



HURLY- BURLY

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Éric Laurent

Private Language, Private Jouissance

This paper was delivered at PULSE (Paris-US English Language Seminar) held in Paris on 2 May 2010. Éric Laurent is an Analyst Member of the École de la Cause freudienne and the New Lacanian School.

A Superior Determination

IN the presentation he gives of his method in the 1904 paper, "Freud's Psychoanalytic Procedure", Freud opposes any method based on suggestion.¹ He argues for a logic in which the patient has to "let himself go". He states that, from the beginning, the analyst and the analysand are subject to the logic of association, so called "free association".

Free association is a pun on the associationism of Wundt who, at the end of the nineteenth century, on more or less the same basis as the cognitivism of today, was enchanted by the forced logic of associations. For Freud, so-called free association revealed a determination of another order.

Lacan would provide this operation with its matheme. To set out the matheme for the beginning of analysis, which the first session introduces, is of

¹ Freud, S., "Freud's Psychoanalytic Procedure" in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works...*, Vol. VII, Hogarth Press, London, 1959, pp. 247-254.

course to maintain Freud's formalisation in his metaphorical reference to chess.² Lacan's matheme sets out the fact that, in association, one signifier is linked to another.

$$S_1 \longrightarrow S_2$$

And this has the effects of producing a subject whose identifications are put in suspension.

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \longrightarrow S_2$$

This reveals a superior determination, beyond any possible identification which is that of jouissance. This can be written down as the object *a*.

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \longrightarrow \frac{S_2}{a}$$

This logic is not the logic of the function of the automaton. It doesn't have to be conceived of as a kind of "mechanism", as logical positivism fancied. The production of the subject *between* identifications requires both a horizon of truth and the more intimate relations between the order of symbolism and the "feeling of life", the body and what exceeds it, i.e. the object *a*. In this sense, an analysis begins when the relationship any one of us has with the symbolic order, or disorder, what lacks in it, is stated.

The Horizon of Truth

PSYCHOANALYSIS as a practice of truth, in opposition to any logical positivism spelt out by Lacan in his 1951 "Presentation on Transference" when he reminds us that Freud took Dora's words and her complaints about her father's statements of a truth that has to be taken into account in order to open the field of the analysis.³ Freud, who had treated Dora's father two years before her first session, knew about the whole situation, knew how deep ran the father's lies to his family, and to his daughter especially. So, it is when Freud begins to take into account the function of truth in Dora's complaints, in her wording, that the

² Freud, S., "On Initiating Treatment", in *Wild Analysis*, transl. by A. Bance, Penguin, 2002, pp. 4-5.

³ Lacan, J., "Presentation on Transference" in *Écrits, The First Complete Edition in English*, transl. by B. Fink, Norton & Co., 2006, p. 177; pp. 178-9.

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Private Language Jouissance

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transl. by A. Bance, Penguin, 2002, pp. 43-64
The First Complete Edition in English, transl. by

analytic symptom separates off from the medical or psychological symptom. It
can be recognised in its peculiarity.

When we say it has a function of truth, we must not forget that the truth we
are speaking about is peculiar. It cannot be reduced to the value of a letter like
those in logical truth tables.

T
F

Rather, the *Salva veritate* permutations that can be produced in any given
statement open up a hole in language.

X

This hole is occupied by a fragment of the body. This body is broken,
imaginary, and split, but it comes to the place at which this argument is opened
up in language.

The truth table is very peculiar in psychoanalysis. Dora can state, *All men
are liars. My father is a man, and so my father is a liar*. But to state this peculiar
truth she has to put a part of her own body into it.

Take her aphonia. It is a way of stating this truth. *The proof that all men are
liars, is that I, Dora, become aphonic. I cannot say anything, I lose my voice. And
why do I lose my voice? It's because I know my father uses his tongue for
cunnilingus to give his mistress, Mrs. K, her jouissance because he is impotent*.
In her aphonia, she denounces her father. Her aphonia follows on from her
cough, which likewise referred to a scene of sexual gratification *per os*.

So this is a strange way, an equivocal way of stating one's truth through the
symptom.

