

Published (1) La Cause Freudienne , No 40, 1999

(2) p41-54 of Psychoanalytical Notebooks PN 3 - Love, Autumn 1999

See https://www.londonsociety-nls.org.uk/Publications/psychoanalytical-notebooks/003/Di-Ciaccia-Antonio_The-Love-of-God-and-of-the-Neighbour.pdf

THE LOVE OF GOD AND OF THE NEIGHBOUR

Antonio Di Ciaccia

The commandment

“*Ante omnia, fratres carissimi, diligatur Deus deinde proximus, quia ista praecepta sunt principaliter nobis data*”. Thus begins the rule written by St. Augustine in the IVth century, become in the course of the history of the Church the rule followed by most religious orders.

Let’s underline three terms: *primo*, that God is the object of love, *secundo*, that the neighbour is also an object of love, *tertio*, that that love is a precept.

To love — God and the neighbour — is therefore an obligation. It means that this love is not natural. The term ‘love’ is attributed to the relation with respect to God and to the neighbour in an inappropriate way. One could say by displacement. Whilst *al cuor non si comanda*, on the contrary, love with respect to God and the neighbour is imposed. The fact that it is a matter of obligation means that the commandment is opposed to the natural tendency of murder of the neighbour and nullification of God.

The term ‘love’ has therefore a double sense: the first sense indicates what St. Thomas defined as ‘*prima omnium passionum*’¹, and which is deployed naturally ‘*in appetitu naturali, sensitivo et intellectivo*’² in two registers, that of friendship and of concupiscence of sexual desire.³ The other sense is relevant to the precept, generally, designated in theological tradition by the term charity. Whilst love in its first sense is natural, anchored in the body, sensitive to sexual desire, charity, on the contrary, is not natural, not anchored in the body, in principle it does not know sexual desire which is either effaced or repressed or denied or sublimated. Charity is supernatural, transcendent, contemporary with the emergence of an otherness which is exterior to it, otherness which surrounds it, envelops it and marks it off. Charity is not experienced as an instinct or a drive, but it arrives from outside like an obligation and like a gift. Obligation and gift which according to religious myth is provided by God. “*Charitas non est in nobis naturaliter, nec causatur ex actibus nostris, sed infunditur a Deo*”.⁴ The base on which charity stands is not of the order of feeling, of affects, indeed of desire, but of another order, that theology attributes to God. That’s why charity is a theological virtue,⁵ that is to say, it is transcendent, as is belief and hope. But charity is superior because, as the apostle Paul writes, it ‘never stops’ (1st Co, XIII, 8), alone subsisting beyond the Last Judgement.

The object of the commandment

After a discussion in which Christ had silenced the Sadducees, it was the turn of the Pharisees to put him in a predicament. One of them questioned him: ‘Master, what is the greatest commandment of the Law?’ Jesus said to him: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy mind: that’s the greatest and the first commandment. The second is similar: thou shalt love thy neighbour like thyself. To these two commandments clings the entire Law and the Prophets” (Mt. XXII, 36-40).

Thus is announced the commandment in the gospel. Christ notes that it concerns a commandment already written in the Torah. Announced by Christ in the gospel of Matthew — a gospel addressed to the Jewish people —, in the gospel of Luke — addressed to the gentiles and written by someone known to St. Paul — a jurist who takes up again a passage from Deuteronomy (Dt. VI, 5) and another from Leviticus (Lv. XIX, 18) announces it.

But what does this commandment in the Old Testament mean? By the side of God, it means that the people of Israel must love Yahve. That the people of Israel have no sense nor existence outside of that relation which binds them to Him by a symbolic pact. Let’s underline these two aspects: one the one hand, God installs into his people a relation of reciprocal and exclusive belonging, ‘Thou shalt have no other gods but me’ (Ex. XX, 3), and, on the other hand, nothing counts outside this relation. Yahve wants above all to preserve his relation with his people without concerning himself with other people nor with their gods (Dt. VI, 14). The idea of a universalisation is late and only appears amongst the prophets. It concerns a universalisation which only involves the power of God, for Yahve ‘wilt exercise his authority over the nations’ (Is. II, 4), but it is not about a universalisation amongst the

peoples, for the nations only have to recognise that from “Zion will come the Law and from Jerusalem the oracle of Yahve” (Is. II, 3).

