

FEMININE POSITIONS OF BEING

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Freud and the clinic of perversions

*A Child is Being Beaten*¹ (Endnote 1¹) is a date in the psychoanalytic clinic of perversions, being the article in which Freud for the first time demonstrates that the perversions are not deducible from drive functioning but are organised by Oedipal structure. Until then, including the 1915 additions to *The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*ⁱⁱ, Freud had followed the famous classifiers of the clinic of perversion — and firstly Krafft-Ebing who in ten years, from 1890 to 1900, had classified the perversions in a nosography that is still used and which inspired Freud when writing his *Three Essays*. The notions of voyeurism, of exhibitionism, of sadism, of masochism are collected and organised by Krafft-Ebing who finishes off his nosographical project within the space of time in which the clinic of psychosis is produced. The person who occupied the chair in Vienna at the same time as Kraepelin did in Munich applied himself to produce this exhaustive description. The thesis was that the pervert is a subject who cannot master his drives, who is dominated by his drives, who very quickly deviates from good sense — which is originally what ‘perversion’ means. There is correct meaning, then the inversions when one makes the opposite object-choice, the perversions when the aim goes astray. The sexual instinct is classified: the asthenics who no longer have a sexual instinct, they are lost to science, as it were, there being nothing left to extract; there are the genital types, too asthenic, they have to be calmed, which gives rise to all the projects which have in any case always animated psychiatric teaching, projects of castration: see all the inquiries about chemical and surgical castration, etc. in order to calm the perverse criminal. All this classifying effort based on the idea of sexual drive, of sexual instinct, landed up in the grand project, the grand classification of Krafft-Ebing.

Freud follows in his own way the psychiatric trend in at first deriving perversions from different partial drivesⁱⁱⁱ. When I say that he follows the psychiatric trend, it’s in his own way because for him there was never a unified sexual instinct — the famous term Lacan appropriated in *The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* where Freud insists that the particularity of man, in the sense of human subject, indicates that there is in him no representation of a unified sexual tendency — ‘*die ganze Sexualstre- bung*’; *ganze*, that is, unique: the sexual tendency has no unique representation, it’s scattered. ^{iv}It’s on this point that he is in opposition to the entire psychiatric trend of his time. Whilst in the unifying project of Krafft-Ebing, who is the most systematic exponent of it, there is one sexual instinct and deviations in relation to the instinct which allows for a regrouping, for a definition of a complete nosographic system. For Freud we have at least four instincts, at least four fragments of the sexual instinct impossible to unify, there being an oral, anal, and Freud does not add the scopic, the voice, but he does add voyeurism, exhibitionism, masochism and sadism. It will fall to Lacan to unify these four fragments of the sexual instinct under the single rubric of object, a particular object, since one has to recognise the gaze as having the status of drive-object, and on this point to complete the Freudian doctrine, by recognising in the crucial function of the order the particularity of the function of the object voice in perversion, whether sadistic or masochistic; the sadistic order is in opposition to the masochistic contract which is what is left over from the voice when one suppresses speech and when the voice is registered in a system of letters.

Genesis of perversions and the Oedipus Complex

So in the very moment in which Krafft-Ebing is constructing his classificatory work, Freud is subverting its order by presenting the impossibility of a unique instinct. Nevertheless, he maintains until 1915 that these drive stages, this infantile drive organisation, is not elaborated around a constructed object-choice and therefore not articulated within the Oedipus complex as he established it as the drama of the structure of object-choice^v. It will be the analysis of the ‘Wolf Man’ that is going to convince Freud of the existence of infantile stages of drive organisation, on being astonished that the Wolf Man’s disorders of appetite are linked to an oral stage of sexual organisation.^{vi}

Freud adds something to it. He is not satisfied to say that everything comes back to the oral stage. What is a novelty for him is that this stage, this oral drive, concerns the father, the little boy does not think about the father with his penis, he thinks about the father with the oral drive.^{vii} Until then in the

¹ S. Freud, *A Child is Being Beaten*, 1919, trans. J. Strachey, SE: XVII, PFL Vol 10 : Published with English & German shown at Richard G. Klein’s site <http://www.freud2lacan.com> & available [here](http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf) | http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf

Oedipus one thinks about the father because one wants to use his prick like the little lizard. One thinks about the father in making devouring use of him. For Freud one thinks about the oral drive like Lacan said: one thinks with one's soul, Aristotelian term. What's new for Freud is the discovery that oral organisation concerns the father by way of devouring and that there is from the beginning the cannibalistic meal. In his text on identification^{viii} it will lead Freud to establish a primordial, cannibalistic identification with the father. Here we are on the road which in the Wolf Man's analysis, in his preoccupations, led Freud to the discovery of the emerging infantile stages of the sexual organisation. In 1919, one year after the publication of the text on the Wolf Man he emphasised the novelty of his thought:

"Childhood perversion can, as one knows, serve as a ground for the formation of a perversion lasting one's entire life, which consumes the human being's entire sexual life, or it can be interrupted and equivalent, kept in the background of a normal, sexual development, from which it nevertheless continues to extract a certain quantum of energy."^x

It's the perverse trait that's preserved. A little further on:

"It would of course be important to know if it is correct to consider in quite a general way whether the origin of infantile perversions is based on the Oedipus complex."^x

Freud doesn't think that it is established, he thinks that it has to be demonstrated:

"If the perversions can universally be derived from the Oedipus complex, our appreciation of this complex acquires a new confirmation."^{xi}

Briefly, he considers that the universality of the Oedipus would be thereby confirmed, let's say the clinical span of the Oedipus, once again. One begins to understand towards the fifth part of *A Child is Being Beaten* why Freud so gently begins his text with proposals that smack of those of a stunned, empirical researcher:

"The fantasy representation of 'a child is being beaten' is avowed with an astonishing frequency by persons who have demanded a psychoanalytic treatment, hysterical or obsessional. It is very likely it is present still more frequently amongst other persons who are not constrained by a manifest illness from taking this decision."^{xii}

One asks oneself why he only noticed this in 1919. He could have noticed it a lot earlier. It's really the art of Freud to take the reader by the hand, to put him to sleep a little at the beginning of his articles with empirical considerations: 'It happens that...', 'One frequently says...', then to demonstrate the universality of the Oedipus in any perversion. He has just discovered it, and he wants to consider it as a change in a fundamental thesis that he is in the process of operating. From this point of view, it's rather from this nucleus of his demonstration that one is taken back to the reading he makes of the whipping fantasy which is very 19th century: it's in the 19th century that the theme of happiness in evil appeared in literature, a post-romantic theme. In this category a worldly author had a great success, Sacher-Masoch^{xiii}, for his considerations of flagellation.

A Child is Being Beaten — a story of disorientation

Freud insisted that in an analysis he realised that any quest for the trauma was useless and that a point is reached at which it is lost. The origin of the fantasy, the whipping [JE: beating] fantasy, is lost, without a date, in a zone where it is impossible to mark precisely a discontinuity, which the trauma marks. This fantasy is presented with a mythical flavour of having always been there. Freud shows 'the child entangled in the excitations of its parental complex'^{xiv}, not, in effect, a traumatic history but one of disorientation, of entanglement in a structure. For that reason he can describe three extremely logical phases, three permutative phases, a thousand miles away from the anecdotal description. Freud from a distance constructs a permutation:

"The first phase of the whipping [JE: beating] fantasy in the girl must belong to the early period of childhood. There is something in these fantasies which quite remarkably remains impossible to determine, as if the thing were indifferent. The lean reply that one gets from these patients at the time of the first communication, 'a child is being beaten', appears justified for this fantasy."^{xv}

In other words, in the first phase one has 'a child is being beaten' and what remains, the agent, remains undetermined. On the other hand, the object, one is sure that it is not the one who is speaking, [is] the subject.^{xvi}

I would like to draw your attention to a detail of the Freudian method, that attention to what is not there, to consider as a positive, remarkable fact something which remains impossible to determine, not to consider that it's a fault, that it's an incapacity to determine, but that this impossibility to be determined is in itself a fact. And there it is a question of a central method in the very delicate Freudian clinical examination, a question of all the modes of negation. Freud is a clinician of negation as there have been few in history. He is an Aristotle of negation.

"... But something else is surely determinable, each time in the same sense. The child being beaten is never the same as the author of the fantasy, but regularly another child... The fantasy is certainly then not masochistic; one would be tempted to qualify it as sadistic, only one must not neglect the fact that the author of the fantasy is also never the one doing the beating. One doesn't see clearly at first who in reality the person is doing the beating... It's an undetermined grown up person who can subsequently be recognised clearly as being the father..."^{xvii}

What has never existed does not cease to be written^{xviii}

Then comes the second phase: *"the person who is doing the beating stays the same..., but the child who is being beaten has become an other child, which is the very child who is the author of the fantasy..."^{xix}*

The agent is the same, but there has been a change of object, which this time is the subject. The phrase is formulated as follows:

"I am being beaten by my father. It has without a doubt a masochistic character. This second phrase is the most important of all and the most laden with consequences. But one might say of it that it has never had in a certain sense a real existence. It is not in any way remembered, its contents have never become conscious. It's a construction of the analysis but is nonetheless a necessity."^{xx}

What does Freud mean when he says that it is laden with consequences and that it has never had any existence? It's this phenomenal contrast which is that whatever has never been realised does not cease to be realised. Moreover, he will say that in the psychoanalytical clinic there are violent fathers. There is even a clinic of beaten children, of abandoned children, which has grown up in the last ten years, a social scourge. But what is happening is of another order than that which Freud describes. The catastrophic maltreatment of children is something else [JE other] than what Freud designated by this fantasy associated with a high degree of pleasure in the formulation 'I am being beaten by my father' which has never existed and which nevertheless does not cease to be written.

The third phase, says Freud rediscovers a certain resemblance with the first one:

"The person doing the beating is never that of the father, it is either left undetermined like in the first phase or invested in a typical way with a substitute for the father (professor). The child who is the author of the fantasy does not appear in the beating fantasy. Plied with questions the women patients only reply: the likelihood is that I am looking. Instead of one child being beaten, one now has to do for the most part with several children."^{xxi}

	Agent	Object
A child is being beaten	Agent?	Subject
1 My father is beating a child	My father	Subject
2 I am being beaten by my father	My father	The Subject
3 Children are being beaten by a substitute father	Father	Subject

What's identical with the first phase is what joins up with it: It's not the father and it's not the subject. There is a fantasy where it's not him or her. It's constructed like the story of Alphonse Allais "The masked ball where the Canoe and the Mask have to meet, and it's not him, not her"^{xxii}. It's the deployment of the fantasy; the story of Alphonse Allais is the writing of the fantasy with this type of fantastic logic which has its charms. It's not the subject but a mob and that explosion which is characteristic of a narcissistic mechanism in Freudian logic: everywhere the mob collects there are eruptions of the subject's ego.^{xxiii}

It's rather like Irma's injection^{xxiv}, for instance. There's Irma who enters the room; Freud goes up to her and examines her throat; then there's the crowd which fills up the room and Freud analyses that this entry — what Lacan calls the entry of the clowns^{xxv} — this entry of all the vacillating identifications of various grandees who are populating that room, eruptions of his own ego which are dispersed like light by a Newtonian prism through Irma's throat. It's really the entry of clowns, for in the little girl's fantasy there are always, says Freud, boys, there are lots of boys. In the great majority of cases in the fantasies of girls there are boys who are beaten without being known individually.^{xxvi}

The mysteries of the second phase of the fantasy

Freud guides us through a perfectly common fantasy, nevertheless connected to a perversion, but which, as fantasy, goes across hysterical and obsessional neuroses, trans-structural, as it were. It is not necessarily realised as a perversion, and little girls also have a right to the use of fantasy, which is Freud's way of disabusing his readers from the idea that only boys have access to masochism. There is a little surprise for us in this text which is to explain how between the first and this second phase there are formidable mysteries because in the second phase which doesn't exist, the pleasure is intense. There where the pleasure is intense, there is no representation, if one closely follows the consequences, because this phase must be reconstructed, the phase of intense pleasure, and from there to the third this pleasure disappears.

