admit that I experience in myself some taste for the same thing'. This is what for him described the psychasthenic character, the impossibility of committing oneself to a path, and once having entered on it, engaged on it, remaining on it

to the end.

The intervention of hesitation, of multiple motives, is a brilliant piece of psychology which gives us the essential, the mainspring, the sap of its essence, in this remark made in passing by Coleridge: after all I have a taste for that myself. This means, I can see myself in it. He admits this in passing, and he is not the only one. One finds an analogous remark in someone who is more or less Coleridge's contemporary, and who wrote some remarkable things about Shakespeare in his *Essays on Shakespeare*, namely Hazlitt, whom Jones is wrong not to mention at all because he is someone who wrote the most remarkable things on the subject at that time.

He goes still further, he says that in the last analysis to talk about this tragedy We have heard so much about this tragedy, that we scarcely know how to criticise it, any more than we would know how to describe our own face. There is another note which makes the same point. And here we have lines that I am going to take very much into account.

I will pass very quickly over the other aspect, the one about an external difficulty, which was established by a group of German critics the two principal ones being Klein and Werder who wrote at the end of the 19th century in Berlin. This is more or less how Jones groups them. He is right. It is a question of highlighting the external causes of the difficulty of the task that Hamlet has set himself, and the forms that Hamlet's task are supposed to have. This is supposed to be to make his people recognise the guilt of Claudius, the man who after having killed his father, and married his mother, is reigning over Denmark. There is something here which does not support the criticism, because the difficulties that Hamlet would have had in accomplishing his task, namely in having the guilt of the king recognised, well there are two possibilities, to intervene already in the way that he intervened when he did intervene, by murdering him, and then to be in a position to justify this murder, are evidently very easily removed by a simple reading of the text.

Hamlet never poses himself such a problem. The principle of his action, namely that the vengeance he must take on the one who is the murderer of his father, and who at the same time took his throne and his place with the wife whom he loved above everything else, must be purged by the most violent action, and by murder, is not only never put in question by Hamlet, but I think that on this point I will read you passages that will show you that he treats himself as a weakling, as a coward. He foams with despair on the stage because he cannot decide to take this action.

But the principle of the thing is never in doubt. He does not pose himself the slightest problem about the validity of this act, of this task. And on this point there is a man called Loening, whom Jones makes a lot of, who made a remark at the same period discussing the theories of Klein and Werder in a very decisive fashion. I point out in passing that Jones warmly commends these remarks. In effect he quotes some which appear to be very penetrating.

But all this does not have an extraordinary importance because the question is really superseded once we take the third position, the one by which Jones introduces the analytic position. These delays in my presentation are necessary, because they have to be followed if we are to have the background against which the problem of *Hamlet* is posed.

The third position is the following: it is that even though the subject does not doubt for a moment that he has a task to accomplish, for some reason unknown to him this task is

repugnant to him. In other words, it is the task itself and not what is happening either in the subject or outside him. There is no need to say that there can be much more subtle versions of what is happening outside than the ones that I gave you at first to clear the ground.

There is therefore an essentially conflictual position with regard to the task itself. And it is in short in this very solid fashion, which gives us a lesson in method, that Jones introduces the analytic theory. He shows that the notion of conflict is not at all new, namely: the internal contradiction in the task had already been brought forward by a certain number of authors who saw very clearly, like Loening, if we are to believe the quotations that Jones gives from him, that one can grasp the problematic, conflictual character of the task, by certain signs which did not have to await analysis for their indicative character to be seen: namely the diversity, the multiplicity, the contradiction, the false consistency of the reasons that the subject gives in order to postpone this task, not to carry it out at the moment when it is offered to him. The notion in short of the superstructural, rationalised, rationalising character of the motives that the subject gives, had already been perceived by psychologists well before analysis. And Jones knows very well how to highlight it, to give it its relief.

Only it is a question of knowing where the conflict lies and the authors who are on this path do not allow it to be glimpsed that there is something which appears in the forefront, and a sort of underlying difficulty which without being properly speaking articulated as unconscious is considered as being more profound, and in part unmastered, neither completely elucidated nor perceived by the subject.

And the discussion by Jones presents this character which is quite characteristic of what in his case is one of the traits that he knew well how to make use of in his articles which played a great role in making the very notion of the unconscious a valid one for a large intellectual public. He powerfully articulates that what these authors, some of them very subtle, had highlighted is that the underlying, contrary motive for the action of Hamlet, is for example a motive of right. Namely, has he the right to do this.

And God knows the German authors have not failed, especially since this was happening in the full Hegelian period, to notice all sorts of registers which Jones has a fine time ironising about, showing that if something must come into unconscious principles, they are not motives of an elevated order, of a lofty character of abstraction, bringing into play a morality, a State, absolute knowledge, but that there must be something much more radical, more concrete, and that what is in question is precisely what Jones is going then to produce, because it is more or less about that year that there begins to be introduced into America Freudian points of view - this is the same year that he publishes a review of Freud's theory of dreams, that Freud publishes his article on the origins and development of psychoanalysis, directly written in English if I remember rightly because what is in question are the famous lectures at Clark University.

I believe that one cannot put one's finger on, in an analysis which really goes as far as it is possible to go at that epoch, which highlights in the text of the play, in the unfolding of the drama, to show its oedipal signification, which highlights what we can call the mythical structure of the Oedipus myth I must say that we are not so mentally clean and tidy as to be all able to smile so easily at seeing brought forward in connection with *Hamlet* Telephos, Amphion, Moses, Pharaoh, Zoroaster, Jesus, Herod - everyone gets into the act - and finally what is essential, two authors writing more or less around 1900 published *Hamlet in Iran* in a very well known journal, a reference of the Hamlet myth to the Iranian myths which are about the legend of Cyrus, which another author also made

great play of in an unknown and unfindable journal.

The important thing is that in Jones' introduction, in 1910, of a new criticism of *Hamlet*, and of a criticism which is going to consist entirely in leading us to this conclusion: 'So we reach the apparent paradox that the hero, the poet, and the audience are all profoundly moved by feelings due to a conflict of the source of which they are unaware' - they have not woken up, they do not know what is going on.

I think it is essential to notice the step that has been taken at this level. I am not saying that it is the only step possible, but that the first analytic step consists in transforming a psychological reference not into a reference to a more profound psychology, but into a reference to a mythical arrangement which is thought to have the same meaning for all human beings. And there must all the same be something more, because *Hamlet* is not all the same *Syrrhos Sage*, a story about Cyrus and Cambyses, nor about Perseus and his father Acrisios, it is all the same something different.

If we are speaking about it, it is not only because there have been a myriad of critics, but also because it is interesting to see what that makes of *Hamlet*. When all is said and done you have not the slightest idea because through some kind of effect which is quite curious I think I can say from my own experience that it cannot be done in French. I have never seen a good *Hamlet* in French. Nor anyone who plays Hamlet well. Nor a text one could really listen to.

For those who read the text, it is something that knocks you over backwards, makes you bite the carpet and roll on the ground, it is something unimaginable. There is not a verse of Hamlet, nor one of his replies which does not have in English a percussive power, a violence of language which makes of it something at which one is at every moment absolutely stupefied. You could believe that it was written yesterday, that one could not write things like that three centuries ago.

In England, that is to say where the play is played in its own tongue, a production of *Hamlet* is always an event. I would even go further - because after all one cannot really measure the psychological pressure of the public except at the booking office - and I would say what it is for the actors, which proves it to us again, first of all because it is quite clear that to play Hamlet is for an English actor the crowning of his career, and that when it is not the crowning of his career it is really what he wants in order to retire happily by giving his farewell performance, even if his role consists in playing the first Gravedigger.

There is here something which is important, and we will have to see what it means, because I am not making this remark at random.

There is a curious fact, which is that when after all an English actor comes to play *Hamlet* he plays it well. They all play it well. A still stranger thing is that people speak of this or that person, as many Hamlet's as there are great actors. The Hamlet of Garrick, the Hamlet of Kean, etc. are still evoked. This too is something extraordinarily indicative.

If there are as many Hamlets as there are great actors, I think that it is for analogous reasons - it is not the same because it is a different thing to play *Hamlet* and to be involved as a spectator and critic But the point of convergence of all that, what is particularly striking and what I would ask you to keep in mind, is that it can be thought that in the final analysis it is because of the structure of the problem that Hamlet as such poses about desire, namely the thesis that I am putting forward here that Hamlet brings into play

the different planes, the very framework that I am trying to introduce you to here, in which desire comes to situate itself.

It is because this place is exceptionally well articulated here, so well I would say and in such a fashion that each and every person finds his own place in it, can recognise himself in it, that the machinery, the net of the play *Hamlet* is this kind of network, of bird catchers' net in which the desire of man is essentially articulated here, in terms precisely of the coordinates that Freud uncovers for us, namely its relationship to the Oedipus complex and to castration.

But this presupposes that it is not simply another edition, another version of the eternal type, drama, conflict, of the heros struggle against the father, against the tyrant, against the good or the bad father. Here I am introducing things that we are going to see being developed subsequently. It is that things are pushed by Shakespeare to such a point that what is important here is to show the atypical characteristics of the conflict, the modified fashion in which there is presented the fundamental structure of the eternal Saga that one rediscovers from the beginning of time, consequently in the function in which in a certain fashion the coordinates of this conflict are modified by Shakespeare in such a way as to show how in these atypical conditions there comes to operate, in all its most essentially problematic character, the problem of desire in so far as man is not simply possessed, invested, by it but that he has to situate, has to find this desire. Has to find it at all costs, and in great suffering, to the point of not being able to find it except at the limit, namely in an action which cannot be completed, be produced by him, except by being fatal.

This encourages us to look more closely at the unfolding of the play. I do not want to make you wait too long, but I must all the same give its most salient aspects.

Act I, concerns something that could be called the introduction to the problem, is here all the same a point of overlapping, of accumulation, of confusion around which the play turns. It is necessary all the same for us to come back to something simple which is in the text. We are going to see that this composition deserves to be retained, that it is not something vague, or something which deviates to the right or to the left.

As you know things begins with a guard, a changing of the guard on a platform of Elsinore. And I must say that it is one of the most magisterial beginnings of all Shakespeare's plays, because not all of them begin so magisterially. It is at midnight that the change takes place, a change in which there are some very fine, very striking things. For example it is the ones who are coming on guard who ask: 'Who's there?', when it should be the other way round. The fact is that in effect everything happens in an unusual way. They are all anxiety-ridden because of something they are waiting for. And the thing arrives in fewer than forty verses. Even though it is midnight when the change takes place, one o'clock sounds when the ghost appears.

And from the moment the ghost appears we have entered into a very rapid movement with rather curious stagnations.

Immediately afterwards there is the scene where the king and the queen appear, the king saying it is time to get over our mourning, we may weep with one eye, but let us laugh with the other (I ii 12), and in which Hamlet who is there manifests his feelings of revolt against the rapidity of the remarriage of his mother and the fact that she has married somebody who, compared to his father, is an absolutely inferior character. At every instant in Hamlet's remarks we see highlighted the exaltation of his father as a being on whom he

would say later: ‘... every god did seem to set his seal to give the world assurance of a man’ (III iv 61). It is much later in the text that this phrase will be pronounced by Hamlet. But from the first scene there are analogous words. It is essentially in terms of this sort of betrayal, and also this falling off - sentiments which his mother’s conduct inspired in him, this hasty marriage, two months we are told, after the death of his father - that Hamlet presents himself. There is the famous dialogue with Horatio: ‘Thrift, thrift, Horatio! The funeral baked meats did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables’. (I ii 180) I do not need to remind you of the celebrated themes.

Then, immediately, we have the introduction of two characters: Ophelia, and Polonius, and this in connection with a sort of little dressing down that Laertes, who is a very important character in our story of Hamlet, who has been seen as - we will come back to it - someone who plays a certain role with respect to Hamlet in the mythical unfolding of the story, and quite correctly of course, addresses to Ophelia who is the girl with whom Hamlet, as he tells us himself, was in love, and whom now in the state that he is in he rejects with all sorts of sarcasms. Polonius and Laertes come one after another to the unfortunate Ophelia to give her all sorts of sermons on prudence, to urge her not to trust this Hamlet.

There then comes the fourth scene: the encounter on the platform of Elsinore between Hamlet, who has been rejoined by Horatio, and the ghost of his father. In this encounter he shows himself passionate, courageous, because he does not hesitate to follow the ghost wherever the ghost leads him, in order to hold with him a rather horrifying dialogue. And I underline that the character of horror is articulated by the ghost himself (*I v 80*). He cannot reveal to Hamlet the horror and the abomination of the place in which he lives, and what he suffering, because his mortal organs would not be able to tolerate it. And he gives him an order, a command. It is interesting to note right away that the command consists in the fact, that however he manages it, he has to stop the scandal of the queen’s ‘luxury’; and that in all of this moreover he should restrain his thoughts and his movements; that he should not let himself be carried towards some excess or other concerning his thoughts with respect to his mother.

Naturally the authors have made a lot of this kind of disturbed background to the orders given by the ghost to Hamlet, of having in short to restrain himself in his relationships with his mother. But there is one respect in which it seems that what is in question has not been articulated, that in short already, and immediately it is about a question that must be resolved: what is to be done about something, which appears here to be the essential, despite the horror of what is articulated, the accusations formally pronounced by the ghost against the character of Claudius, namely the assassin. It is here that he reveals to his son that he has been killed by him.

The order that the ghost gives is not an order in itself; it is something which already puts in the foreground, and as such, the mother’s desire. This is absolutely essential, moreover we will come back to it.

The second act is constituted by what one can call the organisation of the surveillance around Hamlet. In short, we have a sort of preamble to it in the form - it is rather amusing, and this shows the character of reduplication of the group Polonius, Laertes, Ophelia, over against the group Hamlet, Claudius and the queen - of instructions that Polonius, the prime minister, gives to someone for spying on his son who has gone to Paris. He tells him how to proceed in order to get information about his son. Here we have a purple passage in the style of the eternal truths about the police which I do not need to

insist on. Then there intervene, it has already been prepared in the first act, Guildenstern and Rosencrantz, who are not simply the lightweight characters that people think. They are people who are old friends of Hamlet. And Hamlet distrusts them, mocks them, derides them, routs them, and plays with them an extremely subtle game under the cover of madness - we will also see what is meant by this problem of the madness or the pseudo-madness of Hamlet - really appeals at one moment to their old and ancient friendship, with a tone and an accent which also deserves to be highlighted if we have the time, and which also deserves to be retained, which proves that he does it without any confidence. And he does not for a single moment give up his position of rusing, of playing, with them. Nevertheless there is a moment when he speaks to them with a certain tone.

Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are the vehicles, they come to sound him out for the king and this indeed is what Hamlet senses and what he urges them truly to admit to him. Were you sent to me? What are you doing around me? And the others are sufficiently shaken for one of them to ask the other: what are we to say to him (II ii 300). But that passes because everything always passes in a certain fashion. Namely that one never breaks through a certain wall which would relax a situation which appears essentially, from beginning to end, essentially knotted up.

At this moment Rosencrantz and Guildenstern introduce the players they have met on the way, and whom Hamlet knows. Hamlet has always been interested in the theatre and he is going to welcome these actors in a really remarkable fashion. Here again you should read the first samples that they give of their talent.

The important thing is that a tragedy concerning the end of Troy, the murder of Priam - and concerning this murder we have a very beautiful scene in English, where we see Pyrrhus raising a sword above the person playing Priam, and remaining thus:

So as a painted tyrant Pyrrhus stood.
And like a neutral to his will and matter.
Did nothing.(II ii 502)

Since it is one of the fundamental themes of the affair, this deserves to be highlighted as a first image, that of an actor, in connection with whom there is going to come to Hamlet the idea of using them in what is going to constitute the body of the third act - this is absolutely essential - what the English call in a stereotyped way, the play scene: theatre within theatre. Hamlet then concludes:

The play's the thing
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.(II ii 635)

This kind of crash of cymbals which ends here a long tirade of Hamlet's which is entirely written in blank verse - I point this out - and in which we find this rhyming couplet, is something which has all its value as an introduction. I mean that it is on this that the second act ends and that the third, in which the play scene is going to be put on, is introduced.

This monologue is essential. In it we see, both the violence of Hamlet's sentiments, and the violence of the accusations that he makes against himself on one hand:

Am I a coward?
Who calls me villain? Breaks my pate across?

Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face?
 Tweaks me by the nose? Gives me the lie i' the throat
 As deep as to the lungs? Who does me this?
 Hah! (II ii 598ff)

This gives the general style of this play which is enough to convulse you with laughter. And immediately afterwards he talks about his present step-father:

Swounds, I should take it. For it cannot be
 But I am pigeon-livered and lack gall
 To make oppression bitter, or ere this
 I should have fatted all the region kites
 With this slave's offal.

We spoke about these kites, in connection with *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*. I think that it is a kind of *milan*. It is a question of his step-father and this victim, of this slave who is made precisely to be offered up as a victim to the muses. And there begins here a series of insults

Bloody, bawdy villain!
 Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain!

But these cries, these insults, are addressed as much to himself as to the one meant in the context. This point is absolutely important, it is the culmination of the second act. And what constitutes the essential of his fury is the fact that he saw the actors weeping as they described the sorry lot of Hecuba before whom Priam her husband is being cut into little pieces. Because after having for a long time stayed in a fixed position, his sword suspended, Pyrrhus takes malicious pleasure - this is what the text tells us:

When she saw Pyrrhus make malicious sport
 In mincing with his sword her husband's limbs,'(II ii 536)

In cutting up - *mincing* is I think the same word as *emincer* in French - in front of this woman who is described for us as rolled up with some sort of blanket around her lank loins, Priam's body. The theme is all of this for Hecuba. But what does Hecuba mean to these people? Here are people who can rise to the heights of emotion for something which does not concern them at all. This is what unleashes in Hamlet this despair at not feeling something equivalent. This is important to introduce what is in question, namely the play scene for which he gives the reason. As if caught by the atmosphere, he seems to see all of a sudden the use he can make of it.

What is the reason that pushes him? There is undoubtedly here a rational motivation: to catch the conscience of the king. Namely: by putting on this play together with some modifications introduced by himself, to see what is going to move the king; make him betray himself. And this indeed is how things happen. At a certain moment, with a great noise, the king can no longer hold out. The crime that he committed is represented to him in such an exact fashion, together with Hamlet's commentaries that he brusquely cries out: 'Give me some light' and he goes off with great noise. And Hamlet says to Horatio there is no longer any doubt.

This is essential. And I am not the first to have posed, in the analytic register which is our own, what the function is of this play scene. Rank did it before me in a book which is

called

Das Schauspiel in Hamlet, Psychoanalytik, which appeared in the International Psychanalytik in 1919 in Vienna-Leipzig (p.72-85).

The function of this *Schauspiel* was articulated by Rank in a certain fashion to which we will have to return. It is clear in any case that it poses a problem which goes beyond its functional role in the articulation of the play. Many details show that it is a question all the same of knowing up to what point and how we can interpret these details. Namely whether it is enough to do what Rank contented himself with doing, namely picking out from it all the traits which show that in the very structure of the fact of watching a play there is something which evokes the first observations made by the child of parental copulation. This is the position that Rank takes up; I am not saying that it does not have a value, or even that it is wrong; I believe that it is incomplete, and that in any case it deserves to be articulated within the whole movement, namely in that by which Hamlet tries to organise, to give a structure, to give precisely what I call somewhere this dimension of disguised truth its structure as fiction with reference to which alone he managed to reorient himself, beyond the more or less efficacious character of the action for making Claudius unveil himself, betray himself. There is something here, and Rank has touched on something important in what concerns his own orientation with respect to himself. I am only indicating it here to show the interest of the problems that this gives rise to.

Things do not just simply happen, and the third act does not finish without the consequences of this articulation appearing in the following form: the fact is that he - Hamlet - is summoned very urgently to his mother who of course cannot stand any more. These are literally the words that are used: 'Oh Hamlet, speak no more'. (III iv 90) And that in the course of this scene he sees Claudius, when he is going towards his mother's apartment, in the process of coming, if not to resipiscence, at least to repentance, and that we assist at a whole scene which is called that of the repentant prayer of this man who finds himself here in a way caught up in the very nets that he is holding onto, the fruits of his crime, and who lifts up to God some prayer or other to have the energy to free himself from it.

And catching him literally on his knees and at his mercy, without being seen by the king, Hamlet has vengeance within his reach. This is where he stops and makes this reflection: by killing him now is he not going to send him straight to heaven, while his father had insisted a great deal on the fact that he suffered all the torments of some hell or purgatory or other, is he not going to be sending him straight to eternal happiness? This is precisely what I must not do.

Here he had an opportunity to settle things. And I would even say that everything here is about this 'to be or not to be' which, I introduced it for you the last time, it is not for nothing that it is essential to me. The essential is in fact here in its entirety. I mean that because of the fact that what has happened to the father is precisely the fact of having come back to tell us that he is fixed forever in this moment, this bar drawn at the bottom of the account of life which ensures that he remains in short identical to the sum of his crimes; this is also what Hamlet comes to a stop before with his 'to be or not to be'. Suicide is not so simple. We are not so much dreaming with him of what happens on the other side, but simply this, that to put in the final full stop in something does not prevent the being remaining identical to everything that he has articulated by the discourse of his life, and that here there is no 'to be or not to be', that the 'to be' whatever it is, remains eternal.

And it is precisely for him also, for Hamlet, to be confronted with this, namely not to be purely and simply the vehicle of the drama, the one through whom pass the passions, the one who like Eteocles and Polyneices continue in the crime that the father has completed with castration; it is precisely because he worries about the eternal 'to be' of this Claudius, that in a quite consistent fashion in effect he does not at that moment even draw his sword from the scabbard.

This in effect is a key point, an essential point. What he wants, is to wait, to surprise the other in 'incestuous pleasure', in other words in the situation always defined with respect to this mother, who is the keypoint, namely this desire of the mother, and that he is in effect going to have with the mother this pathetic scene, one of the most extraordinary things ever performed, this scene in which there is shown to her the mirror of what she is, and in which between this son who undoubtedly loves his mother as his mother loves him - this we are told - more than he can express, there is produced this dialogue in which he urges her properly speaking to break the bonds of what he calls this damned monster of habit.

That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat.
Of habits devil, is angel yet in this.
That to the use of actions fair and good
He likewise gives a frock or livery
That aptly is put on. Refrain tonight,

All of this is told to us in a marvellously crude way –

And that shall lend a kind of easiness
To the next abstinence, the next more easy. (III iv 161)

This is the point that I wanted to introduce you to, there are two replies which appear quite essential to me. I have not yet spoken much about poor Ophelia. It is all around this that it is going to revolve; there is a moment when Ophelia says to him: 'You are as good as a chorus, my lord.' Namely, you are giving a very good commentary on the play. He replies: 'I could interpret between you and your love, if I could see the puppets dallying' (III ii 255). Namely as regards what is happening on the stage. It is in any case a question of something which is happening 'between you and your love'.

Likewise, in the scene with the mother, when the ghost appears, because the ghost appears at a moment when precisely the objurgations are beginning to weaken, he says:

Oh, step between her and her fighting soul.
Conceit in weakest bodies strongest works.
Speak to her, Hamlet. (III iv 114)

Here the ghost, who appears just to him in this case - because usually when the ghost appears everybody sees it - says to him: 'Step between her and her fighting soul'.

'Conceit' is univocal. Conceit is used all the time in this play, and precisely in connection with what belongs to the soul. Conceit is precisely the *concetti*, the point of the style, and it is the word which is used to speak about a precious style. 'Conceit in weakest bodies strongest works. Speak to her, Hamlet'.

This place where Hamlet is always being asked to enter, to operate, to intervene, is

here something which gives us the real situation of the drama. And despite the intervention, the signifying summons. It is signifying to us because this is what is in question for us, what intervening means for us: 'Between her and her'; that is our work. 'Conceit in weakest bodies strongest works', it is to the analyst that this appeal is addressed.

Here once more Hamlet weakens and leaves his mother saying: after all let yourself be caressed, he will come, he will give you a greasy kiss on the cheek and caress your neck. He abandons his mother, he literally allows her to slip, to return as one might say to the abandonment of her desire. And here is how this act finishes, except that meanwhile the unfortunate Polonius had the misfortune to make a movement behind the arras, and Hamlet has run his sword through his body.

We come to the fourth act. There is something here that begins very nicely, namely the hunt for the body. Because Hamlet has hidden the body somewhere, and really there is question at the beginning only of a hunt for the body that Hamlet seems to find very amusing. He cries: They are playing catch the fox and everybody is running after him. Finally he says to them, do not worry, in a fortnight you will begin to smell him. He is there under the stairs, we will say no more about it.

Here he makes a reply which is important and to which we will return:

The body is with the king, but the king is not with the body. The king is a thing -
(IV ii 29)

This is one of Hamlet's schizophrenic remarks. It also contributes something to the interpretation for us. We will see it in what follows.

This act is an act in which a lot of things happen, rapidly: the sending of Hamlet to England; his return before anyone has had time to turn around - we know why, he had uncovered the secret plot, that he was being sent to his death - his return is accompanied by some drama, namely that Ophelia in the meantime has become mad, let us say because of the death of her father, and probably something else as well; that Laertes has revolted and has mounted a little coup; that the king has prevented a revolt by saying that Hamlet is the guilty one, that no one can be told this because Hamlet is too popular, but that matters can be quietly settled by arranging a contrived duel in which Hamlet will perish.

This indeed is what is going to happen. The scene of the final act is established by the churchyard scene. I referred a little while ago to the first Gravedigger; you will all more or less remember the extraordinary remarks that are exchanged between these characters who are in the process of digging Ophelia's grave and who at every word uncover a skull, one of which is picked up by Hamlet who makes a speech about it.

Because I was talking about actors, in the memory of a theatre dresser, there has never been a Hamlet and a first Gravedigger who were not at daggers drawn. The first Gravedigger has never been able to tolerate the tone in which Hamlet speaks to him, which is a little trait that is worthwhile noting in passing, and which shows us the point to which the power of the relationships brought into play in this drama can go.

Let us come to something to which I will draw your attention the next time: this is that it is after this long and powerful preparation that there is effectively found in the fifth act the thing that is in question; this desire which always collapses, this something exhausted, incompletable, uncompletable that there is in Hamlet's position, why are we going

to see it all of a sudden made possible? Namely why are we going all of a sudden to see Hamlet accepting, in the most unlikely conditions, the challenge of Laertes. In conditions which are all the more curious in that he is the champion of Claudius. And we see him defeating Laertes in every round - he touches him four or five times even though the bet made was that he would touch him at most five times against twelve - and becoming impaled as was intended on the poisoned tip, not without there being a sort of confusion in which this tip comes into his hand and he also wounds Laertes; and it is in the measure that both are mortally wounded that there comes the final blow which is delivered against the one who from the beginning it was a question of killing, Claudius.

It is not for nothing that I evoked the last time a sort of picture by with Ophelia floating on the river. I would like to propose another one to you to finish our remarks today. I wish someone would paint a picture in which one would see a cemetery on the horizon, and here the hole of the grave, people going away like people at the end of the oedipal tragedy dispersing and covering their eyes in order not to see what is happening, namely something which with respect to *Oedipus* is more or less the liquefaction of Mr. Valdemar.

Here it is something else. Something has happened to which not enough importance is attached. Hamlet who has disembarked in a hurry thanks to the pirates who have allowed him to escape from assassination, happens on Ophelia's burial. This is the first news he has had of it, he did not know what had happened during his brief absence. We see Laertes tearing his breast, and leaping into the grave to embrace for a final time the body of his sister crying aloud his despair. Hamlet, literally, not only cannot tolerate this manifestation towards a girl whom as you know he had very badly mistreated up to then, but he precipitates himself after Laertes after having given a great roar, a war cry in which he says the most unexpected thing. He concludes by saying: who is giving these cries of despair in connection with the death of this young girl. And he says: the one who is crying 'is I Hamlet the Dane' (V i 280).

We have never heard him saying that he is a Dane; he hates the Danes. All of a sudden we see him absolutely converted by something which I can say is absolutely significant with regard to our schema. It is in the measure that something S is here in a certain relationship with o that all of a sudden he makes this identification which makes him discover for the first time his desire in its totality.

They pass some time struggling in the grave. We see them disappearing into the hole and finally they are pulled out in order to be separated. This is what would be seen in the picture: this hole from which one would see things escaping. We shall see how we can conceive of what that would mean.

Seminar 15: Wednesday 18 March 1959

The principle of analysis is all the same that in order to reach your goal you must not be in a hurry. Perhaps some of you think - I do not believe that there are many of that kind - that we are a long way from clinical practice. That is not at all the case. We are right in the middle of it because since what is in question is how to situate the meaning of desire - of human desire - this method of finding our bearings in what is moreover from the beginning one of the great themes of analytic thinking is something which should in no way distract us from what is most urgently required of us.

Many things have been said about *Hamlet*, and I alluded to them the last time. I tried to show the magnitude of the accumulation of commentaries on *Hamlet*. In the meantime I got hold of a document for which I was pining in my desire for perfection, namely the *Hamlet and Oedipus* of Ernest Jones.

I read it and saw that in short Jones had kept his book up to date with what had happened since 1909. And it was no longer Loenig that he alluded to as a reference to be recommended, but to Dover Wilson who wrote a good deal about *Hamlet* and who wrote very well. Meanwhile since I had myself read part of Dover Wilson's work, I think I have more or less given you the essentials of it.

It is now rather a question of standing back a little from all of that, from Jones' speculation which, I must say, is very penetrating, and one could say, on the whole, of a different style to anything which, in the analytic family, has been written, added to the subject.

He makes very correct remarks which I find myself simply repeating on occasion. In particular he makes this simple common-sense remark that Hamlet is not a real person, and that all the same to pose ourselves the most profound questions about the character of Hamlet is perhaps something which deserves a more serious reflection than we usually accord to it.

As usual when we are in a domain which concerns on the one hand our exploration, and also on the other hand an object, there is a twofold path to be followed. Our right to engage ourselves in a certain speculation founded on the idea that we form of an object. It is quite obvious that there are things, which are I would say to be cleared away from the beginning, in particular for example that what we are dealing with in works of art, and especially in dramatic works, are characters, in the sense that this is understood in French.

Characters, namely something that we suppose the author possesses in all their depth; that he has made up someone, a character, and he is supposed to move us by transmitting characteristics of this character. And by this simple description we are supposed already to be introduced to a kind of supposed reality which would be beyond what we are given in the work of art.

I would say that *Hamlet* already has this really very important property of making

us sense the degree to which this point of view, which is very common, and which we apply the whole time, spontaneously, when we are dealing with a work of art, is all the same to be if not refuted, at least suspended, because in fact in any art there are two points which we can solidly hold onto as being absolutely certain reference points, which are that it is not enough to say as I said, that *Hamlet* is a kind of mirror where everyone reader and spectator has seen himself in his own way. But let us leave to one side the spectators whose depths cannot be sounded.

In any case the diversity of critical interpretations of it which have been given, suggest that there is here some mystery, because the totality of what has been put forward, affirmed, in connection with *Hamlet* is properly speaking irreconcilable, contradictory. I hope I have already sufficiently demonstrated this the last time. I articulated that the diversity of interpretations was strictly of the order of contrary to contrary. I also indicated a little what *Hamlet* is for actors. It is a domain to which we will perhaps have to return a little later, which is very significant. I said it was the role *par excellence*, and that at the same time one spoke about the Hamlet of such and such a person. Namely that there are as many Hamlet's as there are actors who have a certain personal power.

But this goes further. Some people have gone to the point of sustaining - and in particular Robertson - at the time of the third centenary, supported a little no doubt by the sort of 'rush' at that time about Shakesperian themes, the passionate exaltation with which the whole English literary world revived this theme, some people brought forward an opposing point of view by saying that strictly speaking *Hamlet* was a vacuum, that it did not hold up; that there was no key for *Hamlet*, that Shakespeare did what he could to patch together a theme the philological exploration of which - which has been taken fairly far - shows - it was known that there was already a *Hamlet* which was attributed to Kyd, which had been played twelve years before this autumn of 1601 when we can be more or less certain that this *Hamlet* appeared for the first time - it was even said - and I would say that it is on this that the first chapter of Jones' book ends - it was properly speaking articulated, up to the time of Grillparzer, an Austrian playwright to whom Freud on occasion makes a very important reference, and who says that the impenetrability of Hamlet is its *raison d'être*, which is all the same a rather curious opinion.

The fact that it was possible to put this forward - one could not say that this is not strictly speaking an anti-Aristotelian opinion, in so far as the *homoios* character of the hero compared to us is what is put in the foreground to explain, on the very basis of the Aristotelian explanation of the effect of comedy and of tragedy - the fact that all of this could be put forward about Hamlet has its importance.

It must be said that there is here a whole range of opinions which are not equivalent, which present a whole series of nuances concerning what can be said about it, and that it is not the same thing to say that *Hamlet* is a failed play - you should remember that no less a person than T.S. Eliot who in a certain *milieu* is looked on as more or less the greatest modern English poet, also thinks, and he has said it, that Shakespeare was not equal to his hero. I mean that if Hamlet is someone who is unequal to his task, Shakespeare too was unequal to the articulation of the role of Hamlet.

These are opinions which one can all the same say are problematical. I am enumerating them for you to lead you towards what? Towards what is in question - it is the most nuanced and I believe the most correct opinion - it is that there is in the relationship of *Hamlet* to the person who grasps it, either as a reader or as a spectator, something which is of the order of an illusion.

This is not the same thing as saying that Hamlet is simply a vacuum. An illusion is not a vacuum. In order to produce on the stage a ghostly effect of the order of what if you wish my little concave mirror would represent, with the real image which arises and which can only be seen from a certain angle and from a certain point, a whole machinery is necessary.

That *Hamlet* is an illusion, the organisation of the illusion, here is something which is not of the same order of illusion as if everyone was dreaming about a vacuum. It is all the same important to make this distinction.

What is sure, in any case, is that everything confirms that there is something of this order. This gives - this is the first point - the handle that we can solidly hold on to. For example Trench who is quoted by Jones, we will see in what terms, writes something like the following.

We find it hard, with Shakespeare's help, to understand Hamlet: even Shakespeare, perhaps, found it hard to understand him. Hamlet himself [you see that this passage is amusing, the pen or the thought finds itself slipping into the following -] Hamlet himself finds it impossible to understand himself. Better able than other men to read the hearts and the motives of others (The end of this sentence refers not to myself nor to Shakespeare but to Hamlet. You know that Hamlet all the time plays this deconstructing game with his interlocutors, with those who come to question him, he sets traps for them.] ... he is yet quite unable to read his own.(Jones 50)

I point out to you immediately afterwards, Jones who has precisely begun by being full of reservations saying that we must not allow ourselves to be drawn into talking about Hamlet as if he were a real person - we must look elsewhere for the articulation - and that beyond him we should find Shakespeare - this is the traditional position for analytic interpreters but which I believe contain some error, some fallacy, to which I will first of all draw your attention; Jones makes this remark and after this quotation does not fail himself to slip into something which can be expressed more or less as follows. 'I know of no more authentic statement than this in the whole literature on the Hamlet problem.'

In another place the same Jones will tell us that in short 'the hero, the poet, and the audience are all profoundly moved by feelings due to a conflict of the source of which they are unaware'.(Jones 51)

There is here then something which allows us to put our finger on the strict equivalence of certain terms of the question, namely the poet and the hero, with something which it is enough to dwell on for a moment in order to see it, the fact is that they are only really there through their discourse.

If it is a question of something which is the communication of what is in the unconscious of those who are put forward here as being the first terms, namely the poet and the hero, one cannot say that this communication of the unconscious can in any case be conceived of, nor presentified here by anything other than the articulation of the dramatic discourse.

We will not speak about the hero who, to tell the truth, if you follow me along the path that I am trying to lead you, is not strictly identical to these words. Especially if we begin to have the feeling that what gives its highest dramatic value, on this occasion, to this

hero is a style (?). This indeed is the second handle that I would ask you to hold on to. It is of the same order as this aspect which escapes from everything that we can say about its consistency. In other words, here *Hamlet* becomes the exemplary work.

That the mode in which a work touches us, touches us precisely in the most profound fashion, namely on the unconscious plane, is something which has to do with an arrangement, a composition of the work which no doubt ensures that we are interested very precisely at the level of the unconscious; but that this is not because of the presence of something which really supports before us an unconscious.

I mean that we are not dealing, either, contrary to what is thought, with the poet's unconsciousness, even if it bears witness to its presence through some unintentional aspects of his work, by parapraxes, by symbolic elements not perceived by him. This does not interest us in a major way. One can find some traces of it in *Hamlet*. In the final analysis, this was what Ella Sharpe worked on as I told you the last time, namely she is going to try to polish up here and there what in *Hamlet's* character can allow there to be glimpsed some hang-up, some fixation of the metaphor around feminine themes, or oral themes. I assure you that with respect to the problem that *Hamlet* poses, this is really something which appears as secondary, almost puerile, without being completely uninteresting naturally.

In many works, by searching also from this angle some traces, something which can give you information about an author, you are carrying out a biographical investigation of the author, you are not analysing the import of the work as such. And in the foreground the import that *Hamlet* takes on for us is what gives it the structural value equivalent to that of *Oedipus*.

Something which may allow us to interest ourselves at the deepest level of the texture of what for us allows us to structure certain problems, is obviously something other than one or other fleeting admission. It is quite obviously the totality, the articulation of the tragedy in itself which is what interests us. It is what I am in the process of accentuating. Its value comes from its organisation, through the fact that it establishes superimposed planes within which the proper dimension of human subjectivity can find its place. And what ensures that, if you wish, in this machinery, or again in these armatures to metaphorise what I want to say to you, in the necessity for a certain number of superimposed planes the depth of a play, of a room, of a scene, the depth is given within which there can be posed in the fullest fashion the problem of the articulation of desire for us.

You clearly understand me then. I am saying then that if *Hamlet*, this is the essential point, has a privileged import for us, I mean if *Hamlet* is really the greatest drama, or one of the greatest dramas of modern tragedy putting *Faust* on the other side, it is not simply because there is a Shakespeare who is as much of a genius as we suppose him to be, and a particular turning point in his life - because obviously we can also say that *Hamlet* is a point at which something happened in Shakespeare's life. This can be summed up perhaps in the fact that all that we can say about it, because we know the thing that has happened, it is the death of his father, and to be satisfied with that means that we are satisfied with very little. And we also suppose that around this event there must also have been other things in his life, because the veering, the orientation, the turnabout of his production is really obvious. Before there was nothing except this succession of comedies, or these historical dramas which are really two *genres* that in both cases he pushed to their highest degree of beauty, of perfection, of ease. Up to then he is almost an author with two great specialties on which he plays with a mastery, a *brio*, a happiness which puts him among the authors enjoying popular success. From *Hamlet* on the whole skyscape has altered, and we touch things

which are beyond all limits, which no longer have anything to do with any kind of canon, which are no longer of the same order. After *Hamlet*, we have *King Lear*, and still more things before we end with *The Tempest*.

We sense here something completely different, a human drama which develops on a completely different register. It is when all is said and done the Shakespeare who is the jewel of human history and of the human drama, who opens up a new dimension on man. Therefore something has certainly happened at that moment. But is it enough for us to be certain of that to think that that is what it is? Of course in some way. But let us observe all the same that if *Hamlet* is the play which most presents itself as an enigma, it is only too obvious after all that not every play which poses a problem is for all that a good play. A really bad play can be one also. And in a bad play there is probably, on occasion, an unconscious just as present, and even more present, than there is in a good play. If we are moved by a piece of theatre, it is not because of the difficulty of effort that is represented by it, or because of what the author allows to pass into it unknown to himself. It is because, I repeat, of the dimensions of development that it offers to the place to be taken up by us in what properly speaking the problematic of our own relationship with our own desire conceals in us.

And this is only offered to us in such an outstanding fashion in a play which from certain points of view realises to the maximum these necessities of dimension, this order and this superimposition of planes which gives its place to what should here, in us, begin to reverberate.

It is not because Shakespeare is at that moment caught up in a personal drama - if we push things to their final limit, we think we have grasped this personal drama and it slips away; people have gone so far as to say that it was the drama which was in his *Sonnets*, the relationships with his protector and his mistress. You know that he was deceived twice over by his friend and by his mistress. People have gone so far as to say, even though the drama at that moment very probably happened at a more temperate period of Shakespeare's life (there is no certainty about his history, and we only have the testimony of the *Sonnets* which itself is particularly elaborated).

I think that it involves some cause other than that. What is at stake is not the presence, the point behind *Hamlet* of everything that we can on occasion dream about, it is the composition of *Hamlet*.

No doubt the author has succeeded in pushing this composition to a high degree of maturity, of perfection, which makes of *Hamlet* something which is distinguished from all the pre-*Hamlets* that we have been able to discover with our philology by means of an articulation which is so singular, so exceptional that it is precisely what ought to be the object of our reflection.

If Shakespeare was capable of bringing it to this point, it is probably because of a deepening which is just as much the deepening of the authors craft, as the deepening of the lived experience of a man who undoubtedly lived, and whose life was happy, since everything indicates that his life was not untouched by every sort of demand and every sort of passion. That the drama of Shakespeare exists behind *Hamlet* is secondary with regard to what makes up the structure of *Hamlet*. It is this structure which corresponds to the effect *Hamlet* has, and this all the more that *Hamlet* himself, as the authors put it metaphorically, all the more that *Hamlet* himself is a character whose depths we do not know and not simply because of our ignorance. He is effectively a character who is composed of

something which is the vacuum for situating - because this is the important thing - our ignorance.

A situated ignorance is different to something purely negative. This situated ignorance, after all is precisely nothing other than this presentification of the unconscious. It gives to Hamlet its import and its force.

I think that I have succeeded in communicating to you with all the nuances, without omitting anything, without denying the properly psychological dimension involved in a playwright, which is a question of what is called applied psychoanalysis, even though it is completely the contrary at the level that we are at, it is theoretical psychoanalysis that is really in question, and with regard to the theoretical question which is posed by the adaptation of our analysis to a work of art, any kind of clinical question is a question of applied psychoanalysis

There are people here who are listening to me and who will no doubt need me to say a little bit more along a certain direction about which they will pose me questions.

If *Hamlet* is really what I am telling you, namely a composition, a structure of a kind in which desire can find its place, sufficiently correctly, sufficiently rigorously posed, for every desire or more exactly for all the problems of the relationship of the subject to desire to be projected into it, it should be enough in a way to read it.

I am alluding therefore to the people who may here pose me the question of the function of the actor. Where is the function of the theatre, of the production? It is clear that it is not at all the same thing to read *Hamlet* and to see it produced. I do not think either that this should be a problem for you for too long, and that in the perspective that I am trying to develop before you concerning in short the function of the unconscious - the function of the unconscious that I defined as discourse of the Other - one could not better illustrate it than in the perspective which we are given by an experience like that of the relationship of the audience to Hamlet. It is clear that here the unconscious is presentified in the form of the discourse of the Other which is a perfectly composed discourse. The hero is present here only through this discourse, just as the poet, who is long dead, when all is said and done bequeaths his discourse to us.

But naturally this dimension that is added by the production, namely the actors who are going to play this *Hamlet*, is strictly analogous to that by which we ourselves are involved in our own unconscious. And if I tell you that what constitutes our relationship to the unconscious, is the thing by which our imaginary, I mean our relationship with our own bodies - it seems that I ignore the existence of the body, I have an incorporeal theory of analysis; this is what is being discovered at least if one hears about the effect of what I am articulating here at a certain distance.

To say the word, it is we who provide the signifier with its material - this is the very thing that I teach and that I spend my time telling you; it is with our own members - this is what the imaginary is - that we compose the alphabet of this discourse which is unconscious, and of course each one of us in different relationships because we do not make use of the same elements in order to be caught up in the unconscious. And this is the analogy; the actor lends his members, his presence, not simply as a puppet, but with his unconscious which is well and truly real, namely the relationship of his members to a certain history which is his own.

Everyone knows that there are good and bad actors, it is in the measure I believe that the unconscious of an actor is more or less compatible with this loan of his puppet, whether he lends himself to it or does not lend himself to it. This is what makes an actor have more or less talent, genius, indeed that he is more or less compatible with certain roles - why not. Even those who have the most extensive range can after all play certain roles better than others.

In other words, the actor of course is there; it is in the measure of the appropriateness of something which in effect may well have the closest relationship to his unconscious, to what he has to represent to us that he gives to this a point which undoubtedly adds something, but is far from constituting the essential of what is communicated to us, the representation of the drama.

This I believe would open to us pretty far the door towards the psychology of the actor. Of course there are laws of general compatibility. The relationship of the actor to the possibility of the show is something which poses a problem of psychology peculiar to the actor, the problem which has been tackled of the relationship between certain psychological textures and the theatre. Someone, a number of years ago, wrote a rather promising article about what he called hysteria and the theatre. I read it again recently. We will perhaps have the opportunity to speak about it with interest, indeed with a certain amount of agreement.

Having closed this parenthesis, let us take up the thread of our own remarks. What then is this structure around which there is composed the essential putting into place in which I am trying to make you understand the effect of *Hamlet*: this setting up of the interior, within which desire can and must take its place.

From the first point of view, we are going to see that what is said about it commonly in the analytic register, in terms of articulation, comprehension, of what Hamlet is, is something which seems to go in following direction.

Am I making you all these introductory remarks in order to rejoin themes which are quite classical, even banal? You will see that this is not at all the case. Nevertheless let us begin by approaching things by what is usually presented; I do not think that it is all that simple, nor so univocal. And a certain rectitude is what is most difficult for the authors themselves to maintain in the development of their thought, because all the time there is a sort of flight, of oscillation, some examples of which you are going to see in what I am going to enounce to you.

In a first approximation which is one that everyone agrees with, Hamlet is the person who does not know what he wants, the one who pauses bitterly when he sees marching off the troops of the young Fortinbras who pass for a moment on the horizon of the stage, and who is suddenly struck by the fact that here are people who are going to perform a great action for nothing, for a little piece of Poland, and who are going to sacrifice everything, their lives - while he has 'cause, and will, and strength, and means to do it', as he himself says: 'Why yet I live to say 'this things to do'.(IV iv 44)

Here is the problem that is posed for everyone. Why does Hamlet not act? Why is this will, this desire, this wish, something which remains suspended in him, which if you like rejoins what Racamier writes about the hysteric.

Some say he does not want to; he says he is not able. What is in question is that he is not able to will. What does the analytic tradition say to us about this? The analytic

tradition says that everything reposes on this occasion on the desire for the mother. That this desire is repressed, that this is the cause which means that the hero cannot advance towards that action which is commanded him, namely to take revenge on a man who is the current possessor, illegitimately because criminally, of the maternal object, and that he cannot strike one whom he is designated to prosecute, in the measure that he himself in short has already committed the crime that it is a question of avenging.

It is to the extent, we are told, that in the background there is the memory of the infantile desire for the mother, of the oedipal desire for the murder of the father, it is in this measure that Hamlet finds himself in a way the accomplice of the present possessor, that this possessor is in his eyes a lucky possessor, that he is his accomplice, that he cannot therefore attack this possessor without attacking himself. But is this what is meant, or is it that he cannot attack this possessor without awakening in himself this ancient desire, namely a desire experienced as guilty, a mechanism which all the same is more tangible.

But after all does all this not allow us, fascinated by something unfathomable linked to a schema which for us is surrounded by a sort of untouchable, non-dialectical character so that could we not say that all this in short is reversed. I mean one might just as well say, that if Hamlet immediately hurled himself on his step-father, that he would find here after all the opportunity for allaying his own guilt by finding outside of himself the really guilty party. That all the same, to call things by their name, everything pushes him to act in the opposite direction, and goes in the same direction, because the father comes back from the beyond in the form of a ghost to command him to prosecute this act. There is no doubt about this. The commandment of the super-ego is here materialised in a way, and provided with all the sacred character of the very person who comes from beyond the grave, together with what is added to it by the authority of his greatness, his seductiveness, the fact of being a victim, the fact of really having been dispossessed in an atrocious way not only of the object of his love, but of his power, of his throne, of his very life, of his salvation, of his eternal happiness.

There is this, and also there comes to operate in the same sense something which could be called on this occasion Hamlet's natural desire. If it is something which he has not been able to experience while he is still separated from this mother, that undoubtedly the least that can be said to count for him is that he is fixed on his mother - it is the most certain and the most obvious thing in Hamlet's role. Therefore this desire which on this occasion I call natural, and not unintentionally, because when Jones was writing his article on *Hamlet* he is still at the stage of having to plead before the public for this dimension of repression and of censorship, and every page he writes on this occasion tends to give to this censorship a social origin.

It is all the same curious - *curiously enough* - he says, that the things that are obviously the most censored by social organisation, are the most natural desires. In truth this does in effect pose a question. Why after all is society not organised to satisfy these most natural desires, if it is really from society that there emerges the dimension of repression and of censorship? This might take us perhaps a little further, namely that it is something quite tangible that this never seem to be perceived, that the necessities of life, of the life of the group, the sociological necessities are not at all exhaustive in order to explain this sort of prohibition from which there emerges in human beings the dimension of the unconscious.

This suffices so little that Freud had to invent an original, pre-social myth which we should not forget because it is what founds society, namely *Totem and Taboo* can explain

the very principles of repression. And Jones' commentary at the date he wrote it, and in which curiously he unfortunately preserves this sociological genesis of prohibitions at the level of the unconscious, more exactly of censorship, very exactly of the source of the Oedipus complex, is an error on Jones' part.

It is perhaps a rather deliberate, apologetic error, the error of someone who wants to convince, who wants to conquer a certain public of psycho-sociologists; it is not at all something which does not pose problems for us.

But let us come back to our Hamlet. We see him when all is said and done with two tendencies; the over-riding tendency which is doubly commanded him by the authority of his father and the love which he bears him; and the second of wanting to defend his mother, and of wanting to keep her for himself, which ought to make him go in the same direction and kill Claudius. Therefore two positive things, this is a curious thing, will give a zero result.

I know well that this happens. I found a very fine example of it at a time when I had broken my leg: a shortening, then another shortening - that of the other leg - and there is no longer any shortening. It is a very good exercise for us, because we have to deal with things of this order.

Is this what is in question? No, I do not think so. I believe rather that we are engaging ourselves in an illusory dialectic, that we are satisfying ourselves with something which after all cannot be justified at all, namely that Hamlet is there, that he has to be explained. That we touch all the same on something essential, namely that there is a relationship which makes this action difficult, which makes this task repugnant to Hamlet, which puts him effectively in a problematic character *vis-à-vis* his own action, and that this is his desire; that in a way it is the impure character of this desire which plays here the essential role, but without Hamlet knowing it; that in a way it is because his action is not disinterested, that is it not motivated in a Kantian way, that Hamlet cannot accomplish his act, I think that in general there is here something in effect which we can say, but which in truth then is almost accessible before analytic investigation, and we have traces of this - the interest of Jones' bibliography is that it shows this.

Some people, well before Freud, even began to articulate it in the writings of 1880 or 1890, some authors had glimpsed it.

Nevertheless I believe that we can formulate analytically something more correct, and go further than that to which I believe what has been formulated analytically on this plane has been reduced. And I believe that to do it we only have to really follow the text of the play and see what will follow from it.

What will follow from it consists in remarking to you that what Hamlet has to deal with, all the time, what Hamlet is grappling with, is a desire which should be regarded, considered where it is in the play, namely very different, very far from his own, that it is not the desire for his mother, but the desire of his mother.

This is really all that is in question. The pivotal point, the whole scene which I should read with you, is that of the encounter with his mother after the play scene, the scene of the play that he has had acted, and with which he has surprised the conscience of the king, and at which everyone, more and more disturbed about Hamlet's intentions, decided to have him called, to have a conversation with his mother.

Hamlet himself desires nothing more. On this occasion he is going he tells us to turn the knife in the wound. He speaks about daggers, in his mother's heart. And there takes place this long scene which is a kind of highpoint of the theatre, this something about which the last time I told you that to read it brings you to the limit of what you can tolerate, where he is going to adjure his mother pathetically to become aware of the point that she is at - I regret not being able to read the whole of this scene, but do it yourselves, and as one does it at school, pen in hand. He explains to her: what sort of a life are you living; and then, you are not in the first flush of youth all the same. Your blood should be a little tamer (cf III iv 69).

It is things of this order that he tells her in this admirable language. These are things which one does not believe could be heard in a more penetrating fashion, or one which responds better to the fact that Hamlet has gone like a dart to tell it to his mother, namely things which are destined to open her heart, and which she experiences as such. Namely that she herself tells him: '...thou hast cleft my heart in twain'(III iv 156). And she literally groans under the pressure.

We are more or less certain that Hamlet is thirty years old. This may be argued, but one can say that in the graveyard scene there is an indication, something from which one can deduce that Hamlet is thirty years old. His mother is at least forty-five, even if Hamlet is a little bit younger. It is quite clear that as he remembers poor Yorick who died about thirty years earlier, and whose lips he has kissed, one can say that he is thirty years old. It is important to know that Hamlet is not a little young man.

Afterwards he compares his father to Hyperion the one on whom the gods have all set their seals. And alongside him we have this rubbish, a king of shreds and patches, a filth, a peasant, a tout, this other, and it is with him that you roll about in the filth. This is all he talks about, and it is well to articulate it. You will see further on what is in question. But in any case it is a question of the desire of the mother, of an adjuration by Hamlet which is a demand of the style: take a certain path, dominate yourself, take, as I told you the last time, the proper moral path, begin by no longer sleeping with my uncle - this is the way things are said. And then everyone knows, he says, that the more you get the more you want, that this monster custom who binds us to the worst of things also acts in the opposite way; namely: by learning to behave better, it will become more and more easy for you. (cf III iv 157ff)

What do we see? The articulation of a demand which is made by Hamlet manifestly in the name of something which is the order not simply of the law, but of dignity, and which is delivered with a force, a vigour, even a cruelty, of which the least one can say is that it causes some embarrassment. Then having arrived at that, while the other is literally gasping, to the point that one can ask whether the apparition of the ghost who then appears - because you know that the ghost reappears in the bedchamber scene - is not something which consists in saying to Hamlet no doubt: Tally ho! Tally ho! on you go, more of it, but also to a certain degree to call him to order, to protect the mother against some kind of aggressive excess before which the mother herself at a certain moment begins to tremble. 'What wilt thou do? Thou wilt not murder me?'(III iv 21). Then his father comes to remind him of the following. 'Step between her and her fighting soul'.(III iv 112)

And having got to this summit that is in question, there is in Hamlet a sudden collapse which makes him say: And then after all, now that I have said all that to you, do whatever you want, and go and tell all of this to Uncle Claudius. Namely you are going to

let him give you a little kiss on the cheek, tickle your neck a little, scratch your tummy a little, and the pair of you are going to end up in bed as usual. This is exactly what is said by Hamlet.

