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!URGENT!

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DISRUPTION OF JOUISSANCE IN THE MADNESSES UNDER TRANSFERENCE

Éric Laurent

I have chosen this title to explore the use that we can make of transference, according to the indications given by Lacan, in what Jacques-Alain Miller has called his last teaching, the one that starts with *Encore* (1972-1973). I have chosen to use the term “madness” because of the new emphasis it acquires in a text of the same period, which includes the provocative phrase “everyone is mad, that is delusional.”¹ I have also used the word disruption, because it is the title under which I have – along with Nouria Gründler, Dominique Laurent and François Ansermet – been teaching this year at the ECF, and also because it is the term chosen by Jacques-Alain Miller as synonymous with the effraction that jouissance constitutes in the homeostasis of the body, as the basis for the repetition of the One:

In all the cases to which analysis gives access, its mode of entry [that of jouissance] is always that of an effraction, in other words not deduction, not intention or evolution but rupture, a disruption in relation to a previously established order created by the routine of discourse through which significations are kept in check or in the routine that we imagine for the animal body.²

Disruption is taken here in two senses. It is both the first effraction and also its aftershocks, which in some cases keep disturbing the various states of homeostasis or stabilizations that the subject has been able to establish as defences against the sudden effraction of a jouissance of which he is unaware.

This paper was originally given as a keynote presentation at the XI Congress of the World Association of Psychoanalysis in Barcelona, *Ordinary Psychoses and the Others, Under Transference*, April 2018. Éric Laurent is a psychoanalyst practicing in Paris. He is an Analyst Member of the School of the ECF, the NLS, the ELP, the EBP, the EOL, and the NEL. He is former president of the WAP. His recent books include *Lost in Cognition: Psychoanalysis and the Cognitive Sciences* (2014), and *L'Envers de la biopolitique* (2016).

1. Jacques Lacan, “There are four discourses,” *Culture/Clinic* 1 (London: Minnesota, 2013): 3.
2. Jacques-Alain Miller, *L'Être et l'Un*, 2010-2011, *L'orientation lacanienne* (Annual course delivered within the framework of the Department of Psychoanalysis, The University of Paris VIII, lesson of the 23rd of March 2011).

So, I've chosen the word "madness" (*folie*). I could have used the word *delusion* (*délire*) to encompass ordinary psychoses, other psychoses, and their mode of treatment since, in his 1976 Seminar, Lacan included psychoanalysis within the field of delusion. "Psychoanalysis is not a science [...] It is a delusion – a delusion from which a science is expected."³ Generalizing the approach to the subject through generalized foreclosure comes at a price, as Miller has highlighted in his presentation of the *last Lacan*. This price is the virtual disappearance of the use of the term transference in Lacan's texts. Let us note, straight away, that the approach to transference in the psychoses, first extraordinary and then ordinary, has not stopped posing questions for us, ever since the status of the relation to the Other was specifically placed in the spotlight in the final paragraphs of "On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis," which "introduces [...] the conception to be formed of the handling of the transference in such treatment,"⁴ only for the question to be left hanging, for to broach it would be to go "beyond Freud."⁵

The end of "Question Prior" (or "Preliminary Question"), stops at the point where the *father-God* fades away before God as the partner of jouissance: "after the Name-of-the-Father began to collapse – the latter being the signifier which, in the Other, qua locus of the signifier, is the signifier of the Other qua locus of the law."⁶ Lacan does not speak of the collapse of the Other, but of the Name-of-the-Father. It thus turns out that, according to Schreber's expression, anticipating Georges Bataille, "God is a whore,"⁷ in other words a partner of jouissance. This reformulation is a reduction, which is the key to handling transference with a partner of jouissance without the guarantee of the Name-of-the-Father. It is therefore to be situated, is it not, as being precisely *preliminary* to the great final reduction of Lacan's last teaching? And already, the first reduction introduces multiple difficulties. These are the difficulties that have been addressed, in recent articles – by Miquel Bassols and Vicente Palomera – in the excellent last issue of the journal *El Psicoanálisis*, on the topic of what is unknown about transference.

3. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIV: L'insu que sait de l'une bévue s'aile à mourre, Ornicar ?* n° 14, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, (Easter 1978): 8. [T.N. cf. French title: Science des Rêves – Interpretation of Dreams].

4. Jacques Lacan, "On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis," *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York/London: Norton, 2006), 485.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

Vicente Palomera situates the question of transference in psychoses very well:

While the work of transference presupposes a libidinal bond with an Other in the position of object, in the work of delusion it is the subject as such who takes upon himself, in a solitary way, not the return of the repressed (as we say for neurosis), but the returns in the real that overwhelm him. While there is no self-analysis with the neurotic, delusion is a kind of self-elaboration. The problem is whether this work can fit into the analytic discourse and if so, how? Can the analytic act have an impact on this self-treatment of the real, as it does in the work of transference?⁸

For his part, Miquel Bassols has argued, since the NLS Congress in Dublin, in July 2016, that the major effect of the introduction of "ordinary psychosis," this unstable category that defied categorization and seemed to be subject to Russell's paradox, could only be organized through the encounter with the contingency of transference. He concluded his text by saying "the ordinary psychoses are only clinically ordered when their phenomena are precipitated, ordered, according to the logic of the transference. It is only there that the ordinary psychoses are revealed as ordered under transference."⁹ This approach was tantamount to using ordinary psychosis to re-examine the question of transference in psychoses in general. Here, too, the transition from the order of "patriarchy to partner of jouissance" opens up a dual pathway.¹⁰ On the one hand, the handling of transference in psychoses can tell us something about the approach to transference in the last period of Lacan's teaching. On the other, Lacan's late teaching allows us to go further and get rid of certain things that were encumbering us and holding us back in our act.

From Transference Without the Name-of-the-Father To Transference Without the Other

In the last period of his teaching, Lacan resolutely goes beyond Freud, but without raising the veil directly on the handling of transference. He even goes so far as to reduce it to the old notion of suggestion: "Does psychoanalysis work – since from time to time it does work – does it work through what is called an effect of suggestion? For the effect of suggestion

8. Vicente Palomera, "Transferencia y posición del analista en las psicosis. Entrevista" *El psicoanálisis* n°32, (Abril 2018), (available online).

9. Miquel Bassols, "Psychosis, Ordered Under Transference" (available online).

10. Dominique Laurent, "L'ordinaire de la jouissance, fondement de la nouvelle clinique du délire," *La Cause du désir* n° 98 (March 2018): 27.

to take hold, it supposes that language... takes hold of what is called man (*l'homme*). It is not for nothing that at one time, I showed a certain liking – just like that – for a certain book by Bentham which speaks of the utility of fictions.”¹¹ And Miller gives this approach its full weight: “To consider interpretation to be an effect of suggestion is, as I said, enormous. It’s huge because it leaves transference completely to one side. And in fact, transference is indeed what is absent from this very last teaching, at least in the Seminars on the *Sinthome* and the *Une-bévue*.”¹² However, as Miller has shown, Lacan leaves indications for us “to reinvent psychoanalysis” with him, especially by making this link between suggestion and fiction. We have to start from this – the perspective of the *sinthome* as One is that of separate, unarticulated Ones: “There is something radical here: to each his *sinthome* [...] which invites us to grasp each person as an absolute One, that is to say separate.”¹³ Miller continues explaining how transference “is what is pared down by the perspective of Lacan’s very last teaching. One could say that this perspective takes analytic practice against the grain.”¹⁴

But this way of going “against the grain,” isn’t it particularly well suited for our psychoanalytic practice with madnesses, where we cannot support ourselves with the Name-of-the-Father, in the era of the *sinthome* and the *parlêtre*? This way of leaving transference aside, since the subject is no longer approached on the basis of the Other, isn’t it precisely what can liberate us, since Lacan leaves transference aside, because “transference supposes a big Other that’s well-established and well-built [...] There is a transference when [...] one has already supposed the knowledge that would mean something.”¹⁵ But this well-constructed Other is the one that vanishes in the clinical field that concerns us. Likewise, that something means something is also put into question. Generalization, radicalization, and against the grain! These are the perspectives from which I would like to approach our theme.

