

The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power

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I. *Who Analyses Today?*

1. It is supposed to be obvious to say that an analysis is marked by the person of the analyser.² But if anyone interests himself in the effects that the person of the analyst may have on the analysis, he is thought to be a very bold man indeed. This, at least, would explain the slight tremor we feel when modish remarks are made about the counter-transference - remarks that serve simply to mask its conceptual identity. What nobility of soul we display when we reveal that we ourselves are made from the same clay as those we mould!

Now that's a nasty way of putting it. But it lets those it is aimed at away lightly, since they shamelessly confess, in the name of psychoanalysis, that they are working on the 'emotional re-education of the patient' [22].³

Situating the action of the analyst at this level implies a position of principle, with regard to which anything that might be said about the counter-transference, however valid it may be in itself, is merely a diversion. For the deception that I want to dislodge here, ever since then, lies beyond such considerations.⁴

But I do not have to expose what is anti-Freudian in present-day psychoanalysis. For in that we should be grateful to them for lowering the mask, since they pride themselves on going beyond what, in fact, they are ignorant of, having retained from Freud's teaching just enough to sense how much what they say about their experience is out of tune with it. I hope to show how the inability to sustain a *praxis* in an authentic manner, falls back, as is usually the case in man's history, on the exercise of power.

¹ First report at the international colloquium held on these dates at the invitation of the *Société Française de Psychanalyse*, published in *La Psychanalyse*, vol. 6.

² *L'analysé*. The term 'analyser' (*analysant*) substituted here was introduced in 1967.

³ Numbers in square brackets correspond to the references provided at the end of this report.

⁴ To turn against the spirit of a society a term at whose price it can be evaluated, when the maxim with which Freud equals the pre-Socratics: *Wo Es war, soll Ich werden*, is translated

2. Certainly the psychoanalyst directs the treatment. The first principle of this treatment, the one that is spelt out to him before all else, and which he meets with throughout his training, to the extent that he becomes utterly imbued with it, is that he must not direct the patient. Spiritual direction, in the sense of the moral guidance that a Catholic might find in it, is radically excluded here. If psychoanalysis poses problems for moral theology, they are not those of spiritual direction, speaking of which I would add that spiritual direction itself poses some.

The direction of the treatment is something quite different. First of all, it consists in making the subject apply the analytic rule, that is, the directives whose presence cannot be ignored at the origin of what is called 'the analytic situation' on the pretext that the subject would apply them better without thinking about them.

These directives are initially communicated in the form of instructions which, however little actual comment the analyst makes on them, will reveal, through the way they are presented, the analyst's own understanding of them and the importance he attaches to them. Which does not mean that the analyst is any less involved in the mass of prejudices which, depending on the notion that cultural diffusion has allowed him to form of the methods and aim of the psychoanalytic enterprise, besiege the patient at this stage.

This is already enough to show us that, from the initial directives on, the problem of direction cannot be formulated in a line of univocal communication - a fact that forces us to pause at this stage and to throw further light on it in what follows.

Let us simply state, reducing it to its bare truth, that this phase consists in making the patient forget that it is merely a question of words, but that this does not excuse the analyst for forgetting it himself [16].

3. Moreover, I have declared that it is from the side of the analyst that I intend to approach my subject. Let us say that in putting up the funds for the common enterprise, the patient is not the only one who finds it difficult to pay his share. The analyst too must pay: pay with words no doubt, since the transmutation they undergo from the analytic operation raises them to having an interpretative effect;-

in it quite simply for French use by: *Le Moi doit déloger le Ca* [The ego must dislodge the id]

but also risk his own skin, in that, whatever happens, he lends himself as a support for the remarkable phenomena that analysis has discovered in the transference;
- can anyone forget that, in order to intervene in an action that goes to the heart of being (*Kern unseres Wesens*, as Freud put it [6]), he must pay with what is essential to his innermost judgement: how could he be the only one to remain outside the field of play?

Let those who wish me well in my struggles not be concerned at the thought that I am exposing myself here once again to opponents who are always only too happy to send me back to my metaphysics.

Because at the heart of their claim to be satisfied with effectiveness, the statement is made that ‘the analyst cures not so much by what he says and does but by what he is’ [22]. Nobody, apparently, demands an explanation for such a statement, nor does anyone appeal to their author’s sense of shame when, with a tired smile at the derision he incurs, he falls back on goodness, *his* goodness (we must be good, no transcendence implied), to put an end to the fruitless debate about the transference neurosis.⁵ But who would be cruel enough to question someone bent double under the weight of his suitcase, when the way he is carrying it already shows that it is full of bricks?

Yet being is being, whoever invokes it, and we have a right to ask what it is doing here.

4. So I shall put the analyst in the dock again, in so far as I am myself one, and observe that the less sure he is of his action the more interested he is in his being.

As interpreter of what is presented to me in words or deeds, I decide on my oracle and articulate it as I please, sole master on board after God, and of course far from being able to measure the whole effect of my words, but well aware of this fact and striving to guard against it. In other words always free in the timing, frequency and choice of my interventions, to the point that it seems that the rule has been arranged entirely so as not to impede in any way my own freedom of execution. The aspect of ‘material’ is correlative to this, and it is from its angle that my action deals with what it has produced.

5. In my handling of the transference, on the other hand, my freedom is alienated by the duplication to which my person is subjected in it, and everyone knows that it is there that the secret of analysis is to be sought. This does not prevent people believing that they are really getting somewhere when they discover the learned notion that psychoanalysis must be studied as a situation involving two. It is no doubt hedged about by conditions that restrain its movements, but it remains that conceiving the situation in this way serves to articulate (and with no more artifice than the emotional re-education referred to above) the principles of a training of an ego described as ‘weak’, by an ego that people like to believe has the energy, on account of its ‘strength’, to carry out such a project. That it is not expressed without a certain embarrassment is shown by the strikingly clumsy regrets that are offered, like the one specifying that there must be no compromise on the need for a ‘cure from within’ [22]⁶. But it is all the more significant to observe that the assent of the subject, referred to in this passage, comes only secondarily, as an effect of what was first of all imposed.

It is not for fun that I point out these deviations but rather so that their danger may serve as beacons on our route.

In fact, every analyst (even if he is one of those who go astray in this way) always experiences the transference in wonder as the least expected effect of a relationship between two people, if it were like any other. He tells himself that he has to accept a phenomenon for which he is not responsible, and we know with what insistence Freud stresses its spontaneity in the patient.

For some time, analysts, in the heart-rending revision that they treat us to, have been ready enough to insinuate that this insistence, which was for so long their

⁵ ‘*Comment terminer le traitement analytique*’, *Revue franc. de psychoanalyse*, 1954, IV, p.519 and passim. To measure the influence of such a formation, read: Ch-H. Nodet, ‘*Le psychanalyste*’, *L’évolution psychiatrique*, 1957, no IV, p.689-691.

⁶ I promise my readers not to weary them any more in what comes, with such foolish formulae, which here have really no other use than to show where people have got to in the analytic discourse. I apologised to my foreign listeners who no doubt have just as many available in their own tongue, but perhaps not at quite the same level of platitude.

bulwark, expresses in Freud a flight from the commitment that the notion of situation presupposes. We are, you see, up to date.

But it is rather the easy rapture of the gesture of throwing feelings, put under the heading of their counter-transference, onto one pan of the scales where the situation is supposed to be balanced by their own weight, which for me is evidence of a bad conscience correlative to a failure to conceive the true nature of the transference.

One cannot regard the phantasies that the analyser imposes on the person of the analyst in the same way as the ideal gambler might guess his opponent's intentions. No doubt there is always an element of strategy, but one should not be deceived by the metaphor of the mirror, appropriate as it may be to the smooth surface that the analyst presents to the patient. An impassive face and sealed lips do not have the same purpose here as in a game of bridge. Here the analyst is rather bringing to his aid what in bridge is called the dummy (*le mort*) in order to introduce the fourth player who is here to be the partner of the analyser, and whose hand the analyst, by his play, will try to get him to divine; such is the link, let us say of abnegation, that is imposed on the analyst by what is at stake in the game of analysis.

One might pursue the metaphor by deducing his game according to whether he places himself 'on the right' or 'on the left' of the patient, that is to say, in a position to play after or before the fourth player, to play, that is to say, before or after him with the dummy.

But what is certain is that the analyst's feelings have only one possible place in the game, that of the dummy/dead; and that if it is revived the game will proceed without anyone knowing who is leading.

That is why the analyst is less free in his strategy than in his tactics.

6. Let us take this further. The analyst is even less free as to what dominates strategy and tactics, namely, his policy, where he would be better advised to take his bearings from his lack of being (*manque à être*) rather than from his being.

To put it another way: his action on the patient, as well as the idea that he forms of it, escapes him, as long as he does not start again from what makes it possible, as

long as he does not remember the paradox of its many-sidedness and revise from the beginning the structure by which any action intervenes in reality.

For today's psychoanalysts, this relation to reality goes without saying. They measure the patient's defections from it on the authoritarian principle always employed by educators. Only they rely on the training analysis to ensure it is maintained at a adequate level among analysts, who are not allowed to feel that, in confronting the human problems that are presented to them, their views are sometimes a little parochial. This only removes the problem from an individual level.

And it is scarcely reassuring, when they outline the procedure of analysis as the reduction in the subject of deviations, attributed to his transference and his resistances, but mapped out in relation to reality, to hear them declaiming about the 'perfectly simple situation' that is provided by analysis to take the measure of it. Come on! The educator is not ready to be educated, if he judges in such a frivolous way an experience that he himself must, after all, have gone through.

We must presume from such an appreciation that these analysts would have given a different slant to this experience if they had had to depend on their sense of reality to invent it themselves: a priority that is rather difficult to imagine. They suspect as much, and that is why they are so punctilious in preserving its formalities.

You can understand that in order to prop up so obviously precarious a conception some on the other side of the ocean felt the need to introduce into it some stable value, some standard of the measure of the real: the autonomous ego.⁶ This is the supposedly organised ensemble of the most disparate functions that lend their support to the subject's feeling of innateness. It is regarded as autonomous because it appears to be sheltered from the conflicts of the person (*'non-conflictual sphere'*) [14].

We recognise here a down-at-heel mirage that has already been rejected as untenable by the most academic psychology of introspection. Yet this regression is celebrated as a return to the fold of 'general psychology'.

However, it does solve the problem of the analyst's being.⁷ A team of egos no doubt less equal than autonomous (but by what stamp do they recognise one another in the self-sufficiency of their autonomy) is offered to Americans to guide them towards *happiness*, without upsetting the autonomies, egotistical or otherwise, that pave with their non-conflictual spheres the *American way* of getting there.

7. To sum up. If the analyst were dealing only with resistances, he would look twice at them before making an interpretation, as is in fact the case, but with this prudence he would have done enough.

However, this interpretation, if he gives it, will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be. Will he agree to take advantage of this error about his person? The ethics of analysis do not contradict this, on condition that the analyst interprets this effect, otherwise the analysis will amount to little more than a crude suggestion.

An incontestable position except that the analyst's words will still be heard as coming from the Other of the transference, and the emergence of the subject from the transference is thus postponed *ad infinitum*.

It is therefore because of the being (being that is elsewhere) that the subject imputes to the analyst that an interpretation can return to the place from which it can have an effect on the responses that are given.

But then who will say what the analyst is, and what remains of him when faced with the task of interpreting? Let him dare say it himself, if all he has to say to us by way of an answer is that he is a man. Whether or not he has anything to say would then be all there is to it: yet this is where backs off, not only on account of the impudence of the mystery, but because in this *having*, it is *being* that is in question, and how! We shall see later that this 'how' is not an easy matter.

So, he prefers to fall back on his ego, and on the reality he knows something about. But then he is speaking in terms of I and me with his patient. What is he to do if they are at daggers drawn? It is here that people cleverly count on the

⁷ In France the doctrinaire of being, quoted above, went straight to this solution: the being of the psychoanalyst is innate [c.f. *P.D.A.*, I, p136]

understanding that must exist in the place, named, on this occasion, the healthy part of the ego, the part that thinks as we do.

W.B.U.B.I.P, one might conclude, which brings us back to our initial problem, namely, how to reinvent analysis?

Or to recast it - by treating the transference as a particular form of resistance.

Many hold that view. It is to them that I would pose the question that forms the title of this chapter: Who is the analyst? He who interprets, taking advantage of the transference? He who analyses it as resistance? Or he who imposes his idea of reality?

A question that may put the squeeze on those to whom it is addressed, and be less easy to avoid than the question, 'who is speaking?', which one of my pupils dinned into their ears on behalf of the patient. For their impatient answer: an animal of our species, to the changed question would be more annoyingly tautological by having to be stated as: me.

As bluntly as that.

II. What is the place of interpretation?

1. What has gone before does not answer all the questions that may occur to a novice in this regard. But in gathering together the problems currently being discussed about the direction of the treatment, in so far as this discussion reflects present practice, I think I have kept things in proportion.

