

THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN

BOOK XV

The psychoanalytic act

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Translated by Cormac Gallagher from unedited French manuscripts

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This year I chose as subject the psychoanalytic act. It is a strange couple of words, which, to tell the truth, has not been common up to now. Assuredly, those who have followed for a certain time what I am stating here, may not be astonished at what I am introducing under these two terms.

What my discourse of last year closed on within this logic of phantasy, all of whose lineaments I tried to bring here, those who heard me speaking in a certain tone and in two registers about what the equally coupled term of the sexual act can and ought to mean, these people may feel themselves in some way already introduced to this dimension that the psychoanalytic act represents. Nevertheless, I have to behave as if a part of this assembly knew nothing about it and introduce today what is involved in this usage that I am proposing. Psychoanalysis, it is understood as least in principle, it is supposed, at least by the fact that you are here to listen to me, that psychoanalysis does something. It does, that is not enough, this is the essential, it is at the central point, it is properly speaking the poetic view point of the thing, poetry also does something. I remarked moreover in passing, having interested myself a little recently in this field of poetry, that people have paid very little attention to what it does and to whom, and more especially, why not, to the poets.

Perhaps to ask oneself that would be a kind of introduction to what is involved in the act in poetry. But this is not our business today since what is at stake is psychoanalysis, which does something, but certainly not at the level, on the plane, in the sense of poetry.

(10) If we have to introduce and very necessarily at the level of psychoanalysis the function of the act, it is in as much as this psychoanalytic doing profoundly implicates the Subject. That to tell the truth, and thanks to this dimension of the subject which completely renews for us what can be stated about the subject as such and which is called the unconscious, this subject, in psychoanalysis, is as I already formulated, activated (*mis en acte*) in it.

I recall that I already put forward this formula in connection with transference, saying at a time already long past, and at a level of formulation that was still approximate, that transference was nothing other than the activation of the unconscious. I repeat that this is only an approach and what we will have to put

forward this year about this function of the act of psychoanalysis will allow us to bring to it a specificity worthy of the numerous steps - some decisive I hope - that we have been able to take since then.

Let us approach simply along the path of a certain obviousness, if we keep to this sense that the word act has which can be constituted with respect to what - let us leave that to one side - can constitute a breakthrough.- It is sure that we encounter the act on entering analysis. It is all the same something that merits the name of act to decide, with everything that this involves, to decide to do what is called a psychoanalysis. This decision involves a certain commitment. We encounter there all the dimensions that ordinarily, are accepted, in common usage, in the common use of this word act. There is also an act which can be described, the act by which the psychoanalyst sets himself up as such, here is something which merits the name of act, up to and including the fact that this act can be inscribed somewhere: Mr So-and-so, psychoanalyst.

In truth, it does not appear foolish, inordinate, out of place, to speak about the psychoanalytic act in the same way that one speaks about the medical act. In this sense what is the psychoanalytic act? One could say that it could be inscribed under this rubric in the register of Social Security. Is the psychoanalytic act the session, for example? I can ask what it consists of. What sort of intervention is involved? Because after all one does not write out a prescription. What is the act properly speaking? Is it interpretation? Or is it silence? Or anything whatsoever that you want to designate in the instruments of the function.

But in truth, these are illuminations which scarcely make us advance and to go to the other end of the supporting point that we can choose, to present, to (11) introduce the analytic act we will point out that in psychoanalytic theory, precisely, people speak about it. We are moreover not yet in a position to specify this act in such a way that we are able in any way to establish its boundary with what is called in a general term, not current, faith, in this psychoanalytic theory: action.

People speak a lot about action and it plays a role as a reference. A rather curious reference role since, moreover, to take the case, it is made use of with great emphasis, namely, when it is a matter of accounting, I mean theoretically, and for a rather large field of theoreticians who express themselves in analytic terms, to explain thinking. Through a sort of need of security, as it were, this thinking, which for reasons that we will have to deal with, people do not want to make into an entity which appears too metaphysical, people try to account for this thinking on a foundation that on this occasion they hope is more real. And thinking will be explained to us as representing something that is motivated, that is justified by its relation to action, for example in the form that it is a more reduced action, an inhibited action, an incipient action, a little model of action. Indeed that in thinking there is something like a sort of taste of what the action that it supposes, or that it renders immanent may be.

These discourses are known to all. I have no need to illustrate them by quotations, but if someone wants to look more closely at what I am leaving understood, I would evoke not just a famous article, but a whole volume written on this by Mr Rappaport, a psychoanalyst of the New York Society. What is striking, is that assuredly for someone who is introduced without prejudice into this dimension of action, the reference in this case does not appear any clearer to me than what is referred to. And that to illuminate thinking by action might presuppose, perhaps, that first of all one should have a less confused idea than the ones which are manifested on these occasions about what constitutes an action, in as much as an action seems indeed, if we meditate for an instant, to presuppose at its centre the notion of act.

I know well that there is a fashion, which is moreover the one to which those who try to formulate things in the register that I have just spoken of cling onto, I mean energetically support themselves with, which is to identify action to motor (12) activity. Here indeed we have to carry out at the beginning of what we are introducing an operation, call it what you will, of simple elucidation or of clarification, but it is very essential. In effect, it is well known and, after all, my God, why not, acceptable, that people want here to apply in a way that is admissible, quite routine, to obey or even simply pretend to obey the rule of not explaining what people continue to call, not always moreover with a lot of justification, the superior and the inferior. Of not I am saying, explaining the inferior by the superior but, as it is said - people now no longer know very well why - that thinking is superior. To start from this inferior which is supposed to be the most elementary form of response of the organism, namely, this famous circle whose model I have given you under the name of the reflex arc. Namely, the circuit that is called, according to the case, stimulus-response, when you are prudent and when you identify to the sensory-excitation couple, whatever it may be, and the motor release which here plays the role of response. Besides the fact that in this famous arc it is not too sure that the response is at all necessarily and obligatorily motor. But that when, for example, if it is excretory, indeed even secretory, the response is that it becomes wet, well then the reference to this model, to situate in it, to take as a starting point in it the foundation of the function we can call action, assuredly appears much more precarious. Besides one can remark that the motor response, if we only pinpoint it from the link defined by the reflex arc, has truly only very little right to give us the model of what can be called action. Because what is motor, once you insert it into the reflex arc, appears quite simply as a passive effect, as a pure and simple response to stimuli, a response which involves nothing other than a passivity-effect.

The dimension which is expressed in a certain way of conceiving the response as a discharge of tension - a term which is also current in psychoanalytic energetics - will then present action to us here as nothing other than a consequence, indeed a flight, following on a more or less intolerable sensation, let us say in the broadest sense of stimulus in as much as we bring into it

elements other than those that psychoanalytic theory introduces under the name of intermittent stimulation.

Here we are then, assuredly, in the position of not being able to situate the act (13) from this reference to either motor activity or discharge. We must now on the contrary ask ourselves why the theory still has, and manifests, such a strong penchant for making use of them as support and finding in them the original order in which there is supposed to be established, from which there is supposed to begin, in which there is supposed to be installed as a lining, that of thinking.

It is clear that I am only giving this reminder because we are going to have to make use of it. Nothing produced in the order of these elaborations, however paradoxical this appears when seen from a certain point, can fail to leave us, nevertheless, with the idea that there is some motivation for sustaining this paradox, and that from this very motivation, this is the method that psychoanalysis never fails to use, from this very motivation we can draw certain fruit.

That the theory occasionally takes support then from something that, precisely, analytic theory is in a better position to know to be only a short circuit as compared to what it must indeed establish as the status of the psychic apparatus, that not only the texts of Freud but all psychoanalytic thinking can only be sustained isolating, in the interval between the afferent element of the reflex arc and its efferent element, this famous psi-system of the first Freudian writings. But that nevertheless it feels the need to maintain the emphasis on these two elements, assuredly here testifies to something which urges us to mark its place, (I mean for analytic theory), with respect to what we call, in a more comprehensive way the physiologising theory of the psychic apparatus. It is clear that we see there being manifested here a certain number of mental edifices founded in principle on recourse to the experiment. These try to use, to make use of this first model given as the most elementary, whether we consider it at the level of the totality of a micro-organism, the stimulus-response process at the level of the amoeba, for example, and to make of it in a way a homologue, the specification for an system which is supposed to concentrate, at least on a certain powerfully organising point, its reality on the organism, namely, at the level of this reflex arc once it has been differentiated in the nervous system.

Here is what we have to account for in this perspective, that this difference persists at a level, in a technique – psychoanalysis - which seems to be, properly speaking, the least appropriate to have recourse to it, given what it implies in terms of a completely different dimension, in effect, radically opposed to this (14) reference which results from an obviously lame conception of what is involved in the act, not satisfactory in an internal fashion, completely opposed in effect to what we have to do, to this position of the function of the act that I evoked at first in its purely obvious aspects, and which, it is well known, is the one that interests us in psychoanalysis. I spoke earlier about commitment, whether it is that of the analysand or of the analyst. But, after all, why not pose

the question of the act of the birth (*l'acte de naissance, birth certificate*) of psychoanalysis. Because in the dimension of the act, there immediately comes to light this something that a term like the one that I have just spoken about implies. Namely, the inscription somewhere, the correlative signifier which, in truth, is never lacking in what constitutes an act. If I walk up and down here while speaking to you, that does not constitute an act, but if one day it is to cross a certain threshold by which I put myself outside the law, that day my motor activity will have the value of an act.

I put forward here, in this very room, that it is simply to have recourse to an admitted order of obviousness, of properly speaking language dimensions about what is involved in an act. This allows there to be gathered together in a satisfying fashion all the ambiguity that this term may present, going from one to the other end of the scale that I first evoked, including in it not simply, beyond what I called on this occasion a notarised act, I mentioned this term: the act of the birth of psychoanalysis. Why not? This is how it emerged at a particular turning point of my discourse. But, in fact, if we dwell a little on it, we are going to see there being easily opened up the dimension of the act with respect to the very status of psychoanalysis. Because after all, if I spoke about inscription, what does that mean? Let us not remain too close to this metaphor. Nevertheless, the one whose existence is recorded in an act when he comes into the world is there before the act. Psychoanalysis is not a nurseling. When one speaks about the act of the birth of psychoanalysis, which indeed has a sense, since, precisely, it appeared one day, it is the question that is evoked. Did this field that it organises, over which it reigns in more or less governing them, did this field exist before? It is a question that it is well worthwhile evoking when such an act is at stake. It is a question that is essential to pose at this turning point. Of course, there is every chance that this field existed before. We are certainly not going to contest that the unconscious made its effects felt before (15) the act of the birth of psychoanalysis. But all the same if we pay very careful attention, we can see that the question of who knew it, is perhaps not without import here.

In effect, does this question have any other import than the *epoché*, the idealist suspension, the one founded on the idea, taken as radical, of representation as founding all knowledge and which then demands where reality is, outside of this representation.

It is absolutely certain that the question that I am raising in the form of, who knew this field of psychoanalysis, has absolutely nothing to do with the fallacious antinomy on which idealism is founded. It is clear that there is no question of contesting that reality is prior to knowledge. Reality, yes! But knowledge? Knowledge (*le savoir*) is not knowing (*la connaissance*). And to touch the minds that are least prepared to suspect this difference I have only to make an allusion to *savoir-vivre*, or to *savoir-faire* [art of living, know-how]. There, the question of what is there before takes on all its sense. *Savoir-vivre* or *savoir-faire* can emerge at a given moment. And then, provided the accent that I

have always put on language has ended up by taking on its import for a certain number of you, it is clear that here the question takes on all its weight. That of knowing precisely what was involved in something that we can call the manipulation of the letter, according to a formalisation described as logical, for example, before it was tackled. The field of algebra before the invention of algebra is a question that takes on all its import.

Before people knew how to manipulate something that must be called by its name, figures (*chiffres*), and not simply numbers, I am saying figures - without being able to go into it here, I appeal to the few that I suppose exist among you, who have sufficiently read somewhere in a journal or in popular books, how Mr Cantor proceeded in order to demonstrate to you that the transfinite dimension in numbers is absolutely not reducible to that of the infinity of the series of whole numbers, namely, that one can always fabricate a new number which had not been included in principle in this series of whole numbers, however astonishing this may appear to you, and this, with nothing more than a certain way of operating on the series of figures in accordance with the method that is called diagonal. In short, the opening to this undoubtedly testable order which has a right, quite simply just as much as any other term to the qualification of truthful, was this order there, awaiting Mr Cantor's operation from all eternity? Here is a question that has its value and which has nothing to do with that of the (16) priority of reality with respect to its representation. A question which has all its weight. It is a combinatorial and the dimension of truth that is deployed in it is what allows there to emerge in the most authentic way what is involved in the truth that it determines before knowledge (*savoir*) is born from it.

This indeed is why an element of this combinatorial can come to play the role of representative of representation and justifies the insistence that I put on the fact that this is how there ought to be translated the German term in Freud of *Vorstellungrepräsentanz*. That it is not because of a simple personal sensitivity that every time that I see emerging in one or other marginal note the translation ideational-representative, I only denounce in it, I only designate in it, in a quite valid way, an intention, precisely this confusing intention. And it is a matter of knowing why such and such become the holders of it in a certain place in the analytic field. In this order, formal quarrels are not vain because they bring along with them a whole subjective presumption which is properly speaking in question. We will subsequently have to bring in one or other pinpointing which will allow us to orientate ourselves on this point. It is not my object today when, as I told you, it is a matter only of introducing the function that I have to develop before you. But already, I indicate that in simply marking with three reference points something that has the function of a term like that of set, in mathematical theory, to show in it the distance, the distinction from that of class in use for a much longer time, and to hook onto it in a relation of articulation which shows that what I am going to say is inserted there by a certain articulated difference, and which implicates it in the same order, this order of the subjective positions of being which was the true subject, the secret title of the second year of teaching that I gave here under the name of *Crucial Problems*, to refer to the

distinction between set and class, the function of the object insofar as the o takes on its whole value of subjective opposition. This is what we will have to do at the right time. I am only marking it here as a boundary stone whose indication and at the same time whose essence you will rediscover when we shall have to start from it again. For today, having marked then what is at stake, I want to start again from the physiologising reference in order to show this something which, perhaps is going to illuminate in the most efficacious way possible, what (17) I mean by the term of psychoanalytic act. And since we have so easily criticized the assimilation of the term action to motor activity, it will perhaps be easier, more comfortable for us, to grasp what is involved in this fallacious model. For to support it with something which comes from everyday experience, for example the triggering of a tendon reflex, I believe that from now on, it will perhaps be easier for you to see that it constitutes a functioning which, I do not see why, is called automatic, since automation has well and truly in its essence a reference to chance, while what is implied in the dimension of the reflex, is precisely the contrary. But let us leave that.

Is it not obvious that we cannot conceive in a rational fashion of what is involved in the reflex arc, except as something in which the motor element is nothing other than what is situated in the little instrument, the hammer with which one triggers it. And that what is picked up is nothing other than a sign, a sign in this case of what we can call the integrity of a certain level of the medullar system. And in this sense a sign of which it must indeed be said that what is most indicative about it is precisely when it is absent, namely, when it condemns the non-integrity of this system. For on the subject of what is involved in this integrity, it does not give us very much. On the contrary, its value as a sign of lack, of lesion, which has a positive value, yes, there is takes on its whole value.

To make of this something which has only the entity and the meaning of being something isolated in the functioning of the organism, isolated in function of a certain questioning that we can call clinical questioning, who knows, we can push it further, indeed, even the desire of the clinician, is something which does not give to this totality that we call the reflex arc, any special title to serve as a conceptual model for anything whatsoever that can be considered as fundamental, elementary, an original reduction of a response of the living organism.

But let us go further, let us go to something which is infinitely more subtle than this elementary model, namely, the conception of the reflex at the level of what you will indeed allow me to call, because this is what I am going to interest myself in: Pavlovian ideology.

This is to say that I intend here to question, not at all certainly from the point of view of any absolute critique, but for what, as you are going to see, it brings us as a suggestion about what is involved in the analytic position. I certainly do not (18) dream of depreciating the totality of the works that have been inscribed in

this ideology. I am not saying anything either which goes too far, in saying that it proceeds from a project of materialist development - and it avows it - from something which is a function in which it is a matter precisely of reducing the reference which might be made - as if what was at stake here again is a terrain where it would be necessary to fight - to some entity of the order of the spirit.

The perspective of Pavlovian ideology, in this sense, is much better accommodated, for its part, than this first order of reference that I indicated with the reflex arc and that we could call the organo-dynamic reference. This perspective is much better accommodated in effect because it is organised from the grip of a sign on a function that, for its part, is always organised around a need. I have no need, I think, you have all done enough secondary studies to know that the usual model by which it is introduced into the manuals, and which we can also make use of now to support what we are going to say, of the association of the fact of the sound of a trumpet, for example, to the presentation of a piece of meat before an animal, a carnivorous one of course, is supposed to obtain after a certain number of repetitions the triggering of a gastric secretion, provided that the animal in question has in effect a stomach, and this, even, after the untying, the freeing of the association, which is of course carried out in the sense of maintaining only the sound of the trumpet. The effect being easily demonstrated by the fitting of a stomach fistula. I mean that one collects in it the juice emitted, after a certain number of repetitions, from the simple production of the sound of the trumpet.

I would dare to qualify this Pavlovian enterprise as extraordinarily correct as regards its perspective. For in effect what it is a matter of grounding, when it is a matter of accounting for the possibility of higher forms of such and such a functioning of the mind, it is obviously from this grasp on the living organism of something, which here, only takes on its illustrative value, from the fact of not being an adequate stimulus for the need that is involved in the affair; and even properly speaking to be only connoted in the field of perception by being really detached from any object of eventual fruition, fruition meaning enjoyment (*jouissance*). I did not mean to say enjoyment, for since I already put a certain stress on the word enjoyment, I do not want to introduce it here with its whole context; fruit is the contrary of useful. It is not a useable object that is at stake. It is the object of the appetite founded on the elementary needs of the living (19) being. It is in so far as the sound of the trumpet has nothing to do with anything that might interest a dog, for example, at any rate in the field in which his appetite is awakened by the sight of a piece of meat, that Pavlov legitimately introduces it into the field of the experiment.

Only if I say that this way of operating is extraordinarily correct, it is very precisely in the measure that Pavlov reveals himself there, as I might say, to be a structuralist at the start. At the start of his experiment, he is a structuralist ahead of time, a structuralist of the strictest observance, namely, of the Lacanian observance, in so far as precisely what he demonstrates there, what he holds in a way to be implicated there, is very precisely something that means that the

signifier, namely, that the signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier.

Here in effect is how to illustrate what I have just put forward. The sound of the trumpet represents nothing other here than the subject of science, namely, Pavlov himself. It represents it for whom? For what? Obviously for nothing other than for something which is not a sign, but a signifier, namely, this sign of gastric secretion, which only takes on its value, very precisely, from the fact that it is not produced by the object that one would expect to produce it, that it is an effect of deception, that the need in question is adulterated and that the dimension in which there is installed what is produced at the level of the stomach fistula, is what is involved, namely, the organism in this case is deceived.

There is indeed an effect then, a demonstration of something which, if you look more closely at it, is not of course that you are going to make a completely different type of animal from a dog. All Pavlovian experimentation would really be of no interest if it were not a matter of constructing the essential possibility of the grasp of something which is well and truly, and not to be defined otherwise, than as the effect of the signifier on a field which is the living field. This has no other repercussion, I mean theoretical repercussion, than to allow it to be conceived how, where there is language, there is no need to search for a reference in a spiritual entity. But who dreams of it now? And who could be interested in it? It must all the same be highlighted that what is demonstrated by the Pavlovian experiment, namely, that there is no operation involving signifiers as such which does not imply the presence of the subject, is not entirely the first thing that foolish people may think about.

(20) It is in no way the dog who gives this proof and not even for Mr Pavlov, because Mr Pavlov constructs this experiment precisely to show that one can do very well without a hypothesis about what the dog thinks. The subject whose existence is demonstrated, or rather the demonstration of his existence, it is not at all the dog who gives it, but, as everyone knows, Mr Pavlov himself, because he is the one who blows into the trumpet, he or one of his helpers, it does not matter. I made a remark incidentally, saying that, of course, what is implied in this experiment, what is implied is the possibility of something which demonstrates the function of the signifier and its relation to the subject. And I added that, of course, no one had the intention of obtaining in this way anything whatsoever of the order of a change in the nature of the animal. What I mean by that is something which has indeed its interest. It is that one does not even obtain a modification of the order of those that we must indeed suppose to have taken place, at the time when this animal who is called a dog was made pass over to the domestic state.

It must be admitted that the dog has not been domesticated since the time of the earthly paradise. So then, there was a moment when people were able to make of this animal not at all, certainly, an animal endowed with language but an

animal as regards which, perhaps, it seems to me that it would be interesting to examine whether this question, the one which is formulated as follows, namely, whether the dog, perhaps, can be said in a way to know (*savoir*) that we are speaking, as is apparently the case. What sense is to be given here to the word *savoir*? This appears to be just as interesting a question at least as the one raised by the *montage* of the conditioned or conditional reflex.

What strikes me, rather, is the way in which in the course of these experiments we never receive from the experimenters the least testimony of what is involved and which, nevertheless, must exist, in the personal relations, as I might say, between the animal and the experimenter. I do not want to play the tune of the Society for the Protection of Animals, but you must admit that it would all the same be very interesting, and that perhaps there, one would learn a little more about what can be called neurosis at the level of animals, than what is registered in practice. For one aims, in the practice of these experimental stimulations, when they are pushed to the point of producing these sorts of diverse disorders which go from inhibition to disorganised barking, and that are qualified as (21) neurosis on the sole pretext of something, which firstly is provoked, secondly, has become completely inadequate with respect to external conditions as if for a long time the animal has not been outside all of these conditions, and which in no case, of course, has the right under any heading to be assimilated to what precisely analysis allows us to qualify as constituting neurosis in a being who speaks.

In short, we see it not alone here, Mr Pavlov shows himself in the fundamental instauration of his experiment, as I said, to be a structuralist and one of the strictest observance. But one could say that, even what he receives as response, has really all the characteristics of what we have defined as fundamental in the relation of the speaking being to language, namely, that he receives his own message in an inverted form. My formula produced a long time ago applies here quite appropriately, for what happens? What he hooked onto, put in second place: the sound of the trumpet as one might say, first, to illustrate with respect to the physiological sequence set up by him at the level of the organ, a stomach fistula, what does he get now? What he gets is an inverse sequence in which the animal's reaction presents itself as attached to this sound of the trumpet. For us in all of this there is very little mystery, which moreover takes nothing from the import of the benefits which were able to be produced in this sort of experimentation, at the level of one or other point of cerebral functioning. But what interest us are its aims. That its aims are only obtained at the cost of a certain miscognition of what constitutes the structure of the experiment at the start, is designed to alert us to what this experiment signifies *qua* act, for this subject - Pavlov here - who in this case does nothing more than very exactly, and without being aware of it, pick up in the most correct form the benefits of a construction which can be very exactly assimilated to the one imposed on us, once it is a matter of the relation of the speaking being to language. This is something, in any case, that deserves to be highlighted, if only because it has

been left out of the demonstrative point, as one might say, of the whole operation.

In connection with the whole field of activities described as scientific at a certain historical period, this aim of a reduction described as "materialist" deserves to be taken as such for what it is, namely, symptomatic. Should they have believed in God, someone is going to shout at me. But in truth, it is so true (22) that this whole construction described as materialist or organicist, as we might say again, in medicine, is very well accepted by spiritual authorities.

In the final count, all of this leads us to ecumenism. There is a certain way of carrying out the reduction of the field of the divine which, in its final term, in its final source, is quite favourable in ensuring that all the little fish are finally gathered into the same big net. This, which is even manifestly more tangible, is spread out - as I might say - before us, this tangible fact which is manifestly spread out before your eyes, ought all the same inspire in us a certain withdrawal as regards what is involved - as I might say - in the relations to truth in a certain context.

If the lucubrations of logicians at a time now ended, considered as relegated in the order of the values of thinking, which is called the Middle Ages, if the simple lucubrations of logicians were able to draw down major condemnations, and if on one or other point of doctrine in the field on which we operate, and which were called heresies, people very quickly came to the point of strangling one another, of massacring one another, why think that these are the effects, as they say, the effects of fanaticism? Why the invocation of such a register, when perhaps it would be enough to conclude from it that one or other statement about the relations of knowledge could communicate, were infinitely more sensitive at that time in the subject, to the effects of truth.

We no longer retain anything from all these debates that are rightly or wrongly called theological - we will have to come back to this, to what is involved in theology - except texts that we know how to read more or less well, and which, in many cases in no way deserve the title of dust-covered. What we, perhaps, do not suspect, for example, is that this had, perhaps, immediate, direct consequences in the market place, at the school door, and if necessary in household life, in sexual relations. Why should such a thing not be conceivable? It would be enough to introduce a different dimension to that of fanaticism, that of seriousness, for example.

How does it come about that, that as regards what is stated in the framework of our teaching functions and of what is called the university, how does it happen that, on the whole, things are in such a state that it is not absolutely scandalous to formulate that everything that is served up to us by the *Universitas Litterarum*, the Arts Faculty, which still has the upper hand on what are nobly (23) called the Human Sciences, is a knowledge (*savoir*) titrated in such a way that in no case does it have in fact any kind of consequence. It is true that there

is the other side, the *Universitas* no longer holds its place very well because there is something else which is introduced into it and which is called the Science Faculty.

I would point out to you that in the Science Faculty, because of the mode of inscription of the development of science as such, things cannot be so distant. Because here it has proved that the condition of the progress of science, is that people want to know nothing about the consequences of what this knowledge of science involves at the level of truth. These consequences are allowed to develop all by themselves.

For a considerable time in the historical field, people who already well and truly deserved the title of *savant* looked twice before they put into circulation certain systems, certain styles of knowledge that they had perfectly well glimpsed. There was a certain Mr Gauss, for example, who is rather well known, who had rather advanced ideas on this. He allowed other mathematicians to put them in circulation thirty years later while it was already in his own papers. It appeared to him that, perhaps, the consequences at the level of truth deserved to be taken into consideration.

All of this to tell you that the complaisance, indeed, the consideration the Pavlovian theory enjoys in the Science Faculty, where it has the greatest prestige, depends perhaps on the fact which I emphasise, and which is properly speaking its futile dimension. Futile, you do not know perhaps what that means, in fact. Neither do I, I did not know up to a certain moment, up to the moment when I found myself, found myself stumbling by chance on the use of the word *futilis* in a corner of Ovid, where that means properly speaking, a vase that leaks (*fuit*).

Leakage (*la fuite*), I hope I have sufficiently circumscribed it, finds itself at the base of the Pavlovian edifice. Namely, that what it is a matter of demonstrating has not been demonstrated, since it is already said at the beginning. That simply Mr Pavlov demonstrates here that he is a structuralist, except that he does not know it himself. But this obviously takes away any import from what may claim to be here any proof whatsoever, and that moreover all that is to be demonstrated has really only a very reduced interest, given that the question of what God is about, is hidden somewhere quite different. And, in a word, everything that is concealed in terms of foundations for belief, of hope for (24) knowledge, of an ideology of progress in the Pavlovian functioning, if you look closely at it, resides only in the fact that the possibilities that the Pavlovian experimentation demonstrates, are supposed to be already there in the brain.

That one should obtain from the manipulation of the dog in the context of signifying articulation, effects, results, which suggests the possibility of a higher degree of complication of these reactions has nothing astonishing about it because we introduce this complication. But what is implied is entirely in what

I highlighted earlier, namely, whether the things that one reveals are already there beforehand.

What is at stake when what we are dealing with is the divine dimension and generally that of the spirit, turns entirely around the following: what do we suppose to be already there before we discover it. If in a whole field it proves that it would not be futile, but frivolous, to think that this knowledge (*savoir*) is already there, waiting for us before we make it emerge, this could be of a nature to make us carry out a so much more profound questioning.

This indeed is going to be what is at stake in connection with the psychoanalytic act.

The time forces me to stop here the remarks that I am making before you today. You will see the next time in getting closer to what is involved in the psychoanalytic act, in this ideological model, whose paradoxical constitution as I told you consists in the fact that someone can ground an experience, can ground an experience on presuppositions that are profoundly unknown to himself. And what does it mean that they are unknown to him? This is not the only dimension to bring into play, that of ignorance, I mean, concerning the properly structural presuppositions of the instauration of the experience. There is another much more original dimension, to which I have been alluding for a long time, it is the one that next time I will venture to introduce in its turn.

Seminar 2: Wednesday 22 November 1967.

I cannot say that the crowd of you who are here this year does not pose me a problem. What does that mean for a discourse which, if there were any doubt about it, I repeated it often enough for it to be known, which, essentially is addressed to psychoanalysts. It is true that my place here, the one from which I am speaking to you, already bears sufficient witness to something that happened which puts me in an eccentric position with respect to them. The very place that for years, in short, I have done nothing but question, what I took this year as subject: the psychoanalytic act. It is clear that what I said the last time, could not but encounter this murmur of satisfaction which came to me about the general opinion of the audience, if I can express myself in this way, which in truth, for a part (those necessarily who are there, given this number, who are coming here for the first time) for a part then, who came to see because they had been told that they would comprehend nothing. And in fact they had a pleasant surprise.

In truth as I pointed out in passing, to speak about Pavlov in this case as I did, was indeed to lend a helping hand to the feeling of comprehension since, as I said, nothing is more respected than the Pavlovian enterprise, especially in the Arts Faculty. But it is all the same from that quarter that on the whole you come to me. Does that mean that this sort of approval pleases me in any way? You have no doubt: certainly not, since after all, moreover, this is not what you come looking for either.

To get to the nub, it seems to me that if something can decently explain this (26) crowd, it is something that in any case would not depend on this misapprehension that I do not lend myself to. Hence, the type of expectation to which I alluded earlier, is all the same something which for its part is not a misapprehension, and it encourages me to do my best to face up to what I called this crowd. The fact is that, to a greater or lesser degree, those who come, on the whole, it is because they have the feeling that here something is being stated which might indeed, who knows, be of importance.

It is obvious that if this how things are, this crowd is justified since the principle of the teaching that we will describe, as a way of crudely situating things, university teaching, is precisely that anything whatsoever in everything that touches on the most burning subjects, indeed current politics, for example, all of this should be presented, put into circulation, precisely in such a way that it is of

no importance. This is at the very least the function that university teaching has satisfied for a long time in developed countries. This indeed is the reason moreover why the university is at home in them, because where it does not satisfy it, in underdeveloped countries, there is a tension. So then it fulfils its function properly in developed countries. The fact is that it is tolerable in that whatever is professed in it does not involve any disorder.

Naturally, it is not on the plane of disorder that we will consider the consequences of what I am saying here, but the public suspects that at a certain level, which is precisely that of those to whom I am addressing myself, namely, the psychoanalysts, there is a certain tension. This, in effect, is what is at stake as regards the psychoanalytic act. Because today we are going to advance a little bit further. We are going to see what is involved for those who practise this act. Namely, this is what defines them, those who are capable of such an act, and capable in a way that they can situate themselves in it, as they say among the other acts, sporting or technical, as professionals.

Assuredly, from this act, in so far as one makes a profession of it, there results a position as regards which it is natural that one feels assured in what one knows, in what one possesses from one's experience. Nevertheless, this is one of the ways, one of the interests of what I am advancing this year. There results from the proper nature of this act a field which, it is not unimportant to say it, I did not even skim the surface of the last time. On the nature of this act there depend more serious consequences as regards what results from the position that must (27) be held, if one is skilled in exercising it.

It is here that there can be situated, curiously, as you are going to see, the fact that I can allow others beside analysts, non-analysts, to conceive of what it is in this act which, all the same, concerns them.

The psychoanalytic act concerns very directly and in the first place, I would say, those who do not make a profession of it. It will be enough here to indicate that, if it is true as I teach that what is at stake here is something like a conversion in the position which results for the subject as regards what is involved in his relation to knowledge, how can we not immediately admit that there cannot but be established a really dangerous gap if only some people take an adequate view of this subversion, since that was what I called it, of the subject. Is it even conceivable that the subversion of the subject, and not of one or other elective moment in a particular life, should be something that is even imaginable as being produced only here and there, indeed at a particular gathering point at which all of those who have not undergone this turnabout, comfort one another?

The fact that the subject is only realisable in each one, of course, leaves no less intact its status as structure precisely, and put forward in the structure. Henceforth, it already appears that to make understood not outside, but in a certain relation to the analytic community what there is in this act which interests everyone, cannot but allow there to be seen more clearly within this

community what is desired as regards the status that those who make an active profession of this act can give themselves. And this is how the approach that we find ourselves taking this year in tackling it, as we were able the last time to put forward about what must precisely be distinguished at first, as one can, in flicking through pages see it sometimes presented, the act from motor activity. And attempting immediately to go through some stages, which are in no way presented as an apodictic approach, which cannot, which above all does not, claim to proceed by way of a sort of introduction which is supposed to be on the psychological scale of greater or lesser depth. It is, on the contrary, in the presentation of accidents regarding what is stated about this act, that we are going to seek the diversely situated flashes of light that allow us to grasp where the problem really is. So that in having spoken about Pavlov, I was not looking for any classical reference in this connection, but rather pointing out what is in (28) effect in the corner of not a few memories. Namely, the convergence noted in a classic work, that of Dalbiez, between Pavlovian experimentation and Freud's mechanisms. Of course, this still has its little effect, especially given the epoch. You cannot imagine, given the background of the psychoanalytic position, how precarious it felt, what joy some people experienced at the time, as they say, namely, in the years 1928 or 30, that psychoanalysis was spoken about in the Sorbonne. Whatever may be the interest of this work, carried out, I must say, with great care, and full of relevant remarks, the sort of comfort that can be drawn from the fact that Mr Dalbiez articulates, my God, relevantly that there is in a sense no derogation between the psychology, the physiology of Pavlov and the mechanisms of the unconscious, is extremely weak, extremely weak, why? For the reasons that I noted for you the last time, namely, that the link from signifier to signifier in so far as we know it to be subjectifying in its nature is introduced by Pavlov in the very setting up of the experiment. And, therefore, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that what is constructed from it rejoins the analogical structures that we find in analytic experience in as much as you have seen that I was able to formulate the determination of the subject in it as founded on this link of signifier to signifier.

It nevertheless remains that except for the fact that they find themselves closer to one another than either to the conception of Pierre Janet, this indeed is what Dalbiez emphasises, we will not have gained very much from such a *rapprochement* founded precisely on the failure to recognise what grounds it. But what interests us still more is Pavlov's failure to recognise the implication that I called, more or less humorously, structuralist, not at all humorously in the fact that it is structuralist, humorously in as much as I called him a Lacanian structuralist, as it happens. This is where I stopped, suspended around the question: what is involved in what one can call here, from a certain perspective, what? A form of ignorance? Is that sufficient? No. We are not going, all the same, from the fact that an experimenter does not question himself about the nature of what he is introducing into the field of experimentation, (it is legitimate for him to do so, but let him go no further into what might be called this prior question!) we are not, all the same, going to introduce here these functions of the unconscious.

(29) Something else is necessary which, in truth, we are lacking. Perhaps this other thing will be given to us in a way that is more manageable to see, something quite different. Namely, let us go at it immediately in a crude way. A psychoanalyst who, before an audience - it is always necessary to take into account the ears that any formula whatsoever is addressed to - a psychoanalyst who puts forward this remark which was recently reported to me: "I do not admit any psychoanalytic concept that I have not verified on a rat!"

Even to ears that were prepared, and it was the case at the time of this statement, they were ears as one might say, and at the time, because this remark was made at an already distant epoch, let us say fifteen years ago, it was to a communist friend since it was he who reported it to me fifteen years later, he was the one addressed by the psychoanalyst in question, even to ears which might have seen in it something or other, like a reminiscence, the remark appeared a little crude.

This then was reported to me recently and far from expressing a doubt, I began to dream out loud, and addressing myself to someone who was on my right during this meeting, I said: So and so it quite capable of having made this remark. I named him, I will not name him here, he is the one that in my *Ecrits* I call the "*benêt*".

"*Benêt*" says the excellent dictionary that I often speak to you about, that of *Bloch et von Wartburg*, is a late form of *benoît*, which comes from *benedictus*, and its modern sense is a subtle illusion, which results from this remark written in chapter 5, paragraph 3 of Matthew "Blessed (*bénis*) are the poor in spirit".

In truth, this is what makes me pin the name *benêt* on the person in question. And, as it happens, my interlocutor immediately said to me: "But yes, he was the one who said it to me". Up to a certain point, he was the only one who could have said it.

I do not necessarily lack respect for the person who could in a theoretical statement about psychoanalysis make such an astonishing remark. I consider the fact to be rather a fact of structure that, in truth, does not properly speaking involve the qualification of poverty of spirit. For me it was rather a charitable gesture to impute to him the happiness reserved for the aforesaid poor in spirit. I am almost certain that to take up such a position is not any kind of chance, either good or bad that is involved, either subjective or objective, but that, in truth, he must feel himself rather beyond chance to come to such extremes. And (30) also moreover you can see that his case, far from being unique, if you consult a certain page of my *Ecrits*, that of the Rome discourse where I give an account of what is put forward by a certain Masserman who in the United States has the position of what in Alain is called an Important Person. This Important Person in the same search no doubt for comfort, gives a glorious account of the researches of a Mr Hudgins, on which I dwelt at the time, it is already a long time ago, it is the same time as the remarks that I reported to you earlier. He

gives a glorious account of what he was able to obtain from a reflex which was also conditioned, constructed in a subject, this time a human one, in such a way that the contraction of the pupil was regularly produced by pronouncing the word "contract". The two pages of irony that I developed, because it was necessary to do so at the time to be even heard, namely, whether the link supposedly determined in this way between the sound and what he believes to be language, appeared to him to be also sustained if one substituted for "contract", "marriage contract", or "contract bridge" or "breach of contract" or even if one concentrated the word until it is reduced to its first syllable, is obviously the sign that there is something here in the breach of which it is not vain to maintain oneself, since others choose it as a key point in the comprehension of what is at stake.

Perhaps after all this personage will tell me that I cannot but see here a contribution to this dominance that I accord to language in analytic determinism. This indeed shows in effect the degree of confusion that one can come to from a certain perspective.

The psychoanalytic act, you see then, can consist in questioning first of all, and starting - of course, this is necessary - from what one considers must be set aside, the act as it is effectively conceived of in the psychoanalytic circle with the critique of what this may involve. But this may, all the same also, this conjunction of two words, "the psychoanalytic-act", evoke for us something quite different, namely, the act as it operates psychoanalytically, what the psychoanalyst directs of his action into psychoanalytic operancy. In this case then, of course, we are at a completely different level.

Is it interpretation? Is it transference that we are thus brought? What is the essence of the act of the psychoanalyst *qua* operating? What is his part in the (31) game? This is something which psychoanalysts do not fail, in effect, to question among themselves. Here is something about which, thank God, they put forward more relevant propositions, even though they are far from being univocal or even progressive as the years go by.

There is something else. Namely, the act, I would say, as it is read in psychoanalysis. What is an act for the psychoanalyst? It will be enough, I think, to make myself understood at this level, for me to articulate, for me to recall, what each and every one of you know, that no one is ignorant of in our time, namely, what is called the symptomatic act, so particularly characterised by the slip of the tongue, or moreover by this level which in general can be classified as belonging to the register, as one says, of daily action, hence the awkward term of "*Psychopathology of everyday life*", of what properly speaking has its centre in the fact that what is always at stake, and even when it is a matter of a slip of the tongue, is its aspect of act.

It is here indeed that we see the value of the reminder that I gave about the ambiguity left at the conceptual basis of psychoanalysis between motor activity

and act. It is assuredly by reason of these theoretical starting points that Freud favours this displacement precisely at the moment that, in a chapter to which I will perhaps have time to come later, concerning what is involved in mistakes, *Vergreifung*, as it is called, he recalls that it is quite natural that one should come to this after seven or eight chapters on the field of the act, since like language, he says, we will be remaining here on the motor plane. On the contrary, it is quite clear that everything in this chapter and in the one which follows, the one about accidental or again symptomatic actions, there will never be anything else at stake than this dimension that we have posited as constitutive of every act, namely, its signifying dimension. There is nothing introduced in these chapters about the act except the fact that it is posited as signifying.

Nevertheless, it is not so simple, for if it takes on its value, its articulation as a signifying act with regard to what Freud then introduces as unconscious, it is certainly not that it shows itself off, that it posits itself as act. It is quite the contrary. It is more than effaced here as an activity, as the person involved says, an activity to fill a gap, which only occurs if one is not thinking about it, in the measure that one does not concern oneself with it, which is only there where it is expressed, for a whole part of his activities, to occupy hands that are supposedly distracted from any mental relation. Or again, this act is going to put its sense (32) precisely on what it is a matter of attacking, of shaking, its sense under the protection of awkwardness and failure. Here then is what analytic intervention is. The act then, a reversal similar to the one that we carried out the last time about that of the very motor aspect of the reflex that Pavlov calls absolute. This motor aspect is not in the fact that the leg stretches out because you have tapped a tendon. The motor aspect is where one holds the hammer to provoke this. But if the act is in the reading of the act, does that mean that this reading is simply added on and that it is from the act reduced *Nachträglich* (subsequently) that it takes on its value? You know the stress that I have laid for a long time on this term which would not figure in the Freudian vocabulary, if I had not extracted it from Freud's text. I was the first and, moreover, in truth, for a long while the only one.

This term has its value. It is not simply Freudian. Heidegger uses it, with a different perspective it is true, when it is a matter for him of questioning the relationships between being and *Rede*. The symptomatic act must already contain in itself something which at least prepares it for this way in, for that which for us, in our perspective, will realise its plenitude as act, but subsequently. I insist on it, and it is important from now on to mark it. What is the status of the act? It must be said to be new, and even unheard of if one gives its full sense, the one we started from, the one which has from all time been valid about the status of the act.

And then what? After these three acceptations, the psychoanalyst in his acts of affirmation, namely, what he utters when he has to give an account very especially of what is involved for him about this status of the act. And here a lucky turn of events means that quite recently, precisely, someone, in a certain

context, called that of the psychoanalysts of the romance languages, had to give a report, an account of what is envisaged from the point of view of the authorised psychoanalyst about the *passage à l'acte*, or again acting out. Here after all, why not, is a very good example to take, which I did moreover, since it is available to us. I opened the report by one of them called Olivier Flournoy, a celebrated name, the third generation of great psychiatrists, the first being Theodore, the second Henri. And you know the celebrated case by which Theodore remains immortal in the analytic tradition: this deluded clairvoyant with the marvellous name on whom he produced a whole work. And you will greatly profit from it if the work comes into your hands. I believe that it is not widely available at the moment. So then, in the third generation, this young man (33) puts forward something to us which consists in taking at least a part of the field, the one that the other *rapporteur* who spoke about acting out did not take. He is going to deal with *l'agir* [acting], and since, no doubt, people believe not without foundation that there is an acting in what concerns transference, he puts forward some questions about transference which, moreover, have the value of propositions.

I am not of course going to read it for you, because there is nothing more difficult to put up with than reading before such a large audience. Nevertheless, in order to give you the tone of it, I will take the first paragraph which goes more or less as follows:

“From this review of the recent evolution of ideas from which one always gathers the impression of something obscure and unsatisfying. ... Why should a regression imply transference, namely, the absence of memory and an acting in the form of a transformation of the analyst, by projection and introjection, and why does it not simply imply regressive behaviour? Namely, its own structure. In other words, why does it evoke transference? Why does an infantilising situation imply transference, and not an infantile behaviour based on the model of child-parent behaviour, alluding to another register which puts the accent on development and on the antecedents of development and no longer on the proper category of regression which alludes to the phases located in analysis. Indeed, he adds, repeating a conflictual situation and even drawing its force from it.”

Is this enough to confer on this behaviour the epithet of transference? What do I mean, in already announcing to you the question introduced in this tone. It is assuredly, and everything that follows will demonstrate it, a certain tone, a certain style of interrogating transference. I mean, to take things in a rather lively way, and in putting its very concept in question as radically as possible. This is something that I did myself very exactly nine years ago or more exactly almost nine and a half years ago, in what I entitled “*The direction of the treatment and the principle of its power*”.

In truth you can find there in chapter 3, page 102, “Where have we got to with transference”, the questions which are posed here. Posed and developed with infinitely greater breadth and in a way which, at the time, was absolutely without

an equivalent. I mean that what since then has made its way, I am certainly not (34) saying thanks to my opening things up, but through a kind of convergence of times which meant, for example, that someone called Sachs [Szasz?] posed the most radical questions about the status of transference. So radical, I would even say, that, in truth, transference is considered as so much at the mercy of the very status of the analytic situation that it is posited as being properly the very concept which would make psychoanalysis worthy of objection. Because things have got to the point that a psychoanalyst of the strictest observance - and one very well placed in the American hierarchy - can find nothing better to say to define transference than that it is a mode of defence of the analyst. That it is to keep at a distance the reactions, whatever they may be, obtained in the situation and which might seem to involve him too directly, concern him, be his responsibility, properly speaking, that analysis forges, invents the concept of transference. Thanks to which he decides, he judges in such a way that he says, in short, essentially, in the radical foundation of this concept, that he has not for his part any share in the aforesaid reaction. And specifically not by being there as an analyst. But simply being able to highlight in them what they contain in terms of a revival, a reproduction, of previous behaviour, of living stages of the subject, who finds himself reproducing them, acting them instead of remembering them.

Here then is what is at stake and what Flournoy confronts, with some spirit no doubt, but giving its whole place to the conception to which, at the extreme position, there seem to be reduced within psychoanalysis itself, those who believe themselves to be in the way of theorising it.

If this extreme position, which, once it is introduced, is going to have its consequences, I mean that for Szasz everything depends, in the final analysis, on the capacity for strict objectivity in the analyst. And since this can be in any case only a postulate, the whole of analysis from this point of view is doomed to a radical interrogation, to a fundamental putting in question of every point where it intervenes.

God knows I have never gone that far, and with good reason, in the questioning of analysis. And it is, in effect, remarkable as well as strange, that in the circles where people are most attached to maintaining its status socially, the questions can in short within this circle be pushed so far that what is at stake is nothing less than whether analysis in itself is well founded or illusory.

(35) This would be a very disturbing phenomenon if we did not find in the same context, as one might say, the foundation of what is called information, which is established on the basis of total liberty. Only, let us not forget, we are in the American context. And everyone knows that however broad may be the liberty to think, a commonsense liberty and from all the ways in which it is expressed, we know very well what it involves. Namely that, in short, one can say anything at all, that what counts is what is already well and truly established. Consequently from the moment that the psychoanalytic societies are firmly

established on their base, one can also say that the concept of transference is worth damn all. That does not affect anything. This indeed is what is at stake. Very precisely, it is also indeed here that, by taking a different tone, our lecturer is going to be engulfed and that henceforth we are going to see the concept of transference remitted to the discretion of a reference, to what one can, all the same, call a little story, the one from which no doubt, apparently, it emerged, namely, the history of Breuer, of Freud and Anna O, which, between ourselves, shows much more interesting things than what is made of it in this case, and what is made of it in this case goes very far. I mean that we are going to see being highlighted the third relation, of course, the fact that Freud first of all protected, defended himself, as it is put, and by means of transference, by sheltering himself from the fact that, as he says to his fiancée - for there is also the fiancée naturally in the explanation we are dealing with, because there is going to be a question of nothing less than what I called the other day the act of the birth of psychoanalysis - he will say to his fiancée that these are things, of course, that could only happen to someone like Breuer.

A certain type of relevance, even cheap daring, which is going to make transference appear to us as being entirely linked to accidental conjunctions. Indeed later, as one of them announces, a specialist in hypnotism, that later when the incident reoccurs with Freud himself, at that very moment the maid came in. Who knows, if the maid had not come in, what might have happened? So in that case Freud was able to re-establish the third party situation. The maidly superego played its role and allowed him to re-establish what has been since then the natural defence. It is written in this report that when a woman coming out of hypnosis throws her arms around you should say to yourself: "I welcome her as a daughter".

This sort of *mühen* of trivialities is obviously what more and more is the law of what I called earlier the act of affirmation of the analyst. The more one affirms (36) oneself from trivialities, the more one engenders respect.

It is all the same curious that this report which, no doubt, this can be seen by many signs, and it is in this sense that I am asking you on this occasion to get to know it - that will increase the sale of the next *Revue de Psychanalyse*, the organ of the *Société Psychanalytique de Paris* - to see if there is not some relation between this audacious meditation and what I was stating nine years previously. In truth the question, will remain eternally undecided, since the author in these lines bears no witness to it. But some lines, some pages further on, something happens to him. Namely, that at the moment when he is speaking, my God, of what is in question - because it is a personal advance - the tone that he has just given to things, consists in highlighting in it what he nobly calls "the inter-subjective relation".

Everyone knows that if you read the Rome Discourse quickly you may think that this is what I am talking about. You can discover the dimension of the inter-subjective relation through intermediaries other than me, since this error, this

misconstruction, which consists in believing that this is what I re-introduced into a psychoanalysis that ignored it too much, was made by many people around me at that time. And if you are formed by them you could indeed, in effect, put forward the inter-subjective experience as a reference to be recalled in this context.

“It is this inter-subjective context”, he writes, “which appears original to me in analysis. It explodes the straitjacket of the diagnosis described as ‘mental affection’. Not that psychopathology is a useless word. It is undoubtedly indispensable for an exchange between individuals outside the experience. But its meaning evaporates during the treatment.” You see the tone except that between “not that psychopathology is a useless word”, and “it is of course indispensable”, a parenthesis explodes and I ask you what justifies it here.

“In this connection in re-reading an *Ecrit* of Lacan, I was astonished to see that he speaks about the sick person (*du malade*), he who is oriented above all towards language”.

This relates to me as you are going to see. I must say that I do not know in which of my writings I speak about the sick person. It is not, in effect, quite my style. I am not going to object to it. In any case but the idea of paging through the nine hundred and fifty pages of my *Ecrits* to see where I speak about the sick person is not one that would have come to me.

(37) On page 70 on the contrary, I find ‘desire’. “Desire of what one is not, desire which cannot be satisfied, or even a desire to be unsatisfied as Lacan, Lacan in the same *Ecrits* quoted” ... (ah! what a relief, we are going to be able to see) ... “in the same *Ecrits* quoted, unceremoniously presents it with respect to the butcher’s wife”. And there is a little note on what I say about the butcher’s wife, which is fairly well known, because it is a rather brilliant piece. You might expect that this is what is referred to. Not at all. You are referred back to the butcher’s wife in Freud. Good for me, I can use that. I can go searching not for the passage about the butcher’s wife that you will find on page 620, but what is at stake:

“This theory, (I am taking the second theory of transference) whatever point of degradation it has come to recently in France” - it is object relations that is at stake, and as I explain, I am dealing with Maurice Bouvet – “has, like geneticism its noble origin. It is Abraham who opened up its the register, the notion of partial object is his original contribution. This is not the place to demonstrate its value. We are more interested in indicating its link to the partiality of the aspect that Abraham detaches from transference in order to promote it in its opacity as the capacity to love, as if this were, (this capacity to love), a constitutional given in the sick person in which there can be read the degree of his curability...”

I will spare you the rest, this “in the sick person” is thus attributed to Abraham.

I apologise for having developed before you such a long story. But it is to make the link between what I called just now the psychoanalyst in his acts of affirmation and the symptomatic act which I stressed the moment before. For what does Freud bring us in the psychopathology of every day life in connection precisely with errors and, properly, of this kind?

It is, he tells us, and he says it knowingly, in connection with three mistakes that he made in the interpretation of dreams. He links them explicitly to the fact that at the time he was analysing the dreams in question there was something that he held back, put in suspense in the progress of his interpretation. Something was held back at this precise point, as you will see in chapter ten, which is that on mistakes, in connection with three of these mistakes, specifically that of the famous station *Marburg*, which should have been *Marbach*, Hannibal whom he transformed into Hasdrubal and some one of the Medicis that he attributed to the history of Venice. What is curious in effect, is that it is always in connection with something when in short he held back some truth that he was lead into (38) committing these errors.