Private Language and the Private Relationship with Jouissance

THIS runs counter to the movement of logic. You remember in "Über Sinn und
Bedeutung" of 1892, Frege wanted to eliminate any equivocal constitutions of
the context, just as Quine wanted to do in the following century. He wanted to
obtain an unequivocal functioning of the logic of modality. He wanted to reduce
the opacity of contexts. You know the basic example of the morning star and the
evening star which are two expressions (*Sinn*) that refer to the same reference
(*Bedeutung*). They are two meanings that lead to the same reference, not a star

but a planet, the very bright planet Venus. In opposition to this, our functioning of truth in psychoanalysis presents the equivocal uses of language.

For example, let's take an obsessional subject who complains of being late to all his obligations, late for everything he has to do in life. At a certain level this is universal, any obsessional subject will complain sooner or later that he is late, and if you're drawing up the next DSM, you can state that one feature of the obsessional subject is that he complains about being late. This is of absolutely no use in psychoanalysis. This objectification, this itemisation is of no interest. What's more interesting is that, during the preliminary sessions, at the same time as this subject states his complaint, he also asks himself why he has dreams that keep recurring in which he has an incestuous relationship with his aunt. In his family, his mother was on the side of duty, and her sister, his aunt, was the feminine one, the one with charm, and of course he had some inclination towards her. But why does he have these dreams? In French, you have a play on words between *la tante*, "the aunt", and *l'attente*, "the wait". So, when he states for the third time, *pourquoi la tante ?*, there the analyst says, "it's true, why *l'attente*?" With this wordplay – this is also a particularity of the French language, it is not possible in English – with this contingency you can aim towards a peculiarity of the *jouissance* at stake in *l'attente*. Instead of registering this in the universal or in the generality of the category of *the obsessional who is always late*, you aim towards a subjectification of this waiting in his own language. His own language includes the fact that as a child he had an incestuous object like his aunt.

The problem is, this is not causation. You cannot use this to say, for instance that all obsessional subjects have an incestuous inclination towards their aunt. It can't be done. They all have, in a more or less strict sense, an incestuous relation to the forbidden object, but the peculiarity of this relation has to be stated in his story and in the language he speaks. In this case, it involves the common use of the French language, but for him, within his own use of the common language he has a peculiarity of his private language. For him *la tante/l'attente* is a nexus of meanings. They cannot be separated out, they cannot be rendered univocal with Frege's procedures. It has to come through the evocation of the obscure object of *jouissance* that is written in the pun between *la tante* and *l'attente* and which resonates throughout his childhood history.

So, entering the meanders of subjectivity through the equivocal use of language is opposed to any objectification, to any cognitive-behavioral approach. We do not aim at self-observation, observation of one's body, nor even bio-feedback. The only bio-feedback we admit is the one that cannot have any representation, that of the *jouissance* at stake. This cannot be re-presented by a machine which can show the subject the measure of his anxiety or his brain functioning. If you show him a picture of his aunt and show him that his heart has just accelerated, you're on the wrong track. This has to do with a kind of *jouissance* that cannot be represented as such.

In Freud's history is evident when the Rat which rats are introduced states that, "as I was to one of my loved ones unknown to himself". It indicates that it can also have a drive. But it's always unknown.

So, both with the hysteric's position of *jouissance*, which is established by the articulation of the re-

Truth and Jouissance

ACROSS the development between truth and *jouissance*.

First, he tried to be tamed by a certain use, could introduce it. This was the idea coherent with his pre-drive. It was the idea of *jouissance*. That was

Then he tries to re-

This is like in the table of *jouissance*.

This extraction of language – the object of particular truth.

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In Freud's historical example, we meet this kind of approach at its most evident when the Rat Man, telling Freud about his fascination with the torture in which rats are introduced into the anus of a poor condemned subject, stops and states that, "as I was telling you of this horror, I had the idea that it could happen to one of my loved ones". Freud notes on the face of the Rat Man a jouissance unknown to himself. That's how Lacan translates it, which makes it resonate for us. It indicates that jouissance in the Rat Man has a kind of enormous presence. It can also have a discreet presence, as in the pun between *la tante* and *l'attente*. But it's always unknown to the subject.

So, both with Dora, where the accent lies more on truth, which fits with the hysteric's position, and with the Rat Man, where the accent lies more on jouissance, which fits more with the obsessional position, beyond the signification established by common language, we can see them giving voice to the articulation of their private relationship with jouissance.