"The fantasy of the phase of incestuous love indicated: he (the father) only loves me and not the other child since he is beating the latter. The sense of guilt cannot find a worse punishment than the reversal of this triumph: 'No, he doesn't love you, he is beating you'. The fantasy of the second phase — to be beaten oneself by the father — becomes... the direct expression of the sense of guilt..."^{xxvii}

Freud backs off from the idea that one could find this phase of the fantasy. This phase would be the pure voice of conscience and guilt, and one would have put his finger on the genealogy of morality, finally. There would be a direct expression of the universal foundation of morality which Nietzsche was seeking through the philosophical representations of that morality; a pure voice which would arise: "my father is beating me, and I am enjoying it", which would be the scandalous foundation of morality, those points that Nietzsche tried to approach or Kafka with his punishment machine: the machine wrote the sentence on the skin of the condemned man, when at the last moment of the sentence the condemned man dies^{xxviii}; an inspired invention in that atrocious conjunction of the text, of the law and of mortal action of the law. Freud says that the second phase does not exist in so far as conscience and guilt are always disguised, not seen except by their effects.^{xxix} Freud does not suppose any direct expression. For that reason he backs off, saying, the second time:

"would become a direct expression... It has become masochistic; to my knowledge it's always like that, each time conscience and guilt are the factors that transform sadism into masochism. But that is certainly not the entire content of masochism. Conscience and guilt cannot remain of the terrain all alone; love must play its part as well."^{xxx}

That's as far as structure goes. Beyond clinical arguments of the type: "we can find subjects who recall very well being beaten by their father and experiencing pleasure", and one comes across them — the point that is never found is the pure expression of that conscience and guilt and its link with the death drive, although one has that bit between Eros, love of the father and its link with the other dimension which is conscience and guilt.

Perverse metaphor

By means of which the following transformation is given: in the place where normally prohibition dominates *jouissance*, the perverse metaphor is situated consisting in giving *jouissance* free range over prohibition:

prohibition	<i>jouissance</i>
<i>jouissance</i>	prohibition

At the point at which prohibition resists something that joutit, the perverse manoeuvre consists in restoring *jouissance* there where there was prohibition. That makes the pervert, according to Lacan, a crusader, a soldier, who has a mission^{xxxii}. The mission of the pervert is based on a desolate world, a waste land, to use the title of T. S. Eliot's poem. He takes up the theme of desert earth of the myth of Parsifal or of *Matiere de Bretagne* reorganised by Chrétien de Troyes, the myth of the fisherman king, where the earth is desolate; it has to be regenerated, and if the earth is a dead desert, it's because of the king's sin. But if the pervert is a crusader, a soldier, his mission is, despite an earth made desolate by prohibition, to make everyone jouir, hence the relentless, proselyte character of the perverse subject who wants to convince everyone that one does not jouir enough on this earth, that one has to jouir more. To jouir more does not mean more pleasure, one very quickly leaves the terrain of pleasure to enter into the most horrible terrains but which are part of the relentlessness of his mission. He is a soldier working for that metaphor [*jouissance* over prohibition], and it is what makes Lacan qualify him as a soldier who is working for an obscure god to whom he sacrifices all his interests in order to restore to the world the remainder of *jouissance* which it lacks. When Freud qualifies this restoration as the essence of masochism and speaks of it in terms of regression, we can utilise our minimal bit of writing in order to see the structure which is in play and re-established. What's very odd is that Freud in this text which is truly a surprising one, admirable, says:

"The fantasy of the second phase — to be beaten oneself by the father — remains generally unconscious, apparently due to the intensity of the repression. I am not able to say why in one of my six cases (a man) it was nevertheless consciously remembered. This man who is now an adult has retained a very clear memory of the fact that he used to use the representation 'being beaten by the mother' for masturbatory purposes."^{xxxiii}

The inadvertent reader would think that everything turned around the father. But, he says: '*being beaten by the mother*'. Does Freud mean by that there is a symmetry between little girls, '*being beaten by the father*', and little boys, '*being beaten by the mother*'? That's basically what seems to emerge there. In this matter one sees that Freud has not yet established, which he will do in two phases, 1923^{xxxiii} and 1932^{xxxiv}, the total dissymmetry between the boy and the girl, he has not yet established the change of objects for the girl: first the mother then the famous difficult passage to the father. Freud is not walking along this route with any certainty yet. He introduces, as if it were normal, as if it went without saying, this symmetry between the sexes: '*I found the phase of the fantasy 'being beaten by the mother'*'; then one wants to say to him that he would have found it in more than one case. It's found in lots of neuroses. Everything depends on what one calls pleasure experienced with the beating fantasy, but in any case I can state that in a series of cases, several dozen, to have re-found the expression '*being beaten by the mother*' for a little boy, using it consciously as the argument for a masturbatory fantasy — it's very common. And Freud inscribes it on saying '*curiously*'; it seems to me that this also goes with Freud's difficulty at that time of asking himself whether the relations be-

tween the sexes have to be thought with respect to *jouissance* and to these metaphors of prohibition and *jouissance* in a symmetrical or dissymmetrical way.

The extension of the fantasy into the subject's life

He notes very quickly that there is nevertheless a substitution:

"In two of my four cases of women a smart superstructure of day dreams developed out of the masochistic fantasy of whipping which were very important for the life of the persons in question, and to this superstructure devolved the function of making the feeling of satisfied excitation possible, even after the renunciation of the masturbatory act. In one of these cases the content 'being beaten by the father' was allowed to take a risk anew with the conscience if the ego was rendered unrecognisable in a slight disguise. The hero of these stories was regularly beaten by the father, punished later, humiliated, etc."^{xxxv}

There the story begins to touch on the extension of the fantasy to the subject's life. He describes two women who not only had such fantasies supposed to have been declared — unconscious fantasies — in the analysis, but what Freud calls a smart superstructure, a deployment of the fantasy in life, in a constant day dream, day dream in which the subject insures its own sexual satisfaction, "makes possible (the term is very delicate in Freud), makes possible the feeling of satisfied excitation."

What does it mean? One understands better when Freud says: *"In one of these cases the content 'being beaten by the father' was allowed to take a risk anew with the conscience if the ego was rendered unrecognisable in a slight disguise. The hero of these stories was regularly beaten by the father, punished later, humiliated, etc."*^{xxxvi}

For the women — two out of four — it's going to be the essential turning point of what will be for Freud masochism, the obvious or manifest forms of feminine masochism, for the girls, it's possible that they experience in a conscious way in day dreams the satisfaction of being beaten by the father on condition that it is disguised. The sex is constant of the persons in the fantasy. In the third phase what is manifest, 'a child is being beaten', it's always 'a boy who is beaten'^{xxxvii}, and Freud notes:

"This trait is not explained in an intelligible way by any rivalry between the sexes, for in boys' fantasies there ought to be many more girls beaten; it has nothing to do with the sex of the hated child of the first phase [that is to say, nothing to do with the fact there it was a brother or a sister], but he refers to a process which introduces complications in girls. When they turn away from incestuous genital love for the father, the girls break with the greatest of ease with their feminine role and bring their 'masculinity complex' to life... and thereafter only want to be boys."^{xxxviii}

This paragraph is crucial for the notion of feminine masochism. It's the first time that Freud presents an alternative for girls; it's enough that they give up expecting a child from the father in order to transform themselves into boys:

"That's why the whipping boys they set up as substitutes are also boys. In two cases in the day dreams — one of them almost reaching the level of poetry — the heroes were always exclusively young men, that is, in these creations the women absolutely do not intervene and are not admitted until after many years in a secondary role."^{xxxix}

It's a magnificent description of these day dreams which adolescents embrace, in which the subject for many years, unbeknownst to all, lives her life in these dreams; an all the more beautiful description since very probably the person of whom Freud is speaking is his daughter. In the biography of Anna Freud, edited by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl^{xl}, there is an entire passage on the analysis of Anna Freud.

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl emphasises that the fifth patient whom Freud is speaking about who 'entered analysis because of an indecision in life' who could not be precisely diagnostically classified or could be considered as psychasthenic was probably Anna Freud herself. In her article on Punishment Fantasies and Day Dreams^{xli}, Anna Freud refers to the psychasthenic patient that she accepts into analysis, she brings out her own case there:

"Anna Freud presents a little girl who adored her father, and whose incestuous relation was transformed according to a regressive process into an anal-sadistic scene which was realised as a con-

scious masturbatory fantasy of punishment. These fantasies appeared before the little girl returned to school, between the fifth and sixth year, then to be replaced by more agreeable stories, in English, 'nice stories'. These agreeable stories had apparently no more relation to the punishment stories, although she admits, admits to her analyst as well, that the punishment fantasies suddenly break off these nice stories, and that she was punishing herself by refusing to take refuge in these nice stories for a certain time. The analyst notes for the patient that her punishment fantasies and the nice stories have a very similar structure. The nice stories always open up with a weak young man who was doing something stupid and found himself at the mercy of an older man. And in scenes of increasing tension the young man is threatened with punishment until he is finally pardoned in a scene of harmony and reconciliation. The patient understood the similar structure between the two and ended by recognising that these stories were interchangeable.

In difficult periods, that is when the patient had to face up to difficult external demands, or felt himself reduced in his capacities, the nice stories were no longer fulfilling their function, and he came to a conclusion at the height of his fantasies when pleasure was replaced by the old situation of punishment which emerged and which alone led to the effective discharge of excitation. But these incidents were quickly forgotten... Enabling for several years the patient of whom Anna Freud is speaking to pass on from these dreams about writing short stories. They didn't have the same structure, they were not constructed around episodes as isolated as punishment and reconciliation, probably it was an attempt to sharpen up a strong poetic production, to sharpen up a novel.

We have to note that we have a letter from Anna Freud to her father^{xlii} a little while after he finished editing 'a child is being beaten', a letter from Anna Freud to her father in which she says that she is in the course of writing the grand history of childhood.

In this grand history of childhood, it's about history which is modelled on the story of a medieval knight..."

We are at the beginning of the 20th century and there are symbolist stories which must be contemporary with Pelleas and Melisande, *grosso modo*. The history of the middle ages excited Anna Freud, and she threw herself into these stories; one knows they were about a cavalier, a boy. This meets up with the girl of whom Freud speaks that she turns away from her feminine role to be a boy and equally in the case of the woman where the phenomenon of feminine masochism is deployed, it's his daughter, concerning the transformation of the paternal bond. What surprises him is the ease with which she renounces her position of daughter in order to become that wise virgin which will be the characteristic of Anna Freud. What is also astonishing is that the end of analysis is the moment in which Anna Freud was going to speak in public.