Yahve is therefore unique. Uniqueness which — contrary to the God that one will call the God of the philosophers after Pascal — is bound to the fact of being a God of the particular: “I am the God of thy Father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob” (Ex. III, 6). Uniqueness and particularity, those are the traits of Yahve.

The traits that Yahve requires of Israel are fear and faithfulness: “And now, Israel, what does Yahve, thy God require of you? But to fear Yahve, thy God” (Dt. X, 12). It’s certainly not by chance that Jacques Lacan refers to the ‘fear of God’ in order to illustrate in *Seminar III* the essential point which knots the signified and the signifier, essential point that he is going to call anchoring point.⁶ And still in the same seminar Lacan by the fear of God indicates the other element in play in the relation between God and Israel: ‘faithfulness’.⁷ This faithfulness is for man the fruit of the fear of God, and for God faithfulness is the principle attribute (Ps. LXXXIX, 50).

From the term faithfulness — which is for Israel and for Yahve, faithfulness to the word, to the pact, to the alliance — gushes out all the nuances that can be illustrated by human love, by conjugal love, by passionate love, as Lacan remarks with regard to Hoshiah in *Seminar XVII: L’envers de la psychanalyse*. God’s fidelity is immutable and without reproach. Israel’s fidelity leaves something to be desired. This faithful God presents himself as jealous, irritable, discontent, angry because of the fact that Israel is limited and balks at remaining faithful to the line indicated by Him. The tone varies, going from invective: “You profited from your fame in order to prostitute yourself, in your debauchery you made offers to all comers..” (Ez. XVI, 15), to tenderness: “You are very beautiful, my beloved, and without a stain” (Ct. IV, 7), as far as being human, too human: “You make me lose my mind, my sister, my fiancée, you make me lose my mind by just one of your looks [...]: how delicious is your love, more than wine!” (Ct. IV, 9-10)

As for love of the neighbour in the Old Testament, it’s written in Leviticus: “Yahve spoke to Moses and said: ‘speak to the whole community of the children of Israel, say to them: be holy, for I, Yahve, your God, am holy. Each one of thee shall fear his mother and his father. [...] None of thee shall steal, lie or defraud his fellow countryman. [...] Thou shalt not bear hatred in thy heart towards thy brother. [...] Thou shalt neither revenge thyself on the children of your people nor bear them any rancour. Thou shalt love thy neighbour like thyself” (Lv. XIX, 1-18). Inspired by the Decalogue, Leviticus takes up the legislation of the Pentateuch. The ten commandments are resumed under the sole commandment of loving God and the neighbour.

In this context it is clear that the neighbour is the counterpart. Love for the neighbour is the love that in the name of the God of Israel every child of Israel carries for each and every child of Israel, counting himself in their number. The stranger is hardly cited, Yahve recommending to leave him something: “Thou shalt not hoard the left over of thy harvest [...] Thou shalt give it up to the poor and to the stranger” (Lv. XIX, 9-10), what Booz will do for Ruth the Moabite. The enemy in contrast must be destroyed because, as idol worshipper, he endangers the faithfulness of Israel: “Kill all the male children. Also kill all the women who have shared a bed with a man [...]” (Nb. XXXI, 17).

The enemy is the neighbour

Freud in *Civilisation and its Discontents* considers the commandment ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’ as a pretension that comes from the ‘*Idealbildungen des Menschen*’.⁸ Freud continues a few pages further on that it is a pretension, known everywhere in the world that’s older than Christianity which presents it as its most grandiose declaration. In fact, as we have just seen, this precept comes from the Torah. Nevertheless, Freud is correct because Christ brings a rectification to it: “You have learned that it has been said: thou shalt love thy neighbour and thou shalt hate thy enemy. But I tell you: love thy enemies” (Mt. V, 43-47). This rectification is also found in the gospel of Matthew and Luke.