The fact that it is precisely after having made this reference to the butcher's beautiful wife which was difficult to avoid given that there follows a little piece which is written as follows. "The desire to have what the other has in order to be what one is not. The desire to be what the other is in order to have what one does not have. Indeed the desire not to have what one has, etc." Namely, a very direct extract - and I must say a little bit amplified, but amplified in a way that does not improve it - from what I wrote precisely about this direction of the treatment, as regards what is at stake in the phallic function. Do we not see here being touched the fact that it is curious that someone should be grateful for it, by this mistake obviously, if not by the irrepressible reference to my name, even if it is put under the heading of some incomprehensible stumbling or other on the part of someone who above all speaks about language, as he puts it. Is there not something there which makes us question ourselves? About what? About what is involved in the fact that with respect to a certain analysis, a certain field of analysis, people, even while supporting themselves explicitly by what I put forward, can only do so on condition that they repudiate it, I would say. Does not this just by itself pose a problem, which is none other than the problem, on the whole, of the status that the psychoanalytic act receives from a certain coherent organisation and which is, for the moment, the one which reigns in the community which is concerned with it.

To make this remark, to manifest the emergence, at a level which is certainly not that of the unconscious, of a mechanism which is precisely the one that Freud highlights with regard to the act, I would not say the most specific, but the new dimension of the act that analysis introduces. This itself, I mean to make this *rapprochement*, and to pose a question about it, this itself is an act, mine. I ask your pardon only because in order to bring it to a close I took what may appear to you to be an inordinate amount of time. But what I wanted to introduce here

is something that is difficult for me to introduce precisely before such a numerous assembly in which things can reverberate in a thousand displaced ways. I would not however want there to be displaced the notion that I am trying to introduce. I will no doubt have to take it up again. It has its importance, as you will see. It is not that in using it for a long time in its key forms I have not announced it coming one fine day.

(39) In praise of stupidity (*Eloge de la connerie*).

It is a long time now since I produced the project, the eventual work, let us say that after all, in our epoch it would be something to merit the truly prodigious success that one cannot be surprised at, which ensures that there still remains in the library of every doctor, pharmacist and dentist, the "*In praise of folly*" by Erasmus which, God knows, no longer touches us.

The praise of stupidity would undoubtedly be a more subtle operation to carry out for, in truth, what is stupidity? If I introduce it at the moment of taking the true essential step concerning what is involved in the analytic act, it is in order to point out that it is not a notion. To say what it is, is difficult. It is something like a knot, a knot around which many things are constructed, and delegate to themselves all sorts of powers which is undoubtedly something stratified, and that one cannot consider as simple. At a certain degree of maturity, as I might say, it is more than respectable. It is perhaps not what merits the greatest respect but it is assuredly what receives it.

I would say that this respect comes from a particular function, which is altogether linked with what we have to highlight here. A function of "*dé-connaissance*", if I may express myself in this way. And if you will allow me to amuse myself a little, to recall that people say "*il déconnaît*" [he was talking rubbish]. Do we not have here a crypto-morpheme? Is it not by taking it in the present that there would emerge the solidly established status of stupidity?

People always think that it is the imperfect. "He was talking rubbish at a mile a minute", for example. But, in truth, the fact is, this is a term which, like the term "I am lying" is always difficult to use in the present.

In any case, it is very difficult not to see that the status of the stupidity in question, *qua* established on the "*il déconnaît*", does not invest simply the subject that the aforesaid verb includes. There is in this approach something intransitive and neuter in the style of "*il pleut*" which gives its whole import to the aforesaid morpheme.

The important thing is what stupidities was he talking? Well then, this is how there is distinguished what I would call the true dimension of stupidity. The fact is this "she was talking stupid", is something which, in truth, is what deserves to be affected with this term, namely, to be called stupidity. The true dimension of (40) stupidity is indispensable to grasp as being what the psychoanalytic act has

to deal with. For if you look closely at it and specifically in these chapters that Freud gives us under the heading of mistakes and under that of accidental and symptomatic acts, each and every one of these acts is distinguished by great purity. But not when it is a question for example of the celebrated story of taking out one's keys before a particular door which are precisely the wrong ones. Let us take the case that Jones speaks about, because Freud showed the meaning and the value that this little act may have. Jones is going to tell us a story which ends with, "I would have liked to be at home here". Ten lines later we are at the end of another story which interprets the same gesture by saying, "I would have been better off at home". All the same it is not the same thing!

From the relevance of the noting of this function of slip, of mistake in the use of the key, to its floating, equivocal interpretation is there not an indication that you will easily rediscover in considering a thousand other facts collected in this register? And specifically the first twenty-five or thirty that Freud collects for us. It is, in a way, what the act transmits to us. It is undoubtedly something that it images assuredly in a signifying way and for which the suitable adjective would be to say that it is not so stupid (*pas si conne*).

Here indeed is the fascinating interest of these two chapters. But that everything that tries to adapt itself to them as interpretative description already represents this certain form of *dé-connaissance*, of fall and of evocation in which it must be said, in more than one case here, quite radical as regards what cannot but be sensed as stupidity. Even if the act, which we have no doubt about, for at this point of the emergence of what is original in the symptomatic act, there is no doubt that there is here an opening, a flash of light, something flooding in which will not be closed off for a long time.

What is the nature of this message which Freud underlines for us that at the same time, he does not know that he is giving it to himself and that, nevertheless, he does not want it to be known. What lies at the final term in this strange register which, it seems, cannot be taken up again in the psychoanalytic act except by falling below its proper level?

That is why I would like to introduce today, before leaving you, this slippery term, this risky term which, in truth, is not easily manageable in such a large (41) social context, which is given the note of curse, of insult and disparagement which is attached in the French tongue to this strange word "*le con*". This is, let it be said in parenthesis, findable neither in *Littré* nor in *Robert*. Only the *Bloch et von Wartburg*, which deserves to be honoured for it, gives us its etymology: *cunnus* (Latin).

Assuredly, to develop what is involved in French as regards the function of this word, "*le con*", which is nevertheless so fundamental in our tongue and in our exchanges, it is indeed the case that it would be the task of structuralism to articulate what links one to the other, the word and the thing. But how can it be done? How can it be done, except by introducing here, something or other

which would be the prohibition for under eighteen's, or perhaps it should be the over forties.

This nevertheless is what is at stake. And someone whose words we have in a book which is distinguished by the very special - I do not think anyone has ever made this remark - absence of stupidity, namely, the gospels, has said, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's". Observe that naturally no one has ever noticed that it is absolutely extraordinary to say, "render to God" what he has contributed to the operation. It does not matter. For the psychoanalyst, the law is different. It is, "Render to truth what belongs to the truth, and to stupidity what belongs to stupidity".

Well then, it is not so simple. Because they overlap. And because if there is a dimension which is here proper to psychoanalysis it is not so much the truth of stupidity as the stupidity of the truth.

I mean that apart from the cases in which we can aseptically, which comes down to saying de-sex, the truth, namely, to no longer make of it as in logic, only a value with a capital T which functions in opposition to a capital F, everywhere that truth is engaged with something else, specifically with our function of speaking being, the truth finds itself in difficulty because of the incidence by which something which is the centre in what I am designating, on this occasion, by the term of stupidity, and which means the following - I will show you the next time that Freud also says it in this same chapter, even though everyone lets it pass - and which means that the organ which gives, as I might say, its category to the attribute in question, is precisely marked by what I would call a particular inappropriateness for enjoyment. It is from this that what is at stake takes on its relief. Namely, the irreducible character of the sexual act for any truthful (42) production. This is what is at stake in the psychoanalytic act, for the psychoanalytic act, assuredly, is articulated at another level which corresponds at this other level to the deficiency that truth experiences in approaching the sexual field. This is something whose status we must question.

To suggest to you what is at stake, I will take an example. One day I picked up from the mouth of a charming young man who had every right to be called a *con* the following anecdote. He had had a misadventure. He had had a rendezvous with a young girl who had let him drop like a pancake. "I understood right away he told me that once again she was a *femme de non recevoir*". That was what he called it.

What is this charming stupidity, because he said it like that, with all his heart. He had heard three words following one another and he applied them. But supposing that he had done it deliberately this would have been a witticism. In truth, the simple fact that I, I am reporting it to you, that I am raising it to the field of the Other, effectively makes of it a witticism. It is very funny, for everyone except for him and for whoever receives it face to face with him. But once it is told, it is extremely amusing. So that one would be quite wrong to

think that the *con* lacks wit, even if it is from a reference to the Other that this dimension is added.

In a word, what is involved in our position *vis-à-vis* this amusing little story is still exactly what we have to deal with every time that it is a question of putting in form what we grasp as a dimension, not at the level of all the registers of what happens in the unconscious, but very properly speaking in what belongs to the psychoanalytic act.

I wanted simply to introduce today this register which you may guess is undoubtedly risky. But you will see that it is useful.

Seminar 3: Wednesday 29 November 1967

(43) At the beginning of an article on counter-transference published in 1960, a good psychoanalyst to whom we will give a certain place today, Dr Winnicott, writes that the word counter-transference ought to be referred back to its original use. And, in this connection, to oppose it, he takes into account the word self. A word like self, he says, here I am going to have to use English: “naturally knows more than we do”, *en sait naturellement plus que nous ne pouvons faire, ou que nous ne faisons*. It is a word which he says, “uses us and commands us”, *nous prend en charge, peut nous commander*, as I might say.

It is a remark, by God, which is interesting to see from the pen of someone who is not distinguished by a special reference to language, as you are going to see.

This feature appeared rather piquant to me and will appear still more from what I will have to evoke before you today about this author. But moreover, for you, it takes on its value from the fact that, whether you suspect it or not, you are integrated into a discourse that obviously many of you cannot see in its totality.

I mean that what I am advancing this year only has its effect from what has gone before, and it is not because you are only approaching it now - if such is the case for some of you - that you are any less subject to its effect. Curiously, because of this, the fact is in short that this discourse - you find perhaps that I am insisting too much on this - is not, in short, directly addressed to you. It is addressed to whom? My God, I repeat it every time: to psychoanalysts, and in (44) conditions such that it has to be said that it is addressed to them from a certain atopia. An atopia which is my own and which therefore has to give its reasons. It is precisely these reasons that are going to be here, I mean today, a little more emphasised.

There is a rhetoric, as I might say, about the object of psychoanalysis, that I claim is linked to a certain style of teaching of psychoanalysis which is that of the existing societies. This relation may not appear to be immediate, and in effect - why should it be - only provided at the price of a certain investigation one may feel to be necessary.

To start from there, namely, from an example of what I will call a normative knowledge about what is useful behaviour with all that this can involve as extension to the general good, and the particular good, I will take an example

which is worth what it is worth. But which is worthwhile from the fact that it is typical, and that coming from the pen of a well known author, simply, however little you may be initiated into what is involved in the analytic method to the extent to knowing, in general, that what is involved is to speak for weeks and for months at the rate of several sessions a week, and to speak in a certain particularly loose way, in conditions which, precisely, abstract from any perspective concerning this reference to the norm, to the useful, precisely, perhaps, to come back to it, but above all to free oneself from it in such a way that the circuit, before returning to it, is the simplest possible.

I believe that the lines that I have chosen, taken where they are found, namely, at the beginning of an article very explicitly from the pen of an author who published it in 1955, put in question the concept of the genital character. Here is more or less where he starts from in order, effectively, to contribute a critique that I do not have to develop. Today it is the style that is at stake. It is a piece from the classical Mr Fenichel, in as much as the author admits, I mean the author specifies it carefully, Fenichel forms part of the basis of this teaching of psychoanalysis in the institutes.

A normal, genital character is an ideal concept, he says himself. Nevertheless, it is certain that the achievement of genital primacy involves a decisive advance in the formation of character. The fact of being capable of obtaining full satisfaction from genital orgasm makes the regulation of sexuality, a physiological regulation, possible and this puts an end to the *damming up*, that is to the barrier, to the stemming of instinctual energies with their unhappy effects (45) on the behaviour of the person. "It also does something for the full development of *love*, of love and hate", he adds in parenthesis, namely, the surmounting of ambivalence. Besides, the capacity to discharge large quantities of excitation signifies the end of "reaction formations" and a growth in the capacity to sublimate.

The Oedipus complex and the unconscious feelings of guilt which have an infantile source can now be really overcome. As regards emotions, they are no longer kept in reserve but can be developed by the ego. They form a harmonious part of the total personality.

There is no longer any necessity to keep the still demanding pre-genital impulses in the unconscious. Their inclusion in the total personality - I am expressing it as it is in the text - in the form of traits or advances in sublimation, becomes possible. Nevertheless, in neurotic characters, the pre-genital impulses retain their sexual character and disturb rational relations with objects. However it is with neurotics, in the normal character they serve, as partial impulses, the goal of fore-pleasure or of preliminary pleasure, under the primacy of the genital zone. But in as much as they come in a greater proportion they are sublimated and subordinated to the ego and to *reasonableness*, *la raisonabilité*, I believe that one cannot translate it otherwise.

29.11.67

I do not know what such an enchanting picture inspires in you or whether you find it alluring. I do not believe that anyone - analyst or not - provided he has a little bit of experience of others and of himself, can for a moment take seriously this strange lullaby. The thing is properly speaking wrong, completely contrary to reality and to what experience teaches us.

I also allowed myself, in my text, in a text that I evoked the other day - that on the direction of the treatment - some derisive remarks about what was put forward about it, in another context, and in a form that is even literally much more vulgar - the tone in which people were able to speak at a certain date, precisely that of my text, around 1958 - about the primacy of object relations and the perfections in which they reached the effusions of internal joy which came from having reached this highest point, which is properly speaking ridiculous, and in truth is not even worth while taking up again here, no matter who wrote about them at the time.

(46) The curious thing is to ask oneself how such statements can preserve - I will not say the appearance of seriousness, in fact they do not have that for anyone - but appear to respond to a certain necessity concerning, as was said at the beginning of what is stated here, a sort of ideal point which would have at least this virtue of representing in a negative form the absence then of all the inconveniences which would accompany, which would be the ordinary thing, in other states. I cannot think of any other reason.

This is naturally to be taken up in so far as we can grasp the mechanism in its essence, namely, notice the measure in which the psychoanalyst is in a way called, even constrained, for what are wrongly called didactic ends, to speak in a way which, in short, one could say, has nothing to do with the problems that his experience puts up to him in the sharpest and in the most everyday fashion.

The matter, in truth, has a certain import in so far as it might allow it to be seen that a discourse, in the measure - and this says nothing about it - from which there comes a certain number of clichés finds itself, nonetheless, up to a certain point incapable of reducing them in an analytic context, and indeed much more as regards what is involved in the organisation of teaching. Naturally, no one believes any more in a certain number of things, or is completely at ease with a certain classical style. But fundamentally, on many points, of levels of application, it nevertheless remains that this changes nothing. I mean, moreover, that one can simply see my discourse taken up, I mean in some of its forms, of its sentences, of its statements, indeed its turns of phrase, taken up into a context that in its fundamentals has hardly changed.

I asked, a rather long time ago, someone who could be seen in more recent times assiduously attending to what I was trying to bring order into here, I asked: "After all, given your general positions, what advantage do you find in coming to my lectures?" My God, with a smile of someone in the know, I mean of someone who knows what he means: "No one", he answered me, "speaks about

psychoanalysis like that.” Thanks to which, of course, that gives him material and choice to add to his discourse a certain number of ornaments, flourishes. This does not prevent him on occasion, from referring back radically to the tendency that is supposed by him to be constitutive of a certain psychic inertia, (47) referring back radically the status, the organisation of the analytic session in itself - I mean in its nature, in its finality also - to a return which occurred along a sort of slide, of slippage, everything that is most natural, towards this fusion where something which was essentially of its nature, this so-called fusion presupposed at the origin between the child and the maternal body, and it is within this sort of figure, of fundamental schema, that there is supposed to be produced what? My famous “it speaks”.

You see clearly the use that can be made of a discourse by broadcasting it cut off from its context which was that in saying “it speaks” in connection with the unconscious, I absolutely never meant the discourse of the analysed person - as he is improperly called it would be better to say the analysand - we will come back to this subsequently, but assuredly which, even, unless one wants to abuse my discourse, may suppose that there is anything whatsoever in the application of the rule which comes in itself from the “it speaks”, which suggests it, which calls for it. In no way, at least, you see, would I have had this privilege of repeating after Freud, after Breuer, the miracle of a phantom pregnancy, if this way of evoking the concavity of the maternal womb can represent what happens in the analyst’s office. Well indeed, in effect, what is found to be justified at another level, I am supposed to have repeated this miracle but on psychoanalysts. Does that mean that I analyse the analysts?

Because after all one could say that. It is even tempting. There are always little smart-alecks who find elegant formulae like that to summarise the situation. Thank God, I put up a barrier to this aspect also, ahead of time, by writing I believe somewhere - I do not know if it has appeared yet - in connection with a recalling, it was a matter of a little account that I gave of my seminar last year, of a reminder of these two formulae that there is not in my language an Other of the Other. The Other in this case being written with a capital O. There is no, to respond to an old murmuring at my seminar at Sainte-Anne, alas, I am very sorry to have to tell you, true about the true. In the same way there is no reason to consider the dimension of the transference of transference. This means of any possible transferential reduction, of any analytic taking up of the status of transference itself.

I am still a little embarrassed, given the number of those who occupy this room this year, when I put forward such formulae, because there may be some of you (48) who have not the slightest idea of what transference is, after all. It is even the most usual case, especially if you have heard about it. You are going to see that in the rest of what I have to say today.

Let us highlight here, I already put it forward all the same the last time, that the essence of this position of the concept of transference is that this concept allows

the analyst - this is even how certain analysts, I put forward the last time, and by God, how vainly, believe themselves obliged to justify the concept of transference in the name of what, by God, something which appears to them to be very threatened, very fragile, namely, from a sort of superiority in the possibility of objectifying, of objectification, or from the quality of outstanding objectivity which is supposed to be what the analyst has acquired and which would allow him in a situation that is apparently present to be in a position to refer it to other situations which explain it and that it only reproduces them with this illusory accent or the illusions that this involves.

I already said that, far from this question which appears to impose itself, which appears even to involve a certain dimension of rigour in the one who puts forward in a way its interrogation, its critique, it is purely superfluous and vain for the simple reason that transference, its manipulation as such, the dimension of transference, the first strictly coherent aspect of what I am in the process of trying to produce this year before you under the name of psychoanalytic act, outside what I called the manipulation of transference, there is no analytic act.

What must be understood, is not the legitimising of transference in a reference which would ground its objectivity, it is to grasp that there is no analytic act without this reference. And of course to state it in this way does not dissipate every objection. But it is because, precisely, to state it in this way is not, properly speaking, to designate what constitutes the essence of transference, this is why we have to advance further in it.

That we should be forced to do so, that I should be required to do it before you, at least suggests that this analytic act is precisely what has been least elucidated by the psychoanalyst himself. Much more, that it is what has been completely more or less eluded. And why not, why not in any case question oneself as to whether the situation is not so, because this act cannot but be eluded after all. (49) Why not? Why not up to Freud and his interrogation of the psychopathology of everyday life, what we now call, what is current, what is within the range of our modest understanding under the name of symptomatic act, of *parapraxis (acte manqué)*. Who would have dreamed, and even who still dreams of giving to them the full sense of the word act.

Despite everything, the idea of missing out (*ratage*) which Freud says is only a shelter behind which there is dissimulated what are properly called acts, does not count. People continue to think of them in function of missing out, without giving a fuller sense to the term act.

Why then should it not be the same about what is involved in the analytic act? Assuredly what can enlighten us is whether we, for our part, can say something about it that goes a little further. In any case, it may well be that it cannot but be eluded, if for example what happens when it is a matter of an act, is that it is in particular, completely intolerable, intolerable in what regard? It is not a matter of something that is intolerable subjectively, at least I am not suggesting this.

Why not intolerable in the way of acts in general, intolerable in one of its consequences. I am approaching, as you can see, by little touches. I cannot say these things in terms that are immediately noticed - as one might say - not at all that I do not do so on some occasions, but because here in this matter which is delicate, what must above all be avoided is misunderstanding.

This consequence of the analytic act, you will tell me, ought to be well known, ought to be well known through the training analysis. Only I, for my part, am speaking about the act of the psychoanalyst. In the training analysis, the psychoanalytic act is not on the part of the subject who, as it is put, submits to it. This does not mean that he might not have a suspicion of what the result is for the analyst of what is happening in the training analysis.

Only look, things are such up to the present that everything is done to hide from him, in a quite radical way, what is involved at the end of the training analysis on the side of the psychoanalyst.

This masking, which is fundamentally linked to what I was calling earlier the organisation of psychoanalytic societies, this might, in short, be a subtle modesty, a delicate way of leaving something in its place, the supreme refinement of Far Eastern politeness. It is nothing of the kind. I mean that it is (50) not quite from this angle that things ought to be considered, but rather on what results from it for the training analysis itself. Namely, that by very reason of this relation, this separation that I have just articulated, the result is that the same *blackout* exists on what is involved in the end of the training analysis.

A certain number of unsatisfying, incomplete things have all the same been written about the training psychoanalysis. Things have also been written that are very instructive because of their mistakes about the end of analysis. But strictly no one has ever yet succeeded in formulating - I mean black on white - I am not saying anything valid, anything whatsoever, yes or no ... nothing about what might be the end, in every sense of the word, of the training analysis.

I am simply leaving open here the point of whether there is a relation, there is the strictest relation between this fact and the fact that nothing has been articulated either about what is involved in the psychoanalytic act.

I repeat. If the psychoanalytic act is very precisely that to which the psychoanalyst seems to oppose the most frenzied miscognition, this is linked not so much to a sort of subjective incompatibility, the subjectively untenable aspect of the position of the psychoanalyst, which, it can assuredly be suggested, Freud did not miss out on, and much more I would say, from what would result once the perspective of the act is accepted as regards the assessment the analyst may make of what he for his part picks up, subsequent to the analysis, in the order properly speaking of knowledge.

Since, after all, I have here an audience, or it seems so - even though for the past two or three times I cannot locate clearly - in which there is a certain proportion of philosophers, I hope they will not think too badly of me, I was able, even at Sainte-Anne, to obtain permission to go this far. I managed to speak for a whole trimester and even a little more, about Plato's *Symposium*, precisely in connection with transference.

Well then, today I would ask at least some people, if this is of interest to them, to open a dialogue called *Meno*. I once spoke for a whole semester about Plato's *Symposium* in connection with transference. Today I am asking you to open *Meno*.

It even happened formerly that my dear friend Alexandre Koyré did us the honour and had the generosity to speak to us about *Meno*. This did not last long. The psychologists who were there said "All right for this year, but that's the end (51) of it, that's enough now! No, no, no, no. Among serious people, this is not the sort of water that is going to warm us up".

Nevertheless, I assure you that you would lose nothing by engaging with it a little bit, quite simply by opening it. I found in paragraph 85, according to the numeration of Henri Estienne:

"He will know then without having had a master, thanks to simple questions, having found of his own accord his science in himself".

And the following reply:

"But to rediscover science in oneself of one's own accord is that not precisely to recollect it? Is it not necessary that he should have received at a certain moment the science that he now has, or indeed that he always had it"?

All the same, for analysts, to pose the question in these terms, does one not have the feeling that there is here something that one is not sure applies, I mean in the way in which it is said in the text. But anyway that this is designed to remind us of something.

In fact, it is a dialogue on virtue. To call that virtue, is no worse than something else. For many people, this word and words like it have since resonated differently through the centuries. It is certain that the word virtue has now an opening, a resonance, which is not quite that of the *areté* that is at stake in *Meno*, since moreover *areté* goes rather in the direction of the search for the good. One is struck to grasp it, in the sense of the profitable and useful good, as it is called. This is designed to make us see that we also, for our part, that we have returned there, that it is not completely unrelated to what, after this long detour, has come to be formulated for us in the discourse of a Bentham. I already made a reference to Utilitarianism, at a time that is already in the distant

past, when I took on the task of stating throughout a year something which was called *The ethics of psychoanalysis*.

(52) It was, if I remember correctly, the year 1958-59. Unless it was not quite that; then the following year it was transference.

As for the four years since I have been speaking here, a certain correspondence could be made between each one of these years with two. And in the order of the years of my previous teaching, we would arrive then at the level of this fourth year at something which would correspond to the 7th and 8th year of my preceding seminar, echoing in a way the year on ethics, as can be clearly read in my very statement of the psychoanalytic act and from the fact that this psychoanalytic act is something that is quite essentially linked to the functioning of transference. This should allow some people at least to find their way along a certain path that I am taking.

So then, it is *areté* that is at stake and an *areté* which at the start puts its question in a register which should not at all disorient an analyst since moreover what is at stake is a first model given of what this word means in the Socratic text about good political administration, namely, of the city. As regards man, it is curious that from the first moment there appears the reference to the woman, saying that, my God, the virtue of the woman is the proper ordering of the house. As a result of which, here are the two of them on the same footing, on the same plane. There is no essential difference and, in effect, if that is how it is taken up, why not?

I am only recalling this because among the thousand riches that will be suggestive to you in this text, if you are willing to read it from beginning to end, you will be able to put your finger there on the fact that the characteristic of a certain morality, traditional morality properly speaking, has always been to elude, but it is admirably done, in a way, to conjure away at the start in the first exchanges, so that one no longer has to speak about it, nor even to pose the question that is precisely so interesting for us analysts, in so far as we are analysts, of course, as to whether there is not perhaps a point where the morality of the man and of the woman might perhaps be distinguished, at the moment when they find themselves in a bed, together or separately.

But this is promptly eluded in what concerns a virtue that we can already situate on a more public, more environmental terrain. And because of this fact, the questions posed can proceed in a way that is the one by which Socrates proceeds, and which quickly comes to pose the question of whether, how one can ever come to know [*connaître*] by definition what one does not know since the first condition of knowing [*savoir*], of knowledge, is to know what one is talking about. If one does not know at the beginning what one is talking about, as is proved after a long series of exchanges with his partner who is the Meno in question, there emerges what you know and what appears in the two or three sentences that I read for you earlier, namely, the theory of reminiscence.

You know what is involved, but I will take it up again. It is time to develop it, to show what that means, what that can mean for us, why this deserves to be taken up by us again.

That it is said, that it is expressed that the soul - as it is expressed, it is the language used in any case in this dialogue - does nothing more when it is taught than remember, involves in this text as in ours, the idea of an endless extension or rather a duration without limit as regards what is involved in this soul. It is a little what we also say when we find ourselves out of arguments to refer to. Since we do not see very clearly how this can happen in ontogenesis for things that are always the same and so typical to be reproduced, phylogenesis is appealed to. I do not see much difference.

Then, what more, where is this soul going to be sought out to demonstrate that it is only remembrance as regards everything that it can learn? It is indeed the significant gesture made by Socrates at his epoch. Look Meno, I will show you. You see, there you have your slave, he of course never learnt anything in your house, a completely cretinous slave.

He is questioned and by means of a certain style of questioning, in effect, you manage to make him say things, by God, that are rather sensible, which do not go very far in the domain of mathematics. It is a matter of what happens or of what has to be done to make a surface the double of the one that you started from, if it is a square that is involved. The slave picks up, like that, out of the blue, that it is enough for the side of the square to be twice as long. It is easy to quickly make him see that with a side that is twice as long the surface will be four times bigger.

As a result of which, by proceeding in the same way with questions we will quickly find the right way to operate, which is to operate by the diagonal, to take a square whose side is the diagonal of the preceding one.

What do we get from all these amusements, these primitive recreations which do (54) not even go so far as people had already gone at that epoch as regards the irrational character of the root of two? It is because we have taken an exceptional subject, a slave, a subject who does not count.

There is something more ingenious and better that comes afterwards as regards what must be raised, namely, whether virtue is a science. All in all, it is certainly the best part, the best piece of the dialogue. There is no science of virtue. This is easily demonstrated by experience, by showing that those who make a profession of teaching it are masters who can be very much criticized - it is the Sophists that are in question - and that as regards those who could teach it, namely, those who themselves are virtuous, I mean virtuous in the sense that the word virtue is used in this text, namely, the virtue of the citizen, and that of good politics, it is very manifest that this is developed by more than one

example, they do not even know how to transmit it to their children. They teach something different to their children.

So that what we arrive at, at the end of this, is that virtue is much closer to true opinion, as it is put, than to science. Now true opinion, where does it come to us from? Well, from the heavens. Here is the third characteristic of something which has this in common, it is that what we refer ourselves to, is namely what can be learned.

You sense how close it is - I am being prudent - to the notation that I give under the term of subject. What can teach itself, is a subject who already has this first characteristic of being universal. On this all subjects are at the same starting point. Their extension is of such a nature to them that this supposes they have an infinite past, and therefore probably a future that is no less so, even though the question about what is involved in the afterlife is not settled in this dialogue.

We are not putting forward the myth of the of Er the Armenian, but assuredly that the soul has from all time, and in a properly speaking immemorial fashion, stored up what has formed it to the point of rendering it capable of knowing, this is something that is not simply contested here but is at the very principal of the idea of reminiscence.

That this subject is exceptional (*hors classe*), is another term. That he is absolute in the sense that he is not, it is expressed in the text, as science marks with what is called there by a term that really echoes everything we are able to (54) say here, that he is not marked by logical concatenation, articulation in the very style of our science. This 'true opinion', is it something that ensures that it is much more, and it is said again, of the order of *poiesis*, of poetry? This is what we are lead to by the Socratic questioning.

If I took so much care with this reminder, it is to note for you what is meant, in this archaic point which has remained present in the questioning of knowledge, what is meant by the fact which had not been isolated before I did so, properly in connection with transference, the function, not even in the articulation, in the presuppositions of every question about knowledge, by what I call the subject supposed to know. Questions are posed starting from the fact that there is somewhere this function, call it what you will, here it appears in all its aspects, obvious because mythical, that there is somewhere something which plays this function of the subject supposed to know.

I already put this forward here, as a question mark in connection with one or other advance, breakthrough, progress of a certain sector of our science. Is the question not posed of where there was, of how we can conceive, for example, before one or other new dimension in a mathematical conception of infinity, is it a fact that before this infinity was forged, we can conceive it as having been known somewhere. Can we already report it as known from all time? This is the question. It is not a matter of knowing whether the soul existed before being

incarnated. It is simply of whether this dimension of the subject *qua* support of knowledge is something that must be pre-established in a way to questions about knowledge.

Note, when Socrates questions the slave, what does he do? He uses, even if he does not do it on the board, since it is a very simple drawing, one can say that he uses the drawing of this square. And moreover, in the way that he reasons – namely, in the first mode of a metric geometry, namely, by decomposition into triangles and counting the triangles of equal surface. In this way it is easy to show that the triangle constructed on the diagonal will include just the number of little squares that are necessary compared to the first number. And that if the first number had four squares there would be eight if we proceed in this fashion. All the same it is indeed a drawing that is in question and, questioning the slave, it is not we who invent the question. It has been remarked for a long time that (54) this procedure has nothing very demonstrative about it, in as much as far from Socrates being able to find an argument in the fact that the slave never did geometry, and that though he has not been given lessons, just the way of organising the drawing by Socrates is already to give to the slave, as is very tangible, a lesson in geometry. But that is not where the question is for us.

It is, as I might say, to be considered in these terms. Socrates uses a drawing. If we say that in the mind of his partner, there is already everything necessary to respond to what Socrates brings along, that can mean two things that I would express as follows. Either it is a drawing, I would not say a double, or, to use a modern term which corresponds to what is called a function, namely, the possibility of the application of Socrates' drawing onto his own or inversely. It is, of course, not at all necessary for the squares to be correct, either in one case or in the other. But, let us say, in one case it is a square according to a Mercator projection, namely, a square square, and in the other case something twisted in different ways. It will nevertheless remain that the point by point correspondence is what gives to the relation of what Socrates contributes, to that through which his interlocutor answers him, a very particular value which is that of deciphering. This interests us, us analysts. Because in a certain way this is what our analysis of transference means in the interpretative dimension. It is in the measure that our interpretation links in a different way a chain which is nevertheless a chain and already a signifying chain that it works. And then there is another possible way of imagining it. Instead of our seeing that there are two drawings which are not, at first approach, the transfer (*décalque*) one of the other, we can suppose a metaphor, namely, that nothing is seen, I mean from the side of the slave, but in the way that one can say in certain cases: this is a drawing. You see nothing, but it must be exposed to fire. You know that there are inks that are called sympathetic and the drawing appears. There is then, as we say when we are dealing with a sensitive plate, a revelation.

Is it between these two terms that the suspense occurs of what is at stake for us in analysis, in terms of a re-translation, I am saying "re" because in this case already the first signifying inscription is already the translation of something. Is

it onto the signifying organisation of the unconscious structured like a language that our interpretation is applied? Or, on the contrary, is our interpretation in a (57) way an operation of a quite different order, one that reveals a drawing hidden up to then?

It is very obviously not that, neither one nor the other, despite what perhaps this opposition might have suggested in terms of a first response, to some people that I teach.

What is at stake is something that makes the task much more difficult for us. Namely, that, in effect, things have to do with the operation of the signifier, which renders highly possible the first reference, the first model to give of what a deciphering is. Only, look, the subject, let us say the analysand is not something flat, as suggested by the image of the drawing. Inside, he is himself the subject as such already determined and inscribed in the world as caused by a certain effect of the signifier.

What results from it is the fact that not a lot is necessary for it to be reducible to one of the preceding situations. All that is necessary is the following: that knowledge, at certain points that may, of course, be still unknown, fails. And it is precisely these points which, for us, give rise to questions in the name of truth.

In this respect, the subject is determined in a way that makes it unsuitable, as our experience demonstrates, to restore what is inscribed by the signifying effect, by its relation to the world, in making it incapable of closing in on itself, of completing itself at certain points in a way that is satisfying, as regards its status as a subject. And they are the points that concern him in so far as he has to posit himself as a sexed subject.

Before this situation, do you not see what results from what is going to be established if the transference is set up, as it is in effect set up, because this has always been the movement, the movement really established from what is traditionally inherent. The transference is set up in function of the subject supposed to know, exactly in the same way that was always inherent in every questioning about knowledge. I would even say more, that from the fact that he goes into analysis, he refers to a subject supposed to know better than the others.

That does not mean, moreover, contrary to what is believed, that he identifies it to his analyst. But this indeed is the core of what I want to designate before you today. It is that immanent to the very start of the movement of analytic research, there is this subject supposed to know. And as I was saying just now, supposed to know better again, so that the analyst submits himself to the rules of the (58) game. And that I can pose the question of whether, when he responds in a way that he ought to respond, whether it is a matter of Socrates' slave and that the slave is told to flounder around as he wishes. Which is not done, of course, at the level of the experience of the *Meno*.

The question of the intervention of the analyst is posed in effect in the suspense I mentioned earlier. The two maps corresponding point by point or on the contrary one map that thanks to some manipulation or other one reveals its nature as map. This indeed is how everything is conceived of, through, in a way, the data given at the beginning of the operation.

The anamnesis is carried out in so far as what one remembers, is not so much things, as the constitution of the amnesia or the return of the repressed which is exactly the same thing. Namely, the way the chips are distributed at every moment in the squares of the game, I mean in the squares where one has to bet. In the same way the effects of interpretation are received at the level of what? Of the encouragement that it lends to the inventiveness of the subject. I mean of this poetry that I spoke about earlier.

Now, what does the analysis of transference mean? If it means anything, it can only be the following: the elimination of this subject supposed to know. For analysis, and still less for the analyst there is nowhere - and this is the novelty - a subject who is supposed to know. There is only what resists the operation of the knowledge making the subject, namely, this residue that one can call the truth.

But precisely, it is here that Pontius Pilate's question can arise: what is truth? What is truth, is properly the question that I am posing to introduce what is involved in the properly psychoanalytic act.

What constitutes the psychoanalytic act as such is very curiously this feint by which the analyst forgets that, in his experience as a psychoanalysand, he was able to see there being reduced to what it is, this function of the subject supposed to know. Hence, at every instant, all these ambiguities, which moreover transfer, for example, towards the function of adaptation to reality. The question of what is involved in the truth, is to feign also that the position of the subject supposed to know is tenable because it is the only access to a truth from which the subject is going to be rejected by being reduced to his function of cause of a process that is in an impasse.

The essential psychoanalytic act of the psychoanalyst involves this something (59) that I am not naming, that I outlined under the name of feint, and which becomes serious if this becomes forgetting, to feign to forget that one's act is to be the cause of this process. That what is involved there is an act is accentuated by a distinction that it is essential to make here.

The analyst, of course, is not without a need, I would even say to justify to himself what is done in analysis. Something is done, and what is at stake is indeed this difference between doing (*faire*) and acting. It is to this bench that one harnesses, that one puts the psychoanalysand, it is the bench of a doing. He does something. Call that what you will, poetry or breaking in, he does something. And it is quite clear that precisely one part of the instructions of

psychoanalytic technique consists in a certain *laisser-faire*. But is that enough to characterise the position of the analyst when this *laisser-faire* involves, up to a certain point, the maintaining intact in himself of this subject supposed to know in so far as he knows from experience what it is to fall away and be excluded from this subject, and what results from the analyst's side ?.

What results from it, I am not putting forward immediately today since it is precisely what we have to further articulate in what follows. But I will end by indicating the analogy encountered from the fact that in order to advance this new angle of interrogation about the act, I have to address myself to this third that you constitute by reason of the register that I already introduced under the function of number. Number is not multitude, because not much is necessary to introduce the dimension of number. If it is by such a reference that I introduce the question of what can be involved in the status of the psychoanalyst, in so far as his act puts him radically out of synch with respect to these preliminaries, it is to remind you that it is a common dimension of the act, not to include in its agency the presence of the subject.

The passage of the act is that beyond which the subject will rediscover his presence as renewed, but nothing other.

I will give you the next time, because I did not have the time this time, something which is an illustration of it. The Winnicott by whom I introduced in connection with this word "self" the example of a sort of right touch with regard to a certain effect of the signifier. This Winnicott will give us the illustration of what happens to the psychoanalyst in the very measure of the interest that he takes in his object. He will make us touch that, precisely, in the measure that he is someone who is distinguished in the technique as outstanding for having (60) chosen an object that is privileged for him, the one that he qualifies more or less as this latent psychosis which exists in certain cases, he finds himself very curiously disavowing the whole analytic technique in itself.

Now, this is not at all a particular case but an exemplary case. If the position of the analyst is determined by nothing but by an act, the only effect that it can enregister for him is the fruit of an act. And since I employed this word fruit, I recalled already the last time its echo of fruition. What the analyst records as major experience cannot go beyond this turning point that I have indicated of his own presence.

What might be the means for there to be collected what, through this process triggered by the analytic act, is recordable in terms of knowledge, this is what poses the question of what is involved in analytic teaching. In the whole measure that the psychoanalytic act is mis-recognised, in this measure there are recorded negative effects as regards the progress of what analysis can add up in terms of the knowledge, that we have noted, that we can put our finger on. This is manifested and expressed in many other passages and across the whole

breadth of the production of analytic literature, a deficit with regard to what can be added up, what it can store up in terms of knowledge.

Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967

"What's the first thing you remember?"

"The first thing that comes into my head, you mean?"

"No - the first thing you remember.

(Pause) "No it's no good it's gone"

"You don't get my meaning. What is the first thing after all the things you've forgotten?"

(Pause)

"I've forgotten the question".

These few exchanges that I extracted for you (I will give you my sources) from a very skilful and even penetrating little play, which had attracted me by its title which contains two characters rather full of meaning for me: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Both one and the other, the title tells us, are dead. Would to heaven it were true! They are nothing of the kind. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are still there. These exchanges are well designed to evoke the separation, the distance that exists between three levels of mathesis, of learned understanding. The first, that the theory of reminiscence that I represented to you the last time by the evocation of *Meno*, gives an example of. I will centre it on an "I read" as a revelatory test. The second, different, which is made present in the tone - it is the correct word - of the progress of our science is an "I write". I write even when it is in order to follow the trace of a writing already marked out. The bringing out of signifying incidence as such, signifies our progress in this grasp of what knowledge is.

(62) What I wanted to recall to you, not by this anecdote, but by these very well forged exchanges which, in a way, designating their own place, by situating themselves in a new way of handling these puppets essential for the tragedy which is really our own, that of Hamlet, the one I spent a long time on, mapping out the place of desire as such, designating by that something which might have appeared strange up to then: that, very exactly, everyone was able to read his own in it.

These three exchanges designate then this proper mode of knowing apprehension which is that of analysis and which begins with "I lose". I lose the thread. Here is where what interests us begins. Namely, - whoever is astonished or open eyed at it on this occasion will clearly show that he is forgetting what the coming into the world of the first steps of analysis was - the field of the slip, of stumbling, of parapraxis.

I reminded you of its presence from my first words this year. You will see that we will have to come back to it and that it is essential to maintain this reference always at the centre of our perspective if we do not want to lose our advantage as regards the most essential form of what I am calling this year the psychoanalytic act. But you have also seen me on almost every occasion, and from the beginning, in some kind of embarrassment that I apologise for, the reason was nothing other than your gracious attendance. I posed for myself in a form that is being centred today, the problematic of my teaching. What is meant by what I have been producing here, for the past four years now? It is worthwhile posing the question, is it a psychoanalytic act? This teaching is produced before you, namely, in a public way, as such it could not be a psychoanalytic act.

What is meant by the fact then that I am tackling its thematic. Does it mean that I am submitting it here to a critical agency? It is a position which, after all, could be assumed and, moreover, has been assumed many times, even if properly speaking it was not this term act that was used. It is rather striking that the attempt, every time it was made by someone from outside, only gave rather poor results. Now I am a psychoanalyst, and I am myself caught up in the psychoanalytic act. Could there be in my case a different plan than that of grasping the psychoanalytic act from outside? Yes. And here is how this plan is set up. A teaching is not an act. It has never been one. A teaching is a thesis, as was always very well formulated at the time when people knew what a teaching (63) in the university was. In the good old days when this word had a sense, it meant thesis.

Thesis supposes anti-thesis. With the anti-thesis the act can begin. Does this mean that I expect it from psychoanalysts? The matter is not so simple within the psychoanalytic act, since my theses sometimes imply consequences. It is striking that these consequences encounter there, I mean inside, objections which belong neither to the thesis nor to any other formulated antithesis than the ways and customs reigning among those who make a profession of the psychoanalytic act. It is curious then that a discourse that is not up to now within those who are in the psychoanalytic act easy to contradict, encounters in certain cases an obstacle which is not a contradiction. The hypothesis which in my case guides the pursuit of this discourse is the following. Certainly not that there is in it the indication to criticise the psychoanalytic act, and I am going to say why, but on the contrary to demonstrate, I mean in the agency of this act, what it fails to recognise, which is that by not getting out of it one would go much further. We have to believe then that there is something in this act that is intolerable, unsustainable enough for whoever is engaged in it for him to dread approaching, it must be said, its limits. Since, moreover, what I want to introduce is this particularity of its structure that is after all well enough known for anyone to grasp it but is almost never formulated.

If we start from the reference that I gave earlier, namely, that the first form of act that analysis inaugurated for us, is this symptomatic act of which one can say that it is never so successful as when it is a parapraxis.

When the parapraxis is supposed, is tested, it reveals itself for what it is. Let us pin to it this word that I already insisted enough should be revived, the truth.

Observe that it is from this foundation that we analysts start in order to advance. Without this, no analysis would even be possible, because every act even which does not carry this little index of failure, in other words, which gives itself high marks as regards its intention nevertheless falls exactly under the same jurisdiction. Namely, that there can be posed the question of a different truth to that of this intention. Whence it results that this is properly to sketch out a topology that can be expressed as follows. That by simply sketching its way (64) out, one enters into it without even thinking. And that after all the best way to enter it, in a certain way, is to get out of it for good and all.

The psychoanalytic act designates a shape, an envelope, a structure such that, in a way, it makes everything that up to then has been established, formulated, produced as a status of the act, depend on its own law. It is, moreover, what from the point of the one who under some heading or other engages in this act, in a position where it is difficult to find an approach from any angle, henceforth suggests that some mode of discernment ought to be introduced. It is easy to pinpoint, by taking things up again from the start, that if there is nothing so successful as failure with respect to the act, this does not mean for all that, that a reciprocity is established, and that every failure is, in itself, the sign of some success, I mean the success of an act.

It is quite obvious that not all slip-ups are interpretable slip-ups. And this imposes at the start a simple remark which is, moreover, indeed the only objection which was every produced in their use. It is enough to begin, with some 'common sense' person, as they say, to introduce - if he is new, if he has still not been immunised, if he has kept some freshness - the dimension of analytic cogitations, for people to respond to you: "But what are you at, telling me so much about these stupidities that we know all about, and that are simply without any graspable support, that are only negative"!

It is sure that at this level, there is no certain rule for discernment. And this indeed is how you see that by remaining in effect at the level of these exemplary phenomena, the debate remains in suspense. It is not inconceivable that, where the psychoanalytic act takes its importance, namely, where for the first time in the world there are subjects whose act it is to be psychoanalysts, namely, who in this area organise, group together, pursue an experience, take their responsibilities in something which is of a different register to that of the act, namely a doing (*un faire*). But pay attention: this doing is not their own.

The function of psychoanalysis is clearly characterised by the following: setting up a doing through which the psychoanalysand obtains a certain goal that no one has yet clearly fixed. One can say that, if one is to trust the truly disordered oscillation of the needle that occurs when one questions the authors about it.

(65) This is not the time to give you the range of this oscillation, you can believe me and test it in the literature. The law, the rule as they say, which circumscribes the operation called psychoanalysis structures and defines 'a doing'. The patient, as it is still expressed, the psychoanalysand as I recently introduced the word, a pinpointing that spread rapidly, which proves that it is not inopportune and that moreover it is obvious. To say the psychoanalysed person leaves all sorts of equivocations about the completion of the matter while one is still in psychoanalysis. The only sense that the word psychoanalysis has is to indicate a passivity, which is not at all obvious, it is rather the contrary, since the one who talks the whole time is indeed the psychoanalysand. This is already a pointer.

The psychoanalysand whose analysis is brought to a term whose import as end, as I have just said, no one has yet strictly defined in all the acceptations of this word, but nevertheless it is supposed that it may be a successful doing. Pin on it a word like being, why not, this term remains rather empty for us and full enough, nevertheless, for it to be able to serve us here as a reference point. What could be the end of an operation that undoubtedly, at least at the start, has to do with the truth if the word being could not be evoked at its horizon.

Is it so for the analyst? Namely, the one who is supposed to have gone through such a journey on the principles that it presupposes and which are contributed by the act of the psychoanalyst. It is useless to question oneself whether the psychoanalyst has the right, in the name of some objectivity, to interpret the sense of a given figure in this poetic operation by this doing subject. It is useless to ask oneself whether it is legitimate or not to interpret this 'doing' as confirming the fact of transference. Interpretation and transference are implied in the act through which the analyst gives to this doing support and authorisation. It is designed for that. This all the same gives some weight to the presence of the act even if the analyst does nothing. Hence this separating out of the doing and of the act is essential to the status of the act itself. Where is it graspable that the psychoanalytic act shows it has run into an obstacle? Let us not forget that the psychoanalyst is supposed to have reached this point at which, however restricted it maybe, there has been produced for him this ending which includes the evocation of the truth.

From this point of being, he is supposed to be the Archimedes capable of making turn everything that develops in this structure first evoked, of which the circumscribing of an "I lose" by which I began, gives the key.

(66) Would it be interesting to see there being reproduced here this effect of loss, beyond the operation that the analytic act centres? I think that by posing

the question in these terms, it will immediately appear to you that there is no doubt that it is in the insufficiency, I would say, of analytic production that there ought to be read something which corresponds to this dimension of obstacle. Beyond an act that is supposed to bring to an end (*faire fin*), but whose magisterial point we must suppose if we want to be able to speak about anything at all concerning it. Moreover, there is nothing excessive in evoking it, when the analysts themselves, and those who may most fall under the threat of the designation of this obstacle - there where I am proposing that we should search for the incidence which can complete the support, indeed establish it - of our critique. There is nothing excessive in speaking about this turning point, in speaking about the passage of the psychoanalysand to the psychoanalyst, since among psychoanalysts themselves the reference to the very thing that I have just evoked is constant and given as a condition of any analytic competence.

It could be an infinite task to put the psychoanalytic literature to the test. Moreover, I have highlighted some examples of it on the horizon. In my first class this year I cited the article by Rappaport which could be called in French (it appeared in the *International Journal*) "*statut analytique du penser*". *Thinking*, the present participle. In such a large gathering it would be tedious, inefficient, to take such an article to see there being manifested in it the best of good intentions, as I might say. A sort of flattening of everything that can, from the Freudian statement itself, be organised in terms of stating what is involved for the function of thinking in what is called the analytic economy. The striking thing about it would be that the tearing apart that is marked at every instant, the impossibility of not, for example, making this *montage* or *démontage*, as you wish, of *thinking*, start from the primary process itself, at the level of what Freud designates as primary hallucination. This is linked to the first pathetic search, that supposed by the simple existence of a motor system. When it does not encounter the object of its satisfaction, it is supposed - at the source of the explanation of the primary process - to be responsible for this regressive process which makes the phantastical image of what is sought appear.


The complete incompatibility of this register, which is nevertheless put under the heading of thinking, with what in the secondary process is established in (67) terms of a thinking which is a sort of reduced action, a small scale action which makes it necessary to pass into a completely different register than the one first evoked, namely, the introduction of the dimension of reality testing, does not fail to be noted in passing by the author. In pursuing his path imperturbably he will come to see that not only are there not two modes and two registers of thinking but that there are an infinity of them which are to be more or less echeloned in what psychologists had previously noted in terms of stages of consciousness. And consequently to completely reduce the relief of what had been contributed by Freud to what is called the reduction to general psychology, namely, to its abolition. This is only a trivial example and each one of you can, each one as you wish, can go and confirm it. If other people saw the interest in holding a seminar in which something like this would be followed in its details - why not - the important thing it seems to me is that it is completely eluded in

this perspective of reduction and consequently fails. What is striking, outstanding, extraordinary, implied in this dimension of primary process is something which can be expressed more or less as follows: not “in the beginning is dissatisfaction”, which means nothing. It is not that the living individual chases after satisfaction that is important, it is that there is a status of enjoyment (*jouissance*) which is dissatisfaction.

To elude it as original, as implied in the theory of the one who introduced it, this theory, it does not matter whether or not he expressed it like that, but if he constructed it like that, namely, if he formulated the pleasure principle as it had never been formulated before him, for pleasure from all time served to define the good, it was satisfaction in itself. Except for the fact that no one was able to believe it, because everyone knew from all time that to be in the good is not always satisfying. Freud introduces this other thing. It is a matter of seeing what is the consistency between this point and the one first indicated in the dimension of truth.

I opened a journal by chance. I do not know what it is, a weekly, a tri-annual, in which I saw distinguished signatures, one from the side of the horizon where the divine battle is still firing on all cylinders, that for the good precisely. I saw an article which began with a sort of incantation around “the symbolic, the imaginary and the real”. ... To which the person referred the illumination that had been brought into the world by this tripartition for which I am responsible. And he valiantly concludes: to us this says what it says, the Real is God. This is (68) how people can say that I am a contribution to theological faith.



This, all the same, encouraged me to do something that I will attempt for the numerous people who see that this is mixed up. That what can be indicated, if one takes these terms otherwise than in the absolute, is the following:



The symbolic, if you wish, we are going to put like that.

The imaginary, we are going to put it over here and the real ... it is completely idiotic, like that.

There would really be nothing to make of it, especially not a rectangular triangle, if, perhaps finally, to allow us a little to pose questions.



You are not going to go around with that on a piece of paper saying to yourself: what square am I in! All the same.

(69) If we remember what I teach about the subject as determined by two signifiers or more exactly by a signifier as representing it for another signifier, why not put the barred Subject like a projection onto the other side? This will allow there to be asked what is involved in the relation of the Subject between the Imaginary and the Real.

On the other hand this I of the unary stroke, the one we start from to see how, effectively, in the development of the mechanism, this mechanism of the incidence of the signifier in development, is produced, namely, the first Identification. We will put it also as a projection on the other side.

The third function will be given me by this "o" which is something like a falling of the Real onto the vector stretched from the Symbolic to the Imaginary, namely, how the signifier can very well take its material, who would see in this an obstacle, in the imaginary functions, namely, in the most fragile, the most difficult thing to grasp as far as man is concerned. Not that there are not in him primitive images destined to provide us with a guide in nature, but precisely, as the signifier lays hold of them, they are always very difficult to locate in their raw state.


You see that the question can be posed about what the vectors uniting each one of these mapped out points represent. This is going to have an interest - that is why, of course, I am preparing you for this little game. The fact is that, all the same, since we have been speaking about the psychoanalytic act, all we have been able to do is to re-evoke the dimensions in which there are deployed our (70) references concerning the function of the symptom when we have posited it as putting a check on what is knowable, on knowledge, which always represents some truth. We would put here what constitutes the third pole, namely, enjoyment.