It goes to show the less important place occupied by interpretation in present day psychoanalysis - not that its meaning has been lost, but that the way of tackling this meaning is always a source of embarrassment. No author confronts it without first distinguishing it from all the other styles of verbal intervention that are not interpretation: explanations, gratifications, responses to demand, etc. The procedure becomes revealing when it gets close to the centre of interest. It means that even something said with the intention of leading the subject to an insight into his behaviour, especially in

its signification as resistance, may be given a quite different name, confrontation, for example, if only of the subject with his own words, without meriting the name of interpretation, just because it is an illuminating remark.

One cannot but be touched by one author's attempts to force the theory of form, in order to find in it the metaphor that would allow him to express the resolution that interpretation brings about in an ambiguity of intention, the closure to an incompleteness that is nevertheless realised only after the event [2].

2. One senses that it is the nature of the transmutation in the subject that is being avoided here, and this is all the more painful in that it escapes thinking as soon as it comes into effect. In fact, there is no adequate indication to show where interpretation acts, unless one radically accepts a concept of the function of the signifier, that grasps where the subject is subordinated to the point of being suborned by it.

To decipher the diachrony of unconscious repetitions, interpretation must introduce into the synchrony of the signifiers that compose it, something that suddenly makes translation possible - precisely what the function of the Other as harbouring the code allows, since it is in connection with it that the missing element appears.

This importance of the signifier in locating analytic truth appears in filigree once an author holds firmly to experienced connections in the definition of aporias. You should read Edward Glover if you want to appreciate the price he pays for lacking this term: though articulating the most relevant insights, he finds interpretation everywhere, finding nowhere to stop it, even in the banality of a medical prescription. He even goes as far as to say quite baldly - I am not sure whether he is aware of what he is saying - that symptom-formation is an incorrect interpretation by the subject [13].

Conceived of in this way, interpretation becomes a sort of phlogiston: manifest in everything that is understood rightly or wrongly, providing it feeds the flame of the imaginary, of that pure display, which, under the name of aggressivity, flourished in the technique of that period (1931 – recent enough to be still applicable today. Cf. [13].)

It is only in as much as interpretation culminates in the here and now of this interplay that it is distinguished from the reading of the *signatura rerum* in which Jung tries to outdo Boehme. To follow it there would not suit our analysts at all.

But to be up to date with Freud is a very different matter, and that is why it is not a luxury to know how to take the clock to pieces.

3. My doctrine of the signifier is first of all a discipline in which those I form have to train themselves about the different ways in which the signifier effects the advent of the signified, which is the only conceivable way that interpretation can produce anything new.

For it is not based on any assumption of divine archetypes, but on the fact that the unconscious has the radical structure of language, that a material operates in it according to certain laws, those discovered in the study of positive languages, languages that are or were actually spoken.

The phlogiston metaphor, which was suggested to me a moment ago by Glover, gets its appropriateness from the error that it suggests: meaning no more emanates from life than phlogiston escapes from burning bodies. We should speak of it rather as the combination of life with the atom O of the sign⁸, first and foremost of the sign in so far as it connotes presence *or*

⁸ O, which rather than being vocalised as the symbolic letter of oxygen, evoked by the metaphor being used, can be read, zero, inasmuch as this figure symbolises the essential function of place in the structure of the signifier. Here is an example: in the USA where Kris ended up, publication gets you tenure, and a teaching like mine would every week have to stake its claim to priority against the plundering it would not fail to occasion. In France it is by way of infiltration that my ideas penetrate a group, where people obey the orders that prohibit my teaching. Since they are accursed, they ideas can only serve as adornments for

absence, by introducing essentially the *and* that links them, since by connoting presence or absence, it establishes presence against a background of absence, just as it constitutes absence in presence.

You will recall that, with the sureness of touch he had in his field, Freud, seeking the model of repetition compulsion, stopped at the cross-roads formed by a game of hiding and an alternating scansion of two phonemes, whose conjugation in a child had struck him.

At the same time, there also appears in it the value of the object as in itself insignificant (what the child makes appear and disappear), and the subsidiary character of phonetic perfection in relation to phonematic distinction - and no one would dispute that Freud was right to translate it immediately by the *Fort! Da!* of the German he as an adult spoke [9].

This is the point of insertion of a symbolic order that pre-exists the infantile subject and in accordance with which he will have to structure himself.

4. I will spare myself the task of giving the rules of interpretation. It is not that they cannot be formulated, but their formulae presuppose developments that I cannot presume to be known, and it would be impossible to provide a condensed account of them here.

I will confine myself to remarking that when one reads the classical commentaries on interpretation, one always regrets how little is made of the very data that are advanced.

For example, everyone recognises in his own way that to confirm that an interpretation is well founded, it is not the conviction with which it is received that matters, since the criterion will be found much more rather in the material that emerges as a result of it.

some dandies. No matter: the void that they make reverberate, whether I am quoted or not makes another voice heard there.

But the psychologising superstition is so powerful in peoples' minds that the phenomenon is always solicited in terms of the subject's assent, entirely omitting the consequences of what Freud says about *Verneinung* as a form of avowal - to say the least, it cannot be treated as the equivalent of drawing a blank.

This is the way theory expresses how resistance is engendered in practice. It is also what I mean when I say that there is no other resistance to analysis than that of the analyst himself.

5. The serious thing is that with present-day authors the sequence of analytic effects seems to be understood in reverse. What they seem to be saying is that interpretation can only be a hesitant and uncertain stammer in comparison with a wider relation in which we understand one another ('from the inside' no doubt).

According to this view, interpretation is required by a weakness to which we must offer help. It is also something else, something that is very difficult to make him swallow without rejecting it. It is both at once, that is to say, a very inconvenient means.

But what we have here is only the effect of the analyst's passions: his fear, which is not of error, but of ignorance, his taste, which is not to satisfy, but not to disappoint, his need, which is not to govern, but to keep the upper hand. It has nothing to do with any counter-transference on the part of this or that individual; it is a question of the consequences of the dual relation, if the therapist does not overcome it, and how can he overcome it if he sees it as the ideal of his action?

Primum vivere no doubt: a break must be avoided. That we should class under technique the practice of puerile, honest politeness taught to achieve this end is just about acceptable. But that one should confuse this physical necessity, the patient's presence at the appointment, with the analytic relation, is a mistake that will lead the novice astray for a long time.

6. In this perspective, transference becomes the analyst's security, and the relation to the real the terrain on which the combat is decided. Interpretation, which had been postponed until the consolidation of the transference, now becomes subordinate to its reduction.

As a result, interpretation is reabsorbed into a 'working through'¹⁰, which might very well be translated as transference work, which serves as an alibi for a sort of revenge taken for the initial timidity, that is to say, for an insistence that opens the door to all kinds of forcing, put under the flag of 'strengthening the ego' [21-22].

7. But has anyone observed, in criticising Freud's approach, as presented for example in the case of the Rat Man, that what astonishes us as prior indoctrination is due simply to the fact that he proceeds in the inverse order? Namely, that he begins by introducing the patient to an initial mapping of his position in the real, even if this involves a precipitation, let us admit it, a systemisation, of the symptoms [8].

Another famous example: when he reduced Dora to realising that she has done more than participate in the great disorder of her father's world, whose damaging effects form the object of her protest, but that she was in fact the pivot of it and that it could not have gone on without her [7]

I have long stressed the Hegelian procedure at work in this upsetting of the positions of the *belle âme* in relation to the reality that it accuses. It is hardly a question of adapting her to it, but of showing her that she is only too well adapted, since she co-operates in the construction of that very reality.

But the path to be travelled with the other stops here. For the transference has already done its work, showing that it is certainly a question of something quite different than of the relations between the ego and the world.

Freud does not always seem to be able to find his bearings in the cases he shares with us. And that is why they are so precious.

For he recognised immediately that it was the source of his power - in which respect it was not distinguished from suggestion - but also that this power gave him a way out of the problem only on condition that he did not use it, for it was then that it took on its whole development as transference.

From that moment on, it is no longer the person in his presence that he is addressing, and that is why he refuses to meet him face to face.

Interpretation in Freud is so bold that a process of popularisation has robbed it of its full oracular significance. When he exposes a tendency, what he calls *Trieb*, which is quite different from an instinct, the freshness of the discovery prevents us from seeing that the *Trieb* implies in itself the advent of a signifier. But when Freud brings to light what can only be called the subject's lines of fate, it is the figure of Tiresias that we question before the ambiguity in which his verdict operates.

For these divined lines concern so little the subject's ego, or anything it may make present *hic et nunc* in the dual relation, that it is exactly, in the case of the Rat Man, by seizing on the pact that presided over his parents' marriage, on something, therefore, that occurred well before he was born, that Freud finds these intermingled conditions: of honour saved by a hair's breath, of a betrayal in love, of social compromise, and prescribed debt, of which the great compulsive scenario that led the patient to him seems to be the cryptographical transfer. This finally comes to justify the impasses in which his moral life and his desire had gone astray.

But the most striking thing about it is that access to this material was opened up only by an interpretation in which Freud presumed a prohibition laid down by the Rat Man's father against the legitimising of the sublime love to which he had devoted himself, in order to explain the mark of impossibility with which, in all sorts of ways, this relationship was struck for him. An interpretation, which, to say the least, is incorrect, since it is contradicted by

the reality it presumes, but which nevertheless is true in the sense that in it Freud shows an intuition that anticipates my own contribution to the understanding of the function of the Other in obsessional neurosis. I have demonstrated that this function is particularly suited to being held by a dead man, and that in this case it could not be better held than by the father, in so far as by being dead he had rejoined the position that Freud recognised as that of the absolute Father.

8. I will ask those who are already familiar with my writings and who have attended my seminars to forgive me for citing examples I have already dinned into their ears.

This is not only that I cannot make use of my own analyses to demonstrate the plane on which interpretation is brought to bear, when interpretation, proving to be coextensive with the history, cannot be communicated in the communicating milieu in which many of our analyses take place, without risking an infringement of anonymity. For, I have succeeded on occasion in saying enough about a case without saying too much, that is to say make my example understood, without anyone, except the person in question, recognising it.

Nor is it because I regard the Rat Man as a case that Freud cured, because were I to add that I do not think that the analysis is entirely unconnected with the tragic conclusion of his history by his death on the field of battle, what an opportunity for shameful thinking I would be offering to those who wish to think evil!¹¹

What I am saying is that it is in a direction of the treatment, ordered, as I have just shown, according to a process that goes from the rectification of the subject's relation with the real, to the development of the transference and then to interpretation, that there is situated the horizon within which Freud made the fundamental discoveries, which we are still living off, about the dynamics and the structure of obsessional neurosis. Nothing more, but nothing less either.

The question is now posed of whether by upsetting this order we have lost this horizon.

9. What can be said, is that the new ways, by which the approach opened up by the discoverer has supposedly been legitimised, show a confusion of terms that can only be revealed in the particular. I will therefore take up an example that has already contributed to my teaching; naturally, it has been chosen from a distinguished author, who, by virtue of his background, is particularly sensitive to the dimension of interpretation. I am referring to Ernst Kris and to a case which, he does not hide, he took over from Melitta Schmideberg [15].

It concerns a subject inhibited in his intellectual life and particularly incapable of completing his research by publishing it – this because of an impulse to plagiarise, which, he seems unable to master. Such is the subjective drama.

Melitta Schmideberg had seen it as the recurrence of childhood delinquency - the subject had stolen sweets and books - and it was from this angle that she had undertaken the analysis of the unconscious conflict.

Ernst Kris credits himself with taking up the case using a more methodical interpretation, the one, he says, that proceeds from the surface to the depths. The fact that he puts it under the patronage of Hartman's 'ego psychology', which he believed he was under some obligation to support, is incidental to an appreciation of what takes place. Ernst Kris changes the perspective of the case and claims to give the subject *insight* into a new start from an event that is merely a repetition of his compulsion, but in which Kris, very worthily, does not content himself with what the patient says. When he claims to have taken, in spite of himself, the ideas for a piece of work that he has just completed from a book which, on being remembered, enabled him to check it, after the event, he looks at the work and discovers that apparently nothing in it went beyond common practice in the research field.

In short, having assured himself that his patient is not a plagiarist when he thinks he is, he sets out to show him that he wants to be one in order to prevent himself from really being one. This is called analysing the defence before the drive, manifested here in an attraction for the ideas of others.

This intervention may be presumed to be erroneous, simply by the fact that it presupposes that defence and drive are concentric, the one being moulded, as it were, on the other.

What proves that it is in fact so, is the very thing that Kris thinks confirms it, namely, that when he asks the patient what he makes of this new version of things, the latter, day-dreaming for a moment, replies that for some time, on leaving the session, he has wandered along a street full of attractive little restaurants, scrutinising the menus in search of his favourite dish, fresh brains.

A confession which, rather than sanctioning the appropriateness of the intervention by virtue of the material that it brings out, seems to me to have the corrective value of *acting out* in the very account that he gives of it.

This after-dinner mustard that the patient inhales, seems to me rather to be telling the host that it was missing at the meal. Compulsive as he is to breathe it in, it is a *hint*; a transitory symptom no doubt, but it warns the analyst: you've got it wrong.