Truth and Jouissance in Lacan's Teaching

ACROSS the development of his teaching, Lacan examines this relationship between truth and jouissance from different positions.

First, he tried to think in terms of a jouissance from the body that could be tamed by a certain use of truth. He thought that the signifier as such, through its use, could introduce some silence into the expression of jouissance and regulate it. This was the idea that the signifier was the death of the object, which was coherent with his presentation of Freud's repetition-compulsion as the real death drive. It was the idea that the signifier could silence the excess of life present in jouissance. That was one moment of his teaching.

Then he tries to reduce this functioning of jouissance at the place of truth.

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \longrightarrow \frac{S_2}{\textcircled{a}}$$

This is like in modern logic, like a letter that could function in some kind of table of jouissance.

$$\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{T} \\ F \end{array}$$

This extraction of the place of jouissance within the functioning of a private language – the object *a* as a letter – could obtain a kind of taming of that particular truth.

And then, finally, he considered that jouissance would not be able to function as a linked variable after all, and rather that jouissance uses language as a means of empowerment. The only empowerment is jouissance itself using truth and knowledge as a way to expand its field. Jouissance is the real substance involved, the only one, the one that it is impossible to reduce and impossible to empty out. It is the ineluctable remainder that is at stake after the operation of emptying-out that happens within the subject.

To obtain this impossible, this remainder, it is first necessary to connect the subject to his jouissance. In a deeper sense, this is the operation that Lacan calls "subjective rectification"; the operation that Lacan describes in speaking of Freud's approach to Dora: *my dear Dora, you complain about the state of the world, but you participate in this state of the world, you are building it, you are an agent of it*. According to Lacan, this is a Hegelian reference to the law of the heart. Hegel was playing the ironist, considering the romantic complaints he had to live with in the 1820s to be the intellectuals' way of participating in the order of the world. Lacan takes up this law of the heart by stating that, yes, it has to be recognised as a truth, but Dora's truth underlies its jouissance in metaphor.

A	Truth
J	Jouissance

Senso

THIS metaphor between language *per se* and jouissance can be written down as *joui-sens*, as the enjoy-meant that any formulation, any wording of meaning as such, would include.

<i>Joui-sens</i>
Jouissance

We meet this in the short story by Camillo Boito, which Visconti adapted into a great film: *Senso*. *Senso* is at once an absolutely meaningless story of two people who destroy themselves without any reason, simply out of fascination for their own death and destruction, and at the same time, a lush description of the joy of the senses in *fin-de-siècle* Venice at the time of the Austrian occupation. This jouissance cannot be separated from its aspect of death drive.

This is what has been appearing in contemporary psychiatry's reduction of the beyond of the pleasure principle to "addiction". This extension of the field of addiction, where anything can be submitted to the addiction principle, simply shows how nowadays, conflating sexual practice with "lifestyle", or maintaining

the notion of some natural horizon that the term precisely, in an attempt is ready to abandon. However, the real of "addiction" and the Tiger Woods, Michael treated in clinics that

Non-action and U

IN analysis, introducing pleasure and what is first interpretation of interpretation once the other.

And then the analysis and the subject. How his power of subject He has to refuse what mean that he can let to what might be the good, it's quite another patient, you know what

In analysis, the position the Christian tradition the community, from the Other, or the position of non-action, refers to

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
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the notion of some natural sexual instinct, is ever more absurd. The naturalistic horizon that the term "perversion" includes seems absolutely ridiculous, but precisely, in an attempt to save this naturalistic, biological reference, psychiatry is ready to abandon all the sexual identifications to the relativism of gender. However, the real of sexual practices is making its return with this idea of "addiction" and the treatment of the real beyond the pleasure principle. Thus, Tiger Woods, Michael Douglas and a host of other serial philanderers are being treated in clinics that supposedly operate at this level, the level of addiction.

Non-action and Un-Work

In analysis, introducing this connection to all the facets of jouissance, to both pleasure and what lies beyond the principle of pleasure, is obtained through the first interpretation. Lacan stresses the fact that, once you have made the interpretation once, then it can no longer repeat. You stop referring to the little other.