This introduces more correctly a certain fundamental attachment of the human spirit to the imaginary. This introduces something that can help you like cardinal points and which perhaps may serve as a support every time I evoke one of these poles, for example, like today, I pose the question of what is involved in the act of the analyst with respect to the truth.

At the start the question can and ought to be posed, does the analytic act take charge of the truth? It seems to do so, but who would dare to take responsibility for the truth without drawing derision on himself? In certain cases I take myself for Pontius Pilate. There is a pretty image in Claudel. Pontius Pilate whose only mistake was to pose this question, he was unlucky, he is the only one to have posed it before the truth. That knocked him a little off centre. The result is, (here I am staying in Claudel's register, it is he who invented that) that when he was travelling afterwards, all the idols (it is still Claudel who is speaking) saw their bellies opening and clattering down with the loud noise of a slot machine.

I am not posing the question, either in this context or with such vigour to obtain this result. But in any case, sometimes, it is close to it. The psychoanalyst does not take charge of the truth. He does not take charge of the truth because none of the poles can be judged in function of what it represents in terms of our three starting vertices, namely, that the truth is at the locus of the Other, the

(71) inscription of the signifier. Namely, the truth is not there like that, any more than enjoyment in fact, which certainly has a relation with the Real, but from which precisely the pleasure principle is designed to separate us. As for Knowledge, it is an imaginary function, an incontestable idealisation, this is what renders delicate the position of the analyst who is in the middle, where there is the void, the hole, the place of desire.



But this involves a certain number of taboo points, in a way, of discipline, namely, that since one has to answer to something, I mean those who come to consult the analyst in order to find more security (*assurance*), well then my God, it happens that a theory is constructed of the conditions of the security that ought to come to someone who develops normally. It is a very lovely myth.

There is an article by Erik Erikson on the dream of Irma's injection that is constructed in this way. He enumerates in stages, how there ought to be edified the security of the little chap who first of all has had a suitable Mammy, one who has, of course, learnt her lessons in the books of psychoanalysts. And there is a series of stages which goes right to the peak, to give us (I already evoked it at one time) a perfectly secure GI. This can be constructed. Everything can be constructed in terms of psychology. It is a matter of knowing how the psychoanalytic act is compatible with such rubbish. It must be believed that it has something to do and the word rubbish (*déchet*) is not to be taken there as coming by chance. Perhaps by pinpointing, as we should, certain theoretical productions, we can immediately locate on this map, since it is a map, so Socratic a one that it is no more than the one I evoked the other day in connection with *Meno*. That has no more import, import as an exercise, than to see the relation that a production can have which, in no case, has a function with respect to the practice that even the analysts most exuberant about these constructions, in general optimistic, respect no less. No psychoanalyst, unless

through excess or by way of exception, is going to believe in it when he intervenes.

The relation of these productions to the natural high point of rubbish here, namely the *o*, may help us to make progress as regards what is involved in the relation of analytic production to another term. For example, that of the idealisation of his social position that we would put on the side of the *I*.

In short, the inauguration of a method of discernment of what is involved in the (72) productions of the analytic act, of the perhaps necessary amount of loss, I am not saying, that it involves, may be of a nature not at all simply to illuminate with a bright light what is involved in the analytic act, of the status that is presupposes and that it supports in the ambiguity it deploys. And why stop at any particular point of the extension of this ambiguity, until, as I might say, we have come back to our point of departure, if it is true that there is no way of getting out of it, we may as well complete the circuit of it.

We are going to try this year to give a first trial image of it. For this, for example, I am not, of course, going to take the worst examples. There is rubbish and there is rubbish. There is uninterpretable rubbish, even though you should pay attention that this designation of uninterpretable is not taken here in the proper sense.

Let us take an excellent author: Mr Winnicott. It is remarkable that this author to whom we owe one the most crucial discoveries, I remember, and I will never fail to come to it in homage in my memory, the help the transitional object, as he put it forward, gave me when I was questioning myself about the way to demystify the function of the so-called partial object, as we see it being sustained to support the most abstruse, the most mystifying, the least clinical theory about the so-called developmental relations of the pre-genital with respect to the genital.

The simple introduction of this little object that Mr. Winnicott calls the transitional object, this little piece of cloth that the baby, before the drama around which there have accumulated so many confused clouds, before this drama of weaning, which, when we observe it, is not at all necessarily a drama. As someone who does not lack penetration pointed out to me, it can happen that the person who most resents weaning is the mother. The presence, the simple presence in this case which seems in a way to be the support, the fundamental arch thanks to which everything would no longer ever after be developed simply in terms of a dual relation, the relation of the child to the mother. It is immediately interfered with by the functions of this tiny object whose status Winnicott articulates for us.

I will take up next year (January 10th) these features whose description one can say is exemplary. It is enough to read Mr Winnicott to translate him in a way. It is clear that this little piece of cloth or of blanket, a dirty piece that the infant

(73) clings onto, which in a way is something to see here, the relation to this first object of enjoyment which is not the mother's breast which is never there permanently, but one that is always within reach: the thumb of the child's hand. How can analysts distance themselves to this degree from their experience of what is brought to them in the first place about the function of the hand, to the point that for them human (*l'humain*) ought to be written *l'hu-main* (with a hyphen in the middle).

The reading that I am recommending to you is in number five of this journal which passed as mine for a long time, which is called, *La psychanalyse*. There is a translation of this transitional object of Winnicott. Read it. There is nothing more tiring than reading something and less likely to hold the attention. But if someone wants to do it the next time, who will not understand that all of this is to say what this little *o* object is. It is neither within, nor without, neither real nor illusory. It does not enter at all into this artful construction that the usual analysis edifies around narcissism by seeing in it something completely different than what it is meant for. Namely, not to make two moral aspects, namely, on the one side self-love and on the other that of the object, as they put it.

It is very clear, I already did it here, in reading what Freud said about the *Real Ich* and the *Lust Ich*, that it was to demonstrate to us that the first object was the *Lust Ich*, namely, myself the rule of my pleasure and that it remains so.

So then this whole precious description which is so close to the *o*-object, only lacks one thing, which is that one sees that everything that is said about it means nothing but the bud, the point, the first emergence from the earth of what? Of what the *o*-object commands, namely, the subject. The subject as such, which functions at first at the level of this transitional object. This is certainly not a test designed to diminish the sort of production that can be done around the analytic act. But you will see what is involved in it when Winnicott pushes things further. Namely, when he is no longer the observer of the little baby (he is more capable of it than many others), but maps out his own technique concerning what he, for his part, seeks to know, in an open way. I indicated it to you the last time at the beginning of the lecture, namely, The Truth.

This *self* that he speaks about as something that is there from all time, behind everything that is happening before even the subject is mapped out in any way, something is capable of freezing, he says, the situation of lack. When the (74) environment is not suitable in the first days, in the first months of the baby, something may function which brings about this *freezing*, this *gelation*. Undoubtedly, this is something which only experience can settle. And there again there is, with respect to these psychotic consequences, something that Winnicott saw very clearly. But behind this *freezing*, there is, Winnicott tells us this *self* which is waiting. This *self* which, by being frozen, constitutes the false self that Mr. Winnicott has to return to by a process of regression whose relation to the acting (*agir*) of the analyst it will be the object of my discourse the next

time to show. Behind this false self there is waiting what? The true to start up again. Who does not see, when we already have in analytic theory the *Real Ich*, the *Lust Ich*, the ego, the id, all these references already articulated enough to define our field, that the addition of this *self* represents nothing other than, as it is avowed in the text with *false* and *true*, the truth? But who does not also see that there is no other *true-self* behind this situation than Mr Winnicott himself, who places himself here as the presence of the truth.



This says nothing to involve in any way a disparagement of what this position leads him too. As you will see the next time, extracted from his own text, it is a position which avows that it must as such and in an avowed way emerge from the analytic act, to take up the position of doing, through which he assumes, as another analyst puts it, to answer all the needs of the patient.

We are not here to go into the details of what this leads to. We are here to indicate how the slightest miscognition - and how would it not exist since it is not yet defined - the slightest miscognition of what is involved in the analytic act, immediately draws the one who assumes it, and all the more so if he is more certain, more capable - I am quoting this author because I consider that there is no one who comes near him in English - that immediately he is brought, black on white, to the negation of the analytic position.

This just by itself appears to me to confirm, to give a beginning, if not yet a support to what I am introducing as the method of a critique by theoretical expressions of what is involved in the status of the psychoanalytic act.

Seminar 5:

10 January 1968



Seminar 5: Wednesday 10 January 1968.

I offer you my good wishes for the New Year, as they say.

Why "new"? All the same it is like the moon, when it has finished it begins again. And this point of finishing and of recommencing one could put anywhere, where, perhaps as opposed to the moon which was made, as every knows, and as a familiar saying recalls, for the intention of a not indifferent person. And there is a moment when the moon disappears, which is a reason for declaring it to be new afterwards.

But for the year, and for many other things and generally for what is called the real, there is no assignable beginning. Nevertheless, it is necessary that it should have one once it had been called "year", because of the signifying mapping out of what is found, for one part of this real, to be defined as a cycle.

It is a cycle that is not quite accurate, like all the cycles in the real. But once one grasps it as cycle, there is a signifier that does not quite agree with the real. It is corrected by speaking, for example, about a great year in connection with a little thing that varies from year to year until it makes up 28,000 years. In short, it is recycled.

So then, where should one put the beginning of the year, for example? This is where the act comes in. This at least is one of the ways of tackling what is involved in the act, a structure about which, if you search carefully, you will see that people have, when all is said and done, spoken little.

The New Year gives me the opportunity to approach it from this angle.

(76) An act is linked to the determination of the beginning, and very especially where there is need to make one, because, precisely, one does not exist. That is why, in short, what I did at the beginning has a certain sense. To offer you my wishes for a good year, is something that enters into the field of the act. Naturally, a small act, a very lay residue of act. But do not forget that if we make these little bowings and scrapings - which are always more or less going out of fashion, but which subsist, this is what is remarkable - it is as an echo of things that people speak about as if they were gone, namely, ceremonial acts which, in a

framework that one can call the Empire, acts which consisted in the fact that on that day the Emperor handled the plough with his own hands.

It is an organised act that marked a beginning in so far as it was essential for a certain order of empire that this foundation renewed at the beginning of each year should be marked. We see here the dimension of what is called the traditional act, the one founded on a certain necessity of transferring something considered as essential in the order of the signifier. That it should be necessary to transfer it presupposes apparently that it is not transferred by itself, that beginning is well and truly renewal. This even opens the door by way of an opposition to the fact that it is conceivable that the act constitutes, if one can express it in this way, without quotation marks, a true beginning. That there should be in a word, an act, which is creative and that this is the beginning.

Now, it is enough to evoke this horizon of any functioning of the act to grasp that it is obviously here indeed that there resides its true structure, which is quite apparent, obvious, and shows the fecundity, moreover, of the myth of creation.

It is a little surprising that it did not emerge in a way that is now current, admitted into common consciousness, that there is a certain relation between the break produced in the evolution of science at the beginning of the 17th century and the realisation, the advent of the true import of this myth of creation which thus took sixteen centuries to come to its true incidence, to what one can call throughout this epoch, Christian consciousness. I cannot come back too often to this remark which, I underline, is not mine but that of Alexandre Koyré: "At the beginning was the action" says Goethe. A little later, people think that this is a (77) contradiction of the Johannine formula: "In the beginning was the word". This is what makes it necessary to look a little more closely at it. If you are introduced to the question along the path that I have just tried to open up for you in a familiar way, it is quite clear that there is not the slightest opposition between these two formulae. In the beginning was the action because without an act there can quite simply be no question of a beginning. Action is indeed at the beginning because there could not be a beginning without action.

If we can grasp from some angle what is never, or what has never been up to now, put forward quite as it is necessary to do, the fact is that there is no action that is not presented first and foremost with a signifying point. This is what characterises the act, its signifying point, and its efficiency as act has nothing to do with its efficacy as a doing. Something that reaches this signifying point. One can begin to speak about act simply, without losing sight - it is rather curious that it should be a psychoanalyst who can for the first time give to this theme of act this accent, more exactly what constitutes its strange and therefore problematic and double feature - on

the one hand, that it is in the analytic field, namely, in connection with the parapraxis (*acte manqué*), that it appeared precisely that an act which presents itself as missing out is an act, and uniquely from the fact that it is signifying. And then, that a psychoanalyst presides, precisely, (let us limit ourselves to this term for the moment) over an operation described as psychoanalysis which, in its principle, commands the suspension of every act.

You sense that when we are now going to engage ourselves on this path, of questioning in a more precise, more insistent way than we were able to do in the introductory sessions of the last trimester, what is involved in the psychoanalytic act, I want all the same, a little bit more than I was able in these first words, to highlight that at our horizon, we know what it can be a question of in every act. Of this act whose inaugural character I showed earlier, and whose type as one might say, is given to us through this vacillating meditation that is carried on around the politics of the act described as that of Crossing the Rubicon, for example. Behind it others are profiled. The Night of the 4th of August, the *Jeu de paume*, the Days of October ...

Where is here the sense of the act?

Certainly we feel, we sense, that the point at which questioning is first (78) suspended, is the strategic sense of one or other breakthrough. Thank God, it is not for nothing that I first evoked the Rubicon. It is a rather simplistic example completely marked by the dimensions of the sacred. Crossing the Rubicon did not have a decisive military meaning for Caesar. But on the contrary, to cross it was to re-enter his motherland. The land of the Republic, which to attack, was to violate. This was a breakthrough that had been made, in the sense of these revolutionary acts that I find myself - unintentionally of course - to have profiled behind it. Is the act the moment when Lenin gives one or other order, or the moment when there are loosed upon the world the signifiers that give to one or other precise success in the strategy its sense of a beginning that is already traced out? Something in which the consequence of a certain strategy comes to take its place, and to take in it its value as sign.

After all, it is worthwhile posing the question here, at a certain starting point. Because in the way that I am going to advance onto the terrain of act, there is also a certain breakthrough in evoking this dimension of revolutionary act and pinning on it something different to any warlike efficacy and which is called stimulating a new desire.

“Un coup de ton doigt sur le tambour décharge tous les sons et commence la nouvelle harmonie

Un pas de toi c'est la levée des nouveaux hommes et l'heure en marche.

Ta tête se détourne, le nouvel amour. Ta tête se retourne, le nouvel amour.”

[Your finger on the drum looses all the sounds and begins the new harmony
A step from you is the rising of new men and time on the march.
Your face turns aside, the new love. Your face turns back, the new love.]

I think that none of you can fail to understand this text by Rimbaud that I am not finishing and which is called "*A une raison*".

It is the formula of the act.

Can the act of positing the unconscious be conceived of otherwise. And especially from the moment that I recall that the unconscious has a language structure, when having recalled it without recording the profound tremors among those who are interested by that, I take up and speak about its disruptive effects on the *Cogito*.

Here, I take up again, I underline, it happens that in a certain field I can formulate, "I think". That has all sorts of characteristics. What I dreamt last (79) night, what I missed this morning, or indeed what I touched on yesterday through some uncertain stumbling, without wanting to, by making what is called a witticism, sometimes without doing it deliberately.

In this "I think", am "I there"? It is quite certain that the revelation of the "I think" of the unconscious implies - everyone knows this whether one has done psychoanalysis or not, it is enough to open a book to see what is at stake - something that, at the level of what Descartes' *Cogito* makes us put our finger on about the implication of the "therefore I am", and this dimension that I would describe as that of defusing. This means that where I most certainly think, because I am aware of it, I was in it, but exactly as they say - you know I already used this example, but experience teaches me that it is not vain to repeat myself - it is in the same sense in which, according to the example extracted from remarks of the linguist Guillaume, in the same sense that this very specific use of the imperfect in French which gives all its ambiguity to the expression "*un instant plus tard la bombe éclatait*" [another second and the bomb was gone off]. Which means that precisely it did not go off.

Allow me to add, to stick this nuance onto the German *Wo Es war*, which does not include it, and by this to add to it the renewed use that can be given of "*Wo Es war soll Ich werden*". Where it was, where it is no longer anywhere but there, because I know that I thought it, "*soll Ich werden*". *Ich*: for a long time I have underlined that it can only be translated by, the subject. The subject must become. Only can he? That is the question!

"Where it was ..." Let us translate: "I must become", continue, "a psychoanalyst". Only from the fact - it is the question that I posed about this *Ich* translated by the subject - how is the psychoanalyst going to be able to find his place in this conjuncture. This conjuncture is the one that last year I expressly articulated under the title of the logic of phantasy, by a disjunctive

conjunction of a very special disjunction which is the one that, more than three years ago, I introduced by giving a new sense to the term of alienation. Namely, the one which proposes this curious choice whose consequences I articulated which is a forced choice and, necessarily, a losing one. "Your money or your life", "liberty or death". The last one that we are introducing here and that I am bringing in to show its relation with the psychoanalytic act is: "either I do not think or I am not". If you add to it, as I did earlier to the *soll Ich werden*, the term which is indeed what is in question in the psychoanalytic act: the term psychoanalyst, it is enough to make this little (80) machine run. Obviously, there is to be no hesitation. If on the one hand I am not a psychoanalyst, the result is that I do not think.

Naturally the interest of this is not simply humorous. It ought indeed to lead us somewhere and particularly to asking ourselves what is involved simply in our experience of last year, in what I will call this starting supposition which is constituted by the "either I do not think or I am not". How does it happen that it has proved to be not simply efficacious but necessary for what I called last year a logic of the phantasy, namely, a logic of such a kind that it preserves in itself the possibility of giving an account of what is involved in the phantasy and of its relation to the unconscious.

Because it is there as unconscious, again I must not think of what is involved in my unconscious as thinking.. Where I think it, I am no longer at home. I am no longer there. "I am no longer there (*je n'y suis plus*)" in terms of language in the same way that I make the person who answers the door say: "Sir is not at home". It is an "I am not there" in so far as it is said. This indeed is what gives it its importance. This means in particular, this means that as psychoanalyst I cannot pronounce it. You can see the effect it would have on my clientele! This is also what corners me in the position of "I do not think". At least if what I am putting forward here as logic is able to be followed along its true thread. "I do not think" could be - having drawn the two circles below and their intersection (cf schema), I marked with all the quotation marks of prudence, and to tell you that you must not get too alarmed - this "false-being (*faux-être*)". It is the being of all of us. One is never so solid in one's being as when one does not think. Everyone knows that.

Only all the same, I would like to mark clearly the distinction from what I am putting forward today.

There are two distinct falsehoods. Everyone knows that when I came into psychoanalysis with a little broom which was called the mirror stage, I began by mapping out, because after all it was in Freud, it is said, mapped out, serial. I took the mirror stage to make a portmanteau. It is even much more emphasised immediately than I was ever able to do it in the course of statements that spared peoples sensitivities, that there is no love which does not derive from this narcissistic dimension. That if one knows how to read

Freud, what is opposed to narcissism, what is called object libido, what (81) concerns on the bottom left hand corner the o-object, for that is object libido. It has nothing to do with love since love is narcissism and the two are opposed: narcissistic libido and object libido.

So then when I speak about "false-being" it is not a matter of what comes to plant itself there upon it, in a way, like mussels on the hull of a ship, if you wish. It is not a matter of an individual (*être*) puffed up with the imaginary. It is a matter of something underneath which gives it its place.

It is a matter of the "I do not think" in its structuring necessity *qua* inscribed at this starting place without which we would not have been able, last year, to articulate the least thing about what is involved in the logic of the phantasy.

(82) Naturally, it is a convenient place, this "I do not think". It is not just the puffed-up individual that I spoke about just now, who finds his place there. Everything comes into it, medical prejudice as a whole, psychological or psychologising prejudice no less. On the whole, note the fact that in any case the psychoanalyst is particularly subject to this "I do not think" because he is inhabited by everything that I have just stated, pinpointed, as prejudices by qualifying them by their origin. He has others besides, for example about doctors. The advantage as I might say, when medical prejudice preoccupies him, and God knows that it preoccupies him a good deal, for example, to take only it. And precisely indeed the doctors do not think about it, even though it still worries them - but not the psychoanalyst. He takes it like that, precisely in the measure that he has this dimension that it is only a prejudice, but since it is a matter of not thinking he is all the more at ease with it.

Have you ever, unless exceptionally, seen a psychoanalyst who questioned himself about what Pasteur meant in the medical adventure? Pasteur is not a fashionable subject, but this might precisely have caught the attention of a psychoanalyst. It has never been seen. We will see if it changes. In any case, it would be necessary here to propose to oneself this little exercise: what is this initial point? It is worthwhile all the same posing oneself the question, if as we have glimpsed at the beginning - it is the axis of our progress today - the act in itself is always related to a beginning. I quite deliberately did not pose the question of this logical beginning last year, because, in truth, like more than one point of this logic of the phantasy, we would have had to leave it in suspense. Let us pin it down as *arché*, since this is how we have entered today, by the beginning. It is an *arché*, an *initium*, a beginning but in what sense?

Is it in the sense of the zero on a little measuring apparatus? An individual, for example, quite simply. It is not a bad start to ask oneself this question, because already it seems it can even be seen right away that to pose the question in this way is to rule out that it is a beginning in the sense of the unmarked.

We even touch with our finger that the only fact that we have to question this *arché*-point about, namely, is whether it is zero. The fact is that in any case it is already marked, and that, after all, this works out rather well all the same for from the effect of the mark, it appears very satisfying to see there flowing the “either I do not think” or “I am not”. “Either I am not this mark”, or “I am nothing but this mark”, namely, that “I do not think”. For (83) the psychoanalyst, for example, this applies very well.

He has the label, or indeed he is not it.

Only one must not be deceived by it. As I have just marked it, at the level of the mark, we see only the necessary result precisely of alienation. Namely, that there is no choice between the mark and the individual, so that if it must be marked somewhere, it is precisely on the top left (cf schema of the “I do not think”). The alienating effect has already taken place and we are not surprised to find there, in its original form, the effect of the mark, which is sufficiently indicated in this deduction of narcissism that I made in a schema that I know that at least some of you know, the one that relates in their dependence the ideal ego and the ego ideal.

So then knowing the nature of the logical starting point remains in suspense in so far as it still depends on the conjunction before the disjunction, the “I do not think” and the “I am not”. Assuredly, last year it was towards this, since it was our starting point, and as I might say the initial act of our logical deduction, we would not be able to come back to it if we did not have what constitutes the opening, the gap that it is always necessary to find in every presentation of the analytic field, which made us, after having constructed the moment of the logic of phantasy, spend the last trimester around the sexual act, precisely defined by the fact that it constitutes an aporia.

Let us take up again then, starting from the psychoanalytic act, this questioning about what is the *initium* of the logic of the phantasy that I had to begin to recall here. That is why I inscribed on the board today this aspect of it that I articulated last year under the terms of operation alienation, operation truth, operation transference, to make of them the three terms of what one can call a Klein group, on condition of course of grasping that in naming them in this way, we are not seeing the return, the operation, of what constitutes for each one the return operation. That here as they are inscribed with these vectorial indications, there is only, as I might say, half a Klein group.

Let us take up the act at the sensitive point that we see it in the analytic institution and let us start from the beginning in so far as this today means that the act establishes the beginning.

(84) Is it an act to begin a psychoanalysis, yes or no? Yes, assuredly. Only who performs this act? We pointed out earlier what it implies for the one who engages himself in psychoanalysis, what it implies precisely in terms of relinquishing the act. It becomes very difficult, in this sense, to attribute the structure of the act to the one who engages in a psychoanalysis. A psychoanalysis is a task, and some people even say that it is a trade. I am not the one who said it, but people all the same who know about it. These people who have to follow the rule or not, however you define them, must be taught their trade. In any case, in that quarter people do not talk about their trade as psychoanalysts. They are going to say it now because the word has become popular. Nevertheless, that is what it means.

So then, it is clear that if there is an act, it is probably necessary to look for it elsewhere. We do not after all have to force ourselves very much to ask ourselves to say that if it is not on the side of the psychoanalyst, it is on the side of the psychoanalysis. There is no doubt about it. Only this becomes a difficulty. Because after what we have just said, as regards the act of positing the unconscious, is it necessary for the psychoanalyst to posit it again each time? Is it really possible, especially if we think that after what we have just said, to reposit it each time would be to give us each time a new opportunity for not thinking?

There must be something else, a relation between the task and the act which has perhaps not yet been grasped and which perhaps cannot be. It is necessary perhaps to make a detour. One sees right away where we can find this detour. At another beginning, at this moment of beginning when one becomes a psychoanalyst.

We must take into account the fact which is in the data that if one is to believe what is said, it is necessary to trust oneself in this domain.

Beginning to be a psychoanalyst, as everyone knows, begins at the end of a psychoanalysis. We have only to take that as it is given to us if we want to grasp something. We must start from that, from this point which is accepted by everyone in psychoanalysis.

So then, let us start from things as they present themselves. You have come to the end once. It is from this that you must deduce the relation that this has with the beginning on every occasion. You have reached the end of your analysis once, and it is this act so difficult to grasp at the beginning (85) of each psychoanalysis that we guarantee. It must have a relation with the end of what once occurred.

Now here it is already necessary that what I put forward last year should be of some use. Namely, the way in which there is formulated in this logic the end of psychoanalysis.

The end of psychoanalysis supposes a certain realisation of the truth operation. Namely, that if in effect this ought to constitute this sort of journey, which, from the subject installed in his false-being makes him realise something about a thinking which includes the "I am not". This does not fail to rediscover as is appropriate, in a crossed and inverted form, its truer place, its place in the form of "where it was" at the level of the "I am not". This is found in this o-object whose sense and practice we have done a lot, it seems to me, to give you, and on the other hand, this lack which subsists at the level of the natural subject, of the subject of knowledge, of the false-being of the subject, this lack, which from all time, has been defined as the essence of man and which is called desire, but which at the end of an analysis is expressed by this thing, not only formulated but incarnated, which is called castration.

This is what we usually label with the letter minus phi ($-\phi$). The inversion of this relation of left to right which makes the "I do not think" of the alienated subject correspond to the "where it was" of the unconscious in the discovery of the "where it was" of desire in the subject in the "I am not" of unconscious thinking, this reversing itself is properly what supports the identification of the o as cause of desire, and of the minus phi ($-\phi$) as the place from which there is inscribed the gap proper to the sexual act.

It is precisely here that we ought to suspend things for a moment. You see it, you put your finger on it, there are two "*wo Es war*", two "where it was", corresponding moreover to the distance which in the theory splits the unconscious from the Id. There is the "where it was" inscribed here at the level of the subject, and I already said it, I am repeating it so what you will not let it pass, where it remains attached to this subject as lack. There is the other "where it was", which at an opposite place is the one is on the bottom right (cf schema), of the locus of the unconscious which remains attached to the "I am not" of the unconscious as object, object of loss.

The initial lost object of the whole analytic genesis, the one that Freud hammered at every phase of the birth of the unconscious, is there, this lost object, cause of desire. We are going to see it as being at the source of the act.

(86) But this is only an announcement. I am not justifying it immediately. There is still a journey to take before being sure of it, we have to pause there for a while. In general, it is only worthwhile pausing for a while to grasp the time that one has passed on it without knowing it, we will say moreover, to correct ourselves. Passed ... it would be better to say "passing (*passant*)" and if you will allow me to play with the words "not without knowing it (*pas sans le savoir*)".

Namely, with knowledge, one passed it. But precisely, it is because I have presented to you the result of my schemas from last year, that you are

supposed to know, though there is not some exaggeration in this. Yes, it is with this knowledge that I passed this time, too quickly, namely, in haste. As you know haste is precisely what allows the truth to escape. This moreover allows us to live. The truth is that the lack (on the top left), is the loss, (of the bottom right). But the loss for its part, is the cause of something else. We will call it the cause of itself on condition, of course, that you are not deceived. God is the cause of himself, Spinoza tells us. Did he realise how right he was? Why not, after all. He was someone very able. It is quite certain that the fact of conferring on God the fact of being the cause of himself, dissipated the whole ambiguity of the *Cogito*, which might well have a similar pretension, at least in the minds of some people. If there is anything that analytic experience reminds us of, it is that if this expression, "cause of itself", means something, it is precisely to indicate to us that the self, or what is called such, in other words, the subject to which everyone has to come, since even in one or other Anglo-Saxon field where it can be said that people understand nothing about any of these questions, the word *self* had to emerge. It can be adapted to nothing in analytic theory, nothing corresponds to it.

The subject depends on this cause which makes it divided and is called the \circ -object. Here is what marks what it is important to underline: that the subject is not its own cause, that it is the consequence of loss and that it has to put itself into the consequence of the loss, the one that the \circ -object constitutes, to know what he is lacking.

That is why I am saying that we would be going too quickly to state as I have done, these two points of the oblique line, from left to right (cf schema) and from top to bottom, of these two separated terms of the first division. The thing is supposedly known in the statement that the "where it was" is lack starting from the subject. It is only truly such if the subject makes of (87) himself a loss. Now this is what he cannot think except by making himself be. "I think, he says, therefore I am". He rejects himself invincibly into the being of this false act, which is called the *Cogito*. The act of the *Cogito* is error about being, as we see in the definitive alienation resulting from it of the body, which is rejected into extension, the rejection of the body outside of thinking is the great *Verwerfung* of Descartes. It is stamped with its effect that it reappears in the real, namely, in the impossible. It is impossible for a machine to be a body. That is why knowledge continues to prove it by making it into spare parts. We are in this adventure, I do not need I think to make allusions to it. But let us leave our Descartes here for today to return to what followed and to the punctuation that we must give today to our progress.

We know that the subject of the analytic act can know nothing about what is learnt in the analytic experience, unless there operates in it what is called transference. The transference that I restored in a complete fashion, by relating it to the subject supposed to know.

The term of analysis consists in the fall of the subject supposed to know and his reduction to the arrival of this *o*-object, as cause of the division of the subject which comes in its place. The one who, phantastically, with the psychoanalysand, plays the game with respect to the subject who is supposed to know, namely, the analyst, it is he the analyst who comes to the term of analysis by being able to tolerate being nothing more than this remainder. This remainder of the thing known, which is called the *o*-object, it is around this that our question should be brought to bear.

The analysand who has come to the end of the analysis in the act, if there is one, which carries him to become a psychoanalyst, must we not see that this passage only takes place in the act which puts back in its place the subject supposed to know.

We now see this place where it is because it can be occupied. But it is only occupied in so far as this subject supposed to know, is reduced to this term that the one who up to then guarantees it there by his act, namely, the psychoanalyst, the psychoanalyst for his part has become this residue, this *o*-object.

He who at the end of a training analysis takes up, as I might say, the challenge of this act, we cannot omit that it is knowing what his analyst has become in the accomplishment of this act, namely, this residue, this rubbish, this rejected thing. By restoring the subject supposed to know, by himself picking up the torch of the analyst, he cannot but install, even if he does not (88) touch it, cannot but install the *o* at the level of the subject supposed to know. This subject supposed to know, that he can only take up again as condition of every psychoanalytic act, he knows, at this moment that I called in the pass, he knows that here is the *désêtre* that through him, the psychoanalysand, has struck the being of the analyst. I am saying, without touching it, that this is how he is engaged. Because he, the subject in the pass at the moment of the analytic act, knows nothing about this *désêtre* established at the point of the subject supposed to know. Precisely because he has become the truth of this knowledge, and that, if I may say a truth that is reached "not without knowing it", as I said earlier, well, it is incurable: one is this truth.

The analytic act functions at the start, as I might say, with a falsified subject supposed to know. For the subject supposed to know now proves what was quite simple to see immediately: that it is what is at the *arché* of analytic logic. If the one who becomes analyst could be cured of the truth that he has become, he would be able to mark what has happened in terms of a change at the level of the subject supposed to know. This is what in our graph we have marked by the signifier of *S* (\emptyset).

It would be necessary to grasp that the subject supposed to know is reduced at the end of the analysis to the same "not being there" which is characteristic of the unconscious itself, and that this discovery forms part of the same truth-operation.

I repeat. The putting in question of the subject supposed to know, the subversion of what, I would say, the whole functioning of knowledge implies and that I already questioned before you many times in the form of: "so then this knowledge, whether it is that of the transfinite number of Cantor or of the desire of the analyst, where was it before it was known?"

From that alone perhaps, can one proceed to a revival of the individual (*l'être*) whose condition it is to grasp that if its origin and its re-challenging, that which could take place from the signifier of the other that has finally vanished towards what replaces it, since moreover it is from its field, from the field of the Other that this signifier has been torn, namely, the *o*-object, this would also be to grasp that the individual as it can emerge from any act whatsoever, is an individual without essence as all the *o*-objects are without essence. This is what characterises them.

Objects without essence which are, or not, to be re-evoked in the act starting (89) from this sort of subject which, as we will see, is the subject of the act, of every act, I would say, in so far as like the subject supposed to know at the end of the analytic experience, it is a subject which is not in the act.

Seminar 6: Wednesday 17 January 1968

(91) In speaking about the “psychoanalytic act”, I have, as I might say, two ambitions: one long term and the other short, but necessarily the short term one is the better. The long term one, which cannot be set aside, is to illuminate what is involved in the act. The short term is to know in what the act of the psychoanalyst consists. Already in some writings in the past, I spoke about the psychoanalyst. I said that I was only starting from the fact that there is something of the psychoanalyst (*du psychanalyste*). The question of whether there is “the” psychoanalyst is not to be put completely in suspense either, but that of knowing how there can be a psychoanalyst is a question that is posed more or less in the same terms as what is called in logic the question of existence.

The psychoanalytic act, if it is an act and it is indeed from this that we began last year, is something that puts to us the question of articulating it, of saying it, which is legitimate. And even going further, implies the consequences of the act in so far as the act itself is in its proper dimension a statement (*un dire*). The act says something. This is what we started from.

This dimension has always been glimpsed. It is present in the facts, in experience. It is enough to evoke for even an instant some pregnant formulae, formulae that have worked, like that of “to act according to one’s conscience”, to grasp what is at stake. To act in accordance with one’s conscience is indeed a kind of middle point around which the history of the act could be said to have turned or that one can take as a point of departure to centre it. To act in accordance with one’s conscience. Why and before whom?

(92) The dimension of the Other, in so far as the act bears witness to something, cannot be eliminated either. Does this mean that this is the true turning point, the centre of gravity? Could we even sustain it for an instant where we are coming from, namely, where conscience as such is put in question, put in question in the measure that it can lead to what? Assuredly not to knowledge or to the truth either. It is from here that we start again by taking the measure of what has not yet been defined, of what has not yet been really circumscribed, of what is only introduced here, not even presupposed, the psychoanalytic act, in order to question again this point of equilibrium around which the question is posed of what the act is.


On the horizon, of course, as we know, a distant murmur, a murmur which comes from afar, which comes from the times described as classical, or again our Antiquity, where assuredly we know that all that is said on the subject of the exemplary act, of the meritorious act, of Plutarchism, if you wish. We surely sense already that there is a little too much self-esteem getting into the game, and nevertheless are we that far from it? I think that today it is around a discourse on the subject that we will take up the act again. And that our advantage comes from nothing other than something which has made us restrict the supporting point of this subject by imposing on ourselves the most severe discipline, by only wanting to take as certain this dimension by which it is the grammatical subject.

Let us clearly understand here that it is not new, and that last year in our presentation of the *Logic of Phantasy*, we marked at its place, the place of "I do not think", this form of the subject which appeared as a curtailing of the field reserved to it. This dimension properly of grammar which meant that the phantasy was able to be dominated literally by a sentence which is only sustained, which is only conceived of in the grammatical dimension: *Ein Kind wird geschlagen*, a child is being beaten. We know all about it. This is the surest point we have, around which, in the name of what we posit for disciplinary purposes, that there is no meta-language, that logic itself must be extracted from this given which language is. It is around this logic, on the contrary, that we made revolve this triple operation, to which by a sort of attempt at a trial, a divination, a risk, we gave the form of the Klein group. (93) An operation that we began by highlighting, on the path along which we tackled it, by the terms of alienation, truth, and transference.

Undoubtedly, this is only a pinpointing. And having gone over them in a certain direction we are - to find our way in them, to support what they can represent for us - forced to give them another name, and of course, on condition that we see that it is the same journey that is at stake.

So then it is starting from the subversion of the subject that we have already for some ten years sufficiently articulated, so that people can conceive of the sense that this term takes on, when we say that it is from the subversion of the subject that we have to take up again the function of the act. In order for us to see that it is between this grammatical subject, the one that is there, inscribed in the very notion of act, in the way in which it is made present for us, the *I* of action, and this subject articulated in these terms that are sliding, always ready to flee us by a displacement, by a jump, to one of the vertices of this tetrahedron, in recalling to you the functions of these terms, namely: the position of the *either-or* from which there starts the originating alienation, the one which culminates at the "I do not think", for it to be even chosen - and what does this choice mean? - the "I am not" articulates its other term. These vectors, or more exactly these directions in which the fundamental operations

are taken being those that I recalled earlier under the terms of alienation, truth, and transference.



What does that mean? Where does that lead us?

We posit the psychoanalytic act as consisting in the fact of supporting the transference. We are not saying: who supports, who performs the act, the (94) psychoanalyst therefore implicitly. This transference which would be a pure and simple obscenity, I would say, with some babbling added on, if we did not restore to it its true core, in the function of the subject supposed to know. Here, we have done this for some time by showing that everything that is articulated, about its diversity, as a transference effect, can only be organised by being referred to this truly fundamental function that is always present in everything that is involved in any progress of knowledge. This takes on its value here precisely from the fact that the existence of the unconscious puts it in question - a question never posed because we are still there, as one might say, implicitly - the answer is even unnoticed. From the moment that there is knowledge, there is a subject, and there must be some shift, some split, some shaking, some moment of *I* in this knowledge, for one to notice all of a sudden, for there to be thus renewed this knowledge that he knew before.

This is scarcely noticed when it is happening, but it is the field of psychoanalysis that makes it inevitable. What is involved in the subject supposed to know, since we have to deal with this sort of unthinkable thing which in the unconscious situates for us a knowledge without a subject? Naturally, this is something that one may not notice, by continuing to think that this subject is implied in this knowledge, quite simply by allowing there to escape everything involved in the efficacy of repression, and that it cannot be conceived of otherwise than in the fact that the signifier present in the unconscious, and liable to return, is precisely repressed in that it does not imply a subject, that it is no longer what represents a subject for another signifier, which is something that is articulated to another signifier without for all that representing this subject. There is no other definition possible of what is really involved in the function of the unconscious, in so far as the Freudian

unconscious is not simply the implicit, or the obscured, or the archaic, or the primal. The unconscious is always in a completely different register, in the movement established as doing by this act, of supporting, or accepting to support the transference.


The question is what becomes of the subject supposed to know? I am going to tell you that in principle, the psychoanalyst knows what becomes of it. Assuredly, it falls. What is implied theoretically in this suspension of the subject supposed to know, this line of suppression, this bar on the S which symbolises it in the becoming of analysis, manifests itself in the fact that something is produced at a place, that is certainly not indifferent to the (95) psychoanalyst, since it is at his own place that this thing arises. This thing is called the little *o*-object.

The little *o*-object is the realisation of this sort of *désêtre* that strikes the subject supposed to know. That it is the analyst, and as such, who comes to this place is not in doubt. It is marked in all the inferences in which he felt himself implicated to the point of no longer being able to do anything but bend the thinking of his practice in the sense of the dialectic of frustration, as you know. This is linked to the fact that he presents himself as the substance that is operated on and manipulated in the analytic deed. But this is precisely to fail to recognise the distinction there is between this deed and the act which allows it, the act which establishes it, the one that I started from earlier by defining it as this acceptance, this support given to the subject supposed to know, to the fact that the psychoanalyst knows that he is nevertheless doomed to *désêtre* and which thus constitutes, as I might say, an act that is out of synch since he is not the subject supposed to know, since he cannot be it. And if there is someone who knows it, it is above all the psychoanalyst.

Must I now, or a little later, yes, but why not now, why not right away, provided I can come back on something that I want to make you familiar with, by reminding you of its co-ordinates in other registers, in other statements. Must I now remind you that the analytic task, in so far as it is outlined from this point of the already alienated subject, in a certain sense naïve in its alienation, the one that the psychoanalyst knows to be defined by the “I do not think”, that what he sets him to as a task, is an “I think” which takes on precisely its whole emphasis, from the fact that he knows the “I do not think”, inherent to the status of the subject?

He sets him to the task of a thinking that is presented in a way in its very statement, in the rule that he gives him of it, as admitting the fundamental truth of the “I do not think”, that he should associate and do so freely. That he does not seek to know whether or not he is entirely there as subject, whether he affirms himself there. The task to which the psychoanalytic act gives its status is a task which already implies this destitution of the subject, and where does that lead us?

You must remember, you must not spend your time forgetting what is articulated about it, what is articulated about it in Freud, explicitly about the result. It has a name, and Freud did not soften it for us, which is something that is all the more to be highlighted because as subjective experience this was (96) never done before psychoanalysis. It is called castration, which is to be taken in its dimension of subjective experience in as much as nowhere except along this path can the subject be realised. I mean the subject of course.



This subject is only realised exactly *qua* lack, which means that the subjective experience culminates in something that we symbolise by $(-\phi)$. But if every use of the letter is justified by demonstrating that it is enough to have recourse to its manipulation in order not to be mistaken, on condition that one knows how to use it, it nevertheless remains that we have a right to try to be able to put into it an "it exists" - which I evoked earlier in connection with the psychoanalyst at the start of today's discourse. And that this "it exists" in question, this "it exists" of a lack, must be incarnated by us in what effectively gives it its name: castration. Namely, that the subject realises that he does not have, that he does not have the organ of what I would call unique, unary, unifying enjoyment (*jouissance*). It is a matter, properly, of what makes enjoyment *one* in the conjunction of subjects of opposite sex. Namely, what I insisted on last year, in picking out the fact that there is no possible subjective realisation of the subject as element, as sexed partner in what is imagined as unification in the sexual act.

This incommensurability - that I tried to circumscribe before you, last year, by using the golden number, in so far as it is the symbol that allows the greatest play, this is something on which I cannot insist, because it belongs to the mathematical register - this incommensurability, this relation of **small o**, since it is the **small o** that I took up again not unintentionally to symbolise it in the (97) golden number, of **small o** to 1. This is where there operates what appears as subjective realisation at the end of the psychoanalytic task. Namely, this lack is not the organ, this naturally is not without a background


if we remember that the organ and the function are two different things. So different that one can say that there comes back from time to time the problem of knowing what function must be given to each organ, and this is where the true problem of the adaptation of the living being lies. The more organs he has, the more entangled he is.

But let us pause ... It is a matter then of a limited experience, of a logical experience and after all, why not? Because for a moment we have jumped onto a different plane, onto a plane of the relation of the living being to itself, that we only tackle by the schema of this subjective adventure. We must clearly recall here that from the point of view of the living being all of this, after all, can be considered as a artefact. And that logic is the locus of truth changes nothing in it, because the question that comes at the end is precisely the one to which we will be able to give its whole emphasis in time. What is the truth?

It is up to us to see that from these two lines, the ones that I designated as the task, the path taken by the psychoanalysand in as much as he speaks, a naïve subject who is moreover the subject alienated from this realisation of lack, in as much as, as I pointed out to you the last time, this lack is not what we know to be at the place of the "I am not". This lack was there from the start, and that from all time we have known that this lack is the very essence of this subject that is called man. Sometimes that it is desire, as has already been said, which is the essence of man. Quite simply this lack has made progress in the articulation of its function as *organum*, an essentially logical progress in this realisation as such of the phallic lack. But it involves that the loss in so far as it was there at first, at the same point, before its journey was followed through, and simply for us who know - the loss of the object which is at the origin of the status of the unconscious, this had always been explicitly formulated by Freud - is realised elsewhere. It is so precisely, this is what I started from, at the level of the *désêtre* of the subject supposed to know.

It is in as far as the one who gives its support to transference is there under the black line, that he knows where he is starting from. Not that he is there, he knows only too well that he is not, that he is not the subject supposed to (98) know, but that he is rejoined by the *désêtre* that the subject supposed to know undergoes. That in the end it is he, the analyst, who embodies what the subject becomes in the form of the little o-object. So then, as is to be expected, it is in conformity with every notion of structure that the function of alienation which was at the start, and which meant that we started from the top left hand vertex of an alienated subject, finds itself at the end equal to itself, as I might say. In this sense that the subject has been realised, in his castration, along the path of a logical operation. An alienated path, remits to the Other, gets rid - and this is the function of the analyst - of this lost object, from which, in Genesis, we can conceive that the whole structure originates. The distinction of alienation, of **small o** in so far as it comes here and is

separated from $(-\phi)$, which at the end of analysis is ideally the realisation of the subject. This is the process that is at stake.



There is a second phase in this statement that I am producing. I open a parenthesis here in order to put what I came to a stop before earlier, in order to give what I should have given to it, an introduction. I will now give a reminder of it, which is that it is not by chance, a scholarly game, a question of taking a familiar point that your brains were tickled by, at the end of secondary school teaching, that I refer to Descartes' *cogito*. The fact is that it includes in itself this element that is particularly favourable for the Freudian detour to be relocated in it. Not at all, of course, in order to demonstrate here some historical consistency or other, as if all of this could be put end to end, from century to century, as a kind of progress, when it is only too obvious that if there is anything that this evokes, it is much more rather the idea of a maze. What matter, let us leave Descartes. In looking closely at the *cogito*, note carefully that the subject who is supposed there as being, may well be that of thinking, but of what thinking, in short? Of that thinking which has just rejected all knowledge. It is not a question of what is done after Descartes by those who meditate on the immediacy from "I am" to "I think", an obviousness that, as they wish, they make consistent or fleeting. What is at stake is the Cartesian act itself, in so far as it is an act. What is reported and said to us about it, it is precisely by saying it that it is an act. It is from this point, where there is completed a suspension of all possible knowledge. That this is what assures the "I am": is it to be "thought" by the *cogito* or is it from the rejection of knowledge?

The question is well worth asking if one thinks of what is called in the manuals of philosophy the successors, the posterity of a philosophical thinking, as if it were simply a question of taking it up again, a piece of treacle to make another mixture out of it. While what is at stake every time is a renewal, an act which is not necessarily the same. And that if we take Hegel, of course, there again, as everywhere else, we find the putting in suspense of the subject supposed to know, except for the fact that it is not for

nothing, that this subject is designed to give us, at the end of the adventure, absolute knowledge.

To see what that means, one must look more closely at it, and why not look at it at the start. If the *Phenomenology of the spirit* is explicitly set up by being generated from the function of act, is it not visible in the mythology of the fight to the death for pure prestige, that this knowledge of the origin, by having to trace out its path in order to become this unthinkable thing, this absolute knowledge, and one can even ask oneself - and one is entitled to ask oneself because Hegel formulates it - what kind of subject can depend upon it, for even a single instant. That this starting knowledge, that is presented to us as such, is the knowledge of DEATH, namely, another extreme, radical form of putting in suspense as the very foundation of this subject of knowledge.

Is it by questioning this again from the point of view of consequences, something that is easy for us to see that, what psychoanalytic experience proposes as the little *o*-object - along the path of my discourse in so far as it only summarises, highlights, gives its sign and its sense to what is articulated everywhere in this experience - this is what generates in disorder and confusion this little *o*-object. Do we not see that it comes in the same place (100) where there is in Descartes, this rejection of knowledge, in Hegel, this knowledge as knowledge of death. And we assuredly know that this is its function. That this knowledge of death, articulated precisely in this fight to the death of pure prestige, in so far as it grounds the status of the master, it is from it that there comes this *Aufhebung* of enjoyment. This explains it. And it is as renouncing enjoyment in a decisive act, in order to make himself the subject of death that the master is established. And it is moreover there, for us, I underlined it at one time, that there is put forward the objection that we can make to this through a curious paradox, a paradox unexplained in Hegel. It is to the master that enjoyment is supposed to return from this *Aufhebung*. Many times we have asked why? Why, if it is because he has not renounced enjoyment that the slave becomes a slave? Why does he not keep it? Why should it come back to the master, whose status is precisely to have renounced it, unless in a form that we can, perhaps, require a little more of than the conjuring trick, the Hegelian *maestria* to account for it? It is no little test if we can feel in the Freudian dialectic a manipulation that is more rigorous, more exact, and more in conformity with experience as regards what is involved in what becomes of enjoyment after the first alienation.


I already sufficiently indicated it in connection with masochism for people to know here what I mean and that I am only indicating a path to be taken up again. We certainly cannot delay on it today, but it was necessary to indicate its beginnings at the right place.

To continue on our path in function of what is involved in the psychoanalytic act, we have done nothing up to now except to demonstrate what it generates

by being carried out. To take a further step, let us now come to the only point where the act can be questioned: at its point of origin.


What are we told? I evoked it again the last time. That it is at the end of an analysis that is supposed to be complete that the psychoanalyst may become a psychoanalysand. It is not at all a matter here of justifying the possibility of this connection. It is a matter of posing it as articulated and of putting it to the test of our little tetrahedric schema.

It is the subject who has accomplished the task at the end of which he has realised himself as subject in castration, *qua* something lacking in the enjoyment of sexual union. This is what we have to see by a rotation, or a tipping over, to a certain number of degrees, as this figure is drawn, by 180° in (101) order to see passing, coming back what has been realised here to the starting position. Except for the fact that the subject who comes here (on the top left), knows what is involved in the subjective experience, and that this experience also implies that on the left, there remains what has become of the one whose act is responsible for the path taken. In other words, that for the analyst as we now see him emerging at the level of his act, there is already a knowledge of the *désêtre* of the subject supposed to know, in so far as it is the necessary starting position for this whole logic.



It is precisely because of this that there is question of what is involved for him in this act, that we have defined earlier as an act that is out of synch. What is the measure of the illumination of his act? Because in so far as he has taken the path that permits this act, he is himself already the truth of this act.

This is the question that I posed the last time, in saying that a truth conquered “not without knowing it” is a truth that I described as “incurable”, if I can express myself thus. For if we follow what results from this tipping over of the whole figure which is the only one in which there can be explained the (102) passage of the conquest, the fruit of the task, to the position of the one who breaks through the act by which this task can be repeated. It is here that there comes the \$ which was there at the start in the *either-or* of the “either I do not think” or “I am not”. And effectively, in so far as there is an act mixed up with the task that sustains it, what is at stake is properly a signifying intervention. The way the psychoanalyst acts, however little it may be, but



where he properly acts in the course of the task, is to be capable of this signifying interference which properly speaking is not open to any generalisation that might be called knowledge.


What analytic interpretation generates is this something, which cannot be evoked from the universal except in the form that I would ask you to notice is so contrary to everything that has been qualified as such up to now. It is, as one might say, this sort of universal key, the key that opens all the boxes. How the devil can it be conceived of? What does it mean to offer oneself as the one who has at his disposal what initially can only be defined as something or other particular?

Such is the question that I am also leaving only opened up here about what is involved in the status of the one who at the point of this subject, \$, can ensure that there exists something in the task, and not in the foundational act, which corresponds to the subject supposed to know. Here is quite precisely what opens up the question. What is necessary for it to be possible that there should be an analyst? I repeat, on the top left of the schema, what we started from, is that in order for the whole schematisation to be possible, for the logic of psychoanalysis to exist, there had to be something of the psychoanalyst (*du psychoanalyste*).

When he puts himself there, after having himself taken the psychoanalytic path, he already knows where he will be led to then as psychoanalyst by the path to be re-travelled: the *désêtre* of the subject supposed to know by being nothing but the support of this object called the little *o*-object. What is outlined for us by this psychoanalytic act, one of whose co-ordinates it must be carefully recalled is precisely to exclude from the psychoanalytic experience any act, any injunction to act? It is recommended to what is called the patient, the psychoanalysand, to name him, as far as possible he is recommended to wait before acting. If something characterises the position of the psychoanalyst, it is very precisely that he only acts in the field of signifying intervention that I delimited just now.

But is this not also an opportunity for us to grasp that the status of every act (103) emerges from it completely renewed? For the place of the act, whatever it is, and it is up to us to notice from its trace, what we mean when we speak about the status of the act, without even being able to allow us to add to it, of the human act. The fact is that, if there is somewhere that the psychoanalyst at once does not know himself, and, it is also the point where he exists, it is in

so far as he is, assuredly, a divided subject, even in his act. And that the end where he is awaited, namely, this little o-object, in so far as it is not his own,



but what the psychoanalysis requires of him as Other, so that with him, he is rejected from it. Is this not an image to open up for us what is involved in the destiny of every act. And this under diverse figures, from the hero where Antiquity from all time has tried to place, in all its breadth, in all its drama, what is involved in the act. Not at all certainly that at this same time knowledge was not oriented towards other traces, for it is also, and it is not negligible to recall it, a time when people sought the reason for what is involved in a wise act - and in truth there is nothing there to be disdained - in a good. "The fruit of the act", here is what seems to give its first measure to ethics. I took it up at one time in commenting on Aristotle's.