Namely that we see here the oscillation between this which, at the moment of the collapse of Hamlet's discourse is something which is in the words themselves, namely the disappearance, the dying away of his appeal into something which is a consenting to the desire of his mother, laying down his arms before something which seems ineluctable to him; namely that the mother's desire here takes on again for him the value of something which in no case, and by no method can be raised up.

I have been going much more slowly than I thought possible. I will be forced to stop at a point which you see is going to leave us confronted with the programme of the decipherment of Hamlet for perhaps two more of our meetings.

To conclude today I will try to show you the relationship between what I am in the process of articulating and the graph. What I am trying to lead you to, is the following, that beyond the elementary discourse of the demand, in so far as it submits the need of the subject to the consent, to the caprice, to the arbitrariness of the other as such, and thus structures human tension and intention in terms of the fragmentation of the signifier, if what is happening beyond the other, if the discourse of the subject which is the one that is carried on, in so far as beyond this first stage, of this first relationship to the other, what he has to find in this discourse which models him, which structures him in this already structured discourse, is to rediscover within this what he really wants because this is the first stage and the fundamental stage of any mapping out of the subject with respect to what is called his will; his own *volonté*.

His own will, is first of all that most problematic thing as we analysts know, namely what he really desires. Because it is quite clear that beyond the necessities of demand, in so far as it fragments and fractures this subject, the rediscovery of desire in its ingenuous form is the problem that we are constantly dealing with. Analysis tells us that beyond this relationship to the other, this questioning of the subject about what he wants is not simply that of the question mark which is here drawn on this second level of the graph, but that there is above it something in order to rediscover oneself.

Namely that as in the first stage there is installed somewhere a signifying chain which is called properly speaking the unconscious, and which already gives to that its signifying support; that one can rediscover oneself there somewhere.

There is here inscribed a code which is the relationship of the subject to his own demand. There is already a register which is established, thanks to which the subject can perceive what? Not as it is said that his demand is oral, or anal, or this or that, because this is not at all what is in question. That he is in a certain privileged relationship, *qua* subject. And this is why I inscribed in this way, with a certain form of demand, this line beyond the other in which there is posed the subject's question. It is a conscious line. Before there was analysis or analysts, human beings asked the question, and ceaselessly posed it, you can believe, just as in our time, just as since Freud, of where their true will was.

This is why we make this line a continuous one. It belongs to the system of personality, whether you call it the conscious or the preconscious, for the moment I am not going to get into any further detail.

But what does the graph indicate to us here? It is that it is obviously on this line that there is going to be situated somewhere the x which is desire; that this desire has a relationship with something which must be situated on the return line, opposite this intentional line. It is in this respect that it is homologous to the relationship of the ego to the image. The graph teaches us that this desire which, floating here somewhere, but always in this beyond of the other, this desire is submitted to a certain regulation, to a certain height as one might say of fixation which is determined. Determined by what? By something which is here delineated thus, namely by a return path of the code of the unconscious, $S \diamond D$, towards the message of the unconscious on the imaginary plane. That this dotted circuit, in other words the unconscious, which begins here and which passing to the level of the unconscious message, $S($, goes to the level of the unconscious S over against demand, returns to the desire, and from that towards the phantasy; that in other words it is essentially with respect to what regulates on this line the height, the situation of desire, and on a path which is a return path with respect to the unconscious - because if you notice how the graph is made, you will see here that there is no return arrow; it is in this direction that there is produced the circuit of the formation of desire at the level of the unconscious.

What can be articulated in this very connection, and by keeping ourselves to this scene of Hamlet face to face with his mother? It is essentially the fact that there is never a moment when, in a more complete way, and precisely in a way to further cancel out the subject, this formula that the desire of man is the desire of the other, is not here tangible, manifest, complete.

In other words what is in question is that in the measure that it is to the other that the subject addresses himself, not with his own will, but with the one of which he is at that moment the support, and the representative, namely that of the father, and also that of order, and also that of modesty, of decency - I will come back on these terms, they are not just there for effect; I already brought into play the demon of modesty, and you will see the place it will hold in what follows - and that it is in so far as he holds before his mother this discourse beyond herself, and that he falls back from it, namely that he falls back to the strict level of this other before whom he cannot bow, can only trace out as one might say the movement of this scene is more or less as follows, that beyond the other, the adjuration of the subject tries to rejoin, at the level of the code of the law, and that he falls back not towards a point where something stops, where he meets himself with his own desire - he has no further desire. Ophelia has been rejected, and we will see the next time the function of Ophelia in all of this - but everything that happens if you wish, to schematise, as if this return path returned purely and simply onto the articulation of the other, as if he could no longer receive any other message than the signified of the other here, namely the reply of the mother: I am what I am, there is nothing to be done with me, I am a real genital character - in the sense of the first volume of *Psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui* - mourning means nothing to me.

The funeral meats served the following day for the wedding banquet, thrift, thrift - the remark is Hamlet's. As regards her, she is simply a gaping cunt. When one goes, another arrives. This is what is in question. The drama of Hamlet, the articulation of *Hamlet* if it is the drama of desire, is - we have seen it right throughout this scene - the drama - why not say it; it is very curious that one all the time uses words like object, but that the first time one encounters it one does not recognise it - from the beginning to the end this is all that is spoken about: there is a worthy object, and an unworthy object.

'A little propriety, please; there is all the same a difference between this god and that filth.' This is what is in question, and no one has ever spoken about object-relations in

connection with Hamlet. People are still baffled by it.

This however is all that is in question. The discourse to which I alluded a little while ago concerning the veritable female, or the veritable male genital character, is a coherent discourse, because you can read in it that the characteristic of the genital character is that he does not mourn very much. This is written in the same first volume of *Psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui*. It is a marvellous commentary for the dialectic of Hamlet.

However one cannot but be struck by this - I am going a little quickly because I must give you a glimpse of the horizons towards which I am tending - that if it is indeed a problem of mourning that is in question, here we see coming in through the mediation, and linked to the problem of mourning, the problem of the object. Which will perhaps allow us to give a further articulation to what has been contributed in *Trauer und Melancolie* namely that if mourning takes place - and we are told that it is because of an introjection of a lost object - in order for it to be introjected perhaps there is a preliminary condition, namely that it is constituted *qua* object; and that thenceforward the question of the constitution *qua* object is not perhaps purely and simply linked to the conception, to the co-instinctual stages as they are given to us.

But there is something which already indicates that we are here at the heart of the problem. It is this something on which I ended the last session, and on which the whole of the next of our meetings will centre, it is the following: it is that the key point, the decisive point at which Hamlet as one might say took the bit between his teeth - because in effect it has been very appositely remarked that after having hung around for a long time, all of a sudden Hamlet cuts loose, he launches himself into a business which is presented under most unlikely conditions; he has to kill his step-father, it has been proposed to him to support a sort of a wager by this step-father which is going to consist in fighting a fencing match with the gentleman about whom he knows that the least that can be said is that at the time that this is happening this gentleman does not wish him particularly well, it is neither more nor less than the brother of Ophelia who has ended her life because of a disturbance that clearly he is partly responsible for; he knows in any case that this gentleman blames him for it, Hamlet is very fond of this gentleman, he says it to him, and we will return to this, and nevertheless it is with him that he is going to cross swords for the sake of someone who in principle he has to butcher. And at this moment he reveals himself as a real killer, with absolutely no precedent, he does not allow the other person to even touch him - it is a real headlong flight forward which is here altogether manifest, the point at which Hamlet takes the bit between his teeth, is the one on which I ended with my little plan of the graveyard and these people grappling with one another at the bottom of a grave, which is all the same a strange scene, which is entirely due to Shakespeare because in the early Hamlets there is no trace of it.

What is happening, and what was Hamlet doing there? Because he could not tolerate seeing someone other than himself demonstrate or manifest precisely an overwhelming grief. These words which I am speaking each one of you is going to have to support them by reading *Hamlet*, because it is too long for me to do it. There is not one of my words which is not supported by something which is in substance in the text. He says it: 'But, sure, the bravery of his grief did put me into a towering passion'. (V ii 78) He explains it afterwards in order to excuse himself for having been so violent. Namely confronted with what Laertes had done, jumping into the grave into the grave of his sister, he must also leap after him to embrace. It must be said that one has a curious idea of what is happening inside. I suggested it to you the last time with my little imaginary painting.

It is by way of mourning in other words, and of a mourning assumed in the same narcissistic relationship as there is between the ego and the image of the other, it is in function of what there is represented all of a sudden for him in this passionate relationship of a subject to an object which is at the bottom of the painting, the presence of \$ which it puts before him all of a sudden as support in which this object which for him is rejected because of a confusion of objects, of an inmixing of objects, it is in the measure that something here all of a sudden grabs him that this level can all of a sudden be reestablished which for a short instant is going to make a man of him. Namely something which is going to make of him someone capable, for a short moment no doubt, but a moment which is enough to end the play, capable of fighting, and capable of killing.

What I want to tell you is not that Shakespeare, of course, said all these fine things to himself, it is that if he has put somewhere in the articulation of his play something as singular as the character of Laertes in order to have him play at the high point, the crucial point of the play, this role of example and of support towards which Hamlet precipitates himself in a passionate embrace, and from which he emerges literally other, this cry accompanied by commentaries which are so much along the line that I am giving you that you have to read them, that it is here in Hamlet that there is produced the moment at which he can lay hold again of his desire.

Which proves to you that we are here at the heart of the economy of what is in question. Naturally this has almost only a marginal interest, after all, and to show us to what point are drawn all the avenues of the articulation of the play and it is along these avenues that at every moment for us our interest is suspended. This is what ensures our participation in the drama of *Hamlet*. Naturally it is only interesting that things have come to this because beforehand there were four acts which preceded the graveyard scene. In these four acts there were other things which we are now going to see by going back over them.

In the forefront, there is the role of the play scene. What is this production; what does it mean? Why did Shakespeare conceive of it as indispensable? It has more than one motive, more than one pretext, but what we will try to see is its most profound pretext.

In short I think that I have today sufficiently indicated to you in what sense of the experience, of the articulation of structure there is posed for us the problem of the study of *Hamlet*, namely what we, when we have finished, will keep of it as being usable, as begin manageable, as schematic for our own mapping out of desire - I will tell you what. The desire of the neurotic at every moment of its incidence. I will show you this desire of Hamlet. It has been said that it is the desire of a hysteric. This is perhaps quite true. One could say it is the desire of an obsessional. It is a fact that he is full of even quite severe psychasthenic symptoms. But that is not the question.

In fact he is both. He is purely and simply the place of this desire. Hamlet is not a clinical case. Hamlet of course, it is too obvious to recall it, is not a real person. It is a drama which permits to situate if you wish, like a turning plate where a desire is situated, where we can find all the traits of desire, namely orientated, interpreted in the sense of what happens at the outcome of a for the desire of the hysteric, namely this desire that the hysteric is forced to construct for himself. It is for this reason that I would say that the problem for Hamlet is closer to the desire of the hysteric, because in a way the problem of Hamlet is to rediscover the place of his desire.

This resembles a good deal what a hysteric is capable of doing, namely of creating for himself an unsatisfied desire.

But it is just as true that it is the desire of the obsessional in so far as the problem of the obsessional, is to support himself on an impossible desire. It is not quite the same thing.

Both are true. You will see that we will make the interpretation of Hamlet's remarks and acts also veer from one side to the other.

What you must come to grasp, is something more radical than the desire of one or other, than the desire with which you pick out an hysteric, or an obsessional.

..... when he addresses the character of the hysteric says that everyone knows that an hysteric is incapable of loving. When I read things like that, I am always tempted to say to the author, and you, are you capable of loving. He says that an hysteric lives in the unreal, and himself? The doctor always talks as if he were well settled at home, at home with regard to love, to desire, to willing, and all the rest. It is all the same a curious position, and for some time now we ought to know that it is a dangerous position. It is thanks to this that one takes up counter-transference positions thanks to which one understands nothing about the patient one is dealing with. This is exactly the order of things, and that is why it is essential to articulate, to situate the place of desire.

Seminar 16: Wednesday 8 April 1959

‘Let me be given my desire’. This is the meaning that I told you *Hamlet* had for all those, critics, actors or spectators, who lay their hands on it. I told you that it was this way because of the exceptional, the inspired structural rigour at which the theme of Hamlet arrives after an obscure elaboration which begins in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with Saxo Grammaticus, then subsequently in the romantic version of *Beliefest*, and no doubt in an outline by Kyd, and also in a first draft, it appears, by Shakespeare, to end up with the form of it that we have.

This form is characterised in our eyes, with the method that we use here, by something which I call the structure which is that precisely to which I am trying to give you a key which will allow you to find your bearings with certainty in this topological form which I have called the graph, which one perhaps could also call the gramme.

Let us take up again our *Hamlet*. I am sure that since I have spoken to you about it three times, you have at least read it once. Let us try to regasp, in this movement which is at once simple and profoundly marked by all the detours which have allowed so much human thinking to lodge there, this movement of *Hamlet*. If it can be both simple and never ending, it is not very difficult to know why. The drama of Hamlet, is the encounter with death.

Others have insisted - I moreover alluded to them in my earlier approaches - on the prodigiously gripping, striking character of the first scene on the platform of Elsinore, of this scene about the return of something that the sentries have seen once already. It is the encounter with the ghost, with this form from below: one does not yet know what it is, what it is bringing, what it wants to say. Coleridge says in his notes on *Hamlet* which are so well done and which are easily found in his *Lectures on Shakespeare* - I am coming back to it because I may have given you the impression that I thought badly of it. I mean that in telling you that after all Coleridge only found himself there, I seemed to minimise what he said about it. He is the first person who sounded, as in many other domains, the depths of what there is in *Hamlet* - in connection with this first scene that Hume himself, who was so much against ghosts, believed in this one, in whom the art of Shakespeare managed to make him believe despite his resistance. The energy that he deployed against ghosts, he says, is like that of a Samson. And here Samson is defeated.

It is clear that it is because Shakespeare came very close to something which was not the ghost, but which was effectively this encounter not with a dead person, but with death, which in short is the pivotal point of this play. Hamlet’s going in front of death, this is where we should begin from to conceive of what is promised to us from this first scene when the ghost appears at the very moment when he is said to have appeared, ‘the bell then beating one’.(I i 39)

We find this ‘one’ at the end of the play when, after a complicated journeying, Hamlet finds himself very close to performing the act which ought at the same time complete his destiny, and where in a way he advances with closed eyes towards the one whom he must strike, saying to Horatio - and it is not at an indifferent moment that he ends

by saying to him: What is it to kill a man, 'And a man's life's no more than to say One'.(V ii 74)

Obviously in order to get here he takes strange paths, you could say that he plays truant. Which allows me to borrow a word which is in the text. It is a question of Horatio who, all modesty and all kindness, when he comes to bring him his help, says I am a 'truant' scholar; I am being idle (I ii 169). No one believes him, but it is in effect what has always struck the critics: that Hamlet idles. That he does not go straight at things.

In short what we are trying to do here, to investigate, is why things are so. On this point what we are doing is not something like taking a wrong road. It is a road which is different to the one followed by those who have come before us, but it is different in so far as it perhaps takes the question a bit further. What they have said does not for all that lose its importance. What they sensed is what Freud immediately put into the foreground; it is that in this action which is in cause, the action of bringing death, and regarding which one does not know why an action which is so urgent, and in the last analysis so quick to carry out, demands so much time from Hamlet.

What we are told first of all about it, is that this action of killing encounters in Hamlet the obstacle of desire. This is the discovery, the reason and the paradox, because what I showed you and what remains the unsolved riddle of Hamlet, the riddle that we are trying to resolve, is precisely this thing on which it seems the spirit should dwell, it is that the desire in question, because it is the desire discovered by Freud, the desire for the mother, desire in so far as it stirs up rivalry with the one who possesses her, this desire God knows should go in the same direction as the action.

In order to begin to decipher what this means, therefore in the last analysis the mythical function of Hamlet which makes of it a theme equal to that of Oedipus, what appears to us first of all is that what we read in the myth, the intimate link that there is in short between this murder which is to be done, this just murder, this murder that he wants to carry out - there is no conflict in him about law and order, involving as some authors have suggested, as I reminded you, the basis of the execution of justice. There is no ambiguity in him between public order, the hands of the law, and his private tasks; there is no doubt for him that this murder is the whole law; there is no question about this murder - and his own death. This murder will only be executed when Hamlet has already received a fatal wound, in this short interval that remains to him between the death blow he has received and the moment that he dies.

It is from this then that we must begin. From this rendezvous to which we can give its name, to which we can give all its meaning. Hamlet's act projects itself, situates itself at its term at the final rendezvous of all rendezvous, at this point with respect to the subject as we are here trying to articulate it, to define it, to the subject in so far as it has not yet come to birth, - its advent is delayed in the properly philosophical articulation - to the subject as Freud tells us it is constructed. A subject which is distinguished from the subject about which occidental philosophy has been speaking ever since theories of knowledge exist, a subject which is not at all the universal support of objects, and in a way its negative, its omnipresent support, to the subject in so far as it speaks and in so far as it is structured in a complex relationship with the signifier which is very precisely the one that we are trying to articulate here.

And to represent it once again, if it is true that the point of intersection of the intention of the demand and the signifying chain occurs the first time at the point O which

we have defined as the big Other *qua* locus of the truth, I mean *qua* locus where the word is situated by taking place, establishes this other order evoked, invoked every time the subject articulates something, every time he speaks and does this something which is distinguished from all the other immanent forms of captivation or of the one with respect to the other, there is nothing equivalent to the fact that the word always establishes this third element, namely this locus of the Other in which the word, even when it is lying, is inscribed as desire.

This discourse for the other, this reference to the other, is further prolonged, in the fact that it is taken up again, starting from the other in order to constitute the question of: 'what do I want?' or more exactly the question which is proposed to the subject in a form which is already negative: 'what do you want?'; the question of what beyond this alienated demand in the system of discourse in so far as it is there, reposing in the locus of the other, the subject prolonging his *élan* asks himself here what he is as subject, and where he has in short to encounter what? Beyond the locus of the truth that which the genius itself - not of the tongue but of the extreme metaphor which tends to be formulated before certain significant spectacles, which is called by a name which we will recognise here in passing: the moment of truth.

Because let us not forget, at a time when the whole of philosophy is engaged in articulating what it is that links time to being, that it is quite simple to see that time, in its very constitution, past-present-future (those of grammar) refers itself to the act of the word - and to nothing else. The present, is the moment at which I speak and nothing else.

It is strictly impossible for us to conceive of a temporality in an animal dimension. Namely in a dimension of appetite. The abc of temporality requires even the structure of language. And in this beyond of the other, in this discourse which is no longer discourse for the other, but discourse of the other properly speaking, in which there is going to be established this broken line of signifiers of the unconscious; in this Other into whom the subject advances with his question as such, what he is aiming at in the final term, is the moment of this encounter with himself, of this encounter with his willing, of this encounter with something which we are going in the final term to try to formulate, and of which we cannot even give all the elements immediately, even though all the same certain signs represent them for us here and are in a way for you the reference point, the prefiguring of what awaits us in what can be called the necessary steps, the necessary stages of the question.

Let us note all the same that if Hamlet, who I told you is not this or that, is not an obsessional for the good reason first of all that he is a poetic creation - Hamlet does not have a neurosis; Hamlet demonstrates some neurosis to us, and this is a completely different thing than being one - if Hamlet by certain sentences when we look into Hamlet from a certain mirror-like light, appears to us to be closer to the structure of the obsessional, it is already because of the fact that the function of desire - because this is the question that we are posing about Hamlet - appears to us precisely in the fact, which is revelatory of the essential element of the structure which is the one precisely highlighted to the maximum by obsessional neurosis - it is that one of the functions of desire, the major function in the obsessional, is to keep at a distance, to wait for, this desired moment of encounter.

And if I employ the term offered by Freud in 'Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety', namely *Erwartung*, which he expressly distinguishes from *vorhergesehen* [to offer one's back]; *Erwartung*, waiting in the active sense is also to make it wait This game with the moment of encounter essentially dominates the relationship of the obsessional. Hamlet

no doubt shows us this whole dialectic, all this unfolding which plays with the object, in many other aspects also, but this is the most obvious one, the one which appears on the surface, which strikes us, and which gives its style to this play, and which has always constituted its enigma.

Let us now try to see in other elements the coordinates that the play gives us. What is it that distinguishes Hamlet's position with respect in short to a fundamental texture? What is it that makes of it this variant of the Oedipus complex which is so striking in its character of variation? Because in the case of Oedipus, he did not go into all these complications as Freud very clearly remarked in the little explanatory note to which one has recourse when one does not know the answer. God knows things are getting worse, we moderns are in a period of decadence, we get into all sorts of knots before doing what the others, the good, courageous ancients, did right away. This is not an explanation; this reference to the idea of decadence should make us suspicious; we can take things from a different angle.

I think that it is appropriate to take the question further. If it is true that we moderns are at that point, there must be a reason for it, at least if we are psychoanalysts, other than the reason: our nerves are not as good as those of our fore-fathers. No, already something that I drew your attention to is essential. Oedipus in his case, did not have to spend all this time talking before acting, he had done it without even thinking about it, and without knowing it. The structure of the oedipal myth is essentially constituted by this.

Now it is quite clear and obvious that there is something here; something which is precisely that by which I introduced you this year - and it is not by chance - into this initiation to the gramme as a key to the problem of desire. Remember the very simple dream from 'the desire principle and the reality principle', the dream in which the dead father appears. And I marked for you on the upper line, the line of enunciating in the dream: 'He did not know'; the blessed ignorance of those who are plunged in the necessary drama which follows from the fact that the subject who speaks is subject to the signifier, this ignorance is here.

I point out to you in passing that no one explains why to you. Because indeed if the father sleeping in the garden was murdered because there had been poured into his ear - *l'oneille* as it is called in Jarry - this delicate sap, hebenon, it seems that he should not have been aware of this, because there is nothing to tell us that he woke up and recognised the damage, that the scabs which covered his body were ever seen except by those who discovered his corpse. And therefore this supposes that in the domain of the beyond one has very precise information about the way in which one got there, which can in effect be a hypothesis in principle, which is not something either which we should right away hold to be certain.

All of this to underline the arbitrariness of the initial revelation, the one from which there begins the whole great movement of *Hamlet*; the revelation by the father of the truth about his death distinguishes essentially a coordinate of the myth from what happens in the Oedipus myth.

Something is lifted, a veil, the one which weighs precisely on the articulation of the unconscious line; this veil which we ourselves are trying to lift, but not without as you know a certain amount of difficulty. Because it is clear that it must indeed have an essential function. I mean for the security of the subject in so far as he speaks, so that our interventions to reestablish the coherence of the signifying chain at the level of the

unconscious present all these difficulties, receive on the part of the subject all this opposition, these refusals, this is something which we call resistance and which is the pivot of the whole history of analysis.

Here the question is solved. The father knew, and from the fact that he knew, Hamlet also knows. Namely that he has the answer. He has the answer, and there can only be one response. It is not necessarily sayable in psychological terms; I mean that it is not necessarily a comprehensible response, and still less one that gets you in the gut; but it is none the less a response of a quite fatal type. We are trying to see what this response is. This response is in short the message at the point that it is constituted on the upper line, on the line of the unconscious; this response which I already symbolised for you in advance, and not of course without being forced because of this to ask you to trust me. But it is easier, more honest to ask someone to trust you on some point which at first makes no sense. This does not commit you to anything, except perhaps to look for it, which all the same allows you the freedom to create it by yourselves; this response I began to articulate in the following form: signifier $S(\bar{})$; what distinguishes the response at the level of the upper line, from that at the level of the lower line. At the level of the lower line the response is always the signified of the other, $s(O)$, it is always with respect to this word which unfolds at the level of the Other and which shapes the meaning of what we have wanted to say. But who would have wanted to say that at the level of the Other?

This signified at the level of the simple discourse, but at the level of the beyond of this discourse, at the level of the question the subject poses to himself which means in the final analysis: 'What have I become in all of this?'. The response as I told you, is the signifier of the Other with the bar, $S(\bar{})$.

There are a thousand fashions to begin developing for you what is included in this symbol. But today we choose, because we are in *Hamlet* the clear, obvious, pathetic, dramatic path. And this is the value of *Hamlet* that it allows us to gain access to the meaning of $S(\bar{})$.

The meaning of what Hamlet learns from his father, is here before us very clearly, it is the irredeemable, absolute, unplumbable betrayal of love. Of the purest love, the love of this king who perhaps of course, like any man, may have been a great rogue but who with this being who was his wife would go so far as to keep the wind away from her face. At least according to what Hamlet tells us (cf I ii 141)...

It is the absolute falseness compared to what appeared to Hamlet as the very witness of beauty, of truth, of the essential.

Here there is the response. The truth of Hamlet is a hopeless truth. There is not a trace in the whole of Hamlet of a raising up towards something which could be described as the beyond, atonement, redemption.

We are already told that the first meeting came from below. This oral, infernal relationship to the Acheron which Freud had chosen to move since he was not able to bend the higher powers, is here what situates *Hamlet* in the clearest fashion. But this of course is only a quite simple, quite obvious remark which it is rather curious to see that the authors, by some modesty or other - sensitive souls must not be disturbed - scarcely highlight in connection with *Hamlet*. I put it to you after all only as a step in the order of the pathetic, in the order of the tangible, however painful it may be. There must be something in which there can be formulated more radically the reason, the motive of this whole choice, because

after all, every conclusion, every verdict, however radical it may be, by taking on a more accentuated form in the order of what is called pessimism, is still something which is made to veil from us what is in question.

S(does not mean everything that is happening at the level of O is worthless; namely that every truth is fallacious. This is something which may make you laugh in the periods of amusement which follow the post-war, in which for example people produce a philosophy of the absurd which is of use particularly in cellars.

Let us try to articulate something more serious, and lighter. So then what does S(with the bar, what does this mean essentially? I think that this is the time to say it, even though of course this is going to appear from a very particular angle; but I do not believe that it is contingent.

S(means the following: it is that if O, the big Other is not a being but the locus of the word, S(means that in the locus of the word, in which there reposes in a developed form, or in a form the totality of the system of signifiers, namely of a tongue, something is missing. Something which can be only a signifier is lacking to it.

The signifier which is lacking at the level of the Other, and which gives its most radical value to this S(, is the following which is as I might say the great secret of psychoanalysis, that through which psychoanalysis contributes something, through which the subject who speaks, in so far as the experience of analysis reveals him to us as necessarily structured in a certain fashion is distinguished from the usual subject, from the subject to which a philosophical evolution which after all may well appear to us in a certain point of view of fruitful delusion, but of delusion in retrospect.

This is the great secret: there is no Other of the Other. In other words for the subject of traditional philosophy, this subject subjectivises himself indefinitely. If I am in everything I think, I am in so far as I think that I am, and so on, this has no reason to stop. The truth is that analysis teaches us something quite different. The fact is that it has already been glimpsed that it is not so sure that I am in so far as I think, and that one can only be sure of one thing, which is that I am in so far as I think that I am. Certainly that. Only what analysis teaches us is that I am not the one who precisely is in the process of thinking that I am, for the simple reason that because of the fact that I think that I am, I think in the locus of the Other; I am different to the one who thinks that I am.

But the question is that I have no guarantee of any kind that this Other, through what there is in his system, can give me if I may express myself in this way, what I gave him: his being and his essence as truth. There is no, I have told you, Other of the Other. There is not in the Other, any signifier which is able on this occasion to answer for what I am. And to say things in a transformed way, this hopeless truth that I spoke to you about a while ago, this truth which is the one that we encounter at the level of the unconscious, is a faceless truth, is a closed truth, is a truth which can be bent in every direction. We only know it too well. It is a truthless truth.

And this indeed is what creates the greatest obstacle for those who approach our work from outside, and who before our interpretations, because they are not on the path with us where they are meant to have their effect which is only conceivable in a metaphorical fashion, and in so far as they play and reverberate always between these two lines, cannot understand what is in question in analytic interpretation.

If we talk about this signifier, that the Other does not have at its disposition, it is all the same because it is - of course - somewhere.

I set up this little gramme for you so that you would not lose your bearings. I made it as carefully as I could, but certainly not to increase your confusion. You can recognise, everywhere the bar is, the hidden signifier, the one that the Other does not have at its disposition, and which is precisely the one which concerns you; it is the same one which makes you enter the game in so far as you, poor simpletons, since you were born, were caught up in this sacred *logos* business. Namely the part of you which in this is sacrificed, and sacrificed not purely and simply, physically as they say, really, but symbolically. And this is not nothing, this part of you which took on a signifying function. And this is why there is only one; and there are not ninety nine of them. It is very exactly this enigmatic function that we call the phallus which is here, this something of the organism of life, of this sprouting, or vital surge which you know I do not think should be used on all sorts of occasions, but which once it is well circumscribed, symbolised, put where it is, and especially where it is of use, there where effectively it is caught up in the unconscious, takes on its meaning. The phallus, the vital tumescence, this enigmatic, universal something more male than female and nevertheless of which the female herself may become the symbol, this is what is in question, and that which, because it is not at the disposition of the Other, that which, even though it is this very life which the subject makes signifying, nowhere comes in to guarantee the signification of the discourse of the Other.

In other words, though it may be sacrificed, this life is not given back to him by the Other.

It is because Hamlet starts from there, namely from the response of the given, that the whole path can be cleared, that this radical revelation is going to lead him to the final rendezvous. To reach it we are now going to take up what happens in the play *Hamlet*.

The play *Hamlet* is as you know the work of Shakespeare, and we should therefore pay attention to what he added to it. It was already a long time on the road, but it must have offered - and it was enough for it to be offered for it to be taken - a long enough path still to be travelled to show us what can be called the genuine article, for Shakespeare to have travelled it.

I pointed out to you the last time the questions that are posed by the play scene, the players' scene. I will return to it. I would like today to introduce an essential element; essential because it concerns what we are getting close to after having established the function of the two lines, namely what lies in the interval, that which, as I might say, constructs for the subject the distance that he can maintain between the two lines in order to be able to breathe there while he is still alive; and this is what we call desire.

I told you what pressure, what abolition, what destruction this desire undergoes in so far as what is encountered with this something of the real Other, of the mother in so far as she is a mother like so many others, namely something structured by this something which is less desire than gluttony, even engulfment, this something which obviously, we do not know why, but after all it does not matter, at this level of Shakespeare's life had been a revelation for him.

The problem of the woman, undoubtedly, had never not been present in the whole of Shakespeare's work, and there were fine strapping women before *Hamlet*, and such abysmal, ferocious and sad ones only appear after *Hamlet*. *Troilus and Cressida* which is a

pure marvel, and certainly one that has not been highlighted enough, allows us perhaps to go further into what Hamlet thought at that time. The creation of *Troilus and Cressida* is I think one of the most sublime that one can meet with in dramatic work. At the level of *Hamlet* and at the level of the dialogue which one could call the paroxysm of the play between Hamlet and his mother, I told you the last time the meaning of this movement of adjuration *vis-à-vis* the mother, which is more or less: do not destroy the beauty, the order of the world, do not confuse Hyperion himself - it is his father whom he designates thus - with this most abject of beings; and the collapse of the adjuration before what he knows to be the fatal necessity of this sort of desire which sustains nothing, which retains nothing.

The quotations that I could give you here of what Shakespeare's thought is in this regard are very numerous. I will only give you the following one which I picked up during the holidays in a quite different context. It is a question of someone who is rather in love, but also it must be said rather bizarre; who is moreover a decent man; it is in *Twelfth Night*. The hero, in a dialogue with the girl who to win him, and again with nothing in the hero, the Duke as he is called, putting in doubt that his leanings are towards women - because it is his passion that is in question - approaches him disguised as a boy, and which all the same is a peculiar way to promote oneself as a girl because she loves him. It is not for nothing that I am giving you these details, it is because it is a contribution to something which I am going to introduce now namely the creation of Ophelia. This woman Viola, is precisely before Ophelia. *Twelfth Night* is about two years before the production of *Hamlet*, and here we see exactly the example of the transformation of what is happening in Shakespeare on the level of his feminine creations, which as you know are among the most fascinating, the most attracting, the most captivating, the most disturbing also, which create the really immortally poetic character of a whole aspect of his genius.

This girl-boy or boy-girl, here is the very type of creation in which there flowers, in which there is revealed something which is going to introduce us to what is now going to be our topic, our next step, namely the role of the object in desire.

After having taken this occasion to show you the perspective in which there is inscribed our question about Ophelia, here is what the Duke, without knowing that the person in front of him is a girl, and a girl who loves him, responds to the specious questions of the girl who, while he despairs of himself, says to him:

How can you complain. If there was someone near you who was sighing after your love, and whom you had no desire to love - which is the case, this is what he is suffering from - how could you welcome her. You must not therefore blame others for what you would undoubtedly do yourself.

He is like a blind man and, greatly puzzled, tells her at that moment something about the great difference between feminine desire and masculine desire.

There is no woman's side
 Can bide the beating of so strong a passion
 As love doth give my heart: no woman's heart
 So big to hold so much; they lack retention.....(II iv)

And his whole development is in effect about something which makes of desire essentially this distance that there is, this particular relationship to the object sustained as such, which is something precisely, which is what is expressed in the symbol which I put for you on this return line of the x of the will. Namely the relationship $\$ \diamond o$, to the object in

so far as it is as one might say the cursor, the level at which there is situated, there is placed that which in the subject is properly speaking desire.

I would like to introduce the character of Ophelia by profiting from what the philological and textual criticism has brought us about as I might say her predecessors. I saw on a page by some cretin or other a lively movement of good humour which came to him one day not especially suddenly because he must have known it for some time, when he noticed that in Belleforest there is something which corresponds to the role of Ophelia.

In Belleforest one is all the same embarrassed by everything that happens to Hamlet, namely that he really does seem to be mad; but all the same people are not all that more reassured by that, because it is clear that this madman knows well enough what he wants; and what he wants is what is not known, it is a lot of things; and what he wants is the question for all the others. They send him a prostitute who is meant, by drawing him off into a corner of the forest, to capture his confidences while someone who is listening may come to know something more. The stratagem fails, of course, thanks I think to the girls love. What is certain, is that the critic in question was quite content to find this sort of proto-Ophelia in order to uncover there the reason for the ambiguities in Ophelia's character.

Naturally I am not going to reread Ophelia's role; but this character who is so eminently pathetic, overwhelming, of whom one could say that she is one of the great figures of humanity, presents herself as you know with extremely ambiguous traits so that no one has ever yet been able to declare if she is innocence itself, who speaks about or who alludes to her most carnal movements with the simplicity of a purity which does not know modesty, or if on the contrary she is a shameless hussy who is ready for anything.

The texts about it are a real mish-mash. You can find everything in them. And in truth you find particularly in them a great charm, in which the mad scene is not the least important moment. Things are quite clear in effect. If on the one hand Hamlet behaves towards her with a quite exceptional cruelty, which is embarrassing, which people describe as painful, and which makes a victim of her, on the other hand one senses that she is not at all, and far from being, the disincarnated or uncarnal creature that the Pre-Raphaelite paintings which I have evoked have made of her. She is something quite different.

In truth it is surprising that prejudices about the type, the nature, the signification, the morals to speak plainly of women are still so strongly anchored that one can ask such a question about Ophelia. It seems that Ophelia is quite simply what every girl is whether or not she has broken through, after all we do not know anything about it, the taboo step of the breaching of her virginity. The question does not seem to be posed in any way about Ophelia. On this occasion it is a question of knowing why Shakespeare brought forward this character who seems to represent a kind of extreme point on the curve which goes from his first heroines, the boy-girls, to something which is going to be formulated subsequently, but transformed into a different nature.

Ophelia, who seems to be the summit of his creation of the type of the woman, at the exact point at which she is herself a bud which is ready to blossom, and which is menaced by the insect gnawing at the heart of this bud. This vision of life ready to blossom, and of life which carries all lives, it is thus moreover that Hamlet qualifies it, situates it, in order to reject it: you will be the mother of sinners, this image precisely of vital fecundity, this image to speak plainly, illustrates for us more I think than any other creation the equation I noted in my lectures, the equation Girl = Phallus. There is obviously here

something which we can very easily recognise.

I will not take into account things which in fact appear to me to be simply a curious encounter. I had the curiosity to look up the derivation of 'Ophelia', and in an article by Boissade in the *Dictionnaire étymologique grec*, I found a Greek reference. Shakespeare did not have at his disposition the dictionaries that we use, but one finds in the authors of that epoch things so stupefying alongside extraordinary ignorance, such penetrating things, which resemble the constructions of the most modern criticism, that I can on this occasion tell you the following - which is in the notes which I have forgotten.

I believe that it is in Homer, if I remember rightly there is *Ophelio*, in the sense of to make pregnant, to impregnate; that *Ophelio* is used for this moulting, vital fermentation, which is described more or less as allowing something to change, or to thicken. Funnier yet, one cannot take it into account, is that in the same article Boissade who is an author who sifts rather severely the organisation of his signifying chains, thinks it necessary to make express reference in this connection to the verbal form of *Ophallos*. To the phallus.

The confusion between Ophelia and *Phallos* does not require similarities in order to be obvious to us. It appears to us in the structure. And what it is now a question of introducing, is not the way in which Ophelia can be the phallus, but if she is as we say truly the phallus how Shakespeare made her fulfill this function.

Now this is the important thing. Shakespeare carries onto a new plane what is given in the legend of Belieforest, namely that in the legend as Belieforest reports it, the prostitute is the bait destined to tear his secret from him. Well, transposing that to a higher level which is the one at which the real question is sustained, I will show you the next time that Ophelia is there to question the secret, not in the sense of sinister plans which it is a question of making Hamlet avow to those who surround him and who do not know very well what he is capable of, but the secret of desire.

In the relations with the object Ophelia, in so far as they are punctuated throughout the play by a series of moments on which we will dwell, something is articulated which allows us to grasp, in a particularly lively way, the relations of the subject in so far as he speaks, namely of the subject in so far as he is submitted to the rendezvous with his destiny, with something which must take on in analysis, and through analysis, a different meaning. This meaning around which analysis turns, and regarding which it is not for nothing that it is the turning point which it is approaching in connection with this term of object which is so predominant, and certainly much more insistent and present than it ever was in Freud, and to the point that some people have said that analysis has changed meaning in so far as libido the pleasure-seeker, has become object-seeking.

I have told you, analysis has engaged itself along a false path in so far as it articulates this object and defines it in a fashion which misses its goal, which does not sustain what is really involved in the relationship which is inscribed in the formula $S \diamond o$, S castrated, S subjected to something which I will describe for you the next time, and which I will teach you to decipher under the name of the *fading* of the subject, which is opposed to the notion of the *splitting* of the object, of this relationship of the subject to the object as such. What is the object of desire? One day which was I think the second session of this year, I gave you a quotation by someone whom I hope someone has identified since, who said that what the miser regrets in the loss of his moneybox would teach us a good deal, if we knew it, about human desire. It is Simone Weil who said that.

It is this that we are going to try to circumscribe in terms of this thread which runs right through the tragedy between Ophelia and Hamlet.

Seminar 17: Wednesday 15 April 1959

I announced as a kind of lure that today I would in fact speak about the kind of lure Ophelia is. And I think that I will keep my word.

This object, this theme, this character, comes in here as an element in our exposition, the one that we have already been presenting for four of our meetings, whose purpose is to show in *Hamlet* the tragedy of desire. To show that if it can properly speaking be thus qualified, it is in the whole measure that desire as such, or human desire, the desire that we have to deal with in analysis, the desire which we are in a position, according to the style of our outlook with respect to it, to weaken, even to confuse with other terms, this desire can only be conceived of, can only be situated with respect to fixed coordinates in subjectivity which Freud demonstrated to be of such a nature that they fix at a certain distance from one another the subject and the signifier, which places the subject in a certain dependence on the signifier as such.

This means that we cannot account for analytic experience by starting from the idea that the signifier is for example a pure and simple reflection, a pure and simple product of what are called on occasion interhuman relationships. And it is not only an instrument, it is one of the initial, essential components of a topology without which one sees the totality of phenomena being reduced, being leveled down in a way which does not allow us, us analysts, to account for what one can call the presuppositions of our experience.

I started on this path, taking *Hamlet* as an example of something which betrays to us a very lively dramatic sense of the coordinates of this topology, and which means that it is to this that we attribute the exceptional power of captivation that *Hamlet* has, which makes us say that if the tragedy of *Hamlet* has this predominant role, in the preferences of the critical public, that if it is always so seductive for those who approach it, this is because of something which shows that the poet has put into it from some angle some glimpses of his own experience. And this is indicated by the sort of turning point that *Hamlet* represents in Shakespeare's work. Also indeed that his experience as a poet, in the technical sense of the term, had little by little shown him the way to it.

It is because of certain detours that we think we can interpret here in function of certain of our reference points, of those which are articulated on our gramme, that we can grasp the import of this study which is certainly very essential. A sudden change in fortune is noted in a way which distinguishes Shakespeare's play from preceding plays or from the narratives of Saxo Grammaticus, of Belieforest, as plays that we only have fragmentary glimpses of. This detour is that of the character of Ophelia who is certainly present in the story from the beginning - Ophelia as I told you, is the trap -; from the beginning of the legend of *Hamlet* it is the trap into which Hamlet does not fall, first of all because he has been warned, then because the lure itself, namely the Ophelia of Saxo Grammaticus, does not lend herself to it, since she has been in love for a long time, Belieforest's text tells us, with Prince Hamlet.

Out of this Ophelia, Shakespeare constructed something completely different; in the plot perhaps he has only deepened this function, this role that Ophelia has in the legend,

destined as she is to take hold of, to captivate, to surprise Hamlet's secret. She is perhaps something which becomes one of the most intimate elements of the drama of the Hamlet that Shakespeare constructs for us, of the Hamlet who has lost the way, the path to his desire. She is an essential articulating element in this journey which makes Hamlet go to what I called the last time the moment of his fatal rendezvous, of the accomplishment of an act which he accomplishes in a way in spite of himself.

We will see even more today the degree to which Hamlet is indeed the image of this level of the subject at which one can say that it is in terms of pure signifier that destiny is articulated, and that the subject is in a way nothing but the reverse side of a message which is not even his own.

The first step then that we took along this path, was to articulate the degree to which the play, which is the drama of desire in relation to the desire of the other, the degree to which it is dominated by this Other who is here desire in the least ambiguous fashion, the mother, namely the primordial subject of demand. The subject whom I showed you to be the true omnipotent subject that we are always talking about in analysis. This is not the for the woman which has in itself this dimension which is the omnipotence called omnipotence of thought. It is the omnipotence of the subject as subject of the first demand that is in question, and it is to her that this omnipotence should always be referred, I told you this when we were taking our first steps.

It is a question of something, at the level of the desire of the other which is presented to Prince Hamlet, namely to the principle subject of the play, as such a tragedy, the drama of a subjectivity. Hamlet is always there, and one could say much more than in any other drama.

The drama always presents itself in a twofold fashion, its elements being at once inter-subjective and intra-subjective. Therefore in the very perspective of the subject, of Prince Hamlet, this desire of the other, this desire of the mother presents itself, essentially as a desire which between an eminent object, between this idealised, exalted object who is his father, and this disparaged, contemptible object who is Claudius, the criminal and adulterous brother, does not choose.

She does not choose because something of the order of instinctual voracity is present which means that in her case this sacrosanct genital object of our recent terminology presents itself as nothing other than the object of a *jouissance* which is really the direct satisfaction of a need.

This dimension is essential; it is the one which forms one of the poles between which Hamlet's adjuration of his mother vacillates. I showed it to you in the scene where confronted with her, he launches this call for abstinence to her at the moment when in terms, which are moreover of the crudest, the cruelest sort, he transmits the essential message which the ghost, his father, charged him to transmit. Suddenly this appeal fails and turns back on itself; he sends her off to the bed of Claudius, to the caresses of the man who will not fail to make her yield yet again.

In this sort of collapse, of abandonment at the end of Hamlet's adjuration, we find the very term, the model which allows us to conceive of the way in which his desire, his natural movement towards an action which he burns to accomplish, so that the whole world becomes for him a living reproach for never being equal to his own will, this action collapses in the same way as the adjuration that he addresses to his mother. It is essentially

in this dependence of the desire of the subject with respect to the other subject that there is presented the major approach, the very accent of the drama of Hamlet, what one can call its permanent dimension.

It is a question of seeing how, in a more articulated fashion, by entering into a psychological detail which would remain I must say fundamentally enigmatic if it were not, this detail, submitted to this total vision which gives the meaning of the tragedy of Hamlet, the way this reverberates at the very core of Hamlet's willing, into this something which in my graph is the hook, the question mark of the *Che vuoi?* of the subjectivity constituted in the Other, and articulating itself in the Other.

This is the meaning of what I have to say today. What one can call the imaginary regulation of what constitutes the support of desire, of that which face to face with an undetermined point, a variable point here at the origin of the curve, and which represents this assumption by the subject of his own essential willing, which is regulated on something which is somewhere opposite, and in a way one can say, immediately at the level of the conscious subject, the culmination, the abutment, the term of what constitutes the question of the subject, is something that we symbolise by this \$ in the presence of o, and which we call the phantasy, which in the psychic economy represents something that you know. This something ambiguous in so far as it is effectively in consciousness, when we approach it in a certain phase, a final term, this term which makes of all human passion in so far as it is marked by one of those traits which we call traits of perversion.

The mystery of phantasy, in so far as it is in a way the final term of a desire, and always more or less presents itself in a fairly paradoxical form because it properly speaking motivated the ancient rejection of its dimension as belonging to the order of the absurd, and this essential step which was taken in the modern epoch of psychoanalysis constitutes the first turning point which tends to interpret, to conceive of this phantasy *qua* perverse - and that it could not be conceived of except in so far as it was organised with respect to an unconscious economy; and if it appears to be the abutment in its final term, in its enigma, if it can be understood in function of an unconscious circuit, or which articulates it through another signifying chain profoundly different to the chain that the subject commands in so far as it is this one, the one which is below the first one, and at the level firstly of demand. And this phantasy intervenes, and it also does not intervene.

It is in the measure that something which normally does not get there by that path, does not return to the level of the message, of the signified of the Other, which is the module, the sum of all the significations such as they are required by the subject in the interhuman exchange and complete discourse. It is in so far as this phantasy gets through or does not get through in order to arrive at the message, that we find ourselves in a normal situation or in an atypical situation.

It is normal that it should not get through this path, that it remain unconscious, that it be separated. It is also essential that at certain phases, and phases which are inscribed more or less in the pathological order, that it should also get through. We will give their name to these moments of breakthrough, these moments of communication which can only happen, as the schema indicates to you, in one direction. I am indicating this essential articulation because it is in order to advance in short in the handling of this apparatus that we call here the gramme, that we are here.

We are going to see simply for the moment what is meant by, and how there functions in Shakespearean tragedy, what I called the moment of craziness of Hamlet's

desire, in so far as it is to this imaginary regulation that it should be referred.

Ophelia, in this mapping out, is situated at the level of the letter o; the letter o in so far as it is inscribed in this symbolisation of a phantasy. The phantasy being the support, the imaginary substratum of something which is called properly speaking desire, in so far as it is distinguished from demand, as it is distinguished also from need. This o corresponds to something towards which the whole modern articulation of analysis is directed when it tries to articulate the object and object- relations .

There is something correct in this research, in this sense that the role of this object is no doubt decisive as it articulates it. I mean the common notion in object-relations as it articulates it when it articulates it as that which fundamentally structures the mode of apprehension of the world. Simply in object-relations as it is most usually explained to us today in most of the treatises which give a greater or lesser place to it, whether it is a volume which appeared fairly close to us to which I allude as the most caricatural example, or others more elaborated like those of Federn [Fairbairn?] or one of the others, the error and the confusion consists in this theorisation of the object *qua* object, which itself is called the pregenital object.

A genital object is also specifically within diverse forms of the pregenital object, and the diverse forms of the anal object, etc. It is precisely what is materialised for you on this schema in the fact that this is to take the dialectic of the object for the dialectic of the demand. And this confusion is explicable because in both cases the subject finds himself at a moment, in a position with regard to the signifier, which is the same. The subject is in an eclipsed position. In so far as in these two points of our gramme, whether it is a question of the code at the level of the unconscious, namely of the series of relationships that he has with a certain apparatus of demand, or whether it is a question of the imaginary relationship which constitutes him in a privileged fashion in a certain position also defined by his relationship to the signifier before an object o, in these two cases the subject is in an eclipsed position.

He is in this position which I began to articulate the last time by using the term *fading*. I chose this term for all sorts of philological reasons etc., and also because it has become quite familiar in connection with the utilisation of the communication machines which we have. *Fading* is exactly what happens in a machine for communicating, for reproducing the voice, when the voice disappears, subsides, vanishes, in order to reappear at the whim of some variation in the support itself of the transmission.

It is in so far therefore as the subject is at a like moment of oscillation which is the one which characterises - we will naturally come to give its support and its coordinates to what is only a metaphor - before the demand and in the object that the confusion can be produced, and that in fact what is called a relation to the object is always a reference to the subject in this privileged moment which is called the *fading* of the subject from - not objects as is said - signifiers of demand.

And in so far as the demand remains fixed, it is by the mode, by the signifying apparatus which corresponds to the different types, oral, anal and others, that one can articulate something which in effect has a sort of clinical correspondence. But there is a great drawback in confusing what is a relationship to the signifier with what is a relationship to the object, because this object is different, because this object, *qua* object of desire has a different meaning, because all sorts of things make it necessary that we should not overlook that we should even give all their primitive determining value, as we are

doing, to the signifiers of demand in so far as they are oral, anal, signifiers - with all the subdivisions, all the differences of orientation and of polarisation that this object as such can take on with relation to the subject - (which object-relations as they are currently articulated overlook), precisely this correlation to the subject which is expressed in this way in so far as the subject is marked by the bar.

This is what brings it about that the subject, even when we consider him at the most primitive stages of the oral period, as it has been articulated for example in an extremely tight, extremely rigorous, exact fashion by Melanie Klein - we find ourselves, you should notice in the very text of Melanie Klein, in the presence of certain paradoxes, and these paradoxes are not inscribed in the pure and simple articulation that one can construct of the subject as being put face to face with the object corresponding to a need, specifically the nipple, the breast on this occasion.

Because the paradox appears in the fact that from the beginning another enigmatic signifier presents itself at the horizon of this relationship. This is perfectly demonstrated by Melanie Klein, who has only one merit on this occasion which is to have no hesitation in plunging ahead, namely to ratify what she has found in clinical experience and for want of an explanation to content herself with very poor explanations. But undoubtedly she testifies that the phallus is already there as such, and as properly speaking destructive with respect to the subject.

She makes of it from the beginning this primordial object which is at once the best and the worst, that around which there are going to revolve all the phenomena of the paranoid period and the depressive period.

All I am doing here of course is indicating, recalling.

What I can articulate further in connection with this and in so far as it interests us not in so far as it is confronted with, related to the demand, but with this element which we are going to try this year to more closely circumscribe, which is represented by the *o*; the *o*, an essential object, the object around which revolves as such the dialectic of desire, the object around which the subject experiences himself in an imaginary otherness, before an element which is otherness at the imaginary level as we have already articulated and defined it on several occasions. It is image, and it is *pathos*.

And it is through this other which is the object of desire that there is fulfilled a function which defines desire in this double coordinate which means that he does not understand, not at all an object which is as such the satisfaction of a need, but an object in so far as it is itself relativised, I mean placed in a relationship with the subject - the subject who is present in the phantasy.

This is something obvious phenomenologically, and I will return to it later.

The subject is present in the phantasy. And the function of the object, which is the object of desire only in the fact that it is a term of the phantasy the object takes the place, I would say of that of which the subject is symbolically deprived.

This may appear a little abstract to you. I mean, for those who have not gone through all the earlier stages of this path with us. Let us say for them that it is in so far as in the articulation of the phantasy the object takes the place of that of which the subject is deprived. Which is what? It is from the phallus that the object takes on this function that it

has in the phantasy, and that desire, with the phantasy as a support constitutes itself.

I think that it is difficult to go further to the extremes of what I mean concerning what we must call properly speaking desire and its relationship with the phantasy. It is in this sense, and in so far as this formula that the object of phantasy is this otherness image and pathos through which an other takes the place of what the subject is symbolically deprived, you see clearly that it is in this direction that this imaginary object finds itself in a way in a position of being able to condense in itself what can be called the virtues or the dimension of being, that it can become this veritable lure of being, which the object of human desire is; this something before which Simone Weil stops when she points out the most dense, the most opaque relationship which can be presented to us of man with the object of his desire, the relationship of the Miser with his moneybox in which there seems to culminate for us in the most obvious fashion this character of fetish which is that of the object of human desire, and which is also the character or one of the aspects of all his objects.

It is rather comical to see, as recently happened to me, a gentleman who came to explain to us the relationship between the theory of signification and Marxism, say that one cannot approach the theory of signification without taking interhuman relations as a starting point. This went rather far. Within three minutes we were learning that the signifier was the instrument thanks to which man transmitted to his neighbour his private thoughts - we were told this textually by someone whose authority was Marx. By not referring things to this foundation of interhuman relations we would fall it appears into the danger of fetishising what was in question in the domain of language.

Undoubtedly I am prepared to admit that in effect we must encounter something that is very like a fetish. But I ask myself whether this something which is called a fetish, is not precisely one of the very dimensions of the human world, and precisely the one that must be taken into account. If we see the whole thing being rooted in interhuman relations we end up with only one thing, which is to refer the fact of the fetishisation of human objects to some interhuman misunderstanding, which itself therefore supposes a reference back to significations. Just as the private thoughts that are in question - I think in a genetic way of thinking - are enough to make us smile, because if the private thoughts are there, what is the use of looking any further.

In brief it is rather surprising that this reference, not to human praxis, but to a human subjectivity given as essentially primitive, should be sustained in a doctrine which qualifies itself as Marxist, because it seems to me that it is enough to open the first volume of *Kapital* to see that the first step in Marx's analysis is very properly speaking, in connection with the fetish character of merchandise, to tackle the problem very exactly at the proper level and as such, even though the term as such is not mentioned, at the level of the signifier.

The signifying relationships, the relationships of value are given first, and all subjectivity, even that of fetishisation, come to be inscribed within this signifying dialectic. There is no shadow of doubt about this.

This is not a simple parenthesis, a reflection that I pour into your ears about my occasional indignations, and the annoyance I feel at having wasted my time.

Now let us try to make use of this relationship of \$ in the presence of o which for us is the phantastical support of desire. We must articulate it clearly, because this o this

imaginary other, what does that mean?

That means something fuller than what a person may include in it, a whole chain, a whole scenario. I do not need to return on this occasion to what last year I put forward here in connection with the analysis of Jean Genet's *Le Balcon*. It is enough to give a meaning to what I mean on this occasion to refer to what we can call the diffused *bordel* in so far as it becomes the cause of what we call the sacrosanct genital.....

