

similar, but much weaker and more transitory attack with the same feelings. (From this I saw that the path leading down to the deeper layers of her mind lay through her memory-image of the orgasm itself.) We now investigated this earlier scene. At that time—four years back—she had had an engagement at Ratisbon. In the morning she had sung at a rehearsal and given satisfaction. In the afternoon, at home, she had had a “vision”—as if there were something between her (a row) and the tenor of the company and another man, and afterwards she had had the attack, with the fear that she was going mad.

Here then, was a Scene II which had been touched on by association in Scene I. But once again the memory clearly had gaps in it. There must have been still further ideas present, to account for the release of sexual feeling and flight. I enquired for these intermediate links, but instead I was given her motivations. She had disliked the whole of life on the stage.—Why?—The brusqueness of the manager and the actors’ relations to one another.—I asked for details of this.—There had been a comic old woman, and the young men had amused themselves by asking her if they might come and spend the night with her.—I asked for something further, about the tenor.—*He* had pestered her as well; at the rehearsal he had put his hand on her breast. Through her clothes or on her bare skin?—She began to say the latter, but then took it back; she had been in outdoor clothes.—Well, what else?—The whole character of their relations—she had found all the embracing and kissing between the actors frightful.—Yes?—Once again the manager’s brusqueness; moreover she had only stayed a few days.—Was the tenor’s assault made on the same day as your attack?—No; she did not know whether it was earlier or later.—The procedure by pressure showed that the assault had been on the fourth day of her stay and her attack on the sixth day.

Interrupted by the patient’s flight.

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I. I. 96.

My dear Wilhelm,

The first leisure of the new year belongs to you—to shake your hand across the few kilometres between us, and to tell you

how glad I was to hear both your family news and the news about your work. I am delighted that you have a son,¹ and with him the hope of other children. While the prospect was still distant I did not want either of us to have to admit what you would have missed. . . .

Your letters, such as the last for instance, contain a wealth of scientific penetration and imagination about which all I can say, unfortunately, is that I am fascinated and overwhelmed. The thought that we should both be busy with the same work is the happiest that I could have just now. I see that you are using the circuitous route of medicine to attain your first ideal, the physiological understanding of man, while I secretly nurse the hope of arriving by the same route at my own original objective, philosophy. For that was my original ambition, before I knew what I was intended to do in the world. During the last few weeks I have tried repeatedly to summarize my latest findings about the defence neuroses for you, as some recompense for what you have sent me, but my thinking capacity was so exhausted last spring that now I cannot do anything. But I shall pull myself together and send you the fragment.² A still, small voice has warned me again to postpone the description of hysteria—it contains too much uncertainty. You will probably be pleased with the obsessional neurosis. The few remarks on paranoia arise from a recently begun analysis which has already established beyond doubt that *paranoia is really a defence neurosis*. Whether this explanation has therapeutic value remains to be seen.

Your remarks on migraine³ have led me to an idea which would result in a complete revision of all my $\varphi\psi\omega$ theories, on which I cannot venture now. I shall try to indicate it, however.⁴

I start off from the two species of nerve-endings. The free nerve-endings receive only quantity and conduct it to ψ by

¹ Robert Wilhelm.

² See the following Draft K (p. 146), part of which is identical with the paper “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence.” (1896 b).

³ These have not survived.

⁴ The following refers to the “Project”, p

summation; [Cf. "Project", p. 377-8] they have no power, however, to evoke sensation—that is, to affect ω . In this connection the neuronics retain their genuine character of being monotonous in quality. [*Ibid.*, pp. 371-2]. These are the pathways for all the quantity that fills ψ , including sexual energy, of course.

The nerve-paths which start from terminal organs do not conduct quantity but their particular qualitative characteristic. They add nothing to the sum [of quantity] in the Ψ -neurons, but merely put these neurons into a state of excitation. The perceptual neurons (ω) are those Ψ -neurons which are capable of only a very small quantitative cathexis. The necessary condition for the generation of consciousness is the coincidence of these minimal quantities with the quality which is faithfully transferred to them from the terminal organ. In my new scheme I insert these perceptual neurons (ω) between the Φ -neurons and the Ψ -neurons; so that Φ transfers its quality to ω , and ω transfers neither quality nor quantity to Ψ , but merely excites Ψ —that is, indicates the direction to be taken by the free psychical energy [of attention]. (I do not know if you can make out this double Dutch. There are, as it were, three ways in which neurons can affect one another: (1) they can transfer quantity to one another; (2) they can transfer quality to one another; (3) they can, in accordance with certain rules, have an exciting effect on one another.)

On this view, perceptual processes would *eo ipso* [from their very nature] involve consciousness, and would only produce further psychical effects *after* becoming conscious. The Ψ -processes would in themselves be unconscious, and would only subsequently acquire a secondary, artificial consciousness by being linked with processes of discharge and perception (with speech-associations). A discharge from ω which I had to assume in my other account, now becomes unnecessary. Hallucinations, which were always hard to explain, are no longer a retrogression of excitation to Φ , but only to ω . It is now far easier to understand the rule of defence, which does not apply to perceptions but only to Ψ -processes. The fact that secondary consciousness lags

behind makes it possible to give a simple account of the processes in neuroses. I am also relieved of the troublesome problem of how much of the strength of Φ -excitations (sensory stimuli) is transferred to Ψ -neurons. The answer is: none at all, directly; the quantity (Q) in Ψ depends only on how far free Ψ -attention is directed by the perceptual neurons (ω_N).