In fact, it is an interpretation from the precept from the Torah and consists in devaluing the usual reading according to which loving one’s neighbour means loving one’s loveable counterpart which makes the counterpart emerge in the foreground as not loveable: Cain inhabits each and every counterpart. But Cain must be loved despite his murderous act. Now if Genesis tell us that Yahve had marked Cain with a sign, so that no one might strike him, and “if someone slays Cain, vengeance will be heaped upon him seven times” (Gn. IV, 15). Christ tells us that to love one’s own, Cain is the sign of love for God, this God who, besides, is at the bottom of the evil that gripped Cain for his brother: “Then, Yahve welcomed Abel and his offering. But he did not welcome Cain and his offering, and Cain was very angry with a despondent look” (Gn. IV, 4-5). Because of that ‘Cain threw himself upon his brother and killed him’ (Gn. IV, 8).

To love thy neighbour and to love thy enemy are hence the same thing. In both cases the commandment orders the love for another whose heart is structurally evil. Lacan will show us in

Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis "...that each time Freud stops horrified before the consequences of the commandment regarding love of the neighbour, what emerges is the presence of that darkest evil which dwells in the neighbour".⁹ Indeed, after having professed reciprocal love between counterparts — accepting at bottom "*Liebe deinen Naechsten wie der Naechter dich liebt*", which means I love you if you love me — and having made much of his profound revolt against the new commandment of loving the enemy, Freud concludes that fundamentally loving one's neighbour and one's enemy is the same thing, '*Es ist im Grunde dasselbe*'.¹⁰

Lacan compared to Freud goes further because amongst the others, the subject must also include himself. The himself is not read by Lacan as the reference point to allow love by identification, but it is read inside out, that is that me as well, as much as the other, evil dwells in me. Indeed, he concludes: "But if that is the case, then it also dwells within me (that evil)".¹¹ Lacan takes one more step compared to Freud since the heart of 'myself' is structurally the same as the heart of the other: in which the death drive dwells, *jouissance*, he will say later.¹² So, where the subject and the other are identical, not under the sign of the ideal, but under the sign of the *kakon*.¹³ "The Christian commandment reveals from this case the value it has to be prolonged [...] like yourself you are, at the level of speech, the one that you hate in the demand for death because you ignore it. There it meets up with a point on the horizon where the instructions of Freud are articulated, his *Wo es war, soll Ich werden*. It's also what another wisdom expresses in its You are that".¹⁴

Early on, it did not escape Lacan that someone who flaunted it in his way in the Christian tradition did not contest the aphorism of Plautus '*Homo homini lupus*',¹⁵ taken up again by Freud,¹⁶ who was able to confirm on the contrary that "man's ferocity in the place of his counterpart goes beyond anything amongst the animals".¹⁷ It was Baltasar Gracian, Jesuit and man of the court.¹⁸ As for his role in the question: "*Utrum sit de necessitate charitatis, ut inimici diligantur*", replies St. Thomas of Aquinas that in itself love for the enemy is '*perversum*'.¹⁹ So, if one must love the enemy, it's because he, too, is a neighbour. And the neighbour must be loved, not because he is good or bad, but solely because of God: "*Charitas diligit proximum propter Deum, ideo objectum ejus proprie est Deus*".²⁰ If we add that '*amor in divinis est subsistens*'²¹ developed at length in the *Summa*, we have the outline of a theological vision of love that one owes to God, love in its essence, and to the neighbour as object of a derived love.