The *Ethics to Nicomachus* starts from this: that there is something good at the level of pleasure and that following a correct channel in this register of pleasure will lead us to the conception of the sovereign good.

It is clear that this was, in its way, a sort of act that has its place in the journeying of any act described as philosophical. The way that we may judge it is of no importance here. It was a time, as we know, when there was set up a completely different questioning, the tragic questioning about what is involved in the act, and this was what was remitted to an obscure divinity. If there is a dimension, a force, which was not supposed to know, it is indeed that of the ancient *ananke*, in so far as it was incarnated by these furious (104) madmen that the gods were.

Measure the distance travelled from this perspective on the act to that of Kant. If there is something which in another way renders necessary our statement about the act as a saying (*un dire*), it is indeed in the measure that Kant gives of it, from the fact that it ought to be regulated by a maxim that could have a universal range. Is this not also what I took my time to caricature, by connecting it to a rule as it is stated in the phantasmagoria of Sade?

Is it not true, on the other hand, that between these two extremes, I am speaking about Aristotle and Kant, the reference to the Other taken as such is the one, also very farcical, which was given at least by a classical form of religious direction? The measure of the act in the eyes of God is supposed to be given by what are called good intentions. Is it possible to initiate a more established path of dupery than that of putting this measure at the principle of the value of the act.

Can the good intention in an act in any way remove for a single instant for us the question of what is its fruit? It is certain that Freud is not the first to allow us to emerge from these closed rings. That to put in suspense what is involved in the value of a good intention, we have a quite effective, explicit and useable critique in what Hegel articulates for us about the law of the heart or the delusions of presumption. That it is not enough to rise up against the disorder of the world, for this very protestation not to be itself its most permanent support. What succeeded the act of the *cogito*, has given us many models, precisely, of this thinking. When the order, arising from the law of the heart, is destroyed by the critique of the *Phenomenology of the spirit*, what do we see, if not the return, that I cannot do otherwise than qualify as offensive, of the ruse of reason.

It is here that we must notice that this meditation opened out very specially on to something called the political act. And that assuredly it is not vain that what was generated not simply in terms of political meditations but of political acts, in which I in no way distinguish the speculation of Marx from the way in which it has been put into effect at one or other detour of the revolution, is it not possible for us to situate a whole line of descent of reflections on the political act, in so far as assuredly they are acts, in the sense that these acts were a saying (*un dire*) and precisely to say in the name of such a one who brought to them a certain number of decisive changes, is it not possible to question them again in the same register as the one at which there will culminate today what is outlined in terms of the psychoanalytic act? There where at the same time it is and it is not, and which could be expressed as follows, in virtue of the slogan that Freud gives to the analysis of the unconscious. *Wo Es war*, he says and I taught you to re-read it the last time, *soll Ich werden?*

Wo \$ tat and you will allow me to write the S of the letter barred here, there where the signifier worked in the double sense that it has just ceased or that it was just going to act, not at all *soll Ich werden* but *muss Ich*, I who am acting, I who am launching into the world this thing to which one can address oneself as to a reason *muss Ich (o) werden*. I must become the waste product of what I am introducing as a new order into the world.

Such is the new form in which I am proposing to you to posit a new way of questioning what is involved, in our day, in the status of the act, in so far as this act is curiously related to a certain number of original introductions, in

the first rank of which is the Cartesian *cogito*, in as much as the psychoanalytic act permits the question to be posed again.

Seminar 7: Wednesday 24 January 1968

(107) Today there is going to be something a little bit modified in our pact. Naturally, it is understood that in accordance with the good law of offering an exchange, you give me your presence for something that you are expecting. This is supposed to emerge from a certain background and to have been, up to a certain point - it is a matter of knowing which - predestined. In short you are expecting a lecture, a class.

On several occasions, it happens from time to time that I pose myself the question of whom I am addressing myself to, and where it (*ça*) speaks from. You know the amount of care I take to insist on the fact that I cannot for a single instant lose sight of the original reference point, which is that this discourse on psychoanalysis is addressed to psychoanalysts. There are so many people who are not such and who are gathered here, to hear something. This just by itself demands a certain number of explanations. One would be wrong in this connection to content oneself with historical explanations, namely, an encounter or encounters, the effects of crowd pressure, what it means that I found myself in the position of being heard elsewhere than where I gave it originally. This is obviously not enough to explain things. It is indeed here that one could compare the references of history - for after all, what one in general calls history, this scrum - and of structure.

There are obviously reasons of structure. If I am speaking this year about the act, and am posing the question of the act, that I arrived at the point of what I said the last time which seemed to me by some little samples, proofs that I received, that at least some people have glimpsed the importance of what was formulated the (108) last time in as much as it marks a point which justifies, which allows there to be gathered together at least in a core point, what began to be articulated by me from the start of our year and which of course might have left a fuzzy impression, especially if one starts from the idea that what is first said are necessarily principles. In many cases one is forced to proceed otherwise, even when one has a structural reference and even especially when one has one, because it is of its nature not to be able to be given at the beginning. It has to be conquered. Otherwise I do not see why a schema of the type of the Klein group, upon which I am trying for the moment to articulate what is involved in the act in the perspective that the psychoanalytic act opens up, I do not see why I would not have started from there fifteen years ago.

Today, there will be a pause whose occasion here is only a pretext, although that does not mean, for all that, that it is marginal. It is planned in this year's seminar on the psychoanalytic act, that the 31st January, the 28th February, the 27th March and the 29th May entry will be by invitation. This means that it will be reduced to a certain number of more restricted encounters, in order to allow a conversation.

This has been planned to give a minimum of this something that has always been difficult to handle. The rule governing closed seminars, with all the complications that this involves in the way of choosing. There is always established in things of this order a kind of competition. The place where you do not want to go, you begin to desire once your pal is going. All of this does not make the principle of who to welcome easy, but it is necessary to try to establish a *milieu* of exchange that has a somewhat different internal relation. I thought of it today but because no one having been warned, I had my reasons for not doing it. It is certain that apart from the people of my school who for their part were, not many candidates would have presented themselves.

Here is how I intend to resolve matters. Something that has nothing to do with the series means that, this 31st, I will not be there. This is not a reason for there not to be a closed seminar. It was agreed that the members of the Paris School described as Freudian, which everyone knows I look after, and this altogether legitimately because moreover they are psychoanalysts, that these should be the ones, in the measure in which they manifest the desire, to come here on the 31st January. I have not even asked yet - I am asking him now - Dr Melman to be (109) there, in short, to organise this meeting.

I had set out the principle that only the members of the School who have shown themselves here in a sufficiently regular fashion to know what I have stated up to now, should come to this meeting. You are going to see the degree to which it is justified. Because I am going to give to this meeting the following object: the idea moreover is not uniquely my own, far from it, I would even say that it was given to me by Dr Melman who, in the context of the teaching of the School, recently proposed to me that in the course of this seminar, which is particularly important all the same, it is hard to see how one could touch on a point more central for psychoanalysts than that of the psychoanalytic act itself, provided of course this word has a sense. This is what I hope has been sufficiently laid out up to the present in your sight, that at the very least I gave a certain shape to this sense. One can articulate it by following a certain number of questions and whether one can answer it and whether these are even questions, is precisely what is left open. This is the way, all the same, the problem is posed. I gave it its initial articulation, as a result of which one can see there being manifested within it certain blanks, in other points squares that are already full or even super-abundantly filled, or even completely overflowing, unbalanced because of not taking others into account. This is precisely the interest of introducing what is called "structure". It is rather curious that we are still at it, and I am obliged to say it since there are certain recent manifestations it among psychoanalysts to

even consider whether there can be a question, at the level of principle, about structure. There are things that I really did not have the time to look at and which it is not even sure that I will look at closely but of which, of course, I hear echoes.

One sees people who have a psychoanalytic authority of a certain weight, honourable practitioners as they say, who find themselves manifesting very curiously the point at which things are at. For example, there is a whole *milieu* where is was, as everyone knows, forbidden even to come within range of the accursed word. And then there was a time, a fabulous time - but it has to be said that things go slowly in this very special *milieu* - can you imagine, 1960, there are people here who were fourteen years old at the time. The Congrès de (109) Bonneval is immemorial, it is dust-covered, unbelievable! It must be said that it took almost six years to produce its proceedings. There are people who, to discuss what I am teaching, think that it is great to take things up again from the Congrès de Bonneval!


I thank very much the people of my school for having produced a journal, which is obviously not mine, which allows these decanting effects. One could not put it elsewhere, elsewhere is not its place. In a certain *Revue Francaise de Psychanalyse*, as it is called, there is no question of discussing what I teach, and that is understandable, because psychoanalysis is not spoken about in it. So then, at this point, the empty pockets from next door can empty themselves to discuss what I am saying about the signifier. With all that I have been saying for four years, which has largely gone beyond the question of whether it must be known if at the source it is a matter or not of the signifier.

People go back to the Congrès de Bonneval which was a tunnel, this famous tunnel where the blacks fought one another, without knowing who was hitting who, and where there are the most fantastical lucubrations. There was someone called Lefebvre there, unbelievable people, the friendliest of people, my dear friend Merleau-Ponty who intervened on that occasion. But, everyone at that time, was off target. It was simply a matter, for the first time, of publicly discussing what at that time I had been teaching for seven years at Sainte-Anne to a little circle.

That is how things happen, and this is what makes tangible that in every discourse, there are act-effects. If there had only been the dimension of discourse in it, it ought to have spread more quickly. Precisely, this is what must be highlighted. That this discourse of mine, has this dimension of act at the moment that I am speaking about the act, is something that leaps to the eye. If one looks closely at it, it is the only reason for the presence of people who are here, for it is hard to see, particularly at the level of a young audience, what they can come looking for here. We are not on the plane of providing university services. I can bring you nothing in exchange for your presence. What amuses you is that you sense there is something happening. People do not agree. It is already a little beginning in the dimension of act.

It is truly fabulous - naturally I only have this by hearsay - but in any case it has been affirmed to me that these kind of authors that I spoke about earlier, are among the people who object to this structure which is supposed to leave us, we (111) who are persons, so ill at ease. The being of the person is supposed to be something that would suffer from it. I am afraid that here we are into something which altogether merits analysis and study. What is involved in the being of the person of the psychoanalyst, is precisely something that can only be really grasped from its mapping out in the structure.

In this little tetrahedron which we have started from these last times, something all the same must be quite tangible in it: the multiplicity of translations that it lends itself to.



- 1 - the either/or
- 2 - the I am not/ I do not think
- 3 - this worthy unconscious; I am not
- 4 - the I do not think, which is not a place reserved to the psychoanalyst,

all the same. The psychoanalyst reveals its necessity. That is something quite different. He reveals it in the fact that if it is obviously necessary for someone who is dealing only with thoughts "not to think", what are we to say about the others! This is why this starting point is instructive, and that in short it is something which makes quite clear the fact that this point on the top left then, of the forced choice which is the definition that I gave of alienation in its revised form, alienation as I have explained it here for you, a little improvement given to the notion of alienation as it had been discovered before us. It had first of all been pointed out at the level of production, namely, at the level of social exploitation.

This "I do not think" is what allows us to give its sense, to this word truly manipulated in a way that up to the present was rather abject, in this sense that it reduced the position of the psychoanalysand, the patient, to an attitude that I would qualify as disparaged, if the psychoanalysand, who is rightly or wrongly called the patient in a certain vocabulary, resisted. Anyway you see what that (112) reduces analysis to. To something that analysis certainly is not and that no one had ever thought of making of it, namely, operation of ensnaring, of getting the rabbit out of his burrow; he resists. What resists is obviously not the subject in analysis. What resists is obviously the discourse, and very precisely in the

measure of the choice that is at stake. If he renounces the position of "I do not think" as I have just told you, he is all the same drawn to the opposite pole which is that of the "I am not". Now, the "I am not" properly speaking cannot be articulated. It is certain that what is presented first in resistance, is that discourse is not able to go and be something. What?

One would like to ask the people who speak to us about the being of the person in order to make of it an objection to structure, to articulate what it is for them, what they call in this case Being. It is not easy to see very clearly where they place it. They speak for themselves. There is a certain way of placing the being of the person in the others which is a rather something of an operation of odd jobbing.

What this act with a rather exceptional structure - we are going to try to say how it is so - that the analytic act is, what it is a matter at least of putting forward, of suggesting, of pointing out, is how it can preside at a certain renewal of what all the same remains, and from all time, the orienting point of our compass, the way in which it can renew the function of the enlightened act. There can be some renewal in it. If I use the term enlightened, it is not without seeing in it an echo of the *Aufklärung*. But it is also to say that if our compass always seeks the same north, and here I endorse this north, it can be posed for us in terms structured a little differently.

At the two poles that I defined and articulated of the position of the psychoanalyst, in as much as I do not refuse him at all the right to resistance, it is hard to see why the psychoanalyst should be stripped of it, this psychoanalyst in so far as he establishes the psychoanalytic act, namely, gives his guarantee to the transference, namely, to the subject supposed to know. While his whole advantage, the only one that he has over the psychoanalysing subject, is to know from experience what is involved in the subject supposed to know. Namely, what he - and in as much as he is supposed to have traversed the psychoanalytic experience in a way of which the least that can be said without entering any further to doctrinal debates, is that it ought to be a way that we could say is (113) pushed a little further than that of treatments - he ought to know about what is involved in the subject supposed to know. Namely, that for him, and I explained to you the last time (cf schema), why it is that the subject supposed to know comes here. For him who knows what is involved in the psychoanalytic act, the outline, the vector, the operation of the psychoanalytic act ought to reduce this subject to the function of the little *o*-object. That is what in an analysis, the one that founded this analysis in an act, his own psychoanalyst has become.

He had become it precisely in as much as at the end he has become joined to what he was not at first, I mean in the subjectivity of the psychoanalysand, he was not at first, at the start, the subject supposed to know. He becomes it, at the end of the analysis, I would say by hypothesis. In analysis, one is there to know something. It is at the moment when he becomes it that also he is vested for the

psychoanalysand with the function occupied in the dynamic by him, the psychoanalysand as subject, the little *o*-object.

This particular object that the little *o*-object is, I mean in this sense that it offers a certain diversity which moreover is not very broad, because we can make it quadruple with something empty in the centre, in so far as this little *o*-object is absolutely decisive for everything that is involved concerning the structure of the unconscious.

Allow me to return to my earlier questioning about those who are still there on the edge, hesitating about what is or is not acceptable in a theory sufficiently developed for there to be no longer a question of disputing its principles, but simply of knowing whether at one or other point its articulation is correct, or to be criticised. Is it not the case for any of those who are here, I would even say those, if there are such, who might be arriving for the first time, is not what settles - that does not mean of course that this could have been said so simply before - is not what settles purely and simply the question of the following: can analysis, yes or no, say - it seems difficult to me, in the way that I am going to say it, for people not to see what is at stake - yes or no, does analysis mean that in whatever you wish, a being as they say, or a becoming, or anything whatsoever, something which is of the living order, there should be, whatever there may be, events which have their consequences? Here we have the term consequence, which has all its emphasis.

(114) Is a consequence conceivable outside a signifying sequence? From the very fact that something which happened subsists in the unconscious in a way that one can rediscover it on condition of catching hold of a piece which allows a sequence to be reconstituted, is there a single thing that can happen to an animal that can be imagined as inscribed in this order? Is not everything that has been articulated in analysis, from the beginning, of the order of this biographical articulation in as much as it refers to something that can be articulated in signifying terms? That this dimension is impossible to remove from it, to expel from it from the moment that, as has been seen, it can no longer be reduced to any notion of plasticity or of reactivity or of biological stimulus-response which, in any case, will not be of the order of what is preserved in a sequence. Nothing of what can operate in terms of fixation, of transfixing, of interruption, indeed even of, of setting up, around a system, of what is only a system, and specifically the nervous one, is by itself alone capable of corresponding to this function of consequence. The structure, its stability, the maintaining of the line on which it is inscribed, implies another dimension, which is properly that of structure. This is a reminder and which does not come here at the point that I have got to, at the moment when then I interrupted myself to give this reminder.

Here we are then at this point \$ which situates what is specifically involved in the psychoanalytic act, in so far as it is around it that there is suspended the resistance of the psychoanalyst. The resistance of the psychoanalyst in this structuring is manifested by the fact, which is altogether constitutive of the

analytic relation - that he refuses to act. It is in effect quite original in the status of what is involved in the analytic function. Every psychoanalyst knows it, and finally this ends up by being known even by those who have not approached its field. The analyst is the one who is surrounded by a whole zone, who is called frequently by the patient, to make an intervention in terms of act. Not simply in as much as he may be called from time to time to take sides, to be on the patient's side, with regard to a close relation or anyone else. And even simply to perform the sort of act that is indeed one which consists in intervening by an approbation or the contrary, to give advice. This is very precisely what the structure of psychoanalysis leaves blank.

(115) It is very precisely for that reason that I put on the same diagonal - I am saying that to give an image, because of course what happens on that line (the diagonal) has no more right to be called diagonal than what happens on the others. It is enough to turn the tetrahedron, to make horizontal or vertical lines of it, but for reasons of imagination, it is more convenient to represent in this way. You must not be taken in by it. Even though there is nothing more diagonal in transference than in alienation, or in what I called the truth operation. If there are diagonals it is by reason of the schema. It is indeed because the act remains blank that it is also the one which in the other direction can be occupied by transference. Namely, in the course of what the psychoanalyst does by moving towards its horizon, the mirage, the point of arrival at which I already sufficiently defined the rendezvous in so far as it is defined by the subject supposed to know. At the start, the psychoanalyst picks up his staff and puts on knapsack, to go to meet the subject supposed to know at the rendezvous.

This alone is what permits this careful prohibition that the analyst imposes on himself with respect to the act. In other words, if he did not impose it on himself, he would be quite simply a deceiver, because he knows in principle what is to become in analysis of the subject supposed to know. It is because analysis is, as we have more or less the original experience of it, this artefact, this something which only appears, perhaps, in history from a certain moment as an extremely limited type of episode, of extremely particular cases of a practice, which by chance opened up a completely different style of act relations between humans. This would not for all that be its privilege. I believe I gave you enough indications the last time of the fact that in the course of history the relation of the subject to the act has been modified. That it is not even what can still be found in manuals of morality or sociology that effectively give us an idea of what is effectively involved in act relations in our epoch. For example, it is obviously not only a matter of your having to remember Hegel, in the way the professors speak about him, for you to be able to measure the importance of what is involved in what he represents in terms of a sharp turn with respect to the act.

Now, I do not know what I ought to do at this turning point. To advise you to read something is always so dangerous because everything depends on the degree to which one has previously been more or less cleaned up. It seems (116) difficult to me not to have been sufficiently so, to be able to situate a book,

to give a sense, a weight to what I have just stated. A little book appeared by someone whom I believe I saw at this seminar at one time, who sent it to me because of this, which is called the *Discours de la guerre* by André Glucksmann.

It is a book which perhaps can give you the dimension on a certain plane, in a certain field of what can arise from something which is rather exemplary and rather complete in as much as the relation of war is something about which everyone speaks without rhyme or reason. But as regards the influence of the discourse of war on war, an influence which is not nothing, as you will see from reading this book, namely, one which corresponds to a certain way of taking Hegel's discourse in so far as it is a discourse on war in which one sees clearly how many limits there are on the side of the technician, on the side of the soldier. And then alongside the discourse of the soldier, here again one would be wrong to despise the soldier from the moment that he knows how to sustain a discourse. This rarely happens, but when it happens it is all the same very striking that it is rather more effective than the discourse of the psychoanalyst.

The discourse of Clausewitz in so far as it is connected with that of Hegel and contributes its counterpart to it, can give them some idea of what my discourse could contribute along this line about a relation, which would allow it to be believed, that in our epoch, there is a discourse acceptable outside the discourse of war. This perhaps might also account for a certain gap between Hegel and Clausewitz at the level of a discourse on war. Naturally, Clausewitz did not know the little *o*-object. But if by chance the little *o*-object has allowed us to see a little bit more clearly into something that Clausewitz introduced as the fundamental asymmetry between two parties in war, namely, the absolute heterogeneity there is. And this asymmetry is found to dominate the whole game between offensive and defensive, even though Clausewitz was not precisely someone to go on about the necessities of the offensive. This is only a simple indication.

I am filling in, in a way, hastily, a certain number of lacks in the foundation of what I am articulating in connection with what the psychoanalytic act allows us, in short, to establish or to restore about what constitutes the co-ordinates of the act, of what we are trying to open up the path of this year.

(117) You see then that there are several lacks. First of all something that ought to be taken for granted, namely, what in a logical structure establishes for our mapping out at the minimal level of something quite privileged, psychoanalysis, in so far as it constitutes the connection between an act and a doing. If we do not set up this logical structure, with the parts that are alive in the operation, and then those that are left for dead, we cannot find our bearings in the analytic operation. It is therefore something primordial and something that is not simply important for our practice itself but also to explain the paradoxes of what is produced in its surrounds. Namely, how it can lend itself and very especially on the part of those who are engaged in it, to a certain number of elective

miscognitions which correspond to the dead or suspended parts in the very operation that is at stake.

That gives already two aspects. The third which is no less thrilling, is this something to which, at the end of my discourse the last time, I gave a too facile, too tempting an indication to express rapidly something about which an echo came back to me. One that I cannot subscribe to and which is quite amusing having come from one of these numerous voices that I have at my disposal. It is someone, I no longer remember whom. I no longer know who repeated it to me. He said to me today, decidedly, this is a Che Guevara seminar. All that because in connection with the subject supposed to know, the \$ barred on the bottom left, I had said that what is perhaps - at least this model poses the question for us - the end, the finish, the tipping over, the somersault, which is the normal end in itself of what is involved in the act, in so far as if there is something this psychoanalysis reveals to us, and this from the start, it is that it is not an act of which anyone can say that he is entirely master. It is not something to tear us away from all our certainties, from everything that we have picked up fundamentally from our experience, from what we know about history and a thousand other things again. Every act and not simply the psychoanalytic act promises to the one who takes its initiative only this end which I designate in the little *o*-object. And it is not something to make eardrums burst out of their orbits. It is hardly worthwhile because of that to believe that this is a Che Guevara seminar. There have been others before. I am not in the process of polishing up the tragic in order to make it shine. What is at stake is perhaps something else.

(118) What is at stake is something which is obviously more within our reach, if we bring it back to what we must know about the logical structure of the act to truly conceive of what is happening in the limited field of psychoanalysis.

It is here that questions can be formulated among those who belong to my School who one are presumed to be able to put what I am stating in its place, all along a construction, the necessity of whose different stages they have been able to follow. Let them bring me through the intermediary of Doctor Melman, and this no later than next Wednesday, something like a testimony. A testimony that they are capable of pushing a little bit further the turning points, the living things, the hinges, the doors, the way of using this apparatus in so far as it concerns them.

I mean that what I am expecting from the meeting, from which, I apologise, the majority of those who are here will find themselves excluded in advance, is a certain number of questions which prove to me that, at least up to the point that I have gone this year concerning what is involved in the act, people can question themselves about something, propose an interpretation and to this interpretation an objection. "If you interpret things in this way this is what it means" or "it is in contradiction with one or other point of our experience". In short, to show that up to a certain point I am being understood. This is what will serve then for

the following closed seminar (28/2), in as much as the only people who will be invited, are those of my School who have taken part in this first meeting. It is an act to go out of one's way. It is especially an act not to go out of one's way. It happens, for example, that I can ask someone why a particular analyst, who is very aware to what I am teaching, and I ask, why he is not here, precisely this year, at what I am stating about the act. You will say that people take notes. In passing, I would like to point out that it is better to take notes than to smoke. Smoking is not such a good sign as regards listening to what I am saying. I do not disapprove of smoking ...

It seems to me that since I made an allusion to the fact that what seems to me to motivate this audience which honours me by its presence, is the aspect of opening up of what is happening before you. And I do not even find that on the part of analysts, not to be present here at the moment that I am speaking about the act - namely, that it is not just any discourse whatsoever - even if they are given faithful and well informed notes, there is something rather telling, significant, and which may well lie where I inscribed the term, resistance.

(119) I intended to ask one or two or three people to put one or two questions to me, to give a model for entering the closed seminar. It would not be a bad thing. I also know the freezing effect that results from this large number. I propose, nevertheless, that it should be established that apart from a few exceptions, that for the regulation of the seminar of those admitted on the 28/2, it is those who will have sent me a written question which seems to me to be on the right lines about what I am trying to bring you who will receive the little invitation card for the 28/2.

It only remains for me to pinpoint something here and there to advance us a little, even if today it is not of the *ex cathedra* order that I habitually adopt, alas. It must all the same be noted that this gap, which still remains between the act and the doing, is what is at stake. This is the burning point around which people have been racking their brains for a certain very limited number of centuries, from the few great, great-grandfathers that are necessary to be right away at the epoch of Caesar. You have no idea of the degree to which you are implicated in things that only history manuals make you think belong to the past.

If people rack their brains - look at Hegel - about the difference between the master and the slave, you can give to this as elastic a sense as you wish, if you look carefully at it, it involves nothing other than the difference between the act and the doing, to which we are trying to give a different body, a little bit less simple than the subject who poses the act. It is not at all necessarily and uniquely - this is what is disturbing - the subject who commands. Pierre Janet constructed a whole psychology around that. That does not mean that he was badly oriented, on the contrary, simply his analyses are rather rudimentary. They do not allow very much to be understood. Because outside the fact of what is represented on Egyptian bas-reliefs, namely, a pilot, moreover, that there is a conductor at Pleyel or elsewhere, that there are those who have - this does not

explain very much, because where there is truly a master, that does not mean so much those who have a cushy time as people think - there are those who have to deal with the act and those who have to deal with the doing. So there is doing and doing. This is where one can begin to understand how this doing, despite its futile character, I am speaking about psychoanalysis, has perhaps a greater chance than any other of allowing us access to enjoyment.

(120) Look carefully at this doing in a feature that I would like to underline. There is no need to say that it is a doing of pure speech. It is something that I have killed myself recalling for years in order to try to see its function in the field of speech and of language. What is not noticed, is that, because it is a doing of pure speech, that it gets close to being an act as compared to common doing and that one could moreover express it by the signifier in act. If we look at things very closely, namely, what is truly the sense of the fundamental rule, it is precisely, that up to a point that is as advanced as possible, these are the instructions: that the subject should absent himself from it.

The task, the doing of the subject is to leave this signifier to its operation. The "in act" is a device, but it is not the act of the signifier. The signifier in act has this connotation, this evocation of the signifier that one could call in a certain register, in potency. But to know what our doctor earlier would like there to be recalled among those who put the stress on structure, there are so many there ready to rabbit on about the person. Being is so superabundant that for us to try to catch ourselves in its precise rails, in this logic which is not a logic at all, about which one cannot in any way and by any right put the sign of emptiness. It is not so easy to construct this logic, you see here what it results from. Let us say, that for an analyst to bring up terms like that of the person is something excessive, at least to my ears. But if he wants to reassure himself, let him observe that I would define this logic a little bit like one that would remain as close as possible to grammar. That startles you, I hope. So then, Aristotle, quite calmly, huh? Why not?

We must quite simply try to do better. I point out to you that if this logic of Aristotle has remained un-punctured for long centuries up to our own, it is because of the objections that were made to it of being, as they said, a logic which did not notice that it was doing grammar. I admire enormously professors in the university who know that Aristotle did not notice something. He is the greatest naturalist who ever existed. You can still reread his *History of animals*. It still holds up. It is fabulous. It is the greatest step ever taken in biology. Not that some have not been taken since. In logic also, steps taken precisely starting from grammar. It is still something that we can rack our brains about even after (121) having added to it some very astute things, quantifiers for example. They have only one inconvenience, which is that they are quite untranslatable into language. I am not saying that this does not bring up to date the question on which I took a kind of dogmatic stand, a label, a banner, a slogan: there is no meta-language. You can well imagine that it worries me also if perhaps there is

one. In any case, let us start from the idea that there is not. This would not be a bad thing. It would avoid us believing wrongly that there is one.

It is not sure that something that cannot be translated into language does not suffer from a quite effective deficiency. In any case, following my remarks, bringing us to the question of quantifiers, it is obviously going to be a matter of posing certain questions, which are going to concern what is involved, what is going to happen in the corner of the \$ of the subject supposed to know which has been removed from the map. What we will have to lucubrate about the availability of the signifier in this place, will perhaps leads us to this joint of grammar and logic. This is - I am only remarking it in this connection and to recall it to mind - very precisely the point by which we have always navigated, this logic that my entourage of the time called, with tentative sympathy, an elastic logic. I am not in complete agreement about this term. Elasticity is not the best thing that one could hope for as a standard of measurement.

The joint between logic and grammar, is also something perhaps which will make us take some further steps. In any case, what I would like to say in ending, is that I cannot summon psychoanalysts too much to meditate on the specialness of the position which happens to be theirs, of having to occupy a corner completely different to the one where they are required, even if they are forbidden to act. It is all the same from the point of view of act that they have to centre their meditation on their function.

But it is not for nothing that it is so difficult to get it. There is in the position of the psychoanalyst, and by function, if this schema renders it sufficiently tangible for no offence to be seen in it, something like taking cover (*de tapi*). We will try to decipher somewhere "an image in the carpet", or in the ..., as you wish. There is a certain way for the psychoanalyst to centre himself, to savour something that ends up in this position of taking cover. They call that what they (122) can, they call it listening, they call it the clinic. You cannot imagine all the opaque words that are found on this occasion. For I ask myself what can in any way, what can allow the accent to be put on what is quite specific about this flavour of an experience. It is certainly not accessible to any logical manipulation. In the name of this, I do not dare to say solitary enjoyment, morose delectation, in the name of this to allow oneself to say that all theories are of equal value. That above all you must not be attached to any one of them, whether one expresses things in terms of instinct, of behaviour, of genesis, of Lacanian topology. All of that, we should find ourselves equidistant from this sort of discussion. All of this fundamentally is a hypocondriacal enjoyment. This centred aspect, peristaltic and anti-peristaltic at the same time is something intestinal to psychoanalytic experience. It is indeed this that effectively you are going to see imaged, which displays itself on a rostrum, it is not necessarily the easiest point to win through the effect of a dialectic. This is the essential point around which there is played out, alas, what Clauswitz describes as asymmetrical between offensive and defensive.

Seminar 8: Wednesday 31 January 1968

Jacques Lacan did not attend this "seminar".

Among those who participated in the discussion were: C Melman, G Michaud, J Oury, P Lemoine, F Tosquelles, J Rudrauf, X Audouard, I Roublef, E Lemoine, T Abdoucheli, C Conté, J Ayme, M Noyes, L Mélése, C Dorgeuille, F Guattari, J Nassif and others.

Seminar 9: Wednesday 7 February 1968

I am taking up again then after a fortnight the continuation of what I am advancing before you this year about the psychoanalytic act. It is parallel to a certain number of propositions, to employ the proper term, that I proposed in a circle composed of psychoanalysts.

The responses to these propositions, which moreover are not limited to those entitled such, are followed by a certain number of other productions. There is going to appear at the end of this month a journal which will be the journal of the School. All of this has as a result a certain number of responses or manifestations, which are certainly not in any case without interest for those to whom I am addressing myself here. It is clear that some of these responses, of these reactions, made to the most lively point where my propositions are rather consequent with what I am producing before you on the psychoanalytic act, are assuredly full of sense to define through a test that can be described as crucial, what is involved in the status of the psychoanalyst.

In effect the last time, I left you with the indication of a logical reference. It is quite certain that at the point that we are at, where the act defines by its cutting edge what is involved in the passage in which the psychoanalyst is instaured or established, it is quite clear that we cannot but pass again by way of the kind of testing that logical questioning constitutes for us.

Will it be, to take the inaugural reference of Aristotle, at the moment when, as I evoked, he takes the decisive steps from which there is instaured, as such, the (146) logical category in its formal species? Is it a matter of an approach with an demonstrative or dialectical intention? The question, as you are going to see, is secondary.

Why is it secondary? Because what is at stake is instaured from the discourse itself. namely, that everything that we can formulate about the psychoanalysand and the psychoanalyst, is going to turn - I think I am not going to surprise you in stating it as I am going to - I prepared it sufficiently for the thing to appear to you now as already said - is going to turn around the following: how contest the fact that the psychoanalysand, in his place in the discourse is at the place of the subject? Whatever reference we arm ourselves with to better situate him, it is

naturally in the first place with the linguistic reference. He is essentially the one who speaks.

He is the one who speaks and on whom there are tested the effects of the word. What is meant by this “on whom are tested” (“*sur qui s'éprouvent*”)? The formula is deliberately ambiguous. I mean that his discourse as it is regulated, set up, by the analytic rule, is designed to be the test of the way in which, as subject, he is already constituted as effect of the word. And nevertheless, it is also true to say that this discourse itself, as it is going to be pursued, be sustained as task, finds its sanction, its evaluation, its result *qua* discourse-effect, above all from this proper discourse itself, whatever may be the way the analyst inserts himself into it by his interpretation.

Inversely, we should notice that if the always current, indeed sometimes burning question is brought to bear on the psychoanalyst, let us say, to be prudent, to say the minimum, that it is in so far as the term “psychoanalyst” is given as a qualification. Who, what, can be said to be - predicate - “psychoanalyst”?

Assuredly, if even this way of getting into the question appears to be going too quickly, it is by a twist that it will be justified if this is the way that, to go to the kernel, I am announcing under what escutcheon, under what rubric I intend to place my discourse today. You can trust me, it is not without having, in this connection, renewed contact, as I might say, with what is enlightening in the very history of logic, in the way in which, in our time, the handling of what is designated by this term logic see-saws in such a way, a way which truly makes, as I might say, not always more difficult, but makes us more and more confused before Aristotle's starting point.

(147) You have to consult his text, and specifically the *Organon*, at the level of the categories for example, or the *Prior Analytics*, or the first book of the *Topics*, to notice how close to our problematic is the thematic of the subject, as he states it. For assuredly, from the first statement, nothing is already more tangible to enlighten us about what, in this subject, is of its nature something that slips away *par excellence*. Nothing that at the start of the logic is more firmly affirmed as being distinguished from what has been translated, very insufficiently undoubtedly as “substance”, *ousia*. What is at stake in translating it by substance is clearly seen, in the course of time, to be an excessive slippage in the function of the subject in its first Aristotelian steps, for the term “substance”, which constitutes here an equivocation with what the subject includes in terms of supposition, for the term “substance” to have been so easily put forward.


There is nothing in the *ousia* in what is – namely, for Aristotle - the individual, of a nature to be able to be or situated in the subject, nor affirmed, namely, nor attributed to the subject.

But what else is more likely to make us immediately jump with both feet into the formula in which I believed I could, in all rigour, bear witness to this truly key,

truly central point of the history of logic. The one which by being dulled by a growing ambiguity, the subject rediscovers on his path as in modern logic, this other aspect of a sort of turning point which makes its perspective tip over, as one might say, the one which, in mathematical logic, tends to reduce it to the variable of a function. Namely, something which is going to enter subsequently into the whole dialectic of the quantifier, which has no other effect than to make it henceforth irremediable in the way in which it is manifested in the proposition. The term "turning point" seems to me well enough fixed in the formula that I thought I should give of it, in saying that the subject is very precisely what a signifier represents for another signifier.

This formula has the advantage of re-opening what is eluded in the position of mathematical logic. Namely, the question of what is initial, initiating, in positing any signifier whatsoever, by introducing it as representing the subject. For this is, and this is since Aristotle, what is essential about it and what alone allows there to be situated in its correct place the difference between this first bipartition, the one which differentiates the universal from the particular, and the second bipartition, the one which affirms or which denies. One and the other as you know cross over (148) one another to give the quadripartition of the universal affirmative, the universal negative, and of the particular negative and affirmative, by turns.

The two bipartitions have absolutely no equivalence. What is meant by the introduction of the subject, in so far as it is at its level that there is situated the bipartition of the universal and the particular? What can that mean, to take things as did someone who found himself, as happened to Peirce, Charles Sanders, at this historic point, at this level of the joining of traditional logic to mathematical logic? Which means that in a way, we find from his pen this moment of oscillation in which there is outlined the turning point that opens up a new path. No one more than he - and I already produced his testimony when I had to speak in 1960 about the term identification - has better underlined, or with more elegance, what is the essence of this foundation from which there emerges the distinction between the universal and the particular and the link of the universal to the term subject.



He did it by means of a little exemplary drawing that those who have already followed me for some time know well, but that moreover it is not without interest to repeat, to designate here. The fact is that it gives the facility of giving as a

support to the subject what is really involved in it, namely, nothing. In this case a stroke (*trait*).

None of these strokes that we are going to take in order to exemplify what is involved in the function of the subject for the predicate, there is none of these (149) strokes as we are going to inscribe them which is not already specified by the predicate around which we are going to make the statement of our proposition turn, namely, the “vertical” predicate.

- 1) In the first box, on the top left, the strokes correspond to the predicate, they are vertical strokes.
- 2) And then there are others in this bottom left box, some of which are not so.
- 3) Here on the bottom right none is.
- 4) Here, as you see, there are no strokes. This is where the subject is.

This is where the subject is, because there are no strokes. Everywhere else, the strokes are masked by the presence or absence of the predicate. But to make you grasp clearly why it is the “no stroke (*pas de trait*)” that is essential, there are several methods, even if it were only by instauring the statement of the universal affirmative, for example, as follows. There is no stroke that is not vertical.

You will see that it is making the “no” function on the “vertical” or by removing it that will allow you to make the affirmative or negative bipartition, and that it is by suppressing the “no” before the stroke, and that it is by leaving, the stroke that is or not vertical, that you enter the particular. Namely, at the moment when the subject is entirely subjected to the variation of vertical or not vertical. There are some that are, and others that are not. But the status of universality is only instaurated here for example by the union of two boxes. Namely, the one which has only vertical strokes, but the one moreover where there are no strokes. For the statement of the universal, which says that all the strokes are vertical, is only substantiated, legitimately, from these two boxes and their union.

It is also true, it is more essentially true, at the level of the empty box. There are no strokes except vertical ones means that where there are no verticals, there is no stroke. Such is the acceptable definition of the subject in so far as beneath every predicative stating, it is essentially this something that is only represented by a signifier for another signifier.

I will only mention quickly, for we are not going to spend our whole talk dwelling on what we can draw from Peirce’s schema. It is clear that it is similar from the union of these two boxes (the right hand bracket) that the statement: no stroke is vertical takes its support, why? This indeed is why it is necessary for me (150) to accentuate how it is demonstrated - what is already known if one reads Aristotle’s text in an appropriate way - that the universal affirmative and the universal negative in no way contradict one another, that they are both acceptable on condition that we are in this top right hand box. It is also true at the level of this box to state that all the strokes are vertical, or that no stroke is vertical, the two

things are true at the same time, something that curiously Aristotle, if my knowledge is correct, failed to recognise.

At the other points of the crucial division you have the instauration of particulars. There are in these two boxes (those on the left) vertical strokes, and, at the junction of the two lower boxes, there are only, and nothing more, strokes which are not so.

You see then that at the level of the universal foundation, things are situated in a way that involves an exclusion, that of this diversity, the one in the box on the bottom left. Likewise at the level of the particular differentiation, there is an exclusion: that of the box on the top right.

This is what gives the illusion that the particular is an affirmation of existence. That it is enough to speak at the level of "some", some man, for example, of yellow colour, to imply that from this fact that is stated in the form of a particular, there is supposed to be from this fact, if I may express myself thus, from the fact of this stating, the affirmation also of the existence of the particular. This indeed is something around which innumerable debates have turned on the subject of the logical status of the particular proposition. And this is assuredly what makes it derisory, for it is not enough for a proposition to be stated at the level of the particular, to imply in any way the existence of the subject, except in the name of a signifying arrangement, namely, as effect of discourse.

The interest of psychoanalysis is that it ties together, as has never been able to be done up to the present, these problems of logic, by contributing to them what, in short, was at the source of all the ambiguities that developed in the history of logic, by implying in the subject an *ousia*, a being. That the subject can function as not being (*comme n'étant pas*), is properly - I have articulated it, I have insisted on it from the beginning of this year - what can bring us the enlightening opening thanks to which there can be re-opened an examination of the development of logic. The task is still open - and who knows, perhaps by stating it here, I will (151) provoke a vocation - of showing us what is truly meant by so many detours, so much embarrassment, sometimes so curious, so paradoxical, manifested in the course of history. These are what have marked logical debates throughout the ages and render so incomprehensible, seen from a certain age, at least from ours, the time they sometimes took, and which appear to us for a long time to have constituted stagnations, even passions around the stagnations, whose import we can hardly sense as long as we do not see what was truly at stake behind them. Namely, nothing less that the status of desire whose link, because it is secret, with politics, for example, is altogether tangible at the turning point which constituted the instauration in one philosophy, English philosophy specifically, of a certain nominalism. It is impossible to comprehend the consistency of this logic with politics, without noting what the logic itself implies about the status of the subject and about the reference to the effectiveness of desire in political relations.

For us, for whom this status of the subject is illustrated by questions - and I marked again that all of this happens in a very limited, indeed very short *milieu*, marked by discussions about its pregnancy - whose burning character, participates I would say in these ancient underpinnings, which is why, in this case, we take as example, what we are able to articulate. This is why it cannot but have an incidence on a much larger domain in as much as it is assuredly not just in the practice which turns around the function of desire in so far as analysis discovers it, it is not simply here that the question of it is played out.

Here then are the psychoanalysand and the psychoanalyst placed by us in these distinct positions which are, respectively, what is going to be the status of a subject defined by this discourse, by this discourse that, I told you the last time, is established by the rule, especially because of the fact that the subject is asked to abdicate from it. This is the aim of the rule, and by committing himself, at the limit, to the drift of language, he is going to attempt by a sort of immediate experience of its pure effect, to connect up with its already established effects.

Such a subject, a subject defined as effect of discourse, to the point that he undertakes the trial of losing himself in it in order to find himself, such a subject whose exercise is in a way to put himself to the test of his own resignation, when can we say to what is a predicate applied? In other words, could we state (152) something that falls under rubric of the universal? If the universal did not already show in its structure that it finds its source, its foundation in the subject in so far as he can only be represented by his absence, namely, in so far as he is never represented? We would assuredly have the right to pose the question if anything whatsoever could be stated of the order, for example, of "every psychoanalysand resists".

I am however not going to decide yet whether any universal whatsoever can be posited about the psychoanalysand. We will not set it aside, despite the appearance, that in positing the psychoanalysand as this subject who chooses to make himself, as one might say, more alienated than any other, to dedicate himself to the fact that only the detours of an unchosen discourse, namely, this something which is most opposed to what is here - in the schema - at the start. Namely, that it is of course by a choice, but a choice that is masked, eluded, because made earlier. We have chosen to represent the subject by the stroke, by this stroke that is no longer seen because it is henceforth qualified. There is nothing more opposed, in appearance, to how the psychoanalysand constitutes himself, which is all the same by a certain choice, this choice that I earlier called abdication, the choice of testing oneself against the effects of language. It is indeed here that we are going to find our bearings.

In effect, if we follow the thread, the web that the use of the syllogism suggests to us, what of course we ought to arrive at, is something that is going to connect this subject to what is here advanced as a predicate, the psychoanalyst - if a psychoanalyst exists. And, alas, this is what we lack to support this logical

articulation. If one psychoanalyst exists, everything is assured. There can be a crowd of others.

But for the moment, the question for us is to know how the psychoanalysand can become a psychoanalyst. How does it happen that, in the most well grounded way, this qualification is only supported by the task completed by the psychoanalysand. Here indeed we see there being opened up this other dimension, which is one that I already tried to profile before you, about the conjunction of the act and the task. How do the two connect up? We find ourselves here before another form of what created a problem and ended up by being articulated in the Middle Ages. It is not there for nothing this *inventio medi*, from which there starts with this admirably lively step the *Prior Analytics* (153) of Aristotle. Namely, the first figure of the middle term, of this middle term about which he explains to us that by being situated as a predicate, it will allow us to connect in a rational fashion this vanishing subject to something which is a predicate. Through the middle term, this connection is possible. Where is the mystery? How does it happen that it appears that something exists which is a middle term and which appears in the first figure as predicate of the major where the subject awaits us, as subject of the minor which is going to allow us to lay hold again of the predicate in question. Is it yes or no, attributable to the subject?

This thing which, with the passage of time, passed through different colours, which appeared, at the turn of the 16th century, when all is said and done - there is no doubt that one sees it from the pen of the authors - to be a purely futile exercise. We will give it body again by noticing what is at stake.

What is at stake is what I called the *o*-object which is for us here the true middle term that is proposed, assuredly, as a plus one, of a more incomparable seriousness by being the effect of the discourse of the psychoanalysand. And by being on the other hand, as I have stated it, in the new graph that you see me using here for the last two years, not what the psychoanalyst becomes, what is implied at the start by the whole operation, what ought to be the outcome of the psychoanalysing operation, what liberates in it something of a fundamental truth. The end of psychoanalysis, namely, the subject being unequal to any possible subjectification of sexual reality and the requirement that, in order that this truth should appear, the psychoanalyst should already be the representation of what masks, obtrudes, stoppers this truth and which is called the *o*-object.

Note well, in effect, that I will return at length to the essential of what I am articulating here, the essential is not that at the end of the psychoanalysis, as some people imagine - I saw it from the questions posed - the psychoanalyst becomes the *o*-object for the other. This "for the other" here curiously takes on the value of a "for oneself", in as much as, as subject there is none other than this Other to whom the whole discourse is left. It is neither for the Other, nor in a for oneself which does not exist at the level of the psychoanalyst, that there resides this *o*. It is indeed an in itself (*en soi*), an in itself of the psychoanalyst. It is in as much as,

as the psychoanalysts themselves protest moreover - it is enough to open the (154) literature on it to see the testimony of it at every moment - they are really this breast of the "oh, my mother Intelligence", of our Mallarmé; that they are themselves this waste product, presiding over the operation of the task, that they are the look, that they are the voice. It is in so far as they are in themselves the support of this o-object that the whole operation is possible. There is only one thing that escapes them, which is the degree to which it is not metaphorical.

Now let us try to take up again what the psychoanalysand is, this psychoanalysand, who is engaged in this curious task that I described as being supported by his abdication. Are we not going to sense here that, in any case, there is something enlightening in whether he can or cannot be taken, we do not know, under the function of the universal? There is perhaps another thing that is going to strike us. It is that we have posited him as subject not without intention. That means that the sense of what this word, psychoanalysand, means when we articulate it at the level of the subject, in so far as he is the one who plays with all these colours taken, like those of a murena on the plate of a rich Roman, cannot be put to use except by changing its sense as an attribute. The proof is that when one uses it as an attribute, one uses the term psychoanalysed, as foolishly as possible. But one does not say that these or those or all of these or all of those are psychoanalysands. I did not use, as you notice, the singular term. This would be still more outrageous. But let us leave the singular to one side, experiencing at this turning point the same repugnance that ensures that Aristotle does not use singular terms in his syllogistics.

If you do not sense right away what I am aiming at in connection with this tangible testing of the use of the term psychoanalysand, as subject or as attribute, I am going to make you sense it.

Use the word worker, as it is situated in the perspective of: "workers of the world unite", namely, at the level of the ideology which picks out and emphasises their essential alienation, the constitutive exploitation which considers them as workers. Oppose this to the use of the same term in the paternalistic expression, the one that would describe a population as hardworking (*travailleuse*). These people are workers by nature, they are (attribute) "good workers". This example, this distinction is one which perhaps is going to introduce you to something which will perhaps make you pose the question after all, of why, in this so curious (155) operation which is the one by which, as I told you, the subject of the psychoanalytic act is supported, how, on the principle of the fact that the act by which psychoanalysis is established, starts elsewhere? Is this not designed to make us grasp that there is here also, a kind of alienation. And after all, you are not surprised at it since it was already present in my first schema, that it is from a necessary alienation, the one in which it is impossible to choose between the "either I do not think" and the "or I am not", that I derived the whole first formulation of what is involved in the psychoanalytic act.

But then, perhaps like that, in a sidelong way, it is a way that I have, like that, a heuristic one, of introducing you, you might ask yourselves - I put the question because the answer is already there of course - what does this psychoanalysing task produce?

To guide us we already have the o -object. For if at the end of a terminated psychoanalysis, this o -object, which is no doubt always there, at the level of our question, namely, the psychoanalytic act, it is all the same only at the end of the operation, that it is going to reappear in the real, from another source. Namely, as rejected by the psychoanalysand.

But this is where our middle term functions, that we find it weighted with a completely different accent. This o that is at stake, as we have said, is the psychoanalyst. It is not because it is there from the start, that at the end, from the point of view of the psychoanalysing task this time, it is not what is produced. I mean that one can ask oneself the question of what description can we give of the psychoanalyst. One thing in any case is certain, there is no psychoanalyst without a psychoanalysand. And I would say more, that this thing which is so curious for having entered into the field of our world, namely, that there are a certain number of people of whom we are not so sure that this has the power to establish their status as subject. There are, all the same, people who work at this psychoanalysis. The term work has never been excluded from it for a single instant, from the origin of psychoanalysis. *Durcharbeitung, working through*, is indeed the characteristic to which we must indeed refer ourselves in order to admit the aridity, the dryness, the detours, even sometimes the uncertainty of this area.

But if we put ourselves at the level of an omnitude where all the subjects frankly affirm themselves then, in their universality, as no longer being, and as being (the (156) box on the right) the foundation of the universal. What we see is that, assuredly, there is something that is going to depend on it, which is the product and even properly speaking the production.

Here already I can pinpoint what is the nature of these "people", of this species: the psychoanalyst, by defining him as production. If there were no psychoanalysand, I would say, like in some classic humour or other that I am reversing: if there were no Poles there would be no Poland. It can also be said: if there were no psychoanalysands, there would be no psychoanalyst. The psychoanalyst is defined at this level of production. He is defined as being this sort of subject who can approach the consequences of discourse, in a fashion so pure that he can isolate its plane in these relations with the one for whom, by his act, he sets up the task and the programme of this task. And through all the sustaining of this task, only sees in it relations which are properly those that I designate when I handle this algebra: the $\$$, the o , indeed the O and the $i(o)$. The one who is capable of maintaining himself at this level, namely, of only seeing the point at which the subject is at this task, whose end is, when there falls, when there drops, at the final term the o -object. The one who is of such a kind, which means the one who is capable, in relation to someone who is here in the position

of treatment, of not letting himself be affected by everything involved in that by which every human being communicates in every function with his fellow.

And this has a name, which is not simply the one that I have always denounced, namely, narcissism, up to its extreme term, which is called love. There is not only narcissism, nor luckily only love between human beings, as it is called. There is something that someone who knew how to speak about love happily distinguished. There is taste, there is esteem. Taste is one aspect, esteem is perhaps not the same, but they connect up admirably. There is fundamentally this something which is called "I like you, *Tu me plais*", and which is made up essentially of this titration, of what ensures that in an exact and irreplaceable proportion, of what you can put in the bottom left hand box, the relation, the support the subject takes from the \circ and from this $i(o)$ which grounds the narcissistic relation, resonates, is for you exactly what is necessary for you to like him. This is what ensures that in relations between human beings there is an encounter. It is very precisely from this, which is the flesh and blood of everything that has ever been articulated in the order of what in our day people try to mathematicise in a farcical way under the name of human relations. It is from (157) this that the analyst precisely distinguishes himself, by never having recourse in the relation within analysis, to this unexpressible, to this term which gives its only support to the reality of the other which is the "I like you" or "I do not like you".

The extraction, the absence of this dimension means that there is a being, the being of the psychoanalyst who can make everything that is at stake in the fate of the psychoanalysing subject turn, by being himself in the position of the \circ . Namely, in truth, to make his relation to him turn purely and simply around these terms of an algebra which are in no way concerned with a crowd of existing and more than acceptable dimensions. A pile of givens, of substantial elements in what is in operation, in place and breathing there on the couch. Here is a production that is altogether comparable to that of one or other machine which circulates in our scientific world and which is, properly speaking, the production of the psychoanalysand.