The person whom Freud shows us in his daughter Anna is in a fantasy of being punished before being able to enter into competition with others. Freud had the idea, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl recounts in an amusing way, of making her visit Lou Andreas Salome frequently in order to learn about life so that she might speak amongst women, that she relax a little in order to surmount her inhibitions — a sort of treatment which is presented very briefly. Freud invites Lou Andreas Salome to spend her holidays with the family in saying: "It will do Anna a lot of good". That's not wrong. It certainly helps her. You know that when Freud wrote *The Economic Problem of Masochism*, (Endnote 2²) he was suffering horribly from his jaw and kept the whole house awake because he did not sleep at night. He had to have someone to overcome his pain. He worked a little in the morning, and at night demanded that Anna look after him. She herself is exhausted from the care she has to give her father and writes to Lou Andreas Salome:

"I am currently very busy, but stupidly last week my nice stories surfaced and invaded my days like they haven't for a long time. They're a bit calmer now, but I was impressed by their force and the unchanged character of this daydream, although they have been analysed, torn apart, published, badly treated in all sorts of ways. I know that it's really shameful when I give myself up to them between patients, but it was in any case very nice and this gave me a lot of pleasure."

One sees here demands weighing down on Anna again — she had a lot to do, especially to busy herself with her ill father — and, facing her father's death, the fantasy took up again its entire vigour and she set out again in her day dreams which were the heart of her life.

² S. Freud, *The Economic Problem of Masochism*, 1924, trans. J. Strachey, SE: XIX, PFL Vol 11.

The question of feminine masochism

Between 1919 and 1924 Freud radicalises his point of view, making of masochism not only one fantasy amongst others, but all the privileged access to a real which is the death drive. He notes:

“... we have to realise that the principle of Nirvana which comes under the jurisdiction of the death drive undergoes in the human being a modification which transforms it into the pleasure principle... We obtain an interesting series of relations: the Nirvana principle expresses the tendency of the death drive, the pleasure principle represents the claims of libido, the modification of the latter, the reality principle, represents the influence of the external world. None of these three principles are knocked out of action by the other... The conclusion of these considerations is that one cannot do without designating the pleasure principle as the guardian of life.”^{xliii}

As the guardian of sleep does not stop awakening at the moment of anxiety dreams, the guardian of life does not stop masochism although it has a privileged relation to striving towards the Nirvana principle. Masochism is shared amongst the component drives which shows that in one aspect every drive is a death drive.

How should we consider feminine masochism once the death drive is introduced?

*“... If one has the chance to study cases in which masochistic fantasies are particularly richly developed, one easily discovers that they place the person in a characteristic feminine position and signify being castrated, undergoing coitus or delivery. It's for that reason that I named a *potiori* feminine masochism that form of masochism of which so many elements go back to infantile life.”^{xliiv}*

Freud calls feminine masochism what goes back to childhood which is not necessarily feminine, but because it has a meaning: being castrated, undergoing coitus or delivery. He adds: *“feminine masochism rests entirely on what we have described as primary erogenous masochism, pleasure in pain.”^{xliv}*

This detail of 1924 is also a way of replying to the question raised for him by his daughter, that is, from where does the force of these day dreams, of these fantasies come from, since they were analysed?

It's their erogenous side that accounts for Freud for the difficulty of ridding his daughter of her relations to her fantasies.

We rediscover there the script of the position of feminine sexuality that Lacan gives: the subject's division between, on the one hand, the relation to drive, on the feminine side, a direct relation to drive, and on the other hand a direct relation with what in the Other is a privileged signifier. Firstly, Lacan names this signifier the Name-of-the-Father in so far as it has to do with a consistent Other, there was in any case in the Other the guarantee of the Other, this particular name in the name of which everything signified. Then, Lacan emptied the Name-of-the-Father of its function of guaranteeing the signifying order in order to isolate underneath the Name-of-the-Father the place of the signifier which lacks in the Other — a signifier which is written S (A), the signifier of lack, distinct from what is in the Other, which is written outside and in which there is for Lacan the script of an entire series of logical paradoxes which are germinal in the idea of writing a signifier outside the Other.

That's what Freud added between 1919 and 1924. In *A Child is Being Beaten* (1919)³ everything turns around the place that Lacan will call the Name-of-the-Father. From 1924 the place of the death drive will be extricated. And it's also how Freud explains to himself why, despite the analysis of her fantasies, the analysis of the place of the Father — in these diurnal fantasies, this veil that descended over the life of Anna — there is a remainder which indicates that she never completely separated from that position and from her use of day dreams.

³ S. Freud, *A Child is Being Beaten*, 1919, trans. J. Strachey, SE: XVII, PFL Vol 10 : Published with English & German shown at Richard G. Klein's site <http://www.freud2lacan.com> & available [here](http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf) | http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf

Lacan takes up again in 1969 in the course of *Seminar XVII, L'Envers de la psychanalyse*, (Footnote 3⁴) the commentary of *A Child is Being Beaten*, and he notes that the central moment, the second moment of the father, the one who is doing the beating is not named, and that the proposition of the fantasy, the 'you are beating me', has to be distinguished from its referent.

Lacan has this phrase: "the 'you are beating me' is that half of the subject whose formula makes his link to *jouissance*. He receives, certainly, his own message in an inverse form — that means here his own *jouissance* in the form of the *jouissance* of the Other".^{xlvi}

It's one of the clearest reformulations undertaken by Lacan of meaning that becomes 'enjoy-meant' [*jouis-sens*]. What he called in the semantic years the meaning that the subject received from the Other — he received his own message in inverse form — in the '*jouissance*' years he notes that the structure functions, but what the phrase 'you are beating me' means is I enjoy [*jouis*], I am receiving my *jouissance* from you who are beating me. And it is supposed that the father has to be enjoying [*jouir*] this, that he is guaranteeing it, ensuring its function, the place of *jouissance*.

That strange function of the father appears to be the place of a ravaging *jouissance*, as it were, to be the one who beats, but at the same time, for the second operation, to be the guarantee that some *jouissance* is reserved for the subject. The father, especially in the feminine version of the fantasy, 'a child is being beaten', ensures the just distribution of *jouissance* for the one he evokes. He protects the subject from an unevacuated relation, not marked by a seal, by a signifier, by a name, from a deleterious relation with the death drive. In summary, 'a child is being beaten' protects the subject from an erogenous masochism. That's why in what concerns feminine sexuality the stakes that the Seminar *Encore* (Endnote 4⁵) plays for are to separate S(A) and a, these two algebraic letters in their function on the feminine side.

The being of the woman

One has to restore Lacan's criticism of Freud's conception of masochism. Lacan's reproach concerns this masochism that would be the expression of the woman's being. It's around the notion of the being of the woman that the essential of the debate centres. It's not about the phenomenology of these fantasies, they are not deniable and even rather common. It's not the particular relation of pleasure and pain that Lacan is going to criticise, but that permanent assignment of pain rather than pleasure to the being of the woman. It will be the force of the concept of privation, when Lacan introduces it, to account for the woman's particular *jouissance* in divesting herself of the register of having without it being marked by the least masochism.

Lacan introduced the concept of privation at the end of the 50's, first to distract the analysts who were stuck in the Anglo-Saxon concept, having bet everything on frustration. In the Anglo-Saxon world especially, the presuppositions of the subject conceived by John Locke, supported the Lockean subject in watching out for their interests. This subject of liberalism is a subject that watches over its [JE his/her] 'having', and every time it [he/she] can't have something, it [he/she] suffers, is frustrated. It's around this that the Anglo-Saxon concept turned, not around what language refuses, *Versagung*, — in Freud the concept *Versagung* corresponds to the translation given as 'frustration' — but what in the telling [*dire*], *Sagung*, is avoided. Lacan tried to translate it as '*what is refused*'^{xlvii}: language's refusal to tell, validating relations to demand; there is something in demand which does not manage to get said. What is fundamentally frustrating, to use the English term, is that one does not manage to speak the desire in demand. Whatever the sexual games are in which a person tries to lead his partner to say to him what makes him *jouir* — and there is a whole range of erotic games which consists in using words which shouldn't be used, forbidden words, in twisting language in order to say what makes him *jouir* — in whichever way, that escapes us, because it's always between the lines and it will always be the point which will escape being formulated. This point is really frustrating.

The concept of privation: from having to being

⁴ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XVII: L'Envers de la psychanalyse*, 1969-70, Seuil, Paris, 1991 : Information and availability [Seminar XVII: Psychoanalysis upside down/The reverse side of psychoanalysis: 1969-1970 : from 26th November 1969: Jacques Lacan](#) or [here](#) | <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=241>

⁵ J. Lacan, *Seminar XX: Encore*, 1972-73, trans. B. Fink, Norton, London, 1998 : Information and availability [Seminar XX : Encore 1972 – 1973 \(from 21st November 1972\) :](#) [Jacques Lacan](#) or [here](#) | <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=222>

The idea of privation was made to get psychoanalysts to think in another register than that of having and of demand. There is a register in which one does not demand which is that of being. In the course of his development the question of being in Lacan is complicated. Lacan's development in the 1950s attracted the attention of psychoanalysts regarding boys and girls and the fact that both lack being, and because they lack being, for instance, they lack being a boy or a girl in a total identity, they desire, and this desire is not to have. There are phrases which we must give their full weight: *'desire is the metonymy of the want-to-be [JE lack of being-manque à l'être]*^{xlviii}. Those of you who have read Lacan fifty times know this phrase across everything, and one has to consider it from a new angle because in any case one might say, if one is a psychoanalyst obsessed by frustration, by desire which is a metonymy of the want-to-have: it's enough to have what is frustrating you and then, you will be delighted.

The entire problem is what causes the relation to that object in having, what is transformed or not in the register of 'being'? And on the basis of the introduction of the theme of being, Lacan challenges the idea of a feminine masochism which would explain that women found their being on that point by consenting to pain. They are also fundamentally deprived, but, on the other hand, boys and girls separate themselves in their relation to 'being'.

Confront castration or unload oneself of having

Boys manufacture 'being' on being threatened to lose what they have: masculine castration, more precisely, castration involving the masculine genitals, creates a threat. They make their 'being' out of confrontation with the castration threat, but they never confront it totally, it's a kind of Hegelian struggle between master and slave. In Freud in the genesis of 'being' from the boy's side, it's a battle in which the boy must confront — and would not even have any 'being' without a confrontation with castration. He will have no being in trying to obtain from a more or less cuddly mama, the item he needs not to be frustrated. It's a way especially amongst men which creates a profound weakness: to try and obtain from women the little extra item they need. The path that Freud proposes for the boy is to confront castration. That doesn't mean to behave like a psychopath knocking everyone about as sole objective in existence, it doesn't mean having no God and no master, it means: to choose those for whom one reserves an affect of admiration and that this admiration is not an obstacle to what it concerns, to confront the threat of castration in a certain kind of battle. Women adore pushing men into this: as soon as two men admire each other, a little game starts up: "Oh, Oh, you're not a man, you're always giving in..." It's a push to crime.

On the other hand, there is the feminine 'being'. Here, Lacan takes over or makes use of what Freud had established: castration cannot be a threat since it has already happened. Therefore, the woman fears nothing, and she creates her 'being' by unloading herself of having. A very decided subject, a feminine subject, who in her relation to having has difficulties, re-found a memory of the playground in nursery school, before primary school, before her sixth year, there was at the back of her school a court yard and a vertical drop, a kind of little ditch, and she spent her time — which gave her an enormous satisfaction — throwing over the fence into the ditch everything she was given to take to school with her. From her pencil case she used to throw away the rubber that she loved, the pencil that she also loved, she threw them away and never understood why. She only noticed one thing that she acquired a lot of prestige amongst her little school mates doing what she did. In her life, the subject, followed this path, suffered in love, and that's exactly the point that was established: she enjoyed [*jouir*] being deprived of having and of whatever she might love, her objects. She manufactured 'being' for herself, and her little school mates recognised very well that she was manufacturing some prestige, some 'being', in that kind of potlatch, to take over the term that native Americans use to designate those ceremonies of struggle for recognition in which everyone sacrifices more than the next: instead of offering gifts to the other because it's vulgar, one simply burns them. In honour of the other one destroys things, and each one destroys more than the other. Well, this little girl very early on got the idea that by sacrificing that to one does not know what obscure God, she made some 'being' for herself.