Simplified L Schema

And then the analysis proceeds through the interplay between the big Other and the subject. How does the analyst obtain that? He has to refrain from using his power of subjection, his power to indicate to the subject what he has to do. He has to refuse what might appear to be the good of the subject. This doesn't mean that he can let his patient do whatever he wants, without any indication as to what might be the worst for him. It's one thing to refrain from indicating the good, it's quite another not to indicate the worst. And once you get to know the patient, you know what the worst is for him.

In analysis, the position of what Lacan called the saint, whether the saint in the Christian tradition, the one who cuts himself off from common bonds, from the community, from the world order, to dedicate himself to speaking to the big Other, or the position found in the Oriental tradition of Wu-Wei, the Tao principle of non-action, refers to a position where the analyst acknowledges that he

doesn't have the slightest clue about what is good for the subject. He cannot identify with any Aristotelian position, or any other philosophical position on what the "good life" is. There is no such thing in the analytic experience. There are only peculiarities, upon which the subject builds his own "good life", the one that is right for him. It is of no use to any other subject.

Saying that the interplay lies in the relation between the subject and the Other is a way of stating that when the subject comes into analysis, his unconscious speaks. In his everyday life, he is acting out the unconscious knowledge of his fantasy.

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \longrightarrow \frac{\textcircled{S_2}}{a}$$

So when he comes into analysis he has to put this knowledge in the place of truth.

$$\frac{a}{\textcircled{S_2}} \longrightarrow \frac{\$}{S_1}$$

With knowledge in the place of truth, he will stop acting out his routine or usual way of obtaining jouissance by the division produced in him.

In a way, this is an objection to the idea that one "works" in analysis. It is commonly said, "I want to work with you", or if one is a bit more Lacanian, "I want to work with you on my impasses". The issue is not to work, it is to *un-work*; it is to stop working and let something pass through that has nothing to do with work, something that has nothing to do with the master/slave set-up where the slave works and the analyst would be the master of this peculiar operation.

Let's say that the idea of analysis as work is a Calvinist-Lutheran conception, it is *Beruf*. So we have precisely to refuse this too. The connection with jouissance is beyond any possible work. And what's at stake will pass through, not while the subject is working, but, from now on, in dreams. In dreams, the "ideal worker" will appear, the ideal worker of the dream.⁴ It is ideal in the sense that there is no consciousness that can be responsible for the dream. The dreamer can never obtain his definite description within the dream. He cannot represent himself. He is, as Freud said, in all the different places in the dream. He is at once master and slave; victim and torturer; man and woman. He stands at the place of all the opposite positions that can be stated, described and isolated.

In this sense, what appears with this installation of the dream as the royal road to the unconscious, as Freud calls it, which suspends any master signifier

– that would be the unconscious – where there is no representation formulated, beyond an

It Ain't Necessarily

In a sense, with the open determinations of the term, the law or constitution of a field is revealed where

Hilary Putnam used the operations and considerations of Wittgenstein's language without having any a priori essence of the fact. Existence at the start of the development of games was also developed

One has to bear in mind logical positivism, because you connect the subject consist in obtaining the determination of a common language which rather produce the fact shows how these encounters, they just meet "it ain't necessarily so"

Lacan stated that to produce "creative effects" the subject can build the peculiarity of the encounter way, and rather than as the hole in language which backwards, which can be contingencies.

4 Lacan, J., "Television", translated by D. Hollier, R. Krauss, & A. Michelson in *Television/A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, Norton & Co., New York/London, 1990, p. 14.

5 Putnam, H., "It Ain't Necessarily So"
6 Lacan, J., "On My Antecedents"

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– that would be the un-royal way – is a space into which the subject is introduced where there is no representation, but where ideas, thoughts or statements are formulated, beyond any identification.

It Ain't Necessarily So

In a sense, with the opening of the unconscious through dreams, beyond the determinations of the fantasy, of the subject's relationship to his object *a*, beyond the law or constitution of his fantasy which is an approximation of his jouissance, a field is revealed where the subject can perceive "it ain't necessarily so".

Hilary Putnam used this song title in his famous paper⁵ where, in his reading of Wittgenstein's language games, he shows that you can follow a series of operations and consider facts of the world, states of the world that can appear without having any a priori essence, without having any a priori definition of the essence of the fact. Existence can appear without necessarily being there at the start of the development of the series. This reading of Wittgenstein's language games was also developed by Kripke with his Skeptical Paradox.