You have indeed got it wrong, I would repeat, addressing myself to the memory of Ernst Kris, as it comes back to me from the Marienbad Congress, where the day after my paper on the mirror stage, I left, concerned to get a feeling for the spirit of the times, times heavy with promise, at the Berlin Olympiad. He objected gently: '*Ca ne se fait pas!*' (in French), already won over by that taste for the respectable that perhaps deflects his approach here.

Was this what lead you astray, Ernst Kris, or simply that upright though your intentions may be, for your judgement, too, is beyond question, the times themselves are out of joint.

It is not that your patient does not steal that is important here. It is that he does not...No not: it is that he steals *nothing*. And that is what he should have been got to understand.

Contrary to what you believe, it is not his defence against the idea of stealing that makes him believe he steals. It is that it never occurs to him, or just barely crosses his mind, that he could have an idea of his own.

It is useless, therefore, to engage him in this process of trying to sort out what God himself could not decide, what his friend pinches from him that is more or less original when he is chewing the fat with him.

Could not this liking for fresh brains refresh your own concepts, and remind you of what Roman Jakobson says about the function of metonymy? I shall return to this later.

You speak of Melitta Schmideberg as if she had confused delinquency with the Id. I am not so sure and, looking up the article in which she cites this case, the wording of her title suggests to me a metaphor.

You treat the patient as an obsessional, but he gives you a helping hand with his food phantasy, and the opportunity of being a quarter-of-an-hour ahead of the nosology of your time by diagnosing anorexia nervosa (*anorexie mentale*). At the same time, you would freshen up, by restoring it to its true meaning, this pair of terms which, in common usage, have been reduced to the dubious quality of an aetiological prescription.

Anorexia, in this case, with respect to the mental, with respect to the desire on which the idea lives, and this leads us to the scurvy that rages on the raft on which I embark him with the skinny virgins.

Their symbolically justified refusal seems to me to have a lot in common with the patient's aversion for what he thinks. His father already, you say, was not blessed with many ideas. Is it not because the grandfather, who was celebrated for them, made him sick of them? How can we know? You are surely right to make the signifier 'grand', included in the term of kinship, the origin, no more, of the rivalry played out with the father to catch the biggest fish. But this purely formal challenge suggests to me rather that he means: nothing doing (*rien à faire*).

There is nothing in common, then, between your procession, described as beginning from the surface, and the subjective rectification, highlighted above in Freud's method, in which, moreover, it is not motivated by any topographical priority.

It is because in Freud this rectification is also dialectical, and starts from the subject's own words in order to return to them, which means that an interpretation can be correct only by being...an interpretation.

To opt for the objective here is an error, if only because plagiarism is relative to the practices operating in a given situation.⁹

But the idea that the surface is the level of the superficial is itself dangerous. A different topology is necessary if we are not to be mistaken as to the place of desire.

Erasing desire from the map when it is already covered over in the patient's landscape is not the best follow-up to give to Freud's teaching.

⁹ Here is an example: in the USA where Kris ended up, publication gets you tenure, and a teaching like mine would every week have to stake its claim to priority against the plundering it would not fail to occasion. In France it is by way of infiltration that my ideas penetrate a group, where people obey the orders that prohibit my teaching. Since they are damned there, the ideas can only serve as ornaments for some dandies. No matter: the void that they make reverberate, whether I am quoted or not, makes another voice heard there.

Nor is it a way of getting rid of depth, because it is at the surface that it is seen as scurfy decorating the face on feast days.

III Where do we stand as regards transference?

1. It is to the work of our colleague Daniel Lagache that we must turn to construct an accurate history of the publications which, around Freud while he was pursuing his work and since he has bequeathed it to us, have been devoted to the transference that he discovered. The object of this labour goes much further, by introducing into the function of the phenomenon structural distinctions that are essential for its critique. One has only to recall the very relevant alternative that he presents, as regards its ultimate nature, between the need for repetition and the repetition of need.

Such a work - and I believe I have been able to convey in my teaching the consequences that it involves - shows very clearly by the order that it introduces to what extent the aspects on which discussion is centred are often partial, and particularly the extent to which the ordinary use of the term, even in analysis, cannot free itself from its most questionable, though most popular, approach, namely, to see it as the succession or totality of the positive or negative feelings that the patient has for his analyst.

In measuring where we stand with regard to transference in our scientific community it could be said that neither agreement nor illumination has been reached on the following points on which they would nevertheless seem to be necessary: is it the same effect of the relation to the analyst that is manifested in the primary infatuation to be observed at the beginning of treatment and in the web of satisfaction that makes this relation so difficult to break when the transference neurosis seems to have gone beyond properly analytic means? Is it, again, the relation with the analyst and its fundamental frustration which, in the second period of analysis, sustains the rhythm of frustration, aggression, and regression in which the most fruitful effects of analysis appear to occur? How must we conceive of the subordination of

phenomena when their domain is traversed by phantasies that openly involve the figure of the analyst.

The reason for these persistent obscurities has been formulated in an exceptionally lucid study: at each of the stages at which an attempt has been made to revise the problems of the transference, the technical divergences that made such a revision a matter of urgency have left no place for a true critique of the notion itself [20].

2. The notion that I want to take up here again is so central for analytic action that it may serve as a measure for the partiality of the theories in which it has been thought out. That means that you will not be misled if you judge what these theories are worth by the way transference is handled. This pragmatism is justified. For the handling of the transference is at one with the notion one has of it, and however little elaborated it is in practice, it cannot do otherwise than range itself with the partialities of the theory.

On the other hand the simultaneous existence of these partialities does nothing to make them complement one another: which confirms that they suffer from a central defect.

In order to introduce a little order into the question I will reduce these particular theories to three, even if it means engaging myself in a certain amount of prejudice, less serious for being only a matter of presentation.

3. I will link psycho-genetics - in the sense that it tends to ground analytic phenomena in the developmental stages involved and to be nourished by direct observation of the child - to a particular technique that concentrates on the analysis of defences.

This link is obvious from a historical point of view. It might even be said that it is based on nothing else, since this link is constituted only by the failure of the solidarity that it presupposes.

One can locate its beginnings in the legitimate credence given to the notion of an unconscious ego with which Freud re-orientated his doctrine. To pass from this to the hypothesis that the mechanisms of defence, that are grouped together under its function, ought themselves reveal a comparable law of appearance, one that even corresponds to the succession of stages by which Freud attempted to connect the emergence of the drives to physiology – that was the step that Anna Freud, in her book on *The mechanisms of defence* proposed to take in order to put it to the test of experience.

It might have been an opportunity to make a fruitful critique of the relations between development and the obviously more complex structures that Freud introduced into psychology but the sights were lowered – it was so much more tempting to try to insert into the observable stages of sensori-motor development and of the developing skills of intelligent behaviour these mechanism of defence that supposedly emerge as they progress.

One can say that the hopes that Anna Freud placed in such an exploration were disappointed: nothing emerged from this line of approach that threw any light on technique, although the details that child-observation, illuminated by analysis, allowed to be glimpsed, have yielded some very interesting suggestions.

The notion of *pattern*¹⁶ which functions here as an alibi for an abandoned typology authorises a technique which in pursuing the detection of a non-contemporaneous pattern, concentrates all too easily, it seems, on its deviation from a pattern that finds in its conformism the guarantees of its conformity. One cannot recall without a sense of shame the criteria of success in which this shoddy piece of work culminates: the achievement of a higher income, and the emergency exit provided by the affair with one's secretary, regulating the release of forces strictly bound up in marriage, career and the political community, do not seem to me to be worthy of an appeal (articulated in the analyst's planning, and even in her interpretation) to the discord of life and death instincts even if she decorates her remarks with the pretentious term "economic", and pursues it, in a complete

misunderstanding of Freud's thought, as the interplay of two forces homologous in their opposition.

4. Less eroded in its analytic relief, it seems to me, is the second way in which there can be seen what is avoided in transference: namely, the approach borrowed from object relations.

This theory, although it has lost much of its appeal in France in recent years, has like psycho-genetics, a noble origin. It was Karl Abraham who originated this dimension and the notion of part object is his original contribution to it. This is not the place to demonstrate the value of that contribution. I am more concerned to indicate its connection with the partiality of the aspect of the transference that Abraham extracts, by promoting in it the opacity of the capacity for love: as if that were a constitutional given of the patient in which one could read the degree of his amenability to treatment, and in particular, the only one in which the treatment of psychosis would fail.

We have two equations here in effect. The so-called sexual transference (*Sexualübertragung*) is the basis for the love we call objectal (*Objektliebe*). The capacity for transference is a measure of the patient's access to the real. We cannot stress too much that this merely begs the question.

Unlike the presuppositions of psycho-genetics which is supposed to be based on an order of formal emergences in the subject, Abraham's approach can be explained as a finality, that takes its authority from being instinctual, in the sense that it is based on the image of the maturation of an ineffable object, the Object with a capital O that governs the phase of objectality (to be distinguished, significantly, from objectivity by virtue of its affective substance).

This ectoplasmic conception of the object soon revealed its dangers when it became degraded into the crude dichotomy expressed in the opposition of the pre-genital character and the genital character.

This over-simplified thematisation is summarily developed by attributing to the pre-genital character the accumulated features of projective unreality, of greater or lesser degrees of autism, of restriction of satisfaction by the defences, of the conditioning of the object by a doubly protected isolation from the destructive effects that connote it, in other words an amalgam of all the defects of object relations with a view to showing the motives for the extreme dependence that results from them for the subject. A picture that would be useful despite its inveterate confusion, if it did not seem made to serve as a negative to the puerility of “the passage from the pre-genital form to the genital form”, in which the drives “no longer take on that character of a need of uncoercible, unlimited, unconditional possession involving a destructive aspect. They are truly tender, loving, and even if the subject does not show himself to be oblativ, that is to say disinterested, and even if these objects” (here the author recalls my remarks), “are as profoundly narcissistic as in the previous case he is capable of comprehension and adaptation to the other. Indeed the intimate structure of these objectal relations shows that the object’s participation in his own pleasure is indispensable for the subject’s happiness. The proprieties, the desires, the needs of the object” - what a mess! – “are taken into consideration to the highest degree.”

However this does not prevent the ego from having “a stability that runs no risk of being compromised by the loss of a significant Object. It remains independent of its objects.”

“Its organisation is such that the mode of thought that it uses is essentially logical. It does not spontaneously present regression to an archaic mode of apprehending reality, affective thinking and magical belief, playing only an absolutely secondary role; symbolisation does not grow in extent and importance beyond what it is in normal life.” (!) “The style of the relations between the subject and the object is highly evolved.” (*sic*)¹⁰

¹⁰ Parentheses by the author of the present report.

This is the promise held out to those who “at the end of a successful analysis...realise the enormous difference between what they once believed sexual joy to be and what they now experience.”

We are led to understand that for those who have this joy straight off, “the genital relation is in short, untroubled” [21].

Untroubled except for conjugating itself irresistibly in the verb *to bang your behind against the chandelier*, whose place here seems to me to be marked for the future commentator to have time of his life.

5. If, indeed, we must follow Abraham when he presents us with object relations as typically demonstrated in the activity of the collector, perhaps what regulates it is not this edifying antinomy but is to be sought rather in some impasse that is constitutive of desire itself.

What makes the object present itself as broken and decomposed is perhaps something other than a pathological factor.

And what has this absurd hymn to the harmony of the genital got to do with the real? Are we to erase the Oedipal drama from our experience, when it had to be forged by Freud precisely to explain the barriers and debasements (*Erniedrigungen*) that are so common in even the most fulfilled love life?

Is it our job to camouflage Eros, the black god, as one of the Good Shepherd’s woolly sheep?

Sublimation may well be at work in the oblation that radiates from love, but should we not try to go a little further into the structure of the sublime and not confuse it with the perfect orgasm – which was something Freud, at least, was anxious to disprove.

The worst thing is that souls who are overflowing with the most natural tenderness are led to wonder if they can measure up to the delusional

normalisation of the genital relation – a new burden which we, like those cursed by the Evangelist, have bound to the shoulders of the innocent.

Yet in reading what I have written, if any of it survives into a time when people will no longer know what it was in practice that these enthusiastic words corresponded to, people may imagine that our art was employed at reviving sexual hunger in those afflicted with underdeveloped glands – to the physiology of which we have made no contribution, and about which we have got to know very little.

6. At least three sides are needed to make a pyramid, even an heretical one. The one that closes the dihedron described here in the gap in the conception of transference strives, one might say, to join up the edges.

If transference gets its power by being reduced to the reality of which the analyst is the representative, and if it is a question of ripening the object in the hot house of a confined situation, the analyser is left with only one object, if you will pardon the expression, to get his teeth into, and that is the analyst.

Hence the notion of inter-subjective introjection, the third error, which comes from having made the mistake of installing oneself in a dual relationship.

For we are certainly dealing with a unitive way and the various theoretical sauces with which it is served up – depending on the topography to which one is referring – can do no more than preserve the metaphor while varying it according to the level of the operation considered to be serious: introjection for Ferenczi, identification with the analyst's superego for Strachey, a terminal narcissistic trance for Balint.