As for *jouissance* of privation, on this point, one manufactures for oneself this plus on the basis of a subtraction in having because she is not threatened by castration. On this basis, Lacan holds that women who before him were situated in the register of masochism, like those mystical persons who withstand so much pain, that to strip themselves of everything they had, their worldly goods, she forces the apparition of a 'being' which justifies itself through this strange dialectic, justifies itself all the more in 'being', exists all the more in 'being', given this loss in having. Here the notion of ex-sistence gets its meaning in being written the way it is. This 'being' is a 'being' on the outside, not a 'being' in the register of having, it cannot be 'in', it cannot be possessed. It's really the intuition that Lacan had, no doubt through the Catholic readings of his intellectual formation, no doubt through debates with his brother, although he did everything, as he says, to keep him from joining an order. It was evident that

mysticism and the relations of women to God could be treated by scientific denial or by primary anti-clericalism. It is indeed evident, he said to the joy of mystics, that there are no doubt women who cannot have a relation to the man except by way of the names of the father such as the mystic allows it.

Feminine madness and masculine fetishism: two styles of love

Lacan made privation the instrument for rethinking the 'being' of women after the heritage of masochism. Retrospectively, he denounced the masochistic illusion as a biological illusion. If the links with this biological condition are broken, which happens to women who consent to the man's fantasy in subjective positions in which pain and humiliation are linked, it is because they are sheltered from the threat of castration. For that reason they can go further than men along the paths of devotion in love, and it's the reason why Lacan prefers to the term 'masochism' the term 'ravage' that a man can on occasion inflict on a woman. It's not that women are masochistic but because there is no limit, no barrier placed by the threat of castration. They can be much more decided in giving themselves and their body in order to reach the point at which the *jouissance* of the Other is assured, at which they ensure that the 'you are beating me' returns to them in an inverse form. And the examples carefully collected by psychoanalysts of the generation of Joan Riviere, Helen Deutsch and Anna Freud must be considered again on the basis of feminine decision, of the 'unstoppable' feminine, of the fact that it is always a surprise for the man when having thought he had to do with the most reasonable of women, he now has to take into account that the most reasonable has become the most unreasonable of them all. What is that *jouissance* which alone guarantees the feminine position of the subject? Lacan formulated it in the register of 'feminine madness', what amongst women is the erotomaniacal style of love and not fetishistic; amongst men the fetish is the limit. Basically men are satisfied with little, it's well known, in contrast to the feminine pole that does not have that limit.

For your consideration I'll emphasise in conclusion the effectiveness of the concept of privation in allowing all the known facts under the name of feminine masochism to be swept away and placed in an entirely different perspective which also allows the phenomena to be saved.

Translated by Richard Klein

Endnotes

1. S. Freud, *A Child is Being Beaten*, 1919, trans. J. Strachey, SE: XVII, PFL Vol 10 : Published with English & German shown at Richard G. Klein's site <http://www.freud2lacan.com> & available [here](http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf) | http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf
2. S. Freud, *The Economic Problem of Masochism*, 1924, trans. J. Strachey, SE: XIX, PFL Vol 11.
3. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XVII: L'Envers de la psychanalyse*, 1969-70, Seuil, Paris, 1991 : Information and availability [Seminar XVII: Psychoanalysis upside down/The reverse side of psychoanalysis: 1969-1970 : from 26th November 1969: Jacques Lacan](#) or [here](#) | <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=241>
4. J. Lacan, *Seminar XX: Encore*, 1972-73, trans. B. Fink, Norton, London, 1998 : Information and availability [Seminar XX : Encore 1972 – 1973 \(from 21st November 1972\) : Jacques Lacan](#) or [here](#) | <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=222>

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Julia Evans' Footnotes

ⁱ A Child is Being Beaten : 1919 : S. Freud : trans. J. Strachey, SE: XVII, PFL Vol 10.

Published with English & German shown at Richard G. Klein's site <http://www.freud2lacan.com> & available [here](http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf) | http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/A_Child_Beaten.pdf

ⁱⁱ This refers to footnotes Sigmund Freud added in 1915 to Sigmund Freud : Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality : 1905d : SE VII p123-245

See also, Lecture 20 – The Sexual Life of Human Beings & Lecture 21 – The Development of the Libido : 1916 – 1917 : published in Part III. General Theory of the Neuroses – 1917 in Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis : 1915 – 1917 : Sigmund Freud : Vol 1 PFL

: James Strachey's Footnote : p344 pfl, Lecture 20 : Freud's principal work on this subject was his 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality' : 1905d, to which he made a large number of additions and corrections in a succession of editions over the subsequent twenty years. The material in this and the following lecture is mainly derived from that work. This refers to footnotes Sigmund Freud added in 1915 to 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality : 1905d : Sigmund Freud', SE VII p123-245

: Probably, though also consult the following two footnotes, quotation (bold is JE's) : a) Conclusion to Part (A) Inversion : of Section (1) Deviations in Respect of the Sexual Object : of **Essay I - The Sexual Aberrations** : p59 pfl : CONCLUSION

It will be seen that we are not in a position to base a satisfactory explanation of the origin of inversion upon the material at present before us. Nevertheless our investigation has put us in possession of a piece of knowledge which may turn out to be of greater importance to us than the solution of that problem. It has been brought to our notice that we have been in the habit of regarding the connection between the sexual instinct and the sexual object as more intimate than it in fact is. **Experience of the cases that are considered abnormal has shown us that in them the sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely soldered together - a fact which we have been in danger of overlooking in consequence of the uniformity of the normal picture, where the object appears to form part and parcel of the instinct.** We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thoughts between instinct [JE drive] and object. It seems probable that the sexual instinct is in the first instance independent of its object; nor is its origin likely to be due to its object's attractions.

b) Conclusion to the section (3) The Perversions in General : in Essay I - The Sexual Aberrations : SE VII p???? ++ p76 pfl

TWO CONCLUSIONS

Our study of the perversions has shown us that the sexual instinct has to struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, and of which shame and disgust are the most prominent. It is permissible to suppose that these forces play a part in restraining that instinct within the limits that are regarded as normal; and if they develop in the individual before the sexual instinct has reached its full strength, it is no doubt they that will determine the course of its development.

In the second place we have found that some of the perversions which we have examined are only made intelligible if we assume the convergence of several motive forces. If such perversions admit of analysis, that is, if they can be taken to pieces, then they must be of a composite nature. This gives us a hint that perhaps the sexual instinct itself may be no simple thing, but put together from components which have come apart again in the perversions. **If this is so, the clinical observation of these abnormalities will have drawn our attention to amalgamations which have been lost to view in the uniform behaviour of normal people.**

ⁱⁱⁱ See Essay I - The Sexual Aberrations : Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: 1905d : Sigmund Freud : SE VII p??? : : pfl Vol 7 p45 Footnote 1 : The information in this first essay is derived from the well-known writings of Krafft-Ebing ..., pfl Vol 7 p54 : According to Krafft-Ebing (1895,5)

^{iv} Essay I - The Sexual Aberrations : Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: 1905d : Sigmund Freud : Section (1) Deviations in respect of the sexual object, Part (A) Inversion, 3 Sexual object of inverts : SE VII p??? : [P1184-1185] : [Added 1915:] Psycho-analytic research is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating off homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of a special character. By studying sexual excitations other than those that are manifestly displayed, it has found that all human beings are capable of making a homosexual object-choice and have in fact made one in their unconscious. Indeed, libidinal attachments to persons of the same sex play no less a part as factors in normal mental life, and a greater part as a motive force for illness, than do similar attachments to the opposite sex. On the contrary, psycho-analysis considers that a choice of an object independently of its sex - freedom to range equally over male and female objects - as it is found in childhood, in primitive states of society and early periods of history, is the original basis from which, as a result of restriction in one direction or the other, both the normal and the inverted types develop. Thus from the point of view of psycho-analysis the exclusive sexual interest felt by men for women is also a problem that needs elucidating and is not a self-evident fact based upon an attraction that is ultimately of a chemical nature. A person's final sexual attitude is not decided until after puberty and is the result of a number of factors, not all of which are yet known; some are of a constitutional nature but others are accidental.

& from The Ego & the Id ('Das Ich und das Es') : 1920 [1923]: Sigmund Freud : SE XIX p12-63 : Published by Richard G. Klein at www.Freud2Lacan.com and available [here](https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/The_Ego_and_the_Id.pdf) | https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/The_Ego_and_the_Id.pdf : Part III The ego and super-ego (ego ideal) : SE XIX p31 : [P3101] : The whole subject, however, is so complicated that it will be necessary to go into it in greater detail. The intricacy of the problem is due to two factors: the triangular character of the Oedipus situation and the constitutional bisexuality of each individual.

^v See Essay I - The Sexual Aberrations : Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: 1905d : Sigmund Freud : Section (B) Fixations of preliminary sexual aims : SE VII p???: pfl Vol 7 p68 Footnote 1 : [p1193] : [Added 1915:] In a number of cases of foot-fetishism it has been possible to show that the scopophilic instinct, seeking to reach its object (originally the genitals) from underneath, was brought to a halt in its pathway by prohibition and repression. For that reason it became attached to a fetish in the form of a foot or shoe, the female genitals (in accordance with the expectations of childhood/children) being imagined as male ones.

^{vi} SE XVII p74 : We shall be prepared to hear that during his later illness he suffered from disturbances of his intestinal function which were very obstinate, though various circumstances caused them to fluctuate in intensity. When he came under my treatment he had become accustomed to enemas, which were given him by an attendant; spontaneous evacuations did not occur for months at a time, unless a sudden excitement from some particular direction intervened, as a result of which normal activity of the bowels might set in for a few days. His principal subject of [p75] complaint was that for him the world was hidden in a veil, or that he was cut off from the world by a veil. This veil was torn only at one moment-when, after an enema, the contents of the bowel left the intestinal canal; and he then felt well and normal again.¹

The colleague to whom I referred the patient for a report upon his intestinal condition was perspicacious enough to explain it as being a functional one, or even psychically determined, and to abstain from any active medicinal treatment. Moreover, neither this nor dieting were of any use. During the years of analytic treatment there was no spontaneous motion- apart from the sudden influences that I have mentioned. The patient allowed himself to be convinced that if the intractable organ received more intensive treatment things would only be made worse, and contented himself with bringing on an evacuation once or twice a week by means of an enema or a purgative.

In discussing these intestinal troubles I have given more space to the patient's later illness than has been my plan elsewhere in this work, which is concerned with his infantile neurosis. I have done so for two reasons: first, because the intestinal symptoms were in point of fact carried forward from the infantile neurosis into the later one with little alteration, and secondly, because they played a principal part in the conclusion of the treatment.

^{vii} SE XVII p106 (probably) : The first that we hear of it is in the disturbance of his appetite [p. 98]; for, taking other observations into account, I am inclined, though with due reservations, to regard that as a result of some process in the sphere of sexuality. I have been driven to regard as the earliest recognizable sexual organization the so-called 'cannibalistic' or 'oral' phase, during which the original attachment of sexual excitation to the nutritional instinct still dominates the scene.¹ It is not to be expected that we should come upon direct manifestations of this phase, but only upon indications of it where disturbances have been set up. Impairment of the nutritional instinct (though this can of course have other causes) draws our attention to a failure on the part of the organism to master its sexual excitation. In this phase the sexual aim could only be cannibalism-devouring; it makes its appearance with our present patient through regression from a higher stage, in the form of fear of 'being eaten by the wolf'. We were, indeed, obliged to translate this into a fear of being copulated with by his father. It is well known that there is a neurosis in girls which occurs at a much later age, at the time of puberty or soon afterwards, and which expresses aversion to sexuality by means of anorexia. This neurosis will have to be brought into relation with the oral phase of sexual life.