At bottom Freud and St. Thomas reach the same conclusions: to love one's neighbour and one's enemy is the same. But this love is mad for Freud which is 'a case analogous to *Credo quia absurdum*'.²² For St. Thomas this love is in itself perverse but becomes worthy because of God's love. God is therefore the pivot of the question. But what is going to happen if God collapses? Will the commandment go away? Will men finally be freed of the weight of the law? Not at all. Lacan recalls "I brought to notice that the phrase of the old father Karamazov, 'If God is dead, then everything is allowed', the conclusion which imposed itself in the context of my experience, that the reply to 'God is dead' is 'nothing is any longer allowed'".²³ For his part, although Freud makes the 'apostle Paul'²⁴ responsible for having raised the commandment to its universal value, he recognises that the precept is an obligation that comes from the '*Kultur-Ueber-Ich*',²⁵ of the superego of civilisation. Nevertheless, Lacan here as well takes one more step compared to Freud when he recognises that the precept is a commandment that the structure imposes. The Ten Commandments are commandments of speech. It's for that that respect of the Ten Commandments is fundamental. Indeed, that these commandments are laws of speech, "all disorders begin to affect the function of speech from the moment in which they are not respected".²⁶ Lacan gives more status to the transcendent and non-natural value of the precept, but without giving an ontological status to God nor to the superego, agencies which have on the contrary a structural value. Let's recall in this regard some givens: exteriority logically precedes man but is structurally concomitant with him; the fact that "so-called divine creation is a double of the speaking being to the serpent"²⁷; the fact that the speaking being includes in itself "the first fault — it's the advantage of my sinthome to begin there, sin in English meaning peche",²⁸ Lacan remarks. On the one hand, original sin, as one knows, is the other face of the speaking being. On the other hand, "God is not in language, but he includes the totality of the effects of language, including psychoanalytical effects which is no small thing".²⁹ Finally, despite 'the horizon uninhabited by being',³⁰ structure remains.

Two cases to illustrate

Christ questioned by a lawyer mentioned above on 'Who is my neighbour?', replies with the parable of the good Samaritan. "A man, certainly a Jew, was travelling down from Jerusalem to Jericho. Brigands after having stripped him naked and covered him with blows left him half-dead. A priest goes by and carries on his way; a Levite will do the same, both being held to the Law towards their counterpart. A Samaritan, a stranger and a heretic, 'passes by, stops, tends to the Jew', therefore an

'enemy'. Christ asks: 'which of these three in your opinion, has shown himself to be the neighbour of the man who fell into the hands of the brigands?'" (Lc. X, 29). Reply: the Samaritan.

The parable of the good Samaritan calls for the well known apologue of St. Martin. With justice Lacan remarks that the apologue of St. Martin puts into play more than charity but *jouissance*. As Pierre-Gilles Gueguen noted in his exposé made last year in Jacques-Alain Miller's course, this apologue allows Lacan "to estimate that the value of the object and the value of the gesture are not reducible to their use-value nor even to their exchange-value but to their value of *jouissance*".³¹ Why? Because the altruism of St. Martin is at bottom a form of egoism, useful "in avoiding approaching the problem of the evil that I desire and that my neighbour desires".³² There is a second point: the beggar. He is in need and begs. St. Martin in replying to the demand corks up the need and obstructs him from 'continuing to desire'.³³ Indeed, Lacan raises the question about knowing whether the beggar was begging for something else, namely '...that St. Martin either kill him or fuck him'.³⁴ Jacques-Alain Miller remarks that "it's another thing not as excess of pleasure but a different still as evil".³⁵ It's about a beyond of need which is not metonymised as desire but precipitates as *jouissance*.³⁶ In the apologue of St. Martin, Jacques-Alain Miller remarks, 'there is no third'.

between St. Martin and the beggar remains dual. If one holds to this reading, the gesture of St. Martin which illustrates a broad, usual vision of charity does not conform to the precept of the Gospel: "When I give away all my goods in alms, when I deliver up my body to the flames, if I have no charity, it's of no use to me" (1st Co, XIII, 3), St. Paul writes in one of his Epistles. For St. Paul, doing charitable works is not the same thing as having charity. One might say that only on condition of having charity is doing charitable works something else than a modality of narcissism.

Different to the apologue of St. Martin, the parable of the good Samaritan shows the way to understanding what having charity means and not doing charitable works. For doing charitable works a dual relation is enough. For having charity there has to be a third. This third transforms the subject's act: the subject is not doing charitable works but on the contrary incarnates it. As we have seen, in the Bible this third is God. Indeed, the Gospel leads us to a new third.

How does he bring in the parable? Above all by breaking the symmetrical relation expected by the interlocutors: the parable brings into the scene not one Jew and another Jew, neither a rich Jew nor a poor Jew, but a Jew and a heretical stranger. Whilst one is expecting the subject of the act to be the Jew, the roles are reversed: the subject of the act is the other, someone who, being heretical, has not been submitted to the Law, and in whom, being a stranger, hate should normally dwell. Now, against all expectations the latter becomes his enemy's neighbour.

