

men used to make fun of by asking her if they might come and spend the night with her. — "Something further, about the tenor." — He had pestered her, too; at the rehearsal he had put his hand on her breast. — "Through your clothes or on the bare skin?" — At first she said the latter, but then took it back: she had been in outdoor clothes. — "Well, what more?" — Everything about this relationship, all the hugging and kissing among the players had been abhorrent to her. — "Anything else?" — Once again the manager's brusqueness, and she had only stayed there a few days. — "Was the tenor's assault made on the same day as your attack?" — No; she did not know if it had been earlier or later. — My inquiries with the help of pressure showed that the assault had been on the fourth day of her stay and her attack on the sixth.

Interrupted by the patient's flight.

1. Freud uses the plural.
2. The *seguidilla* from Act 1 of Bizet's opera.
3. Cherubino's *canzonetta* from Act 2 of Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro*:
 You who know what love is,
 Tell me if that is what burns my heart.
4. See note 1 to letter of February 4, 1888.

January 1, 1896

My dear Wilhelm,

The first leisure time in the New Year belongs to you — to clasp your hand across these few kilometers and to tell you how glad I was to have your recent news from the family room and study. That you have a son — and with him the prospect of other children; as long as the hope for him was still a distant one, I did not want to admit either to you or to myself what you would have missed. Your kind should not die out, my dear friend; the rest of us need people like you too much. How much I owe you: solace, understanding, stimulation in my loneliness, meaning to my life that I gained through you, and finally even health that no one else could have given back to me. It is primarily through your example that intellectually I gained the strength to trust my judgment, even when I am left alone — though not by you — and, like you, to face with lofty humility all the difficulties that the future may bring. For all that, accept my humble thanks! I know that you do not need me as much as I need you, but I also know that I have a secure place in your affection.

Even if you had not said so explicitly, I would have noticed that

your confidence in your therapy was finally borne out in your own case as well. Your letters, as again the last one, contain a wealth of scientific insights and intuitions, to which I unfortunately can say no more than that they grip and overpower me. The thought that both of us are occupied with the same kind of work is by far the most enjoyable one I can conceive at present. I see how, via the detour of medical practice, you are reaching your first ideal of understanding human beings as a physiologist, just as I most secretly nourish the hope of arriving, via these same paths, at my initial goal of philosophy. For that is what I wanted originally, when it was not yet at all clear to me to what end I was in the world. During the last weeks I repeatedly tried to give you *something* in return for your communications, by sending you a short summary of my most recent insights into the neuroses of defense, but my capacity to think so exhausted itself in the spring that now I can accomplish nothing. Nevertheless, I have prevailed upon myself to send you the fragment. A gentle voice has counseled me to postpone the account of hysteria since there are still too many uncertainties in it. You probably will be satisfied with the obsessional [neurosis]. The few notes on paranoia come from a recently started analysis which has already established beyond any doubt that *paranoia really is a neurosis of defense*. Whether this explanation also has therapeutic value remains to be seen.

Your remarks on migraine have led me to an idea, as a consequence of which all my $\phi\psi\omega$ theories would need to be completely revised — something I cannot venture to do now. I shall try to give you some idea of it, however.

I begin with the two kinds of nerve endings. The free ones receive only quantity and conduct it to ψ by summation; they have no power, however, to evoke sensation — that is, to affect ω . In this connection the neuronal motion retains its genuine and monotonous qualitative characteristics. These are the paths for all the quantity that fills ψ ; also, of course, the paths for sexual energy. The nerve paths which start from end organs conduct not quantity but the qualitative characteristic peculiar to them; they add nothing to the amount in the ψ neurones, but merely put these neurones into a state of excitation. The ω neurones are those ψ neurones which are capable of only very little quantitative cathexis. The coincidence between these minimal quantities and the quality faithfully transferred to them from the end organ is once more the necessary condition for the generating of consciousness. I now [in my new scheme] insert these ω neurones between the ϕ neurones and the ψ neurones, so that ϕ transfers its quality to ω , and ω now transfers neither

quality nor quantity to ψ but merely excites ψ — that is, indicates the pathways to be taken by the free ψ energy. (I don't know whether you can understand this gibberish. There are, so to speak, three ways in which the neurones affect each other: (1) they transfer quantity to one another, (2) they transfer quality to one another, (3) they have an exciting effect on one another in accordance with certain rules.)