^{viii} Sigmund Freud : Group Psychology & the Analysis of the Ego : 1921, SEXVIII p69-143 : You will find Freud's paper in English with the original German text laid out in the right hand column : published at Richard G. Klein's site www.Freud2Lacan.com : available [here](http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Group_Psychology.pdf) | https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Group_Psychology.pdf : Chapter VII Identification : SE XVIII p105 : ... and an identification with his father which takes him as his model. The two subsist side by side for a time without any mutual influence or interference. In consequence of the irresistible advance towards a unification of mental life, they come together at last; and the normal Oedipus complex originates from their confluence. The little boy notices that his father stands in his way with his mother. His identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and becomes identical with the wish to replace his father in regard to his mother as well. Identification, in fact, is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone's removal. It behaves like a derivative of the first, oral phase of the organization of the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such. The cannibal, as we know, has remained at this standpoint; he has a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people of whom he is fond. [Footnote : See my Three Essays (1905d) SE VII p198] : Probably Essay II Infantile Sexuality, Section [6] The phases of development of the sexual organization – Pre-genital Organization : SE ????: p++++ : SE VII p123-245 : Published at www.Freud2Lacan.com see [here](https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Sexuality.pdf) <https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Sexuality.pdf>, pfl V7 p116-117 : We shall give the name of 'pregenital' to organizations of sexual life in which the genital zones have not yet taken over their predominant part. We have hitherto identified two such organizations, which almost seem as though they were harking back to early animal forms of life.

The first of these is the *oral* or, as it might be called, *cannibalistic* pregenital sexual organization. Here sexual activity has not yet been separated from the ingestion of food; nor are opposite currents within the activity differentiated. The *object* of both activities is the same; the sexual *aim* consists in the *incorporation* of the object – the prototype of a process which, in the form of *identification*, is later to play such an important psychological part. A relic of this constructed phase of organization, which is forced upon our notice by pathology, may be

seen in thumb-sucking, in which the sexual activity, detached from the nutritive activity, has substituted for the extraneous object one situated in the subject's own body.

A second pregenital phase is that of the *sadistic-anal* organization. Here the opposition between two currents, which runs through all sexual life, is already developed: they cannot yet, however, be described as 'masculine' and 'feminine', but only as 'active' and 'passive'. The *activity* is put into operation by the instinct for mastery through the agency of the somatic musculature; the organ which, more than any other, represents the *passive* sexual aim is the erotogenic mucous membrane of the anus. Both of these currents have objects, which, however, are not identical. Alongside these, other component instincts operate in an auto-erotic manner. In this phase, therefore, sexual polarity and an extraneous object are already observable. But organization and subordination to the reproductive function are still absent.

^{ix} 'A child is being beaten' a contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions : 1919 : Sigmund Freud : Available as above : p192 of SE XVII : From James Strachey's translation : 'A perversion in childhood, as is well known, may become the basis for the construction of a perversion having a similar sense and persisting throughout life, one which consumes the subject's whole sexual life. On the other hand the perversion may be broken off and remain in the background of a normal sexual development, from which, however, it continues to withdraw a certain amount of energy.'

^x p192 of SE XVII : From James Strachey's translation : 'It would naturally be important to know whether the origin of infantile perversions from the Oedipus complex can be asserted as a general principle. While this cannot be decided without further investigation, it does not seem impossible.'

^{xi} p193 of SE XVII : From James Strachey's translation : 'If, however, the derivation of perversions from the Oedipus complex can be generally established, our estimate of its importance will have gained added strength. For in our opinion the Oedipus complex is the actual nucleus of neuroses, and the infantile sexuality which culminates in this complex is the true determinant of neuroses. What remains of the complex in the unconscious represents the disposition to the later development of neuroses in the adult.'

^{xii} p179 of SE XVII : From James Strachey's translation : 'It is surprising how often people who seek analytic treatment for hysteria or an obsessional neurosis confess to having indulged in the phantasy: 'A child is being beaten.' Very probably there are still more frequent instances of it among the far greater number of people who have not been obliged to come to analysis by manifest illness.'

^{xiii} From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_von_Sacher-Masoch, Leopold Ritter von Sacher-Masoch (27 January 1836 – 9 March 1895) was an Austrian nobleman, writer and journalist, who gained renown for his romantic stories of Galician life. The term masochism is derived from his name, invented by his contemporary, the Austrian psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing. Masoch did not approve of this use of his name.

^{xiv} SE XVII p186 : translated by James Strachey :

IV If the analysis is carried through the early period to which the beating-phantasies are referred and from which they are recollected, it shows us the child involved in the agitations of its parental complex.

^{xv} SE XVII p184 of James Strachey's translation : The first phase of beating-phantasies among girls, then, must belong to a very early period of childhood. Some features remain curiously indefinite, as though they were a matter of indifference. The scanty information given by the patients in their first statement, 'a child is being beaten', seems to be justified in respect to this phase.

^{xvi} SE XVII p185 James Strachey's translation : The actual identity of the person who does the beating remains obscure at first. Only this much can be established: it is not a child but an adult. Later on this indeterminate grown-up person becomes recognizable clearly and unambiguously as the (girl's) father. & SE XVII, p199 of James Strachey's translation : In the case of the girl the phantasy has a preliminary stage (the first phase), in which the beating bears no special significance and is performed upon a person who is viewed with jealous hatred.

^{xvii} SE XVII p184-185 James Strachey's translation : The first phase of beating-phantasies among girls, then, must belong to a very early period of childhood. Some features remain • curiously indefinite, as though they were a matter of indifference. The scanty information given by the patients in their first statement, 'a child is being beaten', seems to be justified in respect to this phase. But another of their features can be established with certainty, and to the same effect in every case. The child being beaten is never the one producing the phantasy, but is invariably another child, most often a brother or a sister if there is any. Since this other child may be a boy or a girl. there is no constant relation between the sex of the child producing the phantasy and that of the child being beaten. The phantasy, then, is certainly not masochistic. It would be tempting to call it sadistic, but one cannot neglect the fact that the child producing the phantasy is never doing the beating herself. The actual identity of the person who does the beating remains obscure at first. Only this much can be established: it is not a child but an adult. Later on this indeterminate grown-up person becomes recognizable clearly and unambiguously as the (girl's) father. .

^{xviii} Page 3 What has never existed does not cease to be written

Quoted by Jacques Lacan in Seminar XX : 20th March 1973 : p90-95 of Bruce Fink's translation

Quote from pIX 1 to pIX 9 of Cormac Gallagher's translation : See [Seminar XX: Encore: 1972 – 1973: from 21st November 1972 : Jacques Lacan](#) or [here](#)

[Note the two translations differ considerably]

I would like to start from a remark, from a few remarks, the first two make a connection with what today I would be happy to write for you as *hainamoration*, [From Bruce Fink: *Hainamoration* is composed to the noun *haine* (“hate”) and the adjective *énomoré* (“enamored”). “Depth” probably isn’t the best translation for *relief* three words further on; other possible translations include “profile”, “terrain,” “ground,” “outline,” and so on.] which must be written h.a.i.n.a.m.o.r.a.t.i.o.n This as you know, is the relief psychoanalysis was able to introduce in order to situate in it the zone of its experience. It is a testimony – as I might say – of good will, on its part. If precisely it had only been able to call *hainamoration* by a different term than the bastard one of ambivalence, perhaps it would have succeeded better in waking up the context of the epoch in which it is inserted. Perhaps also it is modesty in its part. And in effect, if I ended on something, this something thanks to which I can only approach what polarised everything I was stating the last time. I stated, in the final paragraph, that there was someone named Empedocles, and I had pointed out that it was not for nothing that Freud arms himself with him. That for Empedocles God must be the most ignorant of all beings, which links us up to the question of knowledge. And this very precisely, I said, because of not knowing hatred. To this I added that later on Christians transformed this non-hatred of God into a mark of love.

It is here that the analysis of the correlation that it establishes between hatred and love encourages us towards something by a reminder [JE wonders if this should be remainder], to which I will come back later, and which is exactly the following: that we do not know love without hatred. Namely, that if there is knowledge of something, if this knowledge that was fomented throughout the centuries disappoints us and means that we must renovate the function of knowledge, it is indeed perhaps that hatred has never been put in its place in it.

It is true that this is not either what seems to be the most desirable thing to evoke. And that is why I ended with this sentence: *One could say that the more man attributes to the woman a confusion of himself with God, namely, of what she enjoys* – remember my schema from the last time, I am not going to do it again – *the less he hates*; and at the same time, I said that I was equivocating on *hait* and *est* in French. Namely, that in this business, moreover, the less he loves.

I was not very happy at having ended on that, even though it is the truth. This indeed is what will make me question myself today once more about what is apparently confused in terms of the true and the real, in the way I have contributed a notion of the way that they are sketched out in analytic experience, and what it would be well in effect not to confuse.

The truth, of course, is affirmed as aiming at the real. But it is only stated here as the fruit of a long development and I would say more, of a reduction of the pretensions to truth. Everywhere we see it presenting itself, affirming itself as an ideal, as something of which the word can be the support, we see that the truth is not something that is so easily attained.

I will say that if analysis is based on a presumption, it is that a knowledge about the truth can be constituted. In the schema, the little formula (*gramme*) that I gave you of analytic discourse, the *ais* written on the top left and is sustained by this S_2 , knowledge in so far as it is at the place of truth. It is from there that it summons \$...asked to say anything whatsoever, which ought to result in the production of S_1 , of the signifier from which there can be resolved what? Precisely its relationship to truth. [JE: At the end of this paragraph pIX 3 the analytic discourse has been added – see Seminar XVII]

The truth, let us say to cut to the quick, is originally *aletheia* on which Heidegger speculated so much. *Emet*, the Hebrew term, which, like every use of this term truth, has a judicial origin. Even in our day, the witness is asked to tell the truth. Nothing but the truth. And what is more, *all* if he is able. How also could he do so? The whole truth about what he knows. But what is sought, and precisely, more than anywhere else in judicial testimony, is what? It is to be able to judge what is involved in enjoyment. And I would say more: the fact is that enjoyment is avowed and precisely in that may be unavowable, that the truth sought is precisely that which, more than any other with regard to the law, rules this enjoyment. This is moreover how, in Kant’s terms, the problem is evoked. Is evoked as regards what the free man ought to do with respect to the tyrant, the tyrant who proposes every enjoyment to him in exchange for him denouncing the enemy whom the tyrant fears may be, with respect to enjoyment, the one who is disputing it with him.

How is the question evoked about this imperative not seen: that nothing in the name of what is of the order of the pathetic ought to direct the testimony of what after all is evoked in terms of it? And if what the free man is asked to denounce the enemy, the rival about, if it were true, ought he to do it? Can it not be seen, simply by evoking this problem, that if there is something that assuredly inspires in us all the reservations that are indeed those that we all have, that we all have. It is that the whole truth is what cannot be said. It is what can only be said on condition of not pushing it to the end; to only half-say it.