What is important in this properly structural element of the imaginary phantasy in so far as it is situated at the level of o, is in part this opaque character, the one which specifies it in its most accentuated form as the pole of perverse desire, in other words what makes of it the structural element of perversions, and shows us then that perversion is characterised by the fact that the whole accent of the phantasy is put on the aspect of the properly imaginary correlative of the other, o, or of the parenthesis in which something which is o plus p plus q etc. - it is the whole combination of ; the most elaborated find themselves reunited here according to the adventure; the sequelae, the residues in which there has come to be crystallised the function of a phantasy in a perverse desire.

Nevertheless what is essential, and is this element of phenomenology to which I alluded above, is that you should recall that no matter how strange, how bizarre the phantasy of perverse desire may be in appearance, desire is always in some fashion involved in it. Involved in a relationship which is always linked to the pathetic, to the pain of existing as such, of purely existing, or of existing as a sexual term. It is obviously in the measure that the one who suffers injury in the sadistic phantasy is something which involves the subject in so far as he himself can be open to this injury that the sadistic phantasy subsists. And one can only say one thing about this dimension, which is that one cannot but be surprised that it has been thought possible to elude it for a single instant by making of the sadistic tendency something which in any way could be referred to a pure and simple primitive aggression.

I am dwelling a good deal on this subject. If I do so, it is only to properly accentuate something which is that towards which we must now articulate the veritable opposition between perversion and neurosis.

If perversion is then something well and truly articulated, and exactly at the same level, as you are going to see, as neurosis, something interpretable, analysable, in so far as in the imaginary elements something is discovered of an essential relationship of the subject to his being, in an essentially localised, fixed form as has always been said - neurosis is situated by putting an accent on the other term of the phantasy, namely at the level of the \$.

I told you that this phantasy as such is situated at the extreme, at the tip, at the level of the abutment of the reflection of subjective interrogation in so far as the subject attempts to grasp himself there in this beyond of the demand, in the very dimension of the discourse of the Other in which he has to rediscover what was lost by this entry into the discourse of the Other. I told you that in the final analysis it is not the level of truth, but the moment of truth that is in question.

This in effect essentially is what shows us, what allows us to designate what most profoundly distinguishes the phantasy of neurosis from the phantasy of perversion. The phantasy of perversion I told you, can be named, it is in space, it suspends some essential relationship or other. It is not properly speaking atemporal, it is outside time. The relationship of the subject to time in neurosis, is precisely something of which little is said,

and which is nevertheless the very basis of the relations of the subject to his object at the level of phantasy.

In neurosis the object is charged with this signification which is sought for in what I call the moment of truth. The object here is always at the moment before, or at the moment after. If hysteria is characterised by the foundation of a desire *qua*_unsatisfied, the obsessional is characterised by the function of an impossible desire. But what is beyond these two terms is something which is a double and inverse relationship in one case and the other with this phenomenon which blossoms, which emerges, which manifests itself in a permanent fashion in this procrastination of the obsessional for example, founded on the fact moreover that he always anticipates too late. Just as for the hysteric there is the fact that he always repeats what there was initially in his traumas, namely a certain too soon, a fundamental immaturity.

It is here because of this fact that the foundation of a neurotic behaviour, in its most general form, is that the subject always tries to read his moment in his object, and even as one might say that he learns to tell the time, it is at this point that we rediscover our Hamlet. You will see why Hamlet can be gratified, that he can take on at the whim of each all the forms of neurotic behaviour however far you push it, namely even character neurosis. But also, just as legitimately - for this there is a reason which runs right through the whole plot, and which constitutes really one of the common factors of the structure of Hamlet - just as the first term, the first factor was dependence with respect to desire of the other, to the desire of the mother, here is the second common character which I would now ask you to rediscover by reading or by re-reading *Hamlet*.

Hamlet is always suspended on the others time, and this up to the end.

Do you remember one of the first turning points that I stopped you at in the beginning in order to decipher the text of *Hamlet*, the one after the play scene, the scene of the players, in which the king was disturbed, visibly denounced himself in everybody's eyes in connection with what was produced on the stage, his own crime, because he could not tolerate the spectacle. Hamlet triumphs, exults, jeers at the one who has thus denounced himself; and on the way leading to the rendezvous already made, before the play scene, with his mother, and which everyone is encouraging his mother to have as quickly as possible; on the way to this meeting in which there is going to take place the major scene which I already accentuated so often, he encounters his step-father, Claudius, at prayer, Claudius shaken to his foundations by what has touched him by showing him the very face, the scenario of his action. Hamlet is there before his uncle who everything in the scene seems to indicate is even not only little disposed to defend himself, but does not even see the threat which hangs over his head, and he stops because it is not the time.

It is not the other's time. It is not the time that the other should have to give an account of himself before the eternal. It would be too good a thing on the one hand, or too bad on the other; this would not be enough to avenge his father, because perhaps in this gesture of repentance, of prayer, there would be opened up to him the way to salvation. In any case there is one thing certain: it is that Hamlet who has just made this capture of the king's conscience - 'Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king' - that he proposed for himself, stops short. He does not think for a single instant that his time is now. Whatever may happen afterwards, it is not the other's time and he suspends his gesture. In the same way it will always and ever be, everything that Hamlet does, he will only do it in the others time.

He accepts everything. Let us not forget all the same at the beginning, and in the disgust that he felt even before the encounter with the ghost, and the unveiling of the background to the crime, simply because of his mother's remarriage, he only thought of one thing, leaving for Wittenberg. This is what someone illustrated recently in order to comment on a certain practical style which tends to be establishing itself in contemporary mores. He pointed out that Hamlet was the finest example of the fact that one avoids a lot of trouble by providing passports in good time. If he had been given his passport for Wittenberg this drama would never have occurred.

It is in his parents' good time that he remains there. It is on the time of other people that he suspends his crime; it is in his step-father's time that he embarks for England; it is in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern's time that he is led, evidently with an ease which astonished Freud, to send them to their death thanks to a piece of trickery which is carried out very cleverly. And it is all the same in Ophelia's time also, at the time of her suicide, that this tragedy is going to come to a close at a moment when Hamlet, who has just discovered it seems that it is not difficult to kill someone, the time to say one..... He will not have the time to say ouch! And still there has just been announced to him something which does not seem to be at all an opportunity for killing Claudius. There has just been proposed to him a very fine tournament, all the details of which have been minutely minuted, prepared, and whose stakes are constituted by what we will call in the collector's sense of the term, a series of objects which all have the character of precious objects, of collectors' items. You should take up the text, there are even refinements in it, we are entering into the domain of collectors; it is a matter of swords, of carriages, of things which only have value as *de luxe* objects. And this is going to be the stake for a sort of joust in which Hamlet in fact provoked on the theme of a certain inferiority an advantage for which is accorded to him in the challenge. It is a complicated ceremony, a tournament which of course for us is the trap into which he must fall, which had been engineered by his step father and by his friend Laertes, but which for him, let us not forget is nothing other than once more accepting to play truant. Namely he is going to have a lot of fun.

Nevertheless he experiences in his heart a little warning. There is something in this which moves him. The dialectic of the presentiment of the hero's moment comes here for an instant to give its accent to the drama. But all the same, essentially, it is still at the moment of the other, and in a yet more striking fashion, to support the wager of the other - because it is not his goods that are engaged; it is for his step-father's benefit, and himself as representative of his step-father, that he will find himself getting into this courtly battle in principle with someone who is presumed to be a better fencer than he, and as such is going to give rise in him to sentiments of rivalry and honour thanks to which it has been calculated he is surely going to be caught.

He plunges therefore into the trap. I would say that what is new at that moment, is only the energy, the heart with which he plunges into it. Up to the final term, up to the last moment, up to the moment which is so determining that it is going to be his own moment, namely that he is going to be mortally wounded before he is able to kill his enemy, it is at the others time that the chain of the tragedy always continues and is accomplished. This is, in order to conceive of what is in question, an absolutely essential framework.

It is in this that the resonance of the character and the drama of Hamlet, is the very metaphysical resonance of the question of the modern hero, in so far as in effect something has changed for him in his relationship to his destiny.

As I told you, what distinguishes Hamlet from Oedipus, is that Hamlet knows. And

this moreover more than anything else explains, when we have taken it to this central point, what we have designated as being surface traits. For example Hamlet's madness. There are tragic heroes, in ancient tragedy who are mad, but as far as I know there are none - I mean in tragedy I am not talking about legendary texts - who act mad as such.

Could it not be said that everything in Hamlet's madness is resumed in acting mad? This is the question that we are now going to pose ourselves. But he acts mad because he knows he is the weaker one. And it is interesting to point this out - you see that however superficial it may be I now point it out - not because it takes us any further along our path, but only because it is secondary.

It is not however secondary in the following: we have to reflect on this; if we want to understand what Shakespeare wanted in *Hamlet*, the fact is that this is the essential trait of the original legend, which is in Saxo Grammaticus, and in Belieforest.

Shakespeare chose the subject of a hero who is constrained in order to follow the paths which will lead him to make his gesture to act mad. It is a properly modern dimension. The one who knows is in such a dangerous position as such, so marked out for failure and sacrifice, that he has to take the path as Pascal says somewhere, of being mad along with the others.

This fashion of acting mad is one of the teachings, one of the dimensions of what I could call the politics of the modern hero. It is something which deserves not be neglected if we think that it is what Shakespeare is gripped by at the moment that he wants to write the tragedy of *Hamlet*. What the authors offer him, is essentially that. And this is all that is in question, namely what has this madman got in the back of his head. That Shakespeare should have chosen his subject from within this is an absolutely essential point.

We have now arrived at the point at which Ophelia has to fulfill her role. If the play contains everything that I have already developed for you in its structure, what after all is the good of this character Ophelia.

I recall that some people have reproached me for having advanced only with a certain timidity. I do not think I have demonstrated an exceptional timidity. I would not like to encourage you towards these foolish utterances which literally swarm in psychoanalytic texts. I am only astonished that it has not been written that Ophelia is *ho phallos*, because we find things which are just as gross and just as striking, by people who do not have bats in the belfry, simply by opening the unfinished paper on *Hamlet* which Ella Sharpe has perhaps regrettably left unfinished before her death, and which perhaps it was a mistake to publish.

But Ophelia is obviously essential. She corresponds to that, and is linked throughout the centuries to the figure of Hamlet.

I would simply like, because it is rather late for me to finish with Ophelia today, to punctuate for you what happens throughout the play. We hear Ophelia first spoken of as the cause of Hamlet's unhappy state. This is the psychoanalytic wisdom of Polonius. If he is sad, it is because he is not happy; if he is not happy, it is because of my daughter. You do not know her; she is the peak of perfection, and of course, I her father would not tolerate that.

We see her appearing in connection with something which already makes of her a

very remarkable person, namely in connection with a clinical observation, and she was the one who had the good fortune to be the first person that Hamlet met after the encounter with the ghost. Namely that scarcely had he emerged from this encounter in which all the same some rather upsetting things had occurred, when he met Ophelia. And the way in which he behaved with Ophelia is something which I believe is worth reporting.

My lord, as I was sewing in my closet.
 Lord Hamlet, with his doublet all unbraced.
 No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled,
 Ungartered and down-gyved to his ankle.
 Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other.
 And with a look so piteous in purport
 As if he had been loosed out of Hell
 To speak of horrors he comes before me.....

He took me by the wrist and held me hard.
 Then goes he to the length of all his arm.
 And with his other hand thus o'er his brow
 He falls to such perusal of my face
 As he would draw it. Long stayed he so.
 At last, a little shaking of mine arm.
 And thrice his head thus waving up and down.
 He raised a sigh so piteous and profound
 As it did seem to shatter all his bulk
 And end his being. That done, he lets me go.
 And with his head over his shoulder turned,
 He seemed to find his way without his eyes;
 For out o' doors he went without their helps.
 And to the last bended their light on me. (II i 75)

So Polonius immediately cries: 'It's love!'

This observation, and I think this interrogation, this distance taken from the object as if to carry out some sort of identification which is now difficult, this vacillation in the presence of what up to now had been the very object of exaltation, is something which gives us the first phase, estrangement as one might call it.

We cannot say any more about it. Nevertheless I believe that up to a certain point we are not forcing things in designating what is happening at that moment as properly pathological, testifying as it does to a great disorder of Hamlet in his dress, and making it similar to one of these periods of eruption, of subjective disorganisation of one kind or another. It happens in so far as something vacillates in the phantasy, allows its components to appear, allows them to appear and be received as something which manifests itself in the symptoms as what is called an experience of depersonalisation, and which is that by which the imaginary limits between the subject and the object find there to be changed, in the proper sense of the term the order of what is called the phantastical.

It is properly when something in the imaginary structure of the phantasy manages to join up, to communicate with that which arrives much more easily at the level of the message, namely that which comes from below, at this point here which is the image of the other in so far as this image of the other is my ego. This is the way in which authors like Federn [Fairbairn?] mark with a great deal of finesse the necessary correlation between the

sentiment of one's own body and the strangeness of what happens in a certain crisis, in a certain rupture, in a certain attack on the object as such and at a specific level which we find here.

Perhaps I was forcing things a little in order to interest you, in order to show you the way these things link up with elective experiences of our clinical work. We will no doubt come back to it. You can however be sure that it is impossible in any case, without this reference to this pathological schema, to this drama, to properly situate what was put forward for the first time by Freud at the analytic level under the name of Φ . It is not linked, as some have thought, to all sorts of eruptions from the unconscious. It is linked to this sort of disequilibrium which is produced in the phantasy, and in so far as the phantasy, breaking through the limits which are first of all assigned to it, is decomposed and comes to rediscover that by which it rejoins the image of the other. In fact this is only a hint.

In the case of Hamlet we find afterwards something in which Ophelia is completely dissolved *qua* love-object. 'I did love you once', says Hamlet (III i 116). And things happen in his relations with Ophelia in this style of cruel aggression, of sarcasm pushed to such an extreme which makes of it one of the not least strange scenes in the whole of classical literature.

Because if this note has been struck in really extreme plays, in something which is situated with this really central aspect in the middle of the tragic scene of the *Hamlet* play, a scene like that which takes place between Hamlet and Ophelia is not a banal scene.

That is what characterises this attitude in which we find the trace of what I was indicating above as the disequilibrium of the phantastical relations in so far as it tilts towards the perverse aspect of the object. It is one of the traits of this relationship. Another of the traits, is that the object in question, is no longer treated as she should be, as a woman. She becomes for him the bearer of children and of every sin, the one who is designated to engender sinners, and the one who is designated afterwards as having to succumb to all sorts of calumnies. She becomes the pure and simple support of a life which in its essence becomes condemned for Hamlet. In short, what is produced at that moment, is this destruction or loss of the object which is reintegrated into its narcissistic framework. For the subject it appears as I might say outside; what it is equivalent to according to the formula that I used above, what it takes the place of, and what cannot be given to the subject except at the moment when literally he sacrifices himself when he is no longer it himself, when he rejects it with all his being, is indeed and uniquely the phallus.

If Ophelia is at that moment the phallus, it is because of this, and in so far as here the subject exteriorizes the phallus *qua* signifying symbol of life and as such rejects it. This is the second phase of the relation to the object.

Since time is passing I feel a bit scrupulous about giving you all the coordinates, and I will come back to it.

That it is indeed this that is in question, namely a transformation of the formula $S \diamond \Phi$ (Φ the phallus) and in the form of rejection, this is demonstrated once you have glimpsed by means of something that is quite different to the etymology of Ophelia. First of all because it is not only that that is in question, namely fecundity. Conception is a blessing says Hamlet to Polonius but look to your daughter. (II ii 185) And the whole dialogue with Ophelia is indeed about woman conceived here uniquely as the bearer of this vital tumescence which it is a question of cursing and putting an end to. A nunnery could just as

well at the time designate a brothel. Semantic usage shows it.

On the other hand the attitude of Hamlet to Ophelia in the play scene is also something in which there is designated this relation between the phallus and the object. Here because he is in front of his mother, and expressly in so far as he is in front of his mother, telling her that here there is a metal which attracts me more than you, he is going to place his head between Ophelia's legs: 'Lady shall I lie in your lap?' expressly asking it of her. (III ii 117,119)

The phallic relationship of the object of desire is also clearly indicated at that level, and I do not think either that it is superfluous to point out, because iconography has made so much of it, that among the flowers with which Ophelia is going to drown, there is expressly mentioned that the 'dead-men's-fingers' that are in question are designated in a more or less vulgar fashion by the common people.(IV vii 172) The plant in question is the *orchie mascula*. It is a question of something which has some relationship with the mandrake which means that this has some relationship with the phallic element. I looked for this in the *New English Dictionary* but I was very disappointed because even though it is quoted in the references to the term finger, there is no allusion to what Shakespeare alludes to by this appellation.

The third phase is the one to which I have led you on several occasions and on which I am going once more to leave you, the phase of the graveyard scene. Namely the link in operation between something which is posed as a reintegration of o and the final possibility for Hamlet of looping the loop, namely of finally precipitating himself towards his destiny.

This third phase, in so far as it is entirely gratuitous, absolutely capital because this whole graveyard scene is composed in order that this something should happen which Shakespeare found nowhere else, this sort of furious fight at the bottom of a grave upon which I insisted; this designation as it were of a point of the function of the object as being here reconquered only at the price of mourning and of death, it is on this that I think finally I will be able to finish the next time.

Seminar 18: Wednesday 22 April 1959

Hamlet, as we have said, cannot endure rendezvous. The rendezvous is always too soon for him, and he postpones it. This element of procrastination cannot, in any way - even though certain authors in a literature which I have explored more and more, in the course of this study - be set aside. Procrastination remains one of the essential dimensions of the tragedy of *Hamlet*.

When, on the other hand, he acts, it is always precipitously. He acts when all of a sudden it seems that an occasion presents itself, when some call or other of the event beyond himself, of his resolution, of his decision, seems to present to him some ambiguous opening or other which is properly for us analysts what has introduced into the dimension of performance this perspective which we call flight (*la fuite*).

Nothing is clearer than the moment when he precipitates himself on something which moves behind the arras, when he kills Polonius. And other moments also, the quasi-mysterious fashion, I would say almost in a dissociated state, when he wakes up at night on this boat in a storm, and checks out the messages, breaks the seal of the message that Guildenstern and Rosencrantz are the bearers of, and also the quasi-automatic fashion in which he substitutes one message for another, restores the royal seal with his ring, and is going also to meet this extraordinary chance of being taken by pirates and parting company with his guards who no doubt will go to their own execution.

We have here something of a real phenomenology, because we must call things by their name, whose easily recognisable accent we all know, since it is almost familiar in our experience, as well as in our conceptions, in relation to the life of the neurotic.

This is what I tried to get you to see the last time beyond these very tangible characteristics, in this structural reference which runs right through the play: Hamlet always keeps to the time of the Other. Of course this is only a mirage, because the time of the Other - this too is what I explained to you when I described the final response in this signifier of the Other as barred; there is I told you no Other of the Other. There is in the signifier itself no guarantee of the truth dimension established by the signifier. It has only its own time. And there is also then only one time, it is the time of his destruction. And the whole tragedy of *Hamlet* is to show us the implacable journeying of Hamlet toward this time.

What specifies his destiny, what gives it its highly problematical value, is what then? Because this rendezvous with the moment of his destruction is not just the common lot which is significant for every human destiny. The fatality of Hamlet has a particular sign because otherwise it would not have for us this eminent value. Here then is where we are. This is where we had got to at the end of our discourse the last time.

What does Hamlet lack? And up to what point does the plan of the tragedy of *Hamlet* as Shakespeare composed it allow an articulation, a mapping-out of this lack which will go beyond the approximations that we are always satisfied with, and which also,

because we content ourselves with their approximate character, also give the vagueness, not only of our language, of our behaviour, of our suggestions - it has to be said - when we are dealing with patients.

Let us begin all the same with this approximation that is in question. It can be said, that what is lacking at every moment, in the case of Hamlet, is what we could call in a communicable language, in everyday language, this sort of fixation on a goal, of an object in his action, which always involves some degree of what is called arbitrariness.

Hamlet, as we have seen, we have even begun to explore why, is someone who, as women say, does not know what he wants. And in a way this sort of first dimension is presented by him, in the discourse that Shakespeare makes him hold. It is presentified at a certain turning point which is moreover very significant. It is the turning point of his eclipse in his tragedy. I mean for the short while that he is not there, when he is going to take this sea voyage from which he comes back extremely quickly, after scarcely having left port, when he, always obedient, is going to make this journey towards England on the orders of the king. He meets the troops of Fortinbras who is evoked from the beginning in the background of the tragedy, and who at the end comes to clean things up on the stage, collect the dead, put the damage in order. And here is how our Hamlet speaks about Fortinbras. He is struck by the sight of these valiant troops who are going to conquer a few acres of Poland in the name of some more or less stupid warlike pretext which gives him an opportunity to reflect on himself.

How all occasions do inform against me
 And spur my dull revenge!
 What is a man If his chief good and market of his time
 Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.
 Sure, He that made us with such large discourse.
 Looking before and after, gave us not
 That capability and godlike reason
 To fust in us unused. (IV iv 32)

What the translator transcribes as *la raison*, is the great discourse, the fundamental discourse, what I would call here concrete discourse. 'Looking before and after, gave us not that capability and god-like reason....'

Here the word *raison* is in its rightful place. God has surely not given us this divine gift for it to rust in us for lack of use. 'Now', says our Hamlet 'whether it be bestial oblivion'. Bestial oblivion is one of the key words of the dimension of his being in the tragedy -

.... or some craven scruple
 Of thinking too precisely on the event –
 A thought which, quartered, hath but one part wisdom
 And ever three parts coward – I do not know
 Why yet I live to say 'This thing's to do,'
 Sith I have cause, and will, and strength, and means
 To do 't. Examples gross as earth exhort me.
 Witness this army, of such mass and charge.
 Led by a delicate and tender prince
 Whose spirit with divine ambition puffed
 Makes mouths at the invisible event.

Exposing what is mortal and unsure
 To all that fortune, death, and danger dare.
 Even for an eggshell. Rightly to be great
 Is not to stir without great argument.
 But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
 And honours at the stake. How stand I then.
 That have a father killed, a mother stained.
 Excitements of my reason and my blood.
 And let all sleep while to my shame I see
 The imminent death of twenty thousand men
 That for a fantasy and trick of fame
 Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
 Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause.
 Which is not tomb enough and continent
 To hide the slain? Oh, from this time forth.
 My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth! (IV iv 30)

Such is Hamlet's meditation on what I would call the object of human action. This object which here leaves the door open to what I would call all the particularities on which we dwell. We shall call this oblativity: spilling ones blood for a noble cause, honour. Honour is also mentioned: to be committed by ones word. We shall call this the gift. *Qua* analysts effectively we cannot fail to encounter this concrete determination, not be gripped by their weight, whether it is of flesh or of commitment.

What I am trying to show you here is something which is not simply a common form, the lowest common denominator, of all that. It is not just a question of a position, of an articulation which could be characterised as a formalism. When I write the formula $\$ \diamond o$ put at the end of this question that the subject poses in the Other, which being addressed to him is called the 'What do you want?', this question which is the in which the subject is looking for his final word, and which has no chance, outside the exploration of the unconscious chain in so far as it travels around the circuit of the upper signifying chain, but which is not, outside the special conditions that we call analytical, something which can effectively be opened up to investigation without this help of the unconscious chain in so far as it has been uncovered by the analyst, by the Freudian experience.

What we are dealing with, is this something to which there can accord, in an imaginary short circuit, in the relationship half-way between this circuit of desire and what is opposite it, namely the phantasy and the structure of the phantasy, its general structure is what I express, namely a certain relationship of the subject to the signifier, this is what is expressed by the $\$$, it is the subject in so far as he is irreducibly affected by the signifier, with all the consequences that this involves, in a certain specific relationship with a certain circumstance which is imaginary in its essence, o , not the object of desire, but the object in desire.

It is this function of the object in desire that we must now approach, since it is because the tragedy of *Hamlet* allows us to articulate it in an exemplary fashion that we devote this insistent interest to the structure of Shakespeare's work.

Let us get closer. $\$ \diamond o$ as such signifies the following: it is in so far as the subject is deprived of something of himself which took on the value of signifier by its very alienation. This something is the phallus. It is therefore in so far as the subject is deprived of

something which belongs to his very life, because this took on the value of what attaches him to the signifier; it is in so far as it is in this position that a particular object becomes object of desire.

To be an object of desire is something essentially different from being an object of any need. It is this subsistence of the object as such, of the object in desire, in time, that it has taken the place of what to the subject remains masked by its very nature. This sacrifice of himself, this pound of flesh engaged in its relationship to the signifier, it is because something comes to take the place of that, that this something becomes object in desire.

And this is so profoundly enigmatic because it is fundamentally a relationship to the hidden, to the occulted, it is because it is thus, it is because - if you will allow me a formula which is one of the ones I have written in my notes, and which comes back to me here but do not make of it a doctrinal formula, take it at most as an image - it is in so far as human life might be defined as a calculation whose zero is irrational. This formula is only a mathematical metaphor, and you have to give here to the irrational its mathematical meaning. I am not alluding here to some unplumbable affective state or other, but to something which manifests itself at the very interior of mathematics in a form equivalent to what is called an imaginary number which is the square root of minus one. Because there is something which does not correspond to anything that can be intuited, and whose full function must nevertheless be maintained. It is this relationship I say of the object to this hidden element of the living support, of the subject in so far as in taking on the function of the signifier he cannot be subjectivated as such.

It is because this is the way things are that this structure, in the same way, in the same relationship that we are with the root of minus one which is something that in itself does not correspond to anything real also in the mathematical sense of the term It is precisely also because of this that we can grasp the veritable function of the object only by going around a series of its possible relationships with ϕ , namely with the S which, at the precise point where the ϕ takes on the maximum of value, cannot but be occulted.

And it is precisely this tour of the functions of the object – it would be a lot to say, that the tragedy of Hamlet takes us completely around it; but undoubtedly in any case it allows us to go much further than has ever been gone along any other path.

Let us begin from the end, from the point of encounter, the time of the rendezvous, from this act where, when all is said and done - you should take carefully into account that the terminal act, the one in which he finally throws, as a price for his completed action, the whole weight of his life, this act deserves to be called an act that he activates and that he undergoes. There is indeed about this act an aspect of being in at the death. At the moment that his gesture is performed he is also the hart of Diana at bay. He is the one around whom there tightens the conspiracy that has been hatched, I do not know if you are aware of it, with an incredible cynicism and wickedness, between Claudius and Laertes, whatever may be the reasons each one of them has, there being also implicated in it probably this sort of tarantula, this ridiculous courtier who comes to propose to him the tournament in which the conspiracy is concealed.

This is the structure. It is extremely clear. The tournament which is proposed to him puts him in the position of being another's champion. I already insisted on that. He is the representative of the bet, of the wager, of his uncle and step-father Claudius. There happens something which I insisted on already the last time. Namely as regards the stakes, the objects, ϕ , which are characterised there with all their *éclat*, namely that like any object and

any stake they are essentially at first in the world of human desire characterised by what the religious tradition, in exemplary representations, teaches us to name as a *vanitas*, a sort of finely worked tapestry. It is the accumulation of all these precious objects which are there and placed in the balance over against death.

He has wagered six Barbary horses with Laertes against which this other has put in the balance six French rapiers and poniards; namely all the trappings of a dueller, with everything that is related to it, with what is used to wear them, their scabbards I think. And in particular there are three which have what the text calls carriages. This word carriage is a particularly precious way of expressing a sort of buckle on which the sword is supposed to hang. It is a collector's word, which causes an ambiguity with the gun carriage, so that there takes place a whole dialogue between Hamlet and the person who comes to bring him the conditions of the tournament. Throughout a fairly long dialogue everything is done to display before your eyes the quality, the number, the panoply of the objects, giving all its accent to this sort of test whose paradoxical, even absurd character I pointed out to you, this tournament which has been proposed to Hamlet.

And nevertheless Hamlet seems once more to stick his neck out as if nothing in him can oppose in short a sort of fundamental availability. His response is quite significant.

Sir, I will walk here in the hall. If it please His Majesty, it is the breathing-time of day with me.

Let the foils be brought, the gentleman willing, and the King hold his purpose, I will win for him an I can.

If not, I will gain nothing but my shame and the odd hits (V ii 179).

Here therefore is something which in the final act, shows us the very structure of the phantasy. At the moment that he is at the point of his resolution, indeed as always just on the eve of his resolution, here he is hiring himself literally to another and again for nothing, again in the most gratuitous fashion, this other being precisely his enemy, and the one whom he should kill. And this he puts in the balance against these worldly things, first of all which scarcely interest him, namely at that moment it is not all these collectors' items which are his major worry, but that he is going to try to win for another.

No doubt at the stage below there is something with which the others think they are going to captivate him, and to which of course he is not completely indifferent, not as the others think, but all the same on the same plane as the others are situated, namely that he is interested in honour, namely at a level of what Hegel calls the struggle for pure prestige, interested from the point of view of honour in something which is going to oppose him to a rival whom on the other hand he admires.

And we cannot fail to dwell for a moment on the sureness of the connection which is put here, put forward by Shakespeare. You will recognise in it something which is already long-standing in our discourse, in our dialogue, namely the mirror stage. That Laertes at this level is his counterpart, is something which is expressly articulated in the text. It is articulated in an indirect fashion, I mean within a parody. It is when he replies to this very stupid courtier called Osric, who has come to propose the duel to him, by beginning to display before his eyes the eminent quality of the one to whom he will have to show his merit. He cuts him short by doing still better than him. 'Sir, his definement suffers no perdition in you, though I know to divide him inventorially would dizzy the arithmetic of memory, and yet but yaw neither, in respect of his quick sail.' It is an extremely precious, very finely spun discourse that he pursues, which parodies in a way the style of

his interlocutor, and which he concludes by saying: 'I take him to be a soul of great article, and his infusion of such dearth and rareness as, to make true diction of him, his semblable is his mirror, and who else would trace him, his umbrage - nothing more'.(V ii 117)

In brief, the reference to the image of the other, as being that which cannot but completely absorb the one who contemplates it, is here, in connection with the merits of Laertes, certainly presented inflated in a very over elaborate, conceited way, is something which has all its value at that moment. All the more since, as you are going to see, it is with this attitude that Hamlet is going to approach Laertes before the duel. It is on this footing that he approaches him and it only becomes more significant that it is at this paroxysm of imaginary absorption formally articulated as a specular relationship, a mirror reaction, that it is here there is also situated by the playwright the manifest point of aggressivity.

The person you most admire is the one that you fight. The one who is the ego-ideal, is also, according to the Hegelian formula of the impossibility of co-existences, the one you must kill.

This Hamlet only does on a level that we must describe as disinterested, the level of the tournament. He commits himself to it, in a fashion which we can qualify as formal, even as fictitious. It is without his knowledge that he enters in reality all the same into the most serious game.

What does that mean? That means that he has not entered into it, let us say with his phallus. That means that what presents itself for him in this aggressive relationship, is a lure, is a mirage, that it is despite himself that he is going to lose his life in it, that it is without knowing it that he is going precisely at that moment, at once to encounter the accomplishment of his act and of his own death which is going to coincide with it to the nearest instant.

He has not entered into it with his phallus, is a way of expressing what we are trying to seek, namely where the lack is, where the particularity of this position of the subject Hamlet is in the drama.

He has all the same entered into it, because if the foils have their tips covered, that is only part of the lure. In reality there is at least one which is not covered, which at the moment of the distribution of foils is already in advance carefully marked in order to be given to Laertes. This one has a real point, and what is more it is a poisoned point.

What is striking, is that here the lack of constraint of this screen writer rejoins what can be called the formidable intuition of the dramatist. I mean that he does not trouble himself too much to explain to us that this poisoned weapon is going to pass in the fight, God knows how, - this must be one of the difficulties of production - from the hand of one of the adversaries into the hand of the other. You know that it is in the sort of hand-to-hand in which they grapple after Laertes had delivered the blow from which Hamlet cannot recover, and from which he must perish. In a few moments it happens that this same point is in the hands of Hamlet. Nobody has gone to any trouble to explain such an astonishing incident during the session. Nobody in fact has to worry himself in the slightest. Because what is in question is precisely this and it is to show that here the instrument of death, on this occasion the most veiled instrument of the drama, the one that Hamlet can only receive from the other, the instrument which causes death, is something which is elsewhere than what is here materially representable.

Here one cannot fail to be struck by something which is literally in the text. It is clear that what I am in the process of telling you, is that beyond this parade of the tournament of the rivalry with the one who is his most beautiful counterpart, the myself that he can love, beyond this there is played out the drama of the accomplishment of Hamlet's desire, beyond this there is the phallus.

And when all is said and done, it is in this encounter with the other that Hamlet is going to identify himself with the fatal signifier. Well then, it is a very curious thing, it is in the text. There is talk of foils at the moment of distributing them: 'Give them the foils young Osric. Cousin Hamlet, you know the wager?' And earlier Hamlet says 'Give us the foils'. Between these two terms where there is question of foils, Hamlet makes a play on words: 'I'll be your foil, Laertes. In mine ignorance your skill shall, like a star in the darkest night, stick firey off indeed' (V ii 266). Foil means *fleuret* in the context. Here foil cannot have this meaning, and it has a meaning that is perfectly locatable, it is a meaning that is well attested at the epoch, even rather frequently used. It is the sense in which foil, which is the same word as the French word *feuille* in old French, is used in a precious form to designate the leaf in which something precious is carried, namely a jewel case. Here it is used to say: Here I am only going to be something to highlight your star like brilliance in the blackness of the sky by fighting with you.

Moreover these are the very conditions in which the duel is engaged; namely that Hamlet has no chance of winning, that he will have done well enough if the other takes only three points in twelve against him. The wager is engaged at nine against twelve, namely that Hamlet is given a handicap.

I would say that in this play on the word *foil* we legitimately find something which is included in the underpinnings of the pun.... I mean that it is one of Hamlet's functions to be all the time playing on words, punning, making *double entendre*'s, playing on the equivocal. This play on words is not there by chance. When he tells him, I will be your *écrin* [jewel-case], he is using the same word, he makes a play on words with what is at stake at that moment, namely the distribution of foils. And very precisely in Hamlet's pun there is when all is said and done this identification of the subject to the fatal phallus in so far as it is present here.

He says to him, I will be your *écrin* so that your merits may shine, but what is going to come, in a moment, is well and truly Laertes rapier, in so far as this rapier is the one which has wounded Hamlet to death, but is also the same one that he will himself find in his hand in order to finish his journey and to kill at the same time, both his adversary, and the one who is the final object of his mission, namely the king whom he must destroy immediately afterwards.

This verbal reference, this play on the signifier is certainly not there by chance. It is legitimate to bring it into play. It is not in effect an accident in the text. One of the dimensions in which *Hamlet* is presented, and its texture, is in effect this one throughout the text:

Shakespeare, - and this just by itself would deserve a development You see playing an essential role in it these different characters who are called clowns, whether they are called the court fools, who are those who, having a right to speak frankly, can allow themselves to unveil the most secret motives, the character traits of people which politeness does not allow to be approached directly. It is something which is not simply cynicism, and a more or less insulting style of discourse; it is essentially by way of equivocation, by

metaphor, by playing on words, by a certain usage of *conceits*, of a precious style of speaking, of these substitutions of signifiers whose essential function I insisted on here. They give to the whole of Shakespeare's theatre a style, a colour, which is absolutely characteristic of his style, and which essentially creates its psychological dimension.

The fact that Hamlet is a character who is more agonising than any other one should not dissimulate from us that the tragedy of Hamlet is the tragedy which from a certain point of view, literally, brings this fool, this clown, this player on words down to zero. If for some reason one had to remove this dimension of Hamlet from Shakespeare's play, more than four fifths of the play would disappear as someone has remarked.

One of the dimensions in which the tension of *Hamlet* is accomplished, is this perpetual equivocation, the one which is in a way dissimulated from us, by what I could call the mask or the appearance of the affair. I mean, that which is played out between Claudius, the tyrant, the usurper, and the murderer, Hamlet. That is to say the unmasking of Hamlet's tensions, namely why he acts mad. But what must not be forgotten, is the way in which he acts mad; this style which gives to his discourse this quasi-maniacal aspect; this style of catching ideas on the wing, the opportunities for equivocation, the opportunities to make shine for a moment before his adversaries this sort of flash of meaning.

In this regard there are in the play, texts in which they themselves begin to construct, even to plot. This strikes them not as something discordant, but as something strange which they see as being especially pertinent. It is in this game, which is not just a game of dissimulation, but a *jeu d'esprit*, a game which is established at the level of signifiers, in the dimension of meaning, that there belongs what can be called the very spirit of the play.

It is within this ambiguous disposition which makes of all Hamlet's remarks, and at the same time of the reaction of those around him, a problem in which the spectator himself, the listener, is lost and continually questions himself, it is there that the base must be situated, the plane on which the play *Hamlet* takes on its import.

I am recalling it here only to indicate to you that there is nothing either arbitrary or excessive in giving all its weight to this little play on the word *foil*.

Here then is what is characteristic of the constellation in which the final act is established: the duel between Hamlet and the one who here is a sort of counterpart or double more beautiful than himself. We have insisted on this element, i(o), which is in a way at the lower level of our schema, which is found by Hamlet to be remodelled for an instant that he for whom no man or woman is anything more than an inconsistent and putrid shadow finds here a rival who is in his own class. Let us say it, this remodelled counterpart, the one who is going to allow him at least for a moment to sustain in his presence the human wager of being himself also a man, this remodelling is only a consequence, it is not a starting point. I mean that it is the consequence of that which is manifest in the situation, namely the position of the subject in the presence of the other as object of desire, the immanent presence of the phallus which can only appear here in its formal function with the subject's own disappearance. What makes possible the fact that the subject himself succumbs before even taking it in hand in order to become himself the murderer?

We return once more to our crossroads. This very singular crossroads of which I have spoken, whose essential character in *Hamlet* I have marked: namely what happens in

the graveyard; namely something which ought to greatly interest one of our colleagues who in his work happens to have treated eminently well both jealousy and mourning. This something which is one of the most striking points of this tragedy: the jealousy of mourning.

Because I would ask you to refer to this act with which the graveyard scene ends. The one to which I led you three times in the course of my exposition. Namely the following which is absolutely characteristic: it is that Hamlet cannot tolerate parade or ostentation, and he articulates as such what is intolerable in the attitude of Laertes at the moment of his sisters burial. This ostentatious mourning in his partner, this is the very thing by which he finds himself torn away from himself, upset, shaken to his foundations to the point of not being able to tolerate it as such.

And the first rivalry, this one much more authentic - because if it is with all the apparatus of courtliness and with a covered foil that Hamlet approaches the duel, it is at Laertes throat that he leaps in the hole into which the body of Ophelia has just been lowered, to tell him:

Swounds, show me what thou'lt do.
 Woo't weep? Woo't fight? Woo't fast? Woo't tear thyself?
 Woo't drink up eisel? Eat a crocodile?
 I'll do't. Dost thou come here to whine?
 To outface me with leaping in her grave?
 Be buried quick with her, and so will I.
 And if thou prate of mountains, let them throw
 Millions of acres on us, till our ground,
 Singeing his pate against the burning zone,
 Make Ossa like a wart! Nay, an thou'lt mouth
 I'll rant as well as thou. (V i 297)

And everybody is scandalised by this, and hurries to separate these enemy brothers who are trying to strangle one another. And Hamlet again makes one of these remarks speaking to his partner: 'What is the reason that you use me thus? I loved you ever. But it is no matter, let Hercules himself do what he may, the cat will mew and the dog will have his day'(V i 313). Which is moreover a proverbial element which here seems to me to take on all its value from certain *rapprochments* that some of you may be making. But I cannot delay on this.

The essential thing is that when he is talking to Horatio he explains to him: '... the bravery of his grief did put me into a towering passion' (V ii 78). Here we are brought to the heart of something which is going to open up a whole problematic for us.

What relationship is there between what we have brought forward in the form of *p O* o, concerning the constitution of the object in desire, and mourning? Let us observe the following: let us approach by its most manifest characteristics which may also appear the furthest from the centre of what we are here searching for, what is presented to us.

Hamlet has behaved towards Ophelia in the most contemptible and cruel fashion. I insisted on the character of devaluating aggression, of humiliation ceaselessly imposed on this person who has suddenly become the very symbol of the rejection as such of his desire. We cannot fail to be struck by something which for us completes once more, in another form, in another trait, the structure for *Hamlet*. It is that suddenly this object is going to take

on again for him its presence, its value. He declares: 'I loved Ophelia. Forty thousand brothers could not, with all their quantity of love, make up my sum. What wilt thou do for her?' (V i 292)

It is in these terms that there begins the challenge addressed to Laertes. It is in a way in the measure that the object of his desire has become an impossible object that it becomes for him once again the object of his desire. Once again we believe that we have found here a familiar detour, namely one of the characteristics of the desire of the obsessional. Let us not stop too quickly at these over-obvious appearances. For the obsessional, it is not so much the fact that the object of his desire is impossible which characterises him, even though by the very structure of the foundations of desire there is always this note of impossibility in the object of desire. What characterises it, is not then that the object of his desire is impossible, because it would then only be, and through this trait in this case only one of the especially manifest forms of an aspect of human desire, it is that the obsessional puts the accent on the encounter with this impossibility.

In other words, he arranges things so that this object of his desire takes on the essential value of a signifier of this impossibility. This is one of the notes through which we can already approach this form. But there is something more profound which solicits us.

Mourning is something that our theory, that our tradition, that the Freudian formulae have already taught us to formulate in terms of object-relation. Can we fail from a certain point of view to be struck by the fact that from the time psychologists began to think, it was Freud who highlighted the object of mourning for the first time.

The object of mourning is in a certain relationship of identification, which he tried to define more closely, by calling it a relationship of incorporation with the subject, that it takes on its import, that there are grouped together, that there are organised, the manifestations of mourning. So, are we not able to try, to re-articulate more closely, in the vocabulary which we have learned to handle here, what this identification of mourning may be? What is the function of mourning?

If we advance along this path we are going to see, and uniquely in function of the symbolic apparatuses that we employ in this exploration, appearing from the function of mourning consequences which I think are new, and eminently suggestive for you. I mean destined to open up to you glimpses which are efficacious and fruitful to which you cannot gain access by another path.

The question of what identification is should be clarified from the categories which I have been putting forward here before you for years; namely those of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real.

What is this incorporation of the lost object? In what does the work of mourning consist? We remain in a state of vagueness, which explains the blockage of any speculation around this path which nevertheless was opened up by Freud about mourning and melancholia, because of the fact that the question is not appropriately articulated. Let us stick with the first, most obvious aspect of the experience of mourning. The subject is plunged into the vertigo of suffering, and finds himself in a certain relationship, here in some way illustrated in the most manifest fashion by what we see happening in the graveyard scene, Laertes leaps into the grave, and the fact that he embraces, beside himself, the object whose disappearance is the cause of this suffering, which makes of it in time, at the point of this branching off, in the most obvious fashion, a sort of existence which is all

the more absolute in that it no longer corresponds to anything at all.

In other words, the hole in the real provoked by a loss, a real loss, this sort of unbearable loss for the human being, which provokes mourning in him, is found in the real, is found by that very function in this relationship which is the inverse of the one that I put forward before you under the name of *Verwerfung*.

Just as what is rejected in the symbolic reappears in the real, that these formulae should be taken in the literal sense, likewise the *Verwerfung*, the hole of the loss in the real of something which is properly speaking the intolerable dimension presented to human experience which is, not the experience of one's own death, which nobody has, but that of the death of someone else, who is for us an essential being.

This is a hole in the real, it is found in the real, and because of this fact is found, and because of the same correspondence which in the one that I articulated in the *Verwerfung*, to offer the place where there is projected precisely this missing signifier, this essential signifier, o, as such, in the structure of the Other, this signifier whose accent makes the Other powerless to give you your response. This signifier which you cannot pay for except with your flesh and your blood, this signifier which is essentially the phallus under the veil.

It is because this signifier finds its place there, and at the same time cannot find it, because this signifier cannot be articulated at the level of the Other, that there come, as in psychosis - and this is the way in which mourning is like psychosis - to proliferate instead of it all the images that the phenomena of mourning give rise to, the phenomena in the foreground being those through which there is manifested not one or other particular madness, but one of the most essential collective madresses of the human community as such, namely that which is put here in the forefront, given pride of place in the tragedy of Hamlet, namely the ghost, the *fantome*, this image which can surprise the soul of each and every one of us.

If with respect to the dead person, the one who had just died, something has not been performed which are called rites: rites destined when all is said and done for what? What are funeral rites? The rites through which we satisfy what is called the memory of the dead person, what are they if not the total, massive intervention from earth to heaven of the whole symbolic operation. I would like to have the time to do some seminars with you on this subject of funeral rites by way of ethnological investigation. I remember, it is many years ago, spending some time on a book which is a really admirable illustration of this, and which takes on all its exemplary value for us, because it comes from a civilisation distant enough from our own for the features of this function to appear really in a striking way.

It is the *Li Ki*, one of the sacred Chinese books. The macrocosmic character of funeral rites, namely the fact that in effect there is nothing which can fill with signifier this hole in the real, except the totality of the signifier, the work accomplished at a level of the *logos* - I say this in order not to say at the level of the group or of the community (naturally it is the group and the community *qua* culturally signified that are its supports) - the work of mourning presents itself in the first place as a satisfaction made to what is produced in terms of disorder because of the insufficiency of all the signifying elements to face up to the hole created in existence by the total bringing into play of the whole signifying system for the least bereavement (*deuil*).

And this is what explains to us that all the beliefs of folklore essentially set up the

closest relationship between the fact that something was lacking, elided, or refused in terms of this satisfaction to the dead person, and the fact that there are produced these phenomena which correspond to the ascendancy, to the coming into play, to the putting into operation of ghosts and of the spirits of the dead at the place left free by the signifying rite.

And here there appears to us a new dimension of the tragedy of *Hamlet*. I told you at the beginning, it is a tragedy of the subterranean world. The ghost rises up because of an unexpiatable offence. Ophelia appears in this perspective, neutral, nothing other than a victim offered up for this primordial offence. The murder of Polonius and the ridiculous dragging of his corpse by the feet, by Hamlet who becomes suddenly literally wild, and amuses himself by flouting everyone who asks him where the corpse is, and who amuses himself by proposing a whole series of enigmas in very bad taste the high point of which culminates in the formula 'Hide fox, and all after', (IV ii 33), which is obviously a reference to a kind of game of hide-and-seek. Which means, the fox is hidden, let us run after him; the murder of Polonius and this extraordinary scene of the corpse hidden in defiance of the sensitivities, and the worries of the whole *entourage* is again only a mockery of what is in question, namely an unsatisfied mourning (*deuil*).

We have here, in something the last word on which as you see I was not able to give you today, this perspective, this relationship between the formula $\$ \diamond o$, the phantasy, and something which appears paradoxically distant from it, namely the relation to the object in so far as mourning allows us to clarify it.

Next day we are going to continue in detail, by showing, by taking up the detours of the play *Hamlet* in so far as it allows us to satisfy the economy which is closely linked here of the real, the imaginary and the symbolic.

Perhaps in the course of this many of your preconceived ideas will break down, will even I hope be shattered, but I think you will be well enough prepared for this by the fact that because we are commenting on a tragedy in which there is no shortage of corpses, this sort of purely ideational damage will appear to you, when compared to the damage left behind him by Hamlet, as not amounting to much, and that to speak plainly you will console yourselves about the difficult path that I make you follow with this Hamlet-like formula, *on ne fait pas d'hamlet sens casser des oeufs*.

Seminar 19: Wednesday 29 April 1959

If the tragedy of Hamlet is the tragedy of desire, it is time to notice - this is where I had led you to at the end of my last lecture - as we come to the end of our course what is always noticed at the end, namely what is most obvious - I do not know in effect whether any author has dwelt simply on this remark which is all the same difficult to overlook once it has been formulated - that from the beginning to the end of *Hamlet* there is talk of nothing but mourning (*deuil*).

Hamlet's first remark concerns this scandal, his mother's precipitous marriage. This marriage which the mother herself in her anxiety, her anxiety to know what is troubling her beloved son, herself calls 'our o'erhasty marriage': 'I doubt it is no other but the main, his father's death and our o'erhasty marriage' (II ii 56). No need to remind you of those words of Hamlet about the left-overs of the funeral meal which are used for the wedding breakfast: 'Thrift, thrift, Horatio!' (*Économie, économie*), indicating with this term something which reminds us that in our exploration of the world of the object, in this articulation which is that of modern society between what we call use-value and exchange-value with all the notions that are engendered around it, there is something perhaps that the analysis overlooks - I mean the Marxist, economic analysis, in so far as it dominates the thinking of our epoch - and whose power and breadth we meet at every moment, which are ritual-values.

Again because we pick them up unceasingly in our experience, it would perhaps be useful to separate them out, to articulate them as essential. I already alluded the time before last, to this function of ritual in mourning. It is by means of this mediation which ritual introduces to what bereavement (*deuil*) opens up in terms of a gap somewhere; more exactly in the way in which it comes to coincide, to put at the centre of an essential gap, the major symbolic gap, the symbolic lack, the point x in short about which one can say that when Freud alludes somewhere to the navel of the dream perhaps he is evoking precisely the psychological correspondent of this.

So that on the question of mourning we cannot but be struck that in all these major bereavements, which are put in question in *Hamlet*, this always returns: that the rites were abbreviated, clandestine.

Polonius is buried without ceremony, secretly, as quickly as possible, for political reasons. And you remember everything that takes place around the burial of Ophelia, the discussion about how it happens that having very probably died of her own volition, having deliberately drowned herself - at least this is the opinion of the people - nevertheless she is buried in holy ground, in Christian ground, nevertheless something of the Christian rite is granted her.

The gravediggers are in no doubt: if she had not been someone of such high rank she would have been treated differently, in the way that the priest says it should have been done, because he does not think that she should be given funeral honours: she should have been thrown into unsanctified ground, shards and the detritus of malediction and of darkness would

have been thrown on her. The priests too have only agreed to a shortened ritual.

All of this is very strongly accentuated at the end of the graveyard scene. We cannot fail to take all these elements into account, especially if we add to them many other things. The shade of the father is a shade who has an unexpiatable grievance, who had been surprised, we are told, eternally damaged, who had been surprised - it is not one of the least mysteries of the meaning of this tragedy - in the blossoms of his sins. He did not have time to gather together before his death this something which would have put him in a fit state to appear before the final judgement.

We have here a sort of trace, a clue as they say in English, of elements which are too organised, converge too much in an eminently significant fashion for us not to dwell on them, for us not to ask ourselves, as we began to do the last time, the relationship between the drama of desire and everything that is in question, in terms of mourning and the exigencies of mourning.

It is the point on which I would like to dwell today in order to try to deepen the sense in which this introduces a question for us, in so far as this question is that of the object, and of the object in so far as we approach it in analysis in diverse forms. We approach it in the sense of the object of desire. And there is also from the object to desire a simple relationship as in which can be articulated as if it were a question of a simple agreement when it is perhaps something different.

We also approach the question of the object from a quite different angle when we are talking about the object in so far as the subject identifies himself to it in mourning. He can, it is said, reintegrate it into his ego. What does that mean? Are there not there two phases which in analysis are not well articulated, are not in accord. Does something not demand that we should try to penetrate further into this problem?

Naturally, what I have just said about mourning in *Hamlet* does not allow us to hide that the basis of this mourning in *Hamlet* as in *Oedipus* is a crime. That up to a certain point all these bereavements follow one another in a cascade as the consequences, the *sequelae* of the crime from which the drama began. And this is also why we say *Hamlet* is an oedipal drama, which allows us to equate it, to put it on the same functional level in terms of tragic genealogy as the Oedipus complex.

It is that which put Freud, and his disciples after him, on the track of the importance of *Hamlet* for us. But this should also be for us at the same time an opportunity to say something about this subject, because *Hamlet* for the analytic tradition is situated at the centre of a meditation on origins; because we are used to recognising in the crime of Oedipus the most essential texture of the relationship of the subject to what we here call the Other, namely the locus in which the law is inscribed. It is good to recall some essential terms of the way in which up to now these relationships of the subject with what can be called the original crime have been articulated for us.

It is quite clear that we should distinguish the fact, instead of doing like always, leaving things confused and vague which does not facilitate speculation about the things that we have to say on this subject, that we find ourselves in the presence of two stages. There is the Freudian myth, which deserves to be described as such, the construction of the totem that is set up, in so far as it organises what can be properly speaking called a myth – I already on occasion touched on this problem: how perhaps one can say that the Freudian construction is perhaps here the unique example of the formation of a myth which has emerged in our historical era.

There is the myth which indicates for us in a way this primitive, essential, absolutely necessary link, which means that we cannot conceive of the order of the law except on the basis of something more primordial which presents itself as what? This is the meaning of Freud's oedipal myth: it is only too evident that this crime, which is the primitive murder of the father, the horizon, the final bar of the problem of origins, in any analytic material you should remark, because he always rediscovers it and for him nothing is resolved if it does not rejoin this final term; the primitive murder of the father, which he places at the origin of the horde, or at the origin of the Judaic tradition, has of course obviously the character of mythical exigency.

A different plane is the plane on which this thing develops and is incarnated in a formative drama. The relationship of the primitive law to the primitive crime is a different thing to what happens when the tragic hero who is Oedipus, and who is also of course each of us virtually at some point in his being when he reproduces the oedipal drama, when in killing the father he couples with the mother, when in some way he renews on the tragic plane, in a sort of lustral bath, the renaissance of the law.

Here we see the asymmetry between the tragedy of Oedipus and the tragedy of Hamlet. Oedipus responds strictly to this definition which I have given of the ritual reproduction of the myth. Oedipus, in short completely innocent, unconscious, has a sort of dream which is his life - life is a dream - accomplishes without his knowing it the renewal of the passage which goes from crime to the restoration of order and to the punishment that he himself assumes, which makes him finally appear to us as castrated.

For this indeed is the element that we must essentially take into account, and which remains, if we keep to the genetic level of the primitive murder, the element which remains veiled to us. It is the meaning when all is said and done of what is pointed up by, the import of, namely of this punishment, of this sanction, of this castration in which there lies under lock and key the something which is the result, which is properly speaking the humanisation of sexuality in man, which is also of course the key into which we are accustomed by our experience to turn all the accidents of the evolution of desire.

It is here that it is not indifferent for us to glimpse the asymmetry between the drama of Hamlet and the drama of Oedipus. To pursue them in detail would be almost a too brilliant operation. Let us indicate all the same that the crime occurs in *Oedipus* at the level of the generation of the hero. In *Hamlet* it has already occurred at the level of the preceding generation.

In *Oedipus* it happens without the hero knowing what he is doing, and in a way guided by *fatum*. Here the crime is accomplished in a deliberate fashion because it is even carried out treacherously. It surprises the one who is its victim, the father, in a sort of sleep, and even in a quite real sleep. There is in this sleep something which is not absolutely integrated. One could say that Oedipus played out the drama as each one of us repeats it in his dreams, but here the hero had been really - here our references are of use to us - surprised in a fashion completely different to the thread of what he is then concerned with in his thoughts.