Here is something original. Here all the same is something that is rather tangible, which is not all that new, even though it is articulated in a way that may appear striking to you. Because what does it mean if one asks the psychoanalyst not to bring into play in analysis what is called counter-transference? I would defy anyone to give it another sense than the following. That there is no place either for "I like you", or "I do not like you", after having defined them as I have just done. But then we find ourselves up against the question of what is involved, after having transformed the \circ -object for you at this point into an assembly line production, if the psychoanalyst produces the \circ like an Austin. What can the psychoanalytic act mean, if in effect the psychoanalytic act is, all the same, committed by the psychoanalyst?

This of course means that the psychoanalyst is not entirely *o*-object. He operates as *o*-object. But I think I have already articulated the act in question strongly enough up to the present to be able, to take it up again without commentary, the act which consists in authorising the psychoanalysing task, with what this involves in terms of having faith in the subject supposed to know. The thing was quite simple as long as I had not announced that this faith is unsustainable. And that the psychoanalyst is the first, and up to now the only one, to be able to measure it. It has not yet been done. Thanks to what I am teaching it is necessary for him to know that:

1 - The subject supposed to know is precisely what the transference considered as a gift from heaven, depended on.

2 - But that also from the moment that it proves that transference is the subject supposed to know, he the psychoanalyst, is the only one able to put in question the following. The fact is that if this supposition is in effect quite useful in order to engage in the psychoanalytic task, namely, there is a – call it what you wish the omniscient, the Other - there is someone who already knows all of that, everything that is going to happen. Naturally not the analyst. But there is someone. The analyst, for his part, does not know that there is a subject supposed to know and even knows that everything involved in psychoanalysis, because of the existence of the unconscious, consists precisely eliminating from the map this function of subject supposed to know.

It is then a curious act of faith that is affirmed by putting one's faith in what is put in question, since by simply engaging the psychoanalysand in the task one prefers this act of faith, namely, one saves him.

Do you not see here something that overlaps in a curious way a certain quarrel? One of these things that have now lost their relief a little, to the point that now no one gives a damn about them. At Luther's last centenary it appears that there was a postcard from the Pope: "Best wishes from Rome". Is it faith or works that save? You see perhaps there a schema where the two things are connected. Between psychoanalysing work and psychoanalytic faith, there is some tie-up, which may perhaps allows there to be clarified retrospectively the validity and the asymmetrical order in which there these two formulae of salvation by the one or by the other were posited.

But it will no doubt seem more interesting for us - at least I hope so - to see there being highlighted at the end of this discourse something that I must say, for myself, it is a surprise to find.

If it is true that in the field of the psychoanalytic act what produces the psychoanalysand is the psychoanalyst, and if you reflect on this little reference that I took in passing about the essence of the universal consciousness of the worker, properly speaking, *qua* subject of exploitation of man by man, does not focusing the whole attention about economic exploitation on the alienation of the

product of work not mask something in the constitutive alienation of the economic exploitation of man? Is this not to mask an aspect, and perhaps not without motivation, the cruellest aspect of it which perhaps a certain number of political facts make likely? Why would we not ask ourselves the question of (159) whether it does not appear at a certain degree of the organisation of production, precisely, that the product of the worker, under a certain aspect, is precisely the singular form, the figure that capitalism takes on in our day. I mean that by following this thread, and in then seeing the function of capitalist faith, take some little references in what I am indicating about the subject of the psychoanalytic act. And keep that in the margin, in your head, for the remarks with which I am going to pursue my discourse.

I am going to continue then in a fortnight in virtue of the very vacation that is given to the little brats in secondary school. I am giving it to myself and I am giving you an appointment in a fortnight's time.

Seminar 10: Wednesday 21 February 1968

(161) One of these days a little journal is going to appear that I am not responsible for presenting to you. You will find it out there, at St. Germain des Prés, in a few days. You will see in it a certain number of features which will be particular to it in the first rank of which, the fact that apart from my own, for reasons that I shall explain, the articles in it are not signed. This fact astonished people and created a certain fuss, naturally, principally where it ought to have been grasped almost immediately. I mean among those who, up to now were the only ones to have been informed that this was the way the articles would appear. I mean not simply psychoanalysts, but, better still, people who are members of my School, who, because of that ought to have their ears a little alerted to what is said here. In any case, I hope that after what comes in the order of what I am teaching you, namely,, what I am going to say today, the explanation, the source of this admitted principle that the articles in it will not be signed will, perhaps, appear clearly. Since it seems that few people are capable of taking this little step forward, even though it is already indicated by the earlier approach.

The piquant thing is still that in the news report, it was specified that the fact that these articles were not signed did not mean that one would not know the authors. Because it was said that the aforesaid authors would appear in the form of a list at the end of each year. The term of unsigned article was immediately picked up, amplified by ears, anyway ... ears that are like seashells, from which there emerge singularly ridiculous things about what the function of anonymity is. I will spare you all the things that have been said in this connection. Because if I (162) communicated with some people about this, uniquely for instructional purposes, namely,, how one thing can be transformed into another. There is no worst deafness than when one does not wish to hear the first time. Others have gone further and in copious personal correspondence have pointed out to me the degree to which the visage of anonymity represented a way of using one's collaborators like employees. This is done, it appears, in certain journals that are perhaps not more badly placed because of that, in any case from the outside. This is how people allow themselves to describe the fact that in journals of critics in which it is not usual for the critic to put his name, they are only, it appears, employees of the management. In that case who knows how far the notion of employee can be taken! Anyway, I heard everything that can be heard, as I do every time that I have to get a response to an innovation.

An innovation of something important that is beginning to come to the fore today following the psychoanalytic act. Namely,, what results from that act as a position of the subject described as a psychoanalyst, precisely in so far as this predicate is to be affected to him. Namely,, his consecration as psychoanalyst. This, if the consequences of it that we see, as in the case I have just quoted for you, this would take the form of a sort of, of a sort of very obvious stunting of the faculty of comprehension. If this is demonstrated as being, in a way, included in the premises, as the consequence of what results from the inscription of the act, in what I called the consecration in a predicative form, it would greatly relieve us as regards the comprehension of this singular effect that I called stunting, without pushing any further what one can say about it at the level of the people involved. On occasion the term puerile is used, as if truly, in truth, one should refer to the child as regards what is at stake in its effects.

Naturally, it happens, as has been demonstrated in very good places, that children become mentally handicapped because of the action of adults. It is not all the same to this explanation that one can refer, in the case we are dealing with, namely, that of psychoanalysts. Let us take up again what is involved in the psychoanalytic act, and let us clearly posit that today we are going to try to advance in this direction, which is that of the psychoanalytic act.

Let us not forget the first steps that we have taken in explaining it, namely, that it (163) is essentially inscribed as a language effect. Assuredly, in this case, we were able to notice, or at least simply recall that this is how it is for every act, but of course this is not what specifies it. We have to develop what is involved in it, how the language effect in question is organised. It is in two stages. It presupposes psychoanalysis itself precisely as language effect. It is only definable, in other words, at least by including the psychoanalytic act as being defined by the accomplishment of psychoanalysis itself. We have shown that we have here to reduplicate the division. Namely,, that psychoanalysis cannot be instaured without an act, without the act of the one who authorises its possibility, without the act of the psychoanalyst. And that within this act of psychoanalysis, the psychoanalysing task is inscribed, within this act. I already made there appear in a way this first structure of envelopment.

But what is at stake, and, moreover, it is not the first time that I am insisting on this distinction at the very heart of the act, is the act through which a subject gives to this curious act, its strangest consequence. Namely, that he himself should be the one who institutes it, in other words that he posits himself as psychoanalyst. Now this does not happen without having to hold our attention. Because what is at stake is that he takes this position, that in short he repeats this act, knowing full well what is involved in the continuation of this act. That he makes himself the champion of something whose ending he knows. Namely, that by putting himself in the place of the analyst, he will finally come to be, in the form of the σ , this rejected object, this object in which there is specified the whole movement of psychoanalysis. Namely, the one that comes at the end, by coming to the place of the psychoanalyst, in as much as here the subject separates himself off decisively,

recognises himself as being caused by the object in question. Caused in what way? Caused in his division as subject. Namely, in so far as at the end of the psychoanalysis, he remains marked by this gap which is his own and which is defined in psychoanalysis in the shape of castration.

Here at least is the schema commented, summarised as I am making it for the moment, that I gave of the result, the effect of psychoanalysis. And I marked it on the board for you as represented by what happens at the end of the double movement of psychoanalysis marked in this line by transference, and by what is called castration, and which comes finally to this disjunction of (-) on the one hand and of the \circ which comes to the place at the end of the psychoanalysis.

(164) There is the psychoanalyst, through the operation of the psychoanalysand, an operation he authorised, in a way, knowing what its end is. And an operation whose culminating being he himself establishes, as I told you, despite, as one might say, the knowledge he has of what is involved in this end.

Here the opening remains agape, as one might say, about how this leap can operate, or again, as I did in a text which was a text meant as a proposition, to explore what is involved in this leap that I have called the pass (*la passe*). Until we have looked at it more closely, there is nothing more to be said about it, except that it is, very precisely, a leap. Naturally, many things are done, one could say that everything in the organisation of psychoanalysis is done to conceal that this leap is a leap. That is not all. On occasion people will even make a leap of it, on condition that there is a kind of blanket stretched over what has to be got over, which does not let it be seen that it is a leap. It is still the best case. It is, all the same better, than putting a little safe, convenient foot-bridge, which in that case no longer makes of it a leap at all.

But as long as the matter has not been effectively questioned, interrogated in analysis, and why wait any longer to say that my thesis is that every organising of what is done and exists in psychoanalysis is designed so that this exploration, this interrogation will not take place. As long as, effectively, it has not taken place, we cannot say anything more about it than what is said nowhere, because in truth it is impossible to speak about it all alone.

On the contrary, it is easy to designate a certain number of points, of things, as being, to all appearances, the consequences of the fact that this leap is put in parenthesis. Question for example what is involved in the effects, as I might say, not of official, but of *officiale* consecration, of consecration as office, of what a

subject is before and after this leap is presumed to have been taken. Here indeed (165) is something that, after all, is worth questioning and which it is worthwhile making the questioning of more urgent. I mean that is not simply worth questioning but is the prelude to the response. The insistence, as one might say, of the question of whether it proves that in the very measure of the duration of what I called consecration in the office, something fundamental becomes opaque, about what is effectively involved in the necessary pre-supposition of the psychoanalytic act. Namely,, what I ended on the last time by designating it as being in its own way what we call an act of faith.

An act of faith, I said, in the subject supposed to know and precisely by a subject who has just learned what is involved in the subject supposed to know, at least in an exemplary operation, which is that of psychoanalysis. Namely,, I mean that far from psychoanalysis being able to be established as has been done up to now from the statements of a science, I mean, this moment at which what has been acquired from a science passes over to the state of being teachable, in other words professorial. What is stated from a science never puts in question what it was before the knowledge emerged. Who knew it? The matter, I ought to say, came into nobody's head, because it is so obvious that there was, beforehand, this subject supposed to know. The statements of science, in principle the most atheistic, is firmly theist on this point. For what else is this subject supposed to know, and in truth I know nothing serious that was put forward in this register, before psychoanalysis itself posed us the question. Namely, something that is properly speaking untenable. That the subject supposed to know pre-exists its operation, when this operation consists precisely in the sharing between its two partners of two terms of what is at stake as regards what is operating. Namely,, what I learned to articulate in the logic of phantasy. These two terms of $\$$ and o , in as much as at the ideal end of psychoanalysis, the psychoanalysis that I would describe as finite, and note clearly that here I am leaving in parenthesis the accent this term may receive in its use in mathematics, namely, in set theory. Namely,, this step that is taken when what is at stake is a finite set, to the one where one can treat by means that are tested, inaugurated at the level of finite sets, a set which is not such.

Let us keep for the moment to the level of finite psychoanalysis and let us say that at the end the psychoanalysis, we are not going to say that he is all subject since precisely he is not all, because he is divided. We cannot say for all that that he is two, but that he is only a subject and that he is not this divided subject. That he is not without (*pas sans*), according to the formula to which I accustomed the few people who were listening to me when I was giving my seminar on *Anxiety*, that he is not without this object, finally rejected to the place prepared by the presence of the psychoanalyst, so that he can situate himself in this relation of cause of his division as subject. And that, on the other hand, we will not say either that the analyst, for his part, is all object, that he is nevertheless at the end simply this rejected object. It is indeed here that there lies some mystery or other that conceals, in short, what all practitioners know well. Namely, what is established

at the level of human relations, as it is put, at the end, after the end, between the one who followed the path of psychoanalysis and the one who was "his guide".

The question of how someone can be recognised otherwise than along the very paths that he is sure of, namely,, recognised otherwise than by himself to be qualified for this operation, is a question, after all, which is not special to psychoanalysis.

It is solved habitually, as in psychoanalysis, by election or by a certain kind of choice. Seen from the point of perspective as we are trying to establish it, election or choice, all of that is resumed as being more or less of the same order, from the moment that this presupposes as being still intact, not put into question, the subject supposed to know. In the kinds of election that aristocrats declare to be the most stupid, namely,, democratic elections, I do not see why they should be any more stupid than the other, simply this supposes that the base, the member, the voter, knows something about it. It cannot depend on anything else. It is at his level that the subject supposed to know is put. As long as it is there, things are always very simple, especially from the moment that it is put in question. For if there is put in question, what one maintains nevertheless in a certain number of operations, it becomes much less important to know where it is put. And it is difficult to see in effect why it should not be put at the same level as everyone else.

That is why the Church has been for a long time the most democratic institution, namely, where everything happens through elections. It is because she, she has the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is a notion that is infinitely less stupid than that of the subject supposed to know. There is only one difference, at this level to be put forward in favour of the subject supposed to know, it is that on the whole one (167) does not notice that the subject supposed to know is always there, so that one is not at fault in maintaining it.

It is from the moment that it can be put in question that one can raise categories like the one that I have, as a way of tickling your ears, brought out under the name which cannot naturally be in any way be sufficient, of stupidity (*bêtise*). It is not because one is obstinate that one is stupid. It is sometimes because one does not know what to do. As regards the Holy Spirit, I would point out to you that it is a much more elaborated concept, whose theory I am not going to develop, but as regards which it is all the same easy, for anyone who has reflected a little about what is involved in the function of the Christian Trinity, to find quite precise equivalents as compared to the functions that psychoanalysis allows to be elaborated. And especially those that I highlighted in one of my articles, the one on the questions preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis, under the terms of the as regards which precisely it is not in a very tenable position, except in the categories of psychosis.

Let us leave there pointing, in a way, this detour which has its interest and let us come back one more time to the transference. But it is today very necessary to

articulate the degree to which, since I introduced it as constituting the psychoanalytic act, the degree to which it is essential for the configuration as such of transference. Naturally, if one does not introduce into it the subject supposed to know, transference maintains all its opaqueness. But once the notion of the subject supposed to know is fundamental and the fracture that it undergoes in psychoanalysis is brought to light, transference is singularly illuminated. And this, of course, takes on all its value by taking a look back and noticing, for example, how every time transference is at stake, the authors, the good ones, the honest ones, evoke that the notion, the distance taken which permitted the instauration, in our theory of transference, goes back to nothing less than to the precise moment when as you know, when in emerging from a triumphant session of hypnosis, the patient, Freud tells us, threw her arms around his neck. There you are.

So then what is that? Naturally people stop and marvel. Namely,, that Freud was not very moved for all that. "She is taking me for someone else", people translate the way in which moreover Freud expressed himself. "I am not that *unwidersetzlich*, irresistible", there is something else. People marvel as if there were here, I mean at this level here, something to marvel at. It is perhaps not so (168) much that Freud, as he puts it, in his humorous way, did not believe himself to be the object in question. It is not because one believes oneself or not to be the object. It is that when this is what is at stake, namely, love, people think they know what they are at. In other words, people have this sort of complacency which, however little, gets you caught up in this treacle that is called love.

Because in fact, for the moment, people perform all kinds of operations, of arabesques around what must be thought about transference. We see some people showing courage and saying: but come on! Let us not reject the whole of transference onto the side of the analysand (*analysé*), as it is put. "We are involved in it too", and how! And we are involved in it and the analytic situation is also a little responsible for it. Starting from there comes a different kind of excess. The analytic situation determines everything. Outside the analytic situation there is no transference. Anyway you know the whole variety, the scale, the roundabout that emerges when each one is in rivalry to show a little more freedom of spirit than the others. There are very strange things also. There is a person who, like that, during one of the last congresses where we were dealing with things that were put in question during the meeting of the closed seminar here, was asking at what moment of the psychoanalytic act, I was going to link all of that to the *passage à l'acte*, to *acting-out*.

Of course I am going to do it. In truth, the person who best articulated this question is someone who, exceptionally, remembers what I was already able to articulate about it on a certain 23 January 1963. The author whose personality I began to introduce earlier is an author who, in connection with *acting-out* - no one properly speaking asked him to do it - gives on this subject a little class on transference. He gives this class on transference, which is modelled on this little article which, now, is spreading more and more. Things are articulated about

transference that would not even be conceived of if Lacans' discourse did not exist. Moreover, it is consecrated by demonstrating, for example, that a particular formulation that Lacan put forward in his report on *The function and field of speech and language*, namely, for example that the unconscious is this something which is lacking to discourse, that must in a way be supplied, completed in the history for the history to be re-established in its completeness, in order that, etc. the symptom should be removed. And naturally your man sniggers "Wouldn't it be lovely if that was how things were".

(169) Everyone knows that it is not because the hysteric remembers that everything is arranged. Moreover, that depends on the case, but what matter. People go on to show the degree to which what is at stake in the analytic discourse is more complex. And that it is necessary to distinguish something which is not only, it is said - believing they are taking up arms against me - the structure of the statement, but that it must also be known what use it is to know if one is telling the truth or not. And that sometimes to lie is properly speaking the way in which the subject announces the truth of his desire, since precisely there is no other angle from which to announce it than the lie.

It is something which, as you see, consists precisely in saying only things that I articulated in the most explicit way. If I mentioned earlier this seminar of the 23 January 1963, it is because it is exactly what I said about the function of a certain type of statement of the unconscious, in so far as the stating of desire which is involved is very properly that of the lie. Namely,, the point that Freud himself put his finger on in the case of the female homosexual. And that it is precisely thus that desire is expressed and is situated. And that what is advanced in this connection as being the register where analytic interpretation is played out in its originality, namely,, precisely what ensures that in no way is it possible in a kind of anteriority for there to have been known, what is revealed by the interpretative intervention. Namely,, what makes of transference, something quite different to the object already there, in a way inscribed in everything that it is going to produce. A pure and simple repetition of something which already, from previously, would only be waiting to express itself there, instead of being produced by its retroactive effect.

In short, everything that I have said for the last three years which it must not be believed, of course, does not make its own little way, like that, by absorption. And, in a second moment, remembering what I said ten years before and by making of the second part an objection to the first, in short, people easily arm themselves, on occasion, against what I am stating with what I may have stated after a certain number of stages, built up and shot through with what I am constructing to enable you to find your bearings in the analytic experience. And objections are made from what I said at a later date, as if they were inventing it themselves, to what I first said and which, of course, can be understood as partial, especially if it is isolated from its context. In short, what is involved in the effect of certain purely complementary interpretations of a particular piece of history at the level of the hysteric, was effectively specified by me as being extremely

(170) limited and absolutely not corresponding, since that very epoch when I articulated this too objectifying notion of history which would consist in taking the function of history otherwise than as the history constituted starting from present pre-occupations, namely, like every kind of existing history, and very specifically in my discourse described as the Rome discourse, I rather insistently put my foot in it on this point. Namely, that no kind of function of history can be articulated, can be understood, without the history of the history, namely, from what does the historian construct.

I am only making this remark about a statement which presents itself as a banality to designate this something which is not after all without a certain relation with what I called earlier the structure of what happens in connection with the step that has to be taken, the one that I am trying to get psychoanalysts to take. Namely, what results from the putting in question of the subject supposed to know. What results from it, namely, the style of exercising the question, the formulation of a logic which makes something manageable starting from the necessary revision at the level of this preliminary step, of this pre-supposition, of this pre-establishment of a subject supposed know, which can no longer be the same at least in a certain field. The one in which what is at stake is to know how we can handle knowledge, there, at a precise point of the field where what is at stake is not knowledge but something which, for us, is called truth.

To obtain this sort of answer where, precisely, my question can only be felt as most annoying, because the whole ordering of analysis is constructed to mask this question about the function to be revised of the subject supposed to know. This very precise type of answer which consists - for anyone who knows how to read - in a way that is purely fictitious, in decomposing two phases of my discourse in order to create an opposition between one and the other. Which is moreover quite impossible to find in most cases and which only results from the fiction which would have it that the author who is expressing himself is himself supposed to have discovered the second part. While I would be supposed to have limited myself to the first, to this rather derisory thing which does not fail to stick, if one can also say it here, it must be recognised where things are inserted in their reality, to what is involved at the very foundation of the question.

When I spoke about transference in order to bring it back to its simple and very miserable origin, and if I was able to speak in this connection, so badly, about the (171) terms of love, is it not because the difficulty of putting in question what transference constitutes is neither that it is love, as some people say, nor that it is not so as others are happy to advance. It is that it puts love, as I might say, puts love on the spot. And precisely in this derisory way, the one which allows us to see here, in this gesture of the hysteric coming out of the hypnotic capture, to see what is at stake in what is indeed here, at bottom, in what is affected. What is affected, first of all, is that through which I define what is involved in this thing, which is so rich and instructive and, in truth, new to the world which is called psychoanalysis.

The hysteric reaches the goal immediately. The Freud she is kissing is the *o*-object. Everyone knows that this is what a hysteric needs especially coming out of hypnosis. Things are in a certain way, as one might say, cleared away. Of course Freud, this indeed is the problem about him, how was he able to put in suspense in this radical way what is involved in love? We can perhaps be sure of it by mapping out what is strictly involved in the analytic operation.

The question is not there. Putting it in suspense allowed him to establish, from this original short circuit that he was able to lay out, to the point of giving it this excessive place of the analytic operation in which one discovers the whole human drama of desire. And in the end what? This immense acquisition is not nothing. The new field opened out onto what is involved in subjectification. In the end what? The same result which was reached in this brief instant, namely,, on the one side this $\$$ symbolised by this moment of the emergence, this overwhelming moment of 'between two worlds' in awakening from a hypnotic sleep, and the *o* suddenly clasped in the arms of the hysteric. If the *o* for its part is so suitable, it is because it is what is at stake at the heart of the apparel of love. What is grasped there - I sufficiently articulated and illustrated it - it is around this *o*-object that there are installed, that there are established all the narcissistic coatings with which love is supported.

But the hysteric for her part, clearly knows here what she needs, I mean what necessitates this "I want and I do not want" at the same time, which proceed at the same time from the specificity of this object and from its intolerable rawness.

So that it is amusing incidentally to think that in making this whole construction of psychoanalysis, this Freud, up to the end of his life, asked himself, what does a woman want? Without finding the answer. Precisely that, what he had made, a psychoanalyst. At the level of the hysteric in any case, it is perfectly true. What (172) the psychoanalyst becomes at the end of the psychoanalysis, if it is true that he is reduced to this *o*-object, this is what the hysteric wants. One understands why, in psychoanalysis, the hysteric is cured of everything except her hysteria. This of course is only a marginal remark, in which you would be wrong to see a greater import than that on which it is quite simply inscribed.

But what must be known, is what in a recent fashion, I indeed was lead to say to make a certain number of those who hear these things, here, more sensitive. Is there not here in this expulsion of the *o*-object something which evokes for us (since the telly shows it to us) a little penchant that one might rather easily take by finding analogies between what we are operating on and something or other that might be found at the most abyssal levels in biology.

Biologists are happy to express chromosomic terms in terms of messages. Someone can come to the point, as I recently heard - because when there are stupidities to be said one can say that the opportunity is never missed - someone made this discovery that one could say that language is structured like the unconscious. People will like that, there are people who believed that one should

go from the known to the unknown, but here off you go, huh? Let us go from the unknown to the known, that is often done, it is called occultism. It is what Freud called the taste for the *mystisch Element*. It is very precisely the reflection he made when the hysteric flung her arms around his neck. He speaks very precisely at this moment of the *mystisch Element*.

The whole sense of what Freud did, consists precisely in advancing in such a way that you go against the *mystisch Element* and do not start from it. Let us not forget that it is spoken about. And if Freud protests against the protestation, for it is exactly what he did, which arose around him the day he said that a dream is lying, he repeats at that moment that if people are indignant at the thought that the unconscious can be a liar it is because there is nothing to be done. Whatever I said about the dream, they will continue to want to maintain in it the *mystisch Element*, namely, that the unconscious cannot lie.

Let this not prevent us from taking a little metaphor. Whether this o-object that has to be expelled at the end of analysis, which comes to take the place of the analyst, does not resemble something. You have not heard of that? The (173) expulsion of polar globules in meiosis. In other words, from what the sexual cells get rid of in their maturity. This, in short, would be elegant, this would be what is at stake. Thanks to which the comparison is pursued. What becomes then of castration? Castration is precisely that. It is the result, the reduced cell in a way. Starting from there the subjectification is carried out, which is going to allow them to be, what they say. God made them male or female. Castration is supposed to be truly the preparation for the connection of their enjoyments (*jouissances*).

From time to time, in the margins of psychoanalysis, this naturally does not involve any seriousness but in any case there are those who dream, this has counted. I am saying that. There is only one little misfortune, which is that we are at the level of the subjectification of this function of the man and the woman. And at the level of subjectification, it is *qua* o-object, this object to be expelled, that there is going to be presented in the real the one who is called to be the sexual partner. It is here that there lies the difference between the union of gametes and what is involved in the subjective realisation of the man and of the woman. Naturally, one can see all the female lunatics in the world precipitating themselves onto this level. In any case, thank God, in our field there are not too many of them. Those who are going to look for their references concerning some supposed obstacles of feminine sexuality in the fear of penetration which is supposed to be circumscribed at the level of the break that the spermatozoid makes into the capsule, into the envelope of the ovule. You see that it is not I who, for the first time, waves it in front of you. But so that we can distinguish ourselves from it, so that we can clearly mark in this connection the differences to supposedly biological phantasies.

When I say that it is in the o-object that there will subsequently always necessarily be rediscovered the sexual partner, we see arising a truth inscribed in

a corner of Genesis. The fact that the partner, God knows that this does not involve her in any way, figured in the myth, as being Adam's rib, the o then.

That is why things have gone so badly since that time, at regards what is involved in this perfection which might be imagined as being union of two enjoyments. In truth I am sure of it. It is from this first simple recognition that there emerges the necessity of the medium, of the intermediary of the defiles constituted by the phantasy. Namely, this infinite complexity, this riches of desire, with all its tendencies, all its regions. This whole map, which can be drawn, all the effects at (174) the level of these slopes that we call neurotic, psychotic or perverse and which are inserted, precisely, in this distance forever established between the two enjoyments.

That is why it is strange that in the Church, where they are not so, not so stupid all the same, they should notice that here Freud is saying the same thing as what they are presumed to know to be the truth. Which obliges them, precisely to teach it. There is something that does not work on the side of sex. Otherwise what use is this stupefying technical network? Well then, not at all. Their preference in this area goes much more rather towards Jung, whose position it is clear is exactly the opposite. Namely,, that we enter into the sphere of Gnosis, namely,, the obligatory complementarity of the Ying and the Yang and of all the signs that you see turning around one another. As if, from all time, they were there to connect up with one another, *animus* and *anima*, the complete essence of the male and the female.

You can take it from me: ecclesiastics prefer that.

I am opening the question as to whether it is not precisely because of that. If we were in the truth like them, what would happen to their magisterium? I am not giving myself over to vain excesses of language simply for the pleasure of going for an uncomfortable stroll in the field of what is called *aggiornamento*. Because, of course, these are remarks that, at the point at which we are at, I can go as far as to make them to the Holy Office. I went there not long ago, they were very interested in what I told them. I did not push the question to the point of saying to them, is it because it is the truth that you do not like it? The truth that you know to be the truth? I gave them time to become accustomed to it.

If I am only speaking to you about it here, why is that? It is to tell you that what is perhaps so annoying at the level of power in certain areas, where there is a little more bottle than among us, can be something of the same order. What can happen at the level of this something, of this kind of bizarre Principality of Monaco of the Truth called the International Psychoanalytic Association. There can be effects of the same order. To know exactly what is happening is not always easy. All the more so because, when all is said and done, we for our part can dot the i's for a certain number of things. Namely,, that the analytic adventure, as long as it allows things to be articulated, very precisely in the whole field of the (175) unconscious of human desire, perhaps contributes something

which renews what was beginning to be put forward on a certain slope of cretinisation, such as the one accompanied by the idea of obligatory progress, the seed of science. You have to see where this renewal of the truth is situated. If this is how the analytic experience is defined, by instauring its defiles, this formidable production which is installed where? In a gap that is not at all constituted by castration itself, of which castration is the sign, the most accurate tempering, the most elegant solution. But it nevertheless remains that we know very well that enjoyment, for its part, remains outside. We do not know a single word more about what is involved in feminine enjoyment. It is not a question that dates from yesterday, all the same. There was already a certain Jupiter, for example, this subject supposed to know, well then, he did not know that, he asked Tiresias. An extraordinary thing, Tiresias knew something more about it. He only made one mistake, which was to say it. At that, as you know, he lost his sight.

You see that these things have been inscribed for a long time, in truth, in the margins of a certain human tradition. In any case it would be worth our while, perhaps, to notice in order to understand properly, this moreover is what renders legitimate our intrusion of logic into what is at stake in the psychoanalytic act. It is, moreover, what is here able to encompass our bubble. It is certainly not reducing it to nothing to describe it as a bubble if it is there that there is situated everything that happens which is sensible, intelligible and also even senseless. But in any case it would be worth our while knowing where things are situated, for example, as regards what is involved in feminine enjoyment. There it is quite clear that it is left completely out of consideration.

Why am I talking to you first of all about feminine enjoyment? It is perhaps to already specify something that the subject supposed to know that we are dealing with - some people, we must not deceive ourselves about it, may believe with all the confusion that is being produced that we are somewhere on the side of the subject supposed to know - how one goes to enjoyment! I call on all psychoanalysts, those who all the same know what we are talking about and what can be aimed at, reached. We clear the ground in front of the door, but as regards the door, I believe that we are not very competent.

After a very good analysis, let us say that a woman can find her feet. All the same, if there is a little advantage won, it is very precisely in the measure and in (176) the case that, just before, she might have taken herself for the mentioned earlier. Because, in that case of course, she is frigid.

There is not only that. Freud noted that when what is at stake is the libido as he defined it, namely, the field that is at stake in psychoanalysis, the libido desires, there is only the masculine sort, he tells us. This ought to make us prick up our ears and show us precisely, even though I already stressed it, that the operation and what is at stake is the relation of subjectification concerning the sex thing. But in as much as this subjectification culminates in the relation logically defined by \$ o, in which case everyone is equal.

As regards the libido, it can be qualified as masculine or feminine, as you wish. It is quite clear that what makes us think that it is rather masculine, is that, from the side of enjoyment, as regards the man, this means again going back much further, since feminine enjoyment, we still have it there from time to time within reach of what you know. But for masculine enjoyment, at least as regards analytic experience, it is a strange thing, no one has ever seemed to notice that it is very precisely reduced to the Oedipus myth.

Only there you are. Ever since I have been killing myself in saying that the unconscious is structured like a language, no one has yet noticed that the original myth, that of *Totem and Taboo*, the Oedipus complex in a word, is perhaps an original drama, but it is an aphasic drama. The Father enjoys all the women, such is the essence of the Oedipus myth, I mean from Freud's pen. There are some for whom that does not work. It is botched or it is eaten. It has nothing to do with any drama. If psychoanalysts were more serious, instead of spending their time fiddling around in Agamemnon and Oedipus to draw something or other out of them, always the same thing, they could begin by making this remark. That what is to be explained is why precisely this should have turned into a tragedy. But there is something much more important to be still explained: why psychoanalysts have never explicitly formulated that the Oedipus complex is only a myth thanks to which they put in place the limits of their operations. It is so important to say it. This is what allows there to be put in its place what is involved in psychoanalytic treatment, within this mythical framework destined to contain in an outside already within, from which there is going to be able to be put the realised division from which I started. Namely, that at the end of the analytic act, there is on the stage, this stage which is structuring, but only at this level, the *o*, at (177) this extreme point that we know to be at the end of the destiny of the hero of tragedy. He is no longer any more than that. And everything that is of the order of subject is at the level of this something which has this divided character that exists between the spectator and the choir.

It is not a reason, but this is what is to be looked at closely, since this Oedipus has come one day onto the stage so that we do not see that its economic role in psychoanalysis is elsewhere. Namely,, this putting in suspense of these enemy poles of enjoyment, male enjoyment and the enjoyment of the woman.

Assuredly, in this strange division which already escapes, we notice what, in my sense already truly throws into relief the difference between the function of the myth of Oedipus, namely, the father of the primordial horde, who has no right to be called Oedipus, as you see, and the usage imaged on the stage when Freud recognises him, transposes him, and brings him into play on the stage, whether it is the Sophoclean stage or that of Shakespeare. This is what allows us to create the distance between what really operates in psychoanalysis and what does not operate in it.

To be complete, and before continuing, I would add that you will note that there is in Freud's text a third term, that of *Moses and monotheism*. Freud does not

hesitate in this third case, any more than in the first two which have no resemblance, to claim to make function there, still in the same way, the Father and his murder. Ought this not begin to awaken in you some little suggestions? By doing nothing more than bringing up such a question and especially about the obvious tripartition of the function summarised as Oedipal in Freudian theory, and that not the least little beginning of a development at the true level of what is at stake, nothing has yet been done and specifically not by me. You know why.

I had prepared it by the analysis in my seminar on the Name of the Father, everything having proved at that moment that it was not by chance that it happened like that. If I began to enter into this field, let us say that they appeared to me to be a little fragile. I am speaking about those interested in this and who have quite enough of their psychoanalytic field that we now see defined as being in no way something which, in any way, can claim to take the stage again, either of tragedy or of the Oedipal circuit.

(178) What are we doing in analysis? We notice failures, differences, with respect to something that we know nothing about, to a myth, to something which allows us to put order on our observations. We are not going to say that we are in the process, in psychoanalysis, of doing anything whatsoever to mature a so-called pre-genital. Quite the contrary, since it is by regression that we advance into the fields of prematurity. Just as it leaps to the eye, like anyone who is not absolutely caught up by the things to which we must come, by women who are assuredly in psychoanalysis those who are most efficacious, in certain cases the least stupid, by women, by Melanie Klein. What do we do? We notice that it is precisely at the pre-genital levels that we have to recognise the function of the Oedipus complex. It is in this that psychoanalysis essentially consists.

Consequently, there is no Oedipal experience in psychoanalysis. The Oedipus complex is the frame in which we can regulate the game. I am intentionally saying the game. It is a matter of knowing what game one is playing. That is why I try to introduce here a little logic. It is not usual to begin playing poker, and to say all of a sudden, oh, excuse me, I have been playing manille for the last five minutes. That is not done, especially in mathematics. That is why I am trying to take some reference points from it.

I am not going to detain you any longer today, especially as in this respect we are in no hurry. I do not see why I should make the cut here or there, I will do it according to the time. I am going to posit important elements in terms of logic, why? Because in all of science - I am giving you this new definition of it - logic is defined as this something that properly has as end to resorb the problem of the subject supposed to know.

In it alone, at least in the modern logic from which we are going to start the next time when it will be a matter precisely of posing the logical question, namely,, of these literal figures thanks to which we can progress in these problems, by

figuring in them in literal terms, in terms of logical algebra, how there is posed the question of what “a psychoanalyst exists” means in terms of quantification.

We will be able to make progress where up to the present people have been able to do nothing except something as obscure, as absurd as ratification of a (179) qualification of everything that has ever been done elsewhere and that I evoked earlier, and which, here precisely, by following an experience that is so particularly serious concerning the subject supposed to know, takes on an aspect, an accent, a form, a value of relapsing which precipitates in it such dangerous consequences. Consequences which can figure in an implacable and as it were tangible way, by simply supporting them by these traits, these units, these figures, these propositions of modern logic. I am speaking about the one that introduced what I already announced in a word. I already emitted the word quantifiers.

Well then, if this is of service to us, you should know that it is precisely in function of what I put forward earlier, a definition which, certainly, was never given by any logician, because he is a logician, because this dimension was always for them resorbed, conjured away. They do not notice - everyone has his black spot - that the function of logic is the following. That there should be duly resorbed, conjured away the question of the subject supposed to know. In logic, this is not posed. There is absolutely no kind of doubt that before the birth of modern logic there was very certainly no one who had the slightest idea of it. Within logic, I am not going to prove it to you today, but it would be easy to do so, in any case I am proposing its trace and its indication, it could be the object of an elegant work, more elegant than I would be able to do myself, on the part of a logician, what grounds and legitimates the existence of logic, is this minute point. Very precisely, when the field is defined in which the subject supposed to know is nothing.

It is precisely because it is nothing there, and that moreover it is fallacious, that we are between the two, finding support on logic on the one hand, on our experience on the other. We can at least introduce a question which it is not sure - the worst, as Claudel says, is not always sure - is ever without an effect on psychoanalysts.

Seminar 11: Wednesday 28 February 1968

(181) Someone who had already been alerted the last time through the good offices of Mr Charles Melman, who was kind enough the last time to take this place for the closed seminar at the end of January, found himself solicited by him and in a way that is all the more legitimate in that Jacques Nassif, who is the person in question, was good enough to produce, for the *Bulletin de l'Ecole Freudienne*, a summary of my seminar of last year, that on *The logic of phantasy*. He was good enough to answer this call which consisted in asking him if he did not have something to say or to question, or to present, which gives an idea of the way in which he understands the point that we have got to this year.

I am very grateful to him for having been willing to give this answer, namely, for preparing something which is going to serve as an introduction to what is going to be said today.

I can say already the sense in which this brings me satisfaction. First of all, for the pure and simple fact that he has prepared this work, that he has prepared it in a competent fashion, being perfectly *au fait* with what I said last year. And then it happens that what he extracted from this work, I mean what he highlighted, what he isolated with respect to the content of what I said last year, is properly speaking the logical network. And above all its importance, its accent, its meaning in what is, perhaps, defined, indicated as the orientation of my discourse, indeed its perspective, its end, to say the word.

That we should be precisely at the point at which, in this development, this question that I am posing about the analytic act which presents itself as something (182) that profoundly implicates each one of those who are listening to me here as analysts. We are coming precisely to the point at which I am going to put a still stronger stress than has been put up to now, precisely, in order not, simply, on this something which might be understood in a certain way as: "there is a logic in everything". No one knows very clearly what it means to say that there is an internal logic to something. Here one would be simply looking for the logic of the thing, namely, that the term "logic" would be here put to use in fashion that is in a way metaphorical. No, it is not quite to that we are coming. And the last time, at the end of my discourse, there was an indication of it in this certainly audacious affirmation, to which I do not expect in advance to find an echo, a resonance. I hope, at least, for the sympathetic ear of one or other of those that I may have in my audience, who are here present as logicians. Anyway, what I indicated is that that there ought to be (and, of course, I hope to show that I am in

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P	Je ne connais pas tout	
		de la poésie
U	J'ignore tout	
P	<i>I don't know everything</i>	
		<i>about poetry</i>
U	<i>I don't know anything</i>	

I wrote "*Je ne connais pas*" and "*J'ignore*". I am confronting this "*Je ne connais pas*" and this "*J'ignore*" with something that is going to serve me as a foundation: "about poetry".

For greater rigour, I am saying that I posit that "*je ne connais pas*" is equivalent to "*j'ignore*". I admit, I accept that negation is included in the term "*j'ignore*". Of course, another time, I could return to *ignosco* and to what it indicates very precisely in the Latin tongue from which it comes to us. But logically I am positing today that these two terms are equivalent. It is starting from this supposition that what follows is going to take its value.

I am writing the word *tout*, twice. They are indeed equivalent. What results from this? That, from the twice-repeated introduction of this identical term at these two levels, I obtain two propositions of essentially different value. It is not the same thing to say "I don't know everything about poetry" and "I don't know anything about poetry". Between one and the other there is the distance - I am saying it immediately to clarify, since it is necessary, where I want to get to, it is to the signifying distinction, I mean in so far as it can be determined by signifying procedures - between what is called a universal proposition, to express it like (210) Aristotle, and, moreover, also like everything that has been prorogued in logic ever since, and a particular proposition.

Where then is the mystery if these signifiers are equivalent term by term. Let us say that here we have posited it by convention, I repeat, it is only a scruple about the etymology of *j'ignore*. *J'ignore* means well and truly what it means on this occasion: *je ne sais pas*, *je ne connais pas*. How does that end up with two propositions, one of which is presented clearly as referring to a particular of this

field of poetry (there are some things within it that I do not know; I do not know everything about poetry) and this well and truly universal, even though negative proposition: I know nothing about anything that belongs to the field of poetry, I don't have a clue (which is the case in general).

Are we going to stop at this which, immediately, introduces us into the specificity of a positive tongue, into the particular existence of French which, as very learned people have put it in their time, presents a duplicity in the terms negation is supported by. Namely, that the *ne* which seems to be the sufficient support, (adjunctive, as they say) necessary and sufficient for the negative function, is supported, in appearance is reinforced, but perhaps after all is complicated, by this adjunction of a term which only the usage of the tongue allows us to see what it is for. On this, someone that I can only quote in the margin, namely, a psychoanalytic colleague and eminent grammarian named Pichon, in the work on French grammar that he excogitated with his uncle Damourette, introduced some very pretty considerations, in accordance with his method and procedure, concerning what he calls the rather discordant function of the *ne* and the rather foreclusive one of the *pas*. About this he said things that were very subtle and packed with all sorts of examples taken at every level and very well chosen without, I think, being on the axis which, at least for us, may be truly important.

How this importance is determined for us, is what I shall make you understand later, at least I hope so, and for the moment by referring myself to this specificity of the French tongue. I only want to take the support of this something that must indeed also happen elsewhere, if it happens in our tongue. The fact is - for example - one could raise the following. If the result of this statement depended, for example, on the fact that we can group together the *pas tout*, in which case the sense of the sentence would return, rendering superfluous, in a way, allowing (211) there to be elided, as happens in familiar conversation (I am not saying to suppress, to elide, to swallow) the *ne*. *J'connais pas tout* with *pas tout* together, would be the non-separability of negation, that we can describe as included in the term of *j'ignore*, and which would here be the source of it, and everyone would be happy. I do not see why one should not be satisfied with this explanation if all that were involved, of course, was to solve this little riddle. It is funny but anyway this does not perhaps go so far as it seems to.

Yes, it goes further, as we are going to try to demonstrate by referring to another tongue, the English tongue, for example.

Let us try to start from something that corresponds in meaning to the first sentence:

I don't know everything about poetry,

and the other sentence:

I don't know anything about poetry.

What is nevertheless going to appear to us, in considering things expressed in this other tongue, is that, although producing these two meanings equivalent to the

distance between the first two, the explanation that we evoked earlier of the blocking together of two signifiers is going to find itself necessarily inverted. Because this blocking of the *pas* with the term *tout* in the first example is realised here - at the signifying level I mean - in what corresponds to the second articulation, the second proposition, the one we have qualified as universal.

“*Anything*”, as everyone knows, is there in effect as the equivalent of “*something*”, something which is transformed into “*anything*” in the measure that is intervenes as negative.

Consequently, our first explanation is not fully satisfying, since it is by something completely opposite, it is by a blocking carried out in the second sentence, the one which realises the universal on this occasion, that there is produced this blocking, this equally ambiguous detaching moreover, the *don't* not disappearing for all that, to obtain this sense, I am completely out of it as regards poetry.

On the contrary it is where “*everything*” is joined to “*I don't know*” that the first sense is realised. This is well designed to make us reflect on something that (212) involves nothing less than - as I told you already, showing my hand - what is involved in the mystery of the relations between the universal and the particular.

We will try later to say what was the fundamental preoccupation of the one who introduced this distinction into history, namely, Aristotle.

Everyone knows that, on the subject of the angle from which these two registers of the statement should be taken, a little revolution of the spirit occurred, one that I already pinpointed on several occasions as the introduction of quantifiers.

There are perhaps some people here - I would like to suppose it - for whom it is not simply something that tickles their ears. But there must also be many for whom it is truly only the announcement that I made that at a given moment I would speak about it and - God knows how - I am going to have to talk to you about it from the point where it interests us, the point that I am at, the point then where it seemed to me it could be of use to us. Namely, that I cannot give you its whole history, all its antecedents, how it arose, it emerged, it was perfected and how (when all is said and done, this is what I have to limited myself to) it is thought of by those who make use of it. How can one know that? Because it is not at all certain that because they make use of it, they think about it, I mean that they situate in any way what their way of using it implies in thinking.

So then, I am going to be forced to start from the way in which I for my part think about it, at the level that I think interests you, namely, at the level where this can, be of some use to us.

In Aristotle, everything depends on something that is designated as a sign, which he believes he can allow himself. He allows himself to operate in this way,

namely, that if he said that *every man is an animal*, he can for any useful purpose, if this appears to him to be of some use, extract from it: *some man is an animal*.

This is what we will call - it is not quite the term that he uses - since what is at stake is a relation that has been qualified as subalternate between the universal and the particular, an operation of subalternation.

I will probably have to make some remark more than once regarding the fact, the way that "man" is dinned into our ears in the examples, the illustrations the logicians give to their developments, which is certainly not without a (213) symptomatic value. We can begin to be sure of it in the whole measure that we have made the remark that we perhaps do not know as well as all that what man is. Anyway this would take us ...

The question of whether two sets, as is said in our day, can have something in common is a grave question which is in the process of involving a whole revision of mathematical theory. Because after all, we might very well, from the beginning, and without making vain gestures, I dare to say it, like those of our friend Michel Foucault performing the last rites for a humanism, so long dead that it has gone down the river without anyone knowing where it has got to, as if it were still a question and as if it was what was essential about structuralism. Let us pass on ... Let us say simply that, logically, we can only retain the fact that all that is important for us is whether we are talking about the same thing when we say - I mean logically - *every man is an animal*, or, for example, *every man speaks*. The question of whether two sets, I repeat, can have a common element, is a question that is very seriously raised in as much as it raises the following. Namely, what is involved in the element, if the element itself can only be - it is the foundation of set theory - something in connection with which you can speculate exactly as if it were a set. This is where the question begins to arise, but let us leave it.

You know that the fatherland is at once the most beautiful reality, and that of course it is self-evident that *every Frenchman ought to die for it*. But it is from the moment that you subalternate to know whether some Frenchmen ought to die for it that it seems to me that you ought to notice that the operation of subalternation presents some difficulties. Since *every Frenchman ought to die for it* and *some Frenchman ought to die for it*, is not at all the same thing! These are things that you see every day.

This is when you notice the amount of ontology, namely, something a little more than was his intention in constructing a logic, a formal logic, how much ontology his logic still brings with it.


I am avoiding, I assure you, many digressions. I do not want you to lose my thread ...

(214) Here I am going to introduce right away by an opposition process that is obviously a little decisive. I am happy, perhaps wrongly, but usually there is an eminent logician here in the first row. I always keep the corner of my eye on him to see when he is going to start shouting. He is not there today, I do not believe I see him. On the one hand that reassures me, on the other hand it annoys me. I would like to have known what he would say to me about it at the end. Normally he shakes my hand and tells me that he is in complete agreement, which always does me a lot of good. Not at all because I need him to say it to know naturally where I am going, but everyone knows that when you venture onto a terrain which is not your own, properly speaking, you are always at the risk of - bang bang! Now for my part, of course, it is not encroaching onto terrain that is not my own that is important to me. It is to find, in logic, something that would be for you an example, a thread, an exemplary guide in the difficulties we have to deal with. We, those in the name of whom I am speaking, those also to whom I am speaking - and this ambiguity is here quite essential - namely, the psychoanalysts with respect to an action which concerns nothing less and nothing other than what I tried to define for you as "the subject". The subject is not man. If there are people who do not know what man is they are indeed the psychoanalysts. It is even their merit to put him radically in question, I mean *qua* man, in as much as this word has even still an appearance of sense for anyone.

So then I pass to the logic of quantifiers. And I allow myself, with this *bulldozer* approach that I use from time to time, to indicate that the radical difference in the way of opposing universal to particular, in the logic of quantifiers, resides in the fact (naturally, when you open books on it, you will find your bearings again with what I am telling you, you will of course see that it can be tackled in a thousand different ways, but the essential, is that you should see that this is the principal thread, at least for what interests us) that the universal, at least the affirmative one, must be stated as follows. "There is no man who is not wise" (*pas d'homme qui ne soit sage*).

There you are, believe it from me at least for a moment. The important thing is that you are able to follow the thread to see where I want to get to, which gives the formula of the universal negative. Namely, what in Aristotle, might be articulated as: *All men are wise*, a reassuring statement that on this occasion, (215) moreover, is of no importance. What is important to us, is to see the advantage that we may find in articulating this statement differently.

Here, right away, you can note that this universal affirmative will bring into play to support itself nothing less than two negations. It is important for you to see the order in which things are going to be presented. Let us put on the left the Aristotelian forms, the universal affirmative and negative. It is the letters A and E which designate them among Aristotle's posterity, and the letters I and O are the particulars, I being the particular affirmative (all men are wise, some man is wise).



How, in our quantifying articulation, is *some man is wise* going to be expressed?

I had said first of all *there is no man who is not wise*. Now we articulate *there is a man who is wise* or *man who is wise*. But we will support this *man*, who might remain suspended in thin air, as it is appropriate, with a *he is*, just as *no man who is not wise* is *there is no man who is not wise*, *il n'est homme qui ne soit sage*.

But you also see that there is no longer a *ne*, in *is not wise*. This is how it has to be for *who is wise* to have a meaning. Or, if you again want to articulate *there is a man such that he is wise*, this *such that* is not excessive because you can also put it at the level of the universal: *there is no man such that he is not wise*. So then, to give the equivalent of our Aristotelian subalternation we had to efface two negations. This is very interesting. Because first of all we can see that a certain use of the double negation is not meant to be resolved into an affirmation, but precisely to allow - according to the sense in which this double negation is used, whether it is added or removed - to assure, the passage from the universal to the particular.

This is striking and makes us ask ourselves what indeed must be said for us to be able, in certain cases, to assimilate the double negation to a return to zero.

(216) Namely, what existed in terms of affirmation at the start, and in other cases with this result.

But let us continue to interest ourselves in the property presented by the function we started from, that we have pinpointed, because it is correct, because this is what it corresponds to the quantifying operation. Let us only remove one negation, the first one: *there is a man such that he is not wise*. There also, I particularise, and in a fashion that corresponds to the particular negative. It is what Aristotle would call *some men are not wise* - no longer of subalternation but of the opposite subalternation which is diagonal, the opposition between A and O, from *all men are wise* to *some men are not wise* - this is what he calls "contradictory".

The use of the word contradiction interests us, us analysts. All the more so because, as Mr. Nassif recalled at the last closed seminar, it is an altogether essential point for psychoanalysts that Freud once threw out for them this assuredly primary truth that the unconscious does not know contradiction.

The only inconvenience - you never know the fruits borne by what you announce as a truth, especially a primary one - is that this had as a consequence that psychoanalysts, from that moment on, thought they were on holidays, as I might

say, with respect to contradiction. They thought that this at once allowed them to know nothing about it, namely, not to be interested in it in the slightest.

It is a consequence that is obviously excessive. It is not because the unconscious, even if it were true, does not know contradiction that psychoanalysts should not have to know it, even if it were only to know why it does not know it, for example!

Anyway, let us remark that “contradiction” deserves a more attentive examination which, of course, logicians have carried out a long time ago. And that it is something quite different to speak about contradiction in the principle of contradiction, namely, that A cannot be not-A from the same point of view and at the same place, and the fact that our particular negative is not contradictory here. It is true that it is. But you see from the angle *there is a man such that he is not wise*, I am only raising it, with respect to the formula which served us as a point of departure, founded on the double negation, I am only raising it to the position of an exception.

(217) Of course the exception does not confirm the rule, contrary to what is usually said and which suits everyone. It simply reduces it to the value of a rule without a necessary value. Namely, it reduces it to the value of rule. That is even the definition of the rule.

So then you begin to see the degree to which these things can be of interest to us. I am appealing here to my psychoanalytic audience a little in order to allow it not to be bored. You see the interest of these articulations that allow us to nuance things as interesting as the following, for example. It is not the same thing to say (this is why I made this distinction at the level of contradiction) *man is non-woman* - here, of course, we will be told that the unconscious does not know contradiction - but it is not quite the same as to say (universal) *there is no man* (we are dealing with the subject, of course) *who does not rule out the feminine position, the woman*, or (the state of exception and no longer of contradiction) *there is a man who does not rule out the woman*.