There is something else that constrains us as regards what is involved in the truth, which is that enjoyment is a limit. This is something that stems from the very structure that was evoked, at the time when I constructed my quadrupodes for you, [Seminar XVII] the fact is that enjoyment can only be summoned, can only be evoked, can only be elaborated starting from a semblance. Love itself, I underlined the last time, is addressed from the semblance. It is addressed from the semblance and moreover, if it is indeed true that the Other can only be reached by being bracketed, as I said the last time, with *small a*, [*small o* in Gallagher’s text], the cause of desire, it is moreover to the semblance of being that it is addressed; this being, there, is not nothing. It is sup-posed to this something, to this object which is the little *a* [o Gallagher’s text]. But here, ought we not to rediscover this trace that as such it corresponds to some imaginary?

Assuredly I have explicitly designated this imaginary by *i*, by small *i* placed here isolated from the term imaginary and that this is why it is [at the bottom of p1X 4 there is a diagram in the margin] only by the clothing, by the clothing of the self image that has enveloped the object cause of desire that there is most often sustained – this is the very articulation of analysis – that there is most often sustained the objectal relationship.

This affinity of small *a* [o in Gallagher] to this envelope is the connection, it must be said, one of these major connections that has been advanced by psychoanalysis, and which, for us, is the point of suspicion that it essentially introduces.

This is where what we come to say about the real is distinguished. For this real, if you take it as I believed I should in the course of time, a time which is also that of my experience, the real can only be inscribed from an impasse of formalisation. And that is why I believed I could sketch out the model of it, from mathematical formalisation in so far as it is the most advanced elaboration that we have managed to produce, the most advanced elaboration of significance (*significance*). Of a significance which in short – I am talking about mathematical formalisation – one can say that it runs counter to meaning. I almost said in the opposite direction. The *it means nothing* about mathematics, is what is said in our time by philosophers of mathematics, even when they are themselves mathematicians. I sufficiently underlined the Russell's *Principia*.

And nevertheless, can one not say that this network precisely of mathematical logic that has been pushed so far, in as much as with respect to something that found its high point from a philosophy that was indeed forced to emerge from its own entrenchments – the summit, is Hegel – can we not say that with respect to this plenitude of contrasts dialecticised in the idea of a historical progress whose substance it must be said nothing attests for us, can we not say that with regard to that, what is stated in terms of this formalisation that is so well constructed supported as it is by nothing but the *written*, is something that may only serve us, would only be of service to us if required in the analytic process, in that what is designated in it, in that what is designated in it is what invisibly retains bodies?

And if I were not allowed to give an image of it, I would easily take it from what in nature appears to be closest to what ensures that the written requires, in a way, this reduction to the dimension, two dimension, of the surface and which, in a certain way, is supported, I would say, namely, the textual work that comes out of the spider's belly. The spider's web, a truly miraculous function to see in a way being already supported by it, in this opaque point of this strange being, seeing appear from the surface itself, the one which for us allows the outline of the tracing of these writings which are finally the only point where we might find graspable these limits, these points of impasse, of dead ends which, make the real understood as coming from (*accédant du*) the symbolic at its most extreme point.

That is why I do not believe it was vain that after a work of elaboration whose date I do not need to recall here and now, I came to the writing of this *little a* [o in Gallagher's original], of the capital S read as signifier, of A [Gallagher gives O] quabared – \emptyset – and of capital Φ . Their very writing constitutes the support that goes beyond the word and which nevertheless does not go beyond the very effects of language, and in which there is designated this something where, by centring the symbolic, something that is important on condition of course of knowing how to make use of it. But make use of it for what? To retain a congruent truth. Not the truth that claims to be *all*; the one precisely, the one that we have to deal with in terms of a half-saying, the one that proves to be wary of going as far as an avowal, an avowal which would be the worst, the one that is wary starting with the cause of desire. It presumes that this desire is inscribed on the basis of *corporal contingency*. I recall for you the way in which I support this term *contingency*. One could say that the phallus, as tackled in analytic experience as the key point, the extreme point of what is stated as cause of desire, one could say that *analytic experience does not cease writing it*. Now, if I call it contingency, it is inasmuch that here is where analytic experience encounters its limit. That all it can produce is the S₁, this signifier, this signifier which the last time, I think you still remember the uproar that I succeeded in producing from this audience by qualifying it as the signifier of the most idiotic enjoyment itself, and, it was pointed out to me in the two senses of the term, that of the idiot on the one hand, which has indeed here its function as a reference, and also the one which is most singular.

It is in this *does not cease to be written* that there resides the high point of what I called *contingency*. Contingency, if as I say it is opposed to the impossible, it is inasmuch as the *necessary* is the *does not cease not to be written*. I beg your pardon. It is necessary that introduces to us this *does not cease*. But the *does not cease* of the *necessary*, is the *does not cease to be written*. Now here indeed is the apparent necessity to which the analysis of the reference to the phallus leads us. The *does not cease not to be written*, that I said in a slip just now, is the *impossible*. The impossible as I define it as what cannot in any case be written. This is how I designate what is involved in the sexual relationship. *It does not cease not to be written*, but the correction that by this fact it allows us to contribute to the apparent necessity of the phallic function, is the following: that it is *really quo* mode of the *contingent*, namely, that the *does not cease to be written* ought to be written, *ceases precisely by not being written*.

It is as *contingency*, *contingency* in which there is resumed everything that is involved of that which for us submits the sexual relationship, for the speaking being, to being only in the regime of encounter, it is in this sense that one can say that, through psychoanalysis, the phallus, the phallus reserved in ancient times for the Mysteries, has *ceased not being written*. Nothing more. It has not entered into the *does not cease*, in the field on which there depends necessity on the one hand and, above, impossibility.

The true then, here, bears witness that by warning about the imaginary, as it does, it has a lot to do with anatomy.

It is in the final analysis from a depreciatory angle that I contribute these three terms, those that I inscribe as *small a* [o in Gallagher's], $S(\emptyset)$ and Φ . What shows us the conjunction of these three terms is precisely what is inscribed in terms of this triangle, of this triangle constituted by the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, and in which what is designated by their conjunction is what? On the right the *little reality* on which there is supported this principle that Freud promised as being the one that is elaborated by a progress, which would be fundamentally that of the pleasure principle. The *little reality*, namely, the fact that everything that we are allowed to approach in terms of reality remains rooted in phantasy.

On the other hand, what is $S(\emptyset)$ but the impossibility of saying the whole truth that I spoke about earlier? And finally, the third term, this, this through which the symbolic by directing itself towards the real, demonstrates for us the true nature of this *little a* [o in Gallagher] object that I earlier qualified as *semblance of being*, not by chance. It is indeed because it seems to give us the support of being, it is moreover because what is confirmed by everything that is elaborated as such, and anything whatsoever that belongs to being, of being and even of essence, that we can, by reading it starting from analytic experience, in reading Aristotle for example, see that what is at stake, is the *little a* [o in Gallagher]; that Aristotelian contemplation, for example, issues from this look as I defined it in *The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis* [[Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts: 1963-1964 : beginning 15th January 1964 : Jacques Lacan](#) See [here](#)] as representing one, one of the four supports that constitute the cause of desire.

It is then from a graphing (*graphicisation*), not to mention graph, since moreover a graph is a term that has a very precise sense in mathematical logic, in this graphing that there are shown these correspondences that make of the real one open between the semblance that results from the symbolic and the reality as it is supported in the concrete of human life, in what leads men, in what makes them always charge along the same paths, in what makes them produce still other men, in what ensures that forever the still to be born (*l'encore à naître*) will never result in anything than ... *l'encorné*. [Bruce Fink's footnote: *l'encorné* is "someone with horns," a reference to someone who has been cheated on: a cuckold. *L'encore-né* ("the reborn") is a homonym.]

On the other hand, this *small a* [o in Gallagher] which for its part, by being overall on the right path, would make us take it as being, in the name of the fact that it is indeed apparently something, which only resolves itself when all is said and done by its failure, by precisely not being able to be inscribed in any way completely in approaching the real.

The true, then, the true, then, of course, is that. Except for the fact that it is never reached except along twisted paths, and that everything to which the true, to which frequently we are led to appeal, is simply to recall the fact that one must not make the mistake, that one must not believe that one is already even in the semblance, that before the semblance with which in effect everything is supported in order to rebound into phantasy, that before that, a severe distinction must be made between the imaginary and the real; that it must not be believed that it is in any way we ourselves that even support this semblance. We are not even semblance. We are on occasion what can occupy its place and make reign there what? What assuredly, to limit ourselves to the immediate of today, allows us to say that after all, the analyst, in all the orders of discourse which are those, in any case, which are actually sustained – and this word *actually* is not irrelevant if we give to the act its full Aristotelian sense – among all the discourses that are actually sustained, it is indeed the analyst who, by putting the *small a* [o in Gallagher] object in the place of the semblance, is in the most appropriate position for doing what it is right to do, namely, to examine, to examine what is involved in truth in terms of knowledge.

What is knowledge? It is strange that apart from Descartes who not for nothing is at the dawn of modern science – not the only one but he is there all the same – that before Descartes, the question of knowledge had never been put, that it required in a way this something that is analysis and which came to announce to us that there is some knowledge that does not know itself, and that it is properly speaking a knowledge that is supported by the signifier as such, that a dream does not introduce us to any unfathomable experience, to any mysticism, that it is read in what is said about it and that one can even go further, by taking up its equivocations in the most anagrammatic sense of the word, that it is at this point of language where someone like Saussure asked himself the question as to whether even in the Saturnian verses in which he found the most strange punctuations of writing, it was or was not intentional. Here is where Saussure is in a way waiting for Freud. It is here that there is renewed the question of knowledge.

^{xix} SE XVII p185 James Strachey's translation : 'Profound transformations have taken place between this first phase and the next. It is true that the person beaten remains the same (that is, the father); but the child who is beaten has been changed into another one and is now invariably the child producing the phantasy. The phantasy is accompanied by a high degree of pleasure, and has now acquired a significant content, with the origin of which we shall be concerned later. Now, therefore, the wording runs: 'I am being beaten by my father.' It is of an unmistakably masochistic character.

^{xx} SE XVII p185 James Strachey's translation : Now, therefore, the wording runs: 'I am being beaten by my father.' It is of an unmistakably masochistic character. This second phase is the most important and the most momentous of all. But we may say of it in a certain sense that it has never had a real existence. It is never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a construction of analysis, but it is no less a necessity on that account.

^{xxi} SE XVII p185-186 James Strachey's translation : The third phase once more resembles the first. It has the wording which is familiar to us from the patient's statement. The person beating is never the father, but is either left undetermined just as in the first phase, or turns in a characteristic way into a representative of the father, such as a teacher. The figure of the child who is producing the beating-phantasy no longer itself appears in it. In reply to pressing enquiries the patients only declare: 'I am probably looking on.' Instead of the one child that is being beaten, there are now a number of children present as a rule.