He points it out: I was "Cut off in the blossoms of my sin".(I v 76) A blow struck him from a point where he did not expect it, a veritable intrusion of the real, a veritable rupture in the thread of destiny. He dies on a bank of flowers, the Shakesperian text tells us, and the players' scene goes so far as to reproduce in a kind of preliminary pantomime, this bank of flowers on the stage.

There is here no doubt some mystery, whose contrast I also pointed out to you from the beginning, between the singular fact that this is the eruption of something absolutely foreign to the subject in the crime, is something which appears in a way compensated, contrasted in the

most paradoxical fashion with the fact that here the subject knows. I mean that Hamlet is informed by his father who knows what has happened. And this too is not the least of the riddles that we have to deal with.

The drama of Hamlet, contrary to that of Oedipus, does not begin from the question: what has happened, where is the crime, where is the guilty one? It starts from a denunciation of the crime, the crime revealed to the ear of the subject. And it unfolds from the revelation of the crime. So we will see here both all the ambiguity and all the contrast of something which one can inscribe, in the form which is that in which we inscribe the message of the unconscious, namely the signifier of O. In what we can call the normal form of the Oedipus complex, the S(O) bears an incarnation, that of the other, of the father, in so far as from him there is awaited and called for the sanction of the locus of the other, the truth about the truth, in so far as he must be the author of the law, and nevertheless in so far as he is never the one who undergoes it, the one who can no more guarantee it than anyone else, the one who has also himself been subjected to the bar, the one who in so far as he is the real father makes of him a castrated father.

Altogether different - even though it can be symbolised in the same way - is the position at the end of *Hamlet*, or more exactly at its beginning, because it is the message which opens the drama of *Hamlet*. Here also we see the other confirming himself in the most signifying form as an (. It is not only from the surface of the living that he is struck out, it is from his just reward. With the crime he has entered into the domain of hell, namely of a debt that he cannot pay, of an unexpiatable debt he says. And this indeed is the most terrible, and the most anxiety-provoking meaning of the revelation, for his son.

Oedipus has paid, presents himself as the one who bears in his destiny as hero the charge of this debt which has been satisfied and paid for. What the father of Hamlet complains about for eternity, is that along this line, he was interrupted, surprised, broken off; it is of no longer being ever able to make up for it.

As you see, what our investigation leads us toward, as it progresses, is what is in question in retribution, in punishment, in castration, in relation to the signifier phallus since it is in this sense that we have begun to articulate it. And an ambiguity is established between what Freud himself pointed out to us in a slightly *fin de siècle* way – namely something which would mean that we are destined to no longer live out the Oedipus complex except in some sort of warped fashion, this something of which there is undoubtedly an echo in *Hamlet*.

One of the first cries at the end of the first act of *Hamlet* is the following:

The time is out of joint. Oh, cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right! (I v 190)

The only way I can translate "spite" is *dépit*. "Spite" is everywhere in Shakespeare's *Sonnets*. Spite has taken on for us a subjective sense; our first step in an introduction to the understanding of the Elizabethans would be, in connection with a certain number of words, to restore to them the power of turning on their hinges, namely to situate spite somewhere between objective spite and subjective spite, in something which we seem to have lost as a reference, which is precisely what happens at the level of order, namely of terms which can be between the two, between the objective and the subjective. "Oh, cursed spite", is what he is spited of; it is the way in which the times too are unjust to him. We no longer know how to articulate these words which operate at the centre of what is the living experience of the subject, or indeed of everything that he can designate as injustice in the world. Perhaps you can recognise in it in passing the deviations of the beautiful soul that We have not emerged from, far from it, despite all our efforts, but that the Shakespearian vocabulary transcends. It is not for nothing that I have

alluded so lightly here to the *Sonnets* - therefore "Oh, cursed spite that ever I was born to set it right!"

And here then is there at once justified, but deepened, what can appear in *Hamlet* to illustrate a decadent form of the Oedipus complex, a sort of complete *Untergang*, which causes an ambiguity with that towards which I now want for a moment to direct your attention, namely what Freud thus described in each individual life, namely what he described under this title in 1924, himself calling attention to what is in the last analysis the riddle of the Oedipus complex, which is not simply that the subject should have wished, desired the murder of the father, the rape of the mother, but that this should be in the unconscious: namely how does this come to be in the unconscious, and how does it come to be there to the point that the subject throughout an important period of his life, the latency period - the source of the points of construction in the human being of his whole objective world - comes to no longer worry about it at all?

Not to worry about it to such a degree that you know very well that Freud admits, at least at the origin of his doctrinal articulation, that in an ideal case no longer worrying about it at all becomes something that is happily definitive.

I refer you to this text which is not long, and which you will find in tome XIII of the *Gesammelten Werken*. What does Freud tell us?

Let us start from what he tells us. Then we will see afterwards how it will back up what we are saying. Freud tells us: the Oedipus complex enters into its *Untergang*, into its descent, into its dissolution, into this dissolution which will be a decisive vicissitude for the whole subsequent development of the subject, after the following: in so far as he says as the Oedipus complex has not been experienced, lived through from the two aspects of the triangular position, in so far as the subject, rival of the father, has seen, from this concrete point of view of a threat which is nothing other than castration, namely that in so far as he wants to take the place of the father he will be castrated; in so far as he takes the place of the mother - this literally is what Freud says - he will also lose the phallus, because the point of completion, of maturity of the Oedipus complex, the full discovery of the fact that the woman is castrated, is also made.

It is very precisely in so far as the subject is caught in this closed alternative which allows him no way out on the plane of something that we can articulate as the relation, which we are going to try to better explore further on, to this thing which is called the phallus, and which is the key to the situation which at that moment is the one which is formed as the essential drama of the Oedipus complex. The Oedipus complex, I would say, in so far as it is precisely in the subject, marks the articulation and the turning point which causes the passage from the plane of demand to that of desire to take place.

It is in so far as this thing - because I leave to one side the question about the qualification - and we are going to see what this must be for us; in saying thing *I* have not said object; I say real, not yet symbolised, but in a way potentially so; what to be explicit we can call a signifier, with a diffuse

The phallus, this is what is presented to us by Freud as the key to the *Untergang*, to the descent, to the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. And we see gathered together in the Freudian articulation something which does not put life at all into a position which is - I am not saying asymmetrical - all that asymmetrical. And it is in so far as the subject enters, as regards this thing, into a relationship which we could describe as one of lassitude - it is in Freud's text - as regards gratification, it is in so far as the boy renounces being up to it - it has been yet more articulated for the girl that no gratification is to be expected on this plane - it is in so far, to be

explicit, as there occurs something whose articulated emergence we know is not produced at that moment, namely that the subject has to mourn the phallus, that the Oedipus complex enters into its dissolution.

It is marked out so clearly that it is a mourning that is involved, that we cannot fail to try to make a *rapprochement* in order to see that this is the way in which there is going to be clarified for us the subsequent function of this moment of dissolution, its decisive role which, let us not forget, is not only, cannot be for us simply the fact that the more or less incompletely repressed fragments, remainders of the Oedipus complex are going to reemerge at the level of puberty in the form of neurotic symptoms.

But the following which we have also always admitted, which is the common experience of analysts, that on this there depends something, not only in the unconscious but also in the imaginary economy of the subject, which is called nothing other than his normalisation on the genital plane. Namely that there is no happy success of genital maturation except precisely by the fullest possible completion of this Oedipus complex, and in so far as the Oedipus complex brings as a consequence the stigma, the scar, in man and in woman, of the castration complex.

It is here then perhaps that in making the *rapprochement*, the synthesis with what had been said in the Freudian *opus* about the mechanism of mourning, that we can see that this is what is going to be illuminating for us as regards the fact that there appears in the subject this mourning, no doubt of a particular kind because this phallus is of course not an object like the others.

But here too we can pause, because after all if I ask you, what is it that defines the range, the limits of objects for which we may have to mourn? Up to the present this has not been articulated either. We are quite sure that among the objects that we may have to mourn, the phallus is not like the others. Here as elsewhere it must have its own place apart. But precisely this is what must be specified, and as in many cases when it is a question of specifying, it is the place of something against a background. It is by specifying it against this background that the specification of the fundamental place also appears retroactively.

We are here on completely new ground; let us try then to advance because finally it is in this way that our analysis of *Hamlet* will serve us; it is to remind us of this question that I am working out before you in a series of concentric sketches, that I accentuate, that I make you understand with different resonances, and which I hope to make more and more precise, namely what I call the place of the object in desire.

What does Freud tell us about this mourning for the phallus? He tells us that what is linked to it, what is one of its fundamental principles, what gives it its value - because this is what we are seeking - is a narcissistic exigency of the subject. There is established here the relation of this critical moment at which the subject sees himself in any case castrated, or deprived of the thing, of the phallus. Here Freud brings into play, and as always without the slightest precaution - I mean that he upsets us as usual, and thank God he did it all his life, because he would never have got to the end of the field that remained for him to be traced out - he tells us that it is a narcissistic exigency.

In the presence of the final outcome of these oedipal exigencies, the subject prefers as one might say, to abandon the whole part of himself, as subject, which will henceforth be always prohibited to him, namely in the punctuated signifying chain, which constitutes the upper part of our graph.

The whole business is nothing other than the fundamental business of the love relationship as such as it is presented to him in the parental dialectic, and the way in which he could enter into it. He will allow all of this to be dashed because, Freud tells us, of something which has a relationship to this phallus as such already so enigmatically introduced here from the beginning, and nevertheless in such a clear fashion throughout the whole experience, in a narcissistic relationship with this term. What can this mean for us, in our vocabulary, in so far as our vocabulary can be something illuminating, more illuminating, something by means of which we try to respond to this exigency which Freud I was saying just now must leave to one side because he has to go to the heart, to the cutting edge of the subject, and because he does not have much time to dwell on the premises. It is moreover in this way that all action is grounded, and more especially any genuine action, namely the action which here is, or at least ought to be, our concern. Well, expressed in our discourse, within our reference points, narcissistic implies a certain relationship with the imaginary. Here narcissistic explains the following to us: that very exactly in mourning, in so far as in this mourning nothing is satisfied -and here nothing can satisfy, because the loss of the phallus experienced as such, is the very outcome of the survey made of the whole of the relationship of the subject to what is happening at the locus of the Other, namely to the organised field of the symbolic relationship in which there has begun to be expressed his exigency for love. He has come to the end, and his loss in this affair is radical.

What is then produced is very precisely this something whose likeness to a psychotic mechanism I already indicated in so far as it is with his imaginary texture, and only with it that the subject can respond to it. That which under a veiled form Freud presents to us as being the narcissistic link of the subject to the situation representing this. This allows us at that moment to identify it with something which represents in him on the imaginary plane this lack as such which puts as one might say into a state of nothingness or into reserve in him everything which later on is going to be the mould from which there is going to be remodelled his assumption of his position in the genital function.

But is this again breaking through too quickly what is really in question? Does it make us believe, as people believe, that the relationship to the genital object is a relationship of positive to negative? You will see that it is nothing of the kind, and that is why our notations are better, because they allow to be articulated the way in which the problem is really going to present itself.

What is in fact in question, is something which for us must be connoted in the following form in so far as it makes us approach this something which we already approached when we distinguished the functions of castration, from frustration and privation. If you remember, I then wrote: castration, symbolic action -frustration, imaginary term - and privation, real term. I gave you the connotations of their relations to objects. I told you that castration referred to the imaginary phallic object; and I wrote that frustration, which is imaginary of its nature, referred always to a real good and a real term; and that privation, being real, referred to a symbolic term. There is not, I added at that time, in the real, any kind of phase or split. Every lack is a lack in its place, but a lack in its place is a symbolic lack.

Here is a column which is that of the agent of these actions with their objectal term which is something which I touched on at that time at a single point, at the level of the agent of frustration: the mother, and in order to show you that it is in so far as the mother, as such, is the locus of the demand for love, was first of all symbolised in the double register of presence and absence, that she found herself being in the position of giving its genetic start to the dialectic in so far as the real mother turns what the subject is really deprived of, the breast for example, into a symbol of her love. And I stopped at that.

You can see that here the boxes corresponding to the term agent in the two other relationships have remained free. It is now in effect, and only now that we inscribe here what is in question. The term agent is something which, as regards its place, refers to the subject. We were not able at that time to articulate clearly the different stages of this subject. It is now that we can do it, and now that we can inscribe anew where we have placed the effective locus of the mother, the term in which everything that happens because of her takes on its value, namely the O of the Other in so far as it is here that the demand is articulated. At the level of castration we have a subject *qua* real, but in the form that we have learned to articulate and to discover it since, namely *qua* speaking subject, *qua* concrete subject, namely marked by the sign of the word. Naturally you will see immediately - precisely it is what for some time philosophers are trying to articulate about the singular nature of human action. It is not possible to approach the theme of human action without glimpsing that in the illusion of some absolute beginning or other, which would be the final term where one could distinguish the notion of agent, there is something amiss.

This something which is amiss, throughout the ages an attempt has been made to introduce it to us in the guise of different speculations about the liberty which is at the same time necessary - this is the final term at which philosophers have arrived in order to articulate something, namely that there is no other true action except to put yourself in some way on the straight path of the divine will.

It does not seem to us that we can at the very least claim to contribute here something on a completely different register when we say that the subject *qua* real is something which has this property of being in a particular relationship with the word conditioning in him this eclipse, this fundamental lack which structures him as such at the symbolic level in the relationship to castration.

Here there is no question of a gold ingot, of an open sesame, of something which up opens everything to us. But that this begins to articulate something and something which has never been said, is undoubtedly something that perhaps is worth underlining

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What then is going to appear here at the level of privation, namely of what the subject becomes in so far as he has been symbolically castrated? But he has been symbolically castrated at the level of his position as speaking subject, not at all of his being, of this being which has to mourn something which he has contributed as a sacrifice, as a holocaust to its function of missing signifier. This becomes much clearer, and much easier to connote from the moment that we pose the problem in terms of mourning. In terms of mourning, it is in so far as we can write on the plane where the subject is identical to the biological images that guide him, and which for him constitute the furrow prepared for his behaviour, of what is going to attract him, all the ways of voracity and of that something is taken up, is marked, is withdrawn on this imaginary plane, and which makes of the subject as such something really deprived.

This privation which our contemplation, our knowledge, does not allow us to locate, to situate anywhere in the real, because the real, as such, is defined as being always full. We rediscover here, but in a different form, differently accentuated this . remark of the thinking which is rightly or wrongly called existentialist, that it is the human, living subject, that introduces here an annihilating (*neantisation*), which they call that, but which we call differently. Because this annihilating that the philosophers glory in, and even glory in in their lives (see

Raymond Queneau) does not satisfy us. It does not satisfy us because of the more artificial usages that are made of it in the conjuring tricks of modern dialectic.

We call this *minus phi* ($-\Phi$), namely what Freud pointed to as being the essential of the mark on man of his relationship to the *logos*, namely castration, here effectively assumed on the imaginary plane. You will subsequently see the use that this notation ($-\Phi$) will be to us. It will serve to define for us what is in question, namely the object, *o*, of desire, as it appears in our formulation of phantasy, which we are going to have to situate with respect to the categories, to the chapter headings, to the registers which are our habitual registers in analysis.

The object, *o*, of desire, we are going to define, we are going to formulate as we have already done, and are going to repeat once more here. It is this object which sustains the relation of the subject to what he is not. Up to this we go almost as far, even though a little bit further than what traditional and existentialist philosophy has formulated in the form of the negativity, or of the annihilating of the existing subject. But we add: to what he is not in so far as he is not the phallus. It is the object which sustains the subject in this privileged position which he is led to occupy in certain situations which is to be properly the following that he is not the phallus; that the object *o*, as we are trying to define it, because it has become necessary for us now to have a proper definition of the object, at least that we should construct this experiment starting with a definition which we have thought correct of the object, to try to see how there is ordered, and at the same time is differentiated that which up to the present in our experience we, have rightly or wrongly begun to articulate as being the object.

Because of course what we are going to see, is that we are going to pose ourselves the question: this object, in so far as it is *o*, do we define by this the genital object? Which would mean that all the pregenital objects were not objects? I *am* not answering this question, I am saying that it is going to be posed from the moment that we have begun to pose the problem in this way.

It is clear that the answer cannot be altogether simple, and that henceforth one of the advantages that appears is to allow us in any case to see the distinction, the angle, the plane of splitting which is established between what has being called up to the present the phallic phase - and here I am on the strict path of our traditionally accepted experience - and the genital phase.

It is about the relationship which, for some years, was quite impossible to discover, of this phallic phase in the formation and the maturation of the object in question. It is with respect to this position which is always veiled, which only appears in the *phanes*, in the lightning-like apparitions, which are called having it of course, or not having it; namely in its reflection, at the level of the object, that we encounter, that we glimpse the radical position of what is in question. But the radical position, that of the subject at the level of the privation of the subject *qua* subject of desire as such, is not being the phallus, is to be himself as I might put it, a negative object.

You see how far I am going. The three forms therefore in which the subject appears at the level of the three terms, castration, frustration and privation, are three forms which we can well call alienated, but perhaps we contribute to this term alienation a tangibly different articulation in so far as it is diversified I mean that if at the level of castration the subject appears in a syncope of the signifier, this is something different to when he appears at the level of the Other as submitted to the law of everybody, it is a different thing again than when he has to situate himself in desire where the form of his disappearance then appears to us to have with respect to the two others, a singular originality which is well made to encourage us to articulate it further.

And this indeed is what appears in effect in our experience, and that towards which the unfolding of the tragedy of *Hamlet* draws us. The rotten thing that poor Hamlet has to put right, is something which has the closest relationship with this position *vis-à-vis* the phallus. Throughout the whole play we sense this term everywhere present in Hamlet's manifest disorder each time he approaches as one might say the burning points of his action.

Today I can only indicate to you the points which will allow us to follow its trace. There is something very strange in the fashion that Hamlet speaks about his father. There is an idealising exaltation of his dead father which is summarised more or less in the fact that he does not have the voice to say what he has to say about him, and that he really suffocates and strangles to conclude in something which appears one of the particular forms of the signifier which in English is called *pregnant*, namely something which has a meaning beyond its meaning. He found nothing better to say about his father, except he says, that "He was a man" – like everyone else (I ii 187). What he means is obviously the contrary. A first indication and a trace of what I want to talk to you about.

There are again many other terms. The rejection, the depreciation, the contempt directed at Claudius is something which has all the appearances of a denegation. Namely that in the unleashing of the insults that he covers him with, and specifically in front-of his mother, he ends with this term: "A king of shreds and patches" (III iv 103), a king made up of debris tacked together, which cannot fail to indicate to us that here too there is something problematic, and which undoubtedly we cannot fail to link with one fact: which is that if there is something striking in the tragedy of *Hamlet*, compared to the Oedipus tragedy, it is that after the murder of the father, the phallus is still there. It is well and truly there and it is precisely Claudius who is charged with incarnating it. Namely that the real phallus of Claudius is always in question, and that in short his only reproach to his mother is that precisely, his father being scarcely dead, she has filled herself with it – and he sends her back with his discouraged arms and words to this fatal and fatidical object, which is here well and truly real, which seems to be in effect the only point around which the drama turns.

Namely that for this woman who does not appear to us to be a woman too different in her nature from others, in the play there is, given all the human sentiments that she otherwise shows, something very strong which must all the same attach her to her partner. Now, it seems that this is the very point around which the action of Hamlet turns and hesitates, the point where as one might say his astonished genius trembles before something completely unexpected. The fact is that the phallus is completely outside its usual position compared to our analysis of the oedipal position. The phallus, well and truly real here, must be attacked as such. He always stops.

He says, I could easily kill him, when he finds Claudius at prayer. And this sort of vagueness in front of the object to be killed, this uncertain aspect of what is to be attacked, this is the very principle of what at every instant stays Hamlet's hand, precisely this narcissistic link that Freud speaks to us about in his text on the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. One cannot attack the phallus, because the phallus, even when it is here well and truly real, is a shade.

I would ask you to meditate on this in connection with all sorts of strange, paradoxical things, specifically the following, the degree to which this thing that we were very worked up about at the time, namely why after all it was quite clear that Hitler would not be assassinated. Hitler who represented so well the object whose function Freud showed us in this kind of homogenisation of the crowd by the identification to an object on the horizon, to an object x, to an object which is not like the others, is this not something which allows us to rejoin that which we are for the moment trying to talk about?

The completely enigmatic manifestation of the signifier of power as such, this is what is in question here. The Oedipus complex, when it is presented in the particularly gripping form in the real as it is in Hamlet, that of the criminal, the usurper installed as such, stays Hamlet's hand, not because he is afraid of this character whom he despises, because he knows that what he has to attack is something different to what is there. And this is so true that two minutes later, when he has arrived in his mother's room, when he has really begun to stir her guts with important things, he hears a sound behind the arras, and he leaps at it without looking.

I do not know what astute author has pointed out that it is impossible that he should have believed that it was Claudius, because he has just left him in the room next door, and nevertheless when he has gutted, disemboweled the unfortunate Polonius, he makes this reflection: poor old fool, I thought I was dealing with someone better. Everyone thinks that he wanted to kill the king, but before the king, I mean Claudius, the real king, the usurper also, in the final analysis he halted because he wanted to have something better, namely to take him also in the blossoms of his sin. As he appeared there, that was not it, that was not the right way.

What is in question, is precisely the phallus, and that is why he can never kill him up to the moment when precisely he has made the complete sacrifice, and also despite himself, of all his narcissistic attachment: it is namely when he is wounded unto death, and knows it. It is only at that moment that he can perform the act which gets Claudius. The thing is singular and obvious, it is striking, and I would say that it is inscribed in all sorts of tiny enigmas of Hamlet's style.

With this sort of character who for him is only a calf, a "capital calf" (III ii 110), which he has in a way immolated to the *manes* of his father - because he is scarcely affected by the murder of Polonius - when he has planked this Polonius in a corner under the stairs, and he is being asked everywhere what it is all about, he slips in a few of his little jokes which are always in his case so upsetting for his adversaries. Everyone asks, this is the basis of the affair, if what he is saying is indeed what he means, because what he says affects everybody in his own way. But for him to say it he must know so much that one cannot believe him, and so on.

It is a position which should be rather familiar to us from the point of view of the phenomenon of the subject's admissions. He makes these remarks which have remained up to the present a closed book to the authors: "The body is with the King," (he does not use the word 'corpse', he says 'body' here, I would ask you to notice it), "but the King *is* not with the body" (IV ii 29). I would ask you simply to replace the word king by the word phallus in order to see that it precisely is what is in question, namely that the body is engaged in this affair of the phallus, and how, but that on the contrary, the phallus, itself, is not engaged in anything, and that is always slips between your fingers, immediately afterwards he says: "The King is a thing".

"A thing...?", the people say to him completely bewildered and stunned, like each time when he gives out one of his usual aphorisms: "A thing, my lord?" - "Of nothing." A thing of nothing. Starting from which all find themselves comforted by some quotation of the psalmist where it is in effect said that man is a thing of nothing. But I think it would be better for that to refer to the Shakesperian texts themselves.

Shakespeare appears to me, after attentively reading the *Sonnets*, to be someone who has singularly illustrated in his person a quite extreme and singular point about desire. Somewhere in one of his Sonnets whose daring can scarcely be imagined - I am astonished that one can still talk in this connection about ambiguity; he speaks to the object of his love who as everyone knows was of his own sex, and it seems a very charming young man who seems to have been

the Earl of Essex, he tells him that he has all the appearances which in him satisfy for love, in the fact that he is like a woman in everything, that there is only a small little thing that nature has provided him with, God knows why, and that he unfortunately has nothing to do with this little thing – “adding one thing to my purpose nothing” (XX) – and that he is very unhappy because it must be a delight for women. He says it does not matter, provided your love remains, that this should give them pleasure.

The terms *thing*, and *nothing*, are there strictly employed, and leave no doubt of any kind that this was part of Shakespeare’s familiar vocabulary. This familiar vocabulary, after all here is a secondary thing. The important thing is whether by going further we can precisely penetrate into what was the very creative position of Shakespeare, his position which I think without any doubt can be said to be inverted on the sexual plane, but on the plane of love not all that perverted; if we introduce ourselves to the Sonnets which are going to allow us to specify more accurately what can appear in this dialectic of the subject with the object of his desire we can go further into something which I would call the instants in which the object in some way – and the major way is that of mourning – disappearing, vanishing little by little, causes for a time – a time which can only subsist in the flash of an instant – there to be manifested the true nature of what corresponds to it in the subject, namely what I would call the apparitions of the phallus, *phallophanes* – this is where I will leave you today.

Seminar 20: Wednesday 13 May 1959

We are talking about desire. During this fortnight's interruption, I tried myself to recentre this path which we are taking this year, and which forces us, like every path, sometimes to make long detours.

In my effort to grasp again the origin, as well as the aim of what we are about, I believe I have also tried to bring about for you again this refocusing which is only one more way to concentrate oneself as our attention progresses.

In short it is a question, at the point that we have got to, of trying to articulate where our rendezvous is. It is not simply the rendezvous of this seminar, nor indeed the rendezvous of our daily work as analysts; it is moreover the rendezvous of our function as analyst and the meaning of analysis.

One cannot but be surprised at the persistence of a movement like analysis, if it were only, among others which have appeared in history, a therapeutic enterprise that is more or less grounded, more or less successful. There is no example of any theorisation, of any psychical orthopaedics whatsoever which has had a career lasting longer than half a century. And undoubtedly one cannot help feeling that what is responsible for the duration of analysis, what ensures its place beyond its medical use and function - which no one when all is said and done dreams of contesting - is that there is in analysis something that concerns man in a completely new, serious, authentic fashion. New in what it contributes, serious in its import, authenticated by what: surely by something other than results which are often debatable, sometimes precarious.

I think that what is most characteristic in the phenomenon is the feeling that one has about this thing which I once called *The Freudian Thing*, that it is something that is being spoken about for the first time. I would go further and even say that what constitutes the proof and the most certain manifestation of the authenticity that this thing has, the proof of it is shown every day by the extraordinary amount of verbiage there is about it.

If you take the mass of analytic productions, what strikes you, is this effort of the authors who when all is said and done are always slipping away from grasping the principle of its activity, and articulate this principle in a fashion which throughout analysis is never presented as complete, concluded, accomplished, satisfying. This perpetual movement, dialectical slipping, which is the movement and the life of analytic research, is something which bears witness to the specificity of the problem that this research is grappling with.

In the presence of this, everything that our research involves in terms of mistakes, of confusion, of uncertainty even in its principles, everything that this brings into its practice in terms of ambiguity - I mean of always finding not only before oneself, but in ones very practice what is precisely its principle, what one wanted to avoid, namely suggestion, persuasion, construction, even mystagogy - all these contradictions in the analytic movement only serve to accentuate further the specificity of the Freudian thing.

This thing we envisage this year by hypothesis, sustained by the whole concentric progress of our previous research, in the following form, namely that this thing is desire. And at the same time, at the moment that we articulate this formula, we notice a kind of contradiction coming from the fact that our whole effort seems to be working in the direction of making this desire lose its value, its original accent, without however our being able to put our finger on, indeed ensure that experience shows us, that it is indeed with its original accent that we have to deal with it.

Desire is not something that we can consider as reduced, normalised, functioning through the exigencies of a sort of organic preformation which would lead us in advance onto the traced-out path and way on which we would have to make it enter, bring it back to. Desire, from the origin of the analytic articulation by Freud, is presented with this characteristic that *lust* in English means *convoitise* as well as *luxure*, the same word which is in *Lustprinzip*. And you know that in German it conserves all the ambiguity of pleasure and of desire.

This something which presents itself at first in experience as disturbance, as something which disturbs the perception of the object, a something also which the maledictions of poets and of moralists show us also degrades this object, disorganises it, debases it, in any case shakes it, sometimes goes so far as to dissolve the very person who perceives it, namely the subject.

This accent is certainly articulated as a principle of the Freudian position in the measure that the placing of *Lust* in the foreground as it is articulated in Freud is presented to us in a radically different fashion from anything that was previously articulated concerning the principle of desire. And it is presented to us in Freud as being opposed in its origin and its source to the reality principle. The accent of the original experience of desire is preserved in Freud as being opposed, contrary to the construction of reality. Desire is specified as being marked, accentuated by the blind character of its search; as something which is presented as being the torment of man, and which effectively includes a contradiction in the search for what up to then, for all of those who had tried to articulate the meaning of the ways of man in his searchings, of everything that up to then had always been articulated in principle as being man's search for his good.

The pleasure principle, throughout all philosophical and moralistic thinking, throughout the centuries, in every original definition by which every moral theory of man is proposed, was always affirmed - whatever it was - as hedonistic. Namely that man fundamentally sought his good, whether he knew it or whether he did not know it, and at the same time that it was only through a sort of accident that there emerged the experience of this error of his desire, of its aberrations.

It is in principle, and as fundamentally contradictory that for the first time in a theory of man pleasure finds itself articulated with a different accent. And in the measure that the term pleasure in its very signifier in Freud is contaminated by the special accent with which there is presented *Lust, lust, convoitise, desire*.

Desire therefore is not organised, is not put together in a sort of preformed harmony with the map of the world, as after all a harmonic, optimistic idea of human development might suppose. Analytic experience teaches us that things go in a different direction. As you know, as we have stated here, it shows us something which is precisely the thing which is going to engage us in a way of experience which is also by its very development something in which we are going to lose the accent, the affirmation of this primordial

agency (*instant*).

Namely that the history of desire is organised in a discourse which develops in senselessness - this is what the unconscious is - in a discourse whose displacements, whose condensations are without any doubt the displacements and condensations to be recognised in discourse, namely metonymies and metaphors. But metaphors which as opposed to metaphor do not engender any meaning. Displacements which do not carry any being, and in which the subject does not recognise something which is being displaced. It is around the exploration of this discourse of the unconscious that the experience of analysis has developed.

It is therefore around something whose radical dimension we can call the diachrony of discourse. What constitutes the essence of our research, the place where there is situated what we are trying to grasp again in terms of what this desire is, is our effort to situate it in synchrony. We are introduced to this by something which makes itself heard every time we approach our experience. We cannot help seeing, help grasping - whether we read the account, the textbook of the most original experience of analysis, namely Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, or whether we refer to any session whatsoever, to a succession of interpretations - the character of indefinite deferment (*renvoi*) that there is in every exercise of an interpretation which never presents desire to us except in an articulated form, but which supposes in principle something which requires this mechanism of deferment from wish to wish in which the movement of the subject is inscribed, and also the distance that he finds himself from his own wishes.

This is why it seems to me that we can legitimately formulate the hope that the reference to structure, a linguistic reference as such, in so far as it reminds us that there cannot be a symbolic formation if alongside, and fundamentally, primordially in every exercise of the word which is called discourse there is not necessarily a synchrony, a structure of language as a synchronic system. This is where we are trying to detect what the function of desire is.

Where is desire situated in this relationship which ensures that this x thing which in future we call man in the measure that he is the subject of the *logos*, that he is constituted in the signifier as subject ... Where in this relationship as synchronic is desire situated? What I think will make you sense the primordial necessity of this renewal, is something we see analytic research becoming engaged in, in so far as it overlooks this structural organisation.

In effect at the very moment I articulated earlier the contrary function established fundamentally at the origin by the Freudian experience between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, could you not at the same time perceive that we are precisely at the point at which the theory tries to articulate precisely in the very terms in which I said that we could say desire is not composed. It is nevertheless composed in the appetite that the authors have to think and feel about it, in a certain fashion in a certain harmony with the song of the world.

Everything is done to try to deduce from a convergence of experience with a maturation what is at least to be wished for as a completed development. And at the same time it is quite clear that all of this means that the authors themselves have abandoned any contact with their experience if they can effectively articulate analytic theory in these terms, namely find anything at all that is satisfying, classical, in the ontological adaptation of the subject to his experience.

The paradox is the following: it is that the further one goes in the direction of this exigency towards which one goes by all sorts of errors - revelatory errors it must be said; revealing precisely that it is necessary to try to articulate things differently - the more one goes along the direction of this experience, the more one arrives at paradoxes like the following. I take an example, and I take it from one of the best authors, from one of those most concerned precisely with a correct articulation not only of our experience, but also of the totality of its data, in an effort also to make an inventory of our terms, the notions that we make use of, our concepts, I am talking about Edward Glover whose work is undoubtedly one of the most useful for anyone who wishes to try - first of all in analysis, this is absolutely indispensable, more than elsewhere - to know what he is doing, and also the mass of whose experiences has been included in his writings I take an example from one of the numerous articles which you should read, the one which appeared in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, of October 1933 (the fourth volume of that year): 'The relation of perversion-formation to the development of reality-sense'.

There are many things in this article which are important to discuss, even the starting terms that he gives us with the intention of correctly handling what he wants to show us, in particular the definition of reality-sense as being that faculty whose existence we infer by examining the process of reality-testing. It is very important that from time to time things should be formulated.

The second thing is what he calls efficient reality-testing, which for any subject who has passed the age of puberty, is the capacity to retain psychic contact with the objects that promote gratification of instinct, including here both modified and residual infantile impulses.

Thirdly, objectivity is the capacity to assess correctly the relation of instinctual impulse to instinctual object, whether or not the aims of the impulse are, can be or will be gratified.

These are fundamental data which are extremely important, and which undoubtedly cannot fail to strike you as giving to the term objectivity in any case a character which is no longer the one which is habitually assigned to it.

This characteristic is going to give us the idea that in effect something is not lost to the original dimension of Freudian research, because something can be overturned in what precisely up to then appeared to us to be the categories and the orders required by our view of the world. One cannot but be all the more struck by what our involves with such a starting point. It involves in this case a research into what the perverse relationship signifies; this being understood in the widest sense, with reference to reality-sense. I tell you, the spirit of the article implies that perversion-formation is conceived by the author as being when all is said and done a means for the subject of warding off the rents, the flaws, the things which say nothing to him in terms of a coherent reality.

Perversion is very precisely articulated by the author as being the way to salvation for the subject to assure a continuity to this reality. Undoubtedly we have here again an original way of looking at things. I pass over the following: the fact is that there results from this form of articulation a sort of omnipresence of the perverse function. Because also, taking on the task of retracing as one might say the chronological insertions, I mean for example where it would be appropriate to place it in a system of before and after in which we would see set out in steps psychotic problems as being more primitive than neurotic problems and in between the role that drug addiction plays in Glover's system in so far as

he makes of it something that corresponds to an transitional stage, chronologically speaking, between the points of attachment, the historically fruitful points, the points in development that the origin of these different afflictions go back to.

We cannot here get into detailed critique of this point of view which is certainly open to criticism as always happens when one tries a pure and simple genetic mapping out of analysable afflictions.

But from all of this I want to pick out a paragraph to show you to what degree of paradox one is led by any attempt which in a way starts out from a principle of reducing the function that we are dealing with at the level of desire, at the level of the principle of desire, to something like a preliminary stage, something preparatory, not yet informed by adaptation to reality, to a first form of relation with reality as such. Because it is by starting out from this principle of classifying perverse- formation with respect to reality-sense that Glover here as elsewhere develops his thought.

I will indicate to you what this involves simply by something which you will recognise moreover in a thousand other writings, which here takes its interest by being presented in a form which is picturesque, literary, paradoxical and really expressive. You will recognise in it something which is nothing other than really what one can call the Kleinian period of Glover's thought. So that this period is not so much a phase of the battle that he thought he had to wage against Melanie Klein on the theoretical plane. On several points one could say that this thinking has many points in common with the Kleinian system. It is a question of the period which, he says, appears at the moment when the so-called paranoid phase of the subject is found to end up with this system of reality which he calls oral, anal, and which is supposed to be the one that the child finds himself living out at this epoch. He characterises it as an external world which represents 'a combination of a butcher's shop, a public lavatory,' in other words a urinal or even something more elaborated, 'under shell-fire, and a post-mortem room,' a morgue.

He explains that the particular outcome which results from what is the pivot and the central point of his intention at this moment transforms this world which is as you see in effect rather disturbed, catastrophic, 'into a more reassuring and fascinating chemists shop, in which, however,' there is this reservation, 'the poison cupboard is left unlocked.'

This very nice and very picturesque view is of a nature to suggest that there is all the same some difficulty in conceiving that effectively the approach to reality is something which we should see in a living experience as profound, as immersed, as implicit, as we suppose it to be for the small child, as being that of a butchers shop, a public convenience under bombardment, and a cold storage room.

There is here undoubtedly something which we should not reject in principle just because it is presented to us in a way that is shocking at first sight, but which can at the same time make us legitimately express some doubt as to the exactitude of this formulation, which in a certain, manifest fashion, cannot cover in a regular fashion the development of the small child, to the degree that one should consider it as characteristic of the modes of adaptation of the subject to reality.

Such a formulation necessarily contains at least the articulation of a twofold reality, one in which the behaviourist experience could be inscribed and another one. The in which we will be obliged, reduced to observe the eruptions in the behaviour of the subject, namely effectively to reinstate from the beginning something which implies the

autonomy, the originality of another dimension which is not primitive reality, but which is from the beginning a beyond of the living experience of the subject.

I am going perhaps to have to excuse myself for having laid stress for so long a time on a contradiction which after all, once it is articulated, becomes so obvious, but neither can we fail to perceive what is involved in the fact that it is masked in certain formulations. In effect, we end up with something which involves a serious ambiguity about the term reality.

If reality is considered as having for us anything at all which permits it to be harmonised with a development parallel to that of instincts - and this is the most commonly accepted truth - we end up with strange paradoxes which do not fail to have repercussions in practice.

If desire is there, it is necessary precisely to speak about its original form, and not its masked form, namely the instinct of what is involved in the evolution of what we have to deal with in our analytic experience. If this desire is inscribed in a homogeneous order, in so far as it can be entirely articulated and assured in terms of reality, if it is of the same order of reality, then in effect one understands this paradox implied in formulations which are derived from the most day-to-day analytic experience. The fact is that desire situated in this way involves that it is its maturation which allows the world to be completed in its objectivity. This constitutes more or less a part of the credo of a certain type of analysis.

I want simply here to pose the question of what this means concretely. What is a world for us living beings? What is reality in the sense in which for example Adlerian psychoanalysis, the one which gives the whole share that they deserve to the structuring elements which are involved in the organisation of the ego, in so far as the ego is adapted to make its way in an efficient fashion in established reality, in a world which is more or less identical for the moment to at least an important field of our universe. This means that the most typical, the most complete, form of this world - I too would like to allow myself to give images which will make you sense what we are talking about - adult reality, we shall identify, to fix our ideas, to a world of American lawyers.

The world of American lawyers seems to me to be today the most elaborated, the most developed that one can define concerning the relationship with what in a certain sense we agree to call reality: namely that nothing is lacking in it from a range which begins from a certain fundamental relationship of essential violence, marked, always present in order that reality should be here something which we can say is nowhere elided, and extends to these refinements of procedure which allows there to be inserted in this world all sorts of paradoxes, of novelties which are essentially defined in relationship to the law, the relationship to the law being essentially constituted by the detours necessary to obtain its most perfect violation.

Here is the world of reality. What relationship is there between this world and what one can call a mature desire; what is a mature desire in the sense that we understand it, namely genital maturation? The question undoubtedly can be settled in several fashions of which one, which is the way of experience, namely the sexual behaviour of the American lawyer.

Nothing seems, up to now, to confirm that there is a relationship, an exact correlation between the perfect achievement of a world so well kept in hand in the ordering of all its activities, and a perfect harmony in relationships with ones counterpart, in so far as this involves success on the plane of what one calls loving harmony. Nothing proves it, and

there is scarcely a person who would dream of sustaining it - so that this is after all only a global, illustrative fashion of showing where the question is posed.

The question is posed in the following, that a confusion is maintained at this level in connection with the term object between reality, in the sense that we have just articulated it, where it is supposed to be situated, and the relationship of the subject to the object in so far as it implies knowledge, in a latent fashion, in the idea that the maturation of desire is something which involves at the same time a maturation of the object, it is a question of a quite different object to the one that we can effectively situate here. An objective mapping out permits us to characterise the relationships to reality.

This object that is in question is one we have known for a long time. Even though it is completely masked, veiled here, it is this object which is called the object of knowledge, the object which is the goal, the aim, the term of a long research throughout the ages, of what is there behind the fruits it has obtained at the end of what we call science, but which for a long time had to traverse the ways of a non-refinement, of a certain relationship of the subject to the word. Refinement, I mean on the philosophical plane of something which we cannot deny as being that on whose terrain science was able at a particular moment begin from originally. And it is precisely that which now, distinguishes it like a child who takes on his independence, but which for a long time was nourished by it, by this relationship to meditation, traces of which remain to us under the name of theory of knowledge, and which in this order approached this term as far as can be, this thinking of a relationship of the object to the subject by means of which knowing involves a profound identification, the relationship to a connaturality through which any grasp on the object manifests something of a fundamental harmony.

But this, let us not forget, is only the result of a specialised experience, historically definable in several branches. But we will content ourselves with referring to the spirit, by articulating it, on this branch which is our own, which is that of Greek philosophy. This effort of asserting, of circumscribing this something which is called an object, involves a fundamental attitude which one would be completely wrong to consider that we can now, once the results have been obtained, elide, as if its position as a principle was without importance on its effect.

Undoubtedly we analysts are capable of introducing the question of what was implied about a position of desire in this effort of knowledge. We will, here as elsewhere, only rediscover something which did not go unnoticed by religious experience which, in so far as it can indicate for itself other ends, individualised this desire as the desire to know, *cupido sciendi*. That we should find a more radical basis for it in the form of some ambivalent drive of the scopophilic type, indeed even oral incorporation, is a question to which we will only add our little touch, but there is one thing certain, which is that in any case this whole development of knowledge, with what it involves in terms of carrying these implicit notions of the function of the object, is the result of a choice.

Every establishment, every introduction to the philosophical position has never failed throughout the ages to propose itself as being a position of sacrificing something. It is in so far as the subject enters into the order of what is called disinterested research - after all its fruit, objectivity, is never defined except as reaching a certain reality in a disinterested perspective - in the exclusion at least in principle of a certain form of desire, it is in this perspective that there is constituted the notion of object which we are reintroducing because we do not know what we are doing, because it is implicit in what we are doing when we reintroduce it, when we suppose that in all our investigation of desire we can, as virtual, as

latent, as having to be rediscovered, as having to be obtained, establish a correspondence of the object as object naturally of what we have explored in the perspective of desire.

It is by means of a confusion therefore between the notion of object, such as it has been the fruit of the elaboration of centuries in philosophical research, the object satisfying the desire for knowledge, and what we can expect of the object of any desire, that we find ourselves led to pose so easily the correspondence of a certain constitution of the object with a certain maturation of the drive.

It is in opposition to this that I try to articulate things differently for you, and in a fashion that I claim is more in conformity with our experience, namely to allow you to grasp at every instant what is the true articulation between desire and what one calls on this occasion its object. This is what I call the synchronic articulation, which I am trying to introduce you to, of the relationship of desire to its object. It is the true form of so-called object relations as they have been articulated for you up to now.

This symbolic formula $\$ \diamond o$, in so far as it allows you to give a form to what I call phantasy - I call it fundamental here but that means nothing other except that it is in the synchronic perspective which assures the minimal structure to what must be the support of desire. In this minimal structure, two terms whose relationship to one another constitute the phantasy, which is itself complex in so far as it is in a third relationship with this phantasy that the subject constitutes himself as desire.

We are taking today the third perspective of this phantasy in making the assumption of the subject pass through o . Which is just as legitimate as making it pass through $\$$, it being given that it is in the relationship of confrontation to $\$ \diamond o$ that desire is maintained.

You have already heard things being articulated far enough not to be, I think, in any way astonished, upset, or surprised, if I put forward that the object o is first of all defined as the support which the subject gives himself in so far as he is failing (*défaillance*).

Let us stop here for a moment. Let us begin by saying something approximate so that this speaks to you in the sense, as I might say, that he fails in his certitude as a subject. And then I will come back to say it in another term which appeals too little to intuition so that I did not fear to bring it forward to you at first, which is nevertheless the exact term: in so far as he fails in his designation as subject.

Because what is in question rests entirely on what happens in so far, as I have told you, as the subject has as such this desire in the other. It is in so far as in the other, in this discourse of the other which is the unconscious, something is lacking to the subject - we will come back to it later, we will come back to it as often as necessary, we will come back to it up to the end - it is in so far as something, because of the very structure that establishes the relationship of the subject to the other *qua* locus of the word, something is lacking at the level of the other which permits the subject to identify himself there as precisely the subject of this discourse that he is holding, this something which ensures that the subject disappears in it as such in so far as this discourse is the discourse of the unconscious, that the subject employs for this designation something which is precisely taken at his cost - at his cost not as subject constituted in the word, but as real subject, well and truly living, namely as something which all by itself is not at all a subject - that the subject paying the necessary price for this mapping of himself *qua* failing is introduced to this dimension always present every time desire is in question, namely of having to pay castration.

Namely that something real, on which he has a hold in an imaginary relationship, is raised to the pure and simple function of signifier. It is the final meaning; it is the most profound meaning of castration as such. The fact that castration is involved as soon as desire as such clearly manifests itself, is the essential discovery of Freudianism, it is the thing which up to then was overlooked, it is the thing which has permitted us to give all sorts of historical views and insights to which diverse mythical expressions had been given, expressions which themselves people subsequently tried to reduce in developmental terms.

The fecundity of this dimension was not in doubt. It should not dispense us from searching in a different dimension than this diachronic one, namely in the synchronic dimension. What is here the essential relationship which is involved?

The relationship which is involved is the following: namely that the paying subject - I am trying here to be as picturesque as possible, I am not always putting forward the most rigorous terms - paying with his person must supply for this relationship which is the relationship of the subject to the signifier where he cannot designate himself, where he cannot name himself as subject. He intervenes with something whose analogue we can find in the function of certain symbols of language, in so far as the linguists distinguish them under the term of shifter symbols, in particular, I have alluded to it, to the personal pronoun, in so far as the symbolic notion, in the lexical system ensures that it is something that designates the one who speaks when it is the I.

In the same way on the plane of the unconscious, which it is not a symbol, which is a real element of the subject, o, is what intervenes to support this moment, in the synchronic sense, when the subject fails to designate himself at the level of an agency which precisely is that of desire.

I know how tiring the mental gymnastics of an articulation raised to this level must be for you. So in order to give you some respite I will only illustrate some terms which are part of our concrete experience.

I said that the o was the effect of castration. I did not say that it was the object of castration. We call this object of castration the phallus. What is the phallus? It must be recognised that in our experience, when we see it appearing in what I called the last time the artificial *phallophanes* of the analysis - it is here also that analysis proves itself to have been an absolutely unique, original experience; we have not seen it appearing in any kind of alchemy, therapeutic or not, in the past. In Hieronymus Bosch we see a whole lot of things, all sorts of dislocated members; we see the flatus in which Mr. Jones later thought he had rediscovered its prototype. And you know that it is nothing other than a smelly flatus. We find all of that spread over the images in the most obvious way. You cannot help noticing that one does not often see the phallus.

But we see it. We see it and we also perceive that it is not very easy either to designate it as being here or there. I only want to give one reference to this, that for example of our experience of homosexuality.

Our experience of homosexuality was defined from the time that homosexuals began to be analysed. At the beginning they were not analysed. Professor Freud tell us, in the *Three Essays on Sexuality*, that masculine homosexuality - he cannot go any further at that time - is manifested by this narcissistic exigency that the object cannot be deprived of this attribute which is considered by the subject as being essential.

We begin to analyse homosexuals. I would ask you to refer at that moment to the work of Boehm as it began to organise itself between the years from 1929 to 1933 and beyond. He was one of the first. I am indicating this because it is quite exemplary. Moreover, I indicated the bibliography of homosexuality when I spoke to you of the importance of articles. The development of analysis shows us that homosexuality is far from being a primordial instinctual exigency. I mean, identifiable with a pure and simple fixation or deviation of the instinct.

We are going to find in a second stage that the phallus, whatever the fashion it intervenes in the mechanism of homosexuality is far from being that of object. That the phallus in question is a phallus that one identifies perhaps hastily with the paternal phallus in so far as this phallus is found in the woman's vagina. And because it is there it is, there it is dreaded, that the subject finds himself carried to extremes and to homosexuality.

Here therefore is a phallus with a quite different import, with a quite different function, and on a quite different plane to the one we first saw.

That is not all. After rejoicing, as I might say, at having caught this hare by the ears, on we go with the analysis of homosexuals, and we perceive that in fact - this is where I refer very specially to the works of Boehm which are particularly clear and confirmed by a vast experience - the image that we will encounter at a later date, in the analytic structurings of homosexuality, is an image which although it presents itself as an appendix - we attribute it in a first sketch to the woman, in so far as she is not yet supposed to be castrated - shows itself when it is circumscribed in a more detailed way as being something which is what one can call evagination, the extra- position from the interior of this organ.

That this phantasy, which precisely we have encountered in the dream, and which I analysed at such length for you, whose analysis I took up at such length with you, this dream of the inverted hood, of an appendix made up of something which is in a way the exteriorisation of the interior, this is something which in a certain investigative perspective proves to be the final imaginary term with which the homosexual of whom there is now question - and there are several analysed by Boehme - finds himself confronted when it is a question of showing him the day- to-day dialectic of his desire.


What does this mean if not that here the phallus presents itself indeed in a radical form in which it is something, in so far as this something is to show in the exterior what is in the imaginary interior of the subject, and that in the last analysis one should almost not be surprised that a certain convergence is established between the imaginary function of what is here in the imaginary in a posture of extraposition, of extirpation, almost detached, but still not detached from the interior of the body, and which most naturally finds itself being able to be raised to the function of symbol, without nevertheless being detached from its radical insertion, from what makes it be felt as a menace to the integrity of the self-image .

Having given this glimpse, I do not want to leave you there, because this is not what is going to give you the sense and the function of o *qua* object in all its generality. I have told you; the object in the phantasy, namely in its most completed form, in so far as the subject is desire, as the subject is therefore on the brink of this castrating relationship, the object is what gives its support to this position. Here I would like to show you the synchrony in which this can be articulated. I underline synchrony, because the requirements of discourse will also necessarily give you a formula which is a little diachronic. Namely that you are going to be able to confuse what I am going to give you here with a genesis. It

nevertheless has nothing to do with that.

What I want to indicate to you by the relationships of the letters which I am now going to write on the board is something that permits us to situate this acquisition in its place, and this object in its relationship to the subject who is in the presence of imminent castration in a relationship that I will provisionally call the relationship of ransom to that position, because I must also accentuate what I mean by talking about a relationship of support.

How is this synchronic support engendered? It is done in the following way. If we begin from the most original subjective position, that of demand as we find it at the level which is illustrated as illustration, the example which is manifested in the behaviour which allows us to grasp in its essence how the subject is constituted in so far as he enters into the signifier, the relationship is the following: it is going to be established in the very simple algorithms which is that of division. It is essentially constituted by this vertical bar.



The horizontal bar being joined to it on this occasion, but not being essential because one can repeat it at every level.

Let us say that it is in the measure that there is introduced by the most primordial relationship of the subject, the relationship to the Other *qua* locus of the word, to the demand, that there is established the dialectic whose residue is going to bring us the position of o, the object.

As I told you, by the very fact that it is in terms of signifying alternation that there is articulated primordially, at the start of the process, which is the one which interests us here, that there is primordially articulated the need of the subject, that there is established everything which is going subsequently to structure this relationship of the subject to himself which is called desire.

The Other, in so far as she is here someone real, but who is evoked in the demand, finds herself in the position of raising this demand, whatever it may be, to another value which is that of the demand for love as such, in so far as it refers purely and simply to the presence-absence alternative.

I could not help being surprised, touched, even moved, to rediscover in Shakespeare's *Sonnets*, literally, this term of presence and absence, with a hyphen, when there is question for him of expressing the love-relationship.

Here then the subject constituted *qua* Other is a real person, as being the one through whom the signification of the demand itself is changed. The one through whom the demand of the subject becomes something different from what it demands, in particular the

satisfaction of a need. There is no subject except for a subject - this is a principle which we always have to maintain as a principle. It is in so far as the Other has been primordially posed as the one who in the presence of the demand is able or is not able to play a certain part, it is already in terms of a tragedy that the other is established as subject. From then on, it is from that moment that the introduction of the subject, of the individual, into the signifier takes on the function of subjectivating him.

It is in so far as the other is a subject as such, that the subject at that moment establishes himself, and can set himself up as subject, that there is established at this moment this new relationship to the other by which he has, in this other, to make himself recognised as subject. No longer as demand, no longer as love, as subject.

You must not think that I am in the process of attributing here to some larva or other all the dimensions of philosophical meditation. This is not what is in question. But neither is it a question of this as hidden. It is a question of this in a concrete and quite real form, namely this something by means of which every kind of function and of functioning of the other in the real, as responding to his demand, that in which this has to find its guarantee, the truth of this behaviour whatever it may be, namely precisely this something which is concretely at the base of truth as intersubjectivity, namely that which gives its full sense to the term truth in English, which is employed not simply to express the truth with a capital T but also what we call in a decomposition of language which is found to be the result of a language system, faith or the word. In other words, what makes it possible to count on the other.

That is what is in question. When I tell you that there is no Other of the other, what does that mean if it is not precisely that no signifier exists which might guarantee the concrete consequence of any manifestation of the signifier. This is where there is introduced this term which is manifested in the fact that at the level of the other something is manifested as a guarantee before the pressure of the demand of the subject before which this something is realised from the beginning and primordially in terms of the lack with respect to which the subject is going to have to locate himself. You should note that this lack, is produced at the level of the Other *qua* locus of the word, not at the level of the other *qua* real. But nothing real on the side of the other can supply for it except by a series of additions which will never be exhausted, but which I put in the margin namely the o or the c *qua* other, in so far as he will manifest himself to the subject throughout his existence by his gifts and by his refusals, but which he will never situate except on the margin of this fundamental lack which is found as such at the level of the signifier.

The subject will be involved historically through all these experiences with others; the maternal other on this occasion. But none of this will be able to exhaust the lack which exists at the level of the signifier as such, at the level where it is at this level that the subject has to locate himself to constitute himself as subject, at the level of the other.

It is here in so far as he himself finds himself marked by this failure, by this non-guarantee, at the level of the truth of the other that he will have to establish this something which we already tried to approach above in the form of its genesis, this something which is o; this something which finds itself submitted to this condition of expressing his final tension, which is the remainder, which is the residue, that which is in the margin of all these demands, and which none of these demands can exhaust; this something which is destined as such to represent a lack and to represent it with a real tension of the subject.

This is as I might say the core of the function of the object in desire. This is what comes as a ransom for the fact that the subject cannot situate himself in desire without castrating himself, in other words without losing what is most essential in his life. And indeed it is also that around which is situated this form, which is one of the most exemplary of desire, that which already the remarks of Simone Weil presented to us as follows: if one knew what the miser locks up in his money box one would know, she says, a lot about desire.