In *Seminar XXIII* and *Seminar XXIV*, there is almost nothing on transference, except for a precise passage in the session of the 10th of May 1977 that I would like to comment on with reference to indications given by Miller in his last course taken as a whole. Characteristically, in this session of his Seminar, Lacan starts from what *does not exist* (*de ce qu’il n’y a pas*).

11. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIV: L’insu que sait de l’u.ne bévue s’aile à mourre*, (Session of the 17th of May 1977). *Ornicar ?* 17/18, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, (Spring 1979): 20

12. Jacques-Alain Miller, “En deçà de l’inconscient,” *Ce corps qui jouit, La Cause du désir* n° 91, (November 2015), 105.

13. *Ibid.*, 102.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, 105.

From what is marked in negative terms, negative transference, to arrive at positive transference, which has no definite existence. He evokes the resort to an “it can be felt,” as in *Seminar XXIII*, in order to designate a real that eludes the possibility of being written as existence. We can simply name it. The reasoning must be followed step by step. We name something negatively, to indicate that it does not exist, because we feel that there is an existence whose logical consistency we fail to grasp: “I have to slip, because that’s how it’s designed, I have to slip between the transference we call negative, and [...] We still don’t know what positive transference is, positive transference, that’s what I tried to define with the name subject supposed to know.”¹⁶

It is from this hypothetical level that Lacan wishes to break away. The effect of the hypothesis, of the fiction, is to transfer onto the analyst the place of the cause of the production of knowledge in analysis. This transference is reduced to its attributive logic. The analyst must not forget that it is not his being that is the mainspring of the analytic operation. Lacan here returns to his combative stance against those psychoanalysts of the IPA who maintain that the analyst operates with what he *is*: “what is important is not so much what the analyst says or does but what he is.”¹⁷ Which leads to the following crazy proposition: “In France, the doctrinaire of being [...] went straight to the following solution: the psychoanalyst’s being is innate.”¹⁸ Lacan swept aside the weight of the psychoanalyst’s being by emphasizing, in his classical teaching, that the analyst occupies the place of a supposition or an attribution: “Who is supposed to know? It is the analyst. It is an attribution, as is already indicated by the word *supposed*; an attribution is only a word, there is a subject, something underneath which is supposed to know. Knowing is therefore its attribute. There is only one snag, which is that it is impossible to give the attribute of knowledge to anyone [à *quiconque*].”¹⁹ The opposition between a judgement of attribution and a judgement of existence in Freud is an opposition on which Lacan relied in various ways throughout his teaching. Here, the reference to the judgment of attribution emphasizes, above all, that it is not about a judgment of existence: “The one who knows, in analysis, is the analysand; what he unfolds is what he knows, except that it is an other – but is there an other? – who follows what he has

16. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIV: L’insu que sait de l’u.ne bévue s’aile à mourre*, (Session of the 10th of May 1977) *Ornicar ?*, n°17/18, *Op. cit.*, 17.

17. Jacques Lacan, “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power,” *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, (New York: Norton, 2006), *Op. cit.*, 540.

18. *Ibid.*, 541 (note 6)

19. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIV: L’insu que sait de l’u.ne bévue s’aile à mourre*, (Session of the 10th of May 1977), *Ornicar ?*, n° 17/18, *Op. cit.*, 18.

to say, namely, what he knows. This notion of the Other, I marked it in a certain graph, with a bar that breaks it.”²⁰

The notation of the analyst as *the one who follows what the analysand has to say*, is consistent with the description of the position of the analyst as a witness, or secretary, of the elaboration of the psychotic subject, after the collapse of the Name-of-the-Father. But beyond this we must understand the analyst’s break with his anchoring in the supposition. He is not in the place of the subject supposed to know, he is in the place of the one who *follows*. There is an equivocation in French between the “I am,” “*je suis*,” first person indicative of the verb to be, and the “he follows” “*il suit*,” third person indicative of the verb to follow.