According to this view the perceptual processes would *eo ipso* [from their very nature] involve consciousness and would only produce their further psych[ic] effects after becoming conscious. The ψ processes themselves would be unconscious and would only subsequently acquire a secondary, artificial consciousness through being linked with processes of discharge and perception (speech association). Any ω discharge, which my other account required, now becomes unnecessary; hallucination, the explanation of which always raised difficulties, is now no longer a backward movement of excitation to ϕ , but only to ω . It is much easier today to understand the rule of defense, which does not apply to perceptions but only to ψ processes. The fact that secondary consciousness lags behind makes it possible to give a simple description of the processes of neuroses. I am also relieved of the troublesome question of how much of the strength of ϕ excitation (of sensory stimuli) is transferred to ψ neurones. The answer is — none at all, directly. The Q in ψ depends only on how far the free ψ attention is directed by the ω neurones.

The new hypothesis also fits better with the fact that the objective sensory stimuli are so minimal that it is hard to derive the force of the will from that source in accordance with the principle of constancy. Sensation, however, [in the new theory] brings no Q at all to ψ ; the source of ψ energy is the [endogenous] organic paths of conduction.

I also see the explanation of the release of unpleasure, which I need for repression in the sexual neuroses, in the conflict between the purely quantitative organic conduction and the processes *excited* in ψ by conscious sensation.

As regards *your* side of the question, the possibility arises that states of stimulation may occur in organs which produce no spontaneous sensation (though they must no doubt exhibit susceptibility to pressure), but which can by reflex action (that is, through the influence of equilibrium) instigate disturbances arising from other nerve centers. For the thought of there being a reciprocal binding of the neurones or of the nerve centers also suggests that the motor symptoms of discharge are of various kinds. Voluntary actions are

probably determined by a transference of Q, since they discharge psychic tension. In addition to this there is a discharge of pleasure, spasms, and the like, which I explain, not by Q's being transferred to the motor center but by its being liberated there because the binding Q in the sensory center coupled with it may have diminished. This would give us the long-sought-for distinction between "voluntary" and "spastic" movements, and at the same time a means of explaining a group of subsidiary somatic effects — in hysteria, for instance.

With respect to the purely quantitative processes of transference to ψ , there is a possibility of their attracting consciousness to themselves — if, that is to say, such conductions of Q fulfill the conditions necessary for producing pain. Of those conditions the essential one is probably the suspension of summation and a continuous afflux [of Q] to ψ for a time. Certain ω neurones then become *hypercathected* and produce a feeling of unpleasure, and they also cause attention to be fixed at that point. Thus "neuralgic change" would have to be regarded as an afflux of Q from some organ augmented beyond a certain limit till summation is suspended, the two ω neurones *hypercathected*, and free ψ energy bound. As you see, we have on the way arrived at migraine; the necessary precondition would be the existence of nasal regions in that state of stimulation which you recognized with your naked eye. The surplus of Q would be distributed along various subcortical paths before reaching ψ . Once this has happened, a continuous Q forces its way into ψ and, in accordance with the rule of attention, the free ψ energy flows to the seat of the eruption.

The question of the source of the states of stimulation in the nasal organs now arises. The idea suggests itself that the qualitative organ for olfactory stimuli may be Schneider's membrane and the quantitative organ (distinct from this) may be the *corpora cavernosa*. Olfactory substances — as, indeed, you yourself believe, and as we know from flowers — are breakdown products of the sexual metabolism; they would act as stimuli on both these organs. During menstruation and other sexual processes the body produces an increased Q of these substances and therefore of these stimuli. It would have to be decided whether these act on the nasal organs through the expiratory air or through the blood vessels; probably the latter, since one has no subjective sensation of smell before migraine. Thus the nose would, as it were, receive information about *internal* olfactory stimuli by means of the *corpora cavernosa*, just as it does about external stimuli by Schneider's membrane: one would come to grief from one's own body. The two ways of acquiring migraine —

spontaneously and through smells, or human toxic emanations — would thus be equivalent, and their effects could at any time be brought about by summation.