The new hypothesis also fits in better with the fact of objective sensory stimuli being of such minimal size that it is difficult to derive the force of the will from that source in accordance with the principle of constancy. We now see, however, that sensation brings no quantity (Q) whatever to Ψ , and that the source of Ψ -energy is derived from the [endogenous] organic paths of conduction.

I also find an explanation of the release of unpleasure, which I require for the purpose of repression in the sexual neuroses, in the conflict between the purely quantitative organic conduction and the processes that are *excited* in Ψ by conscious sensations.

As regards *your* side of the question, the possibility arises that states of stimulation may occur in organs which produce no *spontaneous* sensations (though they must no doubt exhibit susceptibility to pressure), but which can be excited in a reflex manner (that is, through the effect of equilibrium) by disturbances arising from other neuronics centres. For the notion of there being a mutual "binding" between neurons or neuronics centres also makes it likely that the symptoms of motor discharge are of very different kinds.¹ Voluntary actions are probably determined by a transference of quantity (Q), since they discharge psychical tension. But on the other hand there are pleasurable discharges, convulsive movements and so on, which I explain by supposing that what is happening is not that quantity is being *transferred* to the motor centre but that it is being

¹ These modifications of the views stated in the "Project" deserve attention as they are a reformulation of the difference between perceptual stimuli and internal stimuli; they prepare the way to the contrast between conscious and unconscious (but not repressed) mental processes and thus point in the direction of the conception of the structure of the mind at which Freud arrived in later years. Their immediate development is to be seen in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*: the conception of hallucination hinted at here is repeated in it practically unaltered.

liberated in that centre because the binding quantity (Q) in the sensory centre coupled to it may have diminished. This would give us the distinction of which we have so long been in search between “voluntary” movements and “spastic” ones, and at the same time would afford a means of explaining a group of subsidiary somatic effects—in hysteria, for instance.

It is possible for the purely quantitative processes of transference to Ψ to attract consciousness to themselves; if, namely, they fulfil the conditions necessary for producing pain. Of these conditions the essential one is probably the suspension of the process of summation and a continuous influx [of quantity] into Ψ lasting for some length of time. Some of the perceptual neurones then become hypercathected, produce a feeling of un-pleasure, and also cause attention to be riveted on this particular spot. Thus “neuralgic changes” would have to be regarded as due to an influx of quantity from some organ being augmented beyond a certain limit, so that summation is suspended, the perceptual neurones are hypercathected and free Ψ energy becomes riveted. As you see, we have arrived at migraine; its determining condition would be the existence in nasal regions of the state of stimulation which was detected by your naked eye. The surplus of quantity would spread out along various sub-cortical paths before reaching Ψ . When this has once happened, what is now a continuous flow of quantity (Q) forces its way into Ψ and, in accordance with the rule of attention [p. 417], the free Ψ -energy streams to the seat of the eruption.

The question now arises as to the source of the state of stimulation in the nasal organ.¹ The idea suggests itself that the *qualitative* organ for olfactory stimuli may be the Schneiderian membrane and that their disconnected *quantitative* organ may be the *corpora cavernosa*. Olfactory substances, as, indeed, you yourself believe, and as we learn from flowers, are disintegrated products of the sexual metabolism; they would act as stimuli upon both these organs. At times of menstruation and of other

¹ Freud obviously wrote the following passage in the hope of building a bridge between Fliess's field and his own. The ideas it contains played no part in the further development of Freud's theories.

sexual processes the body produces an increased number of these substances and therefore of these stimuli. It would have to be decided whether they act on the nasal organ by means of the expiratory air or through the blood-stream; probably the latter since one has no subjective sensation of smell before the migraine. Accordingly, the nose would, as it were, receive information about *internal* olfactory stimuli through the *corpora cavernosa*, just as it does about *external* stimuli by means of the Schneiderian membrane; it could thus come to grief as a result of the products of the subject's own body. These two ways of developing migraine—spontaneously and by smells, poisonous emanations from human bodies, would thus be on a par with each other, and could at any time provide complementary summation in bringing about their effects.

Thus the swelling of the nasal organs of quantity would be a kind of adaptation of the sense organ as a result of increased internal stimulation, analogous in the case of the adaptation of the true (qualitative) sense organs to opening the eyes wide, focusing, straining the ears, etc.

It would not be too hard, perhaps, to adapt this view to the other sources of migraine and to similar conditions, though I cannot yet see how it is to be done. In any case it is more important to test it in relation to the main topic.¹

By this means a number of obscure and ancient medical ideas acquire life and importance. . . .

That is enough for now. Best wishes for 1896, and let me know soon how mother and child are. You can imagine how greatly all that interests Martha.

Your

Sigm.

¹ See Freud's discussion of migraine, p. 116.