In the name of what does the Samaritan act? Certainly not in the name of God because the Samaritan does not have an orthodox faith. Heretical, as he is, his act cannot be referred to a dogmatically guaranteed faith. Neither in the name of ideals because the Samaritan does not share them, being a stranger, nor to reply to the Jew's demand who, left half-dead by the brigands, is not in a position to demand consciously whatever it is. In the name of what, then, is he going to love his neighbour-enemy? The parable does not say and leaves the lawyer in a predicament: "Go, and you, too, do the same" (Lc. X, 37), one says to him. Must he turn himself into a heretic? Stranger? Must he leave his ideals? Renounce his faith? The New Testament gives its reply elsewhere.

From a symbolic third to a real third

Christ goes straight to the point. Professing his dependence on God, he is indicating that henceforward one has to go through him. In other words, if he is supporting the function of God the Father, Christ is establishing an obligatory passage by way of his person: he incarnates the third. Henceforward, the figure and function of God the Father are displaced onto the horizon. At the moment of the Last Judgement Christ will say to the just: "I was hungry, and you gave me to eat, I was thirsty, and you gave me to drink [...]" The just reply to him: "When did it happen that we saw you famished, that we fed you, parched, that we gave you to drink [...]", Christ will say: "Truly I say to you where you have done that for the least of my brothers, you have done it for me" (Mt. XXV 35-40). In the Gospel the Last Judgement is not based on the fact of having or not having faith but on the fact of having or not having charity.

The relation

Christ claims to be the third and the obligatory passage by which one testifies to having charity. What does it mean, then, in this context to have charity? It means to love Christ, or more exactly the body of Christ — with all the meanings that it takes on — through the waste products of humanity, whether one knows it or not, whether one recognises it or not. But why love him? Because of the particular function which belongs to him which is that of being the cause of desire. Cause of desire for man, expressed in the form of being the cause of deliverance from sin (Ro. VIII, 1-3), but also, according to the Gospel just simply cause of desire, because he causes the desire of God Himself, being the cause of the entire creation, according to the Apostle John: "Everything came to pass through Him,

and without Him nothing came to pass" (John, I, 3). Imposter? madness? Blasphemous? As everyone knows, this last hypothesis which was held before the Sandrine by "the chief priest who tore his clothes, saying: he blasphemed" (Mt., XXVI, 65). The rest is known: "What do you think about it? They replied: he deserves to be put to death" (Mt., XXVI, 66). A necessary death to accomplish the writing said to be Matthew's Gospel (Mt., XXVI, 54). The accomplishment of this scripture means so that man can be redeemed, the Son of man has to be sacrificed, and this sacrifice wanted as the sign of love by the Father is of the order of the necessary: it's the *mysterium fidei*.³⁷

The saint

The 'mystery of faith' is the key to the vault of theological architecture but also its blind spot about which the New Testament and the Church Fathers remain mute: the putting to death of the Son of man by the will of the Father, although glorified by the resurrection which follow the passion, and justified by the redemption produced by it, contains an absolute non-sense. In the myth the lack of signifier makes it appearance at a named point. "It's from there which all these formulas which negate existence derive, in the 'there is not'. They negate existence and assert — it's the reverse — that there is lack".³⁸ This structural lack is at the same time hidden and unveiled by the myth, which is "a signifying articulation that covers over a hole in the structure".³⁹ One understands why, then, Jacques-Alain Miller entitles a chapter in *L'envers de la psychanalyse From myth to structure*,⁴⁰ in order to emphasise what Lacan is pointing out, namely that in a myth one refinds a 'bone'.⁴¹ On this point let's recall that from the theological point of view, the sacrifice of Christ completes the sacrifice of Abraham, and that from the point of view of structure, the murder of Christ, the murder of Moses as told by Freud and the murder of the Father of the mythical, Freudian horde all have a certain number of points in common.

What interests us here is the function incarnated by Christ, a function which has a double face: on the one hand, to be trash, product of an operation which caused his death 'in nailing him to the cross' (Ac. X, 39), 'scandal for the Jews and madness for the pagans' (1st Co. I, 23), and, on the other hand, to be cause of desire: "the stone that the builders threw out became the cornerstone" (1st P. II, 7).