Of course, it is precisely to protect his life that the miser - and this you should note is an essential dimension - locks up in something, in an enclosure, *o*, the object of his desire; and regarding this you are going to see that because of this very fact this object is found to be a mortified object. It is in so far as what is in the money box is outside the circuit of life, is withdrawn from it and preserved as being the shadow of nothing that it is the miser's object. And as well that there is sanctioned here the formula that whoever saves his life will lose it. But this is not to say too quickly that the one who consents to lose it will find it just like that, directly.

What we try to see subsequently is where he will find it. Undoubtedly it is not one of the least valuable aspects of the path that we have taken today to make us see that the path that he takes to rediscover it is going to present him in any case with what he consents to lose, namely the phallus. If there is a moment when he has mourned it, we have indicated this as being an essential step, he can only perceive it, envisage it as a hidden object.

That the term *o*, *qua* opaque term, *qua* obscure term, *qua* term participating in a nothing to which he is reduced, it is beyond this nothing that he is going to seek the shadow of his life lost at the beginning, this highlighting of the functioning of desire which shows us that it is not only the primitive object of the primordial impression in a genetic perspective which is the lost object to be rediscovered, that it is of the very nature of desire to constitute the object in this dialectic is what we are going to take up the next time.

Seminar 21: Wednesday 20 May 1959

Today we are going to take up our account at the point at which we left it the last time, namely at the point where what is in question is a sort of operation which I formalised for you in terms of a subjective division in demand.

We are going to take this up again in so far as it leads us to an examination of the formula of the phantasy in so far as it is the support of an essential relationship, of a pivotal relationship, the one which I am trying to promote for you this year in the functioning of analysis.

If you remember, the last time I wrote down the following letters for you: imposition, proposition of the demand at the locus of the other as being the ideal primary stage. It is of course a reconstruction, and nevertheless nothing is more concrete, nothing is more real, because it is in the measure that the demand of the child begins to be articulated that the process is engendered, or that we claim at least to show that the process is engendered, from which there is going to be formed this *Spaltung* of the discourse which is expressed in the facts of the unconscious.

If you remember the last time we alluded, following on this first position of the subject in the act of the first articulation of the demand, to what can be separated out from it as nevertheless necessary concerning the position of the real other as the one who is omnipotent in order to respond to this demand. As I told you, it is a stage that we have evoked, which is essential for the comprehension of the foundation of the first relationship to the other, to the mother, as giving in the other the first form of omnipotence.

But as I told you, it is in what happens at the level of the demand that we are going to continue the process of the logical generation which is produced starting from this demand. So that what I expressed the other day in the form that made the other intervene as real subject - I do not remember if it was in this form or in another form that I wrote on the blackboard the fact that the demand here takes on a different import, that it becomes a demand for love, that in so far as it is a demand for the satisfaction of a need it is invested at this level with a sign, with a bar which essentially changes its import.

It does not matter whether I used these letters or not - these are in fact the ones I used - because this is very precisely what can engender a whole kind of which is that of the real experiences of the subject, in so far as they are going to be inscribed in a certain number of responses which are gratifying or frustrating, and which are obviously very essential so that there can be inscribed there a certain modulation of his history.

But this is not what is pursued in the synchronic analysis, the formal analysis which is the one that we are pursuing now. It is in the measure that, at a stage subsequent to the one of the position of the other as real other who responds to the demand, the subject questions her as subject, namely where he himself appears to himself as subject in so far as he is subject for another, it is in this relationship of the first stage in which the subject constitutes himself in relationship to the subject who speaks, locates himself in a fundamental strategy which is established once the dimension of language appears, and

which only begins with the dimension of language, it is in the measure that the other being structured in language, by this fact becomes the possible subject of a tragedy with respect to which the subject himself can constitute himself as subject recognised in the other, as a subject for a subject. - There can be no other subject than a subject for a subject, and on the other hand the first subject can only establish himself as such as a subject who speaks, as subject of the word;- it is therefore in so far as the other herself is marked by the necessities of language, that the other establishes herself not as a real other, but as other, as locus of the articulation of a word, that there is brought about the first possible position of a subject as such, of a subject who can grasp himself as subject, who grasps himself as subject in the other, in so far as the other thinks of him as subject.

You see, as I pointed out to you the last time, nothing more concrete than that. It is not at all a stage of philosophical meditation, it is this something primitive which is established in a relationship of trust. In what measure, and up to what point can I count on the other? What is viable in the behaviour of the other? What results can I expect from what she has already promised, this indeed is something on which the most primitive conflicts, the most primitive no doubt from the point of view that interests us, of the relationship of the child to the other, is something around which we see turning, the very establishment and basis of the principles of his history, and also that this is repeated at the most profound level of his destiny, of what commands the unconscious modulation of his behaviour. It is elsewhere than in a pure and simple frustration of gratification.

It is in the measure that something can be based on the other, that, as you know, there is established what we find in analysis, indeed in the most day-to-day experience of analysis, the most radical thing that we find in the unconscious modulation of the patient, neurotic or not.

It is therefore in the measure that before the other as subject of the word, in so far as it is primordially articulated, it is with respect to this other that the subject himself is constituted as subject who speaks. Not at all as primitive subject of knowledge, not at all the subject of philosophers, but the subject in so far as he poses himself as regarded by the other, as being able to respond to him in the name of a common tragedy, as a subject who can interpret everything that the other articulates, designates, about her most profound intention, her good or bad faith.

Essentially at this level, if you will allow me a play on words, the S is really posed not alone as the S which is inscribed as a letter, but also at this level as the *Es* of the topographical formula that Freud gives of the subject, *ça*. *Ça* in an interrogative form, in the form also that if you put here a question mark the S is articulated. S, this is all that at this level the subject still formulates of himself. He is at the state of being born in the presence of the articulation of the other in so far as it responds to him, but as it responds to him beyond what he formulated in his demand.

S, it is at this level that the subject is suspended, and that at the following stage, namely in so far as he is going to take this step in which he wants to grasp himself in the beyond of the word, and himself as marked by something which primordially divides him from himself *qua* subject of the word; it is at this level *qua* barred subject that he can, that he must, that he intends to find the response, that that also he does not find it in so far as he encounters in the other at this level this hollow, this emptiness which I articulated for you by saying that there is no other of the other, that no possible signifier guarantees the authenticity of the sequence of signifiers, that he depends essentially for that on the good will of the other, that there is nothing at the level of the signifier which guarantees,

authenticates in any way the signifying chain and word.

And it is here that there is produced on the part of the subject this something which he draws from elsewhere, that he brings from elsewhere, that he brings in from the imaginary register, that he brings in from a part of himself in so far as he is engaged in the imaginary relationship to the other. And this which comes here, which emerges at the place at which there is brought to bear, in which there is posed the interrogation of the about what he really is, about what he really wants. It is there that there is produced the emergence of this something which we call *o*, *o* in so far as it is the object, the object no doubt of desire, and not in so far as this object of desire might be directly coadapted with respect to desire, but in so far as this object comes into play in a complex which we call the phantasy; the phantasy as such; namely in so far as this object is the support around which, at the moment when the subject faints before the lack of the signifier which corresponds to his place at the level of the other, finds his support in this object.

Namely that at this level the operation is division. The subject tries to reconstitute himself, to authenticate himself, to rejoin himself in the demand directed towards the other. The operation stops. It is in so far that here the quotient (*conscient*) that the subject tries to attain, in so far as he has to grasp himself, reconstitute and authenticate himself as subject of the word, remains here suspended in the presence, at the level of the other, of the appearance of this remainder through which he himself, the subject, supplies, pays the ransom, manages to replace the lack at the level of the other, of the signifier which corresponds to him.

It is in so far as this quotient (*conscient*), and this remainder, remain here in the presence of one another, and as one might say are sustained one by the other, that the phantasy is nothing other than the perpetual affronting of this *S*; of this *S* in so far as it marks this moment of fatigue of the subject in which the subject finds nothing in the other which guarantees him in a fashion that is sure and certain, which authenticates him, which allows him to situate himself and to name himself at the level of the discourse of the other, namely *qua* subject of the unconscious. It is responding to this moment that there emerges, as supplying for the signifier which is lacking, this imaginary element which we call in the most general form, as a correlative term of the structure of the phantasy, of support for *S* as such at the moment that he tries to indicate himself as subject of the unconscious discourse.

It seems to me that here I have no more to say about this; that I am nevertheless going to say more about it to remind you what this means in the Freudian discourse; for example the *Wo Es war soil Ich werden*. 'I must come to be where it was'. It is very precise, it is this *Ich* which is not *das Ich* which is not the ego, which is an *Ich*, the *Ich* used as subject of the sentence. Where it has been, the place where it speaks. Where it speaks, namely where a moment before there was something which is unconscious desire, I must designate myself there, there I must be this *I* which is the goal, the end, the term of analysis before it is named, before it is formed, before it is articulated, if indeed it ever is, because as well in the Freudian formula this *soil Ich werden*, this 'it must be, this I must become', is the subject of a becoming, of a duty which is proposed to you.

We must reconquer the lost field of the being of the subject as Freud says in the same sentence in a nice comparison, like the reconquest by Holland from the *Zuider Zee* of lands which could be peacefully conquered. This field of the unconscious which we must win in the great analytic work, is indeed what is in question. But before this is done there where it has been, what designates for us the place of this *I* which must come to birth? What designates it for us, is the index of what? Very exactly of what is in question, of

desire. Of desire in so far as it is the function and the term of what is in question in the unconscious.

And desire is here sustained by the opposition, the coexistence of two terms which are here the *i*, the subject in so far as precisely at this limit he loses himself, as there that the unconscious begins - which means that there is not purely and simply the privation of something which might be called consciousness. The fact is that another dimension begins in which it is no longer possible for him to know, where he is no longer consciousness (*consciencia*).

Here every possibility of naming oneself comes to a stop. But this stopping point is also the index, the index which is put forward, which is the major function whatever may be the appearances of what at that moment is sustained before him as the object which fascinates him, but which is also what keeps him from being purely and simply cancelled out, losing consciousness of his existence. And this is what constitutes the structure of what we call the phantasy.

This is what we are going to dwell on today. We are going to see what this formula of the phantasy involves in its general application. So we are going to take it, because we said the last time that it was in its synchronic function, namely because of the place it occupies in this reference of the subject to himself, of the subject to what he is at the level of the unconscious when - I will not say he questions himself about what he is - when he is in short carried by the question about what he is. Which is the definition of neurosis.

Let us pause first of all at the formal properties, as analytic experience allows us to recognise them, of this object *o* in so far as it intervenes in the structure of the phantasy.

The subject, we say, is on the brink of this failing nomination which is the structural role of what is aimed at, at the moment of desire. And he is at the point where he undergoes, as I might say, to the maximum, to the highest point, what can be called the virulence of the *logos* in so far as he encounters himself at the high point of the alienating effect of his implication in the *logos*.

This grip on man within the fundamental combinatory, which gives its essential characteristic to the *logos* is a question which people other than myself have to resolve in terms of what it means. I mean, what does it mean that man is necessary for this action of the *logos* in the world. But here what we have to see, is what the result is for man, and how man faces up to it, how he sustains it.

The first formula which may come to us, is that he must sustain it really, that he must sustain it in his reality, of himself as real; namely indeed with what always remains most mysterious in him.

A detour would not be out of place here. It is for us to try to apprehend - it is moreover what some of you have been asking yourselves for a long time - what in the last analysis the meaning of this use that we make here of the term real may be, in so far as we oppose it to the symbolic and the imaginary.

It must be said that if psychoanalysis, if the Freudian experience comes at the right time in our epoch, it is certainly not indifferent to state that it is in so far as there has arisen for us with the greatest insistence what I can describe as a crisis of the theory of knowledge, or of knowledge itself. Indeed this point to which the last time I already tried to draw your

attention, namely what the adventure of science signifies, how it was created, grafted onto, linked into this long culture which was a rather biased or what we could call an incomplete standpoint, which was this withdrawal of man to certain positions of being present to the world which were first of all contemplative positions, those which implied not the position of desire - I pointed it out to you no doubt - but the choice, the election of a certain form of this desire; a desire, I said, for knowledge, a desire to know. Undoubtedly we can specify it as a discipline, an acesis, a choice, and we know what has emerged from it, namely science, or modern science, or science in so far as one can say that it is distinguished for us by this exceptional hold on the world which in a certain way reassures us when we are speaking about reality.

We know that we have some hold on the real, but what is it in fact? Is it a hold derived from knowledge - and here I can only indicate the questions for you - does it not seem at the first approach, at the first apprehension that we have of what results from this process, is that undoubtedly at the point that we have got to, at the point especially of the elaboration of the physical sciences, which is the form where the greatest success has been achieved of the hold of our symbolic chains on something which we call the experiment, the constructed experiment, does it not seem that we have less than ever the feeling of attaining this something which in the ideals of early philosophy, of philosophy at its beginnings, was proposed as the end, the recompense of the effort of the philosopher, of the wise man, namely this participation, this knowledge, this identification to being which was aimed at, and which was represented in the Greek perspective, in the Aristotelean perspective as being what was the end of knowledge, namely the identification by thought of the subject, who was not at that time called the subject, of the one who thought, of the one who pursued knowledge, to the object of his contemplation?

At the end of modern science what do we identify ourselves to? I do not even think that there is a single branch of science, whether it is the one where we have arrived at the most perfect results, the most advanced results, or whether it is those where science is trying to make a beginning, to take the first steps, as in the terms of a psychology which is called behaviourist so that we are sure to be disappointed at the final term as regards what there is to be known, that even when we find ourselves in one of the forms of this science which is still at the stammering stage, which claims to imitate, like the little character in Durer's *Melancholia*, the little angel which alongside the great Melancholia begins to describe his first circles, when we begin a psychology which claims to be scientific, we pose at the beginning that we are going to do simple behaviourism, namely that we are going to be content to look, especially that we are going to refuse at the very beginning any aim which involves this assumption, this identification to what is there in front of us beyond the method, this is going to consist at first in refusing to believe that we can, at the end, arrive at what is in the ancient ideal of knowledge.

There is no doubt here something which is really exemplary, and which is of a nature to make us meditate on what happens when on the other hand a psychology which it, of course if we do not pose it and do not articulate it as a science, is all the same something which poses itself as paradoxical compared to the method defined up to now as being a scientific contribution, Freudian psychology, it tells us that the real of the subject is not to be conceived of as correlative to a knowledge.

The first step where there is situated the real as real, as term of something in which the subject is involved, is not situated with respect to the subject of knowledge because something in the subject is articulated which is beyond his possible knowledge, and which nevertheless is already the subject, and what is more the subject who recognises himself in

the fact that he is subject of an articulated chain. That something which is of the order of a discourse from the beginning, which sustains therefore some support, some support which it is not excessive to qualify with the term being, if after all we give to this term being its minimal definition which, if the term being means something, is the real in so far as it is inscribed in the symbolic, the real involved in this chain which Freud tells us is coherent and determines, beyond all the motivations that are accessible to the operation of knowledge, the behaviour of the subject It indeed is something which in the complete sense deserves to be named as belonging to the order of being, because it is already something which is posed as a real articulated in the symbolic, as a real which has taken its place in the symbolic, and which has taken this place beyond the subject of knowledge.

It is at the moment I would say, and this is where the parenthesis that I opened above comes to an end, it is at the moment that in our experience of knowledge something is concealed from us in what has developed on the tree of knowledge, that something in this branch which is called science proves itself, manifests itself to us as being something which has disappointed the hopes of knowledge - even though on the other hand one could say that this has gone much further perhaps than any kind of effect that was expected from knowledge - it is at the same time, and at this moment that in the experience of subjectivity, in the one that is established in analytic confidences, in the confidence of analysis, that Freud designates for us this chain where things are articulated in a way which is structured in a fashion that is homogeneous with every other symbolic chain, with what we know as discourse which nevertheless is not accessible to contemplation, is not accessible to the subject, in so far as he might repose himself there as the object in which he recognises himself.

Quite the contrary, he fundamentally does not know himself. And in the whole measure that he tries in this chain to approach, that he tries there to name himself, to locate himself, it is precisely there that he does not find himself. He is only there, in a way which in the intervals, in the cuts (*coupures*), every time he wants to grasp himself he is always only in an interval.

And this indeed is why the imaginary object of the phantasy on which he is going to seek to support himself, is structured as it is. This is what I want to show you now. There are many other things to be demonstrated in this formalisation of $\$ \diamond o$, but I want to show you how o is made.

I told you, it is as cut, and as interval, that the subject encounters himself at the end point of his questioning. It is as well essentially as a form of cut that the o , in all its generality, shows us its form.

Here I am going simply to regroup a certain number of common traits that you know already, concerning the different forms of this object. For the people here who are analysts I can go quickly. Afterwards I will go into greater detail, and comment on it again.

If what is in question is that the object in the phantasy is something which has the form of a cut, how are we going to recognise it. Frankly I would say that at the level of the result I think that you are already ahead of me. At least I hope so.

In the relationship which brings it about that the S , at the point where he questions himself as S , can only manage to support himself in a series of terms which are those which we here call o , *qua* object in the phantasy, we can in a first approximation give three examples of it. This does not imply that it is completely exhaustive. It almost is. I say that it

is not completely in so far as to take things at the level of what I would call the result, namely of the constituted o, is not a really legitimate step. I mean that to begin there is simply to start you from a terrain which is already known in which you will be able to find your bearings to make your path easier. It is not the most rigorous path, as you will see when we have to rejoin this term by the more rigorous pathway of structure. Namely the path that begins from the subject in so far as he is barred, in so far as it is he who brings up, who gives rise to the term of object. But it is from the object that we will start because it is there that you will be able to find your bearings.

There are three kinds of references to it in analytic experience, well and truly identified up to now as such.

The first kind is the one which we habitually call, rightly or wrongly, the pregenital object. The second kind is this sort of object which is involved in what is called the castration complex. And you know that in its most general form it is the phallus. The third kind, is perhaps the only term which will surprise you as being a novelty, but in truth I think that those of you who have been able to study carefully enough what I wrote about psychoses will not find themselves all the same essentially upset by it, since the third kind of object fulfils exactly the same function with respect to the subject at his point of failing, of fatigue, is nothing other, and neither more nor less, than what is commonly called a delusion, and is very precisely the reason why Freud, from almost the beginning of his first apprehensions, was able to write: 'These people love their delusion as they love themselves' (*Sie lieben also den Wahn wie sich selbst*) [Draft H 24.1.1895].

We are going to take up these three forms of the object in so far as they allow us to grasp something in their form which allows them to fulfill this function, to become the signifiers which the subject draws from his own substance to sustain before himself precisely this hole, this absence of the signifier at the level of the unconscious chain.

Qua pregenital object what does the o mean?

In animal experience, in so far as it is structured in images should we not here evoke the very term in which more than one materialist reflection comes to resume what after all the functioning of an organism is, however human it may be, at the level of material exchanges. Precisely namely - I am not the one who invented the formula - this animal, however human he may be, is after all only a tube with two orifices, one through which things enter, and the other through which things leave.

And also indeed, this is how the so-called pregenital object is constituted, in so far as it manages to fulfill its signifying function in the phantasy. It is in the measure that that from which the subject nourishes himself cuts itself off from him at a certain moment, indeed that on occasion, it is the reverse of this position, the oral-sadistic stage, he himself cuts it off, or at least makes an effort to cut it off, and bites. It is therefore the object *qua* object of weaning. Which means properly speaking the object of a cut on the one hand, and on the other hand, at the other extremity of the tube, in so far as what he rejects is cut off from him, and also indeed the whole apprenticeship he must undergo of the rites and the forms of cleanliness, so that he may learn that what he rejects is something he cuts off from himself?

It is essentially in so far as that which in ordinary analytic experience we see as the fundamental form of the so-called oral and anal phases, namely the nipple, this part of the breast that the subject can hold in his oral orifice, is also what he is separated from - it is

also indeed this excrement which also becomes for the subject at a different moment the most significant form of his relationship to objects ... are taken, chosen very precisely in so far as they are particularly exemplary, showing in their form the structure of the cut, that they are involved in playing this role of support at the level at which the subject himself finds himself situated as such in the signifier in so far as it is structured by the cut. He is himself, on this occasion, the cut.

And it is this that explains to us why these objects, among others and in preference to others, should be chosen. Because it could not be overlooked that if it were a question of the subject eroticising one or other of his functions, simply as vital functions, why should there not be also a more primitive phase than the others, and what looks like a more fundamental one, which is that it would be attached to a function just as vital from the point of view of nutrition as the one which passes through the mouth and ends up by being excreted through the intestinal orifice, this is respiration.

Yes, but there is in respiration no part of this element of cutting. Respiration is not cut off, or if it is cut off it is in a fashion which does not fail to generate some drama. There is no element of cutting inscribed in respiration except only in an exceptional fashion. Respiration is rhythmical, respiration is pulsation, respiration is vital alternation, it is not something which allows there to be symbolised on the imaginary plane precisely what is in question, namely the interval, the cut.

This is not to say however that there is nothing which passes through the respiratory orifice which cannot, as such, be punctuated, because precisely it is by this same orifice that there is produced the emission of the voice, and that the emission of the voice is something which is cut, which is punctuated. And this indeed is also why we will rediscover it later on, and precisely at the level of this third type of o, which we have called the delusions of the subject.

In so far as this emission precisely is not punctuated, in so far as it is simply *pneuma, flatus*, it is obviously very remarkable - and here I would ask you to refer to Jones' studies - to see that from the point of view of the unconscious it is not individualised at the most radical point as being something which belongs to the order of respiration, but precisely just because of this imposition of the form of cutting referred to the most profound level of experience that we have of it in the unconscious - and it is the merit of Jones to have seen it - to the anal *flatus* which is found paradoxically, and through this sort of unpleasant surprise that the analytic discoveries have brought us, is found symbolised in the depths of what is in question each time that at the level of the unconscious the phallus is found to symbolise the subject.

At the second level, and this of course is only a teaching artifice, because there is no first, nor second level, at the point that we are dealing with here all the o's have the same function.

They have the same function: it is a question of knowing why. They take on one or other form, but in the form that we describe in synchrony, what we are trying to separate out are common traits and characteristics.

Here, at the level of the castration complex, we find a different form for it which is that of mutilation. In effect if it is a question of cutting it is necessary and sufficient that the subject should separate himself from some part of himself, that he should be capable of mutilating himself. And after all the thing, as the analytic authors have perceived, does not

even imply a modality that is all that new at first sight, because they recalled in connection with mutilation, in so far as it plays such an important role in all the forms, in all the manifestations of the access of man to his own reality, in the consecration of his fullness as man - we know by history, we know by ethnography, we know by the accounts of all sorts of initiatory procedures through which man searches in a certain number of forms of stigmatisation, to define his access to a higher level of realisation of himself, we know this function of mutilation as such. And this is not the place that I am going to remind you of this whole range and catalogue.

It is simply necessary, and it is sufficient, for me to remind you here simply in order to allow you, on this occasion, put your finger on the fact, that in a different form it is again here a question of something which we can call cutting, and well and truly, in so far as it establishes the passage to a signifying function, because what remains from this mutilation, is a mark. This is what ensures that the subject who has undergone mutilation as a particular individual in the flock from now on carries on him the mark of a signifier which withdraws him from a first state in order to raise him up, to identify him to the power of being different, superior. This is the meaning of every kind of experience of initiatory transition in so far as we rediscover its signification at the level of the castration complex as such.

But also this does not, I point it out to you in passing, exhaust the question. Because since the time I have been trying with you to approach what is in question at the level of the castration complex, you must have perceived the ambiguities which reign around the function of the phallus. In other words, that if it is simply the result of seeing that from some angle it is what is marked, it is what is raised to the function of signifier, it remains that nevertheless the form of castration is not entirely implied in what we can have externally in the results of ceremonies which culminate in one or other deformation, circumcision.

The mark which is made on the phallus is not some kind of extirpation, of a particular function of negating brought to the phallus in the castration complex. We cannot grasp this at this level of exposition. We will come back to it I think the next time, when we will have to explain that which, I am simply indicating it to you today, is the problem which is posed now that we are tackling things again, that we are again making an inventory. It is the question of how, and why Freud could from the start do this extraordinary thing which is to link the castration complex to this something to which an attentive examination shows that it is not all that solidary, namely to the dominating, cruel, tyrannical function of a sort of absolute father.

Undoubtedly this is a myth. And like all Freud's contributions, it is a really miraculous fact, it is myth which holds up, and we are trying to explain why.

It nevertheless remains that in their fundamental function the initiatory rites, which are marked, which are inscribed in a certain number of forms of stigmatisation, of mutilation, at the point here where we are approaching them today, namely in so far as they play the role of o, in so far as they are seen by the subjects themselves who experience them, as being destined to bring about a change in nature in what in the subject up to then, in the freedom of the pre-initiatory stages which characterise primitive societies, had been left to a sort of indifferent operation of natural desires.

The initiatory rites take the form of changing the meaning of these desires, of giving them, precisely from then on, a function in which there is identified, in which there is designated as such the being of the subject, in which it becomes as one might say a man,

but also a woman, in the full exercise of their powers, in which mutilation serves here to orientate desire, to make it take on precisely this function of index, of something which is realised and can only be articulated, be expressed in a symbolic beyond, and a beyond which is the one that we call today being, a realisation of being in the subject.

One could on this occasion make some lateral remarks, and perceive that if something is offered up to the effect, to the signifying mark of the initiatory rite, it is not of course by chance that it should be everything which here may offer itself as appendage.

You know as well that the phallic appendage is not the only one which on occasion is employed, that without any doubt also the relationship that the subject may establish in any reference to himself, and which is the one in which we can conceive that the experiential apprehension may be most remarkable, namely the relationship of tumescence, designates of course in the first place the phallus as something which offers itself in a privileged fashion, to this function of being able to be exposed to cutting, and as well in a fashion which will undoubtedly be more than in any other object dreaded, and at risk.

It is here that in so far as the function of narcissism is the imaginary relationship of the subject to himself, it should be taken as the supporting point in which there is inscribed at the centre this formation of the signifying object. And here also we can perhaps perceive how what is here important in the experience that we have of everything that happens at the level of the mirror stage, namely the inscription, the situation in which the subject can place his own tension, his own erection with respect to the image beyond himself which is in the other, allows us to perceive how legitimate were certain approaches that the tradition of philosophical psychologists had already made in this apprehension of the function of the ego.

I am alluding here to Maine de Biran's contribution in his very subtle analysis of the role of the feeling of effort. The feeling of effort, in so far as it is thrust forward, being grasped by the subject from two sides at once in so far as he is the author of the thrusting, but as he is also the author of what contains it, nevertheless in the fact that he embraces this thrusting of his as being as such within himself, here is something which when linked to this experience of tumescence makes us perceive the way there can be situated there, and be brought into play at this same level of experience as something through which the subject experiences himself, without nevertheless ever being able to grasp himself, because here also there is properly speaking no mark possible, no cut possible, something whose link I think should here be located in so far as it takes on here a symbolic, symptomatic value at the same level of experience which is the one that we are trying to analyse here, which is the very paradoxical experience of fatigue.

If effort cannot be in any way of use to the subject, for the reason that nothing allows it to be imprinted with a signifying cut, inversely, it seems that this something whose mirage-like character, whose unobjectifiable character at the level of erotic experience, which is called the fatigue of the neurotic, this paradoxical fatigue which has nothing to do with any of the muscular fatigues that we can record on the level of facts - this fatigue, in so far as it corresponds, is in a certain way the inverse, the sequel, the trace of an effort which I would call signifyingness (*signifiantité*).

It is here that we can find - and I think that it is important to note it in passing - this something which in its most general form is that which at the level of tumescence, of the thrusting as such of the subject, gives us the limits in which the possible consecration in the signifying mark has vanished.

We come to the third form of this little o, in so far as it can here serve as an object. Here I would not like to be misunderstood, and undoubtedly I do not have enough time in front of me to be able to accentuate what I am going to try to isolate here in all its details. What I think is the most propitious way of showing you what is in question, and how I understand it outside an attentive reading that I would ask you to undertake of what I have written on the subject of *On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis*, namely what I articulated regarding what Schreber's delusion allows us to articulate in such an advanced, such elaborated fashion, is what is going to allow us to grasp the function of the voice in the delusion as such.

I think that it is in so far as we should try to see the way in which the voice, corresponds very particularly in delusion to the formal exigencies of this o, in so far as it can be raised to the signifying function of the cut, of the interval as such, that we will understand the phenomenological characteristics of this voice.

The subject produces the voice. And I would further say we will have to make this function of the voice intervene in so far as we bring into play the weight of the subject, the real weight of the subject in the discourse. In the formation of the agency of the super ego, the big voice is to be brought into play as something which represents the agency of another manifesting himself as real.

Is it the same voice that is in question in the voice of the deluding person? Is the voice of the deluding person this something whose dramatic function Cocteau tried to isolate under the title *La voix humaine*? It is enough to refer ourselves to this experience that we can have of it in effect in an isolated form, in the place where Cocteau, with a lot of relevance and flair himself showed us its pure incidence, namely on the telephone. What does the voice tell us as such, beyond the discourse that it holds on the telephone? There is undoubtedly no need here for you to vary, and to make a little kaleidoscope of the experiences that one can have of it. It should be enough for you to evoke that in trying to demand a service in any commercial or other type of enterprise, you find at the end of the line one of these voices which teach you enough about the character of indifference, of bad will, of a will set up to evade whatever may be personal or present in your demand, and which is very essentially this type of voice which already lets you know that you can expect nothing from the one you are appealing to; one of these voices that we will call the voice of an overseer (*contremaître*). This term so magnificently constructed by the genius of the tongue. Not that he is against the master (*contre le maître*) but that he is the opposite (*le contraire*) of the true master.

This voice, this sort of embodiment of vanity, of inexistence, of bureaucratic emptiness that certain voices can sometimes give you, is this what we designate when we speak about the voice in the function that we make it intervene at the level of o? No, absolutely not. If here the voice presents itself well and truly, and as such, as pure articulation - and this indeed is what constitutes the paradox of what the deluding person communicates to us when we question him, and that something that he has to communicate about the nature of these voices always seems to conceal itself in a very particular way - there is nothing more firm for him than the consistency and the existence of the voice as such. And of course it is precisely because it is reduced in its most trenchant form to the pure point at which the subject cannot take it except as imposing itself on him.

And so I also put the accent, when we were analysing President Schreber's delusion, on this character of cutting which is highlighted to such an extent that the voices heard by

Schreber are exactly the beginning of sentences : *Sie sollen werden* etc., and precisely the words the signifying words, which are interrupted, which are pushed forward, allowing the appeal to signification to arise after they have been cut off.

The subject is involved here in effect, but properly speaking in so far as he himself disappears, succumbs, is entirely swallowed up in this signification which is only aimed at him in a global fashion. And indeed it is in this word: it involves him (*il l'intéresse*) that I would resume today, as I am about to leave you, this something which I tried to apprehend and to grasp for you today.

I agree that this session has been perhaps one of the most difficult of all of those that I have addressed to you. I hope you will be rewarded for it the next time. We will be able to proceed along less arid paths. But I asked you today to sustain yourselves around this notion of *intéressé*. The subject is as being in the interval, as being what is in the interval of the unconscious discourse, as being properly speaking the metonymy of this being which is expressed in the unconscious chain.

If the subject feels himself highly interested by these voices, by these sentences without head or tail of the delusion, it is for the same reason as in all the other forms of this object that I enumerated for you today it is at the level of the cut, it is at the level of the interval that he is fascinated, and that he fixes himself to sustain himself in this instant at which properly speaking he envisages himself and he questions himself as being. As a being of his unconscious.

It is around this indeed that we pose the question here. And all the same I do not want to finish, at least for those who come here for the first time, without making them sense what the import is of such an analysis, of this little link which my discourse today is, with respect to those which have succeeded one another for days. The fact is that what is in question here also is to see what we should do with respect to this phantasy. Because I showed you here the most radical, the most simple forms of this phantasy, those in which we know it constitutes the privileged objects of the unconscious desire of the subject. But this phantasy is mobile; if one teases it out one must not think that it can, like that, drop one of its members. There is no example where a phantasy which has been properly attacked does not react by reiterating its form as phantasy.

So that we know what complicated forms this phantasy can reach in so far precisely as in what is called its perverse form it insists, it maintains, it complicates its structure, it tries harder and harder to fulfill its function. Does interpreting this phantasy, as it is said, to be purely and simply leading the subject back to a present of which we are the measure, the present of a reality that we can define as men of science, or as men who imagine that after all everything is reducible to terms of knowledge?

It seems indeed that this is something towards which a whole direction of analytic technique is tending to reduce the subject to the functions of reality, this reality which I reminded you the last day, this reality which for certain analysts does not seem to be able to be articulated otherwise than as being that of what I called a world of American lawyers. Is it not no doubt the case that the enterprise is outside the range of the means of a certain persuasion? Does not the place occupied by the phantasy require of us to see that there is another dimension where we have to take into account what one can call the true exigencies of the subject? Precisely this dimension not at all of a reality brought about by a reduction to the common world, but of a dimension of being, of a dimension where the subject carries in himself something, by God, which is perhaps just as uncomfortable to carry as Hamlet's

message, but which also indeed even though perhaps it promises him a fatal destiny is not something either which we analysts, if it is the case that we analysts find in the experience of desire something more than a simple accident, than something which after all is really inconvenient, and regarding which there is nothing to do but wait until it passes and old age comes so that the subject can rediscover quite naturally the paths of peace and of wisdom ... This desire designates for us analysts something other. Regarding this other thing that it designates for us, how can we operate with it, what is our mission, what is when all is said and done our duty? This is the question that I pose in speaking about the interpretation of desire.

Seminar 22: Wednesday 27 May 1959

Today we are going to continue the study of the place of the function of phantasy as it is symbolised in the relationships of the subject, provided, from the subject, *qua* marked by the effect of the word with respect to an object *o* which we tried, the last time, to define as such. This function of the phantasy, as you know is situated somewhere at that level. This relationship which we have tried to inscribe on what we call the graph is something very simple in fact because the terms are resumed at the four points, as I might say, situated at the intersection of two signifying chains by a loop which represents the subjective intention, this intersection, therefore, determining these four points which we have called code points, which are those on the right, here, and two other message points, this in function of the retroactive character of the effect of the signifying chain with respect to signification.

Here therefore are the four points which we have learned to furnish with the following significations, they are the loci where there comes to be situated the encounter of the intention of the subject with the concrete fact, the fact that there is language here.

The two other signs that we will have to come to today are S in the presence of D, and S signifier of O. The two signifying chains, as you know, this has been elucidated for a long time, represent respectively the lower chain, that of the concrete discourse of the subject, in so far as it is, as such, let us say, accessible to consciousness. What analysis teaches us, is that in so far that it is accessible to consciousness, it is perhaps, it is surely because it begins from illusions which we affirm to be entirely transparent to consciousness. And if, for several years, I insisted before you from every angle from which it could be suggested on the illusory aspects of this effect of transparency, if I tried to show by every sort of fable, which perhaps you still remember, how, at the limit we were able to try, in the form of an image in a mirror which became efficacious, beyond any subsistence of the subject, by what persistent mechanism, in the subjective nothingness realised by the destruction of all life, if I try to give you, there, the image of a possibility of subsistence of something absolutely specular independently of any subjective support, it is not for the simple pleasure of such a game, but this rests on the fact that a structured *montage*, like that of a signifying chain, can be supposed to last beyond any subjectivity of supports.

Consciousness, in so far as it gives us this feeling of being me (*moi*) in the discourse, is something which, in the analytic perspective, the one which makes us put our finger constantly on the systematic *méconnaissance* of the subject, is something which precisely our experience teaches us to refer to a relationship, showing us that this consciousness in so far as it is first of all experienced, as it is first of all felt in an image which is an image of one's counterpart, is something which, rather, covers over with an appearance of consciousness what is included there in the relationships of the subject to the primary, naive signifying chain, to the innocent demand, to the concrete discourse, in so far as it is perpetuated from mouth to mouth, organises what discourse there is in history itself, what rebounds from articulation to articulation in what effectively happens at a more or less greater distance from this concrete, common, universal discourse, which englobes every

real, social activity of the human group.

The other signifying chain is the one which is positively given to us in analytic experience as inaccessible to consciousness. You can indeed sense all the same that if already, for us, this reference to the consciousness of the first chain is suspect, *a fortiori* this single characteristic of the inaccessibility to consciousness is something which, for us, poses questions about what the meaning of this inaccessibility is.

So that we should consider - and I will come back to this - we should carefully specify what we mean by that. Should we consider that this chain, inaccessible to consciousness as such, is made up as a signifying chain? But this is what I will come back to later. Let us pose it, for the moment, in the way it presents itself to us. Here, the dotted line on which it is presented signifies that the subject does not articulate it *qua* discourse, what he actually articulates is something else, what he articulates at the level of the signifying chain is situated at the level of the intentional loop. It is in so far as the subject locates himself as acting in the alienation of significance with the operation of the word that the subject articulates himself as what? As enigma, as question, very exactly what is given to us in experience from what is tangible in the evolution of the human subject, in a moment of childish articulation, namely that beyond the first demand with all the consequences that it involves, there is a moment at which he is going to try to sanction what he has before him, to sanction things in the order inaugurated by significance. As such, he is going to say what and he is going to say why. It is within this that there is the express reference to discourse, this is what presents itself as continuing the first intention of the demand, carrying it to the second intention of discourse as discourse, of the discourse which questions itself, which questions things with respect to itself, with respect to their situation in the discourse which is no longer exclamation, interpolation, the cry of need, but already nomination. This is what represents the second intention of the subject and if I make this second intention begin from the locus O it is in so far as if the subject is entirely in the alienation of significance, in the alienation of the spoken articulation as such and that it is there and at that level that there is posed the question which I called, the last time, subject as such of S with a question mark. So that, it is not that I enjoy the operations of ambiguity but it is also quite coherent with the level at which we are proceeding, at the point that we are articulating. It is within this questioning, of this internal questioning, to the established locus of the word, to discourse, it is within this that the subject must try to situate himself as subject of the word, again demanding there: is it, what, why, who is speaking, where is it speaking. It is precisely in the fact that that which, at the level of the signifying chain, is articulated, is not articulatable at the level of this S, of this question, which constitutes the subject once he is established in the word, it is in this that there consists the fact of the unconscious (*la conscience*).

Here, I would simply like to recall for the benefit of those who may here be disturbed as if it were an arbitrary construction, by this identification of the unconscious chain which I present here, with respect to the questioning of the subject being in the same relationships as those of the first discourse, of the demand to the intention which arises from need. I would like to remind you of this: the fact is that if the signifier, if the unconscious (*la conscience*) has a meaning, this meaning has all the characteristics of the function of the signifying chain as such, and here I know that in giving this brief reminder I should, for the majority of my listeners, make an allusion to what I know they have already heard from me when I already spoke about this signifying chain in so far as it is illustrated in the story that I published elsewhere, the fable about the white discs and the black discs, in so far as it illustrates something structural in the relationships of subject to subject in so far as one finds three terms there. In this story a distinctive sign permits there to be

identified, to be discriminated, with respect to a black or white couple, the relationship with the other subjects; for those who do not remember it, I will limit myself to telling them to refer to what I wrote on this subject, with reference to this succession of oscillations through which the subject locates himself with respect to what? With respect to the research of the other which is carried out in function of what the others see of himself and of what determines them in a conclusive fashion namely what I will call here the, that by which the subject decides that he is effectively white or black, proves that he is ready to declare that for which the fable is constructed.

Do you not find here very exactly that which we are accustomed to use in the structure of the unconscious (*I'incursion*) namely this fact of relative identification, this possibility of denegation, of refusal of articulation, of defence, which are as coherent to the impulse as the back and front of the same thing, and which conclude with something which becomes for the subject the mark, the choice in such conditions, in such situations, what he always chooses first, this power of repetition, which is always the same, which we try to call, according to the subjects, a masochistic tendency, a penchant for failure, the return of the repressed, the fundamental evocation of the primal scene. All of this is one and the same thing, the repetition in the subject of a type of sanction whose forms go way beyond the characteristics of the content. Essentially, unconsciousness always presents itself for us as an indefinitely repeated articulation and this is why it is legitimate for us to situate, it in this schema in the form of this dotted line. Why do we make it dotted here? As we said, in so far as the subject does not gain access to it and we say, more precisely, in so far as the fashion in which the subject can name himself there, can situate himself in so far as he is the support of this sanction, in so far as he can designate himself there, in so far as he is the one who will after all carry the mark, the stigmata of what remains for him not only ambiguous, but properly speaking inaccessible up to a certain end point which is the one, precisely, that analytic experience gives. No operation of his can be articulated at this level, but the experience presents itself as if it comes from outside and that it is already a lot that it comes, he can read it, as a *ça parle*. There is here a distance of which it is not even said, even though Freud's commandment allows us to envisage it, that the subject can reach its goal in any way whatsoever.

The import, therefore, at this level, of what is called the code point, in so far as we symbolise it here by the confrontation of \$ with the demand, signifies what? Very precisely the following: it is that this and nothing other than this point that we call the code point and which is only carried away in so far as analysis begins to decipher the coherence of the upper chain, it is in so far as the subject S qua subject of the unconscious, namely *qua* the subject who is constituted in the beyond of the concrete discourse, *qua* subject sees, reads, hears, I say retroactively, we can suppose him here as the support for the articulation of the unconscious (*la conscience*), encounters what? Encounters that which in this chain of the word of the subject in so far as he asks questions about himself encounters the demand.

What role does the demand play at this level? At this level, and this is what the sign between \$ and D means, at this level demand is affected with its properly symbolic form, demand is utilised in so far as beyond what it requires in terms of the satisfaction of need, it poses itself as this demand for love or this demand for presence, through which we have said demand establishes the other to whom it is addressed as the one who can be present or absent. It is in so far as demand plays this metaphorical function, *qua* demand, whether it is oral or anal, becomes the symbol of the relationship to the other, that it plays here the function of code, that it allows there to be constituted the subject as being situated at what we call, in our language the oral or anal phase for example.

But this can also be called the correspondence of the message, namely because of the fact that with this code the subject can respond to or receive as message what the question is which, in the beyond, gives the first grasp on the signifying chain. It is presented here also in dots and as coming from the other, the question of *Che vuoi?*, what do you want? This is what the subject, beyond the other, poses for himself under the form of S? The response is the one here symbolised on the schema by the significance of the other *qua* \$. We have given this significance of the other *qua* \$ at this level, a meaning which is the most general meaning, this meaning in which there is going to run the adventure of the concrete subject, his subjective history. The most general form is the following: it is that there is nothing in the other, there is nothing in significance which can suffice at this level of signifying articulation.

There is nothing in significance which is the guarantee of truth. There is no other guarantee of the truth than the goodwill of the other, namely something which is always posed for the subject in a problematic form.

Does that mean that the subject remains stuck with his question, of this entire regarding what for him gives rise to the kingdom of the word? It is precisely here that we arrive at our phantasy. Already the last time, I showed you that the phantasy in so far as it is the concrete abutment by which we tackle at the limits of consciousness, how this phantasy plays, for the subject, this role of imaginary support, precisely of this point at which the subject finds nothing which is able to articulate him *qua* subject of his unconscious discourse.

It is to this then that we must return today, to question more closely what this phenomenon is about. I remind you of what I said the last time about the object, as if the object played here the same role of mirage as at the lower stage the image of the specular other plays with respect to the ego. Therefore then, over against the point where the subject is going to situate himself to accede to the level of the unconscious chain here there is proposed the phantasy as such. This relationship to the object as it is in the phantasy leads us to what, to a phenomenology of the cutting from the object in so far as it can support, on the imaginary plane, this relationship of cutting which is the one at which at this level the subject has to support himself.

We have seen this object *qua* imaginary support of this relationship of cutting at the three levels of pregenital object, of castrating mutilation and also of the hallucinatory voice as such, that is to say less in so far as it is an embodied voice than discourse *qua* interrupted, *qua* cut off from the interior monologue, *qua* cut off in the text of the interior monologue.

Let us see today whether a whole lot more does not remain to be said if we come back to the meaning of what is expressed there, because also what is in question, with respect to something which I already introduced the last time, namely from the point of view of the real, from the point of view of knowledge. At what level are we here since we are introduced to the level of an *esse*? Is this *esse* something other than an ambiguity, which is open to being filled up with any meaning whatsoever. Where are we going to stop, in its verbal belonging by conjugation, to the verb to be. Something was already contributed to this the last time. It is a question in effect of knowing at what level we are here as regards the subject in so far as the subject does not locate himself simply in terms of discourse, but also indeed in terms of some realities.

I am saying the following: if something is presented, is articulated which we might,

in a coherent fashion, entitle reality, I mean the reality that we take into account in our analytic discourse, I would situate its field on this schema here in the field which is beneath the concrete discourse, in so far as this discourse englobes it and encloses it, is a reserve of a knowledge, of a knowledge which we can extend as far as everything that can speak for man. I mean that he is not for all that obliged, at every instant, to recognise what he has already included of his reality, of his history in his discourse, that everything that is presented, for example, in the Marxist dialectic, as alienation can here be grasped and articulated in a coherent fashion.

I would go further. The cut, let us not forget - and this is already indicated to us in the type of the first object of the phantasy, the pregenital object. What am I alluding to as objects which can here support phantasies, if not to real objects in a close relationship with the vital drive of the subject, in so far as they are separated from him. It is only too obvious that the real is not an opaque continuum, that the real is of course made up of cuts, just as much and well beyond the cuts of language and it is not today or yesterday that the philosopher Aristotle spoke to us about the 'good philosopher', which means, as I understand it, just as much someone who knows in all its generality, who can be compared to the good cook, he is the one who knows how to insert the knife in the right place, cutting at the articulations, knowing how to penetrate without injuring them.

The relationship of the cutting of the real to the cutting of language is something therefore which, up to a certain point, appears to satisfy the thing in which the philosophical tradition has always been installed, namely that it is only a question of the overlapping of a system of cutting by another system of cutting. The reason I say that the Freudian question comes at the right time, is in so far as the journey which has now been accomplished by science allows us to formulate that there is in the adventure of science something which goes well beyond this identification, this overlapping of natural cuts by the cuts of some discourse or other, something which by an effort which has essentially consisted in voiding every scientific articulation of its mythological implantations and we will see, later, something which from there has led us to the point that we are now at and which seems to me to be sufficiently characterised without being any more dramatic about it by the term of the disintegration of matter. This indeed is something which might suggest that we should see in this adventure only pure and simple pieces of knowledge. This, the fact is that by placing ourselves on the plane of the real, or, if you wish, provisionally, of something which I will call, on this occasion with all the necessary accent of irony, because it is certainly not my inclination to call it this, the great whole. From this point of view science and its adventure present themselves as the real, referring its own cuts to itself, but as elements creating something new and which take the path of proliferating in a fashion which here, undoubtedly, we cannot deny to ourselves, as men, that our mediating function, our function as agents does not allow us to pose the question of whether the consequences of what manifests itself do not go a little bit beyond us.

Man in fact, enters perhaps into this game at his own expense. There is no need here, for us, to go any further. Because this discourse which I am deliberately making sober and restrained, but I suppose whose dramatic and contemporary accent does not escape you, what I want to say here, is that this question about the adventure of science is different to anything that has been articulated, with even these extreme consequences of science, with all the consequences of the human drama, *qua* inscribed in the whole of history. Here, in this case the particular subject is in relationship with this sort of cut that is constituted by the fact that with respect to a certain conscious discourse he is not, that he does not know what he is. This is what is in question, it is a question of the relationship of the real of the subject as entering into the cut and this coming of the subject to the level of the cut has

something which must be called real, but which is symbolised by nothing. It may seem perhaps excessive to you to see delineated at the level of what we have called above a pure manifestation of this being, the elective point of the relationship of the subject to what we can here call his pure being as subject, that by means of which, from then on, the phantasy of desire takes on its function of designating this point.

This is why, at another moment, I was able to define this function that is fulfilled by the phantasy as a metonymy of being and identify as such, at this level, desire. Let us be quite clear that at this level the question remains entirely open as to whether we can call the one who indicates himself in this fashion, man. For, what can we call man if not the one who is already symbolised as such and who as well, every time he is spoken about, finds himself therefore charged with all the recognitions that we can call historical. The word humanism usually designates nothing at this level. But there is of course in him something real, something real which is necessary and sufficient to assure in experience itself this dimension which we call, I believe, rather inappropriately usually, depth, let us say a beyond, which means that a being is never identifiable to any of the roles, to employ the term that is currently used, that he assumes.

Here therefore, the dignity, as I might say, of this being is defined in a relationship which is neither, in anything, that it is cut, if I may express myself thus, with all the backgrounds, especially the castrating references, if you are able along with other experiences to include in it not someone who is guilty (*coupable*) if I may make a play on words, but the cut (*coupure*) as such, namely when all is said and done what presents itself to us as being the last structural characteristic of the symbolic as such; regarding which, I only want simply to indicate in passing that what we find there, is the direction in which I already taught you to look for what Freud called the death instinct, the way in which this death instinct may find itself converging with being.

At this point, there may be some difficulties, I would like to try to fill things out.

In the last number of the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, there is a very interesting, and temperate, article by Mr. Kurt Eissler called 'The Function of Detail in the Interpretation of Works of Art.' It is to a work of art, and to the work of art in general, in effect, that I am going to try to refer to illustrate what is in question here. Kurt Eissler begins his discourse, and finishes it moreover, with a remark which I would say can be differently described according to whether one considers it as confused or as simply undeveloped. Here, in effect, is more or less what he articulates. The term detail seems to him to be particularly significant in connection with the work of an author who is moreover completely unknown outside the Austrian circle. He is an author-actor, and if I refer to this, it is because I am going to come back, later, to Hamlet. The actor-author in question is a little unknown Shakespeare.

Dealing with this Shakespeare who lived at the beginning of the last century in Vienna, Eissler has composed one of these very pretty little stories, which are quite typical of what is called applied psychoanalysis, namely that once again, he has found, throughout the life of this person, a certain number of indicative, paradoxical elements, which allow questions to be introduced which will always remain unresolved, namely whether had been quite specially affected, five years before he wrote one of his major works, by the death of someone who was for him a sort of model, but a model he had assumed to such a degree that all sorts of questions arise in connection with paternal, maternal, sexual identification, everything that you can imagine. The question, in itself, leaves me fairly cold, it is an example of one of these gratuitous works which, in this style, are constantly renewed with a

value of repetition which keeps also its value of conviction, but this is not what is in question.

What is in question is the following. It is the kind of distinction that Eissler wants to establish between the function of what he calls in English more or less the relevant details, let us call it the detail which does not fit in, and the pertinent detail. In effect, it is in connection with something in a rather well-written play called, it is in connection with something which is completely out of place there, which is absolutely not implied by anything, that Kurt Eissler pricks up his ears, and step by step, he manages to rediscover a certain number of biographical facts whose interest is absolutely obvious. Therefore, what is in question is the value of the irrelevant detail as a guide. And here Eissler draws up a sort of opposition between what happens clinically and what happens in the so-called applied analyses which are usually made in the analysis of a work of art. He repeats twice something - if I had the time I should read out the text for you to give you a sense of its rather opaque character - he says in short, that it is more or less the same role that is played by the symptom and this inappropriate detail, except that in analysis, we begin with the symptom which is given as an element that is essentially irrelevant for the subject. It is in its interpretation that we progress to its solution. In the other case, it is the detail which introduced us to the problem, namely that in the measure that in a text - he does not even go to the stage of formulating this notion of text - in a text we grasp something which not being particularly implicated in it, being discordant, we are introduced to something which can lead us to the personality of the author.

There is here something which, if one looks at it more closely, will not stand up as a relationship of contrast. It seems that it should be enough for you to reflect on it in order to see it. If there is a contrast, there is also of course a parallel, that on the whole, the thing towards which it seems this remark should lead him, is undoubtedly that the discordance in the symbolic, in the symbolic as such in a written work, and here in any case, plays a functional role, completely identifiable to a real symptom, in any case from the point of view of the progress, if this progress can be considered as a progress, in knowledge concerning the subject. From this point of view, in any case, the comparison has a real interest. Simply the question is then posed for us of knowing if in the work of art, I would say it is only the typing error that is going to be significant. And after all why? Because if it is here that in the work of art, what one can call the typing error, you understand of course that I mean something which is presented to us as a discontinuity, can lead us to some knowledge that is useful for us, serve as an indication in which we find in their major illuminations, in their unconscious impact, one or other incident in the past life of the author - this is what happens effectively in this article - is it not a fact that in any case the thing introduces us to the following, that the dimension of the work of art should be illuminated for us. In effect, from then on, and starting from this single fact - we will see it well beyond this fact - we can posit that the work of art, henceforward, can no longer be for us in any way affirmed as representing this transposition, this sublimation, call it what you will, of reality. It is not a question of something which operates as largely as possible by imitation, it is a question of something which operates just as largely as possible in the order of

This can therefore be applied just as well to the following which is moreover the general case namely that the work of art always undergoes a profound reworking, this does not put in question, even the fact which I think we have already gone beyond, but this is not the point that I intend to draw your attention to. The fact is that the work of art is limited for us to a type of work of art. For the moment, I will limit myself to the written work of art. The work of art, far from being something which transfigures, in any way whatsoever,

however broadly you may understand it, reality, introduces in its very structure this fact of the advent of the cut in so far as there is manifested in it the real of the subject *qua* beyond what he says. He is the unconscious subject because if this relationship of the subject to the advent of the cut is prohibited to him in so far as this precisely is where his unconscious is, it is not prohibited to him *qua* subject to the experience of the phantasy, namely that he is animated by what is called this relationship of desire and that by the simple reference to this experience and in so far as it is intimately woven into the work, something becomes possible through which the work is going to express this dimension, this real of the subject in so far as we have called it above the advent of being beyond any possible subjective realisation and that it is towards the virtue and the form of the work of art, the one which succeeds and also the one which fails, that it involves this very dimension, this dimension as I might say, if I may use the topology of my schema to give you a sense of it, this transversal dimension which is not parallel to the field created in the real by human symbolisation which is called reality, but which for its part is transversal in so far as the most intimate relationship of man to the cut in so far as he goes beyond all the natural cuts, that there is this essential cut of his existence, namely that he is there and he must situate himself in this very fact of the advent of the cut, that this is what is in question in the work of art and especially in the one that we have tackled most recently because it is in this respect the most problematic work, namely Hamlet.

There are also all sorts of irrelevant things in Hamlet. I would even say that this is the way that we progressed but in a completely enigmatic fashion. We could not help, at every moment, questioning ourselves about the following: what does this irrelevance mean. Because there is one thing that is clear, which is that it cannot be excluded that Shakespeare intended it. If rightly or wrongly, it does not matter, Kurt Eissler, in the work of, can find it odd that there should be brought in, at a particular moment, a period of five years that nobody had previously spoken about - it is the irrelevant detail which is going to put him on the path of a certain research - it is clear that we have not proceeded in at all the same fashion about what happens in Hamlet, because, in any case, we are sure that this tissue of irrelevancies cannot, in any case, be purely and simply resolved by us by the fact that Shakespeare here let himself be led by his genius. We have the sense that he had some part in it, and after all if for no other reason than as regards the most profound manifestation of his unconscious, in any case here it is the architecture of these irrelevancies which shows us what he arrives at, it is essentially to deploy himself in the major affirmation which we distinguished above, namely in this type of relationship of the subject, to his most profound level, as speaking subject, namely in so far as he brings to birth his relationship to the cut as such.