I am going to draw attention to the substance of this mystical consummation, and if once more I must take to task what is happening on my doorstep it is because analytic experience is known to draw its strength from the

particular. That is why the importance given in analysis to the phantasy of phallic devouring, to which the image of the analyst is subjected, seems to me to be worthy of note, because it tallies so well with the conception of a direction of the treatment that is based entirely upon the arranging of the distance between the patient and the analyst as the object of the dual relation.

For however weak the theory with which an author systematises his technique, the fact remains that he really does analyse, and the consistencies revealed in the error is the guarantee here of the wrong route that he has taken in practice.

The privileged function of the signifier phallus in the way the subject is present to desire is illustrated here, but in an experience that might be called blind: this because of the lack of any orientation regarding the true relationships in the analytic situation, which, as in any other situation in which one speaks, can only be crushed by trying to inscribe it in a dual relation.

Since the nature of symbolic incorporation is overlooked, and with good reason, and since it is unthinkable that anything real should be consumed in the analysis, it will appear from a cursory study of my teaching that nothing can be recognised in what occurs that is not imaginary. For it is not necessary to know the plan of a house to knock one's head against its walls: indeed, to do so, one can easily do without it.

I myself suggested to this author, at a time when we discussed things with one another, that if one confines oneself to an imaginary relation between objects, there remains only the dimension of distance to organise it. This was not how he saw things at all.

To make distance the sole dimension in which the neurotic's relations with the object are played out produces insurmountable contradictions that can be read well enough both within the system and in the opposite direction that different authors will derive from the same metaphor to organise their

impressions. Too much or too little distance from the object sometimes appears to become confused to an inextricable degree. And it is not the distance from the object but rather its excessive closeness to the subject that seems to Ferenczi to characterise the neurotic.

What decides what each one means is its technical use and the technique of *rapprocher*, however priceless the effect of the untranslated term may have in an English presentation, reveals in practice a tendency that borders on obsession.

It is difficult to believe that in the prescribed ideal of the reduction of this distance to zero (*nil* in English) its author can fail to see that this is where its theoretical paradox is concentrated.

In any case, it cannot be doubted that this distance is taken as a universal parameter, regulating variations in the technique (however double Dutch the debate on their extent may be) for the dismantling of neurosis.

What such a conception owes to the special conditions of obsessional neurosis is not to be ascribed entirely to the object. It does not seem that any justification can be got from the results obtained by the application of this conception to obsessional neurosis. It does not even seem that it can be credited with any privilege when we note the results that it obtains in obsessional neurosis. For if I may venture, as Kris did, to give an account of an analysis which I had taken over from another analyst, I can provide evidence that such a technique in the hands of an analyst of indisputable talent succeeded in producing in a clinical case of pure obsession in a man, the eruption of an infatuation that was no less unbridled for being Platonic, and which proved no less irreducible for being directed at the first object of the same sex who came to hand.

To speak of transitory perversion here might satisfy an invincible optimist but only at the cost of recognising, in this atypical re-establishing of the

usually all too neglected third party of the relation, that one should not depend too much on the notion of proximity in object relations.

7. There is no limit to the erosion of analytic technique when it is deconceptualised. I have already referred to the ‘discoveries’ of a ‘wild’ analysis, which to my painful astonishment had not alarmed the supervisor. To be able to smell one’s analyst seemed in this work to be an aim to be taken literally, as an index of the happy outcome of the transference.

One can perceive here a sort of involuntary humour which is what makes this example so valuable. It would have delighted Jarry. It is, in fact, no more than one might expect when the development of the analytic situation is taken to be real: and it is true that, taste apart, the olfactory is the only dimension that enables one to reduce the distance to zero (*nil*) this time in the real. To what extent it provides a clue for *The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power* is more doubtful.

But that an animal odour should find its way into a technique that is conducted largely by ‘following your nose’, as they say, is not just ridiculous. Students from my seminar will recall the smell of urine that marked the turning point in a case of transitory perversion, which I used as a criticism of this technique. It cannot be said that it was unconnected with the accident that motivates the observation, since it is in spying, through a crack in the wall of a public lavatory, on a woman pissing that the patient suddenly transposed his libido, without anything, it seemed, predetermining it: infantile emotions bound up with the phantasy of the phallic mother having until then taken the form of a phobia [23].

It is not a direct link, however, any more than it would be correct to see in the voyeurism an inversion of the exhibition involved in what is correctly diagnosed as an atypical phobia: as the patient’s anxiety had been teased for being too tall.

As I said, the analyst to whom we owe this remarkable publication gives proof in it of rare perspicacity by coming back to a tormenting degree, to the interpretation that she gave of a suit of armour, which appeared in a dream as a pursuer armed with a fly spray, as a symbol of the phallic mother.

Should I not rather have talked about his father? She wondered. She justified not doing so by the fact that the real father had been missing in the patient's history.

At this point my pupils will be able to deplore the fact that the teaching of my seminar was unable to help her at the time, since they know by what principle I have taught them to distinguish between the phobic object *qua* all purpose signifier to fill the lack in the Other, and the fundamental fetish of every perversion *qua* object perceived in the cut of the signifier.

Failing that, should this gifted novice not have remembered the dialogue between the suits of armour in André Breton's *Discours sur le peu de réalité*? That would have put her on the right path.

But how could that be hoped for when this analysis was, in supervision, given a direction that involves constant harassment to bring the patient back to the real situation? How can we be surprised, that unlike the queen of Spain, the analyst has legs, when she herself emphasises the fact in the crudity of her appeals to the order of the present?

Of course this procedure is far from having nothing to do with the benign outcome of the acting out under examination here: since, moreover, the analyst, who is of course conscious of the fact, was in a situation of permanent castrating intervention.

But why, then, attribute this role to the mother, when everything in the anamnesis of the case indicates that she always acted rather as a procuress?

The faltering Oedipus complex was compensated, but always in the form, disarming here in its naivete, of an entirely forced, not to say arbitrary, reference to the person of the analyst's husband – a situation encouraged by the fact that it was he, himself a psychiatrist, who provided the analyst with this particular patient.

This is not a very common situation. In any case it has to be rejected as lying outside the analytic situation.

Reservations about its outcome are not entirely due to the graceless detours of the analysis, and the no doubt mischievous humour involving the fees for the last session, as having been misappropriated for the purpose of debauchery, is no bad sign for the future.

The question that can be raised is that of the boundary between analysis and re-education when its very process is guided by a predominant solicitation of its real incidences. As further evidence for which in this case one need only compare the biographical data and the transference formations. Any contribution to the deciphering of the unconscious is truly minimal. So much so that one wonders whether most of it does not remain intact in the incystation of the enigma, which under the label of transitory perversion, constitutes the object of this instructive communication.

8. But the non-analyst reader should not misunderstand me: I wish in no way to depreciate a work to which the Virgilian epithet *improbus* can rightly be applied.

My only purpose is to warn analysts of the decline that threatens their technique if they fail to recognise the true place in which its effects are produced.

They are tireless in their attempts to define it, and one cannot say when they fall back on positions of modesty or even when they are guided by fictions, that the experience that they develop is always unfruitful.

Research into psycho-genetics and direct observations are far from being cut off from properly analytic inspiration. And in my own treatment of the themes of object relations in a year long seminar, I showed the value of a conception in which child observation is nourished by the most accurate reconsideration of the function of mothering in the genesis of the object: I mean the notion of the transitional object, introduced by D.W. Winnicott, which is a key point for the explanation for the genesis of fetishism [27].

Nevertheless, the flagrant uncertainties of the reading of the great Freudian concepts are correlative to the weaknesses that encumber practical work.

What I mean is that it is in proportion to the impasses encountered in grasping their action in its authenticity that researchers and groups end up forcing it in the direction of the exercise of power.

They substitute this power for the relation to being where this action can be situated, producing a decline in its resources, especially those of speech, from their truly eminent position. This is why it is a sort of return of the repressed, however strange it may seem, which, out of the pretensions least disposed to encumber themselves with the dignity of these means, gives rise to this blunder of a recourse to being as though it were a given of the real, when the discourse that informs it rejects any interrogation beyond what has already been recognised by splendid platitude.

IV How to act with your being

1. The question of the analyst's being appears very early in the history of analysis and it should come as no surprise that it was introduced by the analyst most tormented by the problem of analytic action. Indeed it can be said that Ferenczi's article, *Introjection and transference*, dating from 1909 [3], was inaugural, and it anticipated from afar all the themes later developed about the topic.

Although Ferenczi conceived of transference as the introjection of the person of the doctor into the subjective economy, it was no longer a matter here of this person as a support for a repetitive compulsion, for ill-adapted behaviour, or as a phantasy figure. What he means is the absorption into the economy of the subject of all that the psychoanalyst makes present in the duo as the *hic et nunc* of an incarnated problematic. Does not this author come in the end to articulate that the completion of the analysis can be attained only in the avowal made by the doctor to the patient of the abandonment that he himself is capable of suffering? ¹¹

2. Must one pay this comical price for the subject's lack of being to be recognised as the heart of the analytic experience, as the very field in which the neurotic's passion is deployed?

Outside this hearth of the dispersed Hungarian school whose firebrands are now scattered and will soon be ashes, only the English with their cold objectivity have been able to articulate this gap to which the neurotic bears witness in wanting to justify his existence, and hence implicitly to distinguish from the inter-human relation, with its warmth and its allurements, that relation to the Other in which being finds its status.

We have only to cite Ella Sharp and her very relevant remarks as she follows the neurotic's true concerns [24]. Their power lies in a sort of naivete reflected in the justly celebrated brusqueness of her style as both therapist and writer. She is far from ordinary in the extent to which she glorifies the analyst by requiring him to be omniscient if he is to read correctly the intentions of the analyser's discourses.

We must be grateful to her for having given literary culture pride of place in the training of practitioners, even if she does not seem to realise that in the minimum reading list that she gives them, there is a predominance of works of the imagination in which the signifier of the phallus plays a central role

¹¹ Rectification of the text of the second last sentence and the first line of the following paragraph (1966).

beneath a transparent veil. This simply proves that the choice is no less guided by experience than is her felicitous initial advice.

3. It is again by the English, indigenous or not, that the end of the analysis has been most categorically defined by the subject's identification with the analyst. Certainly, opinion varies as to whether it is his ego or superego that is involved. It is not so easy to master the structure that Freud elucidated in the subject, unless one distinguishes in it the symbolic, the imaginary and the real.

It is enough to say that such shocking statements are never forged without some pressure on those who advance them. The dialectic of phantastical objects put forward in practice by Melanie Klein tends to be expressed in the theory in terms of identification.

For these objects, partial or not, but certainly signifying – the breast, excrement, the phallus – are no doubt won or lost by the subject. He is destroyed by them or preserves them, but above all, he *is* these objects, depending on the place where they function in his fundamental phantasy. This style of identification simply demonstrates the pathology of the slope down which the subject is pushed in a world where his needs are reduced to exchange values, this slope itself finding its radical possibility only in the mortification that the signifier imposes on his life by numbering it.

4. The psychoanalyst it would seem, simply in order to help the subject, ought to be delivered from this pathology, which, as we see, rests on nothing less than an iron law.

This is why people imagine that a psychoanalyst should be a happy man. Indeed is it not happiness that one is asking of him and how could he give it, common sense asks, if he did not have a little of it himself?

It is a fact that we do not retreat from promising happiness in a period in which the question of measuring it has become so complicated: principally because happiness, as Saint-Just said, has become a political factor.

To be fair, humanistic progress from Aristotle to Saint Francis (de Sales) did not fill up the aporias of happiness.

It is a waste of time, as we know, to look for the shirt of a happy man, and what is called a happy shadow (*une ombre heureuse*) is to be avoided for the ills it propagates.

It is certainly in relation to being that the analyst has to find his operating level, and the opportunities that the training analysis offers him for this purpose are not to be calculated simply in function of the resolution of the problem supposedly achieved by the analyst who is guiding him.

There are misfortunes of being that the prudence of the schools and the false shame that ensures domination dare not take away from you.

An ethic is yet to be formulated that integrates the Freudian conquests about desire: one that would place in the forefront the question of the analyst's desire.

5. If one is sensitive to the resonance of earlier works, one cannot but be struck by the decadence that marks analytic speculation especially in this order.

Because they understand a lot of things, analysts on the whole imagine that to understand is an end in itself, and that it can only be a "happy end". The example of the physical sciences may show them however that the most imposing successes do not imply that one knows where one is going.

To think it is often better not to understand, and one can gallop through miles of understanding without the least thought being produced.

This indeed was how the Behaviourists began: renounce understanding. But because they lacked any other thought as far as our particular subject, which

is *antiphysis*, is concerned they adopted the course of using, without understanding it, what we understand: a chance for us to renew our pride.

A sample of what we are capable of producing in ethical matters is provided by the notion of oblativity. This is the phantasy of an obsessional, misunderstood by oneself: everything for the other, my fellow man, it says, without recognising here the anxiety that the Other (with a capital O) inspires by not being a fellow man.

6. I do not claim to teach psychoanalysts what thinking is. They know. But this does not mean that they understood it by themselves. They learnt their lesson from the psychologists. Thought is an attempt at action, they repeat politely. (Freud himself took the same line, which does not prevent him from being a doughty thinker, whose action culminates in thinking).