What is the status of the *broken* Other (*l’Autre rompu*) that is deduced from it? We must already emphasize the originality of the term *broken*, which comes instead of *barred*, which Lacan had used until then. By this displacement, he emphasizes the fact that it is a question of existence, of what can be affirmed or negated on the basis of this judgment: “But broken, does that mean negated? Analysis properly speaking states that the Other is nothing but this duplicity. There is such a thing as One but there is nothing Other.”²¹ The wording is radical and subtle: “*rien d’Autre*” in French.

The bar was part of Lacan’s classical teaching, the break now passes between being and what exists. Lacan continues by emphasizing that the lost bar falls on the One in a strange way. To do this, we must separate the One and dialogue. The One can talk alone: “The One – as I said – dialogues all alone, since it receives its own message in an inverted form. It is he who knows, and not the supposed to know.”²² Here we find the self-elaboration that Vicente Palomera evoked at the heart of the work of delusion, but Lacan argues that this self-elaboration has always been based on the general formula of communication. Everyone receives their message in an inverted form. Our fundamental formulation of the interpretation “I didn’t make you say it...” is thus generalized. There is no longer any need for the fiction of the *I* in the place of the one *supposed* to be extracting knowledge from the locus of the analysand. The analysand knows and it is enough that he addresses the Other that does not exist for the return effect to occur. But this can only operate on condition that we give this knowledge its full weight as radical singularity. We cannot know what is at stake before this knowledge comes to be received in its inverted form. This logic accompanies the radical suspension of any relation of community between the

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

analysand and the analyst. It is a consequence of the suspension of the *all*, which left to subsist, under the supposition, the ghost of a common trait between the analysand and the analyst. Victoria Horne-Reinoso, in a text published in the Review of the ECP, noted the importance of the preliminary “all women are mad [...] but they are not mad at all [*du tout*]”²³ – in order to move on to the separation of the Ones that support the affirmation that “Everyone is delusional”:

I have also proposed the following, which is enunciated from the universal, but in order to negate it: I said that there is no “all.” This is how women are more man than Man. They are not “not-all,” I said. These “all” have no common trait. Yes, they have this one, the only common trait, the trait I’ve called “unary.” They bolster themselves with the One. There is such a thing as One. I repeated this a moment ago to say that there is such a thing as One and nothing Other.²⁴

Transference and Feeling: the One bévue or One Blunder and Making-True

Lacan concludes his reformulation of transference on a key point: the articulation between “negative transference” and hatred that he had hitherto addressed as a passion for being, as the passion that aims, *par excellence*, at the Other’s being. The Other does not exist, but the passion of hatred does exist. Precisely because it does not dwell on the attributes of the Other, it aims at the real. It aims at something deeper, *hatred of one’s fellow man*.

At our last Forum on *The Foreigner*, in Rome, I recalled the function of hatred emphasized by Jacques-Alain Miller:

In the hatred of the Other, it is certain that there is something more than aggression. There is a constant of this aggressiveness that deserves to be called hate, and which aims at the real in the Other. How is it that this Other is Other so that one can hate it, so that one can hate it in its being. This is even the most general form that we can give to the modern racism observable today. It is the hatred of the particular way the Other enjoys.²⁵

23. Victoria Horne-Reinoso, “Point de folie à l’ère du parlêtre,” *La Cause du désir* n° 98, Navarin (March 2018): 68

24. *Ibid.*

25. Jacques-Alain Miller, *Extimité*, 1985-1986, *L’orientation lacanienne* (Annual course delivered within the framework of the Department of Psychoanalysis, The University of Paris VIII, lesson of the 27th of November 1985). In English, “Extimity,” *The Symptom* 9 (Fall 2008).

Hate is on the side of the real, and even if the Other does not exist, hatred comes before love. It is a point of rejection, of expulsion from the Other that goes back to the *Ausstossung*, to the primordial expulsion that situates the subject before the Other. This is what Lacan had isolated in his reading of Freud's *Verneinung*, right from the classical phase of his teaching. "For this is how we must understand [...] *Ausstossung aus dem Ich*, expelling from the subject. The latter constitutes the real insofar as it is the domain of that which subsists outside of symbolization."²⁶ It is against this background that we must read, in counterpoint to the separation of the Ones, Lacan's introduction of the place of feeling (*sentiment*), which in its new definition includes hatred and love: "*Il y a de l'Un*,' there is such a thing as One,' and this means there is feeling all the same, this feeling which I have called, according to the *unaries*, the support of what I really must recognize as hatred, insofar as this hatred is akin to love."²⁷ This *hainamoration* is the consequence of the separation from the jouissance of other Ones. In Rome I noted that to know this, to know of the aporias of love and jouissance in the proximity of one's fellow man, condemns us neither to cynicism, nor to immobility, nor to the recognition of the irreducible presence of hatred or evil.²⁸ Here again, knowing that *hainamoration* exists does not condemn one to immobility for fear of unleashing the hatred.