This may show you, however, something manageable and designed to show the interest of these logical researches, even when the psychoanalyst believes himself (a thing which well deserves, with time, to be called obedience) obliged to have his gaze fixed on the horizon of the pre-verbal.

Let us continue, for our part, on the contrary, our little path of conducting an experiment.

There is a man such that he is not wise, I have said. You have been able to note that we have been able, up to the present, to do without the “*pas*”. Let us try to see what that is going to give. *There is a man such that he is* - for example - *not wise*. There is no problem about this, it means the same thing. There are still some who are not wise.

Let us be careful. This *not wise* may well serve us as a passage to something a little unexpected.

If we restore the “*ne*” it still works. *There is a man such that he is not wise (ne soit pas sage)*”, that will still work.

Let us come then to the *not wise* and let us come back in the diagonal to the A, the universal affirmative of Aristotle being the quantifying locution: *there is no man such that he is not not wise (pas d’homme tel qu’il ne soit pas sage)*. The fact is that this gives a funny sense, all of a sudden. It is the universal negative: they are all not wise.

What could have occurred? This added *not*, which was perfectly tolerable at (218) the level of the particular negative, here if we put it into what previously was the universal affirmative, which appeared altogether designed to tolerate it just as well, with this *not*, it swerves towards blackness and towards some colour or other at E in the Rimbaud’s sonnet. But at the Aristotelian level, it is black, it is the universal negative: *all of them are not wise*.

I am going to tell you right away the lesson we are going to take from this. It is obviously something which makes us put our finger on the fact that the relation of the two *ne*, as it exists in the fundamental structure of the quantified universal affirmative, which is this formula, *there is nothing which does not*, has something which suffices in itself. And we have the proof of it in the liberation of this *pas* which all of a sudden, while inoffensive elsewhere, here makes one universal turn into the other.

This is what allows us to advance and to affirm that the distinction of the quantifying operation, when we give it its rectifying (*rectrice*) function, a normal function of logical operation, is distinguished from the logic of Aristotle by the following. It substitutes - at the place where the *ousia*, the essence, the ontological is not eliminated, at the place of the grammatical subject - the subject that interests us *qua* divided subject. Namely, the pure and simple division as such of the subject in so far as he speaks, of the stating subject *qua* distinct from the subject of the statement.

The unit in which this presence of the divided subject is presented, is nothing other than this conjunction of two negations. This, moreover, is what justifies that to present it to you, to articulate it before you, whether you have noticed it or not - but it is time to notice it - things would not work without using a subjunctive. *There is nothing which is not (qui ne soit) wise or not wise*, the thing is of little importance. It is this *soit* which marks the dimension of this slippage from what happens between these two *ne* and which is precisely where there is going to operate the distance which always subsists between stating and stated. It is therefore not for nothing that in giving you, a few sessions ago, the first example of what is involved in Pierce’s formulation, I well and truly pointed

out to you that, in this exemplification that I showed you of these little lines divided, well chosen, in four boxes, what constituted the veritable subject of every universal, is essentially the subject in so far as he is essentially and fundamentally this no subject (*pas de sujet*) which is already articulated in our (219) way of introducing it: *no man who is not wise*.

It is difficult to stay on this cutting edge. The theory, of course, is very exactly constructed to eliminate it. I mean that what interests us, is that the theory of quantifiers, if we articulate it, forces us to uncover in it this relief and this irreducible flight. Which means that we do not know where there is slipped in the properly instituting core of what only seems to be at first repeated negation, and is, on the contrary, creative negation, in so far as it is from it that there is instaurated the only thing which is truly worthy of being articulated in knowledge. Namely, the universal affirmative, what is valid everywhere and in every case. This alone interests us.

This is how you will see there being formulated from the pen of the logicians of quantification that we can treat as equivalent what is expressed by a \forall , namely, the universal value of a written proposition such as $\forall x, F(x)$, we must write in algebraic terms of symbolic logic. Namely, that this universal truth is valid for every x , that x functions in the function $F(x)$, namely, - for example - on this occasion the function of being wise, and that man will be an x which will be always at its place in this function.

The transformation which is acceptable in the theory of quantifiers is represented as follows: by $\exists x$, this \exists being the symbol that specifies quantification for us, the existence of an x , of a value of x such that it satisfies the function $F(x)$. And we will be told that $x, F(x)$ can be expressed by a $\neg \exists x$. Namely, that no x exists that is such that it explodes the function $F(x)$. $\neg \exists x - F(x)$. In brief, that the conjunction of these two minus signs (and it is indeed something which is found to overlap the articulated, nuanced language form under which I put it forward to you) is enough to symbolise the same thing. It is not true at all. For it is quite clear that even though it is a minus in logical symbolisation, these two minuses do not have the same value. There exists no x which, I was lead to tell you, explodes, namely, renders false this function $F(x)$. I symbolised these two terms. That of non-existence and that of the effect, which end up with the falsity of the function, are not of the same order. But this is precisely what is at stake. It is to mask something that is precisely the fissure and is altogether essential for us to determine and to fix in its plane, which is the distance between the stating subject (220) and the subject of the statement. I will again point this out to you, for example, in connection with another way, among other authors, of giving to the function an image that is more manageable at the level of its properly predicative application. For, in truth, $F(x)$ can designate all kinds of things, including all kinds of mathematical formulae that you can apply to it. It is the most general formula.

On the contrary, if you want to remain at the level of my *all men are wise*, here is the formula: $(\bar{m} \vee w)$, with the sign of disjunction \vee that I already put on the board the last time. A formula to which, according to the logicians who introduced quantification, it would be enough to add the \forall of *pan* to make of it the universal or particular proposition: $\forall (\bar{m} \vee w)$ and which means, in short, that what we are dealing with is the disjunction between *no man* and this *w*. This means that if we choose the contrary of *no man*, namely, *man*, we have the disjunction: he is wise, either in every case, or in certain particular cases.

If we take the negation of wise, namely, if we renounce wise, we are at the other side of the disjunction, namely, on the side of no man. This can still work, up to this point.

But this in no way implies the requirement of not wise for what is not man. Now this is not indicated in the formula. For this it is necessary that the disjunction should be marked, for example, like that $\forall (\bar{\bar{m}} \vee w)$, a sign then which would be the inverse of the one of the square root. This is designed to show us that with respect to implication, if we know here, in short, at the level of the universal that man implies wise, that not wise, certainly, does not imply no man. But that wise is perfectly, for its part also, with no man. Namely, that there can be something other than man who is wise is elided in the way of presenting quite crudely the formula of disjunction, between a subject which is negated and the predicate which is not.

A point, also, which demonstrates something that, in the system described as that of double negation, to express oneself in this script (*scription*) of Mitchell, always allows to escape this something which, this time, far from suturing the fissure, leaves it gaping without knowing it. A confirmation that it is the fissure that is always at stake.

In other words, what is at stake, as regards logic, I mean formal, is always this. What can be drawn, and up to what point, from a statement, namely, to get a (221) reliable statement. It is indeed from there also that Aristotle started.

Aristotle, of course, let us not say that he was at the dawn of thinking, because what is proper to thinking is precisely never to have had a dawn. It was already very old and it knew something. In particular it knew that of course there would be no question of knowing, if there were no language. That is not enough, of course, because knowledge does not depend only on language. But what was important for it, was to know precisely - because thinking did not date from yesterday - what could make of a stating, something necessary. There is no way of yielding on this point. The first *ananke* is the *ananke* of discourse.

The formal logic of Aristotle was the first step in knowing what properly and distinguished as such, at the level of the statement, could be formulated as giving this source - which does not mean that it was the only one, of course - its necessity for stating. Namely, that here there is no way of retreating. Moreover,

it is the sense that the term *episteme* had at that time, it is that of a stating about the distinction between *episteme* and *doxa* is nothing other than a distinction situated at the level of discourse.

It is the difference between what is for us science, to go in the same direction, namely, between a strictly reliable statement, and indeed it is certain for us, who have made some original contributions to what is involved in the statement, and in fact in no other place than in mathematics. These laws of the statement, to be reliable, have become, still become every day more and more exigent and, in this respect, do not fail to show their limits. I mean that it is in the whole measure that we have taken, in logic, some steps, among which of course is the one that I am presenting to you here. But it is the original step, that interests us. Why? Because we analysts find ourselves beyond this attempt at capturing stating by the networks of the statement. But what luck that the work has been pushed so far elsewhere, if through this there are given to us some rules to carefully map out the fissure.

When I state that the unconscious is structured like a language, that does not mean that I know it, since, what I completed it with, is properly this *one (on)* on which I put the emphasis and which is the one which gives vertigo to all the (222) psychoanalysts. The fact is that one knows nothing about it. *One*, the subject supposed to know, the one who must always be there to make us comfortable.

If I state it, therefore, it is not because I know it, it is because my discourse, in effect, organises the unconscious. I am saying that the only discourse that we have about the unconscious, that of Freud, makes sense. This certainly is not what is important, because it makes sense as one makes water: everywhere. Everything makes sense, as I showed you. "*Colourless green ideas sleep furiously*", also makes sense. It is even the best characterisation that one could give to the totality of analytic literature. If in Freud this sense is so full, so resonant with respect to what is at stake, - the unconscious. If, in other words, it is distinguished from everything that he rejected in advance as occultism, if everyone knows and senses it is not Mesmer - that is why it subsists despite the senselessness of the analytic discourse - it is a miracle that we can only explain indirectly. Namely, by the scientific formation of Freud.

The important thing in this discourse is not its sense which must first of all exist so that what I put forward with "the unconscious is structured like a language" has its reference, its *Bedeutung*. Because it is here that one notices that the reference is language. In other words that everything that my discourse articulates about that of Freud on the unconscious ends up with isomorphic formulae, the ones required if what is at stake is language taken as object. The isomorphism that the unconscious imposes on my discourse about the unconscious, with respect to what is involved in a discourse on language, is what is at stake. Which means that every psychoanalyst ought to be caught up in this discourse, in so far as he is engaged in this field defined by Freud for the unconscious.

Starting from there, I can only barely state, before leaving you, some pinpointing designed for you not to lose your heads in this business. I hope that what I have said at the final term concerning the formula “the unconscious is structured like a language” will preserve all the same its value as a turning point for those who have heard for a long time as, moreover, for those who refuse to hear it.

Of course our science, the one that is ours, is not defined simply by these coordinates, which mean that there is no knowledge except through language. It nevertheless remains that science itself cannot be sustained except by putting in reserve a knowledge made up purely of language. Namely, of a logic that is (223) strictly internal and necessary for the development of its instrument in so far as the instrument is mathematics. And everyone can put his finger at every instant on the properly language impasses in which the progress of the mathematical instrument itself puts it. In as much as it both welcomes and is welcomed by every new field of these factual discoveries and is an altogether essential resource for modern science.

It remains indeed then that there is a whole level where knowledge is about language. And it is a vanity to say that this field is properly tautological, that it is at the very origin of what constitutes the start of science, namely, taking the measure of the cleavage thus defined in discourse, from a logical asceticism called the *cogito*. It is a sign that I was able to develop this asceticism sufficiently to found on it the logic of the phantasy. The one whose articulations were, I must say, very well isolated the last time during the closed seminar by one of those who are working here in the field of my discourse.

It is not a matter, as he said, and as he said in a legitimate fashion in the perspective of what he was trying to contribute as an answer to this discourse, of a “new negation” which is supposed to be the one that I am producing. May heaven preserve me from giving again to anyone whomsoever with the introduction of a novelty the opportunity of conjuring away what is at stake. Which is indeed the complete contrary of this thing that is plugged up because it is something that cannot be plugged. May heaven grant that I do not in any way give to the psychoanalyst a renewed alibi to the one that he has by being in the analytic discourse. Namely, in the proper and Aristotelian sense, his *upokeimemon*, his subjective support certainly, but in so far as he himself assumes its division.

Seminar 13: Wednesday 13 March 1968

What is it to be a psychoanalyst? It is towards this aim that there is making its way what I am trying to tell you this year, under this title of the psychoanalytic act.

It is strange that some, among the messages that are sent to me and for which, since I asked for them, I thank those who were good enough to take this step, it is strange that there sometimes crops up the following. That I am doing here something that is supposed to be close to some kind of philosophical reflection. Perhaps all the same some sessions, like the last one, which, of course, if it did not fail to grip those among you who are best following my discourse, sufficiently warns you nevertheless, that what is at stake is something else. Experience - an experience, it is always something which one recently has had the echoes of - proves that the state of mind produced in a certain order of studies described as philosophical, adapts itself badly to the whole precise articulation of this science called logic. In this echo, I even picked out and retained this humorous judgement, that such an attempt to bring in, properly speaking, what has been constructed as logic into the classes, into what is imposed for the philosophical cursus or gradus, would be something akin to this ambition of the technocrat, whose final slogan among all auricular resistances, is to accuse those who, on the whole, are trying to contribute this more precise discourse, which my own is supposed to be a part of, under the title of structuralism. This, in short, is distinguished by this common characteristic, of taking properly as object, what is constituted, not under the heading of what (226) constitutes the ordinary object of a science, namely, something from which one is once and for all at a sufficient distance to isolate in the real as constituting a special species, but to be occupied properly by what is constituted as language-effect.

To take the language-effect as object is indeed, in effect, what can be considered as the common factor in structuralism. And that assuredly, in this connection, thinking finds its basis, its angle, its way of escaping, in the form of a reverie, from this something which, precisely, around this strives to become embodied, and to restore to it, what? Ancient themes which, under different headings, always found themselves flourishing around every discourse in so far as it is properly the backbone of philosophy. Namely, keeping oneself at the point of what, in the use of discourse, has certain effects. Where precisely there is situated the way in which this discourse unflinching comes to this sort of

mediocrity, inoperancy which means that the only thing left outside, eliminated, is precisely this effect.

Now it is difficult not to notice that psychoanalysis offers a privileged terrain for such reflection.

What in effect is psychoanalysis? I happened, incidentally, in an article, the one found in my *Ecrits* under the title "*Variants de la cure type, Variants of the standard treatment*", to write something that I took care to re-extract this morning. That to ask oneself what is involved in psychoanalysis, since precisely it was a matter of showing how there could be defined, established, these variants, which presupposes that there is something typical. And it was indeed precisely to correct a certain way of associating the word *type* to that of the efficacy of psychoanalysis, that I wrote this article. So then I said, incidentally: "This criterion rarely stated because it is taken to be tautological" - it was already so well before, it is more than ten years ago - I write, "a psychoanalysis, standard or not, is the treatment that one expects from a psychoanalyst".

"Rarely stated", because in truth, in effect, people back away from something that might be not only, as I wrote, tautological, but either would be, or would evoke, this something or other unknown, opaque, irreducible which consists precisely in the qualification of the psychoanalyst.

Observe, nevertheless, that this indeed is what is involved, when you want to verify whether someone is correct in claiming to have gone through an analysis. (227) Who did you go to? Is that person a psychoanalyst or not? This is something that is not settled in the question. If for some reason - and the reasons are precisely what are to be opened up here with a big question mark - the person is not qualified to call himself a psychoanalyst, a scepticism at least is generated as to whether, yes or no, in the experience from which the subject authorises himself, it was indeed a psychoanalysis that was at stake.

In effect, there is no other criterion. But it is precisely this criterion that it would be a matter of defining, in particular when it is a matter of distinguishing a psychoanalysis from this broader thing, whose limits remain uncertain, that is called a psychotherapy.

Let us break up this word "psychotherapy". We will see it being defined by something that is "psycho", psychology, namely, a material of which the least that can be said is that its definition is still subject to some contestation. I mean that nothing is less obvious than what people have wanted to call the unity of psychology, since moreover it only gets its status from a series of references, some of which appeared to be reassuring, because they are most foreign to it. Namely, what is most opposed to it, for example, as belonging to the organic. Or, on the contrary, by the establishment of a series of severe limitations that in practice render what has been obtained, for example, under certain experimental conditions, in the laboratory context, more or less inadequate, indeed

inapplicable, when what is at stake is something that is still more confused, called therapy. Therapy. Everyone knows the diversity of styles and of resonances that this evokes. The centre of it is given by the term suggestion. At least, it is that of all of them. What is referred to the action, the action of one individual on another, being exercised in ways that certainly, cannot claim to have received their full definition. At the horizon, at the limit of such practices, we will have the general notion of what are called on the whole, and what have been rather well situated as techniques of the body. At the other end, we will have ...- I mean by that what, in many civilisations, is manifested as what is propagated here in the erratic form of what people are happy to pinpoint in our epoch as Indian techniques, or again what are called the different forms of yoga. At the other extreme, Samaritan help, which confusedly loses itself in the field, in the abysses, of the elevation of the soul; indeed! It is strange to see it taken (228) up in advertising what is supposed to be produced at the end of the exercise of psychoanalysis; this curious effusion described as the exercise of some goodness or other.

Psychoanalysis let us start then from what is for the moment our only firm point: that it takes place with a psychoanalyst. "With" must be understood here in the instrumental sense, or at least I am proposing that you should understand it in that way.

How does it happen that there exists something that cannot be situated except with a psychoanalyst. As Aristotle says, not at all that one should say, he assures us, "the soul thinks" but "man thinks with his soul" indicating explicitly that this is the sense that should be given to the word "with", namely, the instrumental sense. A strange thing, when I made an allusion somewhere to the Aristotelian reference, things seem rather to have brought effects of confusion to the reader, for want no doubt of recognising the Aristotelian reference.

It is with a psychoanalyst that psychoanalysis penetrates into this something that is at stake. If the unconscious exists and if we define it, as it seems at least, after the long march that we have been making for years in this field, to go into the field of the unconscious is properly to find oneself at the level of what can be best defined as language-effect, in this sense that, for the first time, it is articulated that this effect can be isolated in a way from the subject. That there is knowledge, knowledge in so far as here is what the typical language-effect constitutes. That knowledge is incarnated without the subject who is holding his discourse being conscious of it, in the sense that here, being conscious of his knowledge, is to be co-dimensional with what the knowledge includes, it is to be complicit in this knowledge.

Assuredly, there is here an opening onto something through which there is proposed to us the language-effect as object, in a way that is distinct. Because it excludes from this dialectic, as it has been constructed at the end of the traditionally philosophical questioning, and which would put us on the path of a possible, exhaustive and total reduction of what is involved in the subject, in so

far as it is what states this truth, which claims to give the final word on discourse in these formulae. That the *en-soi* is of its nature destined to be reduced to a *pour-soi*. That a *pour-soi* would envelop at the end of an absolute knowledge everything involved in the *en-soi*. That things are different, by the (229) very fact that psychoanalysis teaches us that the subject, because of the effect of the signifier, is only established as divided and this in an irreducible fashion. This is something that solicits from us the study of what is involved in the subject as language-effect. And how this is accessible, and the role that the psychoanalyst plays in it, is assuredly something essential to ground.


In effect, if what is involved in knowledge always leaves a residue, a residue in a way constitutive of its status – is not the first question posed about the partner, about the one who is there, I am not saying as aid, but as instrument, for something to occur, the psychoanalysing task, at the end of which the subject, let us say, is aware of this constitutive division, after which, for him, something opens up which cannot be called otherwise nor differently than *passage à l'acte*, let us say an enlightened *passage à l'acte* - it is precisely from the fact of knowing that in every act, there is something which escapes him as subject, which will have an incidence there, and that at the end of this act, the realisation is, let us say for the moment, at the very least veiled about what he has to accomplish, from this act, as being his own realisation.

This, which is the end of the psychoanalysing task, leaves completely to one side what happens to the psychoanalyst, in this task that has been accomplished. It would seem, in a kind of naïve questioning, that we could say that by setting aside the full and simple realisation of the *pour-soi* in this task taken as asceticism, its term could be conceived of as a knowledge which at least would be realised for the other. Namely, for the one who is found to be the partner of the operation, to have established its frame and authorised its process.

Is this how it is? It is true that in presiding, as I might say, over this task, the psychoanalyst learns a lot about it. Does this mean that in any way he is the one in the operation who, in a way, can pride himself on being the authentic subject of a realised knowledge? The specific objection to this is that psychoanalysis disputes all exhausting of knowledge and this at the level of the subject himself, in so far as he is brought into play in the psychoanalytic task.

What is at stake in psychoanalysis is not at all a *gnothi seauton* but precisely a grasp of the limit of this *gnothi seauton*. Because this limit is properly of the nature of logic itself, and because it is inscribed in the language-effect that it always leaves outside itself. And, consequently, in so far as it allows the subject (230) to be constituted as such, this excluded part which means that the subject, of his nature, either only recognises himself by forgetting what firstly determined him in this operation of recognition, or indeed even by grasping himself in this determination, as denial, I mean only sees it arising in an essential *Verneinung* by failing to recognise it.

In other words, we find ourselves, with the basal schema of two forms, specifically the hysterical and the obsessional from which analytic experience starts. These are here only an example, an illustration, a flowering, and this in the measure that neurosis is essentially constructed from the reference of desire to demand. We find ourselves face to face with the same logical schema that I produced the last time, in showing you the framework of what quantification is. The one that links the elaborated approach that we can give of the subject and of the predicate, which here, would be inscribed in the form of the repressed signifier S , in so far as it is representative of the subject for another signifier S^0 . Let us give this signifier the co-efficient O , in so far as it is the one in which the subject has in fact to recognise himself or fail to recognise himself, where it is inscribed as fixing the subject somewhere in the field of the Other, whose formula is the following: $\$(\bar{S} V S^0)$. That for every subject in so far as it is of its nature divided, here exactly, in the same way as we can formulate that every man is wise ($\bar{m}Vw$), we have the disjunctive choice, between the *no man* and the *to be wise*. We have fundamentally this. As the first analytic experience teaches us, the hysteric, in her final articulation, in her essential nature, quite authentically, if authentic means "to find one's own law only within oneself", is sustained in a signifying affirmation which, for us, looks like theatre, looks like comedy. And in truth it is for us that she presents herself in this way as authentic $\$(S V S^0)$. No one will be able to grasp what is involved in the true structure of the hysteric, if he does not take it on the contrary as being the most firm and most autonomous status of the subject, the one that is expressed in the signifier on condition that the first, the one that determines it, remains not alone forgotten, but in ignorance of the fact that it is forgotten. While it is quite sincerely at the level of the structure described as obsessional that the subject produces the signifier that is at stake, in so far as it is his truth, but provides it with the fundamental *Verneinung*, through which he announces himself as not being what precisely he is articulating, that he admits he is formulating. (231) Consequently, he only establishes himself at the level of the predicate, maintained in its pretension of being something else, only formulates himself, as it were, in a failure to recognise in a way indicated by the negation itself with which he supports it, by the denegatory form with which this failure to recognise is accompanied.



[other version: $\bar{m}Vw$
sincere]

It is then from a homology, from a parallel to what has been inscribed in writing in which, more and more there is established what is imposed from the very progress which forces, in discourse, the enriching it is given by having to match itself with what comes to us from the varieties, the conceptual variations, that

the progress of mathematics imposes on us. It is from the homology of forms of inscription - I am making an allusion for example to Frege's *Begriffsschrift*, Frege, which is the writing of the concept. As you know, it is enough to open him. As a writing of the concept, I already gave you some examples of it. And in so far as we are trying to begin with Frege to inscribe in this writing predicative forms which, not only historically, but because of the fact that throughout history they hold up, they are inscribed in what is called the logic of predicates, and first degree logic. Namely, which contributes no quantification at the level of the predicate.

Assertoric judgment



Let us say, to take up our example again, in truth it is important not to spare it too much, that the use that I made the last time of the quite humorous universal affirmative: all men are wise, that the way in which, in his *Begriffsschrift*, Frege would write it, would be in a form which posits, in the horizontal lines, the (232) simply propositional content, namely, the way in which the signifier are stuck together, without anything for all that being required of them except syntactical correctness. By the bar he puts on the left, he marks what is called the implication, the presence of the judgement. It is starting from the inscription of this bar that the content of the proposition is affirmed, or passes to the stage that is called assertoric. The presence here of something that we can translate by "it is true" assuredly we must translate it. And this "it is true" is precisely what, for us, namely, where what is at stake is a logic, which does not deserve in any way to be called technically primary logic, for the term is already used in logical constructions. It designates specifically what can only operate by combining truth values. It is indeed for this reason that what might well be called primary logic, if the term were not already employed, we will call sub-logic. This does not mean inferior logic, but logic in so far as it is a matter of a logic *qua* constitutive of the subject. This "it is true", is indeed for us at the level at which we are going to place something other than this assertoric position, it is indeed in effect here that for us the truth is in question. $\forall(Fx) - \exists x - (Fx) \rightarrow$ double negative, this little hollow, this concavity, this hollowing-out in a way, that here Frege reserves to indicate in it what we are going to see. This is why it seems indispensable to him to assure its correct status to his *Begriffsschrift*. It is here that there is going to come something which operates in the proposition inscribed here under the heading of content, "all men are wise", that we are going to inscribe in this way, for example,


Wise (m)

by putting the "wise" as being the function, and here man as what he calls in the function the argument.

There is, for him, no other correct way of proceeding for any subsequent handling of this *Begriffsschrift*, writing of the concept, than to inscribe here, in the hollow and in a form explicitly indicative of the function that is at stake, that


the same *m* of the man in question, indicating by this that, for every *m*, the formula “man is wise” is true.

I do not have to develop for you here the necessity of such a procedure, because it would be necessary to give what follows, its riches and its complications. Let it be enough for you here to know that in the link that we might make, between (233) such a proposition and another which is supposed to be, in a way, its condition, a thing which in the *Begriffsschrift* is inscribed thus:



namely, that a proposition *F* has a certain relation with a proposition *P*, and that this relation is defined once, (I am saying it for those for whom these words have a sense), in accordance with the module of what is called Philonian implication. Namely, that if this (*P*) is true, this (*F*) cannot be false. In other words, that to give order, coherence to a discourse, there only has to be ruled out, and simply ruled out the following: that the false can be conditioned by the true. All the other combinations, including the fact that the false determines the true are admissible.


I am simply indicating this to you, in the margin, that by writing things in this way, we will have the advantage of being able to distinguish two different forms of implication, according to whether it is at the level of this part of the *Begriffsschrift*, namely, at the level at which the proposition is posited as assertoric, that the conditional incidence will come to connect itself:



or on the contrary this:



(1) French editor says this should be corrected to:



at the level of the proposition itself. Namely, that it is not the same thing to say that, if something is true, we might state that man is wise, or that if something else is true, it is true that all men are wise. There is a world between the two things.

This is only designed, moreover, to indicate to you in the margin, and to show you what the necessity of this hollow corresponds to, which is the following. That somewhere there deserves to be isolated the term which logically, at the point of adequate advancement of logic that we are at, gives body to the term **all** as being the principle, the base starting from which, through the simple operation of diversified negation, there can be formulated all the first positions

defined, contributed by Aristotle. Namely that, for example, there is to be put (233) here, in the form of this vertical line, the negation,



that it will be true for every man, that man is not wise, namely, that we will incarnate the universal negative.

On the contrary, to say in this way:



we are saying that it is not true that for every man we can state that man is not wise. We obtain by these two negations, the manifestation of the particular universal. For if it is not true that for all men, it is true to say that man is not wise, it must be then that there is one little fellow, lost somewhere, who is. And that inversely, if we remove this negation here and only leave that one, we are saying that it is not true that for every man, man is wise, namely, that there are some who are not so.


You sense some artifice in articulating things in this way. Namely, that the fact you sense as artifice, for example the appearance of the last particular described as negative, highlights that in the original logic, that of Aristotle, something is masked from us, precisely by implying these subjects to be a collection, whatever they may be, whether by grasping it in extension or in comprehension. That the nature of the subject is not to be sought in something that is ontological, the subject functioning in a way itself as a sort of first predicate, which it is not. What the essence of the subject is, as it appears in logical functioning, starts whole and entire from the first writing, the one that posits the subject as affirming itself of its nature as all. For every m , man, the formula: "man is wise" is true. And it is starting from that, in accordance in a way with a deduction the inverse to the one that I highlighted before you the last time, that existence, comes to light and specifically the only one that is important for us, (235) the one that the particular affirmative supports: there is a man who is wise. It depends, and through the intermediary of a double negation, on the affirmation of the universal. Just as the last time, in presenting the same thing to you (for we are still dealing with quantifiers), it was the double negation applied to existence that I showed you could express the function of all. That the function, $\forall (Fx)$, I said could be expressed be reversed into a $\exists(x)$. No x exists which renders the $F(x)$ function false, namely a double minus, $\exists x. \neg Fx$.

This presence of the double negation is what for us, creates a problem. Since in truth, the connection with it is only made in an enigmatic fashion with what is involved in the function of the all, because this fact again of course that the linguistic nuance, of the function opposite to *pan* or of *pantes* in Greek, is opposed to the function of *olos*, just as *omnis* is opposed to *totus*. It is, nevertheless, not nothing that Aristotle himself, as regards what is involved in

the universal affirmative, says it is posited *kath olon* "for the whole", and the ambiguity in French remains unaffected, because of the confusion between two signifiers, between which fundamentally has some relation, namely, this function of the all (*du tout*).

It is clear that if the subject, that we manage, with the perfection of logic, to reduce to this "no one who is not" (*pas qui ne*) that I noted the last time, that this subject, nevertheless, in what one might call its native pretension, poses itself as being of its nature capable of apprehending something like all, and that what gives it its status and also its mirage, is that it can think of itself as subject of knowledge. Namely, as an eventual support, just by itself, for something which is all.

Now it is there that I want to lead you, to this indication. I do not know whether the discourse that I am making today as short as I can, as I always do, after having very seriously prepared its stages for you, depending on the attention of the audience - or my own state - I am indeed forced, as in every articulated discourse, and more especially when it is a matter of a discourse about discourse, about logical operations, to take a short cut when it is necessary. It is the fact that, in the way I already indicated to you, the first division of the subject is set up in the repetitive function, what is at stake is essentially the following. The fact is that the subject is only set up as represented by a signifier for another signifier (S and S^1). And it is between the two, at the level of (236) primitive repetition, that this loss, this function of the lost object takes place, around which, precisely, the first operational attempt of the signifier turns, the one that is established in the fundamental repetition;



that what comes here to occupy the place given in the establishment of the universal affirmative, to this factor called "argument" in Frege's statements, which is why the predicative function is always acceptable. And that in every case the function of **all** finds its base, its original turning point and, as I might say, the very principle that establishes its illusion, with reference to the lost object, in the intermediary function of the **o**-object, between the original signifier in so far as it is repressed signifier, and the signifier that represent it in the substitution established by the repetition which itself is first.

And this is illustrated for us in psychoanalysis itself, and by something capital, in the fact that it represents, that it incarnates in a way in the liveliest fashion, what is involved in the function of the **all** in the economy, I would not say of the unconscious, in the economy of analytic knowledge, precisely in so far as this knowledge tries to totalise its own experience. It is even the bias, the slope, the trap into which analytic thinking falls when, for want of being able to grasp itself in its essentially divisive operation, at its term with respect to the subject, it establishes as primary, the idea of an ideal fusion that it projects as original,

but which, if you wish, operates here around this universal affirmative, which is precisely the one that it is supposed to be created to make problematic, and which is expressed more or less as follows: no unconscious without the mother. No economy, no affective dynamic, without this thing which is supposed in a way to be at the origin, that man knows the all, because he was in an original fusion with the mother.

This kind of parasitic myth, for it is not Freudian, it was introduced from an enigmatic angle, that of the birth trauma, as you know, by Otto Rank. To bring in birth from the angle of trauma is to give it a signifying function. The thing then in itself was not intended to contribute a fundamental vitiation to the exercise of a thinking which, as analytic thinking, can only leave intact what is (237) at stake. Namely, that on the final plane where the identificatory articulation stumbles, the gap remains open between man and woman, and that consequently, in the very constitution of the subject, we can in no way introduce, let us say, the existence in the world of male and female complementarity.

Now how was the introduction by Otto Rank of this reference to birth from the angle of trauma used? To profoundly vitiate it subsequently in analytic thinking, because it is said that at least this all, this fusion which means that, for the subject there was a primal possibility, and therefore the possibility of reconquering, a union with what constitutes the all. It is the relation of the mother to the child, of the child to the mother in the uterine state, at the stage before birth, and here we put our finger on where the bias and the error is. But this error is exemplary, because it reveals to us where this function of the all originates in the subject, in so far as it falls under the bias of unconscious destiny. Namely, that it is only recognised authentically by being forgotten, or it is only sincerely recognised by being mis-recognised.

And here in effect, very simply, is where the mainspring is, from the moment that we take things at the level of the function of language: there is no demand that is not addressed to the mother.

We can see this manifesting itself in effect in the development of the child, in so far as he is first of all *infans* and that it is in the field of the mother that he will first of all have to articulate his demand.

What do we see appearing at the level of this demand? This, uniquely, is what is at stake and what every analysis designates for us: it is the function of the breast. Everything that analysis makes operate, as if what were at stake here were a process of knowledge, namely, that the fact that the reality of the mother is first of all only brought to us, designated by the function of what is called the partial object. But this partial object - I do not mind it being called that - in effect, except that we ought to notice that it is at the source of the imagination of the all. That if something is conceived of as totality between the child and the mother, it is in the measure that, at the heart of the demand, namely, in the gap

between what is not articulated and what is articulated as demand, the object around which there arises the first demand, it is the only object which brings to this little newly born being this complement, this irreducible loss, which is its (238) only support. Namely, this breast, so curiously placed here for this use, which of its nature is logical: the *o*-object, and what Frege would call the variable, the variable I mean in the instauration of any function Fx whatsoever. If a variable is quantified, it passes to another status, precisely by being quantified as universal. This means not simply any one whatsoever, but that fundamentally, in its consistency, it is a constant. And that it is for this reason that, for the child who begins to articulate, with his demand, what will constitute the status of his desire, if an object has this favour of being able for an instant to fulfil this constant function, it is the breast. And, moreover, it is strange that there did not immediately appear, in speculating on the biological terms that psychoanalysis aspires to, since it refers to them, that people do not notice that this thing, which seems to be stated as self-evident, that every child has a mother - and people even underline, in order to put us on the track, that assuredly for the father, we are in the order of faith! But would it be so certain that there is a mother if, instead of being a human, namely, a mammal, it was an insect? What are the relations of an insect with its mother?

If we allow ourselves perpetually to play - and this is presentified in psychoanalyses - between the term, the reference, of conception and that of birth, we see the distance there is between the two. And that the fact that the mother is the mother does not depend, except by a purely organic necessity - I mean, of course, that up to the present, she is the only one who can produce in her own uterus her own eggs, but after all, since people practise artificial insemination nowadays, people will also perhaps perform ovular insertion - the mother, is not, essentially at the level that we take her in analytic experience, this something which is referred to sexual terms. We always speak about the relation described as sexual, let us also speak about the sexual described as relation. The sexual described as relation is completely masked by the fact that human beings of whom we can say that if they did not have language, how would they even know that they are mortal? We will also say, moreover, that if they were not mammals, they would not imagine that they had been born. For the emergence of being, in so far as we operate in this constructed knowledge, which moreover becomes perverting for the whole operational dialectic of analysis, that we make turn around birth, is it anything other than something that was presented in Plato in a manner that I for my part find more sensible. Read the myth of Er. What is this wandering of souls once they have left the body, who are there in a hyperspace before entering to re-lodge themselves somewhere, according to their taste or chance, it does not matter, what is it if not something which has much more sense for us analysts. What is this wandering soul, if not precisely what I am speaking about: the residue of the division of the subject? This metempsychosis appears to me logically less flawed than the one constituting what happens before everything that happens in the psychoanalyzing dynamic, the sojourn in the mother's womb. If we do not imagine this sojourn, as it is after all, at the beginning of the mammal line of

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“Every man is an animal, except that he names himself”
 (*Tout homme est un animal, sauf à ce qu'il se n'homme*)

I put that on the board for you as a way of getting you going, since in reality I am not in a very good mood. This little formula has no pretension to being thinking. It may however serve a number of you as something to hold onto, as a pivot for a certain number of you who will understand nothing, for example, of what I will say today, something that is not unthinkable. They will understand nothing, but this will not prevent them from dreaming about something else. I am not insulting you, I do not think that this is the generality of cases, but anyway let us say an average!


The reverie aspect of what is always produced in every kind of statement with thinking pretensions or is believed to be such, must always be taken into account and why not give it a little point to hook onto. Suppose, for example, that this aspect of my teaching, namely, what can pass for being thinking, does not have - as has happened to many people, and those of greater stature than mine - any follow-up. There will remain little things like that, it has happened to the very great. So then on this point, there is produced what is called as in the animal kingdom a sort of very special fauna, these kinds of little beasts of the insect class, individuals with wing-sheaths, there are a whole lot of them which feed on cadavers. They are called death squads in legal medicine. There are about ten generations that come to consume what remains in terms of human debris. When I say generation, I mean that they succeed one another, that different species come (242) at different stages.

This is more or less what the use of a certain number of university activities around the remainders of thinking is like, death squads. There are already some busying themselves, for example, without either waiting for me to die, or seeing the result of the things that I have stated before you in the course of the years, at gauging at what moment, in what is constituted by what I collected, as I was able, with a brush, under the title of *Ecrits*, I really began to speak about linguistics, at what moment, and up to when, what I am saying overlaps what Jacobson says. You will see, this is going to develop. Moreover, I do not at all believe that such an operation is a result of my merits. I believe indeed that it is a rather deliberate operation on the part of those directly interested by what I am saying and who would like the people whose business it is to set about proliferating right away

about what can be retained from my statements under the title of thinking. That gives them a little anticipation of what they are hoping for. Namely, that what I am announcing, and which is not necessarily thinking, is without consequences, I mean for them. There is some feeding in it!

Nevertheless, you will see that this has a certain relation with what I am going to tell you today. We are still of course, at the psychoanalytic act. Why, in short, am I speaking about the psychoanalytic act? It is for psychoanalysts. They are truly the only ones who are implicated in it. Moreover, everything is in that. Today, I am advancing onto a terrain which is obviously little designed for such a large public, namely, how the psychoanalytic act can operate to bring about this something that we will call the identification of the psychoanalyst.

It is a way of taking up the question that at least has this interest: it is new. I mean that up to the present nothing sensible or solid has been articulated about what is involved in what qualifies the psychoanalyst as such. People speak, of course, about rules, about procedures, about modes of access, but this still does not say what a psychoanalyst is. The fact that I am speaking about the psychoanalytic act, from which in short I hope we will be able to take a step forward in what is called the qualification of the psychoanalyst, that I should be lead to speak about the psychoanalytic act before a public which is only in part concerned with it, like this one, is something that in itself gives rises to a problem. A problem that, moreover, is not at all insoluble. Because I want once more to mark what justifies - not what conditions: what conditions, is a series of (243) position-effects which, precisely, what we are able to push forward in our discourse today is going to allow us perhaps to specify something about. But in any case, whatever may be the conditioning [*Lacan interrupts his seminar to make an intervention directed at the audience "... please! Stop that messing! I have enough of it! I am asking you to put that wherever you want and leave me in peace"*] what justifies that, when one is speaking about the act before a wider public than the one interested in it, namely, properly speaking the psychoanalysts, it is obviously because the psychoanalytic act has a particularity. I could do a little more scribbling on the board to show you what it comes from in the famous quadrangle, the one that starts from "either I do not think, or I am not". With what it involves in terms of "I do not think", which is here on the top left, and "I am not", which is here on the bottom right. And you know that the psychoanalytic act takes place on this axis, culminating in this ejecting of the o



which has devolved, in short, to the charge of the psychoanalyst who has posed, has allowed, has authorised the conditions of the act, at the price of coming himself to support this function of the little *o*-object. The psychoanalytic act is obviously what gives this support, authorises what is going to be realised as the psychoanalysing task, and, it is in as much as the psychoanalyst gives to this act his authorisation that the psychoanalytic act is realised.

Now there is something quite curious in the fact that this act whose trajectory, in a way, ought to be accomplished by the Other, with this at least presumed result that what is properly speaking act, in so far as we might be lead to ask ourselves what an act is, is obviously not either in this condition, nor in this quite atypical trajectory that there ought to be drawn at least on this quadrangle, but in this one (\emptyset). Namely, in as much as the psychoanalysing subject, for his part, having come to this realisation of castration, it is a return achieved to the inaugural point, which in truth he never left, the statutory one, that of the forced choice, the (244) alienating choice between “either I am not” and “or I do not think”, which ought, by his act, accomplish this something finally realised by him. Namely, what makes him divided as subject. In other words, that he accomplishes an act while knowing, being fully aware, why this act will never realise him fully as subject.

The psychoanalytic act then, as it presents itself, is of a nature to - because it introduces another dimension of this act which does not act of itself, as I might say - may allow us to throw some light on what is involved in an act, the one that I drew just now crossways, the act without qualification. For I am not all the same going to call it human. I am not going to call it human for all sorts of reasons which this little hooking term that I quoted at the beginning can give you an inkling of, since it grounds man in principle. Or rather it grounds him again, or that it grounds him again every time the act in question, the act just by itself, the act that I am not naming, takes place ... which does not happen often.

At this point, naturally, I all the same tried to give some definitions so that we know what we are talking about. Specifically, that the act is a matter of the signifier (*un fait de signifiant*). It is indeed from this that we started when we began to stammer about it. A matter of the signifier where there takes its place the return of the effect described as the subject-effect which is produced by the word, in language of course, a return of this subject-effect in so far as it is radically divided. This is the novelty brought as a challenge by the psychoanalytic discovery that posits as essential that this subject-effect is a division-effect. This division-effect is that in as much as it is once realised, something can be its return. There can be a re-act. We can speak about act and this act that the psychoanalytic act is, which, for its part, is posited in such a curious fashion, because it is quite different in this sense that nothing requires it to be produced after what, in psychoanalysis, leaves the subject in the position of being able to act. Nothing implies that this, henceforth isolated by the action of the Other who guided him in his psychoanalysis, by a psychoanalysis whose act

allowed the task to be accomplished, nothing explains this leap through which this act which allowed the realising task, the psychoanalysing task, the psychoanalysand, as one might say, to assume what? The programme.

As regards the act - this is a little reflexive parenthesis that I will give here at the start and which is important, which refers moreover to the words by which I (245) began concerning the future of all thinking - all organised thinking is situated in a *bivium*, or starting from a *bivium*, which in our day is particularly clear. Either it rejects this subject-effect I am starting from by linking it once more to itself in a moment which would be original. This is the sense that the *cogito* had historically, the *cogito* is its model, and the honest model as one might say and it is honest because it posits itself as origin. When you see someone beginning to speak about the phantasy of the origin, you can know that he is dishonest. There is no phantasy to be grasped except *hic et nunc*. From now on this is the origin of the phantasy, after that, we can talk about it when we have found out where we are with it. As regards the *cogito* it did not posit itself as origin. Nowhere does Decartes say: "at the origin, the one who thinks gives rise to being". He says: "I think, therefore I am". And, starting from there, it is a good thing in fact, there is no need to be worried about it any more. He completely freed up the entry of science which will absolutely never worry again about the subject. Except, of course, at the required limit where this subject is found, when it has, after a certain time, to notice what it is operating with, namely, the mathematical system and, at the same time, the logical system.

It will do everything then in this logical system, to systematise it without having to deal with the subject, but it will not be easy. In truth, it will only be at these logical frontiers that the effect of the subject will continue to make itself felt, to make itself present and to create some difficulties for science. But for the rest, by reason of this initial approach of the *cogito*, one can say that to science everything was given, and, in short, in a legitimate way. Everything fell into its hands, it has to be said, with a immense field of success. But it is in a way at the price that science has absolutely nothing to say about the subject of the act. It does not impose one. It allows a lot to be done. Not everything that one might wish, it can do what it can, what it cannot do, it cannot. But it is able to do a lot. It is able to do a lot but it does not justify anything, or, more exactly, it gives no explicit reason for doing anything. It only presents itself as a temptation to do (*de faire*), an irresistible temptation, it is true. Everything that we can do with what science has conquered for three centuries, is not nothing, and we do not deprive us (246) ourselves of doing it. But it is in no way said that any act will measure up to it. Where it is a matter of act, where it is decided, where one makes use of it knowingly for ends that appear justified, it is a matter of a completely different style of thinking. It is the other part of the *bivium*. Here thinking gives itself up to the dimension of the act and, for that, it is enough for it to touch the subject-effect.

An example: the fundamental remark of a doctrine that is easy, I think, for you to recognise. The subject does not recognise itself, namely, is alienated in the order

of production which conditions his work. This by reason of the subject-effect called exploitation. No need to add "of man by man", because we have seen that one must be a little suspicious of man on this occasion, and then everyone knows that it was possible to turn this usage into an agreeable witticism. This by reason of the subject-effect then, which is at the foundation of all exploitation, here is something that has consequences as act. That is called the revolution. And, in the act consequences, thinking has the greatest difficulty in recognising itself as has been demonstrated to you, I think, your whole life long, since for a certain number of you it had even begun before your birth. The difficulties that what is called the *intelligentia* had, continues to have, with the Communist order.

All thinking, then, of this category which touches on the subject-effect participates in the act. To formulate it indicates, as one might say, the act and its reference. Only as long as the act has not got going, it is a reference, of course, that is difficult to sustain in the whole measure that it is only isolated at the end, as everyone knows. Any thinking that, in the past, gave rise to a school - the things that remain, like that, pinned up in university herbariums, the Stoic school, for example - had this end of act. This sometimes stops abruptly. I mean that, for the moment, for example, in the circle to which I made allusion, the act which in our time is pinpointed by the term revolutionary, the result is not there yet. It is not isolated nor isolatable, this reference to the act. But anyway, for the Stoics as I evoked them earlier, the fact is that this stopped short, that at a moment, people had nothing more to take than what had been taken from those who were engaged in this path of thinking. Starting from which the necrophagia that I spoke about earlier can begin, and, thank God it cannot go on forever either since there do not remain that many things as wrecks, as debris of this Stoic thinking. But in any case that keeps people busy!

(247) Having said this, let us come back to our psychoanalytic act. And let us take up again this little cross-piece exhibited on the board, about which I already made the remark many times, that you do not have to give a privileged value to the diagonals in it. You ought rather, to have a correct idea of it, see it as a sort of tetrahedron in perspective. That will help you to notice that the diagonal has no privilege in it.

The psychoanalytic act essentially consists in this sort of subject-effect that operates by distributing, as one might say, what is going to constitute the support. Namely, the divided subject, the \$, in so far as this is the acquisition of the subject-effect at the end of the psychoanalysing task. It is the truth conquered by the subject whatever he is and under whatever pretext he has become engaged in it. Namely, for example, for the most banal subject, the one who comes to it with the goal of getting relief. Here is my symptom. I now have the truth of it. I mean that it is in the whole measure that I did not know everything about what was involved in me. It is in the whole measure that there is something irreducible in this position of the subject that is called, in short, and is quite nameable, the impotence to know everything about it. That I am here and that, thank God, the symptom that revealed what remains masked in the subject-effect reverberates

with a knowledge. What is masked there I had lifted, but assuredly not completely. Something remains irreducibly limited in this knowledge. It is at the price - since I spoke about distribution - of the fact that the whole experience turned around this little *o*-object of which the analyst became the support. The little *o*-object in so far as it is what is, was and remains structurally the cause of this division of the subject. It is in the measure that the existence of this little *o*-object has been demonstrated in the psychoanalysing task, and how? But you all know it. In the transference-effect. It is in so far as the partner is the one who is found to fulfil, from the structure established by the act, the function that, ever since the subject has operated as subject-effect, as caught in the demand as constituting desire, he found himself determined by these functions that analysis pinpointed as being those of the feeding object, of the breast, of the excremental object, of the scybalum, of the function of the look and of that of the voice. It is in so far as it is around these functions, in so far as in the analytic relation they have been distributed to the one who is the partner, the pivot, and to say the word, the support of it, as I said the last time, the instrument, that there has been able to be realised the essence of what is involved in the function of $\$$, namely, the impotence of knowledge.

(248) Will I evoke here the analogy between this distribution and the tragic act? For you sense clearly that in tragedy, there is something analogous. I mean that what there is for us, in tragic fiction as it is expressed in a mythology in which it is not at all ruled out that we should see incidents that are altogether historical, lived, real. I mean that the hero, each and every one who engages himself alone in the act, is doomed to this destiny of finally being only the waste product of his own enterprise. I have no need to give examples. Just the level that I call that of fiction or of mythology suffices to fully indicate its structure. But, all the same, let us not forget, let us not confuse tragic fiction - I mean the myth of Oedipus, or Antigone, for example - with what is truly an acceptance, the only valid grounded one of tragedy, namely, the staging of the thing. In the staging we are obviously closer to this *schize* as it is supported in the psychoanalysing task. At the end of psychoanalysis, one can support the division of the psychoanalysing subject that has been realised, with the division in the arena in which there could be played out the tragic production in the purest form. We can identify this psychoanalysand, to the divided and related couple of the spectator and the chorus. While the hero, there is no need for there to be a crowd of them, there is never more than one, the hero, is the one who, on the stage, is nothing but that figure of waste product with which there closes every tragedy worthy of the name.

The structural analogy hovers there in such an obvious fashion that it is the reason why it was brought in massively, as one might say, under the pen of Freud. It is why this analogy haunts, as one might say, the whole analytic ideology. Only with an effect of exaggeration which is close to the grotesque and which ensures, moreover, the total incapacity revealed in this literature that is called analytic to make anything other, around this mythical reference, than an extraordinarily sterile kind of circular repetition. With from time to time, all the same, the feeling that there is something there about a division. And people do not see what

separates it, people do not see where is the radical insufficiency which makes us inadequate to it.

This strikes certain people. It is not the worst that it strikes. But it gives results that truly cannot go much further than yapping. Let us not forget the Oedipus complex, nor what the Oedipus complex is, nor the degree to which it is the interring, integrally linked to the structure of all our experience. And when one (249) has produced this reminder, one does not have to go much further. It is indeed why, moreover, I do not consider that I am wronging anyone by having sworn to myself never to take up again the theme of the Name of the Father. Upon which, seized by some vertigo or other which has happily abated, I once said I would engage myself in the circuit of one of my years of seminars. Things taken up at this level are *hopeless*, while we have a much surer way of tracing it concerning the subject effect, and which has to do with logic.

If I led you to the cross-roads of this properly logical effect that modern logic has so well defined under the term of the function of quantifiers, it is obviously for a reason very close to the one that I announced to you as being the question for today. Namely, the relations of the psychoanalytic act to something of the order of a predication. Namely, what is involved, how can we say that it situates the psychoanalyst.

Let us not forget, if it is at the end of an experience of the division of the subject that something called the psychoanalyst can be established, we cannot trust a pure and simple identification of the term of the one which is at the source of the definition of the signifier, that every signifier represents a subject for another signifier. Precisely, the signifier, whatever it may be, cannot be all that represents the subject. Precisely, as I showed you the last time, because the function that we pinpoint as “all” is dependent on a cause which is none other than the little *o*-object, if this little *o*-object, fallen into the interval which, as one might say, alienates the complementarity - I reminded you of it the last time - of what is involved in the subject represented by the signifier of the subject *S* with the *S*, whatever it maybe, a predicate that can be established in the field of the Other. So then, that what is involved, through this effect, of the “all” in so far as it is stated, involves something completely different to that towards which, as I might say, identification does not go. Namely, towards the recognition come from the Other, since this is what is at stake, that in nothing of what we can inscribe of ourselves in the field of the Other, can we recognise ourselves.

This “all”, what represents us in this business of recognition could have to do with this void, with this hollow, with this lack. Now this is not the way things are.

The fact is that at the source of the establishment of this “all” that is required (250) every time we state anything universal, there is something other than the (*im*)possibility that it masks, namely, that of having oneself recognised. And this has been proved in analytic experience by something that I will articulate in a

very condensed way because it is exemplary: that sex is not an *all* (*pas tout*), for this is the discovery of psychoanalysis. It is all very well to see there emerging today all sorts of collections by people who have been delegated to collect a certain number of texts about what is involved, about this famous field so bizarrely preserved, reserved, which psychoanalysis is. A research bursary is given to a gentleman called Brown who wrote something not all that bad: *Life against death*, once upon a time. He took advantage of it to say rather sensible things about Mr Luther, and since it was for the benefit of the Wesleyan University, all of that was rather well justified. But in the end losing all sense of measure in these collecting operations, he published something called *Love's body* in which there is a commentary in a note that speaks about Freudian pansexualism. Now precisely, if what Freud said signifies anything, it is of course that there was a reference to what people might expect should be produced from sexual conjunction, namely, a union, a whole (*un tout*). If there is something that is forced on us, precisely, at the end of the experiment, it is that, in the sense that I am indicating to you and that I am making resonate for you, sex is not everything (*tout*). The all finds its place, which does not at all mean that this place is the place of the all. The all usurps it by making it believe, as I might say that it, the all comes from sex. This is how the function of truth changes its value, if I can express myself in this way, and that what is found to fit in very well, which is encouraging, with certain discoveries which have been made in the field of logic, which can be expressed as follows, make us put our finger on the fact that the all, the function of the all, the quantifier all, the function of the universal, that the all should be conceived of as a displacement of the part. It is in as much as the little o-object, alone, justifies and gives rise to the function of the all as such, that we find ourselves subjected in logic to this category of the all. But at the same time that there are explained a certain number of curiosities which isolate it in the totality of logical functions, I mean this field in which there reigns the system of the quantifier, which isolates it by giving rise in it to curious difficulties, strange paradoxes.