^{xxii} Probably, 'Raoul and Marguerite, two lovers, arrange to meet at a masked ball; there they skip into a hidden corner, embrace and fondle each other. Finally, they both put down their masks, and – surprise – Raoul finds that he is embracing the wrong woman, that she is not Marguerite, and Marguerite also find that the other person is not Raoul but some unknown stranger...' – the book is unknown. OR 'Umberto Eco, for instance, has analysed a weird brief story by Alphonse Allais in which Raoul and Marguerite, a happily but quarrelling married couple, each gets an anonymous note saying that the other will appear at a masked ball, the wife disguised as a 'pirogue congolaise' [Congolese canoe] and the husband as a 'templier fin de siècle' [end of century templar {knight?}] meet. The reader's presuppositions have of course been played upon to lead them to expect the obvious confrontation. But when each tears off the other's disguise, 'Lui, ce n'était pas Raoul./Elle, ce n'était pas Marguerite'. Any conceivable explanation the reader may work out for this situation is then contradicted by the statement that they both learnt their lesson from it and never quarrelled again. (Eco 1978)

^{xxiii} Probably Sigmund Freud : Group Psychology & the Analysis of the Ego : 1921, SEXVIII p69-143 : You will find Freud's paper in English with the original German text laid out in the right hand column : published at Richard G. Klein's site www.Freud2Lacan.com : available [here](http://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Group_Psychology.pdf) | https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Group_Psychology.pdf : Chapter X The Group and the Primal Horde : SE XVIII p123-124 : Further reflection will show us in what respect this statement requires correction. Individual psychology must, on the contrary, be just as old as group psychology, for from the first there were two kinds of psychologies, that of the individual members of the group and that of the father, chief, or leader. The members of the group were subject to ties just as we see them to-day, but the father of the primal horde was free. His intellectual acts were strong and independent even in isolation, and his will needed no reinforcement from others. Consistency leads us to assume that his ego had few libidinal ties; he loved no one but himself, or other people only in so far as they served his needs. To objects his ego gave away no more than was barely necessary. He, at the very beginning of the history of mankind, was the 'superman' whom Nietzsche only expected from the future. Even to-day the members of a group stand in need of the illusion that they are equally and justly loved by their leader; but the leader himself need love no one else, he may be of a masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and independent. We know that love puts a check upon narcissism, and it would be possible to show how, by operating in this way, it became a factor of civilization.

OR

Chapter VI Further problems, SE XVIII p102 : When this hostility is directed against people who are otherwise loved we describe it as ambivalence of feeling; and we explain the fact, in what is probably far too rational a manner, by means of the numerous occasions for conflicts of interest which arise precisely in such intimate relations. In the undisguised antipathies and aversions which people feel towards strangers with whom they have to do we may recognize the expression of self-love-of narcissism. This self-love works for the preservation of the individual, and behaves as though the occurrence of any divergence from his own particular lines of development involved a criticism of them and a demand for their alteration. We do not know why such sensitiveness should have been directed to just these details of differentiation; but it is unmistakable that in this whole connection men give evidence of a readiness for hatred, an aggressiveness, the source of which is unknown, and to which one is tempted to ascribe an elementary character.

But when a group is formed the whole of this intolerance vanishes, temporarily or permanently, within the group. So long as a group formation persists or so far as it extends, individuals in the group behave as though they were uniform, tolerate the peculiarities of its other members, equate themselves with them, and have no feeling of aversion towards them. Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views, only be produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people. Love for oneself knows only one barrier-love for others, love for objects. The question will at once be raised whether community of interest in itself, without any addition of libido, must not necessarily lead to the toleration of other people and to considerateness for them. This objection may be met by the reply that nevertheless no lasting limitation of narcissism is effected in this way, since this tolerance does not persist longer than the immediate advantage gained from the other people's collaboration. ... p103 If therefore in groups narcissistic self-love is subject to limitations which do not operate outside them, that is cogent evidence that the essence of a group formation consists in new kinds of libidinal ties among the members of the group.

^{xxiv} Information & availability [The Interpretation of Dreams: 1st November 1899 \(published as 1900\): Sigmund Freud](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=655) or [here](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=655) // <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=655> : Chapter II Analysis of a specimen dream, p107 of James Strachey's translation : Dream of July 23rd-24th, 1895 – A large hall – numerous guests, whom we were receiving. -Among them was Irma. I at once took her on one side, ... I took her to the window and looked down her throat, ... I at once called in Dr. M., ... My friend Otto was now standing beside her as well, and my friend Leopold From p108 is Freud's analysis of this dream.

^{xxv} Seminar II : 16th March 1955 : p155-156 of Sylvania Tomaselli's translation : Information & notes [Seminar II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: 1954-1955: begins 17th November 1954 : Jacques Lacan](#) or [here](#) // <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=1141> : Is it really a question of the regression of the ego at the moment when Freud avoids waking up? What we see is that, from this point on, it's no longer a question of Freud. He calls professor M. to his aid because he can't make head or tail of it. This won't get him a better one, a better head or tail. 5 [Footnote 5 The untranslatable pun in French is between 'perdre son latin' ('no longer understand anything') and 'en donner un meilleur, de latin' (roughly, 'be given a better one, of Latin').]

Doctor M., the circle's dominant figure, as he calls him - I haven't identified who it is - is an entirely respectable character in the everyday life of practice. He has certainly never done Freud a great deal of harm, but he doesn't always agree with him, and Freud isn't the sort of man to accept that easily.

There's also Otto and his chum Leopold, who goes one better than his chum Otto. This gives him considerable merit in Freud's eyes, and he compares the two of them to Inspector Bräsig and his friend Karl. Inspector Bräsig is a sly one, but he's always wrong, because he fails to take a close look at things. His chum Karl, always at his side, notices them, and all the inspector has to do is follow him.

With this trio of clowns, we see a rambling dialogue built up around little Irma, closer in fact to a game of interrupted conversations, and even to the well-known dialogue of the deaf.

All this is extremely rich and I am just summarising. Then the associations which show us the real meaning of the dream appear.

^{xxvi} SE XVII p186 of James Strachey's translation : Most frequently it is boys who are being beaten (in girls' phantasies), but none of them is personally known to the subject. The situation of being beaten, which was originally simple and monotonous, may go through the most complicated alterations and elaborations; and punishments and humiliations of another kind may be substituted for the beating itself : But the essential characteristic which distinguishes even the simplest phantasies of this phase from those of the first, and which establishes the connection with the intermediate phase, is this: the phantasy now has strong and unambiguous sexual excitement attached to it, and so provides a means for masturbatory satisfaction. But this is precisely what is puzzling. By what path has the phantasy of strange and unknown boys being beaten (a phantasy which has by this time become sadistic) found its way into the permanent possession of the little girl's libidinal trends?

Nor can we conceal from ourselves that the interrelations and sequence of the three phases of the beating-phantasy, as well as all its other peculiarities, have so far remained quite unintelligible.

^{xxvii} SE XVII p189 of James Strachey's translation : The phantasy of the period of incestuous love had said: 'He (my father) loves only me, and not the other child, for he is beating it.' The sense of guilt can discover no punishment more severe than the reversal of this triumph: 'No, he does not love you, for he is beating you.' In this way the phantasy of the second phase, that of being beaten by her father, is a direct expression of the girl's sense of guilt, to which her love for her father has now succumbed. The phantasy, therefore, has become masochistic. So far as I know, this is always so; a sense of guilt is invariably the factor that transforms sadism into masochism.

^{xxviii} "In the Penal Colony" ("In der Strafkolonie") (also translated as "In the Penal Settlement") is a short story by Franz Kafka written in German in October 1914, revised in November 1918, and first published in October 1919.

^{xxix} SE XVII p189-190 of James Strachey's translation : This second phase-the child's phantasy of being itself beaten by its father-remains unconscious as a rule, probably · in consequence of the intensity of the repression. I cannot explain why nevertheless in one of my six cases, that of a male, it was consciously remembered. This man, now grown up, had preserved the fact clearly in his memory that he used to employ the idea of being beaten by his mother for the purpose of masturbation, though to be sure he soon substituted for his own mother the mothers of his school-fellows or other women who in some way resembled her. It must not be forgotten that when a boy's incestuous phantasy is transformed into the corresponding masochistic one, one more reversal has to take place than in the case of a girl, namely the substitution of passivity for activity; and this additional degree of distortion may save the phantasy from having to remain unconscious as a result of repression. In this way the sense of guilt would be satisfied by regression instead of by repression. In the female cases the sense of guilt, in itself perhaps more exacting, could be appeased only by a combination of the two.

^{xxx} SE XVII p189 of James Strachey's translation : In this way the phantasy of the second phase, that of being beaten by her father, is a direct expression of the girl's sense of guilt, to which her love for her father has now succumbed. The phantasy, therefore, has become masochistic. So far as I know, this is always so; a sense of guilt is invariably the factor that transforms sadism into masochism. But this is certainly not the whole content of masochism. The sense of guilt cannot have won the field alone; a share must also fall to the love-impulse.

^{xxxi} Probably a reference to Seminar IV, which has yet to be translated. See [Seminar IV : The Object Relation & Freudian Structures 1956-1957 : begins 21st November 1956 : Jacques Lacan](#) or [here](#) <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=11980> If you know better, let Julia Evans know.

^{xxxii} SE XVII p189 of James Strachey's translations : see footnote above p4 or footnote xxviii

^{xxxiii} Probably for 1923,

The infantile genital organization (An interpolation into the theory of sexuality) : 1923e : Sigmund Freud : SE
???? ++ Vol 7 pfl :

p310 of Vol 7 pfl : But it seems to me that the significance of the castration complex can only be rightly appreciated if its origin in the phase of phallic primacy is also taken into account.

P312 of Vol 7 pfl : It is not unimportant to bear in mind what transformations are undergone, during the sexual development of childhood, by the polarity of sex with which we are familiar. A first antithesis is introduced with the choice of object, which, of course, presupposes a subject and an object. At the stage of the pregenital sadistic-anal organization, there is as yet no question of male and female; the antithesis between active and passive is the dominant one. [1] At the following stage of infantile genital organization, which we now know about, maleness exists, but not femaleness. The antithesis here is between having a male genital and being castrated. It is not until development has reached its completion at puberty that the sexual polarity coincides with male and female. Maleness combines subject, activity and possession of the penis; femaleness takes over object and passivity.

[1] A passage added in 1915 to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d).

xxxiv Lecture 33 – Femininity : New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis : 1932 (Published 1933) : Sigmund Freud : p146 Vol 2 pfl SE +++++ p +++ **(Bold added) : SE XXII p112-135 Published**

www.Freud2Lacan.com , [download here https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Femininity.pdf](https://www.freud2lacan.com/docs/Femininity.pdf)

To-day's lecture, too, should have no place in an introduction; but it may serve to give you an example of a detailed piece of analytic work, and I can say two things to recommend it. It brings forward nothing but observed facts, almost without any speculative additions, and it deals with a subject which has a claim on your interest second almost to no other. Throughout history people have knocked their heads against the riddle of the nature of femininity -

Häupter in Hieroglyphenmützen,

Häupter in Turban und schwarzem Barett,

Perückenhäupter und tausend andre^[1]

Arme, schwitzende Menschenhäupter. . . .

[Heads in hieroglyphic bonnets^[1]

Heads in turbans and black birettas,

^[1]Heads in wigs and thousand other

^[1]Wretched, sweating heads of humans...^[1]

(Heine, *Nordsee*, Second Cycle, VII, 'Fragen')

Nor will you have escaped worrying over this problem - those of you who are men; to those of you who are women this will not apply - you are yourselves the problem. When you meet a human being, the first distinction you make is 'male or female?' and you are accustomed to make the distinction with unhesitating certainty. Anatomical science shares your certainty at one point and not much further. The male sexual product, the spermatozoon, and its vehicle are male; the ovum and the organism that harbours it are female. In both sexes organs have been formed which serve exclusively for the sexual functions; they were probably developed from the same disposition into two different forms. Besides this, in both sexes the other organs, the bodily shapes and tissues, show the influence of the individual's sex, but this is inconstant and its amount variable; these are what are known as the secondary sexual characters. Science next tells you something that runs counter to your expectations and is probably calculated to confuse your feelings. It draws your attention to the fact that portions of the male sexual apparatus also appear in women's bodies, though in an atrophied state, and vice versa in the alternative case. It regards their occurrence as indications of bisexuality [*], as though an individual is not a man or a woman but always both - merely a certain amount more the one than the other. You will then be asked to make yourselves familiar with the idea that the proportion in which masculine and feminine are mixed in an individual is subject to quite considerable fluctuations. **Since, however, apart from the very rarest cases, only one kind of sexual product - ova or semen - is nevertheless present in one person, you are bound to have doubts as to the decisive significance of those elements and must conclude that what constitutes masculinity or femininity is an unknown characteristic which anatomy cannot lay hold of.**

Can psychology do so perhaps? We are accustomed to employ 'masculine' and 'feminine' as mental qualities as well, and have in the same way transferred the notion of bisexuality to mental life. Thus we speak of a person, whether male or female, as behaving in a masculine way in one connection and in a feminine way in another.