On the basis of the real of hatred, Lacan gives due place to another dimension. It imposes itself on the basis of *stumbling*. For the One's "speaking alone" is not exempt from this dimension, quite the contrary. The trait of the Unary brings with it the trait of the *Une bevue*, of the One-blunder: "There is nothing more difficult to grasp than this trait of the one blunder, of *une bevue*, which is how I translate *unbewusst*, which in German means the unconscious, but which is translated as one-blunder, as *une bevue*, and means something else – a stumbling, a tripping, a slipping from word to word."²⁹ Let's pause on this new version of stumbling isolated by Miller: "in *Seminar XI* he [Lacan] defines the unconscious as a stumbling, in other words as a one-blunder, *une-bevue*. But in *Seminar XXIV*, it means something else. There, the stumbling or the 'slipping from word to word' is situated as a phenomenon in a time anterior to that in which the unconscious can appear. The unconscious only appears in the *une-bevue*, the one-blunder, to the extent that one adds a signifying finality."³⁰ And it's here that a new version of

26. Jacques Lacan, "Response to Jean Hyppolite's Commentary on Freud's 'Verneinung,'" *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, (New York: Norton, 2006), *Op. cit.*

27. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIV: L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*, (Session of the 10th May 1977) *Ornicar ?*, n°17/18, *Op. cit.*, 18.

28. Éric Laurent, "L'étranger extime, I," *Lacan quotidien*, n°770, (22nd of March 2018).

29. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIV*, *Op. cit.*

30. Jacques-Alain Miller, "En deçà de l'inconscient," *Op. cit.*, 104.

positive transference slips in. It is a transformation by the addition of feeling, a transformation by the addition of some signification which allows a new use of the jouissance partner in order to overcome the stumblings of the subject's one-blunder, *une bévue*, when confronted by *lalangue* and its instability, its permanent slippages. As Miller explains, "Lacan gives a name to this transformation which operates by adding meaning. He refers to it as a *faire-vrai*, a making-true: 'Psychoanalysis is what makes true' [...] The unconscious comes after, because we add meaning: 'We add a dose of meaning, but it remains a semblant.'"³¹

The semblant (or make-believe) thus remains submitted to a distinct regime of truth. The semblant, submitted to the "make true," allows the subject to restore a homeostasis, despite the stumbling blocks, despite the fundamental instability of *lalangue*, despite primordial homophony.³² It requires the support of the analyst, beyond his function as witness, support or secretary. He is the one who makes the 'stumbling true': "Of course, that the analysand produces the analyst is beyond doubt. That's why I wonder about this status of the analyst to which I give this place of 'making true,' of semblance."³³

What, at the time of the "Question Prior" was presented as the limit of a possible treatment of psychosis, a stabilization of the delusional metaphor through a non-oedipal fiction is now generalized in the form of a homeostasis governed by the pleasure principle as a defence against the disruption of jouissance. But Lacan introduces a new dimension by considering that the homeostasis of the pleasure principle equates to rest and sleep. Miller gave a transcript of this version of psychoanalysis which acknowledges that the Other is broken and restores a place for the analyst as a semblant understood in the sense of the making of something new: a *making true*. This *making true* is opposed to the register of the contemporary *make be* of the Other that includes the signifier of the Law:³⁴ "Thus we see what psychoanalysis would consist in. It would consist in bringing one back to the pleasure principle through the effect of suggestion [...] Suggestion is the natural effect of the signifier. This is how I understand why Lacan can say that discourse is contaminated by *sleep*."³⁵

As Miller asks, "[w]hat does Lacan indicate as the use of what is called, of what we called, interpretation? It is instructive to see that he then brings

31. *Ibid.*

32. Jean-Claude Milner, "Back and Forth From Letter to Homophony," *Problemi International* vol.1, n°1, Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis (2017).

33. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIV*, *Op. cit.*

34. Jacques-Alain Miller, *L'Être et l'Un*, (lesson of the 11th of May 2011), *Op. cit.*

35. Jacques-Alain Miller, "En deçà de l'inconscient," *Op. cit.*, 106.

back the pleasure principle and that he gives it a place at the level of the One.”³⁶ At the end of this development, suggestion is brought back to its primary foundation: the impact of the signifier on the body, allowing a certain treatment of the disruption of *jouissance*, its tempering towards a homeostasis thanks to the self-elaboration of a non-standard fiction. This is the importance of Lacan’s definition of the end of analysis in the North American Lectures of 1975: “An analysis does not have to be pushed too far. When the analysand thinks he is happy to live, that’s enough.”³⁷ It must be understood that this happiness of living, this satisfaction, is a satisfaction of the One. It runs counter to the satisfaction articulated with the Other, which is what Lacan points to in “Function and Field,” where “the question of the termination of the analysis is that of the moment when the satisfaction of the subject is achievable in the satisfaction of all – that is, of all those it involves in a human undertaking.”³⁸ When Miller comments upon this passage in his last course he indicates that he found it “perplexing.” “We do not exactly see that those who involve themselves in a human undertaking, be it a school or a party, are particularly marked by the compatibility of their satisfaction, we see rather that they clash.”³⁹ This being said, Lacan moves on, in counterpoint to the self-regulating fiction and the satisfaction of the One, to a new approach to interpretation – one that runs counter to the common use of fiction, as an *awakening*.

Interpretation As Jaculation

In *Seminar XXII*, in the session of the 11th of January 1975, Lacan considers the new formulation to be given to the effect of sense that interpretation brings, after the three consistencies R.S.I. become homogeneous. And he comes to separate speech and interpretation, just as he separated interpretation from the role of transference. Interpretation presentifies a beyond of speech:

Analytical interpretation [...] is brought to bear in a way that goes far beyond speech. Speech is an object of elaboration for the analysand, but what about the effects of what the analyst says – for he does say. It is not nothing to say that transference plays a role in it but this doesn’t shed light

36. *Ibid.*, 105.

37. Jacques Lacan, “Conférences et entretiens dans des universités nord-américaines,” Yale University, Kanzer Seminar (24th of November 1975), *Scilicet*, 6/7, Paris, Seuil (1976): 15.

38. Jacques Lacan, “Function and the Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” *Écrits*, *Op. cit.*, 264.

39. Jacques-Alain Miller, *L’Être et l’Un* (Lesson of the 6th of April 2011), *Op. cit.*

on anything. It would be a matter of explaining how the interpretation has an effect, and that it does not necessarily imply an enunciation.”⁴⁰

To account for the effectiveness of the interpretation, he comes to posit the existence of a real effect of meaning: “The effect of meaning required of the analytic discourse is not imaginary. It is not symbolic either. It must be real. What I’m busy doing this year is thinking what the real of an effect of meaning could be.”⁴¹ This interpretation is not of the order of a translation through the addition of a *signifier two* in relation to a *signifier One*. It is an interpretation that does not refer to the concatenation or the production of a signifying chain. It acknowledges the new aim of tightening the knot around the body-event and the inscription that can, in a renewed usage, be noted (*a*):

What we are positing with the Borromean knot already goes against the image of concatenation. The discourse in question does not make a chain [...] Therefore, the question arises as to whether the effect of meaning in its real is due to the use of words or to their jaculation [...] we used to believe it was the words that counted. Whereas if we take the trouble to isolate the category of the signifier, we can see that the jaculation has a sense that can be isolated.⁴²

The choice of *jaculation* in opposition to speech raises questions for us. It should be noted that in French the noun *jaculation* and the adjective *jaculatoire* derive from distinct discourses, humanistic and religious.⁴³