Of course, there is every interest in the greatest possible number of you - and I am also saying for everyone just as much as for you - should have a certain logical (251) culture. I mean that no one here has anything to lose by going to educate himself in what is taught in places about the already constituted fields of the progress of present day logic. You have nothing to lose in going very precisely to educate yourself in it in order to understand what it is I am trying out here, in outlining a logic functioning in an intermediary zone, in as much as it has not yet been handled in a appropriate fashion. You will lose nothing, by grasping what I am alluding to when I say that even though the logic of quantifiers has managed to obtain its proper and truly quite rigorous status, I mean has every appearance of having excluded the subject from it, I mean can be managed by means of pure and simple rules which depend on the handling of letters, it nevertheless remains that, if you compare the use of this logic of quantifiers with such and such another sector, segment, of logic as they are defined in different terms, you will notice that it is curious that while, for all the other logical systems you can always give a rather large number, for example, of geometrical, economic, conceptual

interpretations, I mean that each one of these manipulations of logical systems is quite multivalent as regards interpretation, it is quite striking, on the contrary, to see that whatever may be the rigour to which people have been able, when all is said and done, to push the logic of quantifiers, you will never manage to remove from it this something which is inscribed in the grammatical structure, I mean in ordinary language, and which makes intervene these functions of all and some.

This has consequences one of which has only been able to be highlighted among logicians, I mean where people knew how to make use of what a deduction is. Namely, that anywhere we underpin a system, an apparatus such as the one at stake in the use of the quantifiers, we cannot create algorithms such that it is enough for it to be settled in advanced, that every problem is purely and simply subjected to the use of a rule, of a calculation fixed once and for all. Once we are in this field, we will always be capable of making the undecidable emerge in it.

A strange privilege. For those here who have never heard tell of the undecidable, I am going to illustrate what I am saying by a little example. What does "undecidable" mean? I apologise to those for whom what I am going to say will appear to be an old refrain. I take an example, there are many. You know - or (252) you do not know - what a perfect number is. It is a number such that it is equal to the sum of its divisors. For example: the divisors of the number 6 are 1, 2 and 3, $1+2+3 = 6$. It is also true for 28. It is not a matter of prime numbers, it is a matter of divisors, which means: given a number, into how many equal parts can you divide it? For 28, that will give 14, 7, 4, 2 and 1 that gives you 28.

You see that these two numbers are even numbers. We know lots of them like that. We do not know any odd number that is perfect. That does not mean that they do not exist. The important thing is that one cannot prove that it is impossible that some exist. This is something undecidable. Something undecidable whose link with the structure, the logical function of quantifiers it is not my role here to make you touch. Let us say that if it is really necessary this could be reserved for a closed seminar. I will ask someone whose job it is more than mine to do it in association with me.

But this privilege of the function of quantifiers in so far as it interests us to the highest degree, as you are going to see right away, this privilege - I am raising the hypothesis provisionally, let us say - this impasse in so far as it is, you should note, a fruitful impasse. For if we had the slightest hope that everything could be subjected to a universal algorithm, that in everything we could settle the question of whether a proposition is true or false, this would be rather a closing down. The hypothesis that I am raising depends on the fact that this privilege of the function of quantification depends on what is involved in the essence of the all and its relation to the presence of the little o-object.

There exists something that functions so that every subject believes himself to be all, so that every subject believes himself to be all subject, and through that very

fact the subject of all (*tout*), from this very fact having a right to speak about everything.

Now what analytic experience shows us is that there is no subject whose totality is not an illusion, because it comes from the little *o*-object *qua* elided.

We are now going to try to illustrate it, by showing why this interests us in the most direct fashion. How is there correctly expressed what is involved in the properly analytic dimension if not as follows: all knowledge is not conscious.

(253) The ambiguity, the problematic, the fundamental *schize* that the function of quantifier introduces in so far as it introduces a “for all” and an “it exists”, consists in the fact that it admits but at the same time puts in question the fact that if we say: “it is not true that for all ... what follows, things are such and such”, this implies that it exists. That there is, of this all, something which is not, because it is not true that for all that there are some which are not (*il y en a qui ne pas*).

In other words that, because a negation operates on the universal, something arises from the existence of a particular and that, in the same way, because not all is affected with a not (*ne pas*), something still more striking, there are some - as they say - who, giving rise to a positive particular existence from a double negation, that of a truth which, withdrawn from the all by not being, will make a particular existence emerge from it.

Now, is it enough that it is not demonstrated that all something for there to exist something which is not? You clearly sense, there is here a danger, a question which, just by itself, is enough to render very suspect this use of negation in so far as it would be enough just by itself to assure the link, the coherence of the reciprocal functions of the universal and the particular. As regards what is involved in knowledge, if from the fact that all knowledge is not conscious, we can no longer admit as fundamental that knowledge knows itself, does that mean that it is correct to say that there is something unconscious (*de l'inconscient*)?

It is very precisely what, in this article included in my *Ecrits* called *Position of the unconscious*, I tried to make tangible by using in it what I was able to construct at that time. Namely, a little parable which was nothing other than a way of imaging in a species that even, if I remember correctly, I called, because I rather like playing on the word *homme*, “*l'homelette*” and which is nothing other than the little *o*-object. Naturally, this may be the opportunity for a future “scholar” to imagine that when I was writing my *Position of the unconscious*, I had not the slightest idea about logic, as if of course what constitutes the order of my discourses did not consist precisely in adapting them for a certain audience, as it is supposed to be. This is, moreover, not entirely so, because one knows well what the ears of psychoanalysts are capable of receiving or not receiving at a given moment...

(254) As regards qualification, for a very long time, for everything involved in knowledge, the constructive reflection around *episteme* put in question what is involved for the practitioner when it is knowledge that is at stake. At the level of Plato every time it is a matter of assuring a knowledge in its status it is the reference to the artisan which predominates. And nothing seems to me to prevent it being announced that every human practice - I am saying practice (*pratique*) because this is not at all to say, because we are making the act predominate that we reject the reference to it - every practitioner supposes a certain knowledge if we want to advance into what is involved in *episteme*. To know everything about carpentry is what for us will define the carpenter.

This secretly implies that carpentry knows itself as an art - I am not saying as material, of course - which is prolonged for us analysts by the fact that knowing everything about therapeutics qualifies the therapist, which implies, and in a more doubtful manner, that therapy knows itself.

Now if there is something which most - excuse me, I am going to say it! - instinctively repels the psychoanalyst, it is that knowing everything about psychoanalysis qualifies the psychoanalyst, and it is not without reason, very precisely because of the following. Not of course that we know any more in that way about what the psychoanalyst is. But that all knowledge about psychoanalysis depends so much on the reference to the experience of the little *o*-object, in as much as at the end it is radically excluded from any subsistence as subject. That the psychoanalyst in no way has the right to posit himself as giving an evaluation of the experience of which he is properly speaking only the pivot and the instrument. Any knowledge which depends here on this function of the little *o*-object assuredly does not guarantee anything, and is precisely not able to answer for its totality, except in a reference to this instrumentation, certainly requires that should be nothing that can present itself as an all of this knowledge. But that precisely this absence, this lack, does not in any way require one to be able to deduce from it either that there has been or that there has not been psychoanalysis. The reflection, the rebounding of negation at the level of the all does not imply any consequence at the level of the particular that the status of the psychoanalyst as such depends on nothing other than the following. That he offers himself to support, in a certain process of knowledge, this role of object of demand, or cause of desire, which means that the knowledge obtained can only be taken for what it is: a signifying realisation linked to a revelation of the phantasy.

If the *not all* that we put in the *not all knowledge is conscious*, represents the (255) non-constitution of all knowledge, and this at the very level at which knowledge is required, it is not true that there necessarily exists unconscious knowledge that we can theorise in accordance with just any logical model.

Is the psychoanalyst that the psychoanalysand is, at the end of his task, what it is? A whole way of presenting the theory, because it implies a way of thinking, puts into psychoanalytic action this factor which intervenes as a parasite. The psychoanalyst has the last word about what must be thought of it. Namely, that

he is the one who has the thinking out of the whole affair. That the psychoanalysand at the end is supposed to be regularised, which implies that he brings into being a certain subjective conjunction, that he re-positions himself anew with a renewed *I do not think* only it goes from the special to the general.

Is that how things are? Never. It is not a simple riddle that the psychoanalyst, who knows it better than anyone through experience, should set about conceiving in this form of science fiction, it has to be said, the fruit that he himself obtains from it.

Is it then in the order of *pour-soi* that the psychoanalysand's trajectory is completed? This is something that is no less contradicted by the very principle of the unconscious, through which the subject is condemned not alone to remain divided from a thinking which cannot be assumed by any *I am who is thinking* which posits an *en-soi* of the *I think* that is irreducible to anything thinking it for itself. It is precisely the end of psychoanalysis that he should realise himself as constituted by this division, this division in which every signifier, in so far as it represents a subject for another signifier, includes the possibility of its inefficacy precisely by bringing about this representation of its failure as a representative. There is no one psychoanalysed, there is someone "who has been a psychoanalysand", from which there results only a subject who has been made aware, of what he cannot think of as constitutive of any of his own actions.

We do not yet have any existing type to conceive of what must be involved in this experienced subject. It can only be judged with regard to an act which is to be constructed like the one that, reiterating castration, is established as a *passage à l'acte*. Just as its complement, the psychoanalytic task itself, is reiterated by cancelling itself out as sublimation.

But this tells us nothing about the status of the psychoanalyst for, in truth, if its essence is to assume the place, in which the *o*-object is situated in this operation, (256) what is the possible status of the subject who puts himself in this position? The psychoanalyst in this position may not at all have what I have just developed, namely, not the slightest idea of what conditions it; not the slightest idea of science. This is even the usual thing. In truth, he is not even asked to have it, given the field he occupies and the function that he has to fulfil in it. He will have a lot to learn on the contrary about the logical support of the science. But if I refer in its connection to the statutes of the practitioner whatever they may be, is it to be ruled out that in any of these statutes, as they have been evoked for us since antiquity, in terms of reflection on science, but still in fact present in a certain number of fields, is what can be defined as obvious in the light of, no doubt, and only by, psychoanalysis, in a practical function, by highlighting the presence of the little *o*-object, not a resource, a value for him?

Why, at the end of the year on the *Crucial problems of psychoanalysis*, did I make so much here of the function of perspective? It seems that it is a theory, an operation that only interests an architect, if it is only to show, what he himself had

isolated from all time, I mean ever since the time when, we do not know too well how, to justify the ideal which directed, for example, what is bequeathed to us in the *grammatismes* of a Vitruvius. That what is at stake, what dominates, what we would be quite wrong, given the presence of ideals, to reduce to the utilitarian function of building, for example, what dominates, is a reference that I tried to explain to you in relation to the subject-effect when perspective comes into its proper structure with Dessargue. Namely, when it establishes this other definition of space called projective geometry. And this putting in question of the very domain of vision could it seems, as a first approach, be entirely supported by a patterning of squares. But, on the contrary, there appears there this closed structure, starting from which I was able to try to isolate, to define for you amongst all the others, and because it is the most neglected in the analytic function, the function of the little *o*-object called the look.

Is it for nothing that at the end of this same year, around the painting of *Las Meninas*, I made a presentation to you that is no doubt difficult but that must be (257) taken as an apologue, an example, a reference for the behaviour of a psychoanalyst. Because what is involved in the illusion of the subject supposed to know is always around what is admitted so easily by the whole field of vision. If on the contrary, around this exemplary work, the painting *Las Meninas*, I wanted to show inscribed the function of what is involved in the look, and the fact that it has to operate in such a subtle way that it is at once present and veiled, it is, as I pointed out to you, the very existence of us spectators, that it puts in question. Reducing it to being in a way no more than a shadow with respect to what is established in the field of the painting in terms of an order of representation that does not, properly speaking, have anything to do with what any subject can represent to himself. Is this not the example and the model in which something of a discipline which relates to the very core of the position of the psychoanalyst could be exercised? Is it not the trap to which there yields, in this curious fictitious representation that I tried to give you earlier as that where the psychoanalyst ends up by coming to a halt, with regard to the experience he calls clinical. Could he not find there the model, the reminder, the sign, that nothing can be established in the world, that nothing can be established in the world of his experience without there being, in all necessity, presentified there, and as such, the function of his own look.

Assuredly this is only an indication. But an indication given, as I often do at the end of one or other of my discourse, very much ahead of time. It depends on the fact that if, in psychoanalysis - I mean in the operation situated within the four walls of the office in which it is practised - everything about the little *o*-object is brought into play, it is with a very curious reserve, and this is not by chance, concerning what is involved in the look. And there, I would like to indicate before leaving you today the proper accent the little *o*-object takes on from a certain immunity to negation which may explain the way in which, at the end of the psychoanalysis, the choice is made which leads to the establishment of the psychoanalytic act, namely, what is undeniable in this little *o*-object.

Notice the difference in this negation when it is brought to bear, in predicative logic, on the not-man, as if that existed, but it is imagined, it is supported. "I do not see", the negation depends on something indistinct, where it is a matter of a failure of my sight or a failure of the lighting, that motivates the negation. But, "I am not looking", is this not something that just by itself gives rise to more complementary objects than any other statement. I mean that I am looking at this or that, "I am not looking" means assuredly that there is something undeniable, since I am not looking at him. And the same thing in the four other registers of the little *o*-object which would be incarnated in a "I am not taking" for what concerns the breast - and we know what that means, the appeal that it realises at the level of anorexia nervosa. Of the "I am not letting go" and we know what that means in this structuring avarice of desire. And will I go on to evoke, at the end of what I have to say to you today, what we make understood with an "I am not saying", is in general understood as, "I am not saying no". Hear it yourselves as that: "I am not saying no".

Seminar 15: Wednesday 27 March 1968

J Lacan: This seminar does not at all seem to me to have begun under inauspicious conditions. The reduction of your number is certainly favourable for what I would like, namely, that there should be exchanged here some questions and perhaps answers or rectifications. This small number is probably the result of different conditions, up to and including the fact that there are holidays coming and even also examination periods, and a thousand other factors. One cannot but regret that certain senior members of my School who attend my seminars are not here ... I hope that they will show up because I would like them to get into action. But if they are not there we will do without them.

How to proceed? I received a certain number of letters responding to my soliciting questions. We could read a certain number of them. I have to choose because I received a good number. Is Mr Soury there? I begin with his.

“You have attached the effects of the signifier to the possibility of a consequence ...” This in effect is a quotation, I do not know whether everyone caught it in passing in one of my sentences. I did not have the time to verify the moment at which, under what circumstances I pronounced it but this is not too important; I must, at the beginning of a lecture, have put the accent, probably in response to some contradiction that had been glimpsed, on the term of consequence and on the fact that, to connote it by a biographical figure, the essence of what we put forward as the testimony of our experience, is that events have consequences in it. (259) It is quite certain that the term “consequence”, at the moment that I put it forward, I must have put it forward with the connotation that it takes on from everything that is brought to us in terms of reflection and of what is presentified for us. The fact is that the very notion of consequence as we are able to apprehend it, in so far as we are taught to reflect, is linked to the functions of logical succession. What is there before any consequence, is the articulation of a discourse with what it involves as a continuation, as an implication. One could say that the first field in which we have the apprehension of a necessity, is that of logical necessity. When we say something, it has its importance (*ça tire à conséquence*). Namely, that we can be caught at one or other detour of this sentence, a place to land, a conclusion, a way to close or to conclude. This is implicit in the discourse itself.

You say to me: “consequence can be used for temporal succession, for determinist objects” (I do not see very clearly what you mean by determinist

objects) “for animal life ...” and you quote right away, to articulate what you are saying: “the consequence of an impact is that the particle has as impulsion ...”. Yes, I do not know if it is the best use of the word ‘consequence’. We try as far as possible, to express the effect of an impact, namely, the transmission of impulsions, in formulae that will include the least consequences possible, and ‘consequence’ comes to take its place, we will speak about it again. We will say rather as regards what concerns the law of the transmission of the impact, namely the effect of action and reaction, that all of this will have its importance when we have to speak about it.

In other words, what is important in analysed, analysable experience is not presented at all, in effect, at all at the level of effects which are conceived uniquely from a dynamic function but at the level of a dimension of effects which implies that a question is posed at a level which is locatable as that of language-consequences.

In other words, it is because a subject has not been able in any way, to articulate something primary, that his subsequent effort to give it, I would not even say meaning, sense, but articulation in the sense properly that this articulation is made up of nothing other than a signifying sequence, which takes on a more precise form, the accent of consequence starting from the moment when scissions are established in it. It is in this dimension that there is carried out the whole of this experience which is analytic experience, in so far as what it concerns, is assuredly (261) all sorts of things which have an effect in completely different registers than those of pure and simple discourse. But the fact is that it is in as much as it is a matter of the domain of what takes effect, is caught up in this language articulation, that it interests us, that it creates a question, that we can grasp it in the analysable field.

By their duration, by their persistence, by their adhesive effect on what lasts, on what is maintained in this effect of articulation, we can in effect indirectly measure what is displaced, into the other field that is precisely the field of real forces. But it is always through some knot of consequences, and of signifying consequences, of signifying articulations that we have a hold on what is at stake.

Naturally, this cannot claim in any way to be sufficient. But since you do not seem to be struck by what I wanted simply to give at this level in terms of a brief remark, the fact is that the term “consequence” takes on its true import, its resonance, its ordinary usage at the logical level. And it is indeed because it is a matter of a re-working, of a work, of a logical development that we have to deal with something analysable.

This is a first approach. Naturally, it is in the whole measure that we have been able to push things much further, to give a formulation of these effects that I call subject-effects, to the point of really being quite close to giving them a status, that all of this in tenable.

But this was only a reminder. I am saying this to you as a way of awaking your attention, to accommodate your ear to the inspiration of a discourse.

You then articulate, as if it were convincing: “a child is the consequence of a copulation”.

Logically, the use of this term ‘consequence’ is suspect. In this connection, you appeal to someone to anticipate a little the consequence of his acts. You will say that precisely because you have passed on to the ethical plane. In the case of the mid-wife you are not going to talk about pregnancy as a consequence; that would seem to be superfluous.

And then you add some remarks who have nothing to do with my course but which are personal to you. I read them since, after all, I do not see why I would not take them into account. “Mathematics are diverted into obscurantism because, probably, the rigour in the handling of the signifier becomes the alibi of the absence of rigour in the use of the signifier - social classification, salary indices, examination marks, statistics. The internal concatenation of demonstration, of definitions, is converted into lectures, a concatenation of lectures. Modern mathematics, with its structure, allows there to be formulated the absence of rigour in question, but this possibility is not utilised”.

What do you mean by that?

M. Soury: That recent mathematics allows there to be formulated abuses in the use of figures. If one wants to make understood obscurantist usage, an example is the zero in class, which has replaced the dunce’s cap. The modern school does not give a dunce’s cap, but zero’s. The zero has come from figures and benefits from the prestige of figures and from the prestige of the rigour of figures.

How has the zero, coming from this tradition, become an insult at the disposition of the professor, an ignominious label used against pupils.

The astonishing passage is how a rigorous creation like figures, and the zero in particular, has become an insult to pupils, a dunce’s cap, but which is more respected than if a real dunce’s cap were used?

J. Lacan: Do you believe that we have to bring modern mathematics into play to rise up against this or pose ourselves some questions about the use of the zero?

What I see interesting in what you are saying, what that suggests to me are little points of history that people do not think about, in effect. Since when has zero been used in class? There must be historical testimonies of this. It is obvious that one could only have been able to give a zero in class from the time that the zero functioned in mathematics, which only happened with the adoption of Arabic figures. Namely, that people did not give a zero in the time of the Roman pedants, since the zero did not exist.

Since when were marks given from zero to twenty, might be interesting. Nevertheless, perhaps to extend the reprobation that is inspired in you by the zero conceived of as a weapon to something or other that is supposed to be inherent in the use of mathematics, appears problematic to me.

(263) **Soury:** Not inherent.

J. Lacan: But in any case you make an allusion to the dimension of modern mathematics. I thought, in truth that your remark was closer to something that I suggested, not that the structures allow there to be formulated absences of rigour, but that, in the logic of this mathematics, we see there arising the necessity that it finds itself brought to by its own development, of elaborating its logic. We find ourselves confronted with knots which are inherent in logic itself and which can for us, appear as a kind of resonance of something that constitutes in our field, the field of analysis, what we have to elaborate in terms of logic from a register that is necessarily different because it is applied to a completely different order. Anyway, let us not go on about this.

I will take other questions. Rudrauf, would you like to make a little choice in what you have written?

M. Rudrauf: In fact I had taken up one of your formulae. You have, it seems to me - this is the way I experienced it - stigmatised a certain inversion of your formula "the unconscious is structured like a language". Someone had said, "why not language is structured like the unconscious"? To which you responded clearly that in logic one should go from the known to the unknown and not from the unknown to the known.

This inversion of your formula seemed to me ... to pose a problem of comprehension about the formula itself, in this sense. To say: "the unconscious is structured like a language", is to suppose language known and the unconscious unknown. Since after all this language - and what language? - in the image of which we see the unconscious being structured, was it so well known? And this unconscious to which we might refer was it so completely unknown?

During a subsequent seminar you made some remarks that seemed to me, where you said: "if I say that the unconscious is structured like a language, that does not mean that I know it".

This is obviously to pose the whole question of the knowledge of the analyst, or of the knowledge through which, or from the angle of which, by means of logical articulation. But all the people who are confronted by analytic problems are (264) confronted with the problem of knowing what is happening, what the sick person knows, what the sick person and ourselves learn about this x, which is the unconscious. After all, this x, why say this x, why do I structure the unconscious

here through x , namely mathematical language or through a mathematical figure
...

J. Lacan: x is not in itself a formulation equivalent to “unknown”. It is in the language of novels that one designates an unknown as Mr X or Mr Y. The mathematical usage of x is not at all something which stands for unknown: x designates what is called a variable. It is not the same thing.

M. Rudrauf: In a problem that is posed, x = the unknown in the language of the little pupil.

J. Lacan: Good, let us leave x aside. I do not believe I ever designated the unconscious, in so far as I consider it - as you say very well - as, if not unknown, at least at the start, for us, in its function as unconscious, much less known, and with good reason, than language, I have not for all that identified it to the function usually in use for the letter x in mathematics.

On the contrary you have brought together two things which obviously it is quite legitimate to bring together, which are the fact that I first said that it is not at all the same thing to say that “the unconscious is structured like a language” and to say that “language is structured like the unconscious”. First of all, because the second thing does not really have any follow-up. People were trying to formulate things and rather closely to me, in a fashion that is much more pointed, much more important, than that the order of the unconscious is what the possibility of language can be founded on. This has greater pretensions than the other, and it is more dangerous, as I might say. It is not less weak, but it is more insinuating.

On the contrary, when I say that I can implicate in this dimension, in this approach of my teaching, this whole part of my position that is not knowledge, it is a correction, it is more than a correction. It is to try to bring in here that there can be, when it is a matter of an analyst, a teaching which is supported without involving this principle that there is somewhere something which entirely settles (265) the question. There is a subject supposed to know.

I am saying that we can, in effect, advance into this teaching and in as much, very precisely, as it has as a start this formula without it implying that we also put ourselves in this position that I called properly professorial and which is the one that always elides the fact that the subject supposed to know is in a way there; that the truth is already somewhere. What is the point of your remark once you have made this connection which I have told you that I accept?

M. Rudrauf: If I take up again the text as I formulated it there, it means that to say that the unconscious is structured like a language, is to mark on first hearing, the unconscious is represented as an existing field, according to another of your formula, namely, existing before it is known. Thus sending us back to other reversible formulae, to ask: how is the unconscious structured?

One could say: the unconscious is structured like symptoms, because we search for the psychoanalytic meaning of the symptom; that the unconscious is structured like a dream - of course one could say that the dream is structured like a language - that the unconscious is structured like a child's drawing.

J. Lacan: If you contest that the unconscious is structured like a language it does not take you very far. I assure you that there are many reasons to contest that the dream is structured like a language. If the dream is structured like a language, it is in as much precisely as the dream is the royal road to the unconscious, but that it is not the unconscious just by itself. It is a phenomenon that has many other dimensions than that of being the royal road to the unconscious, and one can speak about the dream otherwise than by speaking about the unconscious. It is even regrettable that people are not more attached to the phenomenon of the dream when it has been separated out, extracted from its relation to the unconscious.

There are all sorts of dimensions of the dream that would deserve to be explained. When I see one or other person who, happily, writes in an obscure journal so that it avoids me having to fight against a style of objection that is really lamentable. (266) When a person trots out a certain number of features to which he believes he can give consistency in the form that one of the effects of what he calls the dream work is the violence it exercises on something whose material, when all is said and done, he does not at all contest belongs to language, it is a distortion, implied in a quite summary fashion with respect to what concerns the incidences of desire that characterise the dream. He can find, here and there, with no difficulty, in the text of Freud himself, a support for these remarks. But one cannot say that he contributes anything whatsoever to the essence of the question. I am not denying at all that, in the dream, language, if only because of the *Rücksichtsdarstellbarkeit*, considerations of representability, and many other things as well, undergoes extremely important distortions, contractions, deformations. Not only am I not denying it, but who would dream of denying it? If the dream interests me in so far as there appears in it, and from the first, this mechanism that I identified to metaphor and to metonymy because it forces itself on us, it is precisely in the measure that the dream is the royal road to the unconscious. It is not something different. It is not to exhaust the substance of the dream, so that it is not an objection to see something else intervening in it.

So then let us not insist too much on this article, except to mark that the confusion of notions of violence undergone with that of work is to say the least strange from the philosophical point of view. The confusion of dream work with violence is supposed to be a kind of representation which I am not denying, when all is said and done, is related to language, but whose whole interest would be to present to us in such a distorted fashion something quite curious and which obviously only draws its source from the fact of coming from a work place, whose principal goal is to distort what I am saying.

I ask myself moreover how it would it have been possible, in this same tender book, to set about distorting anything whatsoever if the material of what I say did not exist. (I am talking very specifically about the course of Mr Ricoeur).

M. Rudrauf: I think that this question of the dream as the royal road to the (267) unconscious is effectively directly linked to this discovery by Freud that the dream speaks, that the dream is structured like a language and that, to understand the dream, to interpret the dream, it is a matter of translating its language, of transforming what up to then appeared like a series of images into a linguistically organised series of signifiers.

The question I thought I was asking (I find it difficult to take up again the synthesis of this question) is the following: this language which is at the same time the path along which we are trying to arrive at the unconscious, and which is at the same time the object that we are searching for, this language what is it? And whose is it? This brings us back to the question of the subject in so far as it is a fact of language, and of language in so far as it is not language except in so far as it is for us revelatory of the subject, an act of the subject. It is at this level more or less that the question is posed.

J. Lacan: Language is not at all an act of the subject. A discourse can on occasion be an act of the subject. But language, precisely, puts us face to face with something as regards which it is altogether to make a jump, and an excessive jump, if you settle this point as regards which I am not saying either that we can say the contrary. I made an allusion to some dimensions. In particular to one of them which is called the undecidable. Why not use it on this occasion? I am not saying that we can prove that it is not an act of the subject. The fact of not being able to prove it, obviously, does not decide anything. But in any case this does not allow us either to affirm in any way that language is an act of the subject, which is obviously implied by the whole position described as the search, whatever it maybe, for the origin of language, which consists in imagining something that up to the present no one has managed to imagine in a satisfying way. Namely, how it could have happened one day that there were people who spoke.

I note simply that, in the history of linguistics, it is very precisely from the day when a certain number of people came together by engaging their honour to one another not to raise this question that linguistics was able to begin. This is simply a historical fact. It has no more of a consequence that one day, someone (he was called Lavoisier) said to himself, in all of these little manipulations by chemists, one should weigh what had gone into the sphere at the beginning and at the end. This does not mean that chemistry is all a matter of weighing, far from it, as was (268) proved by what followed. But here it is of the same order. It is a decisive act at the beginning. We are precisely going to abstain from thinking about everything that could emerge from language as an act of the subject. From that moment on, the extraordinary thing is that people made some valid discoveries in the matter of linguistics, which it must indeed be said, there was no trace of

before. It is all very well point out, there is no need to tickle one's brain to find that *Cratylus* is not so bad. So there were already people who are capable of saying things that were not bad, but this does not constitute in any way even the beginning of a science of language. Linguistics is born from a certain moment when as in all the moments of the birth of a science, it is a moment of that order, of a practical order, there is someone who began to fiddle with the material by imposing a certain number of exclusive laws on himself and limiting himself to a certain number of operations. From this moment on something is possible; it is no more demonstrative; it begins to become demonstrative from the moment that we pose ourselves questions about what can be called the subject-effect. Namely, how does the prohibition of a certain number of registers happen. Setting them aside allows there to be better determined what is happening as a subject-effect, which is not at all necessarily a subject homogeneous to the one that we have to deal with in the common, ordinary usage language. But when we prohibit precisely something that, when one looks at it closely, comes back to limiting language, not at all dominating it, overcoming it, inscribing it in anything whatsoever that might be called a meta-language or a meta-tongue, but on the contrary by isolating certain fields of it. And then subject-effects are produced which are not moreover necessarily human subjects or speaking subjects.

I think that the term "subject" to indicate the field of a science is not necessarily badly chosen either. I spoke about chemistry or about linguistics. There is a subject of chemistry, or linguistics, just as there is also a subject of modern logic. It is more or less established, it goes more or less far, it is more or less vague, it is altogether capital for us to take this sort of reference to know what we are saying when we are speaking about the status of the subject.

It is quite obvious that the status of the subject that we are dealing with in analysis is none of those subjects, nor indeed any of the other subjects that may be situated in the field of a currently constituted science.

(269) **M Rudrauf:** I would like to specify that when I said: "language is a act of the subject", I meant that the language that you give us, your act of discourse, is your act. But in the measure that language is not an act of the subject, I think that it ought to be defined as being the locus of the act of the other.

J. Lacan: Yes, it is risky. I will redirect the question to our dear Nassif, but Nassif has done on this point a work of condensing everything that I said last year, adding to it a note that we still have to take great advantage of. I do not want to abuse either him or you by asking him to answer you on this subject. It is very daring in any case what you have just said. It is more than daring, it can be criticised. Unfortunately our time is measured and I cannot give all its development to all of this.

I would like, because I always have a little scruple about making you go out of your way without you leaving with something in your knapsack, to try to take advantage of the fact that today we are an informal group. I insist - it is especially

for me that this may be insulting, more than for anyone else - on the absence here, of a certain number of people who at other moments are assiduous in attending what I am putting forward this year in the seminar. Why are they not there? Is it because perhaps I might have summoned them to respond in my place to what is being stated here? Who knows? We do not know. It is perhaps for that reason. It is perhaps also because they have a sense of economising their time. So that if they believe they are going to find themselves fiddling around in what I am stating here, once this is only an attempt at work, they think that they will not get enough benefit from it. Who knows, that is another possibility. In short, I deplore it.

On the other hand, I am delighted at the presence of all of those who have been good enough to come to hear something. And it is for them and because we are in an informal group that after all I would like to be able to give you a sense of things - because there are also here many people I have admitted with pleasure, even though they are not analysts - give a sense of the, of the breadth of what is at stake, and also why I cannot say everything, or indeed particular things before just any audience, I mean before an audience that I can locate less well than I can by (270) looking at your faces, before the one that is here today. We write on the board:

All men love women

All psychoanalysts desire to know

I do not think

I am not

Precisely, this in order to presentify things since what is at stake are subjects, subjects that are obviously much less manageable and about which, luckily, linguistics gives us orientations.

It is quite obvious that we are already a little oriented, thanks to my discourse, not thanks to my language, thanks to my discourse. Here, these are subjects that we find at first sight, designated in Greek as what is usually called the grammatical subject, the subject of the sentence. It is on this occasion the subject that one can quite well introduce into propositional logic and rediscover the Aristotelian formula of predicative logic with the help of tiny changes:

all men are loving to women (sont aimant la femme)

all psychoanalysts are desiring to know (sont desirant savoir)

The interest of the matter is that these are propositions, which because of the presence of the *all* fall under the heading of what I introduced this year, and not without reason, as the implication of what is called the logic of quantification.

It is obvious that to write *all men* or to write *all psychoanalysts*, is a way that is distinct from the one that is going to be marked in the two other articulations underneath, by implying what I always put in question to distinguish it severely, by implying the stating subject in the statement.

This is obviously why the logic of quantification interests us, it is at the level of what is called the universal. And once you make the universal intervene, it is clear that what is interesting, what gives it its relief are things that I present to you here, in short, in a familiar way. I mean that it is not strictly rigorous from the point of view of proof. I mean that the remarks that I am going to make to you before leaving you, are rather things in which I am allowing myself a certain laxity with respect to certain requirements of rigour which are not vain, to which I am absolutely obliged to submit myself in a largely public discourse. Here, since it is on a friendlier basis, I can say things like the one that I am saying just now. Namely, that it is quite obvious for you to sense that the reason why this interests us, a formula like the one that all men, for example, are mortal, is in order to point out that there is something which is always profoundly elided. This gives it in a way its secret charm its sticky side, the side which means that we adhere so much, all the same, that we are so interested in these stupendously inane things, like the exemplary syllogisms that we are given. If truly all that was at stake was knowing that all men are mortal and that Socrates being a man, Socrates is mortal, those who do not understand it like that say - what they have always said: what is all that about? It is a *petitio principii*. If you have just said that Socrates is a man, how could you deny that Socrates is mortal, except by putting in question what you said first. It was Locke who discovered that it was a *petitio principii*.

This is a complete idiocy. There is no *petitio principii*, there is something whose interest lies quite elsewhere. Its interest is obviously in the following - it is in the conjurer's sleeves - that it is not at all vain to speak about Socrates on this occasion since Socrates is not mortal in the way that all other men are. And that this is precisely what, when all is said and done, captures and even excites us. It is not simply by a lateral incidence due to the particularity of the illustration, but because this indeed is what is in question right at the heart of logic. Always to know how one could be rid of this sacred stating subject, which is not done easily, and especially not at the level of quantification which is here particularly resistant.

It is not quite the same thing then as this quantified subject, as this much more disturbing subject that then for its part is qualified, is designated quite specifically and in a way that one could say is unveiled as the stating subject. What (272) linguistics has been indeed forced to recognise by giving to the "I" this definition of being the *shifter* which is the "*chief raté*", in other words the index

of the one who is speaking. In other words "I" is variable at the level of each discourse, it designates the one who is giving it. From which there result all sorts of consequences, in particular that a whole series of statements that have "I" as subject are very disturbing. People have dwelt at length on the *I am lying* throughout the ages. That I for my part should have added to it the *I do not think* and *I am not* assuredly has its interest, an interest that you are all capable of seeing in all its developments. It is quite certain that it is much more interesting to dwell on how impossible the *I am not* is, than on the *I am lying* which is so self-evident that truly one cannot say it, as I might say. This *I am not*, is worth the trouble of dwelling on a little, especially if one can give it a support which is quite precise as regards what is at stake, namely, concerning the subject of the unconscious.

The fact is that, once you have noticed it - I do not know if you are there yet but it may come to you - it is when you have noticed the impossibility of saying at all that it is so, because it is, precisely, that is that I am not. It is just as true for you as for me, and that starting from the moment that you have noticed it, the *I am* appears to become not unpronounceable - it can always be pronounced - but simply grotesque.

Now these things are very important to realise, if they appear coherent and strictly coherent, from the introduction into a certain domain which is that of the questions that are posed by the existence or not of the unconscious.

In any case, it is naturally a matter of knowing why I am occupying myself this year with the psychoanalytic act on the one hand, and with the psychoanalyst on the other. Even though it is centred around this act (we are still with familiar language today, I repeat, "centred around" does not mean very much) that *all men love women*, is obviously false. In our day we have enough experience - it has always been known, precisely - let us say, in one half of society (speaking broadly) this is not true, it is false. But the fact that it is false does not solve anything. The important thing is not at all to know that it is grossly false. The important thing is to notice that if we can simply admit that if it is not true, it is because of the fact that there are some people who make a mistake. I do not know how well aware you are of this, the fact is that this seems to be the (273) hypothesis of psychoanalysis. Let us even say the following, let us be quite precise, I do not mean that psychoanalysis says that, in every case, that it is because there are people who make mistakes that they prefer something else. Psychoanalysis may well (here I am on velvet) allow itself every prudence. It may well say that there are some people, male homosexuals, for whom this is due to organic or glandular things or something or other of that kind. It may say something of this kind; that costs it nothing. Moreover, what is remarkable, is the number of things that do not cost it anything.

But as regards what does cost it, it is much less precise. But it seems that it has never asked itself the question of what is involved for those at least among whom it made the hypothesis intervene. The fact is if it is not true, it is because there are

those - I am summarising - who make a mistake. This has its equivalent in analytic theory, but it is from this that it returns.

This is where I would like to remark the following, which is that it is a matter of knowing whether, yes or no, this thing, to which we may give the most subtle body *all men love women* (you will notice that I said "*la femme*, the woman") namely, the entity of the opposite sex. It is something that a psychoanalyst holds to be true or not. It is absolutely certain that he cannot hold it to be true because what psychoanalysis knows, is that all men love not the woman but the mother.

This has, of course, all sorts of consequences including that it may happen, in extreme cases, that men cannot make love with the women they love, because it is their mother. Why on the other hand they can make love with a woman on condition that she is a debased mother, namely, a prostitute.

Let us still remain in the system. I would like to pose the following question. In the case that a man can make love to the woman he loves - which also happens, he is not always impotent with the women he loves - I would like to know the following, what the following question implies, which is a slight modification of the universal statement that I wrote *all men love women*. Is it true that all men desire a woman (there, it is no longer *la femme*) when she is proposed to them as such, namely *qua* object within their reach?

(274) Let us suppose that there are no impotent people, let us suppose that there is no debasement of love-life. I am posing a question that clearly shows the distinction between what I will call the naturalist foundation, with what is called the organic reserve. For it is absolutely not the same thing to say, in the cases that we have to deal with in psychoanalysis, that there are cases which belong to the organic. It is not at all in the name of that that we want to pose the question of whether is it self-evident. And here you are going to see that you are forced to put things that sufficiently show the artificiality of what I am raising. Because I first have to tell you that outside every context, namely, the context of his engagements, of his links, of links that the woman previously has, of this or of that, is it a fact that it is, in principle, natural, let us say us, that in the situations which it is rather remarkable that novelists have been forced to give themselves all sorts of trouble to invent, namely, the situation that I will call - I do not know what to call it - it is unthinkable, the situation of the mountain chalet; a man, a woman normally constituted, they are isolated, as they say in nature - you always have to bring in nature on these occasions - is it natural that they should copulate? That is the question. It is a matter of the naturalism of the desirable.

Here is the question that I am raising. Why? Not at all to tell you things that are afterwards going to do the rounds of Paris, namely, that what Lacan is teaching, means that the man and the woman have nothing to do (*rien à voir*) together. I am not teaching it; it is true. Textually, they have nothing to do together. It is annoying that I cannot teach this without it giving rise to scandal. So then I do not teach it, I withdraw it.

It is precisely because they have nothing to do with one another that the psychoanalyst has something to do with this affair, *cette affaire là*, (let us write it on the board), *Staferla*. (You also have to know how to use a certain way of writing).

Naturally I do not teach it. Why? Because even if this is what emerges from a way that is strictly required from everything that psychoanalysis teaches us, namely, that it is never “who has *tenuis femina*”, I am saying “*femina*” not even “*mulier*” in so far as the “woman” is desired. That desire must be constructed upon a whole order of sources in which the unconscious is absolutely dominant and in which consequently there intervenes a whole dialectic of the subject.

To state in this bizarre fashion, that man and woman finally have no business with (275) one another, is simply to mark a paradox, but a paradox which has no more import but which is of the same order as this paradox in logic that I noted before you. It is of the same order as “I am lying “ or Russell’s paradox of the catalogue of all the catalogues that do not contain themselves. It is the same dependency.

There is obviously no interest in producing them as if it were a matter, precisely, of the only point at which this would constitute on this occasion no longer simply a paradox but a scandal, namely, if this were a naturalist reference.

When someone writes in a little note or elsewhere that, in the way that Lacan re-interprets Freud, it appears, it is a Freud-Lacan, there is an elision of what there would nevertheless be an interest in preserving, the naturalist reference. I ask on the contrary what can now subsist of the naturalist reference concerning the sexual act after the statement of everything that is articulated in Freudian experience and doctrine.

It is precisely by giving to these terms, “man and woman”, a naturalist substratum that people are able to state things which might be presented in effect as follies. That is why I do not pronounce them. But what I am pronouncing today - there is a remarkably inadequate number of psychoanalysts here - is the following question. What does the clinician think “instinctively” - you may well imagine that a word like that never comes from my mouth by chance, - in the name of his clinical instinct - what a clinical instinct is remains to be defined - about the story of the mountain chalet?

You have all only to refer not only to your experience but to your innermost intuition. The chap who comes to tell you that he was with a pretty girl in a mountain chalet, that there was no reason to, not to have a go, simply he did not feel like it. You say “Oh! There is something ... something is not working”. You first of all try to find out if he often has little blockages like that. In short, you launch yourselves into a whole speculation which implies that it ought to work.

This simply in order to show you that what is at stake is the coherence, the consistency of things in the mind of the analyst. For it the analyst reacts like that, instinctively, there is no need even to bring into play the clinical instinct. Behind, (276) there is the naturalist resonance, namely, that the man and the woman are made to go together. I am not saying the contrary. I told you: they can go together without having anything to do with one another. I told you that they had nothing to do with one another.

If the clinician, the clinical essence, intervenes to “wince” in a certain way, it is a matter of knowing if it is something that is – perhaps, why not, that does exist – simply of the order of common sense. I am not against common sense. Or it is something else that is at stake. Namely, whether he allows himself, as analyst, who has every reason to know, whether this woman who, I repeat, for the psychoanalyst is not at all automatically desired by the male animal when this male animal is a speaking being, this woman believes herself to be desirable. Because this is the best thing for her to do when she is embarrassed in a certain way. And then that leads us again a little bit further.

We, for our part, we know that as regards the partner, she believes she loves him, this is even what dominates. It is a matter of knowing why this dominates, in what is called her nature. We also know very well that what really dominates, is that she desires him. That is even the reason why she believes she loves him.

As regards the man, of course, we know the tune. For us it is everlastingly repeated. When it happens that he desires her, he believes he desires her but he is dealing on this occasion with his mother, so then he loves her. He offers her what? The fruit of the castration linked to this human drama. He gives her what he no longer has. We know all that. It goes against common sense.

Is it simply holding on to common sense which ensures that the analyst, with this clinical instinct, believes all the same that if on some occasion there is nothing of all that, because the novelist has done everything for it to be no longer on the horizon (the mountain chalet) if it does not work, it is because there is something wrong?

I am claiming that it is not simply because of common sense. I am claiming that something ensures that the psychoanalyst is precisely, in a way, installed, established, in something consistent. He is so for the very precise reason which ensures that *all psychoanalysts desire to know*, is just as false as what is stated above and we have to know why it is false. Naturally, it is not false because of the fact that it is false, because one can always write it, even if everyone knows that it is false. In both cases there is a misunderstanding somewhere.

(277) After having defined the psychoanalytic act which I defined in a very risky fashion, I even put in the centre this acceptance of being rejected like the o-object, it is enormous, it is new, no one ever said that, it becomes tangible, it is tangible. Someone could all the same try to contradict me, to say the contrary, to

bring in something else, to raise an objection. It is curious that, since I said it, it is not so long ago that I put it in the forefront, no one has even simply begun to protest, to say something against it. Even though, in its essence it is absolutely outrageous, one could shout, say: "what sort of carry-on is this! The end of analysis has never been explained to us like that. What is this analyst who is rejected like a piece of shit"? Shit disturbs people enormously. There is not just shit in the *o*-object, but often it is as a piece of shit that the analyst is rejected. That depends uniquely on the psychoanalysand. It is necessary to know whether for him shit is really what was at stake. But it is striking that all the things I say, I can develop this discourse, articulate it, a whole lot of things can begin to turn around it before anyone dreams of raising the slighted protestation and giving another indication, another theory on the subject of the end of analysis. Curious, curious. This abstention is strange, because on the whole, it is something that involves all sorts of disturbing consequences. This might suggest a sort of inventiveness in contradiction. No, nothing!

So then, if no one brings up the slightest contradiction, it is because, all the same, people sense very well, know very well that the misunderstanding, whether we are dealing with the first proposition or the second, turns around the fact that the psychoanalyst, for his part, does not have to put his tuppence halfpenny in - it a metaphor, it means does not have anything to say about it - except in so far as he joins in the ballet. I mean the psychoanalyst. It is absolutely clear that we are lost if we start from the idea that the psychoanalyst is the one who knows better than anyone else, in the sense that, as regards this whole affair of what is involved in the sexual act and the status that results from it, he is supposed to have the distance which would ensure that he knows something about the matter.

This is absolutely not what is at stake. That is also why he does not have to take sides about whether it is natural or not natural, in what cases it is or in what cases (278) it is not. Simply he sets up an experiment in which he has to put his tuppence halfpenny worth in the name of this third function, this *o*-object, which plays the key function in the determination of desire. Which means that it is in effect the recourse of the woman, in what is involved in the embarrassment that the exercise of her enjoyment leaves her in her relation to what is involved in the act.

I can go further, I can say "what is forced on her" from elsewhere. Here I seem to be making a feminist claim but do not believe it, it is much wider than that. What is forced on her is in the structure, the one that designates her, in the subjective dramatisation of the sexual act, that forces on her the function of the little *o*-object. in so far as she masks what is at stake. Namely, a hollow, a void, this thing lacking at the centre and of which one can say - which is this thing that I tried to symbolise - that it seems that the man and the woman together - and hold on to the choice of terms that I have used, have nothing to do with one another (*rien à voir ensemble*). In other words, since she has no reason, for her part, to accept this function of little *o*-object, he finds himself simply on this occasion on the occasion of his enjoyment, and from the dependence of this on his relation to

the act, noticing the power of deception, but a deception which is not hers, which is something other, which precisely is imposed through the establishment, on this occasion, of the desire of the male.

What the man discovers on his side is nothing other than his own impotence to aim at anything other than what? A knowledge, of course. No doubt there is somewhere and from the origin, to give ourselves over to developmental lucubrations, a certain knowledge about sex. But this is not what is at stake. It is not because all male and female children have sensations that they are not without some hold on and that they can more or less properly channel. What it is a matter of arriving at, knowledge of a sex, this is precisely what is at stake, it is that one never has knowledge of the other sex.

As regards what is involved in the knowledge of a sex, on the male side, it is much worse than on the female side.

You must not believe that when I say that there is no sexual act, I am pronouncing something that signifies in any way that what is happening should be put under the title of radical failure. Let us say that by taking things at the level of psychoanalytic experience, it demonstrates to us, by remaining at this level - you see that here I am making a reservation - that this knowledge of one sex for a male, when it is a matter then of his own, culminates in the experience of (279) castration. Namely, at a certain truth which is that of his impotence, of his impotence to do, let us say, anything full in the sexual act.

You see that all of this can go rather far, namely, this pretty literary hesitation between the power of the lie on the one hand and the truth of impotence on the other; there is an interlacing. You see then how easily all of this might tip over into a type of wisdom, indeed a teaching on sexology, as people might say, anything at all that could be resolved by means of an opinion survey. What I would like to point out, is that what is at stake, in specifying what a psychoanalyst is, is to take note that he has no right to articulate at any level whatsoever this dialectic between knowledge and truth in order to make of it a sum, an evaluation, a totality, by recording some failure or other. Because this is not what is at stake. No one is in a position to master what is at stake, which is nothing other than the interference of the function of subject in this act. And we cannot even say where in our experience - I mean analytic - its reference - let us not say "natural" since this is where it vanishes - but its biological reference is tangible.

The point that I am at when I tell you that the rule for the analyst to escape the vacillation which makes him tip over into a sort of an ethical teaching, is that he should notice what is involved in the question, at the very place of what conditions its essential vacillation. Namely, the little o-object, and that, rather than at the end of his years of experience, considering himself as a clinician namely, the one who, in every case, knows how to measure the cubic content of the affair, he should rather give himself - as I was saying the last time, at the end of my last discourse, at the high point of what I said the last time, before what I

call a larger audience - this reference, that I borrowed from the discourse of a previous year. Namely, I will not say the apologue because I never give apologies, I show you the reality of what is involved for the analyst imaged in other examples. It is not astonishing that these are examples taken from art, for example, something to take one's bearings from. Namely, in order to have a different kind of knowledge than this kind of fictional knowledge he has and which paralyses him, when he questions a case, when he carries out the anamnesis, when he prepares it, when he begins to approach it and once he enters it with the analysis, that he searches in the case, in the history of the subject, like (280) Velasquez in the picture of *Las Meninas*, where he, for his part was already the analyst at a particular moment and at a particular point of the history of the subject.

This will have one advantage. He will know what is involved in the transference. The centre, the pivot of transference, does not pass at all through his person. There is something that was already there.

This would give him a completely different way of approaching the diversity of cases. Perhaps, from that moment on he might manage to find a new clinical classification to that of classical psychiatry which he has never been able to touch or to shake and for a good reason, up to the now. He has never been able to do anything else than follow it.

I would like to image for you still more what is involved, and I would like to do it in the few minutes that I am accepting and that I thank you for giving me.

People speak about private life (*vie privée*). I am always surprised that this word "private life" should never have interested anyone, especially among the analysts who ought to be particularly interested by that. A life deprived (*privée*) of what? One could make rhetorical embellishments.

What is the private life? Why is it so deprived, this private life? That ought to interest you. From the moment one does an analysis, there is no longer a private life. It has to be said that women are furious when their husbands do an analysis, they are right. It is all very well for that to annoy us analysts, you have to recognise that they are right, because there is no longer a private life. That does not mean that it becomes public. There is an intermediary lock: it is a psychoanalysed, or psychoanalysing life. It is not a private life.

This is of a nature to make us reflect. After all why is it so respectable, this private life? I am going to tell you. Because private life, is what allows there to be maintained intact these famous norms that in connection with the mountain chalet, I was in the process of exploding. "Private" means everything that preserves on this delicate point of what is involved in the sexual act and of everything that flows from it, in the pairing of individuals, in the "you are my wife, I am your husband" and other essential devices on another register that we know well, that of fiction, this is what allows there to hold up in a field in which

we analysts introduce an order of relativity which, as you see, is not at all easy to (281) master, and which can be mastered on a single condition. If we are able to recognise the place that we hold in it, we, as analysts, not as analysts who are subjects of knowledge but as analysts who are instruments of revelation.

Here there is posed the question of the private life of the analyst. I am only mentioning it in passing because naturally there are works that are widely diffused and which are tissues are stupidity and one of them has had the greatest success, where it is said that the qualification, the pinpointing of the good analyst, the least that one can require, is that he should have a happy life. It is adorable! And what is more, everyone knows the author; I do not want to start speculating. Anyway...

But that an analyst, for example, could maintain what I have just defined as being the status of private life, is really something! It is precisely because the analyst no longer has a private life that it is better, in effect, for him to keep many things under wraps. Namely, that if he, for his part, has to know what place he already was at in the life of his patient, the reciprocal is not inevitably necessary.

But there is a completely different plane on which it operates, this business of private life. It is precisely the one that I have just raised, namely, that of the consistency of discourse. It is precisely because the analyst is not able, up to the present, to sustain to any degree a discourse about his position, that he creates for himself all kinds of other ones. For him everything is good. He gives a sort of teaching that is like every other teaching, even though his ought in no way to resemble the others, no other one, namely, that he is teaching what? What is necessary for the taught who are already that, namely, to teach them, about the subjects in question, what they already know. Namely, precisely everything that is most irrelevant; every reference is the same to him; he will teach everything, anything whatsoever, except psychoanalysis.