One has to bear in mind these logical approaches that are opposed to any logical positivism, because something like this occurs in psychoanalysis. Once you connect the subject with his jouissance, the analytic operation does not consist in obtaining the law that determines his fantasy, but rather in developing the determination of a chain in which you can have the list of all his private uses of common language, which do not define any kind of absolute determination, but rather produce the fact that things can be otherwise. The analytic operation shows how these encounters with the substance of jouissance were contingent encounters, they just happened that way, but things could be otherwise. And so, "it ain't necessarily so".

Lacan stated that at a certain point the symptom "swings back" and can produce "creative effects".⁶ The peculiarity of the symptom is the point at which the subject can build his own peculiarity. It's the same in the fantasy: the peculiarity of the encounters with jouissance can be stated and appear in this way, and rather than ascribing the subject with a determination, they show him the hole in language where his jouissance was located, which can be read backwards, which can be read as an unknown factor that is open to other contingencies.

X

⁵ Michelson in *Television/A Challenge*:
London, 1990, p. 14.

⁵ Putnam, H., "It Ain't Necessarily So", in *Journal of Philosophy*, Issue 59, 1962, pp. 658-71.

⁶ Lacan, J., "On My Antecedents", in *Écrits, The First Complete Edition in English, op. cit.*, p. 52

At the end of his teaching, Lacan connects the *impossible* and the *contingent*, and this is the real secret that gives the flavour of the first session of psychoanalysis. At the same time as you operate this connection on a subject and show him the determinants behind the making of his fantasy, on the horizon, in the end, it will be impossible to obtain a coherent law of the operation of the fantasy. In the end, it will remain as a question mark. The mystery of it all is that the more you know about it, the more the enigma opens up, and the more contingency appears. In the end, the impossible, that part which it is impossible to reduce, which is the remainder left over after the development of the psychoanalysis, harbours the power of contingency and the fact that things could be otherwise.

Questions

Juan Felipe Arango (Miami): *Lacan establishes a theory of the beginning of analysis in the "Presentation on Transference", but later he adds the S^a which reminds us that the analyst has to be included in the representation of the unconscious. There is an operation that is there from the beginning.*

Éric Laurent: The S^a, the "any signifier"⁷, reminds me of what Saint Paul writes in his Epistles where he says that the real Christian has to be anything for any man.⁸ In his own strange way, Paul reminds us – for him, it was not the unconscious, it was the truth of Christ – that this has to be linked to *someone*. This was how he interpreted the prophet's position. In the Hebrew tradition he interpreted it as being "all things to all men", so that any complaint, any human pain, can find its direction.

The analyst has to be *whatever* or *whoever* because he has to be the point of address of any human pain conceivable in the historical time in which he lives. Beyond prohibition, beyond any existing representation of the ideal of the community he lives in, he has to welcome all of these horrible objects he is presented with, and mustn't put a stop to them, in the name of other signifiers. He mustn't propose the master signifier that might well be able to read the pain that someone is bringing to him. Saying that he is in the position of "any signifier" – *whatever* or *whoever* – is the same as saying that, at the beginning, he doesn't possess the master signifier that would allow him to read what is at stake. First, he's got to make the connection between *jouissance* and the symbolic disorder, and afterwards, the master signifiers will appear with which the subject was reading his own position, with which he was accusing himself for not being able

⁷ Lacan, J., "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School", transl. by R. Grigg, in *Analysis*, Issue 6, 1995, p. 5.

⁸ I Corinthians 9:19-22.

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the same day!

⁹ Cf. "Signification
Pass... or to Fin
pp. 80-1.

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 that any complaint, any human

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 that, at the beginning, he doesn't
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 with which the subject was
 using himself for not being able

to face up to his impasses in life, his guilt, and so on. All of this will be produced
 and then cast into the dustbin of history.

Marie-Hélène Brousse (Paris): *Your last sentence was very beautiful: "It could be otherwise". I would just emphasise the difference between "it could be otherwise", which is the logical conclusion of an analytic treatment, and another sentence which is not: "It could have been otherwise". We often hear this second version. The two versions are very different. There is a strong difference in the time variable.*

That is my first observation. For my second, I would like to recall a small formation of the unconscious that occurred in yesterday morning's session. Thomas Svolos was introducing Heather Chamberlin, and he said, "You are from England, no, sorry, I should say, The United Kingdom". And she replied, "Oh, it goes by many names!". I heard the identification Thomas Svolos was intending, and I think your paper gave us its logical mechanism, or its logical aporia, when you developed the difference between meaning and reference. Between the morning star and the evening star, between England and the United Kingdom, we meet the same impossible reference. I suppose this is the value of England as object a, where it is loved or hated, etc.