This indeed is what the architecture of *Hamlet* shows us in so far as we see what in *Hamlet* fundamentally depends on a relationship which is that of the subject to the truth. Which is different to the dream of the dead father, which we started from this year, in our exploration, the dream of the dead father who appeared before the son transfixed with sorrow. Here the father knows that he is dead and lets his son know it and what distinguishes the scenario, the articulation of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* from the story of Hamlet as is appeared in the story of, is precisely, that they are the only two to know. In the story the murder has taken place publicly and Hamlet acts like a mad-man to dissimulate his intentions. Everyone knows that there has been a crime.

Here, it is only the two of them that know, and one of them is a ghost. Now what is a ghost if not the representation of this paradox as a work of art alone can produce it and it is here that Shakespeare is going to render it entirely credible for us. Other people besides myself have shown the function that is fulfilled by this arrival of the ghost in the

foreground. The function of the ghost is necessary from the beginning of Hamlet. And what does this ghost say? He says very strange things and I am astonished that no one has even approached, I will not say the the psychoanalysis of the ghost, but has not by some questioning put the accent on what the ghost says. There is no doubt in any case about what he says: he says 'The betrayal is absolute, there was nothing greater, more perfect, than my faithful relationship to this woman. There is nothing more total than the betrayal of which I was the object'. Everything that is posed, everything that is affirmed in terms of goodwill, fidelity and vow, is therefore posed for Hamlet. Not simply as revocable but as having been literally revoked. The absolute cancelling out of this unfolds at the level of the signifying chain and is something quite different from this lack of something which might act as guarantee. The term which is guaranteed is the non-truth, this sort of revelation, as one might say of the lie. This is something which would deserve to be followed up, represents the spirit of Hamlet, this sort of stupor that he enters into after the paternal revelations. It is something which in Shakespeare's text is expressed in a quite remarkable way, namely that when he is asked what he has learned, he does not want to say, and with good reason, but he expresses it in a quite particular fashion. 'There's ne'er a villain dwelling in all Denmark but he's an arrant knave' (I v 123), namely that he expresses himself on the level of tautology.

But let us leave this to one side. These are only details and anecdotes. The question is elsewhere. The question is the following: where are we deceived. It is generally accepted that a dead person cannot lie. And why? For the same reason, perhaps, that the whole of our science still preserves the postulate that Einstein has explicitly underlined. He said, from time to time, things which were not all that superficial, as philosophical statements. He said: God is subtle certainly, but he is honest. And can we say as much about a father who tells us in a categorical fashion that he is suffering all the torments of the flames of hell, and this for absolutely infamous crimes. There is here, all the same, something which cannot fail to alert us, there is some discordance and if we follow the effects in Hamlet of what is presented as the eternal damnation of the truth always condemned to be concealed from him, if we conceive that Hamlet remains then locked into this affirmation of the father, cannot we ourselves, up to a certain point, question ourselves about what is signified, at least functionally, by this word, with respect to the genesis and the unfolding of the whole drama? Many things could be said, including the following: that Hamlet's father says the following:

But virtue, as it never will be moved
 Though lewdness court it in a shape of Heaven,
 So lust, though to a radiant angel linked
 Will sate itself in a celestial bed
 And prey on garbage. (I v 53ff)

It is moreover a bad French translation because one should say: *Ainsi le vice quoique lié à un ange radieux.*

What radiant angel are we talking about? If it is a radiant angel who introduces vice, in this relationship of broken love in which the whole blame is visited on the other, could it be here more than anywhere else that the person who always comes to bear testimony to the insult that has been undergone does not have some part in it? This, of course, is the key which can never be turned, the secret that can never be revealed?

But is there not something here that emerges to put us on the track of the word in which we should understand something. Well indeed, it is here, as elsewhere, the phantasy.

Because the eternally unsolved enigma, however primitive we may suppose to be, and with good reason, the brains of Shakespeare's contemporaries, all the same what a curious choice is this vial of poison poured into the ear of the ghost who is the father, who is Hamlet the father, do not forget it, because they are both called Hamlet.

The analysts have not really gone into this area. There have been a good number who have indicated that, perhaps, some symbolic element should be recognised in it. But it is something which, in any case, can be situated, according to our method; in the form of the block that it forms, of the whole that it forms, of the impenetrable enigma that it constitutes. There is no need to underline, I have done so already, the paradox of this revelation, and also its consequences.

The important thing is the following: we have here a structure which is not only phantastical, which fits in so well with what is happening, namely that in any case there is someone who is poisoned through the ear, it is Hamlet, and here what functions as a poison, is the word of his father. From then on, Shakespeare's intention becomes a little clearer, namely that what he has shown us from the beginning is the relationship of desire to this revelation. For two months, Hamlet remains under the influence of this revelation and how is he going to reconquer little by little the use of his limbs? Well, precisely by a work of art. The actors come to him at the right time for him to make of them the testing ground for the conscience of the king, the text tells us. What is certain, is that it is by way of this text that he is going to be able to enter into action, into an action which is going to unfold necessarily from the first consequences, namely, first of all that this person who, since the paternal revelation has only wished for his own dissolution:

Oh, that this too too solid flesh would melt.
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew! (I ii 129ff).

At the end of the play, we see him seized by a drunkenness which has a quite precise name, it is that of the pyrotechnist, he is wild with joy at having succeeded in doing his worst, he can no longer be contained and Horatio has to hold on to his coat-tails to limit this excessive exuberance. When he says to him: 'Would not this get me a fellowship in a cry of players...?' Horatio replies: 'Half a share' (III ii 288ff). He knows the limits that should be observed. In effect everything is far from being reconquered with this affair. It is not because he is a pyrotechnist that he has once again found his role. But it is enough that one should know that he is a pyrotechnist to understand that he will take on the first role that he finds. He will carry out what he is, when all is said and done, commanded to do.

I will read for you another time the text of this passage. 'A poison ingested by a rat' - and you know that the rat is never very far away, especially in Hamlet - 'gives him this thirst which is the very thirst he will die of, because it will dissolve completely in him, this mortal poison as Hamlet was first inspired by it'.

Something is added to what I have just told you which allows its whole accent to be given to it. An author named was astonished by a fact which the audience should have perceived long since, which is that Claudius shows himself so insensitive to what precedes the play scene, the one in which Hamlet presents before Claudius the very scene of his crime. There is a sort of prologue which consists in a pantomime in which one sees, before this whole long scene of the protestations of fidelity and love by the queen in the play to the king in the play, beforehand, the gesture of pouring the poison into the ear in the very context of the orchard, of the garden, is made practically in front of Claudius who literally does not give a peep.

Whole lives have been spent on this point. Mr said something like the fact that the ghost tempted, something which, with God's help, I will not talk about. And Mr has written big books to explain how it could happen that Claudius who is so obviously guilty might not have recognised himself in the scene that was put on. And he has constructed all sorts of minute and logical things to show that if he did not recognise himself, it was because he was looking somewhere else. It is not indicated in the stage directions and, perhaps, after all, it is not worth spending one's whole life working on it. Can we not suggest that Claudius has undoubtedly some part to play in it, he admits it himself, he shouts it to the heavens in a somber story in which there is upset not only the conjugal equilibrium of Hamlet the father, but something more again, even his very life, and that it is quite true that his crime gives off a bad odour to the point of stinking to high heaven. Everything indicates that at a particular moment he feels himself really cut to the quick, in the depths of himself, he reacts at the moment that Hamlet says what to him? He says to him. The one who coming onto the stage is Lucianus, he is going to poison the king, he is his nephew. One begins to understand that Claudius who, for some time, senses that there is something, the smell of sulphur in the air, he has moreover asked: is there anything offensive in it? Not the least offence Hamlet had replied. Claudius, at that moment, senses that things have gone a bit too far.

In fact, we are left in a completely ambiguous situation, namely that if everyone is scandalised, if the whole Court, from that moment on considers that Hamlet is particularly impossible, because everyone is on the king's side, it is undoubtedly for the Court because they have recognised there Claudius crime, because no one knows anything and no one knew anything up to the end, outside Hamlet and his *confidant*, about the way that Claudius had exterminated Hamlet the father. The function of the phantasy seems therefore to be indeed something different from that of the methods as they say in detective stories and this something becomes much clearer if we think, as I believe I am showing you, that Shakespeare has gone further than anybody, to the point that his work is the work itself and is the one where we can see described a sort of cartography of all possible human relationships, with this stigma which is called desire as touchstone, that which irreducibly designates his being, that by which, miraculously, we can find this sort of correspondence.

Does it not seem absolutely wonderful to you that someone whose work crosschecked throughout presents this unity of correspondence, that someone who has certainly been one of the people who have gone furthest in this direction of the oscillations should have himself, no doubt, lived an adventure, the one which is described in the *Sonnets* which allow us to crosscheck exactly the fundamental positions of desire. I will come back to it later. This surprising man traversed the life of Elizabethan England undoubtedly, he could hardly fail to be noticed with his forty plays and with something of which we have all the same some traces, I mean some evidence. But read a very well-written work which summarises at the present time almost everything that has been done in terms of research on Shakespeare. There is something absolutely surprising: it is that apart from the fact that he certainly existed, we are able to say nothing about him, about his attachments, about everything that surrounded him, about his love affairs, about his friendships. Everything has passed away, everything has disappeared without a trace. Our author presents himself to us analysts as the most radically vanished, dissolved, lost enigma that we can find in our history.

(Applause)

Seminar 23: Wednesday 3 June 1959

I am continuing my attempt to articulate for you what should regulate our action in analysis in so far as we are dealing, in the subject, with the unconscious. I know that this is not an easy thing, and also I am not taking too many liberties in the sort of formulation that I would like to lead you to. It sometimes happens that my detours are linked to the feelings that I have of having to make you aware of the steps that must be taken. For all that I do not necessarily always succeed in helping you not to lose your sense of the road we are taking.

Nevertheless I am asking you to follow me, to trust me. And to begin again from the point that we were at the last time I articulate more simply - obviously not without precautions, not without trying to avoid ambiguities - what I formulated in putting the term of being in the foreground.

And to hammer it out, I ask myself, however hazardous such a formula may seem to you, the reinstatement, the reintegration into our daily concepts of terms which are so massive that for centuries nobody dares to touch them any more except with a sort of tremor of respect - I want to speak about being and about the one - let us say - naturally it is only their use which will demonstrate their coherence - that what I call being, and what up to a certain point I even went so far as to qualify the last time as pure being, at a certain level of its emergence, is something which corresponds to the terms according to which we take our bearings, specifically to the real and the symbolic. And that here being is quite simply the fact that we are not idealists, that for us, as they say in philosophy books, we are among those who think that being comes before thought, but in order to take our bearings we need nothing less than this here in our work as analysts.

I regret having to stir up for you here the heavens of philosophy, but I must say that I only do it with a sense of constraint and obligation, and after all because I find nothing better in order to operate.

Being, we will say then that it is properly the real in so far as it manifests itself at the symbolic level. But let us be quite clear that it is at the level of the symbolic - for us in any case we do not have to consider elsewhere this thing which appears quite simple - from the fact that there is something added on once we say it is that, and that this aims at the real, and in so far as the real is affirmed or rejected or denied in the symbolic.

This being is nowhere else - let this be well understood - except in the intervals, in the cuts, and there where properly speaking it is the least signifying of signifiers, namely the cut. That it is the same thing as the cut presentifies it in the symbolic. And we are speaking about pure being. I am going to say it more crudely because the last time it seems - and I willingly admit this to you - that certain formulae which I put forward appeared circumlocutious, or even confused to some of you. The pure being that is in question, is this same being of which I have just given the general definition, and this in so far as under the name of unconsciousness the symbolic, a signifying chain subsists according to a formula which you will allow me to put forward, every subject is one (*tout sujet est un*).

And here I must ask your indulgence, namely to follow me. Which simply means

that you should not imagine that what I am putting forward here is something that I am putting forward with fewer precautions than when I put forward being. I would ask you to give me the credit that before speaking to you I have already noticed that what I am now going to put forward, namely the one, is not a univocal notion, and that the dictionaries of philosophy will tell you that there is more than one use for this term, namely that the one, which is the whole, is not the same in all its uses, in the way it is employed, as the one in numbers, namely the one which supposes the sequence and the order of numbers and which is separated out from it as such. Because it indeed seems in effect, to all appearances, that this one is secondary to the institution of numbers as such, and to make a correct deduction - empirical approaches in any case leave this in no doubt (English psychology tries to establish the empirical entry of number into our experience; and it is not for nothing that I refer here to the most down-to-earth attempt at an argumentation). I already pointed out to you that it is impossible to structure human experience, I mean this most common affective experience, without starting from the fact that the human being counts, and that he counts himself.

I would say in an abbreviated fashion - because it is necessary, to go further, for me to suppose as having been acquired through a certain time of reflection what I have already said - that desire is closely linked to what is happening in so far as the human being has to articulate himself in the signifier, and that *qua* being it is in the intervals that he appears at a level that we will try, perhaps, a little further on, to articulate in a fashion which there I will deliberately make more ambiguous than that of the one which I have just introduced, because I do not think that an attempt has yet been made to articulate it properly as such in its very ambiguity. It is the notion of *pas un*.

It is in so far as this S appears here as this *pas un*, that we are going to take it up again and look at it again, it is what we are going to have to deal with today.

But let us take things up at the level of experience. I mean here at the level of desire. If desire plays this role of serving as an index to the subject to the point at which he can designate himself without vanishing, we will say that at the level of desire the subject counts himself (*se compte*). He values himself (*se compte*), to play on the ambiguities, in the tongue, it is to this first of all that I want to draw your attention: I mean to the tendency that we always have to forget what we are dealing with in experience, the experience of our patients, of those whom we have the cheek to take responsibility for; and this is why I refer you to yourselves. In desire, we value ourselves in cash (*nous nous comptons comptant*).

Here is where the subject appears in full truth not in the calculation, but where it is said he has to face up to what in the last analysis constitutes him as himself.

It is time all the same to remind analysts that there is nothing which more constitutes the final term of the presence of the subject, in so far as this is what we are dealing with, than desire.

That starting from there the handling of the cash (*comptant*) begins to be subject to all sorts of transactions which dissolve it into different fiduciary equivalents, is obviously quite a problem, but there is all the same a moment when one must pay cash. If people come to see us, it is in general for this reason, it is that something is not working at the moment when they have to pay up what is in question, namely sexual desire, which is action in its fullest and in its simplest sense.

It is here that the question of the object is posed. It is clear that if the object were

simple, not only would it not be difficult for the subject to face up to the price of his feelings, but if you will allow me this play on words he would more often be content (*content*) with the object instead of having to put up with it (*s'en contenter*), which is quite different.

This is obviously linked to the fact which is also worth recalling because it is the principle of our experience, that at this level of desire, the object, to satisfy it, is not, to say the least, of easy access, and that we would even say that it is not easy to encounter it, for structural reasons which are precisely the ones that we will now try to go into more fully.

We do not appear to be going quickly, but it is because it is hard, even though I repeat it is our daily experience.

If the object of the most mature, the most adult desire, as we express ourselves from time to time, in this sort of drivelling intoxication which is called the exaltation of genital desire we would not have to constantly point out the division which is introduced into it regularly, and that we are indeed forced to articulate at the very moment that we speak to this very conciliatory, more or less problematic subject, between the two planes which constitute this object as object of love, or as it is said, of tenderness, or of the other to whom we present the gift of our oneness, and the same other considered as the instrument of desire.

It is quite clear that it is the love of the other which resolves everything. But by this single remark one sees clearly that here perhaps we are going outside precisely the limits of our blue-print, because after all it is not to our dispositions, but to the tenderness of the other that there is reserved the fact that at the cost no doubt of a certain decentring of himself he could satisfy in the most exact possible way what on the plane of desire is proposed for us as object.

Finally it seems indeed that, in a more or less disguised way we quite simply the old distinctions of religious experience being introduced. Namely the distinction between the loving tendency, in the concrete or what is called the passionate, carnal sense of the term, and the love of charity. If this is really the case why not send our patients to the pastors who would preach to them much better than ourselves.

Moreover we have had some warnings of the fact that this language would not be tolerated very well, and that from time to time there are no better people than our patients to anticipate the slidings of our language in this direction, and to tell us that after all if it is fine moral principles that we have to preach to them, they could go and look for them elsewhere, but that curiously it has already happened that this gets on their nerves to such an extent that they do not want to be listening to it again.

It is very easy to be ironical about this. But it is not pure and simple irony. I would go further. I would say that when all is said and done that there is no outline of a theory of desire - I mean of a theory of desire in which we could recognise ourselves If I dot the *is*, the very figures through which I now intend to articulate it for you, except religious dogmas; and that it is not by chance that in the religious articulation of desire - this no doubt in hidden corners, access to which is of course reserved, is not wide open to common mortals, or the common faithful; but in these corners which are called mysticism, there is well inscribed as such the satisfaction of desire - is linked to a whole divine organisation which is the one which in common parlance is presented in the form of mysteries - probably also for the others (I do not need to name them). And you have to see what is

represented for the believer in the tangible ladder of sufficiently vibrant terms like that of incarnation, or redemption.

But I would go further: I would say that we would be greatly mistaken to think that the most profound of all, which is called the Trinity, is not something which at least is not without some relationship with the number three with which we always have to deal since we perceive that there is no proper access, or equilibrium that can possibly be acquired for what we will call a normal desire, without an experience which brings into play a certain subjective triad.

Why not say these things because they are there in an extremely simple form. And for me I am not reluctant to do it, what is more I am just as well satisfied with such references as with those referring to more or less confused apprehensions of primitive ceremonies, whether they are totemic or otherwise, among which the best we find are not very different to these elements of structure.

Naturally, it is precisely in the measure that we try to tackle in a fashion which though it is not exhaustive is not taken from the angle of mystery, that I think that it is interesting for us to engage ourselves along this path. But then I repeat that certain questions which I would describe as coming from the moral, or even the social horizon, are not superfluous to recall on this occasion: namely to articulate the fact which appears quite clearly in contemporary experience, that there can be no satisfaction of each without the satisfaction of all, and that this is at the principle of a movement which, even if I have not become as powerfully involved in it as others, pressures us from every side, and no doubt sufficiently to be almost on the point of upsetting a lot of our comforts.

Again it is a question of recalling that the satisfaction in question deserves perhaps to be questioned. Because is it purely and simply satisfaction of needs? The very people that I am speaking about - let us put them here under the rubric of the movement which is inscribed in the Marxist perspective, and which has nothing other as its principle than what I have just expressed: there is no satisfaction for each except in the satisfaction of all - would not dare to claim that, because precisely that which is the goal of this movement and of the revolutions that it involves, is in the last analysis to allow this all to accede to a liberty which is no doubt in the distance, and posed as having to be post-revolutionary.

But this liberty then, what other content can we give it than that of being precisely the free disposition for each of his desire. It remains nevertheless that the satisfaction of desire, in this perspective, is a post-revolutionary question. And we perceive this every day. This does not settle anything. We cannot defer the desire that we are dealing with to a post-revolutionary stage, and everyone knows moreover that I am not in the process here of criticising one or other mode of life, whether it is on this side of or beyond a certain limit.

The question of desire remains in the very foreground of the preoccupations of the powers that be. I mean that there must be some social, collective manner of dealing with it. This is no easier of this side of a certain curtain than on the other. It is always a question of tempering a certain discontent, the discontents in culture as Freud called them. There are no other discontents in culture than the discontents of desire.

To hammer a final nail into what I mean, I would pose to you the question of whether each of you, not *qua* analysts who are too given - less here than elsewhere - to believe yourself destined to lord it over the desires of others ... to ask yourselves about what the term means for each one of you at the heart of your existence: what does realising one's

desire mean?

That exists all the same. There are all the same things which are achieved. They have gone a bit to the right, or a bit to the left, they are twisted, messed up, and more or less unsatisfactory, but they are all the same things which at a certain moment we can pull together in this bundle at one or other moment - this went in the direction of the satisfaction of my desire.

But if I ask you to articulate what it means to realise one's desire, I am willing to bet that you will not articulate it very easily. That nevertheless if I may be permitted - I would cross this with the religious reference which I advanced today - to refer to this extraordinary creation of black humour which the religion to which I referred above, the one which is quite alive here. Christian religion, put forward under the name of the last judgement, I ask you the question simply whether this is not one of the questions which we should project as it were into its most appropriate locus - the locus of the last judgement; the question as to whether on this day of the last judgement what we can say on this subject, what in our unique existence we will have done in this sense of realising our desire, will not weigh as heavily as the one which does not refute it in any degree, which does not counterbalance it in any way, namely whether we will have or not have done what are called good works (*le bien*).

But let us come back to our formula, our structure of desire, to see what makes of it no longer just the function of the object, as I tried to articulate it two years ago, nor yet that of the subject in so far as I tried to show it to you which is distinguished in this keypoint of desire by this fainting of the subject in so far as he has to name himself as such, but in the correlation which links the one to the other, which means that the object has this function precisely of signifying this point at which the subject cannot name himself, where modesty I would say is the royal form of what is translated in the symptoms as shame and disgust.

And I would ask you again for some time before entering into this articulation, to point out to you this something which I am forced to leave here as a mark, namely as a point which I was not able to develop as I would have wished at the time, because of the programme we were following, which is that of comedy.

Comedy, contrary to what empty minded people may think, is what is most profound in this access to the mechanisms of the stage in so far as it allows to the human being the spectral decomposition of what his situation in the world is. Comedy is beyond this modesty. Tragedy ends with the name of the hero, and with the total identification of the hero. Hamlet is Hamlet, he is such and such a name. It is even because his father was already Hamlet that when all is said and done everything is resolved here, namely that Hamlet is definitively abolished in his desire. I think I have said enough now about Hamlet.

But comedy is a very curious trap for desire, and that is why every time a snare for desire functions we are in comedy. It is desire in so far as it appears where it is not expected. The ridiculous father, the hypocritical bigot, the virtuous man in the throes of an adulterous enterprise, these are the people with whom one makes comedy. But there must be of course this element which ensures that desire does not avow itself. It is masked and unmasked. It is jeered at, it is punished on occasion, but it is for appearances sake, because in real comedies, the punishment does not even touch the wing of the crow of desire, which escapes absolutely intact.

Tartuffe is exactly the same after the policeman has put his hand on his shoulder.

Arnolfe, goes phew, namely that he is still Arnolfe, and that there is no reason why he should not begin again with a new Agnes. And Harpagon is not cured by the more or less artificial conclusion of Moliere's comedy. Desire, in comedy, is unmasked, but not refuted.

I am only giving you an indication here. Now I would like to introduce you to something which will serve to situate our behaviour with regard to desire in so far as experience has taught us, in analysis, to see it, as one of our great poets said, even though he is a still greater painter, here we can catch this desire by the tail; namely in the phantasy.

The subject therefore, in so far as he desires, does not know where he is with respect to the unconscious articulation, namely to this sign, to this scansion that he repeats in so far as it is unconscious.

Where is this subject as such? Is he at the point where he desires? This is the point of my articulation today. He is not at the point where he desires, he is somewhere in the phantasy. And this is what I want to articulate today, because it is on this that there depends all our behaviour in interpretation.

I once gave an account here of an observation which appeared in a sort of little bulletin in Belgium, concerning the appearance of a transitory perversion at a moment in the treatment of something which was inappropriately labelled as a sort of phobia, even though it was very clearly a question and as the author herself was aware in her questionings - I must say that this text is precious, it is very conscientious and of great use because of the questionings that the author herself highlights, namely the woman who carried out this treatment, and who no doubt if she had been better directed herself had all the qualities necessary to see things much more clearly and go much further. It is clear that this observation, in which one can say that in the name of certain principles, 'reality' principles on this occasion the analyst allow herself to play with the desire of the subject as if it were a question here of the point which should be put in place for him.

The subject, not without reason no doubt, starts phantasising that his cure will coincide with the fact of being able to sleep with the analyst. No doubt it is not by chance that something so clear, so crude, comes to the forefront in an analytic experience; it is a result of the general orientation given to the treatment, and of something which is clearly well perceived by the author herself as having been the crucial point, namely the moment where there was question of interpreting a phantasy, and of identifying or not an element of this phantasy, which happily is very magnificently, and at this moment, I will not say a man in armour, but a suit of armour which advances behind the subject. A suit of armour armed with something which is fairly easily recognisable because it is a can of Flytox, namely the thing which can be produced as the most comic and also the most characteristic representation of the phallic apparatus as destructive.

And this to the greatest retrospective embarrassment of the author. It is indeed on this that a lot of things depended, and she senses that it was on this that there subsequently hung the whole unleashing of the artificial perversion. Everything depends on the fact that this was interpreted in terms of reality, of an undoubtedly real experience of the phallic mother. And not in the case of the subject of the fact, which emerges quite clearly from a certain point of the view of the observation once one is willing to take it, that the subject makes emerge here the necessary and lacking image of the father as such in so far as he is required for the stabilisation of his desire. And nothing all the same could give us greater pleasure than the fact that this missing person appears then in the form of a *montage*, as something which gives the living image of the subject in so far as he is reconstituted with

the help of a certain number of cuts, of articulations of the suit of armour, in so far as they are joints, and pure joints as such. It is in this sense, and in a quite concrete fashion that one could reconstruct the type of intervention which would have been necessary; that perhaps what is called on these occasions a cure could have been reached with less trouble than by this detour of a transitory perversion played out no doubt in the real, and which undoubtedly allows us to put our finger in a certain practice on the way in which the reference to reality represents a regression in the treatment.

I will now clearly specify what I am trying to get you to sense about the relationships of \$ and o. I will first of all give you a model which is only a model, the *Fort! Da!*, namely something which I need make no further commentary on, namely this moment which we can consider as being theoretically the first in the introduction of the subject into the symbolic in so far as it is in the alternation of a signifying couple that there resides this introduction in relation to a little object whatever it may be, let us say a ball, or just as easily a little piece of cord, something frayed at the end of the bed, provided it holds up, and that it can be rejected and brought back. Here therefore is the element in question, and in which that which is expressed is something which is just before the appearance of S, namely the moment at which the S questions himself with respect to the other *qua* present or absent.

It is therefore the locus through which the subject enters at this level into the symbolic, and makes emerge at the beginning this something for which Mr. Winnicott, because of the requirements of a thought completely oriented towards primary experiences of frustration, introduced the term which is necessary for him in the possible genesis of any human development as such, the transitional object. The transitional object is the little ball of the *Fort! Da!*

From when can we consider that this game is promoted to its function in desire? From the moment that it becomes a phantasy, namely when the subject no longer comes into play, but anticipates himself in this game (*je*), where he short-circuits this game (*je*) where he is completely included in the phantasy. I mean, where he grasps himself in his disappearance.

He will never of course grasp himself without difficulty, but what is required for what I am calling phantasy, *qua* support of desire, is that the subject should be represented in the phantasy in this moment of disappearance. And I would like to point out to you that I am not saying anything extraordinary here. Simply I am articulating this angle, this flash, this moment that Mr. Jones dwelt on when he tried to give its concrete meaning to the term castration complex, and from which for reasons required by his personal understanding he does not depart, because this is the way that for him things are phenomenologically tangible.

People are brought to a halt all the same by the limits of understanding when they try to understand at all costs; this is what I am trying to get you to go beyond a little by telling you that one can go a little further by stopping oneself trying to understand. And it is for this reason that I am not a phenomenologist.

And Jones identifies the castration complex with the fear of the disappearance of desire. It is exactly what I am in the process of telling you in a different form. Because the subject fears that his desire will disappear, this must indeed signify something, which is that somewhere he desires himself desiring. This, pay careful attention, is what constitutes the structure of the neurotic's desire.

This is why I will not go directly to the neurotic, because this may appear to you too easily as a simple reduplication: I desire myself desiring, and desire myself desiring as desired etc. This is not at all what is in question, and this is why it is useful to spell out again the perverse phantasy. And if today I can not go any further I will try to do so by taking one of the most accessible phantasies, and one which is moreover closely related to what I alluded to above in the observation that I evoked, namely the phantasy of the exhibitionist; of the voyeur also, because you are going perhaps to see that it would be well not to be satisfied with the fashion in which the structure in question is usually reported.

We are usually told, it is very simple, this perverse phantasy is very nice, the impulse. Of course one likes to look, or one likes to be looked at, these charming vital drives as Paul Eluard said somewhere. In short there is something there, the drive, which takes pleasure in what Eluard's poem expresses very prettily in the formula *Donner à voir*, a manifestation of the form offering itself spontaneously to the other.

And in sum, I would point out to you, that it is not nothing to say this. This no longer seems so simple to us. It implies, because this is the level that we were at last evening, namely the implicit subjectivity there can be in an animal life, it implies all the same a certain subjectivity. It is scarcely possible even to conceive of this giving a look at (*donner à voir*), without giving to the word 'to give' the fullness of the virtues of the gift, all the same a reference, an innocent, unawakened one no doubt, of this form to its own richness.

And we also have quite concrete indications of it in the ostentation demonstrated by these animals in the manifestations of the captivating parade, principally of sexual parade. I am not going to start wriggling the stickleback in front of you again, I think that I have spoken to you about it at enough length to give a meaning to what I am in the process of telling you. It is simply to say that in the sweep of a certain behaviour, however instinctual we may suppose it to be, something may be implied which is this little movement of return, and at the same time of anticipation which is there in the sweep of the word. I mean a temporal projection of this something which is in the exuberance of the drive to show oneself, as we can rediscover it at the natural level.

Here I can only incidentally, and for those who were at the scientific session last night, urge the person who intervened on this subject to see that it would be appropriate precisely in this temporal anticipation to modulate what is perhaps expectation no doubt in the case of the animal in certain circumstances, with this something which allows us to articulate the disappointment of this expectation as a deception. And the medium I would say, at least until I am convinced of the contrary, seems to me to be constituted by a promise.

Whether the animal promises himself the success of one or other of his behaviours, this is the whole question for us to be able to speak about deception instead of a disappointment of expectation.

Let us come back now to our exhibitionist. Is he inscribed in any way in this dialectic of what is shown, even in so far as this shown is linked to the pathways of the other? I can here simply point out to you all the same that in the exhibitionistic relationship to the other - I am going to employ rough and ready terms to make myself understood; they are certainly not the best, the most literary ones - that the other must be struck at the level of his complicitous desire - and God knows the other is so at times - by what is happening

here, and by what is happening as what: as a breach (*rupture*).

Notice that this breach is not an indifferent one. It is essential that this breach should thus be the trap for desire. It is that it is a breach which passes unnoticed for what we can call on this occasion the most part. And it is perceived by the one that it is addressed to *qua* unnoticed elsewhere. So that everyone knows that there is no real exhibitionism, except of course for some supplementary refinement, in privacy. In order precisely that it should be, that there should be pleasure in it, it must happen in a public place.

And then we come to this structure in our big boots and we say to him: my friend if you show yourself at such a distance it is because you are afraid to approach your object: come closer, come closer. I ask you what sort of a joke is this. Do you think that exhibitionists do not copulate? Clinical experience is completely against this. They are sometimes very good husbands to their wives except that the desire which is in question is elsewhere. They require of course other conditions; these are conditions which it would be well to dwell on here.

One can clearly see that this manifestation, this elective communication which is produced here with the other, satisfies a certain desire only in so far as there are put into a certain relationship a certain manifestation of being and of the real in so far as it involves a symbolic framework as such. This moreover is what makes a public place necessary: one has to be quite sure that one is in a symbolic framework. Namely: I point this out for the people who reproach me with not daring to approach the object, of giving way to some fear or other - that I put as a condition for the satisfaction of their desire precisely the maximum of danger. Here again people will go in the opposite direction, without worrying about the contradiction, and they will say that it is danger that they are looking for. It is not impossible.

Before going that far let us try all the same to notice a structure: the fact is that on the side of what here plays the part of object, namely those who are involved, one or several little girls for whom we should in passing shed a tear to show our good intentions, it can happen that the little girls, especially if there are several of them, enjoy themselves a lot while this is going on. This even forms part of the pleasure of the exhibitionist; it is a variant.

The desire of the other is there then as an essential element in so far as it is surprised, as it is involved beyond modesty, that on occasion it is complicitous. The variations are possible.

On the other hand what do we have here? We have here something whose structure I have already pointed out to you sufficiently just now. There is no doubt what he shows, you will tell me. But for my part I would say to you that what he shows on this occasion is rather variable; what he shows is more or less magnificent; but what he shows is something redundant which hides rather than unveils what is in question. One must not be deceived by believing that what he shows testifies only to the erection of his desire, the difference there is between that and the apparatus of his desire. The apparatus is essentially constituted by what I underlined as what is glimpsed in the unnoticed, which I called quite crudely a trousers which is opened and closed, and to speak plainly is constituted by what we can call the split (*fente*) in the desire.

This is what is essential. And there is no erection however successful one may suppose it to be, which supplies here for what is the essential element in the structure of the

situation, namely this split as such. It is here also that the subject as such designates himself. This is what you must hold onto to see what is in question. And very probably what it is a question of making good. We will come back to it later because I want to check this against the correlative phenomenology of the voyeur.

I can, I think, go more quickly now. And nevertheless to go too quickly is as always to allow ourselves to dodge what is in question. This is why I approach here with the same circumspection, because what is essential, and what is omitted in the scopophilic drive, is to begin also with the split. Because for the voyeur this split is found to be an absolutely indispensable element of the structure. And even though the relationship between the seen and the unseen is divided here differently it is nonetheless distinct.

What is more I want to go into detail. Namely because it is a question of the support that is taken from the object, namely from the other in the specifically voyeuristic satisfaction in this case, the important thing is that what is seen is involved in the affair. This forms parts of the phantasy. Because without any doubt what is seen can very often be seen without knowing it. What we call the feminine object, because it seems that it is not for nothing that it is in this direction that this research is carried out, the feminine object does not know of course that she is being seen, but in the satisfaction of the voyeur, I mean in what supports his desire, there is the fact that it is in lending oneself as one might say innocently - something in the object lends itself to this function of spectacle - that it is open, that she participates in potency in this dimension of indiscretion; and that it is in the measure that something in her gestures may allow it to be suspected that from some angle she is capable of lending herself to it that the *jouissance* of the voyeur attains its true and proper level.

The creature who is surprised will be all the more erotic I would say, because something in her gestures may reveal her to us as offering herself to what I would call the invisible hosts of the air. It is not for nothing that I evoke them here. They are what are called the angels of Christianity which M. Anatole France had the gall to involve in this affair. Read *La Révolte des Anges*. You will see in it at least the very precise link which unites the dialectic of desire with this sort of virtuality of an eye which is ungraspable but always imaginable. And the references made to the book of the Comte de Cabanis concerning the mystical marriages of men with the sylphs and the water sprites were not put there for nothing in a text whose intentions are very well centred as is the case with one or other of Anatole France's books.

Therefore it is in this activity in which the creature appears in this secret relationship with herself, in these gestures in which there is betrayed the permanence of the witness before whom one does not avow oneself, that the pleasure of the voyeur reaches its peak.

Do you not see that here, in the two cases, that the subject reduces himself to the artifice of the split as such. This artifice takes his place and shows him effectively reduced to the miserable function which is his; but he indeed is the one in question, in so far as in the phantasy he is the split.

The question of the relationship of this split to what is symbolically the most intolerable thing in our experience, namely the form which responds to it in the place of the feminine sexual organs, is another question which we will leave open here for the future. But now let us take up the whole thing and let us begin from the poetic metaphor of the celebrated 'I saw myself seeing me' of the *Jeune Pargue*.

It is quite clear that this dream with its perfect closure of completed sufficiency, is realised in no desire, if not the superhuman desire of the poetic virgin. It is in so far as he puts himself at the place of 'I saw myself', that the voyeur and the exhibitionist are introduced into the situation which is what? Precisely the situation in which the other does not see the 'I saw myself' a situation of unconscious *jouissance* of the other. The other, in a way, has his third part decapitated here, he does not know that he can potentially be seen, he does not know what is represented by the fact that he may be shaken by what he sees, namely by the unusual object which the exhibitionist represents to him, and which has its effect on this other only in so far as it is effectively the object of his desire but does not recognise it at that moment.

He establishes therefore the sharing out of a double ignorance, because if the other does not realise at this level, what is supposed to be realised in the mind of the one who exhibits himself, or of the one who sees himself as a possible manifestation of desire, inversely in his desire the one who exhibits himself or who sees himself does not realise the function of the cut which abolishes him in a clandestine automation, which crushes him in a moment whose spontaneity he absolutely fails to recognise in so far as it designates what is said there as such, and which is there at its height again known as present but suspended.

He himself is only aware of this shameful animal manoeuvre, this oblique manoeuvre, this manoeuvre which exposes him to being beaten. Nevertheless this split, in whatever form it is presented, a shade, or a telescope, or some screen or other, this split is here what makes him enter into the desire of the other; this split is the symbolic split of a more profound mystery which is the one which has to be elucidated, namely its place at a certain level of the unconscious, which allows us to situate the pervert, at this level, as being in a certain relationship with

This indeed is the structure of desire as such, because it is the desire of the other as such reproducing the structure of his own that he is aiming at.

The perverse solution to this problem of the situation of the subject in the phantasy is precisely the following: it is to aim at the desire of the other and to believe that one sees in it an object.

It is late so I will stop here. This is also a cut. Its only drawback is that it is arbitrary. I mean it does not allow me to show you the originality of this solution compared to the neurotic solution. You should simply know that it is this which makes it interesting to compare them, and starting from this fundamental phantasy of the pervert to help you to see the function which the neurotic subject plays in his own phantasy. Luckily I already indicated it to you above. As I told you he desires himself desiring. And why then because he cannot desire, is it so necessary that he should desire? Everyone knows there is something involved in this which is properly speaking the phallus. Because after all up to the present you have been able to see that I have allowed to be reserved in this economy the intervention of the phallus, this good old phallus of long ago.

On two occasions in taking up the Oedipus complex last year, and in my article on the psychoses I showed it to you as being bound to the paternal metaphor, namely as coming to give to the subject a signified. But it was impossible to reintroduce it into the dialectic in question if I had not posited for you first of all this structural element through which the phantasy is constituted in something whose symbolism I am going to ask you to make a last effort to accept in future as we part today.

I mean that in future the \$ in the phantasy *qua* confronted and opposed to this o which you have well understood that I showed it to you today as being much more complicated than the three forms that I gave you at first as an approach, because here the o is the desire of the other in the case that I am presenting.

You see therefore that all the forms of the cut, including precisely the ones which reflect the cutting of the subject, are indicated. I am asking you to accept the following notation. I would even allow myself to be so ridiculous as to refer to a notation of concerning the imaginaries. I left you on the brink of this *pas un* in this fainting of the subject. It is at this *pas un*, and even at this as *pas un*, in so far as it is what gives us our opening onto the oneness of the subject that I will take things up the next time. But if I ask you to take it down in this way it is precisely so that you will not see in it the most general form, and at the same time the most confused form of negation. If it is so difficult to speak about negation, it is because no one knows what it is. Already I nevertheless indicated at the beginning of this year an opening in the difference there is between foreclosure and discordance. For the moment I am indicating to you in an closed, shut off, symbolic, but precisely because of this decisive form, another form of this negation. It is something which situates the subject in another order of magnitude.

Seminar 24: Wednesday 10 June 1959

In our last conversation I developed the structure of the phantasy in so far as it is in the subject what we call the support of his desire. The phantasy, there where we can grasp it in a structure sufficiently complete to serve subsequently in a way as a sort of turning plate for that whose different structures we are going to be lead to refer to it, namely for the relationship of the desire of the subject to what for a long time I have designated for you as being its reference, its essence in the analytic perspective, namely the desire of the other.

Today, as I announced, I am going to try to situate for you the position of desire in what we can call the different nosological structures, those drawn from experience, at the first level of neurotic structure.

The perverse phantasy, because it was the one that I chose the last time to allow you to pick out in it what corresponds to the function of the subject and to that of the object in the phantasy in so far as it is the support, the index of a certain position of the subject, just as it is the image of the other which is the starting point and the support - at least at this point where the subject qualifies himself as desire there is this more complex structure which is called the phantasy and into which paradoxically I was led the last time, by taking up a particular, especially exemplary form, not without having a profound motive that of the exhibitionist and of the voyeur, to show you that contrary to what is too often said, these are not two positions which are reciprocal in some way, as a sort of hasty thinking leads it to be formulated, the one who shows, and the one who sees complementing one another.

As I told you, these two positions are on the contrary strictly parallel, and that in the two cases, the subject, in the phantasy, finds himself indicated by something which we have called the split, the gap, something which is in the real both a hole and a flash in so far as the voyeur spies behind his shutter, that the exhibitionist half opens his screen, that he is indicated there in his proper place in the act which is nothing other than this flash of the object of which one speaks. And experienced, perceived by the subject through the opening of this gap, through this something which it situates him as open. Open to what? To a desire other than his own. His own which is profoundly affected, shaken, struck by what is glimpsed in this flash.

It is the emotion of the other beyond her modesty (*pudeur*); it is the openness of the other, the virtual expectation in so far as she does not sense herself as being seen, and that nevertheless she is perceived as offering herself to view; it is this that characterises in the two cases this position of the object which is so fundamental in this structure because when all is said and done analytic experience locates it at the starting point of what it found at first along the path of the causes and the generating stigmata of the neurotic position, specifically the scene that is glimpsed, what is called the primitive scene.

It participates in this structure, namely by a reversal no doubt of this structure which means that the subject sees something opening which is this gap suddenly glimpsed, something which quite obviously in its traumatic value has a relationship to the desire of the other glimpsed, perceived as such, which remains there as an enigmatic kernel until

subsequently, in a deferred way, he will be able to reintegrate this moment that is experienced into a chain which will not necessarily be a correct chain, which will in any case be the chain which generates a whole unconscious modulation, a core generator in the case of neurosis.

I would ask you to dwell on this structure of the phantasy. It is understood that it is a suspended moment, as I underlined, which gives it its value. This is what gives it its value, it is a pause. A pause which has this value of an index corresponds to a moment of action in which the subject cannot establish himself in a certain fashion x which is precisely what we designate as desire here, what we are trying to isolate in its function as desire, properly speaking on condition, that this subject loses the meaning of this position.

Because the fact is that the phantasy is opaque to him. We, for our part, are able to designate his place in the phantasy. Perhaps he himself is able to glimpse it, but the meaning of the position namely the reason why what comes to birth of his being is there, this the subject cannot say. This is the essential point: *aphanisis*. No doubt the term is a happy one and is useful to us, but unlike the function that Jones gives it in the interpretation of the castration complex, its form is enigmatic.

We see in the phantasy that *aphanisis*, at least there where the word disappearance, fading as I also said, is useful to us, it is not *qua* the *aphanisis* of desire, it is in so far as at the point of desire there is *aphanisis* of the subject. The subject, in so far as he is supposed to situate himself at this place, supposed to articulate himself as I where it speaks in the unconscious chain, in so far as he cannot indicate himself there except *qua* disappearing from his position as subject.

From this we can see what is going to be in question. In so far as we have defined this extreme point, this imaginary point in which the being of the subject resides with its maximal density - these are only images so that your minds can hold on to a metaphor - from the moment that we see, or that we define this imaginary point in which the being of the subject in so far as he is the one who is to be articulated, to be named in the unconscious, cannot in any case, in the last analysis, be named, but simply indicated by something which reveals him to himself as a cutting, as a split, as a structure of cutting in the phantasy, it is around this imaginary point - and this is i legitimate in every domain if we can articulate its structure by what starts from it - that we are going to try to situate what effectively happens in the different forms of the subject which are not at all necessarily homogenous forms, forms which are comprehensible from one side by the one who is on the other side.

We know only too well in this respect what can deceive us in the understanding of a psychosis. For example we should be careful not to understand even though we try to reconstruct, to articulate its structure. And this in fact is what we are trying to do here. Thus starting from there, from this structure in which the subject, in his moment of disappearance - and I repeat that this is a notion whose trace we can find when Freud speaks about the navel of the dream, the point at which all the associations converge in order to disappear, in order to be no longer linked to anything except to what he calls the *Nabel*; this is what is in question. In this regard, the subject sees opening out before him what? Nothing other than a gap which, at the limit, would engender a reference to the infinity of desire, towards an other desire.

As we see in the phantasy of the voyeur and the exhibitionist, it is on the desire of the other that he finds himself dependent. He finds himself offered up to the mercy of the

desire of the other. This is concrete. We find it in experience. It is not because we do not articulate it that we do not commonly that it is not very easy to grasp.

When I spoke to you at length, two years ago about little Hans' neurosis, it was nothing other than this that was in question. It is in so far as at a moment of his evolution little Hans finds himself confronted with something which goes much further than the undoubtedly critical moment of a rivalry with the new arrival, with his little sister, with something much more serious than this novelty which is for him the outline of sexual maturation which makes him capable of having erections, even indeed, for specialists the question is still open, of having orgasms. It is neither at the interpsychological level, properly speaking, nor at the level of the integration of a new tendency that the crisis opens up. I well underlined and articulated and even laboured it at that time.

It is in so far as by a closing at that moment of the situation he finds himself effectively and especially confronted as such with the desire of his mother, and that he finds himself in the presence of this desire without any recourse. The *Hilflosigkeit*, that Freud, in his article on the unconscious, the article of 1917 It is this most primitive of all positions of being without recourse, and with respect to which anxiety is already the beginnings of an organisation in so far as it is already an expectation. If one does not know of what, if in any case one does not articulate it right away, in any case it is before everything (*Urbartut?*) Freud tells us. But first there is the following: *Hilflosigkeit*, having no recourse.

Having no recourse before what? That which cannot be defined, centred in any other fashion than before the desire of the other.

It is this relationship of the desire of the subject, in so far as it has to situate itself before the desire of the other which nevertheless literally sucks him in, and leaves him without recourse, it is in this drama of the relationship of the desire of the subject to the desire of the other that there is constituted an essential structure, not only of neurosis, but of every other structure defined analytically.

We will begin with the neurosis; we have gone far enough from perversion for you to be able to glimpse that perversion is linked to it also. Nevertheless let us underline it. We have brought in this perversion only in this instantaneous moment of the phantasy, due to the phantasy, in so far as the *passage à l'acte* in perversion, and in perversion alone, reveals it.

In neurosis, in which we are trying to circumscribe more closely for the moment that which is related to this structure which I am articulating before you, it is this fruitful moment of the neurosis that I am aiming at in the case of little Hans, because it is a question there of a phobia, namely the simplest form of neurosis, the one in which we can put our finger on the character of the solution, the one which I already articulated for you at length in connection with little Hans by showing you the coming into play of this object, the phobic object, in so far as it is an all purpose signifier.

It is there to occupy at this place, between the desire of the subject and the desire of the other, a certain function which is a function of protection or of defence. On this there is no ambiguity about the Freudian formulation. The fear of the phobic object is intended to protect the subject from what? (It is in Freud) From the approach of his desire. And it is by looking more closely at things that we see what is in question: from his desire in so far as it is weaponless with respect to what in the other, the mother on this occasion, opens up for

Hans as the sign of his absolute dependency.

She will lead him to the ends of the earth, she will lead him still further; she will lead him as far and as often as she herself disappears, is eclipsed. That she is the person who at that moment can appear to him not only as the one who could respond to all his demands. She appears to him with this supplementary mystery of being herself opened to a lack whose meaning appears at that moment to Hans to be in a certain relationship to the phallus, which phallus nevertheless he does not have.

It is at the level of the want-to-be of the mother that there opens out for Hans the drama that he can only resolve by giving rise to this signifier of the phobia whose plurivalent function I showed you to be a sort of universal key, and all-purpose key which serves him at that moment in protecting himself against that which in a univocal fashion every experienced analyst has perceived, against the arousal of an anxiety more terrifying again than the fear linked to, than the fear fixed to the phobia. This moment, in so far as it is relationship to desire, that it is something which is going in the structure of the phantasy, in the opposition $\$$ to o , to give to this $\$$ something which will alleviate the part of it which sustains the presence of the object, which is something which the subject can hold onto, this point where in fact the symptom is going to be produced.

The symptom at the deepest level in the neurosis, namely in so far as it involves in the most general fashion the position of the subject. This is what deserves to be articulated here.

If you do not mind we will proceed in this order: to be articulated first of all, then to ask ourselves if this structure of the phantasy is so fatal, how something which is on the brink of this point of being lost, of this point of disappearance indicated in the structure of the phantasy, as this something which is on the brink, which is sustained at the entrance to the vortex of the phantasy, how this something is possible. Because it is quite clear that it is possible.

The neurotic has access to the phantasy. He has access to it in certain privileged moments of the satisfaction of his desire. But we all know that this is only a functional utilisation of the phantasy that its relationship on the contrary to his whole world, and especially his relationship to others, to the real others - this is where we are getting to now - is profoundly marked by what? It has always been said, by a repressed drive.

This repressed drive, it is its relationship that we are trying to articulate a little better, in a more rigorous fashion, in a fashion also that is clinically more evident. We are simply going to see how this is possible.

We are going all the same to indicate how this presents itself. Let us take the obsessional, if you wish, and the hysteric. Let us take them together since in a certain number of features we are going to see one being illuminated by the other.

The object of the phantasy, in so far as it ends up at this desire of the other, it is a question of not approaching it, and for that obviously there are several solutions. We have seen the one which is linked to the promotion of the phobic object, to the object of prohibition. Prohibition of what? When all is said and done of a *jouissance* because it opens up before the subject the abyss of desire as such.

There are other solutions. I already indicated them to you in these two schematic

forms in the Royaumont report. The desire of the subject can be sustained by the subject before the desire of the other. He sustains it in two ways, as unsatisfied desire, this is the case of hysterics. I remind you of the example of the butcher's beautiful wife where this structure appears in such a clear fashion, this dream in whose associations there appears as it were the avowed form of the operation of the hysteric.

The butcher's beautiful wife desires to eat caviare, but she does not want her husband to buy it for her, because it is necessary that this desire should remain unsatisfied. This structure which is pictured there in a little manoeuvre which forms moreover the warp and woof of the daily life of these subjects, goes much further in fact. This story gives the meaning of the whole function that the hysteric gives herself. It is she who is the obstacle. It is she who does not want. Namely that in this relationship of the subject to the object in the phantasy she comes to occupy this same third position which above was devolved on to the phobic signifier, but in another fashion.

It is she who is the obstacle, it is she who is at stake in reality. And here *jouissance* is precisely to prevent desire in situations that she herself constructs. This is one of the fundamental functions of the hysterical subject; in the situations that she constructs her function is to prevent desire coming to term in order that she herself will remain what is at stake.

She takes the place of what we could call using an English term a, namely something like a manikin. has a broader, more general sense. It is a false likeness. The hysteric, in so far as in a situation so frequently observed that it is really clearly recognisable in the observations – it is enough to have the key which is that of her position between a shadow which is her double, a woman who is in this hidden fashion this point precisely where there is situated or inserted her desire in so far as she must not see it - the hysteric establishes, presents herself in this case, as the mainspring of the machine, the one who suspends and situates them with respect to one another like kinds of puppets for she has to sustain herself in this sort of reduplicated relationship which is that of $\$ \diamond o$.

The hysteric is nevertheless in the game herself in the form of the one who when all is said and done is the stake.

The obsessional has a different position. The difference between the obsessional and the hysteric is that he remains outside the game. His true desire you will observe - place your trust in these formulae when you have to deal with the subject who can be clinically described in this way - the obsessional is someone who is never really at the place where something is at stake which could be qualified as his desire. The place where apparently he is risking something is not where he is. It is of this very disappearance of the subject, the $\$$, at the point of approach of desire, that he makes as you might say his weapon and his hiding place. He has learned to make use of this in order to be elsewhere.

And observe it carefully. This of course he can only do, because there is no other place than the one which was reserved up to now for the instantaneous, relational structure of the hysteric, he can only do it by deploying in time, by temporalising this relationship, by always putting off to tomorrow his engagement in this real relationship of desire. It is always for tomorrow that the obsessional reserves engaging with his true desire.

This is not to say that while waiting for this term he does not get engaged in anything; far from it, he proves himself. What is more he can go so far as to consider these proofs, what he does, as a means of acquiring merit. Merit for what: for the reverence of the

other with respect to his desires. You will find these things being well and truly acknowledged throughout the whole field, even if the obsessional does not recognise the mechanism as such. But it is important that you should be capable of recognising it, in order to designate it.

Because after all it is an important thing here, I am saying, to smash this mechanism in the form of what it drags along in its wake, namely all these intersubjective relationships which can only be conceived of as ordered with respect to this relationship or to these fundamental relationships as I am trying here to articulate them here for you.

When all is said and done what does this mean? I mean, even before asking yourselves how this is possible, what do we see emerging in this neurotic position? It is clear that what we see emerging is at least the following: the cry for help of the subject in order to sustain his desire, but to sustain it in the presence and in the face of the desire of the other, in order to constitute himself as desiring. This is what I indicated to you the last time, the fact is that the only thing that he does not know, is that in constituting himself as desiring his steps are profoundly marked by something which is there behind, namely the danger which is constituted by this slope of desire. So that in constituting himself as desiring he does not perceive that in the constitution of his desire he is protecting himself against something, that his very desire is a defence, and cannot be anything else.

Again in order that this may be sustained it is clear that in every case he summons as a help something which presents itself in a third position with respect to this desire of the other, something where he can place himself so that the sucking in, disappearing relationship of the \$ before the o is tenable. It is in the relationship to the other, to the real other, that we see there being sufficiently indicated the role of what permits the subject to symbolise. Because it is a question of nothing else than of symbolising his situation, namely of maintaining in act something in which he can recognise himself as subject, satisfy himself as subject, astonished though he may finally be to see that this subject which is sustained, finds itself the prey of all sorts of contorted, and paradoxical attitudes which designate him to himself once he is able to have the slightest look at his own situation, as a neurotic who is a prey to his symptoms.

Here there intervenes this element which analytical experience has taught us to put at a key point in signifying functions, and which is called the phallus. If the phallus has the key position which I am now designating, it is very evidently *qua* signifier, *qua* signifier linked to something which has a name in Freud, and whose place in the unconscious economy itself was absolutely not dissimulated by Freud, namely the law.

In this regard, every kind of attempt to reduce the phallus to something which can be balanced against, which is related to some other functional correspondent in the other sex is something which of course from the point of view of the interrelationships of the subject, has what one might call its genetic value, but which can only be exercised, be carried out on the condition of overlooking what is quite essential in the valorisation of the phallus as such.

It is not purely and simply an organ. Where it is an organ it is the instrument of a *jouissance*. It is not at this level integrated into the mechanism of desire, because the mechanism of desire is something which is situated at another level, that to understand what is the mechanism of desire it is necessary to define it as seen from the other side, namely once cultural relationships have been established, and from the myth of the primordial murder or not.