Lacan, qualifying the analyst as saint [*saint*], is not just playing with words, but he is also referring to a tradition which like all traditions is more or less idiotic.⁴² Now in the Christian tradition what is the condition that someone become a saint? According to St. Thomas the condition to become a saint '*in charitate consistit*'.⁴³ The condition for becoming a saint is not in having faith. The faithful person, as Freud explains in *Group Psychology*,⁴⁴ is an element of the crowd, on the one hand, linked from the libidinal point of view to Christ, and, on the other hand, to the other faithful persons by identification. The condition for being a saint is also not an identification with such and such a trait of Christ. About this tradition speaks more modestly of imitation. In fact, the condition for being a saint is also to incarnate — as Christian announces it — that double-faced function: to make oneself trash and to cause desire.

Like for the saint, for the analyst the big Other is reduced to little (*a*) and the *agalma* does not go without the *palea* which is recalled yet one more time by Lacan at the end of the *Note italienne*. Lacan condenses this double-faced function in the neologism 'decharitise'. "A saint, to make myself understood, does not have charity. Rather he gives himself over to becoming trash: he decharitises, in order to realise what the structure imposes, that is to allow the subject, the subject of the unconscious to take him as cause of his desire".⁴⁵

However, psychoanalysis is not Christianity. Because Christianity, at the same time as it shows threads of the structure, veils that 'other knowledge'⁴⁶ by which one might be able "to make love more worthily than the burgeoning prattle that it constitutes right now".⁴⁷

A few remarks

First remark: universalisation. In the New Testament universalisation renders all men equal: everyone becomes just anyone — everyone has the same rights and duties — and everyone becomes someone,

divine redemption being offered to all, one by one: "Neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free man, neither man nor woman" (G., III, 28).

Second remark: particularity. Although a universal, God remains unique and particular: the God of Abraham becomes the God of Jesus. The superimposition of the common God onto the particular God will be twelve centuries later the exercise and the symptom of St. Thomas of Aquinas.

Third remark: one notes a displacement operating in the Judeo-Christian tradition from the religion of the Father to the religion of the agalmatic object. It did not escape Lacan who stressed: "...this strange Christocentrism in Freud's writings".⁴⁸ Besides, Lacan sees this double function of the Judeo-Christian tradition: on the one hand, the function of veiling the inexistence of the Other and of assisting in the restoration of the father, and, on the other hand, of unveiling the inexistence of the Other and of indicating a beyond of the father: "...there is a certain atheistic message in Christianity

itself, and I am not the first to have mentioned it. Hegel said that the destruction of the gods would be brought about by Christianity".⁴⁹

Fourth remark: this displacement from the religion of the Father to the religion of the agalmatic object stresses a perverse trait. As Lacan remarked: 'God is *père-vers*. It's a fact made patent by the Jew himself'.⁵⁰ But the traits of perversion are pronounced in Christian mystics. Recall Angela de Foligno who "used to drink with delight the water in which she just washed the feet of lepers", or Marguerite-Marie Alacoque who used to eat 'the excrement of an ill man'.⁵¹ Jacques-Alain Miller notes that Lacan gets 'perversion' to emerge⁵² when he says that it would not be the same thing 'if the excrement were of a beautiful girl [...]'⁵³ instead of 'anyone who calls himself a neighbour'.⁵⁴ As we have just seen, when the neighbour is Christ himself, it confirms the aura of perversion perceived by Lacan. At the point that one could say that one is passing from the religion of the Father which is called by Freud *Menschheitsneurose*,⁵⁵ neurosis of humanity, to a religion of the agalmatic object which one might qualify as, especially in its Catholic version, collective neurosis with sublime traits of perversion.