This mechanism is fundamental in psychoanalysis because we are working through a long process of naming, starting with the names present in the speech of parents and others, trying to find our proper name. You frequently mentioned the notion of "private language" which could be used in the sense of the name one calls oneself. In another paper you gave, you spoke about jouissance as use, there is no other use but jouissance.⁹ And jouissance organises names, especially so given the fact that there are many names for the same referent.

Éric Laurent: Yes, this is the way we read the expression by this hidden logician that Friedrich Nietzsche is, when he said that there is the Eternal Return and one has to love the Eternal Return. What exactly is the Eternal Return? Is it the Eternal Return of the Same? Is the Eternal Return of the Same what Freud called repetition compulsion with only a slight variation? It had to be radicalised in the sense that the Eternal Return of the Same is, in the end, the possibility of contingency.

Marie-Hélène Brousse: *Like in the film Groundhog Day! The Eternal Return of the same day!*

⁹ Cf. "Signification of language as the effect of jouissance produced by its use", in Laurent, É., "The Pass... or to Finesse Against the Subject Supposed to Know", in *Hurly-Burly* Issue 2, November 2009, pp. 80-1.

Éric Laurent: It's a very melancholic position. On the same theme we have Borges's *Funes el memorioso*, the short story of a perfect nominalist who could not forget anything he had done in life. There, it's not the Eternal Return of the Same, it's the co-presence of his entire life. And so he dies. Just as the librarian in the library of Babel falls into the books, Funes falls into the words. There is an absolute absence of life in all that.

So, contrary to this version, we hold that there are many names, but this is neither a nominalist conception nor a realist one. It has to be taken up in the modalities, in the strange function of contingency where the impossible functions as an opening door to contingency, which is an unusual way of thinking of the logic of modalities.

Noa Farchi (Paris): *Unlike the Christian imperative of "know thyself", in Judaism it's "know where you're coming from and where you're heading" It seemed to me that in your lecture you were maybe denouncing both types of knowledge. What is the status of what one comes to analysis with? What one brings to analysis is fundamental, it is the reason one begins an analysis, and yet you say it could be otherwise.*

Éric Laurent: One of the differences between the Hebraic tradition and the Christian one lies in the fact that Saint Paul makes an interpretation of truth in which, for him, truth is absolutely separate from falsehood or untruth. Truth was absolute. In one of his Epistles he denounces for instance the pagans who knew that language could imply falsehood, and he said that one of their philosophers presented himself as a liar.¹⁰ Epimenides the Cretan who said, "I am Epimenides the Cretan, all Cretans are liars". He knew all the paradoxes that were written in the logical tradition of Pagan philosophy and he despised them. For him there was an absolute function of truth.

In the Judaic position, the fact that in Solomon's Judgment truth is obtained with a lie implies a distinction between what has to be obtained and the way it is obtained. That truth and lie are mixed and cannot be separated. You have to go through the process to obtain, at the end, some kind of lying truth. It depends on its efficiency.

In the end, to state the possible absorbance of jouissance into language, Lacan affirms this "mendacious truth" that is developed through analysis. It is more on the Solomonian side than on the side of the absolute use of truth. One comes to analysis with one's fixation on what one's encounters with jouissance have been, and it is only through a kind of Solomonian process that at the end you can know who you are. You are the one who did that and it can be otherwise tomorrow.

¹⁰ Titus 1:12.

Stijn Vanheule: *off from seeing the truth of analysis? Do*

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Take an example of two women. To find out, with the possibilities beyond these real partners mean of course this cannot be itself.

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Stijn Vanheule (Ghent): *With regard to the position of the saint who cuts himself off from social order and goes for a certain truth, like the analyst who goes for the truth of the unconscious, where would you place him at the beginning of analysis? Does it have to do with his handling of silence?*

With the saint and Wu-Wei, is it a matter of analytic silence? It is a matter of active analytic silence. The sinologist and philosopher François Julien commented on how Wu-Wei uses the propensity of things, it always uses the structure of things. The analyst uses this to show the analysand the way, not by stating what he has to do, but by always reminding him of the Tao of the analysis, always reminding him that, in any circumstance, it is not about silence, but about indicating through silence where lies the royal road of the dream that can help in any dilemma the analysand might be facing.