In truth the thinking of analysts is really an action that is coming apart! This leaves some hope that, if one makes them think about it, by taking it up again, they will come to think it out again.

7. The analyst is the man to whom one speaks and to whom one speaks freely. That is what he is there for. What does that mean?

Anything that may be said about the association of ideas is mere psychologistic packaging. We are a long way from word induction; moreover, because of their protocol, nothing is less free.

The subject invited to speak in analysis does not really reveal a great deal of freedom in what he says. Not that he is bound by the rigour of his associations: no doubt they do oppress him, but it is rather that they open up onto a free speech, a full word, that would be painful to him.

Nothing is more dangerous than saying something that might be true. For if it were, it would become entirely so, and God knows what happens when something, by being true, can no longer be doubted.

Is that the procedure of analysis – a progress of the truth? I can already hear louts complaining about my intellectual analyses: though I am in the awkward position, I believe, of preserving the unsayable in it.

That our listening is adjusted to something beyond discourse, I know better than anyone, only I take the trouble to hear (*entendre*) and not to auscultate. Yes certainly, not auscultating the resistance, the tension, the opisthotonos, the pallor, the adrenergic (*sic*) discharge in which a stronger (*resic*) ego would be reformed: what I listen to is in the dimension of understanding (*entendement*).

Hearing does not force me to comprehend (*comprendre*). What I hear remains no less discourse, even if it is as little discursive as an interjection. For an interjection is of the order of language and not of an expressive cry. It is a part of the discourse that is as important as any other for its syntactical effects in a particular tongue.

To what I hear, I have nothing to find fault with if I comprehend nothing in it, and if I do comprehend something I am sure to be mistaken. This would not stop me from answering. This is what happens outside analysis in such a case. I keep silent. Everybody agrees that I frustrate the speaker, he first, me too. Why?

If I frustrate him it must be that he is demanding something of me. To answer him, precisely. But he knows very well that it would be mere words. As he can get from anyone at all. It is not even certain that he would be grateful to me if they were good words, and still less bad ones. It is not these words he is asking me for. He is asking me..., by the very fact that he speaks: his demand is intransitive, it implies no object.

Of course, his demand is deployed in the field of an implicit demand, what he is there for, to cure him, to reveal him to himself, to get him to know psychoanalysis, to make him qualify as an analyst. But, as he knows, this

demand can wait. His present demand has nothing to do with that, it is not even his own, for after all it is I who have offered him the chance to speak. (Only the subject is transitive here).

In short I have succeeded in doing what in the field of ordinary commerce one would like to be able to do with such ease: with the offer I have created demand.

8. But it is, as one might say a radical demand.

Mrs MacAlpine is no doubt right to seek the motive force of transference in the analytic rule alone. But she errs in attributing to the absence of any object a door open to infantile regression [24]. This would rather seem to be an obstacle, for, as everyone knows, child analysts more than anyone, it takes a lot of little objects to keep up a relation with a child.

Through the mediation of the demand the whole past opens up right back to early infancy. The subject has never done anything other than demand, it was the only way he could live, and we just follow on.

It is in this way that analytic regression can take place and does in fact present itself. People talk about it as if the subject acts the child. That no doubt happens, and such pretence is not a very good omen. In any case, it goes beyond what is usually observed in what regression is held to be. For regression shows nothing other than a return to the present of signifiers used in demands that are prescribed.

9. To start from the beginning once again, this situation explains primary transference, and the love by which it is sometimes declared.

For if to love is to give what one does not have, it is certainly true that the subject can expect to be given it, since the psychoanalyst has nothing else to give him. But he does not even give him this nothing, and it is just as well:

and that is why you pay him for this nothing, preferably a large amount, to clearly show that otherwise it would not be worth much.

But although the primary transference generally remains little more than a shadow (*ombre*) this does not prevent the shadow from dreaming and reproducing its demand when there is nothing left to demand. This demand will be all the purer for being empty.

It may be remarked that the analyst nonetheless gives his presence, but I believe that this is at first simply the implication of his listening, and that this is simply the condition of speech. Furthermore, why would the technique require it to be so discreet if, in fact, this were not the case? It is only later that his presence will be noticed.

Anyway, the most acute feeling of his presence is linked to a moment when the subject can only remain silent, that is, when he recoils even at the shadow of a demand.

Thus the analyst is the one who supports the demand, not, as has been said, to frustrate the subject, but to allow the signifiers in which his frustration is bound up to reappear.

10. Now it should be remembered that it is in the oldest demand that primary identification is produced, the one brought about by maternal omnipotence, namely, the one that not only suspends the satisfaction of needs on the signifying apparatus, but also fragments them, filters them, models them on the defiles of the structure of the signifier.

Needs are subordinated to the same conventional conditions as those of the signifier in its double register: synchronic from the opposition between irreducible elements, and diachronic from substitution and combination, through which language, even if it does not of course fulfil everything, structures everything in inter-human relations.

Hence the oscillation to be observed in Freud's statements on the relations between the superego and reality. The superego is not of course, the source of reality, as he says somewhere, but it traces out its paths, before rediscovering in the unconscious the first ideal marks in which the tendencies are constituted as repressed by the substitution of the signifier for needs.

11. There is now no need to seek any further for the source of the identification with the analyst. It may be very diverse but it will always be an identification with signifiers.

As an analysis develops, the analyst has to deal in turn with all the articulations of the subject's demand. But, as I will point out later, he must respond to them only from the position of transference.

Who, in fact, does not emphasise the importance of what might be called the permissive hypothesis of analysis? But there is no need for a particular political regime for what is not forbidden to become obligatory.

Those analysts that we can say are fascinated by the sequellae of frustration are only taking up a position of suggestion that reduces the subject to restating his demand. This no doubt is what is meant by emotional re-education.

Goodness is no doubt more necessary here than anywhere else, but it cannot cure the evil it engenders. The analyst who wants the good of the subject, repeats what he was formed by, and sometimes, even deformed. The most aberrant education has never had any other motive than the good of the subject.

A theory of analysis is conceived, which unlike the delicate articulation of Freud's analysis, reduces the source of symptoms to fear. It engenders a practice in which what I have called elsewhere the obscene ferocious figure of the superego is imprinted, in which there is no other way out of the

transference neurosis than to make the patient sit down by the window and show him all the smiling aspects of nature, adding “Off you go! Now you’re a good child.” [22]

V *Desire must be taken literally (à la lettre)*

1. After all, a dream is just a dream, we hear it said today [22]. Does it mean nothing that in it Freud recognised desire?

Desire, not tendencies. For we must read *The interpretation of dreams* to know what is meant by what Freud calls desire.

We must pause at the vocables *Wunsch* and its English translation *Wish*, to distinguish them from *désir*; nothing could less suggest concupiscence than their damp squib splutter. They are *voeux*.

These *voeux* may be pious, nostalgic, contrary, joky. A lady may have a dream that is animated by no other desire than to provide Freud, who has explained to her the theory that the dream is a desire, with proof that it is nothing of the kind. The point to be remembered is that this desire is articulated in an extremely cunning discourse. But it is no less important to perceive the consequences of the fact that Freud was satisfied to recognise in it the desire of the dream and the confirmation of his law, for what desire means in his thinking.

For he extends its eccentricity still further since for him a punishment dream may very well signify the desire for what the punishment suppresses.

Let us not stop at the labels on the drawers, even though many people confuse them with the fruits of science. Let us read the texts. Let us follow Freud’s thinking in the twists and turns (*détours*) that it imposes on us, and not forget that in deploring them himself, when seen from the standpoint of

the ideal of scientific discourse, he affirms that he was forced into them by the object of his study.¹²

We then see that this object is identical with those twists and turns, since at the first turning point of his work, when dealing with the dream of a hysteric he comes on the fact that by displacement, in this case specifically by allusion to the desire of another woman, a desire from the previous day is satisfied. This is maintained in its dominant position by a desire of a quite different order, since Freud situates it as the desire to have an unsatisfied desire. [7]¹³

You should count the number of referrals (*renvois*) that operate here to bring desire to a geometrically increasing power. A single measure would not be enough to characterise its degree. For it would be necessary to distinguish two dimensions in these referrals: a desire for desire, in other words a desire signified by a desire (in the hysteric, the desire to have an unsatisfied desire is signified by her desire for caviar: the desire for caviar is its signifier), is inscribed in the different register of a desire substituted for a desire (in the dream the desire for smoked salmon, which belonged to the friend, was substituted for the patient's own desire for caviar, which constitutes the substitution of a signifier for a signifier).¹⁴

2. What we find, then has nothing microscopic about it, any more than there is need of special instruments to recognise that a leaf has the structural features of the plant from which it has been detached. Even if one had only seen the plant stripped of leaves one would realise at once that a leaf is more likely to be part of a plant than a piece of skin.

¹² Cf letter 118 (11.9.99. To Fliess in: The origins of psychoanalysis, Imago, London 1954.

¹³ Here is this dream as it is recorded from the account that the patient gives of it on page 152 of G.W., II – III (S.E.IV, p147): 'I wanted to give a supper party but I had nothing in the house but a little smoked salmon. I thought I would go out and buy something, but remembered then that it was Sunday afternoon and all the shops would be shut. Next I tried to ring up some caterers but the telephone was out of order. So I had to abandon my wish to give a supper party.'

¹⁴ This is how Freud justifies hysterical identification, by specifying that smoked salmon plays for the friend the same role as caviar plays for the patient.

The desire of the hysteric's dream, but also any other snippet in this text of Freud summarises what the whole book explains about what are called unconscious mechanisms, condensation, sliding (*glissement*), etc. by bearing witness to their common structure: that is, the relation of desire to that mark of language that specifies the Freudian unconscious and decentres our conception of the subject.

I think my pupils will appreciate the access that I am giving here to the fundamental opposition between the signifier and the signified, in which as I show them, the powers of language begin, though in trying to understand how they operate they have their work cut out

Let me recall the automatic nature of the laws by which the signifying chain is articulated:

- a) the substitution of one term for another to produce the effect of metaphor:
- b) the combination of one term to another to produce the effects of metonymy.[17]

If we apply them here, we see it emerging that in so far as in our patient's dream the smoked salmon, the object of her friend's desire, is all she had to offer, Freud, by suggesting that the smoked salmon is substituted here for caviar, which indeed he considers to be the signifier of the patient's desire, is presenting the dream as a metaphor of desire.

But what is metaphor if not a positive meaning-effect, that is, a certain passage of the subject to the meaning of desire?

The subject's desire being presented here as what is implied by her conscious discourse, namely, as preconscious – which is obvious enough since her husband is willing to satisfy her desire, but the patient who persuaded him of the existence of this desire insists that he should do nothing about it, and you would have to be Freud again to articulate it as the

desire to have an unsatisfied desire – one must go further to know what such a desire means in the unconscious.

Now the dream is not the unconscious, but, as Freud tells us, the royal road to it. This confirms me in the belief that it proceeds by way of metaphor. It is this effect that the dream uncovers. For whom? We shall return to this later.

Let us observe for the moment that if the desire is signified as unsatisfied, it is through the signifier caviar in so far as the signifier symbolises it as inaccessible, but, that as soon as it slips as desire into caviar, the desire for caviar is its metonymy: rendered necessary by the lack of being in which it is situated.

Metonymy, as I teach you, is the effect made possible by the fact that there is no meaning that does not refer to another meaning, and in which their most common denominator is produced, namely, the bit of sense - frequently confused with the non-significant - the bit of sense, I say, that proves to lie at the basis of desire, and confers on it that element of perversion that it would be tempting to expose in this case of hysteria.

The truth of this appearance is that desire is the metonymy of the lack of being.

3. Let us now return to the book we call *La science de rêves (Traumdeutung)* – *mantique* rather, or better *signifiance*.²⁴

In it, Freud does not at all claim to exhaust the psychological problems of dreams. One has only to read it to realise that Freud does not touch on a number of problems that still have been largely ignored (sparse and impoverished is the research that has been done on space and time in the dream, on the sensorial raw material of the dream, dreams in colour or atonal dreams, on whether the sapid, taste and touch occur in them, or the sense of

vertigo, of the turgid and the heavy). To say that Freudian doctrine is a psychology is a crude equivocation.

Freud is far from entertaining this equivocation. On the contrary, he warns us that he is interested only in the dream work. What does that mean? Exactly what we would now call its language structure. How could Freud have been aware of this structure, when it was articulated only at a later date by Ferdinand de Saussure? If it overlaps his terms, it is all the more striking that Freud should have anticipated it. But where did he discover it? In a signifying flux, whose mystery lies in the fact that the subject does not even know where to pretend to be its organiser.

To rediscover oneself in it as desirer, is the opposite of getting oneself recognised in it as subject, for it is as a derivation of the signifying chain that the channel of desire flows, and the subject must switch points in order to catch his own *feedback*.

Desire merely subjugates what analysis subjectifies.

4.

And this brings us back to the question we left earlier: to whom does the dream reveal its sense before the arrival of the analyst? This sense pre-exists its being read and the science of its deciphering.

Both show that the dream is made for the recognition... but my voice hangs fire for a long time before finishing: of desire. For desire, if what Freud says of the unconscious is true and if analysis is necessary, can be grasped only by interpretation.