But you will soon perceive that this is only giving way to anatomy or to convention. You cannot give the concepts of 'masculine' and 'feminine' any new connotation. The distinction is not a psychological one; when you say 'masculine', you usually mean 'active', and when you say 'feminine', you usually mean 'passive'. Now it is true that a relation of the kind exists. The male sex-cell is actively mobile and searches out the female one, and the latter, the ovum, is immobile and waits passively. This behaviour of the elementary sexual organisms is indeed a model for the conduct of sexual individuals during intercourse. The male pursues the female for the purpose of sexual union, seizes hold of her and penetrates into her. But by this you have precisely reduced the characteristic of masculinity to the factor of aggressiveness so far as psychology is concerned. You may well doubt whether you have gained any real advantage from this when you reflect that in some classes of animals the females are the stronger and more aggressive and the male is active only in the single act of sexual union. This is so, for instance, with the spiders. Even the functions of rearing and caring for the young, which strike us as feminine par excellence, are not invariably attached to the female sex in animals. In quite high species we find that the sexes share the task of caring for the young between them or even that the male alone devotes himself to it. Even in the sphere of human sexual life you soon see how inadequate it is to make masculine behaviour coincide

with activity and feminine with passivity. A mother is active in every sense towards her child; the act of lactation itself may equally be described as the mother suckling the baby or as her being sucked by it. The further you go from the narrow sexual sphere the more obvious will the 'error of superimposition' become. Women can display great activity in various directions, men are not able to live in company with their own kind unless they develop a large amount of passive adaptability. If you now tell me that these facts go to prove precisely that both men and women are bisexual in the psychological sense, I shall conclude that you have decided in your own minds to make 'active' coincide with 'masculine' and 'passive' with 'feminine'. But I advise you against it. It seems to me to serve no useful purpose and adds nothing to our knowledge.

* James Strachey's footnote : Bisexuality was discussed by Freud in his 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality' : 1905d

^{xxxv} SE XVII p190 of James Strachey's translation : In two of my four female cases an elaborate superstructure of day-dreams, which was of great significance for the life of the person concerned, had grown up over the masochistic beating-phantasy. The function of this superstructure was to make possible a feeling of satisfied excitation, even though the masturbatory act was abstained from. In one of these cases the content-being beaten by the father-was allowed to venture again into consciousness, so long as the subject's own ego was made unrecognizable by a thin disguise. The hero of these stories was invariably beaten (or later only punished, humiliated, etc.) by his [JE her] father.

I repeat, however, that as a rule the phantasy remains unconscious, and can only be reconstructed in the course of the analysis.

^{xxxvi} Ibid.

^{xxxvii} SE XVII p191 We find here for the first time, too, something like a constancy of sex in the persons who play a part in the phantasy. The children who are being beaten are almost invariably boys, in the phantasies of boys just as much as in those of girls.

^{xxxviii} SE p191 This characteristic is naturally not to be explained by any rivalry between the sexes, as otherwise of course in the phantasies of boys it would be girls who would be being beaten; and it has nothing to do with the sex of the child who was hated in the first phase. But it points to a complication in the case of girls. When they turn away from their incestuous love for their father, with its genital significance, they easily abandon their feminine role. They spur their 'masculinity complex' (Van Ophuijsen, 1917) into activity, and from that time forward only want to be boys.

^{xxxix} SE XVII p191 For that reason the whipping-boys who represent them are boys too. In both the cases of day-dreaming -one of which almost rose to the level of a work of art-the heroes were always young men; indeed women used not to come into these creations at all, and only made their first appearance after many years, and then in minor parts.

^{xl} See [Being Analysed – Chapter 3 of Anna Freud – a biography : 1988 : Elisabeth Young-Bruehl](#) Availability & information [here](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=11994) // <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=11994>

^{xli} See [The Relation of Beating-Phantasies to a Day-Dream : 31st May 1922 : Anna Freud](#) : Information [here](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=11997) | <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=11997>

^{xlii} Note from Young-Bruehl above : a letter from Anna Freud to her father of 9th August 1919 : Note, she also, in August 1919, about five months after her father finished his essay "A Child Is Being Beaten,' told him by letter that she had written down for the first time what she called "the great childhood story," which may have been the medieval tale of Egon referred to in her poem.

^{xliii} Beyond the Pleasure Principle : 1920g : Sigmund Freud, SE XVIII p1-64 : Probably p55-56 of James Strachey's translation : This tallies well with the hypothesis that the life process of the individual leads for internal reasons to an abolition of chemical tensions that is to say, to death, whereas union with the living substance of a different individual increases those tensions, introducing what may be described as fresh 'vital differences' which must of course be one or more optima. The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the 'Nirvana principle', to borrow a term from Barbara Low [1920, p73]) – a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; [Footnote 1 The whole topic is further considered in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924c)] and our recognition of that fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death instincts [JE drive].

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The Economic Problem of Masochism : 1924 : Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, SE: XIX p ???+, PFL Vol 11. P414-415 However this may be, we must perceive that the Nirvana principle, belonging as it does to the death instinct [JE drive], has undergone a modification in living organisms through which it has become the pleasure principle ; and we shall henceforward avoid regarding the two principles as one. It is not difficult, if we care to follow up this line of thought, to guess what power was the source of the modification. It can only be the life instinct [JE drive], the libido, which has thus, alongside of the death instinct, seized upon a share in the regulation of the processes of life. In this way we obtain a small but interesting set of connections. The *Nivana* principle expresses the trend of the death instinct [JE drive] ; the *pleasure* principle represents the demands of the libido ; and the modification of the latter principle, the *reality* principle, represents the influence of the external world.

None of these three principles is actually put out of action by another. As a rule they are able to tolerate one another, although conflicts are bound to arise occasionally from the fact of the differing aims that are set for each – in one case a quantitative reduction of the load of the stimulus, in another a qualitative characteristics of the stimulus, and, lastly [in the third case], a postponement of the discharge of the stimulus and a temporary acquiescence in the unpleasure due to tension.

The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the description of the pleasure principle as the watchman over our life cannot be rejected.

^{xliv} The Economic Problem of Masochism : 1924 : Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, SE: XIX p ???+, PFL Vol 11. P416-417 : But if one has an opportunity of studying cases in which the masochistic phantasies have been especially richly elaborated, one quickly discovers that they place the subject in a characteristically female situation ; they signify, that is, being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby. For this reason I have called this form of masochism, *a potiori* as it were [i.e. on the basis of its extreme examples], the feminine form, although many of its features point to infantile life.

^{xlv} See The Economic Problem of Masochism : 1924 : Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, SE: XIX p ???+, PFL Vol 11. P417 : This feminine masochism which we have been describing is entirely based on the primary, erotogenic masochism, on pleasure in pain. This cannot be explained without taking our discussion very far back.

^{xlvi} - Seminar XVII : 21st January 1970 : p V 14 of Cormac Gallagher's translation : www.LacanianIreland.com :

Over against this use of propositions, shall we not, before leaving, present the following – ‘A child is being beaten’. This indeed is a proposition that constitutes the whole of this phantasy. Can we attribute to it anything whatsoever that can be described in terms of true or false? This case, which exemplifies what cannot be eliminated from any definition of the proposition, allows us to grasp that if this proposition has the effect of being sustained by a subject, no doubt, it is by a subject as Freud immediately analyses it, divided by enjoyment. Divided, I mean that just as much the one who states it, this child that *wird*, *vertu*, *verdit*, *verdoie*, because of being beaten, *geschlagen*- let us play around a little bit more- this child who grows green, is beaten, jokes (*verdit*, *battu badine*), *virtue*, these are the misfortunes of *vers-tu*, namely, the one who is hitting him, and who is not named, however the sentence is stated. The *you are beating me* is this half of the subject whose formula creates its link to enjoyment. To be sure, he does receive his own message in an inverted form- that means here, his own enjoyment in the form of the enjoyment of the Other. This indeed is what is at stake when the phantasy finds itself, in the first place, linking the image of the father to another child- It is the fact that the father enjoys beating him that here puts the stress on meaning and also on this truth, which is a half - because moreover, the one who is identified to the other half, to the subject of the child, was not this child, unless, as Freud says, one reconstitutes the intermediary stage- never in any way substantiated by memory – where in effect it is himself. It is he who from this sentence creates the support of his phantasy, who is the beaten child.

Thus we are led back in fact to the fact that a body can be faceless (*sans figure*). The father, or the other, whoever he may be, who here plays the

role, guarantees the function, provides the locus of enjoyment, is not even named. A faceless God, make no mistake. He nevertheless cannot be grasped except as body. What has a body and does not exist? Answer – the big Other. If we believe in this big Other, he has a body that cannot be eliminated from the substance of the one who said *I am what I am*, which is a quite different form of tautology. This is why [pV 15] before leaving you I will allow myself to put forward something which is so striking in the story that, in truth, it is astonishing that it has not been sufficiently emphasised, or indeed not at all – materialists are the only authentic believers. Experience has proved it - I am talking about the time of the most recent historical eruption of materialism in the 18th Century. Their God is matter. Well then, why not? This holds up better than all the other ways of grounding him.

Only for us that is not enough, precisely because we have logical needs, if you will allow me to use this term.

Because we are beings born from surplus enjoying, the (12) result of the use of language.

When I say the *use of language*, I do not mean that we use it. It is we who are used by it. Language uses us, and that is how it enjoys itself. That is why the only chance of God's existence, is that He – with a capital H- enjoys, it is that He is enjoyment.

^{xlvii} Probably Seminar III : 16th November 1955 : Information & availability [Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=657) or [here](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=657) || <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=657> : p13 of Russell Grigg's translation : The relation that Freud establishes between this phenomenon and this very special *knowing nothing of the thing, even in the sense of the repressed* expressed in this text translates as this - what is refused in the symbolic order re-emerges in the real.

There is a close relation between, on the one hand, negation and the reappearance in the purely intellectual order of what has not been integrated by the subject and, on the other, *Verwerfung* and hallucination, that is, the reappearance in the real of what the subject has refused. Here we have a range, a series, of relations.

^{xlviii} Probably [The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power: 10th-13th July 1958 : Jacques Lacan](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=138) : See [here](http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=138) | <http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=138> : p44 of Cormac Gallagher's translation : The truth of this appearance is that desire is the metonymy of the lack of being. [manque à l'être]

: From p259 of Alan Sheridan's translation : Let us observe for the moment that if the desire is signified as unsatisfied, it does so through the signifier: caviar, qua signifier, symbolizes the desire as inaccessible, but, as soon

as it slips as desire into the caviar, the desire for caviar becomes its metonymy – rendered necessary by the want-to-be in which it is situated.

Metonymy is, as I have shown you, the effect made possible by the fact that there is no signification that does not refer to another signification and in which their common denominator is produced, namely the little meaning (frequently confused with the insignificant), the little meaning, [*Cormac Gallagher's translation, www.LacaninIreland.com : namely the bit of sense (frequently confused with the non-significant) the bit of sense,*] I say, that proves to lie at the basis of the desire, and lends it that element of perversion that it would be tempting to find in this case of hysteria.

The truth of this appearance is that the desire is the metonymy of the want-to-be. [*the lack-of-being – CG*]