Take an obsessional analysand torturing himself over the choice between two women. The idea is not to say which of them is "best" for him, it is rather to find out, with the dream, what signifiers a woman presents him with, and what possibilities, what contingencies are present there. Who is his real partner beyond these choices? This is the active use of silence, reminding him who the real partner is beyond any apparent choices he has to make in life. This does not mean of course that some choices are not for him more ad hoc than others, but this cannot be indicated directly, it always has to pass through the Tao of analysis itself.

Question on the link and the difference between jouissance and the death drive with regard to addiction.

Éric Laurent: Jouissance is a way to state that anything that's linked with pleasure is at the same time linked with the beyond of pleasure. You cannot separate jouissance and the death drive. You have always to be aware that anything in life you are interested in is dangerous. Love is suicide, as Freud stated. Passion is death. And for the rest, as the flamenco singer Camarón de la Isla said, "everything I love in life is either prohibited or makes me fat."

Russell Grigg (Melbourne): *In the "it could be otherwise", there is both the question of contingency and necessity. There are some things that could be otherwise, but there are also some things that couldn't be otherwise. Is it the case that the purification of the fantasy can be understood in terms of this difference between contingency and necessity?*

Éric Laurent: The purification of the fantasy is to delineate what *could not have been otherwise*. In this contraction that leads to the object, to the operation of jouissance, to the fact that everything you have invented in your life, in your work,

with your sexual partners and your partners in love, all of that, in the end, there is a kind of fundamental experiment that reveals the absolute *necessity* of it all – let's call it a *necessary* connection – but at the same time, it reveals that *it could be otherwise*. So, in the same movement by which you *necessarily* reveal the connections between different aspects of your life that you never thought were related to the fantasy, the minute details of your life, the decisions you made in moments when you felt forced or absolutely compelled to do something, when you felt you had no liberty at all, no "free will" in the philosophical sense, even there, there was a fantasy at stake. *It was necessarily so*, it appears that it is *impossible* for it to have been otherwise, but at the same time that this is revealed, it is also revealed to be *contingent*: you can create the word. It's not *how to build worlds with words*, but *how you can build a word where the words carry a different meaning than they used to have*. The meaning they had was linked *necessarily* to the fantasy, but once exposed, they can have another meaning.

As Lacan said, give me sufficient time to speak and I will change the meaning of any word. In analysis there is something like that. Given enough time to develop the analysis, words can change their meaning and at the same time they are produced as the master signifiers of your life. Those words were words you were working for, because they allowed you to read the world, and now, through analysis, the word can be read from another perspective.

Marie-Hélène Brousse: *There is one condition for language's power of indetermination, and that is the substitutive principle of metaphor. So long as you are in a world where you can substitute one signifier for the other, you have the power of indetermination of language. If, however, you cannot deploy the substitutive principle, you are not in a contingent world, but a paranoiac world.*

Éric Laurent: Either you use the word in a system of reduction, which is what the philosophical tradition does, or you use it as the reverse, as the power to change the meaning that the word carries in your own private world.

If metaphor and metonymy are absolute, you fall into madness, it's true. But there is also the perfect world that Lévi-Strauss and Jakobson dreamt of, where, parallel to their use of metaphor and metonymy, they had the idea that there was such a thing as universal discourse. Once you abolish the idea that there is such a thing as universal discourse, then metaphor and metonymy are consequences of that inexistence and allow for the substitution and displacement of words that cannot refer in the final instance to a precise thing. They can only refer to the hole that's written into the structure of the absence of universal discourse.

Transcribed by Matt Schneider
Established with footnotes by Adrian Price

Studies - Speaking -

Herbert Wach

The Child

A first version of the
séminaires; Lacan's
Herbert Wachstein,
and the New Lacan

In his Seminar on the
Roman Jakobson's
that was inspired by
lecturer in linguistics
published in 1962 as
whom she recorded
as he slept alone in
or "soliloquies", and
"perhaps the primary

1 Weir, R. H., *Language* -