But let us continue: the dream work is nourished by the desire; why does my voice fail to finish, for recognition, as if the second word was extinguished which, a little while ago as the first, reabsorbed the other in its light. For, after all, it is not by sleeping that one is recognised. And the dream, Freud tells us without appearing to be aware of the slightest contradiction, serves

above all the desire to sleep. It is a narcissistic folding back of the libido and a decathexis of reality.

Moreover we know from experience that if my dream rejoins my demand (not reality, as has incorrectly been said, which may allow my sleep to continue), or what is shown here to be equivalent to it, the demand of the other, I wake up.

5. After all, a dream is only a dream. Those who now disdain it as a tool of analysis have found, as we have seen, safer and more direct ways of bringing the patient back to sound principles and normal desires – those that satisfy true needs. Which ones? Well, the needs everyone has. If that scares you, trust your analyst and climb the Eiffel Tower and see how beautiful Paris is. Too bad that there are those who step over the railings on the first floor, and precisely those whose needs have all been reduced to their proper measure. A negative therapeutic reaction, I would say.

Thank God, the refusal does not go that far in everyone! The symptom simply sprouts back like a weed – repetition compulsion.

But that, of course, is merely a misunderstanding: you are not cured because you remember. You remember because you are cured. Ever since this formula was discovered, the reproduction of symptoms is no longer a problem – only the reproduction of analysts. That of patients has been solved.

6. So a dream is only a dream. One psychoanalyst who dabbles in teaching has even written that it is a production of the ego. This proves that one runs no great risk in wanting to wake men from their dreams: here is one that is going on in broad daylight, and among those who hardly ever allow themselves to dream.

But even for them, if they are psychoanalysts, Freud on dreams must be read, because it is not possible otherwise either to understand what he means by

the neurotic's desire, by repressed, by unconscious, by interpretation, by analysis itself, or to approach his technique and his doctrine in any way at all. We shall see the resources of the little dream that I picked out earlier for our purposes.

For this desire of our witty hysteric (Freud's own description) – I mean her waking desire, her desire for caviar – is the desire of a fulfilled woman who precisely does not want to be so. For her butcher husband is adept at dotting the i's of the satisfactions that everyone needs, and he does not mince his words to a painter who is chatting him up, God knows with what end in view, on the subject of his interesting face: “Nuts! A piece of some pretty tramp's ass is what you need, and if you think I'm going to pay for it you can stick it you know where”.

There's a man a woman should have nothing to complain about, a genital character and one therefore, who no doubt sees to it that when he fucks his wife, she has no need to masturbate afterwards. Besides Freud does not hide the fact that she is very much in love with him, and teases him constantly.

But there you are, she does not want to be satisfied only at the level of her real needs. She wants other, gratuitous ones, and to be sure that they are so, not to satisfy them. This is why to the question, “What does the witty butcher's wife desire?”, we can reply, “Caviar”. But this reply is hopeless, because caviar is also what she does not want.

7. But that is not the whole of her mystery. Far from imprisoning her, this impasse gives her free access to the desires of all the witty hysterics in the world, whether butcher's wives or not.

This is what Freud grasps in one of those angular shots with which he surprises the true, shattering in passing these abstractions which positivist minds are so ready to see as an explanation for everything: here the imitation dear to Tarde. You have to bring into operation the mainspring of hysterical identification that he provides here. If our patient identifies with her friend it

is to what is inimitable in her in this unsatisfied desire for this Goddamned though not Godsmoked salmon!

Thus the patient's dream responds to her friend's demand which is to come and dine at her place. And we do not know what would make her want to do so - granted that you eat well there - if not the fact, which our butcher's wife never loses sight of, namely, that her husband always speaks well of her. But since she is thin, she is not really built to attract him, him with his taste for curves.

Has not he too, perhaps, got a desire that is thwarted, though everything in him is satisfied? It is the same mechanism which, in the dream, will make the desire of her friend bring about the failure of her demand.

For however precisely symbolised the demand may be by the accessory of the newly born telephone, it is all for nothing. The patient's call does not get through; a fine thing it would be to see the other get fatter so that her husband could feast himself on her.

But how can another woman be loved (is it not enough, for the patient to think that, that her husband respects her?) by a man who cannot be satisfied by her (he the man of the piece of ass)? This precisely brings into focus the question which is very generally that of hysterical identification.

8. This is the question that the subject becomes at this point. In this way the woman identifies herself to the man, and the slice of smoked salmon takes the place of the desire of the Other.

Since this desire is totally inadequate (how can one invite all these people with only one slice of smoked salmon?), I really must when all (and the dream) is said and done give up my desire to give a dinner (that is my search for the desire of the Other, which is the secret of my own). Everything has gone wrong, and you say that a dream is the fulfilment of a wish. How do you work that one out, professor?

For a long time now psychoanalysts have given up answering when challenged in this way, having ceased to question themselves about their patients' desires: they reduce them to their demands, which simplifies the task of converting them into their own. Is this not the reasonable way, and they have adopted it.

But sometimes desire is not so easily conjured away, because it is only too visible, planted at the centre of the stage like here at the love feast, a pretty fish, which it is enough to present as is done in restaurants under a fine gauze, for the raising of this veil to equal what happened was done at the end of the ancient mysteries.

To be the phallus, even if only a somewhat thin phallus. Do we not have here the final identification to the signifier of desire?

That does not seem to be self-evident for a woman, and there are those among us who prefer to have nothing more to do with these word-puzzles. Have we gone to the trouble of spelling out the role of the signifier only to find that we have on our hands the castration complex and penis envy, from which may God preserve us, since when Freud reached that particular cross, he no longer knew how to get out of it, seeing beyond it only the desert of analysis?

Yes, but he brought them that far, and it was a less infested place than transference neurosis, which reduces you to getting rid of the patient, and asking him to leave slowly so as to take his flies with him.

9. Let us nevertheless articulate what structures desire.

Desire is what manifests itself in the interval that demand hollows out on this side of itself, inasmuch as the subject in articulating the signifying chain, brings to light the lack of being with an appeal to receive its complement

from the Other, since the Other, the locus of the word, is also the locus of this lack.

What is thus given to the Other to fill, and what strictly he does not have, since he too lacks being, is what is called love, but it is also hate and ignorance.

It is also, as passions of being, what is evoked by any demand beyond the need that is articulated in it, and it is certainly what the subject remains all the more deprived of to the extent that the need articulated in the demand is satisfied.

What is more, the satisfaction of need appears here only as the lure in which the demand for love is crushed, by sending the subject back to sleep, where he haunts the limbo of being, by letting it speak in him. For the being of language is the non-being of objects, and the fact that desire was discovered by Freud in its place in the dream, from all time a scandal for all the efforts of thinking to situate itself in reality, should be lesson enough for us.

To be or not to be, to sleep, perchance to dream, even the so-called simplest dreams of the child (as “simple” as the analytic situation, no doubt) show simply miraculous or forbidden objects.

10. But the child does not always fall asleep in this way in the bosom of being, especially if the Other, who has her own ideas about his needs, interferes, and in place of what she does not have, stuffs him with the choking pap of what she has, namely, confuses her caring with the gift of her love.

It is the child who is fed with most love who refuses and plays with his refusal as with a desire (*anorexia nervosa*). A dimension where one grasps as nowhere else that hate pays love back in its own coin but where it is ignorance that is not forgiven.

When all is said and done, by refusing to satisfy the mother's demand, is not the child insisting that the mother should have a desire outside him, because this is the path that he lacks towards desire?

11. In fact one of the principles that flow from these premises is that:

- if desire is in effect in the subject through the condition that is imposed on him by the existence of discourse to make his need pass through the defiles of the signifier:

- if, on the other hand, as I have intimated above, by opening the dialectic of transference, we must ground the notion of the Other, with a capital O, as being the locus of the deployment of the word (the other scene, *ein andere Schauplatz*, that Freud speaks about in the *Traumdeutung*); it must be posited that, occurring only in an animal at the mercy of language, man's desire is the desire of the Other.

This is aimed at a quite different function to that of the primary identification evoked above, because it does not involve the assumption by the subject of the insignia of the other, but rather the condition that the subject has to find the structure constituting his desire in the same gap opened up by the effect of the signifiers in those who come to represent the Other for him, in so far as his demand is subjected to them.

Perhaps we can glimpse in passing the reason for this concealment-effect that caught our attention in the recognition of the desire of the dream. The desire of the dream is not assumed by the subject who says "I" when he speaks. Articulated nevertheless in the locus of the Other, it is discourse, a discourse whose grammar Freud began to state as such. This is why the wishes that it constitutes have no optative inflection to modify the indicative of the way they are formulated.

And so we can see by referring to linguistics that what is called the aspect of the verb is here that of the fulfilled (the true sense of *Wunscherfüllung*).

It is this ex-sistence (*Entstellung*)¹⁵ of desire in the dream that explains how the significance of the dream masks the desire in it, while its motive vanishes because it is simply problematic.

12. Desire is produced in the beyond of demand, in that, by articulating the life of the subject according to its conditions, it prunes away need from it, but it is also hollowed out beyond it in that as an unconditional demand for presence and absence, it evokes the lack of being under the three figures of the nothing that constitutes the basis of the demand for love, of the hate that even denies the being of the other, and of the unsayable element in what is unrecognised in its request. In this incarnate aporia, of which one might give the image that it borrow its heavy soul from the hardy shoots of the wounded tendency, and its subtile body from the death actualised in the signifying sequence, desire is affirmed as absolute condition.

Even less than the nothing that is transmitted in the round of meanings that stir up men, it is the inscribed furrow of the course, and it is, as it were, the branding of the signifier on the shoulder of the speaking subject. It is less pure passion for the signified than pure action of the signifier, which stops at the moment when the living being has become sign and renders it insignificant.

This moment of cutting is haunted by the form of a bloody scrap – the pound of flesh that life pays in order to turn it into the signifier of signifiers, impossible to restore, as such, to the imaginary body; it is the lost phallus of the embalmed Osiris.

13. The function of this signifier as such in the quest for desire is, as Freud spotted, the key to what we need to know in order to terminate our analyses: and no artifice can supply for it in achieving that end.

¹⁵ On this it must not be forgotten: that the term is used for the first time in the *Traumdeutung* on the subject of the dream, - that this use gives its sense and by the same token that of the term: distortion by which it is translated when the English apply it to the ego. A remark which allows us to judge the use that is made in France of the term *distorsion du Moi*, by which the lovers of ego strengthening, completely unaware of the

To give an idea of it, I will describe an incident that occurred at the end of the analysis of an obsessional, that is after a long labour in which I was not content to analyse the subject's aggressivity (in other words, to play on the drum of his imaginary aggressions), but in which he was made to recognise the place that he had taken up in the destructive influence exercised by one of his parents on the desire of the other. He guesses at his inability to desire without destroying the Other and hence his desire itself in so far as it is the desire of the Other.

To get to this point, he was shown how at every moment he manipulated the situation so as to protect the Other, by exhausting in the work of transference (*Durcharbeitung*) all the artifices of a verbalisation that distinguishes the other from the Other (small o and capital O), and which, from the box reserved for the boredom of the Other (capital O) made him arrange the circus acts between the two others (the small o and the ego, its shadow).

Undoubtedly, it is not enough to go around in circles in some well-explored area of obsessional neurosis to bring him to this roundabout, or to know the latter in order to bring him to it by a route that will never be the most direct. What is needed here is not simply the plan of a reconstructed labyrinth, or even a batch of plans already drawn up. What is needed above all is to possess the general combinatorial that governs their variety certainly, but which, even more usefully, accounts for the *tromp-oeil*, or rather shifts of perspective in the labyrinth. For there is no shortage of either one or the other in this obsessional neurosis, which is an architecture of contrasts – a fact that has not yet been sufficiently remarked on – which it is not enough to attribute to forms of façade. In the midst of so many seductive, insurgent, impassive attitudes, we must grasp the anxieties that are bound up with the achievements, the spite that does not exclude generosity (to think that that obsessionals lack oblativity!), the mental inconstancies that sustain

need to distrust the false friends that English words are (words, are they not, have such little importance), understand simply...a twisted ego.

unbreakable loyalties. All this moves together in an analysis, though not without localised flaws; nevertheless the great convoy remains.

And so our subject, at the end of his tether, comes to the point of playing on me a rather special three-card trick which reveals the structure of desire.

Let me say that being of mature years, as it is comically put, and with a mind shorn of illusions, he would have been quite ready to mislead me with his menopause in order to excuse his own impotence, and accuse me of the same.

In fact, redistributions of libido are not brought about without certain objects losing their post, even if it cannot be removed.

In short, he is impotent with his mistress, and having taken it into his head to use his discoveries about the function about the potential third person in the couple, he suggests that she sleep with another man, to see.

Now if she remains in the place in which the neurosis has installed her and if the analysis affects her there, it is because of the accord that no doubt she long ago reached with the patient's desires, but still more with the unconscious postulates they maintain.

And it will come as no surprise to learn that without delay, that very night, she has this dream, which, freshly minted, she reports to our discomfited patient.

She has a phallus, she feels its shape under her clothes, which does not prevent her from also having a vagina, nor above all from desiring this phallus to enter it.