The new use that Lacan wants to give to *jaculation* is neither humanist nor religious. It comes from its own Lacanian usage. He has already described the poetic text as *jaculation* for Pindar.⁴⁴ He can also speak of *mystical jaculations*, in relation to Angelus Silesius.⁴⁵ Or again, he makes of Serge Leclaire’s Poordjeli “a secret jaculation, a jubilant formula, an onomatopoeia,” and he also makes a *jaculation* of Fort-Da.⁴⁶ But it is in his Seminar on the object of psychoanalysis that he gives the most general

40. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXII: R.S.I* (Session of the 11th of February 1975), *Ornicar*?, n° 4, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, (1975): 95-96.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, 96-97.

43. Dictionnaire historique de la langue Française, Le Robert.

44. Jacques Lacan, *Transference: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 372 – Lacan speaks of the “jaculation célèbre de Pindare,” translated as “famous ejaculatory proclamation.”

45. Jacques Lacan, *Seminar XIII: The Object of Psychoanalysis*, (Session of the 1st of December 1965, unpublished, available online.).

46. Jacques Lacan, *Seminar XII: Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis*, (Session of the 27th February 1965).

meaning to this *jaculation*, even taking up the first sentences of *Seminar I* about the action of the Zen Master:

everyone knows that a Zen exercise has something to do, though one doesn't know what it means, with the subjective realization of a void. And we are not forcing anything by admitting that anyone, the average contemplator, will see this figure and say to himself that there is something like a kind of peak moment that must have a relation with the mental void that it is a matter of obtaining and which would be obtained, this singular moment, in an abruptness following a period of waiting, sometimes provoked by a word, a sentence, a jaculation, even a rude remark, a snub, a kick in the ass. It is quite certain that these kinds of slapstick moments or clownish behaviour have meaning only in the light of a long subjective preparation.⁴⁷

Let us note here the crucial link between the production of subjective emptiness and the *jaculation*. So, *jaculation* includes the value of intensity, or enthusiasm, but it is to designate a use of the signifier that awakens, in the sense of producing the emptiness of signification. What is called *jaculation* in *Seminar XXII*, as designating a real effect of meaning, in *Seminar XXIV* becomes the new signifier. As Miller points out, when Lacan appeals to a new signifier, it is, in fact, a signifier that "could have another use [...] a signifier that would be new, not simply because with it there would be one more signifier but because, instead of being contaminated by sleep, this new signifier would trigger an awakening."⁴⁸ This awakening is connected to the production of a real effect of meaning as the production of a subjective void. It resonates well with the emphasis placed on the hole and not the chain in the last period of Lacan's teaching.

So, in his last teachings, Lacan draws out (*dessine*), literally, with the knot, a modality of the treatment of the disruption of *jouissance* by the One-blunder, *Une-Bévue*. In order to do this, he revises the classical terms of the instruments of the psychoanalytic operation: the unconscious, transference and interpretation to propose new ones: the *parlêtre*, the act, *jaculation* subject to the logic of "*Yad'l'Un*," a *jaculation* that is central in all of the consequences that Miller has drawn out for us. This set of reprises defines the theoretical framework for a clinic of madness under transference and the treatment of the disruption of *jouissance* that occurs and which is particularly consistent with the disorder in the Other that approaching this

field implies. An accurate reading of the work of our Congress assumes this background of Lacan's last teaching, though Lacan is always best read "*en bloc*" (as a whole).⁴⁹ We need a *bloc orienté*, a well *oriented* bloc, because otherwise we will remain *occidenté* – let's say, occidentally challenged – by the final curve of Lacan's teaching, so well-suited to the contemporary practice of psychoanalysis.⁵⁰

Translated by Philip Dravers. Revised by Véronique Voruz

47. Jacques Lacan, *Seminar XIII*, *Op. cit.*

48. Jacques-Alain Miller, "En deçà de l'inconscient," *Op. cit.*, 106.

49. As was underlined by the very interesting collective work coordinated by Leonardo Gorostiza, *Lacan en Bloque*, Grama 2017.

50. Jacques Lacan, "Lituraterre," *Hurly-Burly* no. 9 (May 2013): 34.