Translated by Richard Klein

1. T. Aquinatis, *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.20, a. 1,c.
2. *Ibid.*, p.1, q. 60, a. 1, c.
3. *Ibid.*, p.1, q. 60, a. 3, c.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 2-2, q.24, a. 2, o.
5. *Dictionnaire de Theologie catholique*, tome II, B, Paris, 1932, col. 2217-2266.
6. J. Lacan, *Seminar III*, trans. R. Grigg, Routledge, London, 1993, p.264.
7. *Ibid.*, p.267.
8. S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, 1930, SE XXI.
9. J. Lacan, *Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, trans. D. Potter, Routledge, 1992, London, p.186.
10. S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, op.cit.
11. J. Lacan, *Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, op.cit. p.186.
12. I refer to numerous passages in Jacques-Alain Miller's course *The Lacanian Orientation*, a teaching given within the framework of the Department of Psychoanalysis of the University of Paris VIII and amongst others the classes of 17 December 1997 and of 7 January 1998 of *The Partner-Symptom* (unpublished).
13. J. Lacan, *Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, especially ch. VI, ch. XIII, ch. XIV, ch. XV, op.cit.
14. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire V, Les formations de l'inconscient*, Paris, Seuil, 1998, p. 507.
15. T.M. Plautus, *Asinaria*, II 4, 88.
16. S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, op.cit.
17. J. Lacan, *Introduction theorique aux fonctions de la psychanalyse en criminologie*, *Ecrits*, Seuil, 1966, p.147.
18. Cf. *Les Documents de la Bibliotheque de l'ECF*, "Homo homini lupus ou l'homme detrompe. Une reference de Jacques Lacan dans ses *Ecrits* au *El Criticon* de B Gracian." ECF-ACF, Paris, 1998.
19. T. Aquinatis, *Summa Theologica*, op.cit., p.2-2, q. 25, a. 10.
20. *Ibid.*, p.2-2, q. 1. a. 1, 3; q.23, a. 5.
21. *Ibid.*, p.1, q. 37. a. 1, 2.
22. S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, op.cit.
23. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire V, Les formations de l'inconscient*, op.cit, p.496.
24. S. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, op.cit.
25. *Ibid.*
26. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire V, Les formations de l'inconscient*, op. cit. p.497.
27. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIII, Le sinthome (1975-76)*, *Ornicar?* No.6, 1976, p.4.
28. *Ibid.*
29. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXII, R.S.I., (1974-75)*, *Ornicar?* No. 2, 1975, p.103.
30. J. Lacan, *Direction of treatment and Principles of its Power in *Ecrits*: A Selection*, trans. A. Sheridan, Routledge, London, 1977, p. 276.
31. P.-G. Gueguen, J.-A. Miller, *Le partenaire-symptôme*, op.cit, 17 December 1997. 32. J. Lacan, *Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, op.cit., p.187.
33. *Ibid.*, p.228.

34. Ibid., p.186.
35. J.-A. Miller, Le partenaire-symptôme, January 7, 1998, op.cit.
36. Ibid.
37. Dictionnaire de Theologie catholique, Tome X, B, Paris, 1929, col. 2586-2599.
38. J.-A. Miller, L'orientation lacanienne: Extimité (1985-86), 29 January 1989.
- A. Zenoni, Myth et Réel in Quarto, No. 57, 1995, p.7.
39. J. Lacan, Le Séminaire XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse, Paris, Seuil, 1991, p.137.
40. Ibid., p.128.
41. J. Lacan, Le Séminaire XXII, R.S.I., op.cit., Ornicar?, No.5, p.17.
42. T. Aquinatis, Summa Theologica, op.cit., p.2-2, q. 186, a. 2.
43. S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 1921, SE XVIII.
44. J. Lacan, Television, trans. G. Mehlman, Norton, 1990, p. 15.
45. J. Lacan, Note Italienne in Ornicar? No.25, 1982, p.8.
46. Ibid., p.10. In reading this text before its publication Virginio Baio told me that he found in it the guidelines which allowed him to speak of love of the real.
47. J. Lacan, Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, op.cit., p.176. 48. Ibid., p.178.
49. J. Lacan, Le Séminaire XXII, R.S.I., op.cit., p.43.
50. Ibid., p.221.
51. J.-A. Miller, Le partenaire-symptôme, 7 January 1998, op.cit.
52. J. Lacan, Seminar VII, The Ethics of psychoanalysis, op.cit. p.188. 53. J.-A. Miller, Le partenaire symptôme, op.cit.
54. S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, 1939, SE XXIII.

This text was originally published in La Cause freudienne No 40, 1999.