On hearing this, our patient recovers his powers on the spot and demonstrates this brilliantly to his partner. What interpretation is indicated here?

You will have guessed from the demand that my patient made to his mistress that he had been trying for a long time to get me to admit to his repressed homosexuality.

This was an effect of his discovery of the unconscious that Freud was very quick to anticipate: among the regressive demands, one of the fables would be based on the truths spread by analysis. The analysis that came back from America exceeded his expectations.

But I remained, as you might imagine, somewhat difficult to persuade on this point.

Let us note that the dreamer is no more obliging, since her scenario excludes any coadjutor. This would guide even a novice who stuck to the text, if he were trained according to my principles.

Yet we are not analysing her dream, but its effect on my patient.

I would be changing my way of behaving if I got him to read in the dream this truth, less widespread for being historically my own contribution: that the refusal of castration, if there is anything like it, is first of all the refusal of the castration of the Other (initially, the mother).

True opinion is not science, and awareness without science is merely the complicity of ignorance. Our science is transmitted only by articulating what is particular in the situation.

Here the situation is unique because it shows the figure that I state in these terms; that unconscious desire is the desire of the Other – since the dream is constructed in order to satisfy the patient's desire beyond his demand, as is suggested by the fact that it succeeds in doing so. Even though not a dream of the patient it may be no less precious for us since, while not addressed to us as the analyst's would be, addresses him as well as the analyst could.

It is an opportunity to get the patient to grasp the function of signifier that the phallus has in his desire. Because it is as such that the phallus operates in the dream in order to enable him to recover the use of the organ that it represents, as I am going to show by the place that the dream is aimed at in the structure in which his desire is caught up.

Apart from what the woman dreamt, there is the fact that she tells him about it. If, in this discourse, she presents herself as having the phallus, is that the only way in which her erotic value is restored to her? Having a phallus, in effect, is not enough to restore her to an object-position that makes her appropriate to a phantasy by which our patient, as an obsessional, may be able to maintain his desire in an impossibility that preserves its metonymical conditions. These determine in his choices an escape mechanism that the analysis has disturbed, but which the woman restores here by a ruse, whose crudeness conceals a refinement well designed to illustrate the science included in the unconscious.

Because for our patient, it is no good having this phallus, since his desire is to be it. And the woman's desire here cedes it to his, by showing him what she does not have.

The usual sort of observation will always make much here of the news of a castrating mother, provided the anamnesis lends itself to it. As it happens, she looms large here.

People think then that everything is finished. But we will have nothing to do with it in the interpretation, where to invoke it would not take us very far, but only bring the patient back to the very point of threading his way between a desire and a contempt for it: assuredly the contempt of his shrewish mother in decrying the too ardent desire whose image his father bequeathed him.

But this would teach him less about it than what his mistress *says* to him: that in her dream having this phallus did not diminish her desire for it. So that it is her own lack of being that has been touched on.

A lack that is the result of an exodus: her being is always elsewhere. He has killed it off as one might say. Do we say this to justify the difficulty of the desire? It is rather that the desire is for difficulty.

We must not be misled, therefore, by this assurance that the subject receives from the fact that because the dreamer has a phallus, she will not have to take it from him – even if only to highlight fastidiously that such an assurance is too strong not to be fragile.

For that would be precisely to fail to recognise that this assurance would not require so much weight if it did not have to impress itself in a sign, and that it is by showing this sign as such, by making it appear where it cannot be, that it has its effect.

The condition of desire that particularly grabs the obsessional, is the very mark by which it is spoiled for him, in the origin of his object: contraband (*la contrebande*).

A singular type of grace since it appears only on the basis of a denial of nature. A favour is hidden here that for our subject is always in the waiting room. And it is by discharging her that one day he will let it enter.

14. The importance of preserving the place of desire in the direction of the treatment obliges us to orientate this place in relation to the effects of demand which at present are the only ones conceived of as being at the source of the power of the treatment.

That the genital act must, in effect, find its place in the unconscious articulation of desire is the discovery of analysis, and it is precisely because of this that in it no one has ever thought of yielding to the patient's illusion

that to facilitate his demand for the satisfaction of need would be of any help to him. (Still less to authorise him with the classic: *coitus normalis dosim repetatur*.)

Why do people think differently when they believe it to be essential for the progress of the treatment to operate in any way whatsoever on other demands, on the pretext that these are supposed to be regressive?

Let us start again from the fact that, it is first of all for the subject that his speech is a message, because it is produced in the locus of the Other. That by virtue of this fact even his demand comes from there and is signed and dated as such, is not only because it is subject to the code of the Other. It is also because it carries the date of this locus of the Other (and even its time).

This can be clearly seen in the most freely given word of the subject. To his wife or to his master, for them to receive his profession of faith, it is with a you are ... (one or the other) that he invokes them, without declaring what he is, other than by murmuring against himself an order to murder that the equivocation of French brings to the ear [*tu est, tuer*].

Desire, even though it always shows through demand as we can see here is nonetheless beyond it. It is also on the hither side of another demand in which the subject, reflected in the locus of the other, does not so much efface his dependence by a return agreement as fix the very being that he has just proposed there.

This means that it is only through a word that lifts the mark that the subject has brought to bear upon himself by his own proposition that he will receive the absolution that may bring him back to his desire.

But desire is nothing other than the impossibility of this word, which by replying to the first can only reduplicate its mark by completing the split (*Spaltung*) that the subject undergoes by virtue of being a subject only in so far as he speaks.

(This is symbolised by the oblique bar of noble bastardy which I attach to the S of the subject in order to indicate that he is that very subject: \$.) ¹⁶

The regression that is placed in the forefront in analysis (temporal regression no doubt, provided one specifies that it is a question of the phases of recollection) concerns only the signifiers (oral, anal, etc.) of demand, and involves the corresponding drive only through them.

To reduce this demand to its place may produce on desire an appearance of reduction by the alleviation of need.

But this is really only the effect of the analyst's heavy-handed approach. Because if the signifiers of demand have sustained the frustrations in which desire is fixed (Freud's *Fixierung*), it is because desire is subjectifying only in their place.

Whether it intends to frustrate or to gratify, any reply to demand in analysis, brings transference back to suggestion.

Freud's discovery is that there is a relation between transference and suggestion which is that transference is also a suggestion, but a suggestion that only operates starting from the demand for love, which is not the demand for any need. That this demand is only constituted as such only in so far as the subject is the subject of the signifier is what allows it to be misused by reducing it to the needs from which the signifiers have been borrowed, which is what psychoanalysts, as we see, do not fail to do.

But identification to the all powerful signifier of demand, of which we have already spoken, must not be confused with identification to the object of the demand for love. This is also a regression, as Freud insists, when he makes

¹⁶ Cf. The (\$ \diamond D) and the (\$ \diamond o) of my graph, taken up again here in the *Subversion of the subject*, p.817. The \diamond sign records the relations: envelopment-development-conjunction-disjunction. The liaisons that it signifies in these two parentheses allow there to be read S

of it the second mode of identification, which he distinguishes in his second topography in writing *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*. But it is a different kind of regression.

Here is the *exit* that enables us to get out of suggestion. The identification with the object as regression, because it starts from the demand for love, opens up the sequence of transference (opens up, not closes it), that is to say, the way by which the identifications that, in stopping this regression, punctuate it, can be exposed.

But this regression is no more dependent on the need in demand than sadistic desire is explained by anal demand, for to believe that a turd is in itself a noxious object is simply one of the ordinary lures of understanding. (“understanding” in the pejorative sense it has taken from Jaspers. “You understand:--“, an introductory phrase by which someone who has no understanding to communicate believes he can impose himself on someone who understands nothing.

But the demand to be a shit is something that makes it preferable to take things from another angle, when the subject finds himself in it. It is the misery of being, evoked above.

Anyone who cannot carry his training analyses to the tacking point at which it is proved with fear and trembling that all the demands that have been articulated in the analysis, and more than any other the original demand to become an analyst, which is now about to come to maturity, were merely transferences intended to maintain in place a desire that was unstable or dubious in its problematic – such a person knows nothing of what must be obtained from the subject for him to be able to assume the direction of an analysis, or even to make an appropriate interpretation in the course of it.

barred: S as fading in the cut of the demand; S as fading before the object of desire. In other words, specifically, the drive and phantasy.

These considerations confirm me in the belief that it is natural to analyse the transference. For the transference is itself, in itself, an analysis of suggestion, in so far as it places the subject with regard to his demand in a position that he holds only because of his desire. It is to maintain this framework of transference that frustration must prevail over gratification.

When the subject's resistance opposes suggestion, it is only a desire to maintain his desire. As such it would have to be placed in the ranks of the positive transference, since it is the desire that maintains the direction of the analysis, quite apart from the effects of demand.

As you see, these propositions are rather different from the received opinions on this matter. If they lead people to think that something has gone wrong somewhere, I will have succeeded in my aim.

15. This is the place for some remarks on the formation of symptoms. Freud ever since his study demonstrating such subjective as dreams, slips of the tongue and witticisms, which, he says quite categorically, are structurally identical to them (but, of course as far as our savants are concerned, all this falls too short of the experience they have acquired – and by what means! – for them even to consider returning to it) – Freud, then, stressed over and over again that symptoms are overdetermined. For the acolyte employed in the daily bragging that holds out the promise of a future reduction of analysis to its biological basis, this is obvious; it is so easy to say that he does not even hear it. So what?

Let us leave to one side my remarks on the fact that overdetermination is strictly speaking only conceivable within the structure of language. In neurotic symptoms what does that mean?

It means that interference will occur between the effects that correspond in a subject to a particular demand and the effects of a position in relation to the other (here his counterpart) that he sustains as subject.

‘That he sustains as subject’ means that language allows him to regard himself as the scene-shifter, or even the director of the entire imaginary capture of which he would otherwise be nothing more than the living marionette. Phantasy is the perfect illustration of this original possibility. That is why any attempt to reduce it to imagination, failing to admit its failure, is a permanent misconception, a misconception from which the Kleinian school which has certainly carried things very far here, is not free, because it has been incapable of even so much as suspecting the existence of the category of signifier.

However, once it is defined as an image set to work in the signifying structure, the notion of unconscious phantasy no longer presents any difficulty.

Let us say that in its fundamental use phantasy is that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing in so far as the very satisfaction of demand robs him of its object.

Oh these neurotics are so delicate! What can we do with them? They are incomprehensible, as one father put it.

But this is precisely what was said long ago, and has always been said, and analysts do not seem to have got any further. The simple-minded call it the irrational, since they have not even realised that Freud’s discovery is confirmed first by regarding it as certain that the real is rational – which, in itself, is enough to knock our exegete off balance – and then by affirming that the rational is real. As a result, he can articulate the fact that what presents itself as quite unreasonable in desire is an effect of the passage of the rational in so far as it is real, namely of language, into the real, in so far as the rational has already traced its circumvallations there.

For the paradox of desire is not the privilege of the neurotic; it is rather that he takes the existence of the paradox into account in his way of confronting it. This does not give him such a bad position in the order of human dignity,

and does no honour to mediocre analysts (this is not an assessment, but an ideal formulated in a wish, overtly expressed, of the interested parties) who on this point do not achieve the same dignity: a surprising distance that other ... analysts have always noted somewhat cryptically...though I do not know how they can be distinguished, since they would never have thought of doing it themselves if they have not first had to oppose the errors of the former.

16. It is therefore the position of the neurotic with regard to desire, let us say to abbreviate phantasy, that comes to mark by its presence the response of the subject to demand, in other words the meaning of his need.

But this phantasy has nothing to do with meaning with which it interferes. Indeed this meaning comes from the Other, in so far as it depends on it whether the demand is satisfied. But the phantasy arrives there only to find itself on the return journey of a wider circuit, a circuit that in carrying demand to the limits of being, makes the subject question himself as to the lack in which he appears to himself as desire.

It is incredible that certain features, which have nevertheless have always been obvious enough, of man's action as such should not have been illuminated here by analysis. I am talking about the way in which this action of man is a *geste* that finds support in his *chanson*. This aspect of exploit, of performance, of outcome strangled by symbol, what makes it symbolic therefore (but not in the alienating sense that this term denotes for the layman) the reason why one speaks of *passage à l'acte*, that Rubicon whose own desire is always concealed in history in favour of its success, everything to which the experience of what the analyst calls acting out, gives a quasi-experimental access, since he shares in its entire artifice, the analyst reduces at best to a relapse of the subject, at worst to a fault on the part of the therapist.

One is stupefied by this false shame displayed by the analyst in the face of action, one that no doubt conceals a true one: the one that he has about an action, his own, one of the highest, when it descends to abjection.

For what else, in fact, is it, when the analyst interposes himself in order to degrade the message of the transference that he is there to interpret, into a fallacious meaning of the real that is nothing more than mystification.

For the point at which the present day analyst claims to grasp the transference is the distance he defines between the phantasy and the so-called adapted response. But adapted to what if not to the demand of the Other, and how would this demand have greater or lesser consistency than the response obtained, if he did not believe that he was authorised to deny all value to the phantasy according to a measure that he takes by referring it to his own reality.