Desire is distinguished from all demands in the fact that it is a demand submitted to the law. This almost looks like breaking through an open door, but this is all the same what is in question when Freud makes the distinction for us between demands which correspond to what are called preservation needs in the species or in the individual, and those which are on another plane. This is why to tell us that those which are on this other plane are distinguished from the first in the sense that they can be postponed, but after all if sexual desire can be postponed in its effects, in its passage to action in man, it is undoubtedly in an ambiguous fashion.

It can be postponed? How can it be more so in man than in animals where after all it does not suffer postponements all that much? It is because no doubt of a genetic flexibility; it is also and essentially - because nothing is articulated in analysis if one does not articulate it at this level - in so far as on this sexual desire itself there is constructed the primordial order of exchanges which found the law through which there enters in a living form number as such into human interpsychology.

What is called the law of alliance and of kinship through which we see the following appearing: it is that the phallus fundamentally is the subject *qua* object of this desire; this object being submitted to what we will call the law of fecundity.

And also this is the way that there is brought into play in a more or less unveiled, a more or less initiatory fashion the phallus, that it is unveiled to those who participate in this initiation. If the function of the father for the subject, *qua* source of his life as it is said, is only the signifier of what I call here the law of fecundity, in so far as it regulates, as it ties desire to a law, effectively this fundamental signification of the phallus is that which, by all the dialectic of desire, in the measure that desire in so far as there is expressed in it the being of the subject at the point that he is lost interposes itself on the trajectory of this functionalisation of the subject *qua* phallus, of this thing through which the subject presents himself in the law of exchange defined by the fundamental relationships regulating the prohibitions of desire in culture, it is in the measure that the subject is, in so far as from a certain moment he no longer is, he wants-to-be, he can no longer grasp himself.

It is from the encounter of this with his phallic function, with his phallic function in the real links of relationships with the real others of the real generation of the line of descendents, it is here that there is produced the point of equilibrium which is the one that we dwelt on at the end of the dream of Ella Sharpe's patient.

If I connected up the whole big digression about Hamlet at this level, it is in the measure that this subject presented to us in his dream, in the purest form, this alternation of *to be or not to be*, which I made so much of. Namely this subject who qualified himself as no one. This subject at the moment that he approaches his desire, when he is just about to put his finger on it, when he has to choose to be no one, or to be caught, entirely absorbed in the devouring desire of the woman, that immediately afterwards he is summoned 'to be or not to be', to bring to birth the 'to be' of the second part which has not the same meaning as in the first, the 'not to be' of the primordial structure of desire, is seen to have an alternative. To be, that is to be the phallus, he must be the phallus for the other, the marked phallus; to be what he can be as subject he is exposed to the menace of not having it.

If you will allow me to use here what is called a logical sign which is the \vee , which is used to designate the either-or of the distinction, the subject sees opening out before him the not to be - not to be the phallus - or if he is it, not to have it, namely to be the phallus for

the other, the phallus in the intersubjective dialectic. This is what is in question. And it is in this game that the neurotic experiences the approach, the integration of his desire as a threat of loss.

The *pas un* by which the \$ designates himself in the fundamental structure of desire, is transformed into a one too many (*un en trop*), either something extra or something missing, in the threat of castration for the man or in the phallus experienced as absence for the woman. That is why one can say that at the outcome of the analytic demystification of the position of the neurotic, something seems to remain in the structure, at least what Freud testifies to us in his own experience which presents itself as a remainder, as something which for the subject causes him to remain in any case in an inadequate position, that of the phallus in peril, for the man, that of the absence of the phallus for the woman.

But also it is perhaps in so far as in the angle adopted first of all for the solution of the neurotic problem, the transversal dimension, the way in which the subject in his desire is dealing with the manifestation to him of his being as such, as possible author of the cut, this dimension is neglected; that in other words the aim of the analyst is directed towards the reduction of the neurotic position of desire, and not towards the disengagement from the position of desire as such beyond the entanglement of this particular dialectic which is that of the neurotic.

How can I come back again on these points to make you sense their articulation still better? Undoubtedly I have introduced it here along its purest cutting edge. It is quite certain that this draws along with it not only all the anecdotes of the history of the subject, but also other structural elements in this past. I mean what we have manifested, highlighted at the proper moment, which is everything that refers as such to the drama of narcissism, to the relationship of the subject to his own image.

Of course when all is said and done it is here that there is inserted for the subject - Freud underlined it several times when it was appropriate and in specific terms - the fear of the loss of the phallus, the feeling also of the lack of the phallus. The ego, in other words, is involved, but let us notice then at this level that if it intervenes, if it can intervene at this place at which the subject may have to sustain himself in this complex dialectic in which he is afraid that he will lose his privilege in his relationship to the other, and indeed this is certainly not if the narcissistic relationship to the image of the other intervenes by reason of something which we could call the weakness of the ego, because after all in all the cases where we note such a weakness, what we are assisting at, is on the contrary a dispersal of the situation, even indeed a blocking of the situation.

After all I have only to make an illusion here to something which is familiar to all of you, which has been I think been translated in the *Revue*, to Melanie Klein's famous case, namely of this child who was well and truly introduced as such to this relationship of desire to the signifier, but who found himself with respect to the other, to the possible relationship on the imaginary plane, on the living plane of gesture and communication with the other, completely suspended, as Melanie Klein describes it to us.

We do not know everything about this case, and after all we cannot say that Melanie Klein has done anything other than present us here with a remarkable case. And what this case demonstrates, is that undoubtedly this child who did not speak is already so open and so sensitive to the spoken interventions of Melanie Klein that for us, in our register, in the one that we are trying to develop here, his behaviour is really remarkable.

The only structures of the world which are accessible, tangible, manifest, manifestable for him from the first moments with Melanie Klein, are structures which carry in themselves all the characteristics of the relationship to the signifying chain. Melanie Klein designates them for us. There is the little chain of the train, namely of something which is made up of a certain number of elements hooked on to one another. There is a door which opens and closes. One might as well say, that which, when I was trying to show you in the possible uses of one or other cybernetic schema for our handling of the symbol, that which is the most simple form of the yes or no alternation which conditions the signifier as such. A door must be opened or closed.

The whole behaviour of the child is limited to this. The fact is nevertheless by simply touching on this in words which are all the same sentences and something essentially verbal, that from the first moments what does the child obtain from the intervention of Melanie Klein? His first reaction is in my opinion almost amazing for its exemplary character: it is to go and put himself - and it is in the text - between two doors.

Between the inner and outer door of the room, in a dark space regarding which it is surprising that Melanie Klein, who in some way saw so well the structural elements, like those of introjection and of expulsion, namely this limit between the exterior world and what one can call the interior darkness with respect to a subject, did not grasp the import of this intermediate zone which is nothing other than the one that we are distinguishing here: the one where desire is situated, namely this zone which is neither the exterior, nor the interior, articulated and constructed, so reduced in this subject, but that which one can call, because in certain structures of the primitive village we find the sort of cleared zones between the two, the zone of 'no man's land', between the village and virgin nature, which is indeed the place where the desire of the little subject has broken down.

It is here that we possibly see the ego intervening, and of course it is in the whole measure that this ego is not weak, but strong, that there will come to be organised, as I have repeated already a hundred times, the resistances of the subject. The resistances of the subject in so far as they are the forms of the very coherence of the neurotic construction, namely of that in which he organises himself in order to subsist as desire, not to be the place of this desire, to be sheltered from the desire of the other as such, to see being interposed between its most profound manifestation as desire, and the desire of the other, this distance, this alibi which is the one in which he constitutes himself respectively as phobic, hysterical, obsessional.

I will come back, it is necessary, to a developed example of a phantasy that Freud gives. It is by no means futile to come back to it after having taken this detour. It is the phantasy, a child is being beaten. Here one can grasp the moments which allow us to rediscover the structural relationship that we are trying to articulate today.

What do we have: the phantasy of obsessionals; girls and boys use this phantasy to arrive at what: at masturbatory *jouissance*. The relationship to desire is clear; what is the function of this *jouissance*? Its function here is that of any satisfaction of need in a relationship with the beyond that the articulation of a language determines for man. That is to say that the masturbatory *jouissance* is here not the solution to desire, it crushes it; exactly the way the child at the breast in the satisfaction of nursing crushes the demand for love with respect to the mother.

And as well this is almost marked by historical testimony. I mean, because we have made allusions from time to time to the hedonistic perspective, to its inadequacy for

qualifying human desire as such - let us not forget after all the exemplary character of one of these points which are paradoxical as such, obviously left in the shadows of the opinion of those who have presented themselves in history as wise men, and wise men of a discipline whose end, qualified as philosophical, was precisely, for reasons which are after all valid because they are methodical, the choice, the determination of a posture with respect to desire, a posture which consists also from the beginning in excluding it, in making it And any perspective which is properly hedonistic participates in this position of exclusion as is demonstrated by the paradoxical example which I will remind you of here, namely the position of the Cynics for whom in a quite categorical way - the tradition, from the mouth of Chrysippus if I remember rightly, testifies to it - namely that Diogenes the Cynic openly claimed, to the point of doing it in public as a demonstratory act, and not as an exhibitionistic one, the solution to the problem of sexual desire was, as I might say, within hands reach for everybody, and he demonstrated it brilliantly by masturbating.

The phantasy of the obsessional is therefore something which of course has a relationship to *jouissance*, of which it is even remarkable that it can become one of its conditions, but whose structure Freud demonstrated for us has a value of what I designate as being its value as an index, because what this phantasy points to is nothing other than a feature of the subject's history, something which is inscribed in his diachrony. Namely that the subject in a past which is consequently forgotten, has seen, Freud's text tell us, a rival - whether he is of one sex or the other does not matter - being punished by the beloved being, on this occasion the father, and has found in this original situation her happiness.

How does the phantastical agency (*instant*) perpetuate as one might say this privileged instant of happiness? It is here that the intermediate phase that is designated for us by Freud takes on its demonstrative value. It is to the extent that at a time Freud tell us which can only be reconstructed - this is indicated by the fact that in Freud we only find the testimony of certain unconscious moments which are properly speaking inaccessible as such. Whether he is right or wrong in the precise, particular case is not in question for the moment.

As a matter of fact he is not wrong, but the important thing is that he designates this intermediate stage as something which can only be reconstructed.

And this intermediate stage between the historical memory in so far as it designates the subject in one of his moments of triumph, a historical memory which at the worst is only repressed, and which can be brought to light, which is why the phantastical agency (*instant*) plays there the role of index, eternalises this moment as one might say by making of it a point of attachment to something quite different, namely the desire of the subject; and this indeed only happens in relation to an intermediate moment which I would call here, even though it may be a point at which it can only be reconstructed, properly speaking metaphorical.

Because what is in question in this intermediate moment? This second phase which Freud tells us is essential for the understanding of the functioning of this phantasy? It is the following: it is that for the other, the rival brother who is the object of the anger and the punishment inflicted by the beloved object, the subject substitutes herself. Namely that in this second moment she is the one who is chastised.

We find ourselves here before the naked enigma of what this metaphor, this transference involves. What is the subject looking for here? What a strange path to

subsequently give to her triumph is this fashion of herself passing in her turn through the Caudine forks of what had been inflicted on the other. Do we not find ourselves here before the final enigma - and Freud also does not hide it - of what comes to be inscribed in the analytic dialectic as masochism, and whose predicament one sees after all presented here in a pure form. Namely that something in the subject perpetuates the happiness of the initial situation in a hidden, latent, unconscious situation of unhappiness.

What is involved in the second hypothetical moment is in sum an oscillation, an ambivalence, more precisely an ambiguity of what the act of the authoritarian person, on this occasion the father, involves by way of recognition. The *jouissance* taken here by the subject is that towards which she slides from an accident of her history to a structure in which she is going to appear as being, as such. The fact is that it is in the fact of being alienated, namely of substituting oneself here for the other as victim, that there consists the decisive step in her *jouissance* in so far as it culminates in the phantastical agency (*instant*) at which she is no longer herself only one. In part instrument of alienation in so far as it is devalorisation.

It is 'is beaten', on the one hand, and that is why up to a certain point I was able to tell you that it becomes purely and simply the phallic instrument in so far as it is here the instrument of her cancellation. Confronted with what? With 'a child is being beaten', a faceless child, a child who is no longer anything but the original child, and not either the child that she herself was at the second moment, whose sex is not determined in any even special way. The examination of the sequence of successive phantasies Freud speaks to us about shows this. He is confronted with what one can call a sort of extract of the object.

It is nevertheless in this relationship of the phantasy that we see emerging at this moment that which constitutes for the subject the privileged instant of his *jouissance*. We will say that the neurotic - and we will see the next time how we can oppose to it something very particular, not perversion in general, because here perversion plays a pivotal role in what we are exploring as structure, but where we can oppose to it something very special, and whose common factor does not seem to have been found up to now, namely homosexuality.

But to keep today to the neurotic, his most common, fundamental structure resides when all is said and done in the fact that if he is this desire desiring what?, something which when all is said and done is simply what permits him to sustain in its precariousness, his desire as such, without knowing that the whole phantasmagoria is constructed for that, namely that it is his very symptoms which are the locus in which hehis *jouissance*. These symptoms which are nevertheless so little satisfying in themselves.

The subject therefore presents himself here as I would not say at all a pure being (*un être pur*), that which I began from to indicate what was meant by the relationship of this particular manifestation of the subject to the real, but a being for (*un être pour*). The ambiguity of the position of the neurotic is entirely here, in this metonymy which ensures that it is in this being for that there resides all his fear of being (*son peur être*).

Seminar 25: Wednesday 17 June 1959 12.30

There is something instructive, I would not go so far as to say in the errors, but even, especially, in the errors - or in the meanderings, if you wish ... You see being fairly constantly used the very hesitations, even the impasses, which manifest themselves in analytic theory, as being by themselves revelatory of a structure of the reality with which we have to deal.

In this respect, it is clear that there is something interesting, remarkable, significant for us in works which are not all that old because the one, for example, to which I will refer is from 1956 (the July - October number of the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 37).

It is an article, I believe, by some of our Parisian colleagues; I will not designate them by name, because it is not their position as personal that I am aiming at in this way. It is an effort to clarify the meaning of perversion. And it is clear that in this article, extremely curiously reserved in its conclusions, and from which there really only emerges this formally articulated conclusion, that there is not, consequently, any specific unconscious content in sexual perversions, because the same discoveries can be recognised in the case of neuroses and psychoses.

There is here something rather striking, which the whole article illustrates, and one cannot say in a fashion which is absolutely convincing, because, without even needing to stand back very far, it can be perceived that the whole article begins from a confusion - really constantly maintained - between perverse phantasy and perversion.

From the fact that there are conscious and unconscious phantasies which overlap, that phantasies manifest themselves, with the appearances of overlapping, in neuroses and in perversions, the conclusion is drawn - with an astonishing ease - that there is no fundamental difference, from the point of view of the unconscious, between neurosis and perversion.

We have here one of these very astonishing things, where certain reflections which, themselves, are presented without guarantees, rather free from the analytic tradition and are presented as a sort of revision of values and principles.

The only conclusion, indeed, that is finally come to, is that it is an abnormal relationship that is eroticised in perversion.

It is therefore not at all a question of a relationship with an object, but rather a valorisation of a relationship for relationships as such eroticism - which, all the same, after any sort of serious examination, after rereading it, can appear as nothing other than something which is a cause of normative virtue. This corresponds to the object. That it is eroticised, is not in doubt!

In fact, it is indeed with this question of the relationship of phantasy and perversion that we ourselves are led to work on today, after what we approached the last time, namely:

we began to indicate the most general terms of the relationship of phantasy to neurosis.

A little word on history: what has happened in analysis - and it is important to recall it here - and I would say, in the light of our progress, perhaps to circumscribe it in a more rigorous fashion - is essentially the following: it is that in short, a very short time after having articulated the functions of the unconscious, this quite particularly in connection with hysteria, neuroses and the dream, Freud was led to pose the presence in the unconscious of what he called polymorphously perverse tendencies (in German: *Polymorph-perverse Neigungen*).

It comes from there, and it is there, for a certain time – long superseded, of course! - that people remained. And what it seems failed to be articulated, is that what is in question, this notion of polymorphously perverse tendency, is nothing other than the following: it is the fact that he had discovered the structure of unconscious phantasies.

The structure of unconscious phantasies resembled the relational mode which opened out, which spread itself out in clear view, which shows itself in the perversions; and, thus, the notion of the consciousness of the polymorphously perverse tendency was posed at first.

When all is said and done - this could be said - this came from the fact that the form of these unconscious phantasies covered what? Something which is a part of perversion, which presents itself to us in perversion, under the following appearance, which we can try to articulate, namely: something which occupies the imaginative field, the desire, the one which constitutes the desire of the pervert; and this something which, in short, the pervert plays out, this something which means that this is presented in its obvious aspect, in clinical practice, is something which for us, with what we know, with the relationship that we have drawn between these phantasies and the history of the subject, where we succeed in attaching him, if you wish, to this history, is, in sum, that the phantasy of the pervert presents itself as something which one could call a sequence, I mean, as one could call it using an empty word in cinema films, I mean: a sequence cut off from the development of the drama like something that one sees appearing under the name - I am not sure of the term - of a 'rush' this piece which in trailers appears to us on the screen as a few illuminating images which are designed to whet our appetite to come back next week to see the film, which precisely is announced in this way.

What is seductive in these images, really depends, in effect, on this aspect of their not being inserted into the chain, of having been broken off from the theme, and it is indeed something of this order that is in question in the phantasy of the pervert.

This we know, in so far as what analysis has taught us to see in it, is, in effect, something which, up to a certain degree, replaced in its context, in its dramatic sequence, that of the subject's past, can in different degrees, indeed at the cost of some modifications, retouching, reverse transformations, take up again its place and its meaning.

So that, this relationship that the phantasy of the pervert has to his desire, it is not for nothing - I mean that it really is in the highlighting of what we already, in our formulation, have already situated in terms of the value, of the position of desire with respect to the subject, I mean this beyond of the nameable, this beyond of the subject in which is situated this desire, here are - I say it retrospectively and in passing - these few things which explain to us the particular quality the phantasy is invested with when it is avowed, whether it is that of a pervert or not, namely: this sort of embarrassment which

must be specifically named, one which effectively holds back for a long time, often, the subjects who have been delivered from it, namely: this ridiculous aspect, which can only be explained, can only be understood if already we have been able to perceive the relationships that we have drawn between desire in its proper position and the field, the domain of comedy. This is only a reminder.

And having recalled this position, this function of the phantasy especially in connection with the pervert, and the problems that they have therefore posed immediately as regards what their real nature was, whether it was a sort of radical, natural nature, whether this nature of the perverse phantasy was a final term, or whether one should not see in it other things just as complex, just as elaborated, in fact just as significant as the neurotic symptom.

This indeed is why a whole elaboration which was carried out, was integrated into the problem of perversity, and which took on an essential part in the elaboration of what is called 'object relations' or of the relationship to the object, as having to be defined in an evolutionary fashion, in a genetic fashion, as regulating the stages, the phases of the development of the subject, not just simply in function of the 'momentariness' of man, therefore sensual 'phase-erogenic' of the subject, but between the mode of a relationship and the mode which each one of these phases defines.

It is from this that there were constructed - as much by Abraham as by Ferenczi and others - I do not need to remind you here of the people who began this - that there were constructed these tables of so-called empty correlative phases, on the one side, of reservoirs of dependency, libidinal forms of the ego, on the other hand. In this form of the libido, this structure of the ego seemed to correspond to and to specify a type of special relationship to reality.

You know what on the one hand, this sort of elaboration contributed by way of clarification, indeed enrichment, and what on the other hand it posed by way of problems. It is enough to refer to the least of the works, to the least of the concrete works, which try effectively to articulate in connection with a precise case, a precise form, to rediscover the correspondence, always established in a slightly theoretical way, to perceive that the problem is sometimes of itself, in its development suggestive of something, of an estimation which it lacks.

I remind you therefore that it is to this, to this theme: 'research into the totality of object relations', this is what we say, this is what I am designating (*désire*) when it is a question, for example, of an opposition like that between partial object and total object which appears in an elaborated form, which in our opinion is inappropriate; in the most recent elaborations, for example that of the famous notion of the 'distance from the object', so dominant in the works, in the technical rules, to which I often alluded here, this notion of distance from the object, is one that a certain French author in particular wants to make decisive in the relationships of obsessional neurosis; as if it were not evident, and much more evident still that, for example, this notion of distance plays a decisive role, when one is simply trying to articulate, to articulate certain perverse positions, those of fetishism for example, in which the distance from an object is much more obviously manifested by the very phenomenology of fetishism. Many other forms can obviously be articulated in this sense.

And the first of the truths that we would have to contribute to this is that undoubtedly this notion of distance is even so essential that after all, it may indeed perhaps

be impossible to eliminate it as such from desire itself - I mean necessary for the maintenance, for the support, for the very safeguarding of the dimension of desire.

It is enough, in effect, to consider that if something is indeed able to correspond to the myth of relationship without distance to the object, it is in effect hard to see how what is properly speaking desire could be sustained. There is here something which, as I say, has a properly mythological form, that of a sort of accord. I would say that there are two aspects, two mirages, two appearances Of what I would call animal accord on the one hand; one could also say, moreover on the other hand, of what we must call mystical accord - is it not so? - with the object, which indeed is a residue within analytic elaboration of something which in no way coincides with the data of experience.

Also, moreover, what is indicated in analytic technique as what ought to correct, to rectify this so called bad distance maintained from the object by the obsessional. Everyone knows in the clearest fashion that this is indicated as something which should be overcomein the analytic relationship, and this by an ideal, indeed an idealising identification with the analyst, himself considered, on this occasion, as not the object, but the prototype of a satisfying relationship to the object. We will have reason to come back to what such an ideal may correspond to exactly, in so far as it is realised in analysis. I already approached it, but we will have reason perhaps to situate it, to articulate it differently a little later.

In effect these problems were approached in a much more rigorous and much more serious fashion, still along the same path, in other contexts, in different groups, and I would put - as I already indicated to you here - in the first rank the articulations of Glover. I remind you of the place of the article - which I already quoted - in Vol. 14 of the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* October 1933 on 'The Relation of Perversion-Formation to the Development of Reality-Sense'.

This is the preoccupation which is, for him, pursued in the sense of a genetic elaboration of the relationships of the subject to this world, the reality which surrounds him, and of an evolution which must be more closely circumscribed as much by reconstruction, by the analyses of adults, as by the direct apprehension of the behaviour of the child, carried out as rigorously as possible in a perspective that is renewed by analysis, that Glover tries to situate these perversions somewhere with respect to a chain.

He had already established a chain involving the dates, as one might say, of insertion of different psychic anomalies with which analysis has to deal, and which led him to construct a series, the order of which lends itself, as is usually the case, to criticism, but which, without insisting any more, is constituted by the primitive, primordial character of psychotic disturbances, paranoid disturbances to be specific, after which there follow different forms of neurosis, which are articulated, are situated in a progressive order - I mean from before to after, from the origins towards what comes later - beginning with the obsessional neurosis which is found then exactly at the limit of paranoiac forms.

It is in so far as he placed there, somewhere, in the interval, in a previous article - the one from Vol. 13, namely of July 1932, part three of Vol. 13 of the *International Journal* - 'On the Etiology of Drug-addiction', in other words what we call *les toxicomanies*, that he thought he could situate with sufficient precision the relationships between paranoiacs and neurotics, that he tries to situate there what the function of perversions could be, at what stage, at what date, with what mode of relationship of the subject to the real; in so far as the paranoiac form is linked to quite primitive mechanisms of projection and interjection, he is at that time, let us state it clearly, working altogether on

the same plane, and expressly in accord, moreover, with a fashion formulated with

You know that he became a spectacular opponent - it is on this plane that he adheres to the Kleinian elaboration and it is in so far as a mode of relationship to the object, very specific to this paranoid-type stage, considered as primitive, exists, that he situates, that he elaborates, articulates, understands the function of drug-addiction.

It is to this that there must be referred the passage which I read for you a few sessions ago, namely: the passage in which, in a very brilliant metaphorical fashion, where in a very instructive way, he does not hesitate to compare the primitive world of the child to something which resembles a butcher's shop, a public lavatory under shell-fire and a post-mortem room combined, to which undoubtedly a more benign organisation is brought by the transformation of this initial, inaugural spectacle of life, by the progress to the stage of a chemists shop with its reserves of objects, some beneficent, the others maleficent.

This is therefore articulated in the clearest fashion, and is instructive, in so far as it signifies for us the direction in which research about the function of phantasy is carried on. In the direction of its functioning, as structural, as organiser of the discovery, of the construction of reality by the subject. In this, there is no difference, in effect, between Glover and Mrs. Melanie Klein. And Mrs. Melanie Klein specifically articulates it for us as follows: the fact is that in short objects are successively conquered by the child, in so far - this is articulated in the article on 'Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego' - in so far as, in the measure that objects less close to the needs of the child are apprehended, are charged with the anxiety linked to their use in the fundamentally aggressive, sadistic, relationships, which are, at the beginning, those of the child to his entourage, as a consequence of any frustration.

It is in so far as the subject displaces his interest onto more benign objects - which, in their turn, will be charged with the same anxiety - that the extension of the world of the child is conceived of as such.

Notice what this represents: this represents the notion that we should search for in a mechanism, in short, that we could call contraphobic, namely: that it is in so far as objects have first of all and primitively a phobic-object function, and the phobic object - as one might say - is looked for elsewhere, it is by a progressive extension of the world of objects in a contraphobic dialectic, this is the very mechanism of the conquest of reality.

Whether or not this corresponds to clinical experience, is really not a question that is directly here within the field that we are dealing with. I think that directly, and in clinical experience, that there are many things which go against it, that there is a unilateral, a partial view of a mechanism which undoubtedly does come into the conquest of reality, but which does not constitute it properly speaking.

But it is not our goal here to criticise the 's theory, because it is compared to 's; every other point of view, we will take into account, we will bring into play; it is with respect to something, and the function which is desire.

Now this is something which immediately shows its consequences. The fact is that Glover ends up with a paradox which undoubtedly seems more instructive for him than for us, because it is not really something which should astonish us. He ends up with the following. he tries concretely to situate the different perversions with respect to his dialectic, to this mechanism as he tries to elaborate it, to reconstitute it, to reintegrate it into

the notion of a regular development of the ego, in so far as it is supposed to be parallel to the modifications of the libido; in so far as one can inscribe, in fact, the destiny, the structuring of the subject, in terms of a pure individual experience of the conquest of reality. Everything is there, in effect.

The difference between the theory that I give you of phobias for example, and the one that you will see in certain recent French authors, in so far as they try to indicate the genesis of phobia in structural forms of infantile experience, for example of the way in which the child has to arrange his relationships with those who surround him, of the passage from clarity to obscurity, it is a question of a purely experimental genesis, of an experience of fear, from which there is engendered and deduced the possibility of the phobia - the difference between this position and the one which I teach you is typically the following: it is to say that there is no kind of direct deduction of the phobia, if one does not admit the function, the exigency as such of a function of the signifier, which supposes its own proper dimension which is not that of the relationship of the subject to his entourage, which is not that of the relationship to any reality, except to the reality and the dimension of language, as such, from the fact that he has to situate himself as subject in the discourse, to manifest himself there as being, which is different.

There is something quite striking, about the appraisal of these phobias, even in the case of someone as perspicacious as Glover. He tries to explain the genesis, the stabilisation of a phobia, when he declares that it is undoubtedly more advantageous to suffer from a tiger-phobia, when one is a child living in the streets of London, than to find the same phobia if one were living in the middle of the Indian jungle.

One may ask oneself if one could not retort that, effectively, it is not on this register that the problem is posed; that is to say: that after all one could even reverse the proposition, and say that a tiger-phobia in the Indian jungle is, on the contrary, it seems, more advantageous to adapt the child to a real adaptation, and that, on the contrary, it is very burdensome to suffer from a tiger-phobia, in so far as we know what is correlative to it, namely: that the behaviour of the child, indeed of the subject who is as advanced as possible in his development, at the moment that he is the prey of a phobia, is undoubtedly more encumbered, and is indeed without any relationship with the real.

In fact, something presents itself, which poses for Glover his problem in these terms: it is that he sees that the greatest possible diversity of reality-distortions is produced in perversions, and to be able to say that he cannot situate perversion in a genetic perspective except by fragmenting it, interpolating it at all the supposed or presupposed stages of development, namely: to admit just as much the existence of very archaic perversions, more or less contemporaneous with the paranoid epoch, even the epoch, as other perversions which must be situated at very advanced stages, even indeed ones that are just phallic, but properly speaking at the phallic or indeed genital stages of development.

This does not seem to him to be an objection for the following reason: the fact is that he ends up giving to perversion the following definition: it is that in short perversion is one of the forms, for him - he cannot end up at anything else given the perspective that he has begun from - is one of the forms of reality testing.

It is to the extent - according to Glover - that, somewhere, something in the testing of reality does not come to fruition, fails, that perversion helps to patch over this flaw, this hole - is that not it - by a particular mode of the apprehension of the real as such, of the real

whose occasion is a psychic real, a real projected, and on the other hand, introjected, that it is therefore properly speaking as a function of maintaining, of preserving a reality which is supposed to be threatened in its totality, it is in so far as perversion serves, if you wish, one might say, both as a patching, in the sense of a cloth, in the sense that one says that a cloth is patched, or again the keystone of a vault, which is something of a substitute one, somewhat shakey, somewhat threatening, compromising the equilibrium of the whole of reality for the subject; in brief, it is only in a non-ambiguous fashion, as a form of salvation with respect to a supposed menace of psychosis, that perversion is conceived by Edward Glover.

This is a point of view. Perhaps certain observations can effectively show us something which appears to illustrate it, but there are many elements which demand that we should distance ourselves from it; besides the fact, that it seems quite paradoxical to make of perversion something which has this economic role, this economic role which many elements contradict, were it only something which indicates to us that it is certain that the precariousness of the perverts edifice, is not something, either clinically or in analytic experience, which strikes us, at least at first sight.

To indicate something here, I will not abandon this Kleinian dialectic without pointing out how it rejoins and initiates the problem that we are posing.

In effect, if we seek what is in question in the Kleinian dialectic, namely: the two stages that she distinguishes between the paranoid phase, then afterwards, the depressive phase, which is characterised, as you know, with respect to the first, by the relationship of the subject to his major predominant object: the mother, as a whole.

Previously, it is with these disjointed elements that he has to deal between good and bad objects, with everything that this is going to establish in him which is that of projection and of introjection. This is how the paranoid barrier is characterised.

Now, what can we say in our perspective? I mean: let us try to understand, by means of the perspective that we ourselves articulate what is in question in this process.

This altogether inaugural process, placed at the beginning of the life of the subject, is that in snort the reality of the first apprehensions of the object, as Mrs. Klein shows it, arises from the following: the fact is in short that the object - and, first of all, beyond the fact that it may be good or bad, profitable or frustrating - the fact is that it is significant.

Because the notion, the distinction which, if the opposition, as such, is strict - and I would say without nuance, without transition, without perceiving in any fashion that it is the same object which can be good or bad, at different times, namely: the mother - that there is here not the experience of the young subject, nor everything that it can involve in terms of transitional attitudes, but that there is clear opposition, a passage of the object, as such, to a function of signifying opposition which is at the basis of the whole Kleinian dialectic, and regarding which it is too little perceived - it seems to me - that however well founded it may be, it is completely opposite, on the opposite side, on the opposite pole, that it is the contrary of this other element highlighted by our experience, namely: the importance of living communication, just as essential at the beginning for development, which is expressed, is manifested in the dimension of maternal care.

There is here something from another register which is contemporaneous, but which cannot be confused, and what Melanie Klein brings us, is a sort of primitive algebra, which

one can say completely rejoins, in effect, what we are trying here to highlight under the name of the function of the signifier.

They are the primary, primitive forms of this function of the signifier, as such, which are rightly or wrongly, whether it is effectively present at that date or simply a *Ruckphantasie*, a phantasy, but a retrospective one; this is - we only have to record it - what Melanie Klein describes for us.

From then on, what value is going to be taken on by this limiting phase between the paranoid period with its organisation of good objects, which are as such interiorised, 'internalised' - she says - by the subject, which are rejected

What is happening? How can we describe what is happening, from the moment that there intervenes the notion of the subject as a whole, which is essential in order that the subject himself should consider himself as having an inside and an outside. Because when all is said and done, it is only from then on that it is conceivable that there should be manifested, be defined the processes of internalisation and externalisation, of introjection and of projection, which are going to be - for Melanie Klein - decisive for this structuration of the primitive animal.


With our points of reference, we see that what is in question is something which resituates this relationship, this primitive *esquisse* - as she herself has put it - of objects into good and bad with respect to this other register of the inside and the outside of the subject.

This something, which I think that we can without being too attracted to the Kleinian perspectives, which we can refer to what we call the mirror stage, it is in so far as the image of the other gives to the subject this form of the unity of the other, as such, that there can be established somewhere this division of inside and outside, with reference to which the good and the bad objects are going to be reclassified - the good in so far as they ought to come inside, the bad in so far as they should remain outside.

Well! What comes to be defined here in the clearest fashion - because it is imposed by experience - is the same thing as we can say in our own discourse; namely it is: that the discourse which really organises the world of objects - I would say according to the being of the subject, at the beginning - extends beyond the one in which the subject himself recognises himself in narcissistic testing, the testing belonging to what is called 'stage number one', namely: in which he recognises himself as mastery and as unique ego, in which he recognises himself therefore in a 'narcissist' or narcissistic relation of identification of one image to another, in which he recognises himself as mastery of an ego.

It is in so far as something defines him in a first identification, in the one which is expressed here (explanations on the blackboard) at the level of the first identification, to the mother, as object of the first identification to the insignia of the other, it is in so far as this preserves for the subject an assimilating value which extends beyond what he is going to be able to put within himself in so far as this within is defined by his first experiences of mastery, of prestige, in so far as he is i(o) of the other i(o), typically and ideally, of this young counterpart, with whom we see him in the clearest possible fashion carrying out his experiences of mastery, it is in so far as what is referred, it is in so far as the two experiences do not overlap, that - I do not say, me: the whole experience of development is organised - that necessarily we must admit this to understand what it is in question in what Melanie Klein describes for us.

In effect what defines this difference, this field X or I which is here, (explanations on the blackboard)



which is at once part of the subject and, at the same time, not part of this subject, is what? It is this object whose paradoxical nature seems to surprise no one, beginning with the first fruits, or the premises that Melanie Klein poses; it is what she calls the 'bad' internal object. The 'bad' internal object presents itself for us right away in the Kleinian dialectic, in the most manifest fashion, as the problematic object, in the sense that, seen - as one might say - from outside where the subject is not subject, but where we should take it as a real being, we can ask ourselves: this bad object, to which the subject supposedly identifies itself, when all is said and done, is the subject it, or is he not it?

Inversely, seen from within, seen from the point of view of the subject, of the mastery of the first exercises of the subject to maintain himself, to affirm himself as subject, to contain himself, we should ask ourselves whether he has or he does not have this bad object, whose absolutely decisive role we know from then on. The question which poses itself, is: does he have it or does he not have it?

Because if we have defined 'good' and 'bad' objects as determinant of the process of the structuring by which the subject interiorises the good objects, and primitively makes them a part of himself, and rejects the bad as being what is not him, all the others, the paradox of the interiorised bad object comes to the forefront. What is meant by this sum (or this zone) of the first object in so far as the subject internalises it, as he both makes it his own, and in a way denies it as virtually bad?

It is clear that here the subsequent function of prohibition is precisely that which has the value of denying, thanks to which the bad object ceases to propose itself as a kind of permanent enigma, an anxiogenic enigma with respect to the being of the subject. Prohibition is precisely what introduces within this problematic function of the bad object this essential denying - this is what constitutes its prohibitory function - the fact is that if he is this bad object, he does not have it; in so far as he is it, is identified with it, it is forbidden for him to have it - the euphony in French between the subjunctive of the verb to have (*il l'ait*) and the indicative of the verb to be (*il est*) should be used: in other words: 'in so far as he is it, he does not have it; in so far as he has it, he is not it' (*en tant qu'il l'est, il ne l'a pas; en tant qu'il l'a, il ne l'est pas*).

In other words, the fact is that at the level of the bad object the subject experiments. It is - if I may express myself in this way - the servitude of his mastery. It is that the true master - everyone knows that he is beyond any face that he is somewhere in language, even though he cannot even be nowhere in it - the true master is the one who delegates the limited usage of the bad object as such, namely: of an object which is not situated with respect to the demand for an object which one cannot demand.

Because it is from there, in effect that the whole import of our data begins.

Beforehand, may I indicate to you that what can be read in a gripping fashion in the precise cases that are presented to us by Melanie Klein, is that in so far as he is manifestly in this impasse, in this field of the 'nondemandable' as such, that we find this particularly inhibited child with whom she is dealing, and whom she presents to us in the article on 'Symbol formation in the development of the ego'.

Is it not clear that what she obtains, once she begins to speak to this child, is something which immediately crystallizes in a demand, a panic-stricken demand 'Is the nurse going to come?' and that, immediately afterwards, in the measure that the child is going to allow himself to get into contact again with his objects, which he appears from the beginning, in the experiment, to be singularly prepared for, there is something which she signals to us as a very astonishing, very decisive fact because, as you remember, it is in the exercise of a sort of little cutting, of scratching with the help of the scissors by the child, who is far from being awkward, because he makes use of all sorts of elements, such as the door handles..... He had never been able to hold scissors. Here, he holds them, and in order to try to detach - and he manages it I - a little piece of coal from something which is not without signification either, because it is an element of the chain of the train, with which she has succeeded in getting him to play, namely a tender - without even wanting to go into here curious games and terms which could be constructed around this tender - which is also tender in Englishit is not the weather map... but *la carte du tendre* which here is offered to us - and it is in this little piece that the child, in truth, isolates, defines, situates himself in this something that he can detach from the signifying chain; it is in this remainder, in this tiny little pile, in this outline of an object, which only appears here under the form of little pieces, of a little piece, the very one which will provoke all of a sudden his panicky sympathy, when he sees it in the form of pencil shavings on Melanie Klein's lap and, for the first time, will be moved in the presence of this other crying out: 'poor Mrs. Klein'.

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Therefore desire is not there

It is from this first intuition that we start: which brings us back to the original conditions in which a subject comes to see us: desire is not demand. When the subject says 'why is this happening?', what is he demanding? In principle, satisfaction and happiness. Except for the fact that every satisfaction does not involve happiness for him, far from it.

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... to organise the history of the subject, as the history of analysis, as the history of technique, in the sense of something which ought to respond to this demand for satisfaction. In what way? By a way which is the following, namely: in trying to respond to the demand for satisfaction of the subject by a reduction of his desires to his needs.

Now, is there not here a paradox, since, on the other hand, all our experience - one could say - is sustained in this dimension, as obvious moreover for the subject as for us - for us, because everything that we have articulated is going to be resumed in what I am going to say; and, for the subject, because, when all is said and done, the subject knows it very well when he comes to see us - I am told that someone is in the process of writing a very important thesis on 'the social signification of analysis' and I am led to understand that in it there will be elements extremely rich from the point of view of experience and extremely well developed; I really hope so, because I think effectively that the social representation of analysis is much less distorted in the community as a whole than one imagines, that what will emerge from it in the clearest fashion is this thing which is frankly at the basis, at the very principle of what a subject implies in front of us by his very presence is what; it is that in the data of his demand there is the following: 'that he does not trust his desire'.

The common factor with which subjects approach us is the following: it is that 'his desire, he does not trust it'.

Though he may, as a result of these new contrivances, follow on after us in his reference, if needs be to desire, indeed even to its sublimation along the elevated pathways of love, it remains, at the beginning, that what characterises desire, is that there is something which, as such, cannot be demanded, and in connection with which the question is posed, and that that is what is, properly speaking, the field and the dimension of desire.

You know that to introduce this division, this dialectic of desire - which is something I did at a very precise date, namely: two and a half years ago now - I started from what? - from what Freud said about the Oedipus complex in women.

Is not this, is not what I have just articulated legible in the fact that, at the level of analytic experience, at the level of unconscious experience, there is a place for separating out the following, what the woman demands at the beginning, that through which - Freud tells us - she enters into the Oedipus complex?

It is not to have a satisfaction, it is to have what she does not have, as such.

It is a question, as you know, of the phallus.

It is nothing other than the source which gives rise to all the problems which will arise to try to reduce the dialectic of the maturation of desire in women to something natural; the fact is that, whether we arrive or not at this reduction, what we have to overcome is a fact of experience; a fact of experience which is the following, that the little girl, at a moment of her development - after all, it does not matter to us whether it is a primary or a secondary process; it is a striking and irreducible process - what she demands to have is namely; the phallus, it is to have it at this critical moment of development that Freud highlights, it is to have it at the place where she should have it if she were a man. This indeed is what is in question; there is no ambiguity about it; and the whole discussion about what happens implies that in fact, even when she manages to get it - because the woman is in a very privileged position compared to the man - this phallus, which is a signifier, I really mean: a signifier she can really have. This is even what constitutes her advantage and the relative simplicity of her affective problems, compared to those of men.

But we must not allow this relative simplicity to blind us, because it nevertheless remains, because of the starting point, that this real phallus that she can have, namely: that it is introduced into her dialectic, into her evolution, as a signifier, she will always have it at least at one level of her experience. (I am always reserving the limiting possibility of the perfect union with a being, namely: of something which completely blends, in an embrace, the beloved being with his organ.) But what constitutes the test of our experience and the very difficulties that we have to deal with in the sexual order, is situated precisely by this: it is that this ideal, poetic, indeed apocalyptic moment of the perfect sexual union, is only situated at the limit, and that with which, in fact, in the ordinary testing of experience, the woman has to deal, even when she has arrived at the realisation of her femininity, is the phallic object, always qua separated. It is even because she is operating, as such, and in this register, that her action, her incidence may be perceived by the man as castrating.

Moreover, this, of course, remains for her, until analysis, unconscious, just as there remains unconscious the following: the fact that this phallus which she does not have,

symbolically she is it, in so far as she is the object of desire of the other. But she does not know the first of these things any more than the second.

This specific position of the woman is valid in so far as it is unconscious to her, which means in so far as it is only valid for the other, for the partner; she (il?) remains nevertheless from the formula, the very particular formula in which her relationship is resumed, his phallus; the fact is that paradoxically in the unconscious she both is it and has it.

We have here one of the most singular effects of the relationship to discourse; the fact is that it is at this position that at the ideal end point, the ideal relationship of the woman, in her phantastical world, in the unconscious, in the best of cases she is it and she has it - except for the fact that she does not know it, except by her desire.

And through her desire of this there results - you will see it in the continuation of what I am developing - that there is a singular similarity between her formula, if one can express oneself in this way, between her transsubjective formula, her unconscious formula, and that of the pervert.

If everything that we have discovered about the unconscious economy of the woman consists in the symbolic equivalences between the phallus and all the objects that can be separated from her, including in the first place the most natural object to be separated from her, namely: her infant, - if it is here that she finds herself having to situate herself, in a series of phallic equivalents by which I am only reproducing here the test of analytic doctrine, we are going to find ourselves in the presence of the following: that for her, in the most natural way in the world, natural objects end up by realising this function of object of desire, in so far as they are objects from which one is separated.

And it is this which explains, I think, the lesser frequency of perversion in the woman. It is that inscribed in the cultural context - there is no question of it being elsewhere - her natural satisfactions naturally find - if I may express myself in this way - a way to situate themselves in the dialectic of separation, as such. In the dialectic of the object signifier of desire, and this is what the analytic authors - there is more than one of them - have expressed very clearly, and in a fashion which will appear no doubt much more concrete than what I have just said, by saying that if there is less perversion in women than in men, it is because in general they satisfy their perverse affects (?) in their relationships with their children. (Smiles) This is why not that your daughter is mute, but why there are some children that we - as analysts - have to deal with.

We come back, as you see, to first truths, but it is not a bad thing to come back to them by a path which is clear and correct. I will take the opportunity also to indicate something to you: to indicate something to you destined, at least for the masculine part of my audience, to temper the astonishment, even the impatience they may feel before one of the singular properties of their relationships with their partners of the other sex. I would like to talk about what is usually called jealousy.

As usual, the analyst, who has brought so much clarity, has also of course brought just as much obscurity. 'No progress', said Nestroy, who was so appreciated by Freud 'is half as great as one imagines it to be'.

The problem of jealousy, and especially of feminine jealousy has been submerged in analysis in the quite different form of masculine jealousy.

Feminine jealousy which in clear-cut dimensions, dimensions as distinct as the style of love in the two different sexes, is really something which, I believe, can really not be situated except at the most radical point.

And if you remember my little drawing of the demand for a relationship to the other, of the subject who questions this relationship and who, as I might say, strikes the other in it with a signifying collapse so that he appears himself as collapsed in the presence of something which is the remainder of this division, this something irreducible, undemandable, which is precisely the object of desire, it is in so far as for the subject, who in so far as she makes herself an object of love, the woman, on this occasion, sees clearly in this remainder this something which is the most essential in her, that she accords so much importance to the manifestation of desire.

Because, indeed, it is quite clear that, in experience, love and desire are two different things, and that one must all the same speak clearly and say that one can love one being very much and desire another.

It is precisely in the measure that the woman occupies this position, and that she knows very well the value of desire, namely: that beyond all the sublimations of love, desire has a relationship to being even in its most limited, its most shortsighted, its most fetishistic and let us say the word, its most stupid form.

Even in the extreme form, in which in the phantasy the subject is presented and in which the subject is literally no longer anything but a support and a sign, the sign of this signifying remainder of relationships with the other, it is nevertheless to this that when all is said and done the woman will attach the value of final proof that it is indeed to her that one is addressing oneself.

The beloved, with all the tenderness and devotion one can imagine..... it nevertheless remains that if a man desires another woman, she knows that even if what the man loves is only her slipper, or the hem of her dress, or the paint that she has on her face, it is nevertheless here that the homage to being is produced.

It is necessary from time to time to recall the first truths, and it is for this reason that I think you will excuse me the perhaps exaggerated tone which I gave given to this digression.

And, now, let us see where things go, namely with respect to this zone of the object in which there is established this ambiguity, and what is the function as such of the phallus?

Already it cannot but appear to you but as particularly outlined in what I have just said concerning the bad internal object.

That if it can be said that if the paternal metaphor - as I called it - establishes there, in the form of the phallus, a dissociation which is exactly that which overlaps the general form, as might be expected, which I gave to you as being that of prohibition, namely that: either the subject is not it, or the subject does not have it.

This means that if the subject is it, the phallus - and this is illustrated immediately in this form, namely: as object of the mothers desire - then he does not have it, namely he does not have the right to make use of it, and this is the fundamental value of the law which is

called the prohibition of incest, - and that, on the other hand/ if he has it - namely if he has realised the paternal identification - then there is one thing certain, it is that he is not this phallus.

This is what is signified, at, what I would call the most radical symbolic level, by the introduction of the dimension of the Oedipus complex. And everything that will be elaborated around this subject will come back always to this: 'either.... or....' which introduces an order at the level of the object that one cannot demand.

How is the neurotic to be characterised? - Well! The neurotic, of course, uses this alternation: it is in so far as he situates himself fully at the level of the Oedipus complex, at the level of the signifying structuring of the Oedipus complex, as such, that he makes use of it, and in a fashion that I would call metonymical, and which I would even call, in so far as here he is not it, presents itself as primary, with respect to 'she does not have it', which I would call a regressive metonymy. I mean that the neurotic is the one who uses the alternative; in this metonymical form, in the fact, that, for him, 'not to have it' is the form in which he affirms himself: and in a masked fashion: 'to be it' - I mean the phallus.

He does not have the phallus, in order to be it, in a hidden, unconscious fashion. And in order not to have it, in order to be it - it is the rather enigmatic 'being for' (*pour être*) around which I organised, I think, our last conversation - it is 'another who has it', while he 'is it' in an unconscious way.

Pay careful attention to this: the fact is that the basis of neurosis is constituted by this: it is that in his function as desirer, the subject takes on a substitute.

Take the obsessional, and look effectively at what happens at the end of his complicated procedures; he is not the one who enjoys (*jouit*). In the same way for the hysteric, she is not the one who enjoys. The imaginary substitution that is in question, and, precisely, the substitution for the subject, at the level that I teach you here to situate him, namely, it the substitution of his ego, as such, for this subject concerning the desire that is in question. It is in so far as he substitutes his ego for the subject that he introduces demand into the question of desire. It is because someone - who is not him, but his image - is substituted for him in the dialectic of desire that when all is said and done he can demand - as experience allows us constantly to put our finger on - only substitutes.

What is characteristic in the experience of the neurotic, and what is on the same level as his own feeling, is that everything that he demands, he demands for something else. And the result of this scene, through which the imaginary, in short, as you see, comes here to play this role in what I called the regressive metonymy of the neurotic, has another consequence, because in this domain it cannot be stopped: the subject is substituted for himself, at the level of his desire; he can only demand substitutes, while believing that he is demanding what he desires.

And, further on again, we know from experience that because of the very form that is in question, namely of the ego in so far as it is the reflection of a reflection, and the form of the other, he substitutes himself also for the one from whom he demands. Because it is quite clear that, nowhere more than in the neurotic, does this separated ego as easily come to take the place of this separated object which I designated for you as being the original form of the object of desire.

The altruism of the neurotic, contrary to what one says, is permanent. And there is

no more common path to the satisfactions he is seeking than what one can describe as 'devoting oneself then to satisfying, as far as one can for the other, all the demands, which he well knows, however, constitute in his case a perpetual failure of desire' or, in other words: 'to blind oneself in ones devotion to the other to one's own dissatisfaction'.

These are not, I think, things which are comprehensible, outside the perspective that I am trying to articulate for you here, namely when all is said and done, that the formula S (O) is transformed into something, if you wish, with reservations and summarily, of the identification of his unconscious being; and this is why we will give to it the same sign as to S barred (S), namely the phallus barred; namely: that in the presence of an object it is the most general form of an object of desire, which is that other in so far as he is situated there, and rediscovers himself there.

We must now pass on to perversion.

But it is late. I will put off therefore till the next time the rest of this discourse. If I cannot make it advance more quickly, you should not see in this any more than the effect of the difficulties in which we have to make our way.

(Prolonged applause) 14.10

Seminar 26: 24 June 1959

The difficulty that we are dealing with does not date from today or yesterday. It is one of those after all about which the whole moralistic tradition has speculated, namely those of fallen desire (*désir déchu*). I do not need to evoke for you from the distant past the bitterness of wise men or of pseudo-wise men about the disappointing character of human desire.

The question takes on an explicit form in analysis in so far first of all as the first analytic experience shows us the in their partial nature, the relationship to the object supposing a complexity, a complication in the incredible risk there is in the fitting together of these partial drives, and making the contingency of the object depend on this fitting together; the combination of partial drives really shows us the fundamentally problematic character of any access to the object which to spell it out shows us a theory, only at the cost of showing it to be completely contrary to what we might think in a first approach to the notion of instinct which in any case, even if we keep its finalistic hypothesis extremely flexible, remains nevertheless - every theory of instinct whatever it may be is a theory as one might say of the centring of the object. Namely that the processes in the living organism ensure that an object is progressively fixed in a certain field, and is captured there by a certain behaviour, a process which of itself is presented under the form of the progressive concentration of the field.

The process, the dialectic which analysis shows us is completely different: that one progresses on the contrary by the addition, by the combination of these partial drives, and which comes to conceive of the advent of a satisfying object, the one which corresponds to the two poles of masculinity and of femininity at the cost of the synthesis of all sorts of interchangeable, variable drives, and of combinations that are necessary to arrive at very diverse types of success.

This is why in a certain fashion you may think that in defining by the \$ of o, placed here in the schema or the graph which we make use of to explain, to expose the position of desire in a speaking subject, that what is there is nothing other than a simple notation. In desire what is required is the relationship of the subject to the object; that o is the object.

The capital S is the subject, and nothing more. There is nothing more original in this notation than this little bar which recalls that the subject, at this high point which is represented by the presentation of desire, is himself marked by the word. And after all it is nothing other than this something which recalls that the drives are fragmented.

It should be carefully noted that the import of this notation is not limited to that. This notation does not designate a relationship of the subject to the object, but the phantasy, a phantasy which sustains this subject as desiring, namely at this point beyond his discourse where it is a question of This notation signifies that in the phantasy the subject is present as subject of the unconscious discourse. The subject is here present in so far as he is represented in the phantasy by the function of cutting which is essentially his own, of cutting in a discourse, and which is not just any discourse, which is a discourse which escapes him: this discourse of the unconscious.

This is essential, and if you follow the thread you cannot fail to be struck by the extent to which it highlights a dimension always omitted when we are dealing with perverse phantasies.

I already indicated to you the other day the prudence with which what we call the perverse phantasy should be approached. The perverse phantasy is not perversion. The biggest mistake is to imagine that we all understand perversion in so far as we are, namely in so far as we are more or less neurotic in some way, in so far as we have access to these perverse phantasies. But the comprehensive access that we have to perverse phantasy does not for all that give the structure of perversion, even though in a way it calls for its reconstruction.

If you will allow me to take a few liberties in my discourse today, namely to take a little gambol outside it, I would evoke for you this book marked by this stamp of our contemporary epoch which is called *Lolita*. I am not requiring you to read this book any more than a series of others which seem to indicate a certain constellation of interest precisely around this mainspring of desire. There are better things written than

Lolita on what one could call the theoretical plane. But *Lolita* is all the same an exemplary enough production.

For those of you who open it there will be nothing obscure as regards the function devolved onto a And obviously in a way that is all the more unambiguous since one can say that curiously the author positions himself in a quite articulate opposition to what he calls Freudian charlatanism, and nevertheless on several occasions, in a fashion which he really does not perceive, gives the clearest witness to this symbolic function of the image of the Including the dream which he has a little while before approaching it in a decisive fashion and which makes it appear to him in the form of a hairy hermaphrodite monster.

But this is not what is important. The important thing in the structure of this work which has all the characteristics of the relationship of the subject to desire, to what is properly speaking a neurotic phantasy, for the simple reason which explodes in the contrast between the first and the second volume, between the sparkling character of desire while it is being meditated on while it occupies some thirty years of the life of the subject, and its prodigious collapse bogged down in a reality, with no means of even reaching the partner, which constitutes the second volume, and the miserable journey of this couple across America the beautiful.

What is important, and in some way exemplary, is that simply in virtue of a constructive coherence, the pervert properly speaking shows himself, appears in an other, an other who is no longer the double of the subject, who is something quite different, who appears there literally as his persecutor, who appears in the margin of the adventure as if - and in effect this is what is most openly admitted in the book - the desire that is in question in the subject can only live in an other, and where it is literally impenetrable and completely unknown.

The character who is substituted for the hero at a given moment of the plot, the character who is properly speaking the pervert the one who really has access to the object, is a character the key to whom is given in the last groans that he gives when he collapses from the shots of the hero's revolver. This sort of negative of the principal character who is the person in whom there effectively reposes the relationship to the object has here

something quite exemplary which may serve us as a schema to understand that it is only at the cost of an extrapolation that we can produce the perverse structure.