Thus the swelling of the nasal organs of quantity would be a kind of adaptation of the sense organ resulting from increased internal stimulation, analogous in the case of the true (qualitative) sense organs to opening the eyes wide and focusing them, straining the ears, and so on.

It would not be too hard, perhaps, to transfer this conception to the other sources of migraine and similar conditions, though I cannot yet see how it is to be done. In any case, it is more important to test the idea in relation to the main topic.

In this way a whole number of obscure and ancient medical ideas would acquire life and value.

Enough now! Best wishes for 1896 and let me know very soon how mother and child are. You can imagine how greatly Martha is interested in everything.

Your
Sigmund

Draft K. The Neuroses of Defense
(A Christmas Fairy Tale)

[enclosed with letter]

There are four types of these and many forms. I can only make a comparison between hysteria, obsessional neurosis, and one form of paranoia. They have various things in common. They are pathological aberrations of normal psychic affective states: of *conflict* (hysteria), of *self-reproach* (obsessional neurosis), of *mortification* (paranoia), of *mourning* (acute hallucinatory amentia). They differ from these affects in that they do not lead to anything's being settled, but to permanent damage to the ego. They come about subject to the same precipitating causes as their affective prototypes, provided that the cause fulfills two more preconditions — that it is of a sexual kind and that it occurs during the period before sexual maturity (the preconditions of *sexuality and infantilism*). About preconditions applying to the individual concerned I have no fresh knowledge. In general, I should say that heredity is a further precondition, in that it facilitates and increases the pathological effect' — the precondition, that is, that principally makes possible the gradations

between the normal and the extreme case. I do not believe that heredity determines the choice of the particular defensive neurosis.

There is a normal trend toward defense — that is, an aversion to directing psychic energy in such a way that unpleasure results. This trend, linked to the most fundamental conditions of the psychic mechanism (the law of constancy), cannot be employed against perceptions, for these are able to compel attention (as is evidenced by their consciousness); it only comes in question against memories and thoughts. It is innocuous where it is a matter of ideas to which unpleasure was at one time attached, but which are unable to acquire any contemporary unpleasure (other than that which is remembered), and in such cases too it can be overridden by psychic interest.

The trend toward defense becomes detrimental, however, if it is directed against ideas which are also able, in the form of memories, to release fresh unpleasure — as is the case with sexual ideas. Here, indeed, is the one possibility realized of a memory's having a greater releasing power than was produced by the experience corresponding to it. Only one thing is necessary for this: that puberty should be interpolated between the experience and its repetition in memory — an event which thus strongly increases the effect of the revival. The psychic mechanism seems unprepared for this exception, and it is for that reason a necessary precondition of freedom from neuroses of defense that no substantial sexual irritation should occur before puberty, though it is true that the effect of such an experience must be increased by hereditary disposition before it can reach a level capable of causing illness.

(Here a subsidiary problem branches off: how then does it come about that under analogous conditions, perversion or simple immorality emerges instead of neurosis?)

We shall be plunged deep into psychological riddles if we inquire into the origin of the unpleasure which seems to be released by premature sexual stimulation and without which, after all, a repression cannot be explained. The most plausible answer will appeal to the fact that shame and morality are the repressing forces and that the neighborhood in which the sexual organs are naturally placed must inevitably arouse disgust during sexual experiences. Where there is no shame (as in a male person), or where no morality comes about (as in the lower classes of society), or where disgust is blunted by the conditions of life (as in the country), there too no repression and therefore no neurosis will result from sexual stimulation in infancy. I fear, nevertheless, that this explanation will not stand up