Here the very path by which he proceeds betrays him, when it is necessary for him to introduce himself into the phantasy by way of that path, and offer himself as an imaginary host to fictions in which a besotted desire proliferates – an unexpected Ulysses giving himself as food so that Circe's pigs may grow fat.

And let it not be said that I am defaming anyone, for it is the precise point at which those who cannot articulate otherwise their practice, are themselves sufficiently concerned to question what they are doing: are not phantasies the means by which we provide the subject with the gratification in which the analysis becomes bogged down? That is the question they repeat to themselves with the hopeless insistence of an unconscious torment.

17. Thus at best the present day analyst leaves his patient of purely imaginary identification in which the hysteric remains captive, because her phantasy implies being ensnared in it.

That is to say, at the very point from which Freud throughout the first part of his career, wished to extricate himself too quickly by forcing the appeal for love onto the object of identification (for Elizabeth von R..., her brother-in-law [5]; for Dora, Mr. K...; for the young homosexual woman in the case of female sexuality, he sees the problem more clearly, but errs when he regards himself as being aimed at in the real by the negative transference).

It was not until the chapter on 'identification' in *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*, that Freud clearly distinguished this third mode of identification that is conditioned by its function of sustaining desire and which is therefore specified by the indifference of its object.

But our psychoanalysts insist: this indifferent object is the substance of the object, eat my body, drink my blood (the profanatory reference is theirs). The mystery of the redemption of the analyst is to be found in this imaginary effusion, of which the analyst is the oblate.

How can the ego on which they claim to call for help here, not be affected by the reinforced alienation to which they lead the subject? Long before Freud came on the scene, psychologists knew, even if they did not express it in these terms, that if desire is the metonymy of the want to be, the ego is the metonymy of desire.

This is how the terminal identification, in which analysts take such pride, operates.

Whether, they are not sure, it is a question of the patient's ego or superego or rather, the case can be made, they do not care, but that with which the patient identifies is their strong ego.

Freud predicted this result very clearly in the article just quoted when he shows the role of ideal that the most insignificant object may assume in the genesis of the leader.

It is not in vain that psychoanalytic psychology is turning increasingly towards group psychology and even to the psychotherapy of that name.

Let us observe its effects in the analytic group itself. It is not true that so-called training analysers conform to the image of their analyst, at whatever level one wishes to examine it. It is rather among themselves that analysers of the same analyst share a common feature that may be quite secondary in the economy of each of them, but in which the inadequacy of the analyst with regard to his work is clearly marked.

Thus anyone for whom the problem of desire can be reduced to the lifting of the veil of fear, leaves wrapped in this shroud all those he has guided.

18. So we have now reached the cunning principle of this power that is always open to a blind direction. It is the power to do good, no power has any other end, and this is why power has no end. But it is a question here of something else, it is a question of truth, of the only one, of the truth about the effects of truth. As soon as Oedipus committed himself to this path, he had already renounced power.

Where then is the direction of the treatment going? Perhaps one would only have to question its means to define it correctly.

Let us remark:

- (1) That speech has all the powers in it, the special powers of the treatment;
- (2) That, according to the analytic rule, one is far from directing the subject towards full speech, or towards a coherent discourse, but that one leaves him free to have a go at it;
- (3) That this freedom is what he tolerates least easily;
- (4) That demand is properly what is put in parenthesis in analysis, since it is ruled out that the analyst should satisfy any one of them;
- (5) That since no obstacle is put in the way of the avowal of desire, it is towards this avowal that the subject is directed, even channelled;

(6) That the resistance to this avowal can in the last analysis only be the result of the incompatibility between desire and speech.

Propositions that some people, even among my usual listeners, may still be astonished to find in my discourse.

You sense here the terrible temptation it must be for the analyst to respond however little to demand.

Furthermore how can the analyst prevent the subject from attributing this response to him, in the form of the demand to cure, and in accordance with the horizon of a discourse that he imputes to him with all the more reason in that our authority, for no good reason has assumed it.

Who will now disencumber us from this tunic of Nessus that we have woven for ourselves: analysis responds to all the desiderata of demand, according to well advertised norms? Who will sweep away this pile of dung from the Augean stables that constitute psychoanalytic literature?

What silence must the analyst now impose upon himself if he is to disengage rising above this bog the raised finger of Leonardo's *St John*, if interpretation is to rediscover the uninhabited horizon of being in which its elusive virtue must be deployed.

19. Since it is a question of taking desire, and it can only be taken letter by letter, since it is the nets of the letter that determine, overdetermine its place as a bird of paradise, how can we fail to demand that the fowler should first of all be lettered?

Which of us, other than a professor of literature at Zurich who has begun to spell it out, has attempted to articulate the importance of the literary element in Freud's work?

This is merely an indication. Let us go further. Let us question what should be the case of the analyst (of the analyst's 'being'), as far as his own desire is concerned.

Who would be so naive as to continue to see Freud as the Viennese bourgeois of regular habits who so astonished Andre Breton by his utter lack of any trace of the Moenades? Now that we have nothing but his work will we not recognise in it a river of fire which owes nothing to Francois Mauriac's artificial river?

Who was more able than he, in avowing his dreams, to spin the thread on which there slides the ring that binds us to being, and makes glow between the closed hands which pass along the game of hunt-the-slipper of human passion, its brief flash?

Who has growled as much as this office-bound man against the takeover of enjoyment by those who load the burdens of need onto others' shoulders?

Who more fearlessly than this clinician, so firmly tied to mundane suffering, has questioned life to its meaning and not to say that it has none, a convenient way of washing one's hands of it, but to say that it has only one in which desire is borne by death?

A man of desire, of a desire that he followed against his inclination into ways in which he looked at himself reflected in feeling, domination and knowledge, but whose unparalleled signifier he, unaided, succeeded in unveiling like an initiate at the defunct mysteries: this phallus of which the receiving and the giving are equally impossible for the neurotic whether he knows that the Other does not have it, or that he has it, because in either case his desire is elsewhere: is to be it, and that man, whether male or female, must accept having it and not having it, on the basis of the discovery that he is not it.

Here there is inscribed that final *Spaltung* by which the subject articulates himself in the Logos, and on which Freud was beginning to write [12], giving us, at the ultimate point of an oeuvre that has the dimensions of being, the solution of ‘infinite’ analysis, when his death applied to it the word Nothing.

Note and References

This report is an extract from my teaching. My address at the Congress and the responses it received put it in context. I presented at it a graph that precisely articulates the directions proposed here for the field of analysis and its handling. I give here, classified in alphabetical order by author, the references to which my text refers by the numbers in brackets.

I am using the following abbreviations:

G.W. *Gesammelte Werke*, by Freud; published by Imago Publishing, London. The Roman numerals indicate the volume.

S.E. *The Standard Edition* of their English translation, published by Hogarth Press, London.

Same remark

I.J.P. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.

P.Q. *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*.

P.D.A.- a work entitled: *La Psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui*

[*Psychoanalysis today*] published by P.U.F., to which I refer to only because

of the naive simplicity with which it presents the tendency in psychoanalysis to degrade the direction of the treatment and the principles of its power. A work for outside consumption no doubt, but also an obstruction inside. Therefore I will not quote the authors, who make no properly scientific contribution in it.

- [1] Abraham (Karl), "Die psychosexuellen Differenzen der Hysterie und der Dementia praecox" (1st International Congress of Psychoanalysis, Salzburg, 26 April 1908), *Centralblatt für Nervenheilkunde und Psychiatrie*, Neue Folge, Bd. 19: 521—33, and in *Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse* (Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich: Int. Psych. Verlag, 1921); "The Psycho-Sexual Differences between Hysteria and Dementia Praecox," *Papers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1927): 64-79.
- [2] Devereux, Georges, "Some Criteria for the Timing of Confrontations and Interpretations," *JLP* XXXII, 1 (1951): 19-24.
- [3] Ferenczi, Sandor, "Introjektion und Übertragung," 1909, *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische Forschungen* I: 422—57; "Introjection and Transference." *Sex in Psycho-Analysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1952): 35-93.
- [4] Freud, Anna, *Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen*, Chapter IV. *Die Abwehrmechanismen.* See *Versuch einer Chronologie*, 60—63 Intern, psychoanal. Verlag, 1936); *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (London: Hogarth Press, 1937); (New York: International Universities Press, 1946).
- [5] Freud, Sigmund, *Studien über Hysterie* (1895), *GW I*; For the case of Elisabeth von R., see pages 196-251 and especially 125-27; *Studies on Hysteria* *SE II* 158-60.
- [6] Freud, Sigmund, *Die Traumdeutung* (1900), *GW II-III*. See, in *Ch IV* "Die Traumstellung," pages 152—56, 157, and 163—68; "Kern unseres Wesens," 609; *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *SE IV*, Chap. IV, "Distortion in Dreams," 146-50, 151, 157-62, and Chap. VII, 603.
- [7] Freud, Sigmund, "Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse (Dora)," finished on January 24, 1901 (see letter 140 in *Aus den Anfängen*, the correspondence with Fliess published in London); 'A Case of Hysteria,' *SE VII*, 35-36.
- [8] Freud, Sigmund, "Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose" (1909), *GW VII*. See, in section l.d, "Die Einführung ins Verständnis der Kur: 402—4, and the notes on pages 404—5; in section l(f) Die Krankheitsveranlassung," namely, Freud's decisive interpretation, on what I would translate as: the subject of the illness; and l. g, "Der Vaterkomplex und die Lösung der Rattenidee," 417—38; "Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," *SE X*. See, section l.d, "Initiation into the Nature of the Treatment," 178—81 and the footnote on 181; and sections l.f, "The Precipitating Cause of the Illness," and l.g, "The Father Complex and the Solution of the rat idea," 195-220.
- [9] Freud, Sigmund, *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1920), *GW XXIII*; see, if it is still necessary, pages 11—14 of Chapter II; *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, *SE XVIII*, 14-16.
- [10] Freud, Sigmund, *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse* (1921), *GW XIII*. Chapter VII, "Die Identifizierung," especially pages 116—18; *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, *SE XVIII*, 106—8.
- [11] Freud, Sigmund, "Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse" (1937), *GW XVI*, 59—99, translated into French as "*Analyse terminée (!) et analyse interminable (!!)*" (my exclamation marks concern the standards

employed in the translation into French of Freud's works. I am mentioning this one because, according *GW* XVI which came out in 1950, it does not exist; see page 280), in *RFP* XI, 1 (1939): p 3-38.

[12] Freud, Sigmund, "Die Ichspaltung im Abwehrvorgang," *GW.XVII*, "Schriften aus dem Nachlass," 58—62. Manuscript dated January 2, 1938 (unfinished); "Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive Process," *Collected Papers* v. 372-75.

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[14] Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, their team contributions in *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* since 1946.

[15] Kris, Ernst, "Ego Psychology and Interpretation in Psychoanalytic therapy," *PQ* XX, 1 (1951): p.21-25. [16] Lacan, Jacques, My Rome report, 26-27 September 1953. *Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse*, in *La Psychanalyse* vol. 1 (P.U.F.), cf p.237

[17] Lacan, Jacques, *L'instance de la lettre dans l'inconscient ou la raison depuis Freud*, May 9, 1957, *La Psychanalyse* vol. 3 (1957), 47-81; cf p. 493

[18] Lagache, Daniel, "Le problème du transfert" (Report to the 14th Conference des Psychanalystes de Langue française. November 1, 1951), *RFP*, XVI, 1-2 (1952): 5-115.

[19] Leclaire, Serge, "A la recherche des principes d'une psychothérapie des psychoses" (Bonneval Congress, April 15, 1957), *L'Evolution psychiatrique, 1958, fasc.2*, 377-419.

[20] Macalpine, Ida, "The Development of the Transference," *PQ XIX** no. 4 Oct.1950: 500-39, especially p 502-8 and p. 522-28.

[21] *PDA*, p. 51—52 (on "pregenitals" and "genitals"), passim (on the strengthening of the ego and its method), p.102 (on distance from the object, principle of a method of treatment)

[22] *PDA*: see successively p. 133 (emotional reeducation), and p.133 (the *PDA's* opposition to Freud on the primordial importance of the two-person relation), p.132 (on the cure "from the inside"), p.135 (what is important... is not so much what the analyst says or does as what he is), p.136, etc., passim, and also p.162 (on saying goodbye at the end of the treatment), and p.149 (on dreams)

[23] R.L., "Perversion sexuelle transitoire au cours d'un traitement psychanalytique", *Bulletin d'activités de l'Association des Psychanalystes de Belgique* 25, p.1—17 (118, rue Froissart, Brussels).

[24] Sharpe, Ella, "The Technique of Psychoanalysis," *Collected Papers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1950). See pages 81 (on the need to justify one's existence); 12—14 (on the knowledge and techniques required of the analyst).

[25] Schmideberg, Melitta, "Intellektuelle Hemmung und Ess-störung," *Zeitschrift für psa. Pädagogik* VIII (1934).

[26] Williams, J. D., *The Compleat Strategyst*, The Rand Series, McGraw Hill, New York, Toronto, London.

[27] Winnicott, D. W., "Transitional objects and transitional phenomena," in *IJP*, XXXIV, 1953: 29-97.