The structure of desire in neurosis is something of a quite different nature to the structure of desire in perversion, and all the same these two structures oppose one another. In fact the most radical of these perverse positions of desire, the one that is put by the analytic theory at the most original point, at the basis of development, and also at the terminal point of the most extreme regressions, namely masochism, this can we not recall here, allows us to put our finger, in a proof obtained through the phantasy, on the degree to which the levels are ignored in the fashion in which we precipitate ourselves in analysis to formulate in these telescoped formulae the nature of what we are in the presence of.

I take masochism here because it will serve us as a pole for this approach to perversion. And everyone knows that the attempt is being made to reduce masochism in its diverse forms to a relationship which, in the final term, would present itself as a quite radical relationship, of the subject in his relationship to his own life; to integrate it, in virtue of valid and precious indications that Freud gave on this subject, with a death instinct through which it is supposed to make itself felt in an immediate fashion and at the very level of the drive of the vital force considered as organic, something which is contrary to the organisation of the instincts.

No doubt there is here something which, at the limit, presents an a way of aiming, a perspective on which no doubt it is not at all indifferent to fix oneself in order to pose certain questions.

In short do we not now see, by posing as it is situated here by the letters which indicate its relationship on the schema, the essential position of desire in a division of the relationship of the subject to discourse, something that appears in a glaring way, and which it is wrong to neglect within the phantastical aspect of what is called masochism. Of this masochism about which, while making of it something that emerges from the most radical of instincts, the analysts are without any doubt in agreement in perceiving that the essential of masochistic *jouissance* cannot go beyond a certain limit of maltreatment. Some features or other, because they are highlighted are destined to bring us some illumination I think at least on a medium, on something which allows us to realise there the relationship of the subject, and this is essential, to something which is properly speaking the discourse of the other.

Is it necessary to have heard the confidences of a masochist, is it necessary to have read the least of the numerous writings which are consecrated to it, some more or less good examples of which have come out recently, in order to recognise an essential dimension of masochistic *jouissance* linked to this sort of particular passivity that the subject experiences and enjoys, in representing his fate as being played out above his head between a certain number of people who are there around him, and literally without taking his presence into account, everything that is being prepared about his fate being discussed before him without him being in the least taken into account.

Is this not one of the features, one of the most obviously striking, perceptible dimensions on which moreover the subject insists as being one of the constituents of the masochistic relationship.

Here therefore in short is the thing in which there is grasped, in which there appears something one can put ones finger on, that it is in the constitution of the subject *qua*

subject, and in so far as this constitution is inherent to the discourse, and in so far as the possibility is pushed to the extreme, that this discourse as such here develops in the phantasy, takes the subject as nothing, that we find one of the first steps. This indeed is a rather important step because it is on this, from this, that a certain number of symptomatic manifestations will develop. A step which will allow us to see at the horizon the relationship that there can be between the death instinct considered as one of the most radical agencies, and this something in the discourse which gives this support without which we would in no way have access to it, this support of this non-being which is one of the original, constitutive, implicit dimensions at the very roots of all symbolisation.

Because we have already for a whole year, the year that we consecrated to *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, articulated this function proper to the symbolisation which is essentially in the foundation of this cut, therefore that by which the current of the original tension, whatever it may be, is caught up in a series of alternatives which introduce what one can call the fundamental machine which is properly what we rediscover as detached, as disengaged at the source of the subjects schizophrenia, in which the subject identifies himself to the discordance of this machine compared to the vital current, to this discordance as such.

In this sense, I point out to you in passing, you put your finger here, in an exemplary fashion, which is at once radical and quite accessible, on one of the most prominent forms of the function of the *Verwerfung*. It is in so far as the cut is both constitutive and at the same time irredeemably external to the discourse in so far as it constitutes him, that one can say that the subject, in so far as he identifies himself with the cut, is *Verworfen*. This is how he apprehends himself, and perceives 'himself as real.

All I am doing here is to indicate to you in a different form, not I believe a fundamentally distinct one, but undoubtedly articulated and deepened differently, of the 'I think therefore I am'. I mean that it is in so far as the subject participates in this discourse - and the only thing that is added to the Cartesian dimension, is that this discourse is a discourse which escapes him, and which helps him without knowing it - it is in so far as he is in the cut of this discourse that he is to the supreme degree an 'I am' which has this singular property in this reality which is really the last one in which the subject grasps himself, namely the possibility of cutting the discourse somewhere, of punctuating it. This property where his essential being lies, his being in which he perceives himself in so far as the only real intrusion that he brings radically into the world as subject, does not exclude however from all other living relationships, to the point that all the detours that we analysts know about are required, for 'I' to be reintegrated into it.

We spoke briefly the last time about the way things happen for neurotics. As we said, for the neurotic the problem passes by way of the paternal metaphor, by way of the fiction, real or not, of the one who peacefully enjoys the object, at the price of what? Of something perverse. Because as we have said, this metaphor is the mask for a metonymy. Behind this metaphor of the father, as subject of the law, as peaceful possessor of *jouissance*, is hidden the metonymy of castration. And if you look at it carefully, you will see that the castration of the son is here only the continuation and the equivalence of the fathers castration.

Like all the myths behind the primitive Freudian myth of the father - and the primitive myth of the father indicates it well enough: Chronos castrates Jupiter, Jupiter castrates Chronos before coming into his heavenly kingship.

The metonymy in question depends in the final analysis on the following: the fact is that there is only ever one phallus in the game; and this is precisely what in the neurotic structure must be prevented from being seen. The neurotic cannot be the phallus except in the name of the other. There is therefore someone who has it, who is the one on whom his being depends.

He does not have what everyone knows is called the castration complex. But if nobody has it he naturally has it still less.

The desire of the neurotic, if you will allow me this formula which is a little summary for something that I would like to give you a sense of here, it is in so far as it is entirely dependent, as the whole development of Freud's work indicates to us, on this mythical guarantee of the good faith of the signifier to which the subject must attach himself in order to be able to live other than in a state of vertigo. This allows us to arrive at the formula that the desire of the neurotic - and everyone knows that there is a close, historical relationship between the anatomy that Freudianism gives to this desire, and something that is characteristic of a certain epoch that we are living, and regarding which we cannot know under what human form, vaguely vaticinated by prophets of different dimensions, it will culminate, or collapse.... but what is certain, is that something is tangible for us in our experience, provided we are not afraid to articulate it: it is that the desire of the neurotic, I would say in a condensed fashion is what arises where there is no god.

You must not think that I am saying what I have not said, namely that the situation is simpler when there is one. The question is the following. that it is at the level of the suspension of this supreme guarantee which is what the neurotic hides within himself, that there is situated and comes to a halt, and is suspended this desire of the neurotic. This desire of the neurotic is something which is only a desire at the horizon of all his behaviour.

Because - and you will allow me to communicate to you one of these formulae which will allow you to recognise the style of a behaviour, we will say that with respect to this desire in which he situates himself, the neurotic is always at his own horizon, that he prepares its advent. The neurotic, if you will allow me an expression which I believe faithfully represents all sorts of things that we see in daily experience, is always preoccupied with packing his bags, or examining his conscience - it is the same thing - or with organising his labyrinth - it is the same thing. He gets his bags together, he forgets them or he puts them in the left luggage, but it is always a question of bags for a journey that he never takes.

This is absolutely essential to consider if we wish to perceive clearly that there is a total contrast, whatever may be said about it by a lazy form of thinking which drags itself like a snail along the phenomenon, without having the will to gather together in it at any moment a perspective, some perspective or other. It is question of opposing to this the structure of perverse desire.

In the case of the pervert of course it is also a question of a gap. There cannot also but be a question, because this is the fundamental relationship, of the subject suppressing his being in the cut. It is a question of knowing how in the case of the pervert this cut is experienced, is supported.

Well here undoubtedly the work, throughout the years, of analysts, in so far as their experiences with perverse patients have allowed them to articulate theories which are sometimes in contradiction, out of tune with one another, but suggestive of the order of

difficulty that they have to deal with, is something that we can in a way take into account. I mean that we can speak about as a material which itself betrays certain structural necessities which are those properly speaking which we are trying to formulate here.

I would say therefore that in this attempt that we making here to establish the real function of desire, we can include even this discrete delusion, even this well organised delusion to which those who have approached this subject have been lead way of these, I mean, psychoanalysts. I am going to take an example of this.

I believe that at the present time taking every thing into account no one has better spoken I believe about perversion than a very discreet man and one who is personally full of humour, I mean Mr. Gillespie. I recommend to those who read English, they will get a lot out of it, the first study by Gillespie who approached this subject in connection with fetishism in the form of an article called 'A Contribution to the Study of Fetishism' (*I.J.P.* October 1940), then the notes that he devoted to the 'Analysis of Sexual Perversions', in No. 23 (1952) Part 4, and finally the last one he wrote in the issue of July-October 1956 (No. 37, Part 4 and Part 5): 'The General Theory of Perversions'.

Something will stand out from this for you. it is that someone who in short is so free, and judges rather well the different avenues along which attempts have been made to approach the question, which is clearly much more complex naturally than can be imagined in a summary perspective, the one which would see perversion as being purely and simply the drive showing itself itself openly. This is not to say either, as has been said, that perversion can be resumed in a sort of approach which tends in short to make it homogeneous with neurosis. I will go straight to what it is a question of expressing, to what will serve us in future as a reference point for questioning perversion in different ways. The notion of splitting is essential to it, already showing something which we can congratulate ourselves on - and do not think that I am going to rush into it right away as something which overlaps in a way the function, the identification of the subject to the split or the cut of discourse, which is the one where I teach you to identify the subjective component of the phantasy. This is only precisely the kind of haste that is implied in this recognition, which has already been put forward, and which has already provided on occasion a sort of glimpse which is a little shameful of himself in the case of one of the writers who have busied themselves with perversion.

In order to testify to this I need only refer to the third case to which Mr. Gillespie refers in the second of the articles. It is the case of a fetishist. I will sketch this case out for you briefly. It is the case of a 30 year old fetishist whose phantasy expressly proves itself after analysis to be that of being split in two by the mother's split whose penetrating prow as I might say is represented here by his bitten breasts, as well as by the split that he has just penetrated and which suddenly changes into a, In short a whole return to a decomposition, a recomposition by what Mr. Gillespie calls castration anxiety, is referred to a series of unfoldings where there also intervenes the primitive exigency for the mother or the primitive regret for the mother, and on the other hand a conception, not demonstrated I must say, but supposed when all is said and done at the end of the analysis by the analyst, a kistanist (?) conception with identification to the split.

We can say that at the end of the article Mr. Gillispie writes with this type of glimpse or half-assumed, interrogative, questioning intuition, but which is really in my opinion quite indicative of the extreme point to which is lead someone who follows attentively, I mean after this development over time, after this explanation which analysis alone gives us of what is found at the depths of the perverse structure: 'The configuration of

the material at this point led me to a speculation about the phantasy associated with the split ego....' The split ego (*L'ego réfendu*), if we accept this term of *réfendu* which is used freely enough to speak about this splitting upon which Freud in a way ended his work. Because you know I think, the unfinished article of Freud on the splitting of the ego, the pen fell from his hand as one might say and he left unfinished this article which was found after his death.

This splitting of the ego 'led me to a speculation about the phantasy associated with the split ego and the split object'. It is the same word that we can use if we use this term. It is the split ego and the split object.

Is not the female genital [it is Gillespie who asks the question] the split object *par excellence*, and cannot the phantasy of a split ego arise from an identification with this split genital? I am aware, he says, that when we speak of the splitting of the ego and of the object we are referring to mental mechanisms which we assume to underlie the phenomena... ,[I mean by that that we are doing science, that we are dealing with scientific concepts] and that phantasies pertain to a different level of discourse.

The order of interrogation that Mr. Gillespie poses here is interesting.

... nevertheless, phantasies, our own no less than our patients' must always play a part in the way that we conceptualise these underlying processes. It seems to me, therefore, that the phantasy of being oneself split in pieces just as the vulva is split may well be very relevant to the mental mechanism of splitting of the object and introjection of the split object, leading to splitting of the ego.

It is implicit, of course, in such a phantasy of the vulva as a split object that it was once intact, and that the splitting is the result of a sadistic attack, whether by the father or by oneself.

It is quite clear that we find ourselves here before something which, for a mind as prudent and measured as that of Mr. Gillespie, can scarcely fail to strike us as something where he himself is playing at and going to the extremes of a line of thought by reducing in a way to a sort of completely primordial identificatory schema what can then serve us as an explanation for something which is on this occasion nothing less than the very structure of the personality of the subject, because what is in question throughout this whole article - there is not only this case to be quoted - is this something so tangible and which decomposes itself in the transference in the case of perverts, namely splittings which are what one could call on this occasion veritable divisions of the personality. To trace in a way the division of the personality of the pervert upon the two valves of the original organ of phantasy, is something which is sure on this occasion to make us smile, or even to baffle us.

But in fact what we find in effect, and here this should be grasped at every level and in extremely different forms of the formation of the personality of the pervert, is something that I have already indicated for example in one of my articles, the one that I wrote in connection with the case of Andre Gide which has been studied in such a remarkable way by Professor Delay. It is something also which is presented as an opposition between two identificatory aspects. The one more especially linked to the narcissistic image of oneself i(o), on the one hand, which is what regulates in the case of this illustrious patient whose confidences we have in a thousand forms in a work - and of course we should take into account the dimensions of this work, because it adds something to the equilibrium of the

subject, and I do not want to develop fully in this connection what I am indicating to you here, because after all our time is almost up this year, I have to give, to throw out a few indications about what will come later what our point of view allows us to approach: it is the relationship that there is in the title which I gave it, which in the first place is particularly striking here, between precisely what this schema articulates, namely desire and the letter.

What does this mean, if not that it is in this direction that there should be sought properly speaking in the reconversion of desire to this production which is expressed in the symbol, which is not the super-reality that it is believed to be, but on the contrary is essentially due to its breaking up, to its partly signifying decomposition; I am saying that it is in the reconversion of the impasse of desire into this signifying material that we should situate, and we should do this if we wish to give an appropriate meaning to the term, the process of sublimation as such.

Our André Gide, undoubtedly, deserves to be situated in the category that is posed for us by the problem of homosexuality. And what do we see: we see this double relationship to a divided object in so far as it is the reflection of this graceless, even disgraced, boy as one writer has put it, that the little Andre Gide was at the beginning; and that in this furtive relationship to a narcissistic object the presence of the phallic attribute is essential. Gide is homosexual. But it is impossible, it is the merit of this work to have shown it, it is completely impossible to

(page 18 missing in Master Copy)

that our friend Gribouille has become.

An absurd fact, the writer cried to his interlocutor. But this is just the reason why I am recounting it. It is the truth. And no doubt the grandmother scarcely thought that she was writing here something disgusting. But I bear witness to the fact that no page of Aphrodite could have disturbed any schoolboy as much as this metamorphosis of Gribouille into a vegetable disturbed the little ignorant boy that I was.

I will add in order to come back to it later, because its dimension should not be overlooked, the other example that he gives us of this phantasy which provoked this primitive *jouissance*.

There was also in a stupid little piece by Mme. de Ségur: *Les diners de Mlle Justine*, a passage in which the domestics took advantage of the absence of their masters to have a good blow out. They go through all the cupboards, and they guzzle away while Justine quietly bends and lifts a pile of plates from the cupboard. The coachman catches her around the waist. Justine who is ticklesome drops the pile, and the plates are broken. The damage made me swoon.

If you need more to grasp the relationship, the phantasy of the second with this quite primordial thing that it is a question of articulating in the relationship of the subject to the cut, I would cite for you the following which is something quite common in the case of such subjects, that one of the fundamental phantasies in masturbatory initiation was also for example the phantasy of a verbal revelation concerning more precisely something which is the thing imagined in the phantasy, namely for example a sexual initiation taken as theme

of the phantasy in so far as it exists.

The relationship uncovered in the first of these phantasies of the subject to something which is detached and which progressively blossoms is remarkable in so far as it presentifies for us something which is demonstrated in a hundred analytic observations, namely the theme which is now admitted and seen as habitual, the order of identification of the subject to the phallus in so far as it arises from phantasying an object inside the mother. This structure is commonly met and nowadays there is no difficulty in it being accepted and recognised as such by any analyst.

The important thing is that here, we see it, manifested as such in the phantasy, taken up in the phantasy as a support for something which represents for the subject one of the experiences of his early erotic life as a, and that what is important for us, is to know more precisely what sort of identification we are dealing with.

We have said that the metonymy of the neurotic is essentially constituted by the following: it is that he is it only at the limit, namely at a point that he will attain from the fleeting point of view of symptoms in so far as he does not have it, the phallus. And this is what must not be revealed. That is to say that we encounter in him, the further the analysis progresses, a growing castration anxiety.

There is in perversion something that we can call a reversal of the processes of proof. What has to be proved by the neurotic, namely the subsistence of his desire, becomes here in perversion, the basis of proof. You can see here something like this sort of return in a position of honour of what in analysis we call reasoning *per absurdum*.

For the pervert the circumstance, this fact which unites into one term by introducing this slight opening which permits a quite special identification to the other, which unites in one term the 'he is' and 'he has'. For that it is enough that this 'he has' should be on occasion 'she has'. Namely the object of primitive identification. He will have the phallus, the object of primitive identification, whether it is this object which is transformed into a fetish in one case, or into an idol in the other. We have the whole span between the fetishistic form of his loves, the homosexual, and the idolatrous form illustrated by Gide. The link is established, as one might say, in the natural support.

We will say that perversion presents itself as a sort of natural simulation of the cut. It is in this that Gillespie's intuition serves as an index. What the subject does not have, he has in the object. What the subject is not, his ideal object is. In short a certain natural relationship is taken as material for this subjective split which is what it is a question of symbolising in perversion as in neurosis. He is the phallus, *qua* object within the mother, and he has it in his object of desire.

This is more or less what we see in the male homosexual. In the female homosexual, remember the case articulated by Freud, and which we have analysed here by comparing it with the case of Dora. What is happening at the turning point at which Freud's young patient is precipitated into homosexual idealisation? She is certainly the phallus, but how? Also *qua* object within the mother. And this is seen in a very clear fashion when at the height of the crisis, she throws herself over the railway bridge, Freud recognises that in this *Niederkommen* there is something which is the identification to this maternal attribute. She makes herself be in this supreme effort of a giving to her idol which is what her suicide is. Why does she fall like an object? In order to give her the object of love, to give her what she does not have, to bring about the maximum of idealisation, to give her this phallus

which is the object of her adoration to which the homosexual love for the singular person who is the object of her loves is identified.

If we try to introduce this in connection with each case, if we make an effort to question ourselves in each case, we will find here what I claim to be putting forward as a structure. You can always rediscover, not just in perversion but especially in this form to which it is objected, with a good degree of pertinence, that it is extremely polymorphous, namely homosexuality, especially with the use that we make of the term homosexuality, how many different forms of experience in fact does it not present us with..... But then again would it not also be of interest to us after all to be able to situate at the level of perversion something which could constitute a centre as such of something which while admitting all sorts of peripheral intermediate forms between perversion and for example let us say psychosis, drug addiction, or one or other form in our nosographical field, homosexuality compared to what the last time for example we were trying to formulate as being the point on which the desire of desire which is the neurotic is based, namely this relationship to the image of the other thanks to which there can be established this whole interplay of substitution in which the neurotic has never to prove that what is in question, namely that he is the phallus, is well and truly

We would say that we have here something which is a certain relationship of primitive identification I with the narcissistic, specular identification, which is i(o).

It is in so far as something already exists, that a schism is already delineated between the accession of the identificatory symbolic subject, primordial relationship to the mother, and the first *Verwerfung*; it is in so far as this is articulated with the second imaginary identification of the subject to his specular form, namely i(o), this is what is used by the subject to symbolise that which with Gillespie we will call the split. Namely, the thing in which the subject intervenes in his phantastical relationship.

And here the phallus is the essential signifying element in so far as it is what arises from the mother as symbol of her desire, this desire of the other which terrifies the neurotic, this desire in which he senses that he is running all sorts of risks. It is this which constitutes the centre around which there is going to be organised the whole construction of the pervert.

And nevertheless the desire of the other is also what experience shows us in the form that is furthest back, and most difficult to reach. It is precisely this which constitutes the depth and the difficulty of these analyses which we have been able to undertake thanks to the access that has been given to us through our experience with children of the constructions and speculations that are particularly linked to primitive objectal identifications.

Obviously even if Gide had presented himself at his own risk to make this sort of effort there is nothing to prove that the enterprise would have gone far enough. Gide did not present himself for analytic exploration. Nevertheless, however superficial when all is said and done may have been an analysis which only developed in the so-called sublimated dimension, we have some strange indications on this point. I believe that nobody to my knowledge has given its importance to this little trait which appears as a sort of singularity in behaviour which almost signs with its symptomatic accent what is in question, namely the beyond of the maternal personage, or more exactly her interior, her very heart. Because this core of primitive identification is rediscovered at the basis of the structure of the perverse subject himself.

If in the neurotic desire is at the horizon of all the demands which have been deployed for so long and are literally interminable, one can say that the desire of the pervert is at the heart of all his demands. And if we say that its unfolding is undeniably woven around aesthetic requirements, nevertheless nothing is more striking than what I would call the modulation of themes around which it is pursued. And you will see that what appears from the first lines, is the relationships of the subject to a fragmented vision, a kaleidoscope which occupies the six or seven first pages of the volume. How can you not sense that you are being carried to the furthest experience of fragmentation.

But there is more, the notion, the perception that he grasps at a particular moment, and which himself articulates in the fact that there are no doubt, he says, reality and dreams, but that there is also a second reality. And further on again - this is what I want to get to - it is the tiniest of indications, but everyone know that for us these are the most important ones, he tells us the story known as the knot in the wood of a door. In the wood of this door, somewhere in Uzes, there is a hole because a knot has been removed. And what is at the bottom of it he is told is a little marble that your father put there when he was your age. And he recounts, to the wonder of students of character, that from his holidays on he spent a year letting the nail of his little finger grow in order to have it long enough at the next meeting to go and remove this little marble in the hole of the wood.

And in effect he manages to get it, only to discover that what he has is a greyish object that he would be ashamed to show to anyone, so that - I think this is what he says - he returns it to its place, cuts his nail of his little finger, and tells nobody about it, except us, the posterity who are going to immortalise this story.

I think that it is difficult to find a better introduction to the notion rejected in a magnificent everything shows the perseverance of something which presents to us the figure of the form in which there is presented the relationship of the perverse subject to the internal object. An object which is at the heart of something. The relationship to this object as such, in so far as it is the imaginary dimension of desire, on this occasion of the primordial desire of the mother, which comes to play the decisive role, the symbolising, central role which allows us to consider that here at the level of desire the pervert is identified to the imaginary form of the phallus. It is to this that next time we will devote our final class on desire, this year.

Seminar 27: Wednesday 1 July 1959

We come to the end of this year which I have devoted, with all its risks and perils for me as well as for you, to this question of desire and its interpretation.

You have been able to see in effect that it is on the question of the place of desire in the economy of the analytic experience that I have remained without budging because I think it is from there that there should begin every particular interpretation of any desire whatsoever.

It has not been easy to circumscribe this place. That is why today I would like simply, by way of conclusion, to point out the major terms, the cardinal points with respect to which there is situated something whose importance I have managed, I hope, to make you sense this year: the specificity to be given to this function of desire as such.

As you know, the slightest experience that you may have of modern analytic work, and especially of what is constituted for example by an analytic observation, will show you a constant feature – I am talking about any observation that people care to communicate - in the period of analysis that we are living through and which began already about twenty years ago - these are cases which are called in contrast to the typical neuroses of the old literature, neurotic characters, cases which are borderline as regards neurosis. What is it that we encounter in this way of approaching the subject?

I read a certain number of them recently, in order to get a clear idea about where analytic thinking is as regards what constitutes the essential of the progress applied from experience. Well in general one can say that with surprising constancy the present state of things - namely at the period of analysis that we are at - is dominated from whatever angle it takes its guidelines, by object-relations. It converges towards object- relations.

What is attached under this rubric to the Kleinian experience appears after all more like a symptom than as a centre of diffusion. I mean a zone in which everything that relates to it has been particularly investigated. But fundamentally any one of the other centres of organisation of analytic thought which structures research is not all that far from it fundamentally. Because object-relations have come to dominate the whole conception that we have of progress in analysis.

This is not the least striking of the observations that present themselves to us on this occasion. Nevertheless in the concrete case of an observation reported with the aim of illustrating some structure or other in which the field of our nosological object is situated, analysis appears to be pursued for some time now along the lines of what one could call moralising normativation.

I am not saying that it is in this sense that the intervention of the analyst directly takes place. It depends on the case. But it is in this perspective that the analyst himself chooses his reference points. The very fashion in which he articulates the particularities of the subject with respect to his surroundings, to this object, will always be in terms of an

appreciation of the apprehension of the object by the subject that he has in analysis. And the deficiencies of this apprehension of the object as measured by a supposedly normal approach to the other as such, where in short we will be shown that the mind of the analyst is essentially dwelling on the degradations of this dimension of the other who in short is seen as being always overlooked, forgotten, fallen in the subject from its proper condition as an independent autonomous subject of the pure other, of the absolute other. That is all.

This is a mapping out which is worth as much as any other; for what is taken as essential, what is granted its full value in terms of this appreciation of the other in his autonomy, his profile.

What is striking is not so much this despite all the cultural presuppositions that it implies. It is an implicit rallying to what one can call a system of values which even though it is implicit is no less present in it. What is striking is what one might call the precipitation of a certain turning point which is that after having elaborated at length with the subject the insufficiencies of his affective apprehension as regards the other, we see in general, either that this expresses directly some turning point or other in the concrete analysis, or simply that it may be by a sort of haste to resume in what appears to the analyst to be the final terms of experience, we see a whole essentially moralising articulation of the observation falling in a way brusquely to a lower stage, and finding this final term of reference in a series of extremely primitive identifications, those which whatever way they are named always approximate more or less to this notion of good and bad objects, internal, introjected, internalised, or external, externalised, projected.

There are always some Kleinian leanings in this reference to the experiences of primordial identification. And the fact that it is masked on other occasions by the highlighting of final principles to which fixations are attributed, whether they are described on this occasion in older terms, in instinctual terms of reference, by referring for example to oral sadism as having profoundly deviated the oedipal relationship, and with the subject motivating in the last resort this accident of the oedipal drama, the oedipal identification, it is always to something of the same order that it is a question of referring oneself in the last analysis. Namely final identifications to which we refer in short the whole development of the subjective drama, whether it is in neurosis, or even in perversion; namely these identifications which leave the very notion of subjectivity profoundly ambiguous.

The subject appears here essentially as identification to what he can consider as coming from himself, more or less, and the therapy is presented as a rearranging of these identifications in the course of a experience which takes its principles in a reference to reality, in what the subject has in short to accept or to refuse of himself, in something which from then on takes on an aspect which may seem to be extremely hazardous because when all is said and done this reference to reality is nothing other than one reality. And the reality supposed by the analyst, when all is said and done, which returns in an even more implicit form this time, still more masked this time, may be quite risky, especially by implying an ideal normativity which is properly speaking that of the ideals of the analyst as being the final measure to which the conclusion of the subject is urged to rally and this is an identificatory conclusion.

I am when all is said and done what I recognise as being the good (*le bon et le bien*) in me, I aspire to conform myself to an ideal normativity which however hidden, however implicit it may be is nevertheless the one which after so many detours I recognise as being designed for me.

By means of a subtle, more subtle than most, but when all is said and done a no different suggestive action is found to be here in this relationship the action, the analyzed interaction.

What I am trying to indicate here in this discourse which I have pursued before you this year, is the way in which this experience, because of having organised itself through a sort of progressive slippage away from the primordial Freudian indications, is an experience which conceals in itself in a fashion that is more and more masked the question which I believe is the essential question without which there is no proper appreciation of our analytic action, and which is that of the place of desire.

Desire as we articulate it has the effect of bringing back to the forefront of our interest, in a way which is unambiguous, but really crucial, the notion of what we are dealing with, which is a subjectivity. Is desire subjectivity or is it not?

This question did not have to wait for analysis to be posed. It has always been there, since the origin of what one can call moral experience. Desire is at once subjectivity, it is what is at the very heart of our subjectivity, what is the most essentially subject, it is at the same time something which is its direct contrary which is opposed to it as a resistance, as a paradox, as a rejected core, as a core that is refutable. It is starting from that - I have insisted on it several times - that the whole ethical experience developed in a perspective at the end of which we have the enigmatic formula of Spinoza that desire - *cupiditas* - is the very essence of man.

Enigmatic in so far as his formula allows what follows to remain open: if what he defines is indeed what we desire, or what is desirable, he leaves open the question of knowing whether or not this is the same thing. Even in analysis the distance between what is desired and what is desirable is wide open. It is starting from there that analytic experience is established, and is articulated. Desire is not simply exiled, rejected to the level of the action and principle of our servitude; which it is up to now? It is interrogated as being the very key, or the mainspring in us of a whole series of actions and behaviors which are understood as representing the deepest part of our truth. And this is the high point, the summit from which at every moment experience tends to redescend.

Does that mean, as one might have thought for a long time, that this desire we are dealing with is a pure and simple recourse to a vital gushing forth? It is quite clear that it is nothing of the kind because from the first spelling out of our experience, what we see is that in the very measure that we go deeper into this desire we see it confusing itself less and less with this pure and simple *élan*. It is decomposed, it is disarticulated into something which presents itself as always more distant from a harmonic relationship. No desire presents itself to us in the regressive tracing-back which constitutes analytic experience; it presents itself to us more as a problematic, dispersed, polymorphous, contradictory element, and to tell the truth, far from any oriented co-adaptation.

It is therefore to this experience of desire that it is a question of referring as something which we cannot leave without deepening it, to the point that we will be able to offer something which fixes its meaning for us, which will prevent us from turning away from what is absolutely original, absolutely irreducible in it. Everything, of course, in the fashion that I said analytic experience is articulated, is designed to hide from us this meaning of desire.

This separating out of the paths towards the object in the experience of transference

only shows us in a way the negative of what is in question, the experience of transference, if we define it as an experience of repetition obtained through a regression itself dependent on a frustration, leaves to one side the fundamental relationship of this frustration to demand. There is however no other in analysis. And only this way of articulating the terms will allow us to see that the demand regresses because the elaborated demand, as it presents itself in analysis, remains without response.

But already an analysis, taking an inappropriate path, involves itself in giving the response in order to guide the analysand towards the object from which he is coming. With all sorts of unbelievable ideas one of the examples of which I frequently had to criticise is constituted by this regulation of the distance that I spoke about because perhaps it plays a greater role here in the French context, this regulation of the distance from the object, which if I may say so, sufficiently shows by itself in what sort of contradictory impasse one becomes involved, along a certain path, that of analysis when it is narrowly centred on object-relations, in so far as undoubtedly any relationship whatsoever, however we are meant to conceive of the normal one, seems indeed to presuppose the maintenance, whatever people say, of a certain distance, and to tell the truth we can recognise here a kind of short application, and in fact a misinterpretation of some considerations about the relationship to the mirror stage, to the narcissistic relationship as such, which have constituted in the case of the authors who have put in the foreground the reference to analytic action, which served as a theoretical baggage at a time when he was not able to situate its place in a larger system of references... In fact every kind of reference to analytic experience contains something which, in the

final analysis is supposed to be based on the so-called reality of the analytic experience taken as a measure, as a standard of what it is a question of reducing in the transference relationship; everything which would also put in the place complementary to this action of analytic reduction a more or less advanced, a more or less analysed, more or less criticised distortion of the ego with the notion of this

With reference to this distortion of the ego, with reference to what exists in the ego as a possible alibi for the reduction of analysis to a reality, everything that is organised in these terms only reestablishes this separation of the doctor from the patient on which there is founded a whole classical nosography, which in itself is not an objection, but also the inoperancy of a subjective therapy which is that of pre-analytic psychotherapy surrendering as one might say to the omnipotent norm of the judgement of the doctor what is in question in the experience of the patient, making of the relationship of the doctor to the patient the following: namely submitting it to a subjective structuring which is no doubt that of a counterpart, but of a counterpart who is on the wrong path, with all that this involves precisely in terms of distance, and of oversights that are impossible to reduce.

What analysis establishes is an intersubjective structuring which is strictly distinguished from the preceding one in that however far the subject, the patient, may be from our norms - and this up to the limit of psychosis, of madness, we do not presuppose that he is this counterpart to whom we are linked by links of charity, of respect for our image.

No doubt there is here a relationship which has its foundation with regard to this something which constitutes an advance, which undoubtedly constituted an advance, and an historical advance in the fashion of behaving *vis-à-vis* the mentally ill patient. But the step forward established by analysis which emerges as decisive, is that we consider it essentially in its nature, in its relationship with him as a speaking subject, namely as such caught just

like ourselves whatever his position may be in the consequences and risks of a relationship to the

This is enough to completely change our relationships to this subject, who is passive in analysis. Because if we start from here desire is situated beyond the feeling of a pressure which is obscure and radical as such, because if we consider this pressure, the drive, the cry, this pressure is only valid, only exists, is only defined, is only articulated by Freud as caught up in a temporal sequence of a special nature, this sequence which we call the signifying chain, and whose properties whose incidences upon everything that we have to deal with as a pressure, as a drive, is that it essentially disconnects this pressure from everything which defines it, and situates it as vital; it renders it essentially separable from everything which establishes it in its living consistency.

It makes possible, as the Freudian theory articulates from the beginning, that the pressure should be separated from its very source, from its object, from its tendency as one might say. It itself is separated from itself because it is essentially recognisable in this very tendency, that it is in an inverse form.

It is primitively, primordially, decomposable, decomposed to tell the truth in a signifying decomposition.

Desire is not the sequence, it is a mapping out of the subject with respect to this sequence in which it is reflected in the dimension of the desire of the other. Let us take an example. Let us take in the most primitive form of what is presented to us by analytic experience, the relationship of the subject to the newcomer into the familial constellation; what we call aggression in this instance is not aggression, it is a death wish, namely however unconscious we may suppose it to be, it is something which is articulated: 'May he die'.

And it is something which can only be conceived in the register of articulation, namely where signifiers exist. It is in so far as it is in signifying terms, however primitive we may suppose them to be, of aggression *vis-à-vis* the rival counterpart that the aggression towards the rival counterpart is articulated. The little counterpart practices aggression, and pretends to bite, pushes them even shoves them away from the place where they can get their food.

The passage of primitive rivalry into the unconscious is linked to the fact that something however rudimentary we may suppose it to be is articulated which is not essentially different in this nature from spoken articulation: 'May he die'. And that is the reason why this 'May he die' wants to remain beneath the 'Isn't he lovely', or the 'I love him' which is the other discourse which is superimposed on the preceding one.

It is in the interval between these two discourses that there is situated what we have to deal with as desire, it is in the interval that there is constituted, if you wish, what the Kleinian dialectic has articulated as being the bad object, and we can see how there can come to converge the rejected drive on the one hand, from the introjected object in a similar ambiguity.

Nevertheless it is about the fashion in which there is structured in the interval this relationship, this imaginary function in so far as it is suspended from, as it depends on both chains of the discourse, the repressed chain and the patent, manifest chain, it is here that we are summoned essentially to specify what must be saved in the articulation in order to know

at what level desire is situated.

You may have on one or other occasion thought, suggested, that I am giving here a phallogocentric conception of desire. Of course it is quite evident that the phallus plays an absolutely essential role in it, but how can we really understand this function of the phallus if not within the ontological reference points which are the ones that we are trying to introduce here.

How can we conceive of the usage that Melanie Klein makes of the phallus. I mean at the most primary, the most archaic level of the experience of the child. Namely when the child is caught up in one or other of the difficulties of development which can on occasion be severe. First of all Mrs. Melanie Klein will interpret for him this little toy that he is manipulating and with which he is going to touch some other element that is part of the game which is used to set up the experiment by saying to him 'this is Daddies penis'.

It is a fact that no one, at least if he comes from outside into such an experiment, can avoid being disconcerted by the perfectly brutal daring of the intervention, but still more disconcerted by the fact that when all is said and done it works. I mean that the subject who in certain cases can certainly resist, but if he resists it is undoubtedly as Melanie Klein herself has no doubt because something is operating here about whose future comprehension we have no reason to despair - and God knows she allows herself on occasion (I have been given reports of experiments all seen from the outside, but reported in a very faithful way) to be insistent. It is clear that the phallic symbol comes into the game at this ultra-precocious period as if the subject was expecting nothing else.

That Mrs. Melanie Klein sometimes justified this phallus as being the model of a simple which is more manageable and more convenient, is something that we can see here as a singular begging of the question.

That which in our register, in our vocabulary remains, and justifies such an intervention, can only be expressed in these terms: it is that the subject accepts, it is clear in any case, this object of which in most cases he has only the most indirect experience, only as a signifier; and that it is as a signifier that the incidence of this phallus is justified in the clearest fashion. Whether the subject takes it in as such at the age that he is at is perhaps an unanswerable question. But undoubtedly if Melanie Klein takes this object, whether she knows it or not, it is because she cannot find a better one as a signifier of desire in so far as it is desire of the desire of the other.

If there is something that the phallus signifies - I mean itself in the position of signifier - it is precisely this: it is the desire of the desire of the other. And it is for this reason that it will take up its privileged place at the level of the object.

But I think that far from maintaining ourselves in this phallogocentric position, as is expressed by those who remain at the appearance of what I am in the process of articulating, this allows us to see where the veritable problem is. The veritable problem is the following: it is that the object with which we have to deal from the beginning, concerning desire, far from being in any way this preformed object, this object of instinctual satisfaction, this object which is destined to satisfy according to some vital preformation the subject as his instinctual complement, the object of desire is absolutely not distinct from the following which is: it is the signifier of the desire of desire.

The object as such, the object *o*, if you wish, of the graph, is as such the desire of

the other in so far I would say as it comes - if the word has a meaning - to the knowledge of an unconscious subject. It is namely, of course, with respect to this subject, in the contradictory position: the knowledge of an unconscious subject. Which is not at all unthinkable. But it is something open.

This means that if it comes to something of the unconscious subject, it comes to it in so far as it is a wish to recognise it, that it is signifier of its recognition. And this is what that means. It is that desire has no other object than the signifier of its recognition. The character of the object in so far as it is the object of desire, should then be sought by us where human experience designates it for us, indicates it for us in its most paradoxical form, I am referring to what we usually call the fetish, this something which is always more or less implicit in everything which usually constitutes the objects of interhuman exchange, but is there no doubt masked by the regular, or regularised character of these exchanges.

People have spoken about the fetishistic aspect of merchandise, and after all this is not something which is simply caused by homophony, I mean of homophony. There is indeed a shared meaning in the use of the word fetish, but for us what should put in the foreground the accent which we must maintain about the object of desire, is this something which defines it first and foremost as being borrowed from signifying material. 'I saw the devil the other night', Paul Jean Poulet says somewhere, 'and under his hide there peeped out his two ...'

This ends: the fruits of science do not fall all at once. And even though they do not all fall for us on this occasion, and that we perceive that what is important is not so much the hidden fruits as the mirage that is present to desire, that precisely the hide, the fetish is characterised by the fact that it is the hide, the hem, the fringe, the bauble, the thing which hides, the thing which depends precisely on the fact that nothing is better suited for the function of signifier of what is in question, namely of desire of the desire of the other. Namely what the child primitively has to deal with in his relationship to the subject of the demand, is that he cannot decipher what this desire of the mother as such is outside demand, except in the most virtual fashion by means of this signifier which we analysts, whatever we may say in our discourse, refer to this common measure, to this central point of the signifying homeland which is on this occasion the phallus because it is nothing other than this signifier of the desire of desire.

Desire has no other object than the signifier of its recognition. And it is in this sense that it allows us to conceive what is happening, what we ourselves are the dupes of when we perceive that in this subject-object relationship, at the level of desire, the subject has passed to the other side. He has passed to the level of o in so far precisely as at this final term he himself is nothing more than the signifier of this recognition, he is nothing more than the signifier of the desire of desire.

But precisely what is important to maintain is the opposition starting from which this exchange operates, namely the grouping of \$ in front of o of a subject who is no doubt imaginary, but in the most radical sense, in the sense that he is the pure subject of the disconnection, of the spoken cut in so far as the cut is the essential scansion in which the word is built up. The grouping I say of this subject with a signifier which is what? Which is nothing other than the signifier of the being with which the subject is signified in so far as this being is itself marked by the signifier.

That is to say that the o, the object of desire, in its nature is a residue, is a remainder. It is the residue which the being with which the speaking subject is confronted as such

leaves to any possible demand. And this is the way that the object rejoins the real. This is how it participates in it. I am saying the real, and not reality because reality is constituted by all the halts that human symbolism, in a more or less perspicacious fashion, passes through the of the real in so far as it makes of them the objects of its experience.

Let us remark, the specific property of objects of experience is precisely to leave in some way, as Monsieur de La Palisse would say, everything that escapes from it in the object. This is the reason why contrary to what is believed, experience - so-called experience, is double edged. That is to say that when you attach yourself to experience to resolve an historical situation for example, you have just as good a chance of erring or of making a serious mistake as the opposite, for the very simple reason that by definition if you tie yourself to experience it is precisely in this way that you overlook the new element that there is in the situation.

The object in question, in so far as it rejoins the real, participates in it because the real presents itself precisely as what resists the demand, what I would call the inexorable.

The object of desire is inexorable as such, and if it rejoins the real, this real to which I alluded when we were doing our analysis of Schreber, it is in this form of the real that this inexorable is best incarnated, this form of the real which presents itself in the fact that it always comes back to the same place. And this is why it is in the stars that curiously we have seen the prototype.

How can one explain otherwise the presence at the origin of cultural experience of this interest for the object which is really the least interesting which exists for anything vital, that is to say the stars. The culture and the position of the subject as such in the domain of desire, in so far as this desire is established, is set up fundamentally in the symbolic structure as such. This is explained by the fact that of all reality, it is the most purely real that there is starting on one condition, it is that the shepherd in his solitude, the one who first began to observe something which has no other interest except that as having been detected as returning always to the same place, he locates it with respect to that with which he sets himself up radically as object, with respect to a form however primitive you may suppose it to be of slit which allows it to be seen when it returns to this same place.

Here then is what we arrive at: it is to pose that the object of desire is to be defined fundamentally as signifier. As signifier of a relationship which itself is a relationship which reverberates indefinitely in some way. Desire, if it is the desire of the desire of the other, opens out on to the enigma of what is the desire of the other as such. The desire of the other as such is articulated and structured fundamentally in the relationship of the subject to the word, namely in the disconnection of everything that is vitally rooted in the subject.

This desire is the central point, the pivotal point of the whole economy with which we have to deal in analysis. By not showing its function we are necessarily led to discover as a reference point only what is effectively symbolised by the term reality. The existing reality of the social context. And it then seems that we overlook another dimension in so far however as it is introduced into our experience, as it is reintegrated into human experience, and especially by Freudianism as something absolutely essential.

It is here that we can see the value of the facts on which I have often based myself of what the result is in analysis of any intervention which tends to the transference experience with respect to what is called this so simple reality, this present reality, of the analytic session, as if this reality was not a complete contrivance, namely the condition in

which normally, and with good reason, because this is what we expect of it, there must be produced on the part of the subject all these things that we have no doubt to respond to, but certainly not by reducing them to any reality that is supposed to be immediate. And this is why I have often insisted in different forms on the common character of what is produced every time the interventions of the analyst, in a too insistent, even brutal fashion, claim to prove in this reactualisation of an objectal relationship considered as typical in the reality of the analysis, what is produced with a regularity which I must say is proved by several observations, has not it seems to me always been identified by the analysts.

In any case, to remain with something which we have criticised here, the famous observation in the *Bulletin* of the Belgian analysts to which I referred once, I am referring to it again in so far as I find in it a remarkable overlap precisely in one of Glover's articles the one in which he himself tries already to pose the function of perversion in relation to the reality-system of the subject.

One cannot help being struck by this: if it is in the measure that the woman analyst, I mentioned the first observation because she is the author, in connection with the phantasies of the subject. Namely phantasies which the subject develops of sleeping with her. She literally responds to him as follows: you are frightening yourself about something that you know is not going to happen. This is the way in which the analytic intervention is presented marking on this occasion something that we do not need to specify concerning the personal motivations of the analyst in question.

No doubt they were justified for her by something, for the analyst. And the analyst was an analyst who was being supervised by someone who is precisely someone to whom I already alluded in my discourse today, specifically concerning the theme of distance.

It is clear that whatever such an intervention represents in terms of panic with respect to the analyst, one could attempt to justify it by a proper apprehension of, namely the relationships of the objects which are present. It is certain that the relationship is decisive and that it is immediately after this style of intervention that there occurs what forms the object of the communication, namely this rejection, this kind of brutal overcast in the subject - a subject who perhaps is not very well specified from the diagnostic point of view, who seemed to me to be undoubtedly closer to the beginnings of a kind of paranoid illusion than really the one that is given, namely of a phobia. This subject arrives in effect absolutely haunted by the shame of being too tall, and there are here a whole series of themes close to depersonalisation whose importance cannot be exaggerated.

What is certain is that it is a neo-formation. This moreover is the object of the observation, I am not the one who says this, to see this subject involving himself in what is called a transitory perversion, namely rushing towards the geographical point where he had found circumstances that were particularly favourable for observing through a slit people, especially females, in a cinema, while they are in the process of satisfying their urinary needs.

This element, which up to then had had no place in the symptomatology, is of interest to us only because on page 494 of the *International Journal*, Vol. 14, Oct. 1933, article 4, on *The relation of perversion-formation to the development of reality-sense*, namely Glover's article on the functions of perversion, in the presence of a subject very close to the preceding one in this sense that he. Glover, goes for a paranoid diagnosis, while I inversely would rather attach it to a phobia. Glover, because of interventions which are no doubt analogous, realises, produces a scenario analogous to a transitory and occasional

perverse explosion. (Glover 223-225)

There is no essential difference between these two cases and the thing for example that I stressed in the discourse on the function of the word and the field of language, namely the intervention of Ernest Kris, who, in dealing with the phobic fear of plagiarism, explains that he is not a plagiarist at all, as a result of which the other rushes outside and asks for a plate of fresh brains to the great happiness of the analyst who sees in this a really significant reaction to his intervention, but of which we can say that in an attenuated form this represents as one might say, the reaction, the reforming of the proper dimension of the subject every time the intervention tries to reduce it, to telescope it, to compress it in a pure and simple reduction to data which are called objective, that is to say to data coherent with the prejudices of the analyst.

If you will allow me to end on something which introduces the place in which we analysts, in this relationship to desire, should situate ourselves, this is undoubtedly something which is not going to work out, if we do not construct for ourselves a certain coherent conception of what precisely our function is in relation to social norms - these social norms, if there is an experience which should teach us the degree to which they are problematic, the degree to which they ought to be questioned, the degree to which their determination is situated somewhere other than in their function of adaptation, it appears to be that of the analyst.

If in this experience of ours of the logical subject we discover this dimension which is always latent, but also always present, which is sustained beneath every intersubjective relationship, and which is found therefore in the relationship of interaction, of exchange with everything which because of that is crystallized in the social structure, we must arrive more or less at the following conception.

It is that we will call something culture - I do not like that word, in fact I do not like it at all; what I mean by it are certain stories of the subject in his relationship to the *logos* whose agency no doubt was able to remain masked for a long time in the course of history, and it is difficult not to see in our own day - this is why Freudianism exists in it - the gap, the distance it represents compared to a certain social inertia.

The relationship of what happens between culture and society we can provisionally define as something which would be well enough expressed in a relationship of entropy. In so far as something of what is happening in culture is produced in society which always includes some function of disaggregation, which is presented in society as culture, in other words in so far as it has entered under different headings into a certain number of stable conditions, themselves also latent, which are what one calls conditions of exchange within the flock - and something which sets up a movement, a dialectic, leaving open the same gap within which we try to situate the function of desire; it is in this sense that we can qualify what is produced as perversion as being the reflection, the protest at the level of the logical subject of what the subject undergoes at the level of identification, in so far as identification is the relationship which organises, which establishes the norms of the social stabilisation of different functions.

In this sense we cannot fail to make the rapprochement that exists between every structure similar to that of perversion and that which Freud somewhere, specifically in the article 'Neurosis and Psychosis', articulates in the following fashion 'it will be possible for the ego to avoid a rupture in any direction by deforming itself, by submitting to encroachments on its own unity and even perhaps by affecting a cleavage or division of

itself. 'In this way,' says Freud, in one of these glimpses by which his texts are always illuminated, compared to the texts that we usually have to deal with in the literature of analysis, 'in this way the inconsistencies, eccentricities and follies of men would appear in a similar light to their sexual perversions, through the acceptance of which they spare themselves repressions.' (SE 1£ 152-3) - *Damit rückten die Inkonsequenzen Verschrobenheiten und Narrheiten der Menschen in ein ähnliches Licht wie ihre sexuellen Perversionen, durch deren Annahme sie sich ja Verdrängungen ersparen.* (GW 13, 391)

He pinpoints in the clearest fashion, precisely, everything which in the social context presents itself as paradox, inconsistencies, confusional forms, and the form of madness - the *Nar* is the madman - in what constitutes the most ordinary and the most common text of social life. So that we could say something like a turning circuit is established between what we can call conformity, or a socially conforming form, so-called cultural activity - here the expression becomes an excellent one to define everything which from culture is exchanged and alienated in society - ...

Here, at the level of the logical subject of perversion, in so far as it represents by a series of degradations everything which in conformity presents itself as a protest properly speaking in the dimension of desire in so far as it is the relationship of the subject to his being - it is this famous sublimation which we will begin perhaps to speak about next year, because here in fact we have indeed the most extreme notion, and the one which most justifies everything that I am trying to advance before you, and which is the one that Freud contributed, namely this sublimation.

What is it in effect? What could this sublimation be? What must it be if we are to be able with Freud to define it as a sexual activity in so far as it is desexualised? How can we even conceive of it - because here it is no longer a question either of the source, nor of the direction of the tendency, nor of the object, it is a question of the very nature of what is called on this occasion the energy that is involved. It will be enough I think for you to read the article by Glover in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* in which he tries to approach with the critical preoccupations that he has, the notion of sublimation. What is this notion if we cannot define it as the very form into which desire flows, because what is pointed out to you is precisely that it can empty itself of the sexual drive as such, or more exactly that the very notion of drive far from confusing itself with the substance of the sexual relationship, is this form itself, that it is the interplay of the signifier, that normally it cannot be reduced to this pure interplay of the signifier. And it is also indeed as such that we can define sublimation. It is something through which, as I wrote somewhere, desire and the letter can become equivalent; if all the same here we can see in a point as paradoxical as perversion, namely in its most general form that which in the human being resists every normalisation, there being produced this discourse, this apparently empty elaboration which we call sublimation, which is something which of its nature, in its productions, is distinct from the social valorisation which is subsequently given to it - the difficulties that there are in attaching the notion of social value to the term sublimation are particularly well highlighted in this article by Glover that I am talking to you about.

Sublimation as such, namely at the level of the logical subject, is where there is unfolded, established, instituted all this work which is properly speaking creative work in the order of the *logos*. And it is here that there comes more or less to be inserted, more or less to find its place at the social level, what is called cultural activity, and all the incidence and the risks that it involves, up to and including the remodelling, even the explosion of previously established conformisms.

And it is in the closed circuit which these four terms constitute that we can at least provisionally indicate something which should for us leave on its proper plane, on its animating plane what is involved concerning desire. Here we come to the problem which is the same, on which I left you last year in connection with the congress at Royaumont.

This desire of the subject, *qua* desire of desire, opens onto the cut, onto pure being, here manifested in the form of lack. This desire of the desire of the other, is when all is said and done what desire is he going to confront in analysis, if not the desire of the analyst? It is precisely the reason why it is so necessary for us to maintain ourselves in front of this dimension on the function of desire. Analysis is not a simple reconstitution of the past, nor is analysis a reduction to preformed norms, analysis is not an *epos*, analysis is not an *ethos*, if I were to compare it to something, it is a narrative which would be such that the narrative itself is the locus of the encounter that is in question in the narrative.

The problem of analysis is precisely this that the desire which the subject has to encounter, which is this desire of the other, our desire, this desire which is only all too present in what the subject supposes we are demanding of him, this desire finds itself in this paradoxical situation that we must guide this desire of the other which for us is the desire of the subject not towards our desire, but towards an other. We mature the desire of the subject for someone other than ourselves, we find ourselves in this paradoxical situation of being procurers, midwives, those who preside at the advent of desire.

How can this position be held? It can undoubtedly only be held by maintaining an artifice which is that of the whole analytic rule. But the final mainspring of this artifice, does it not contain something which allows us to grasp where there can take place in the analysis this openness onto the cut which is the one without which we cannot conceive of the situation of desire? As always it is undoubtedly both the most trivial and the most hidden truth. The essential thing in the analysis of this situation in which we find ourselves, of being the one who offers himself as a support for every demand, and who responds to none of them; is it only in this non-responding which is far from being an absolute non-responding that there is found the principle of our presence? Should we not give some essential share to what happens at the end of each session, but which is imminent in the whole situation itself in so far as our desire should limit itself to this aim, to this place that we leave to desire in order that it may situate itself there, to the cut? To the cut which is no doubt the most efficacious mode of analytic intervention and interpretation.

And that is why it is one of the things on which we should most insist, this cut which we turn into something mechanical, which we understand as limited by a prefabricated time. It is quite elsewhere not alone that we effectively put it. It is one of the most efficacious methods by which we can intervene; it is also one of those to which we should most apply ourselves. But in this cut there is something, this same thing that we have learned to recognise in the form of this phallic object latent to every relationship of demand as signifier of desire.

I would like to end my lesson for this year, and to recall in some way or other what will inaugurate my lessons next year in the form of a *praelectio*, conclude with a sentence that I will offer to you as an enigma, and from which it will be seen whether you are any better at deciphering spoonerisms than I have found to be the case in the course of experiments carried out with some people who visited me. A poet Désiré Viardot in a Brussels' review, in 51 or 52, proposed under the title of *Pantomas* this little inscrutable enigma - we will see if a shout from the audience is going to give us the key to it right away -: the woman has in her skin a grain of phantasy, this grain of phantasy which is

undoubtedly what is in question when all is said and done in what modulates and models, the relationships of the subject to the one from whom she demands - whoever she may be, and no doubt it is not nothing that at the horizon we have found the subject who contains everything, the universal mother, and that we can on occasion make a mistake about this relationship of the subject to the tower which is supposed to be what you are given by analytic archetypes.

But it is indeed something different that is in question. It is the opening, it is the gap onto this radically new thing that every cut of the word introduces. Here it is not only from the woman that we have to wish this grain of phantasy or this grain of poetry, but from analysis itself.