In other words, what I took care to begin with by taking things at the lowest possible level, namely, what may seem to be the least contestable, and to show us that psychoanalysis precisely contests it. It is impossible to write, except by way of challenge, the two first lines that are there. What constitutes the status of the analyst is in effect a life that deserves to be called a private life. Namely, the status that he gives himself is properly the one in which he will maintain - it is constructed for that - the authorisation, the investiture of analysis, its hierarchy. (281) Ascending its grades, in such a way that at the level where for him this function, his own, may have consequences, the most risky of all, that of occupying the place of this little o-object, this allows him to preserve, nevertheless, stable and permanent, all the fictions that are most incompatible with what is involved in his experience and the fundamental discourse which establishes it as technique.

Here is what I am ending today for you, and will understand that I reserved it for a more limited audience, which is not obliged to drawn from it a harvest of scandals, of gossip or of bla-bia-bla.

8 and 15 May 1968: Notes

Since Lacan stood by the call for a strike by the *S.V.E.S.* [the union of teachers in higher education] he refused to give his seminar on the 8th and 15th May, but he was present, knowing that some of his audience would be there. He insisted on the fact that his discourse is addressed uniquely to psychoanalysts, and to them alone, and on the fact that these strikes give him time to read things that usually he only judges on the signature.

Then, as regards contemporary events, he highlights the effect of the shoulder-to-shoulder - of those who are batonned while singing the *Internationale* - as surface: those who are in this field allow themselves to be carried along by it with the feeling of absolute community.

He asks the question, that the events of the moment have again given rise to, of the responsibility of psychoanalysts. They are not at the university, and nevertheless the question of teaching is crucial for them. He then evokes his 1966 text "*Science and truth*" as having contemporary relevance for what is not simply unruliness, as Raymond Aron would like us to think. Contrary to the latter, for Lacan what is at stake is a structural phenomenon, in which the relations between desire and knowledge are put in question. These relations, which are those of the transmission of knowledge, psychoanalysis establishes on the level of lack, of inadequacy.

Once there is a question of dialogue, support should be taken on logic, even that of logicians, but in any case not on an energetics.

Evoking then the relations of expectations between psychoanalysts and insurgents, he says that if the psychoanalysts ought to expect something from the insurrection, the insurrection for its part only expects throwers of stones, which, like the tear gas, occupies the function of o-object.

The way for this whole insurrection was prepared in the *cité universitaire* of Nanterre, by the ideas of Reich. Ideas, says Lacan, that are demonstrably false. And this interests psychoanalysts, because it leads to the fact that anyone can say anything at all. The testimony of psychoanalysts as regards what they can say from a experience of language involving the relations of one sex to the other, is not simply passed over in silence or swamped in a flood of other things by psychoanalysts themselves but, when it is said, is not taken into account. It is all happening as if there never had been psychoanalysts.

Lacan insists on what has always guided him in his teaching: to give reference points, so that what is insisting can be heard. And his failure, with which he opens his publication, is that psychoanalysts make of it something of no importance. Psychoanalysts do not want to be up to what they have taken responsibility for.

Things exist and have their effects. There have to be people to take these effects into account and operate in their fields.

End

MEETING of 15 May 1968

I came here today, like last week, anticipating that there would be a certain number of people, as a way of keeping contact.

I am not going to give, any more than last week, what I habitually give under the heading of a class or a seminar. This in the measure that I am keeping to the call for strike action that I think exists at this time in the Syndicat Nationale de l'Enseignement Supérieur.

This is a simple question of discipline. It is nevertheless not enough to do what would be desirable – to be worthy of the events that are taking place.

In truth it is not very convenient for many people. Since I for my part have only to concern myself with psychoanalysts – I have always underlined it, I am not going to deny now what I always took care to repeat – am only addressing myself to psychoanalysts. It is for psychoanalysts that I have sustained for several years a work that is not meagre. I would even say up to a certain point that this is an opportunity for me to realise it because the simple fact of not having to prepare one of these seminars (since it was already prepared for the last time) I feel as a great relief for me.

Naturally this opens the door to all sorts of things. By the same token I notice something that effort and work always mask, namely, my dissatisfactions. It also gives me the opportunity also perhaps to read articles that I necessarily let pass like that, and only read their signatures. You have even to read the articles of people that you know in advance there is nothing to be expected (286) from. I have on occasion been very surprised. (I am speaking about articles by my colleagues, of course.)

Anyway, for the moment, to be worthy of the events, I would say that even though psychoanalysts bear witness to their sympathy for those caught up in pretty hard encounters, for which one needs to have – and this should be underlined – great courage. You would have to have received, as we analysts do, the testimony of what is experienced at these moments to measure better and at its true value what is represented by this courage. Because from the outside, like that, you can admire, of course, but you cannot always realise that the merit is no less great because these lads are really at certain moments carried away by the feeling of being absolutely bound to their comrades. They express this as they want to, that it is exalting to sing the International while being battered, this is the surface. The International is a very fine song,

but I do not think that they would have this irrepressible feeling that they could not be anywhere other than where they are if they were not carried along by a feeling of absolute community, there, in action with those they are shoulder to shoulder with. This is something that should be explored - as people say without knowing what they are saying - in depth.

I mean that it does not seem to me, to come back to our psychoanalysts, that the fact of signing, in this connection, even if there also people are very much shoulder to shoulder (but of course it is not quite the same thing), 75 people can, this is the number mentioned last night, sign a text protesting against the regime and its operatives (I mean its police operatives). Of course it is meritorious and one would not turn anyone away from putting his signature at the bottom of such a protest, but it is slightly inadequate, it is clearly not enough. If everyone signs it, people coming from every origin and horizon, fine, but to sign as a psychoanalysts - besides it was very quickly opened to people coming from psychology - appears to me to be a rather comfortable way of doing what I was saying earlier: to consider that one had done one's bit for the events.

It seems that when something of this order occurs, of such a seismic order, one could perhaps question oneself when one has had a responsibility oneself. (287) Because after all psychoanalysts had responsibilities, one cannot say in education because they are not in it, any of them. I am in it like that on the edges, on the margin but none of them is properly speaking in the University. But it is not just the University that has responsibilities in teaching. Perhaps after all one might say to oneself that the psychoanalysts did not concern themselves much with what, after all, by being connoted easily at the level of relationships, that since they are collective relationships, fell no less directly under a certain heading, under a certain field, under a certain knot that is their own. Let us try call that without insisting too heavily on the fact that after all I myself highlighted that somewhere in my *Ecrits* there is a text called *Science and truth* which is not completely out of season, since it has a little idea that one cannot reduce what is happening to what we might call the effects of a turbulence that is more or less everywhere.

There is someone whom I could not say I do not esteem, he is a comrade, we sat on the same benches, with links together and we got to know one another. It is a friend, M Raymond Aron, who published an article this morning in a paper that reflects the thinking of honest people who says: it is happening everywhere. But in saying that, for him that means, precisely, they are disturbed everywhere. Everyone must calm them down depending on what is not working out in each place. It is because in all these places there is something that is not working out that they are creating a disturbance. It is beginning as you know in Columbia, namely, in the middle of New York (I had very precise echoes very recently) and now it is going to Warsaw. I do not need to draw a map. What people do not want to ask themselves, or at

least want resolutely to put to one side, which is the sense of this article, written in a very fine tone, is that there must be here a much more structural phenomenon. Since I made an allusion to this quarter, this knot, this field, for me it is quite clear that the relationships between desire and knowledge are put in question. Psychoanalysis also allows this to be tied to a level of shirking, of inadequacy that is properly speaking stimulated, evoked by these relationships which are relationships of the transmission of knowledge. As an echo there reverberate all kinds of currents, elements, forces as they say, a whole dynamic. And on this point I allude again to the article I read recently. (288) There was an insistence on the fact that in a certain order of teaching – my own, to name it – the whole dimension of energetics is supposed to be neglected.

I much admire the fact that these energeticists have not noticed the underlying displacements of energy that may be here. Perhaps this energy has a certain interest as a theoretical evocation, and to tie things together at the level of a logical or logicist reference, on an occasion when people are talking a lot about dialogue, might have a certain interest.

In any case I think, and I am it seems to me confirmed by the events in the fact of finding that this is the articulatable, manipulatable part of what we have to deal with. I am not wrong in leaning on it as much as I can. Where this is not done, where people even think they ought not to do it, where people freely talk about intellectualising – this is the big word as you know – we find no proof of a particular sense of orientation as regards what is happening nor a more correct estimate of the weights in question nor of the true and authentic energetics of the thing.

I note in passing, a simple pinpointing for your information. We had at a meeting last night, in this thing called my *Ecole*, one of the heads of this insurrection, a not too badly shaped head. In any case he is not someone who lets himself be taken in nor does he say silly things. He knows how to give a quick answer and when he was asked a rather touching question, I must say, like the following: “Tell us, my friend, from the point that you are at, what might you expect from psychoanalysts?” This is an absolutely crazy way of posing the question! I kill myself saying that psychoanalysts ought to expect something from the insurrection and there are those who retort: what does the insurrection expect from us? The insurrection answers them: what we expect from you for the moment, this is the time to help throw some paving-stones!

As a way of lightening the atmosphere a little, I point out that in that case – it is a discreet indication – that at the level of dialogue, the paving-stone fulfils exactly a function that has been foreseen, the one I called the o-object. I already indicated that there is a certain variety in the o-object. The fact is the paving-stone is an o-object that that responds to another that is really, for its

part. capital for any future ideology of dialogue when it starts from a certain level: the one called a tear-gas grenade!

(289) Let us leave that. We learned in effect, from an authorised speaker (who found himself taking an immediate advantage about what could have unfolded differently) that at the start, all the disturbances at the start in a certain field, and specifically at Nanterre (this was really news) we learned that the ideas of Reich – you can believe me if you like, many of the people here are disposed to believe something because I transmit it to them, that astonishes me but it is true – really opened things up for them. And this in term of the very precise conflicts that manifested themselves in a certain *cité universitaire*. It is interesting all the same. It is interesting for psychoanalysts who may consider – this is my own position – that Reich's ideas are not simply incomplete, that they are demonstrably, fundamentally false.

The whole of psychoanalytic experience, if we really want to articulate it and not consider it as a kind of locus of whirlpools, of confused forces, an energetics of life instincts and death instincts co-embracing one another, if we really want to put a bit of order into what we objectify in an experience that is a language experience, we will see that Reich's theory is formally contradicted by our everyday experience.

Only since analysts do not testify to absolutely anything of things that might really interest everybody precisely on this subject of the relationships of one sex to another, things of this order are really open. I mean that anybody can say anything he wants. And this is seen at every level.

I was reading yesterday – since I have been left time to read – a little organ called *Concilium* (this is something done by priests). There were two rather brilliant articles on the accession of women to the functions of the priesthood, in which there were discussed a certain number of categories, that of the relationships of the man and of the woman. It is exactly, of course, as if psychoanalysts had never said anything about it. Not, of course, because the authors do not read psychoanalytic literature. They read everything. But if they read this literature they will find nothing that brings them anything new whatsoever as compared to what has always been discussed about this confused notion: who, the man or the woman, is, with regard to anything you (290) wish, Being, more superior, more worthy and all the rest of it. Because when all is said and done, it is all the same striking that what has been denoted by psychoanalysts at the level of experience, has been so perfectly swamped by them that when all is said and done it is exactly as if there had never been any psychoanalysts.

Obviously, all of this is a point of view that you may perhaps consider a bit personal. It is obvious that in this kind of note with which I believed I should

open on a certain tone a certain publication which is mine and that I accentuate with a denotation that I call failure. Namely, that almost everything that I, for my part, tried to articulate - and that I must say it is enough to stand back from a little to see that it is not only articulated but articulated with a certain force and will remain like that attached as a testimony to something in which one can find one's bearings, where there is a north, a south, an east and a west, this will be seen perhaps, in short, when the psychoanalysts are no longer there to surrender it, by the very fact of what they do with it - has absolutely no bearing.

Meanwhile, people sign manifestos of solidarity with the students as would also be done when anyone at all might get beaten up in an affray.

In short, all the same there is this something that is happening, something that can be found well written in advance. I said that in any case even if the psychoanalysts do not want at any price to be worthy of what they have charge of, what they have charge of nevertheless exists, and in any case will make its effects no less felt - the first part of my propositions, we have got there - and it will all the same be necessary for there to be people who try to be worthy of a certain type of effect, those that were there in a way, offered and predestined to be treated by some people in a certain framework. If it is not they it will be certainly others, because there is no example that when effects become a little insistent, it must all the same be noticed that they are there and try to operate in their field.

I said this to you like that, so that you would not have put yourselves out in order to hear nothing.

Annex 1

Lecture of 19th June, 1968

(293) I am not a fake: I did not give notice that I would say a few words to close the present year, as the document of the Ecole puts it, in order to give you what is called a seminar. I will rather say a few words of a ceremonial order.

This year, if I remember rightly, I made an allusion somewhere to the sign of the opening of the year in traditional civilisations. This time, it is for the school year that is ending.

There may remain some regrets that after having opened up a concept like *the psychoanalytic act*, fate decided that you would only have on this subject half of what I had intended to say about it; half ... in truth a little less because the entry procedures, for something that is so new, which had never been articulated as a dimension, as is the case for the *psychoanalytic act*, required in effect some time to open it up.

In truth, things do not have the same speed. It is rather something like when a falling body is subjected to the same force, during its fall, its movement, as they say, accelerates. So that you have not had half of what there was to be said about the *psychoanalytic act*; let us say that you have had a little less than a quarter of it.

It is very regrettable from some points of view, because in truth, it is not my custom to end so late, and in a way by a lucky fluke, something that was interrupted for whatever reason, internal or external.

(294) In truth, my regret is not unaccompanied by another aspect of some satisfaction. Because indeed in this case, the discourse was not interrupted by just something indifferent, but by something which brings into play, certainly at a very baby level, but which brings into play all the same some dimension which is not altogether unrelated to the act. So that, good God, it is not so dissatisfying.

Obviously, there is a little discord in all of that. The psychoanalytic act, this dissertation that I was projecting, was forged for psychoanalysts, as they say, matured by experience. It was destined above all to allow them, and at the same time to allow others, a more correct estimate of the weight that they have to lift, when something precisely marks a dimension of paradox, of internal antinomy, of profound contradiction that does not fail to allow us to conceive of the difficulty that is represented for them in having to bear its weight.

It must be said, that it is not those who best know this weight in practice, who have shown the most lively interest for what I was saying. At a certain level, I must say that they really distinguished themselves by an absence that was certainly not due to chance.

So that, because we are at it, I will tell you by the way a little anecdote to which I already made an allusion, but that I am going to clarify further. One of these people, to whom I had gallantly sent a little letter to ask him whether this absence was an act, replied: "What are you thinking about! Not at all! It is neither an act, nor a parapraxis. As it happens this year, I made an appointment at 11.30 for a long job (he was having work done on his teeth) with a very capable practitioner, at 11.30 every Wednesday". It is not an act, as you can see. It is pure chance.

This tempers for me the regret that something remains as it were in suspense in what I have to transmit to the psychoanalytic community and very especially to the one that goes under the title of my School.

On the contrary, a certain dimension of the act which has, for its part also, its ambiguity, which is not necessarily made up of parapraxes, despite the fact that it gives plenty of work to those who would like to think things out in the traditional terms of politics. All the same, something was found, I mean just now, that the babies brought up one fine day under the heading (295) of act, which may well, like that, give some people work to do in the years to come.

In any case the question - and that is why today I wanted to address a few words to you, precisely to know if I am right to find in this something like a little balance or compensation, to feel myself in a way a little bit relieved of my own responsibility.

For after all, if it is in connection with psychoanalysis, or more exactly about the support it offered me and because this support was the only one, that it was not possible otherwise to grasp a certain knot or, if you wish, a ball, something singular, not located up to then in something that it is not easy to give a label to in our day, given that there are a certain number of traditional terms that are going down the drain: man, knowledge, knowledge, as you wish, this is not quite what is at stake. This particular knot which over there I was able with a red pencil ... on this kind of a knot-bubble that you know well. It is the famous internal eight that I have been producing for some eight years, these terms: knowledge, truth, subject and the relation to the Other, there you are, there is no word to put all four of them together. These four terms have nevertheless become essential for something that is to come, a future that may interest us, those of us who are here, in an amphitheatre not simply to be the plaint in the complaint but precisely with a concern to know. This teaching which showed something or other in terms of dissatisfaction, we can perhaps have a concern for what, after this great tearing apart that makes it so obvious that there is something in that quarter that is no longer working. What was infatuated with a term that is not at all random, the University, that takes its authority from the universe, this precisely is what is at stake.

Does the universe hold up? The universe has made many promises, but it is not sure that it is keeping them. It is a matter of knowing if something that was announced, that was a kind of opening out of the gap of the universe will be sustained long enough for us to see the last word on it.

This question passes by way of what we have seen manifesting itself these last months, in a place, like that, that is bizarrely permanent in history. We have seen the function of place being re-activated. It is curious. It is essential. Perhaps we would not have seen things crystallise so vividly if there had not been a place to which they always returned to be beaten up.

(296) You must not imagine that what is being opened up, what was opened up as a question in this place, is the privilege of our national fabric. I have been, as a way of getting some fresh air, for two days in Rome where such things are not conceivable simply because in Rome there is no Latin Quarter. This is not a simple chance! It is funny but anyway that is how it is.

There were things there that really pleased me. It is easier to pick out there those who know what they are doing. A little group. I did not see a lot of them but even if I had only seen one of them that would have been enough. They are called the Birds, *Ucelli*.

As I said to one of those close to me, in Italy I am - to my amazement, it has to be said, it is the term that is used: (I am ashamed!) - popular. That means that they know my name. Naturally they do not know anything I have written! But, this is what is curious, they know that the *Écrits* exist.

We have to accept that they do not need them, for the *Ucelli*, the birds in question, for example to be capable of actions like the one that obviously have the same relation to Lacanian teaching that the posters of the *Beaux-Arts* have with what is at stake politically, truly. But that means that they have a quite direct relation. When the dean of the Faculty in Rome, accompanied by an eminent representative of the Vatican intelligentsia, gives to them, all gathered together because there are general assemblies there also at which people speak to them, people are for dialogue, naturally where it is useful. So then the *Ucelli* come with one of these big devices that exist, when you go to a restaurant in the country, in the centre of a round table, there is an enormous umbrella, they all go under it for protection, they say, from language!

I hope you understand that that leaves me with some hope. They have not yet read the *Écrits*, but they will read them! Do they really need them since they have discovered that? After all, the theoretician is not the one who finds the way. He explains it. Obviously, the explanation is useful to find the rest of the path. But, as you see, I trust them. If I have written some little things that might have been of use to psychoanalysts, this will be of use to others whose place, whose determination is quite specified by a certain field. This field is circumscribed by this little knot (see the scheme) that is constructed in a certain way by cutting into a certain bubble (297) extraordinarily purified by the antecedents of what culminated at this adventure that I tried to map out before you as being the moment that science was engendered.

So then, this year, in connection with the *psychoanalytic act*, I had come to the moment when I was going to show you what is involved in having to take up one's place in the register of the *subject supposed to know*, and this precisely when one is a psychoanalyst. Not that he is the only one but that he is particularly well placed to know its radical division. In other words this position, inaugural for the psychoanalytic act, that consists in operating on something to which your act gives the lie. This is why I have reserved throughout the years, kept under covers, put to one side the term *Verleugnung* that undoubtedly Freud brings up in connection with an exemplary moment of the *Spaltung* of the subject. I wanted to reserve it, to bring it to life there where undoubtedly it is pushed to its high point of pathos, at the level of the analyst himself.

(298) Because of that, I had to undergo, throughout the years, the harassment of those individuals who followed on the trace of what I contribute to see where they could patch together a little piece, where I might stumble. When I spoke about *Verwerfung*, which is an extremely precise term, and which situates perfectly what is involved in psychosis, people reminded me that it would be cleverer to use *Verleugnung*. In any case you find traces of all that in pathetic lectures and mediocre articles. The term *Verleugnung* could have taken on its authentic place and its full weight, if I had been able to speak to you this year as I had intended.

It was the next step to take. There were others that I cannot even indicate. Undoubtedly, one of the things that most struck me in the course of a teaching experience which you will allow me today to cast a backward glance at, precisely at this turning point, is the violence of the things that I allowed myself to say. Twice at St Anne's, for example. I said that psychoanalysis was something that at least had this in its favour that in its field - what a privilege! - blackguardism could only turn into stupidity. I repeated it on two consecutive years like that, and I knew what I was talking about!

We are living in an area of civilisation where, as they say, there is free speech, namely, that nothing of what you say is of any consequence. You can say anything whatsoever about someone who may well be at the origin of some of indecipherable murder or other; you can even create a play about it. The whole of America - the New York part, no more - crowds into it. Never previously in history would such a thing have been

conceivable without the theatre being immediately closed. In the land of liberty, one can say everything, because this has no consequences.

It is rather curious that from the moment simply when some little paving stones start flying, for at least a moment everyone has the feeling that the whole of society might be involved in it in the most direct way in its daily comfort and its future.

We have even seen psychoanalysts questioning the future of the trade. To my eyes, they were wrong to question it publicly. They would have done better to keep it to themselves, because all the same, the people who saw them questioning themselves about it, precisely when they were questioning them about something completely different, found this a little funny. In any case one cannot say that the stock of psychoanalysis rose!

(299) I have a crow to pluck with the General. He stole a word from me that for a long time I had - it was certainly not of course for the use that he made of it: psychoanalytic disorder (*chienlit*). You cannot imagine for how long I wanted to give that as a title to my seminar. Now the chance has gone!

But then I am going to tell you, that I do not regret it because I am too tired. It is visible enough like that. I have no need to add a commentary.

In any case there is one thing all the same that I would really like - not everyone would like it but I really would - teaching psychoanalysis in the Faculty of Medicine.

You know there are some very restless people around, I do not know what has got into them, who push themselves forward to be there, in that place. I am not speaking about anyone from the *École Freudienne de Paris*. I know well that in the Faculty of Medicine, they know the history of medical doctrines. That means that things have happened there, of the order of, to our eyes, with the perspective of history, of the order of mystification. But that does not mean that psychoanalysis as taught where it is officially taught - they talk to you about libido as if it were something that passed into communicating vessels, as an absolutely unbelievable personage expressed it, at the start of the time when I began to try to change things a little, as a libidinal hydraulics - to teach psychoanalysis as it is taught, let us say the word, at the Institute. That would be marvellous especially at the time that we are living through, when all the same those taught, as they say, are starting to be a bit demanding. I find that marvellous. You should see what is done in certain quarters in terms of a teaching of psychoanalysis. And after having done this little survey you will have been shown the hopes for better times that the course of events reserves for some people. You will tell me, of course, that the personage in question, for example, could always set about teaching Lacan. Obviously it would be better! But again he would have to be able to do it! Because there is a certain article that appeared in *Les cahiers de psychoanalyse* on the o-object in connection with which, (I regret to say it, this again is going to shock some of my closest and dearest colleagues), it was nothing but a long little squib of laughs for these damned Normaliens, as it happens. For my part, I was forced in a little discreet note, somewhere,

just before my *Ecrits* appeared, to indicate that, whatever may be the need one may have (300) to work on psychoanalytic marketing, it is not enough to talk about the o-object for it to be quite that!

In any case, I would like to take things from a slightly higher level. And since I have prepared a few words - not these. I must say that I let myself go a little given the warmth, the familiarity, the friendship that I find in this company, namely, faces of which there is not one that I do not recognise because of having seen them from the beginning of this year - since I spoke about these four terms, let us map out, for those who are a little short sighted and who might not be aware of the quite critical importance of a certain conjuncture, let us recall their principal articulations. Namely, first of all knowledge because, when all is said and done, it is all the same rather curious on the side of knowledge, up to the present, in the classics, that people are wise, and one part of the wise position is obviously to keep quiet. That it should be at the level and as is very correctly said at a privileged level of the transmission of knowledge that so many things are happening, makes it perhaps worth the trouble to take advantage of stepping back a little to take a look.

There is a function, naturally, I apologise to the people who are here - there are a few - who are coming here for the first time, and come in order to see a little what I might say if I was questioned about the "events". I am not going to be able to give the theory of the Other, and this is already something that makes such a conversation, such an interview, very difficult. What the Other is must be explained. We begin with it because it is the key. So then for people who do not know what the Other is, I can say that on the one hand I defined it strictly as a locus, the locus where the word has taken its place. That is not self-explanatory: the locus where the word has taken its place. But in any case it is a quite indispensable topological function to bring out the radical and logical structure that is at stake in what I called earlier this knot or this bubble, this hollow in the world in connection with which there is the notion, this old notion of subject. The old notion of subject which is no longer reducible to the image in the mirror, nor to anything whatsoever of the order of an omnipresent reflection. But effectively this bubble still wanders around as a result of which this world is no longer properly speaking a world. This Other has been there for a long period of time, of course. It has not really being separated out because it is a good place and because there had already been installed in it something that is still there for many of you, called God. *Il vecchio con la barba!* He is still there. The psychoanalysts have not really added very much to (301) the question of whether, an essential point, whether he exists or does not exist. As long as this *or* is maintained, he will be always there.

Nevertheless, thanks to the bubble we can act as if he were not there. We can deal with his place. There was never any doubt that at his place precisely there lay what was at stake as regards knowledge. All knowledge comes to us from the Other - I am not talking about God I am talking about the Other. There is always an Other where there is a tradition, an accumulation, a reservoir.

No doubt people suspected that things could happen. That was called discovery, or even again one of these changes of lighting, one of these ways of dispensing teaching that, in a way, changed its accent and its sense, which ensured precisely that for a certain time, it still held up. Have you ever noticed that what ensures that a teaching gains a foothold, is perhaps that precisely in a certain way of redistributing it, there is inscribed in its design, in its outline, in its structure something that is not immediately said, but is what is heard? Why after all would the subject not appear a little bit worn out for those on the benches? I mean that what is not said to be understood still needs to be something worth the trouble and not a simple hypocrisy, for example. There is some reason, in fact, that it was in the Faculty of Letters or again in the Schools of Architecture that things really became enflamed.

To this relation of the subject to the Other, psychoanalysis contributes a radically new dimension. It is more than what I called just now, like that, a discovery. A discovery still preserves something anecdotal about. This is a profound modification of the whole relationship.

There is a word that I brought in here a few years ago, into this dialectic. It is the word truth. And then, in truth, before articulating it precisely as I did here on a particular day, the perfectly logical mark of which the article *Truth and science*, in my *Ecrits* bears witness to; I had given to the word another function, in an article called *The Freudian thing*, where one can read these terms: *Me, the truth, I speak*.

Who? The *I* that is speaking? This piece, in truth a prosopopoeia, one of these enthusiastic games that I happened to allow myself to articulate for the centenary of (302) Freud, and at Vienna. It was rather a scream of the order of what Münch put so well into a celebrated engraving, this twisted mouth in which we see arising the sublime annihilation of a whole landscape.

A long time ago, in Vienna, I said it especially there where people had not heard for a long time the word truth. It is a very dangerous word. Apart from the use that is made of it when it is castrated, namely, in logical treatises. We know for a long time that people do not know what it means.

What is truth? This is precisely the question that must not be asked. I made an allusion in Lyon when I was speaking there last October to a certain piece by Claudel, a very brilliant one that I recommend to you. I did not have time to find the page for you before coming here - I did not know that I was going to speak about it - but you will find it by searching carefully in the subject index of Claudel's prose: if you look for Pontius Pilate, naturally.

This text describes all the misfortunes that happen to this benevolent colonial administrator for having pronounced in the wrong place at the wrong time this question: "What is truth?"

Among people who for the moment situate themselves in this futile zone of these chaps to whom it is dangerous to state psychoanalytic truth, who give a terrible application to these words picked up in turning one of my pages *Me the truth I speak*, they are going to tell the truth in places where there is no need for it but where it has its effect.

It is very possible that a particular thing that people succeeded in damping down so well under the name of class struggle all of sudden becomes a very dangerous thing. Naturally, one can count on the healthy functions that have existed from all time to maintain what is at stake, namely, to leave things in the field of the sharing out of power.

Make no mistake, people who know a little bit about the handling of truth are not that imprudent. They have the truth, but they teach: all power comes from God. All. That does not allow you to say that it is only the power that suits them. Even the power that is against God comes from God, for the Church. Dostoyevsky grasped that very clearly. Since he believed in the truth, God put him into a blue funk. That is why he wrote *The grand inquisitor*. It was the conjunction, in short, foreseen in advance, of Rome and (303) Moscow. I think that all the same some of you have read it. But it is almost done, my little friends, and you see clearly that it is not as fantastic as that! When you are in the order of power, everything can be arranged!

That is why it is useful for the truth to be somewhere, in a strongbox. Privilege, revelation, is the strongbox.

But if you take seriously *Me, the truth, I speak* this can at first have, alas, great disadvantages for the one who takes this path.

Let us see all the same what novelty we analysts may have contributed to it. Obviously our field is very limited. It is at the level of the bubble.

How is the bubble defined? Its import is very limited. If after so many years, after having shown what is properly speaking its structure, I am now speaking to you about logic, it is not by chance. It is because, all the same, it is clear that this knowledge that interests us analysts is properly speaking only what is said. If I say that *the unconscious is structured like a language*, it is because this unconscious that interests us is what can say itself and that in saying itself, it generates the subject.

It is because the subject is a determination of this knowledge that it is what runs under this knowledge but does not run there very freely, that it encounters stumbling blocks. It is for this reason and for none other that we have to deal with a knowledge. Anyone who says the contrary is led onto paths that I earlier called those of mystification. It is because the unconscious is the consequence of what has been able to be circumscribed that has shown that this relation to discourse has much more complex consequences than had been seen up to then. It is specifically that the subject by being secondary with respect to knowledge, appears not to say everything that it knows, a point that was not doubted, even if for a long time people suspected it does not know everything it says.

This is the point that allowed the constitution of the bubble: it resides very precisely in the fact that in this connection we grasp how the dimension of truth is produced. The truth, this is what psychoanalysis teaches us, lies at the point where the subject refuses to know. Everything that is rejected from the symbolic reappears in the real. This is the key to what is called the symptom. The symptom, is this real knot where the truth of the subject lies.

(304) At the beginning - very early on - of these little episodes, I told that you: "They are the truth". They are the truth, does not mean that they tell it. The truth is not something that knows itself like that, without labour. This is even why it takes this body that is called the symptom, that it demonstrates where is the lair of what is called the truth.

So then this refused knowledge that you come looking for in the psychoanalytic exchange, is it the knowledge of the psychoanalyst? Illusion. The psychoanalyst knows something perhaps: he knows in any case about the nature of the truth. But for the rest, namely, about refused knowledge, he does not know very much. That is why the teaching of psychoanalysis taken at the level of what is supposed to be substantial appears for what it is, pantaloony. The libido that I spoke to you about earlier for example, if this means what I call desire, it is really rather piquant that it was discovered, tracked down, in the neurotic, namely, in the one whose desire is only sustained by fiction. To say that they are the truth is certainly not to deliver it to you, neither to you nor to them. But it is perhaps of some importance that one should know this mechanism of an exchange, a strange exchange which ensures that what is said by the subject, whatever it may be, whether he knows it or not, only becomes knowledge by being recognised by the Other. And this precisely moreover is what is meant by the quite primitive, rough-hewn notion, called censorship. It is the Other that for a long time, during the time of authority, always defined what could be said and what could not be. But it would be quite vain to link that to configurations that experience clearly shows, because they can be null and void, already were so when they were functioning.

It is in a structural way that it is only at the level of the Other that what determines the subject is articulated in knowledge. Stating, the subject of which is not at all necessarily the one who was speaking, stating - by the other - designates the one who said it. The Other was first of all the one he always was when the analyst interprets, and who says to the subject "you I" (this I that is you) I am saying: is that. And as it happens this has consequences. It is what is called interpretation. For a time this Other who was a philosopher, forged for his part, the *subject supposed to know*. It was already a deception as can be seen by simply opening Plato. He made the poor subject say everything that he wanted him to say. At the end, the subject learned. He learnt to say by himself "I say: black is not white", for example. "I say: either it is true or it is false". But (305) the total of what I am saying there, is certainly true because: either it is true or it is false.

Naturally, it is as childish as the movement of the 22nd March. It is not true that: either it is true or it is false. But that can be sustained. The subject has learned to endorse with

an *I say* something that he declared himself ready to answer in a debate whose rules were fixed in advance, and that is what is called logic.

A strange thing. It is from what was purified by this path of the isolation of logical articulation, by the detaching of the subject from everything that can happen between him and the Other (and God knows things can happen, up to and including prayer) that there emerged science, knowledge. Not just any kind of knowledge, a pure knowledge that has nothing to do with the real, nor at the same time, with the truth. Because the knowledge of science is, as compared to the real, what is called in logic the complement of a language. It functions alongside the real. But it bites on the real. It introduces the bubble, namely, after all, something that, from the point of view of knowledge, has no more importance than a gag. But it finally gives the only thing that after all really incarnates Newton's laws, namely, the first Sputnik, which is undoubtedly the best gag that we have seen because it throws everything into question, it Gag...arins it. Because what has it to do with the cosmos, in so far as we have a relation with it, that one can set about turning around the world six times in 24 hours, in a way that undoubtedly completely transcends the understanding of those who believed that movement was related to effort?

Anyway the bubble has made others its own since then. Only there remains a residue of it, in a way. It is that the one who speaks is not always capable of saying *I say* as is proved - it is in this way that we are witnesses, we psychoanalysts - by the fact that we, psychoanalysts, are capable of telling him what he is saying. We were able in a small number of cases, especially if they put an enormous amount of goodwill into it, if they come to us to speak enormously, it can happen that we interpret something to them and what does it mean to interpret something? We never interpret the world for them; we bring them, like that, a little piece of something that appears to be something that has kept its place in their discourse without them knowing it. Where do we analysts pull this out of? There is something that I would have liked to have made you meditate on this (306) year, it is the *frozen words* of Rabelais. In truth, like many things, it has already been written for a long time, but no one has noticed it. I put a strong emphasis on a certain Mr Valdemar described by Poe. I made what one could call a satirical use of him. I spoke in this connection about something that is nothing other than what I denounced here one more time, namely, this survival of the Freudian discourse and of the dead societies that it appears to keep talking.

It is a myth that goes much further. What interpretation uncovers is not always very clear as regards what is at stake, whether they are the realities of life or of death. What I would have led you towards this year, if I had been able to speak about the psychoanalytic act up to the end, would have been in order to tell you that it is not for nothing if I spoke to you about the desire of the psychoanalyst. Because it is impossible to draw it elsewhere than from the phantasy of the psychoanalyst. And this is what undoubtedly may give you the shivers. But we are not next or near it in our day - that it is from the phantasy of the psychoanalyst, namely, from what is most opaque, most closed, most autistic in his word that there comes the shock by which the word is unfrozen in the analysand, and in which there comes to be multiplied insistently this

function of repetition in which we can allow him to grasp this knowledge of which he is the plaything.

Thus it is confirmed that the truth makes itself known through the Other. This justifies that it has always emerged in this way. What we know more, is that it is in relation to the Other which no longer has anything mystical or transcendental about it that this is produced. And the knot whose curve I drew on the blackboard in the form of this little loop which is there and which can almost, you see, be close to appearing to be nothing more than a circle, to be fused in its duplicity as loop. This is what experience teaches us. Namely, that the *subject supposed to know*, where it truly is, namely, not us, the analyst, but in effect what we suppose this subject knows. This in so far as it is unconscious is duplicated by what the practice, this practice which is a little bit hedge-hopping, puts in parallel with it, namely, this *subject supposed demand*. Did I not see someone who appeared very proud to be questioning a member of the movement of the 22nd March, let us not name him, in order to ask him "What are you demanding of us analysts?" I wrote somewhere that the analyst was this privileged personage, a comic (307) one undoubtedly, who with the supply created the demand. It is quite obvious that here it did not work, but that does not prove that we have nothing to do with what is happening at this level. It means that they are demanding nothing of us. And afterwards! It is precisely the error of the analyst to believe that where we have to intervene as analysts, is at the level of demand, which never ceases to be theorised. While what is at stake, is very precisely this interval between the *subject suppose to know* and the *subject supposed demand*, and in the fact that it is nevertheless known for a long time that the subject does not know what he is demanding. Which allows him subsequently not to demand what he knows.

If we recognise this interval, this gap, this Moebius strip, where it is, in this little knot scribbled as I was able to do it on the board, in truth and I did not take much care, this is what is called this residue, this distance, this something to which there is entirely reduced for us the Other, namely, the *o-object*.

This role of the *o-object* which is of lack and of distance and not at all of mediation, it is on this that there is posed, that there is imposed this truth which is the discovery, the tangible discovery - and may those to have to touch on it not forget it - that there is no dialogue, the relation of the subject to the Other is of an essentially asymmetrical order, that dialogue is a dupery.

It is at the level of the subject in so far as the subject has been purified that the origin of science has been established. That at the level of the Other, there has never been anything more true than prophecy. It is on the contrary at the level of the Other that science is totalled, namely, that with respect to the subject it is completely alienated. It is a matter of knowing where there can still reside at the level of the subject something that is precisely of the order of prophecy.

End.

ANNEXE 2
Logics of Phantasies

Frege's Logic

\vdash p assertion of p

\exists p: $(\forall x)p(x)$

\neg p negation, \neg p

\vdash p \Leftrightarrow q

$[(x)b \Leftrightarrow (x)d] (\forall x)$

$[(x)b \Leftrightarrow (x)d] (\forall x)$

LACAN'S LOGIC

$(\forall x) b \Leftrightarrow (\forall x) d (\forall x)$ U.A.

$(x)d \perp (\forall x) d (\forall x) \perp$ P.A.

$\frac{s}{s} \frac{s_1}{s}$ has no logical sense.

Annex 3

*Lacan's summary of the seminar of 1967-68
for the year book of the
Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes*

(311) The psychoanalytic act, neither seen nor heard of before me, namely, never mapped out, much less put in question, we suppose here to be something belonging to the elective moment when psychoanalysand passes to psychoanalyst.

This is the most commonly admitted recourse as regards what is necessary for this passage, all other conditions remaining contingent as compared to it.

Thus isolated from this moment of installation, the act is within the reach of everyone who enters into a psychoanalysis.

Let us say first of all: the act (simply) takes the place of an assertion, whose subject it changes. It is not an act to walk if all one says is "it walks, *ça marche*", or even "let us walk, *marchons*", but only if it ensures that "I am getting there, *j'y arrive*" is verified in it.

The psychoanalytic act seems suited to throw greater light on the act, because it is an act that reproduces itself from the very doing that it commands.

Through this it remits to the in-itself (*l'en-soi*) of a logical consistency, to decide whether indeed the relay can be taken up from an act which is such that it dismisses (*destitue*) at the end the very subject that establishes it.

From this step it can be seen that it is the subject here of whom it must be said whether it is knowledge.

Does the psychoanalysand, at the end of the task assigned to him, know "better than anyone" the subjective dismissal to which it has reduced the very one who commanded him to do it? For instance: this in-itself of the o-object which at this end is evacuated by the same movement in which the psychoanalysand drops, because he has verified in this object the cause of desire.

(312) There is knowledge acquired there, but by whom?

To whom does it pay the price of the truth that at the limit the subject treated cannot be cured of?

From this limit can a subject be conceived who offers to reproduce what he has been delivered from?

And when this itself subjects him to bringing about the production of a task that he only promises by presupposing the very lure that is no longer tenable for him?

Because it is starting from the fiction-structure in which truth is stated, that from his very being he is going to create the stuff for the production...of an unreal.

Subjective dismissal is not any the less in prohibiting this pass because it must, like the sea, always be recommenced.

One nevertheless suspects that the gap revealed here between the act and the dignity of its purpose, is only to be taken to instruct us about what makes of it a scandal: the fault perceived in the subject supposed to know.

A whole indoctrination entitled psychoanalytic, still does not know that it is neglecting here the point that makes all strategy vacillate because it is still not clear about the psychoanalytic act.

To say that there is an unconscious means that there is a knowledge without a subject. The idea of instinct crushes this discovery; but it survives because this knowledge never proves to be anything but legible.

There is a line of resistance to this work that is as inordinately advanced as a phobia can be. This means that it is hopeless and shows that one has understood nothing about the unconscious, if one has not gone beyond it.

Namely, that what it introduces in terms of a division into the subject because a knowledge that moreover holds up does not determine it, presupposes, simply by being stated in this way, an Other, that for its part knows it before it has been perceived. We know that even Descartes makes use of this Other to guarantee at least the truth of his scientific starting point.

This is why the all the philosophical -logies, onto-, theo-, cosmo-, as well as psycho-, contradict the unconscious. But since the unconscious is only understood by being crushed by one of the most bastard notions of traditional psychology, people do not even attend to the fact that to affirm it makes this supposition of the Other impossible. But it is enough for it not to be denounced, for it to be as if the unconscious never happened.

(313) From which one sees that the worst people can make "a return to general psychology" their slogan.

In order to disentangle this, a structure of the Other must be stated which does not permit it to be overridden. Hence this formula: that there is no Other of the Other, or our affirmation that there is no metalanguage.

Let us confirm the latter by the fact that what is called metalanguage in mathematics is nothing but the discourse from which a language wants to exclude itself, namely, strives for the real. Mathematical logic is not, as cannot be imputed to me except in bad faith, an opportunity to rejuvenate my type of subject. It is from the outside that it bears witness to an Other whose structure, and precisely because it is logical, does not overlap itself: this is the $S(O)$ of our graph.

That such an Other should be explored, does not condemn it to know nothing about the effects that it involves for the living being that it carries as being subject-to its effects. But if transference appears to be already sufficiently justified by the signifying primarity of the unary trait, there is nothing to indicate that the o-object does not have a consistency that is sustained by pure logic.

It must then be advanced that the psychoanalyst in psychoanalysis is not a subject, and that by situating his act in the ideal topology of the o-object, it can be deduced that he operates by not thinking.

An "I do not think" which is the law, de facto makes the psychoanalyst depend on the anxiety of knowing where to give it its place to still think about psychoanalysis without being doomed to miss it.

The humility of the limit in which the act is presented to his experience, blocks by the reprobation of stating it to be missed (*manqué*) the surest paths to arrive at this knowledge that it conceals..

Moreover we started, to encourage him, from the testimony that science gives of the ignorance it is in as regards its subject with the example of the Pavlovian approach, taken up to make it illustrate Lacan's aphorism: that a signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier. From which it can be seen that it is by holding onto the rail when it was still in the dark, that the experimenter gave himself some cheap hope by putting the hat into the rabbit. This ingenuity of the slip is nevertheless sufficient to account for a rather broad equivalence of Pavlovian statements, in which the deviation of someone who only thinks of the banks between which he wants to force the analytic crisis, finds a good university alibi.

(314) Still more naive then is the one who hears echoes of this whole apologue and corrects it by saying that the subject of science is never where one thinks it is, since that is precisely our irony...

It remains to make an appeal to where the affair takes place. And it can only be in the structure that the psychoanalyst shows as a symptom, when suddenly struck by an inverted Grace, he comes to raise an idolatrous prayer to "his ear", a fetish that has arisen in his breast along a hypocondriacal path.

There is an area of stigmata that living in this field imposes. because of failing to map out the sense of the psychoanalytic act. It presents itself rather painfully in the penumbra of councils in which the collectivity identified by it. takes on the image of a parodied Church.

It is certainly not ruled out that there should be articulated there confessions that are worth collecting. For example this forgery called *the self*. the first perhaps from this surface to go outside the list of morphemes which make it taboo that they should have come from Freud.

The fact is that it took on its weight or even its very discovery from the doings of the psychoanalyst you have to meet in order for there to be imposed on you the respect for the imprint received from the passion for psychoanalysis.

We have brought to life the writing where in the light of the self there is honed, and made tangible by proving to be an effect of compression. the avowal that passion has only place and strength by going beyond the very clearly recalled limits of the technique. They would serve it better, nevertheless, by being inscribed in the charter of the act once it has been restored to this page that can only be turned by a gesture changing the subject. the very one by which the psychoanalyst is qualified in act.

This self that has been launched will be nevertheless – the theme proliferates and in the sense of the auspices under which it was born - the ruin of the psychoanalyst. who is disqualified by it. The cult element of his profession is, as in other cases. the sign of being unequal to the act.

Moreover the act itself cannot function as a predicate. And to impute it to the subject that it determines. the whole *inventio medii* has to be put in new terms: this is what the o-object can test itself against.

What can be said of *every* psychoanalyst. except something that makes it obvious that none at all exists?

If on the other hand nothing can ensure that a psychoanalyst exists, except the (315) logic by which the act is articulated with a before and an after, it is clear that predicates take on a dominance here. unless they are linked by an effect of production.

If the psychoanalysand makes the psychoanalyst. there is still nothing added except the bill. For it to be due. we must be assured that there is something of the psychoanalyst.

And this is what the o-object responds to.

The psychoanalyst is constituted by the o-object. Is constituted, to be understood as: is produced: from the o-object: with the o-object.

These remarks are too close to the place where logical quantifiers appear to stumble, for us not to have flirted with them as instruments. We feel the psychoanalytic act yielding by breaking hold in the universal that they have the merit of not satisfying.

(And this is what is going to excuse Aristotle for oscillating, in a still more inspired way than in isolating the *upokeimenon*, in not being able to avoid retrieving the *ousia* now and then.)

Because what this act perceives is the kernel constituted by the hollow by which the idea of the whole is justified, by circumscribing it in the logic of quantifiers.

From then on perhaps it allows it to be better named as a *désaïfication* [deconsecration?]

Here the psychoanalyst finds company in carrying out the same operation. Is it at the level of the open field offered to discourse for this purpose?

Such indeed in effect is the horizon traced out by the technique, but its artifice depends on the logical structure that it rightly trusts, because it never loses its rights. The experienced impossibility of a pulverulent discourse is the Trojan Horse through which there enters into the city of discourse its master who is the psychotic.

But there again, as we see, the corporeal deduction is already made from which *something of* the psychoanalyst is to be made, and this is what the psychoanalytic act must be harmonised with.

We can only outline the abrupt logic of the act by tempering the passion it gives rise to in the field that it commands, even if it only does so by withdrawing from it. It is no doubt because he failed to include this tempering that Winnicott believed he had to contribute to it something of his own *self*. But also to receive from it this transitional object from the more distant hands of the child, that I must indeed render to him here, since it is starting from it that I first formulated the o-object.

(316) Let us reduce the psychoanalytic act then to what leaves to the one that it alleviates what it has begun for him: it is that there remains declared to him that enjoyment (*jouissance*), privileged in that it commands the sexual relationship, is offered by a forbidden act, but that this is to mask the fact that this relationship is only established by not being verifiable because it requires the middle term that is distinguished as lacking in it: this is what is called making a subject of castration.

The benefit of this is clear for the neurotic because it resolves what it represented as passion.

But the important thing is that to whomsoever it gives only the enjoyment held to be perverse, is well and truly permitted by this, since the psychoanalyst makes of it the key, in order to withdraw it, it is true, at the end of his operation. Which means that it has only to be taken away from him in order to restore to it its proper use, whether he makes use of it or not.

This cynical outcome should clearly mark the secondary nature of any benefit with regard to the passions. That the axiology of psychoanalytic practice proves to be reduced to the sexual contributes to the subversion of the ethics that depends on the inaugural act only because the sexual is shown by negativities of structure.

Pleasure barrier to enjoyment (but not the inverse). Reality constructed from transference (but not the inverse). And the principle of supreme vanity because the verb is only worthwhile under the gaze of death (gaze to be underlined, not death which slips away).

In the ethics inaugurated from the psychoanalytic act, less etiquette, if you will forgive me, than was ever glimpsed because of starting from the act, logic commands, this is certain because one finds its paradoxes in it.

Except, which is also certain, that types, norms, are added to it as pure remedies.

In order to maintain its own chicane, the psychoanalytic act must not become diluted by them.

Because from its reference points it becomes clear that sublimation does not rule out the truth of enjoyment, which is why heroisms, by being better explained, are organised according to whether they are more or less alert.

Moreover the psychoanalytic act itself is always at the mercy of *acting out* and we have sufficiently depicted above the figures in which it grimaces. And it is important to highlight the degree to which the approach of Freud himself is of a nature to warn us about it, when it is not so much from myth that he first (317) supported it, but from a recourse to the stage. Oedipus and Agamemnon represent stage productions. Today one sees the full import of a feeble-minded clinging to it, in someone who put his signature to a mishap, by venturing on an exegesis of the *o*-object.

Because if the moral act is organised from the psychoanalytic act, it is because it receives its In-I (*En-Je*) from the fact that the *o*-object is co-ordinated from an experience of knowledge.

It is from it that there takes its substance the insatiable requirement that Freud was the first to articulate in *Civilisation and its discontents*. We are highlighting this insatiable with a different accent by the fact that it finds its balance in the psychoanalytic act.

Why put it to the credit of this act that we have reduced introduced its very status in time?

Nor push back this in-time, by having uttered it six months ago in the proposition that anticipated it and unleashed not simply a theoretical, but effective kind of house-breaking in our Ecole that since it got very close to me makes me dare to recognise it as bearing witness to a rendezvous.

Is it enough to remark that in the psychoanalytic act the o-object is only supposed to come in the form of a production for which the means, because it is required for all supposed exploitation, is supported here by knowledge whose proprietorial aspect is properly what precipitates a precise social fault?

Shall we go on to question whether it is indeed the man that an anti-eros would reduce to a single dimension that is distinguished in the May insurrection?

On the other hand putting the In-I into a mass by getting a grip on the knowledge that crushes not so much by its excess as by the auditing of its logic that makes of the subject a pure cleavage, here is where there is conceived a change in the very moorings of anxiety and it must be said that having laid down that it is not without an object, we have here also just grasped what was already disappearing over a ridge.

This is not enough for the act that is required in the field of knowledge, to collapse into the passion for the signifier for there to be some one or no one to take on the job of starter.

There is no difference, once the process has begun, between the subject devoted to subversion to the degree of producing something incurable in which the act finds its own end, and what takes on a revolutionary effect from the symptom, simply by no longer marching under the Marxist baton.

What people believed they were pinpointing here about the virtues of speaking out, is only the suspect anticipation of the rendezvous that is indeed there, but in (318) which the word only comes because the act was there. This should be understood as: was there a little more, even if it only arrived, was there at the very instant that it finally arrived.

This indeed is why I hold that for my part I did not fail to be at the place that the drama of today's psychoanalysts confers on me at this juncture, recognising

that I know a little bit more about it than those who ridiculously did not miss this occasion to display themselves as actors in it.

Here, as always, we find the lead I enjoy and it is enough for it to exist for it not to be something slight, when I remember the judgement, made by a particular person, that in the case from which there remains to be found everything that we know about obsessional neurosis, Freud had been "taken in like a tyro (*rat*)". This in effect was what was enough to read of the *Ratman*, for someone to be able to sustain oneself with regard to the psychoanalytic act.

But who will understand, even among those who are emerging from my meditation on this act, what is nevertheless indicated clearly in these very lines, where the psychoanalyst will come to be relayed from tomorrow, and also what held this place in history?

I am not a little proud, people should know, of this power of unreadability that I have been able to maintain unspoilt in my texts to protect against, here for example, what the historialising of a situation offers as a blessed opening for those who are only in a hurry to histrionicise it for their own comfort.

To be too easy to comprehend is to give a way out to avoidance, and it is to make oneself the accomplice of it, in that in the same package which sends each one to his ruin, you provide a supplement from Elsewhere so that he may hurry to put himself into it.

Was I careful enough in approaching what is required to situate the psychoanalytic act: to establish what determines it from enjoyment and the ways at the same time it must protect itself from it? One can judge by the crumbs that have fallen from it onto the following year.

Here again we do not think it an unimportant augury that a cut was made that spared us from doing it.

Let the interest remains on this hither side, since it is not lacking in what is proliferating because of simply ignoring a lemma like this, bequeathed by me, in passing: to the act, of this seminar, "that there is no transference of transference". This nevertheless is what the report in an upcoming Congress stumbles over, for want of having the least idea of what it is articulating (cf. "The non-transference relationship" in *IJP*, 1969. Part 1, vol. 50)

If it were not irremediable because of having spent so much time in the commerce of the true about the true (the third lack), this Roman Congress might have been able to pick up a little bit more of what, once upon a time, was uttered in act there about the function as well as the field that language determines language.

Sent on the 10th June 1969

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