

CHAPTER 3

From the Mechanism of Psychosis to the Universal Condition of the Symptom: On Foreclosure

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I. Introduction

Lacan introduces the term 'foreclosure' to explain the massive and global differences between psychosis and neurosis; neurosis operates by way of *repression*, while psychosis operates by way of *foreclosure*. This distinction is complemented by a third category, though arguably less secure and more problematic than the first two, of *disavowal*, as a mechanism specific to perversion. These three terms which correspond respectively to Freud's *Verdrängung*, *Verwerfung* and *Verleugnung*, along with the three-part division of neurosis, psychosis and perversion, form the basis of what is effectively a differential diagnosis in Lacan's work, one that aspires to being truly psychoanalytic, deriving nothing from psychiatric categories. Thus, underlying the elaboration of the notion of foreclosure is a clear and sharp distinction between three separate subjective structures.

Two features of this psychoanalytic nosology worthy of note are firstly that it assumes a structural unity behind often quite different symptoms that are expressions of the one clinical type and secondly that there is no continuum between the various clinical types uncovered. A corollary is that in the case of psychosis this structure, a quite different structure from that of neurosis, is present even before the psychosis declares itself clinically.

II. Origin of the Term

While 'foreclosure' is a common French legal term, with a meaning very close to its English equivalent, for Lacan's purposes it clearly derives more directly from the work of the French linguists Jacques Damourette and Edouard Pichon. In their *Des mots à la pensée: Essai de grammaire de la langue française*, these authors speak of 'foreclosure' in certain circumstances when an utterance repudiates facts that are treated as either true or merely possible.¹ In their words, a proposition is 'foreclosed' when 'expelled from the field of possibilities as seen by the speaker,' who thereby 'scotomises' the possibility of something's being the case.² They take the presence of certain linguistic elements as an indication of foreclosure, so that when it is said that 'Mr Brooke is not the sort of person who would *ever* complain' (*M. Brooke n'est pas de ceux qui se plaignent jamais*), on Damourette and Pichon's analysis, the word 'ever' would flag the foreclosure of the very possibility of Mr Brooke's complaining. That Mr Brooke should complain is 'expelled from the field of possibilities.'³

Whether this analysis is correct or not is largely irrelevant as far as Lacan is concerned since, although he derives foreclosure from Damourette and Pichon, he puts it to quite a different use. For Lacan, what is foreclosed is not the possibility of an event's coming to pass, but the very signifier, or signifiers, that makes the expression of impossibility possible in the first place. Thus, 'foreclosure' refers not to the fact that a speaker makes a statement which declares something impossible — a process closer to disavowal — but to the fact that the speaker lacks the very linguistic means for making the statement at all.

This is where the difference between repression and foreclosure lies. In Lacan's analysis of Freud's classic studies on the unconscious — *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* — the mechanisms of repression and the return of the repressed are linguistic in nature.⁴ Lacan's thesis that the unconscious is structured like a language implies that for something to be repressed it has first of all to be registered in the symbolic.⁵ Thus, repression implies the prior recognition of the repressed in the symbolic system or register. In psychosis, on the other hand, the necessary signifiers are lacking and so the recognition required for repression is impossible. However, what is foreclosed

does not simply disappear altogether but may return, albeit in a different guise, from outside the subject.

Lacan chooses 'foreclosure' to translate Freud's *Verwerfung*, a term which is difficult to chart through the *Standard Edition* because it is not indexed, but is there usually given the more literal translation of 'rejection.'⁶ For a number of years Lacan also employed more literal French translations, like *rejet* or on occasion *retranchement*.⁷ It was not until the very last session of his *Seminar III* on psychosis in 1955-56 that he finally opted for the term that has since become so familiar:

I shan't go back over the notion of *Verwerfung* I began with, and for which, having thought it through, I propose to you definitively to adopt this translation which I believe is the best — *foreclosure*.⁸

It is reasonable to regard this choice as an acknowledgement that Lacan raised to the level of a concept what in Freud had remained less clear in its meaning and more ambiguous in its employment. Freud does not use only the term *Verwerfung* in connection with psychosis, since at times, and specially late in his work, he prefers to speak in terms of the *disavowal* (*Verleugnung*) of reality in psychosis.⁹ On a number of different occasions Freud appeared to be grasping for a way of characterising different mechanisms underlying neurosis and psychosis, without ever coming to a satisfactory conclusion. It is fair to say that with the work of Lacan the mechanism of foreclosure and the structure of psychosis are understood in a new way, one that has given the psychoanalytic treatment of psychosis a more secure basis.

Indeed, on more than one occasion Lacan declared that psychoanalysts must not back away from psychosis, and the treatment of psychotics is a significant feature of analytic work within the Lacanian orientation.¹⁰ It should be noted, though, that Lacan's remark is not to be taken as an admonition to shoulder fearlessly the clinical burden imposed by the psychotic patient. It rather reflects his belief that the problems the psychotic raises are central to psychoanalysis and not a mere supplement to a supposed primary concern with neurosis.

Lacan observed that Freud's breakthrough in his examination of President Schreber's *Memoirs* was discovering that the discourse of the psychotic, as well as other bizarre and apparently meaningless phenomena of psychosis, could be deciphered and understood, just as dreams

can.¹¹ Lacan compares the scale of this breakthrough with that obtained in the interpretation of dreams. Indeed, he is inclined to regard it as even more original than dream interpretation, arguing that while Freudian interpretation of dreams has nothing in common with previous interest in the meaning of dreams, the claim that dreams have meaning was itself not new.¹² However, Lacan also indicates that the fact that the psychotic's discourse is just as interpretable as neurotic phenomena such as dreams leaves the two disorders at the same level and fails to account for the major, qualitative differences between them. Therefore, if psychoanalysis is to account for the distinction between the two, it cannot do so on the basis of meaning alone.

It is on this issue of what makes psychosis different from neurosis that Lacan focuses. How are we to explain the massive, qualitative differences between the two disorders? It is because Lacan is convinced that the delusional system and the hallucinations are so invasive for the subject, have such a devastating effect upon his or her relations with the world and with fellow beings, that he regards prior psychoanalytic attempts to explain psychosis, ultimately including Freud's own, as inadequate.

Freud explains psychosis in terms of a repressed homosexual relationship to the father. According to Freud, it was the emergence in Schreber of an erotic homosexual relationship towards his treating doctor, Professor Flechsig, and the conflict this desire produced in him that led in the first instance to the delusion of persecution and ultimately to the fully developed delusional system centred on Schreber's special relationship to God.¹³

Freud also compares the mechanisms of neurosis and psychosis in the following terms: in both there is a withdrawal of investment, or object-cathexis, from objects in the world. In the case of neurosis this object-cathexis is retained but invested in fantasized objects within the neurotic's internal world. In the case of psychosis the withdrawn cathexis is invested in the ego. This takes place at the expense of all object-cathexes, even in fantasy, and the turning of libido upon the ego accounts for symptoms such as hypochondria and megalomania. The delusional system, the most striking feature of psychosis, arises in a second stage. Freud characterises the construction of a delusional system as an attempt at recovery, in which the subject re-establishes a new, often very intense relation with the people and things in the world by way of his or her delusions.¹⁴

One can see that despite the differences in detail between the mechanisms of neurosis and psychosis in Freud's account, both still operate essentially by way of repression: withdrawal of libido onto fantasized objects in neurosis, withdrawal of object libido onto the ego in psychosis. It is basically for this reason that Lacan finds it inadequate:

It is difficult to see how it could be purely and simply the suppression of a given [homosexual] tendency, the rejection or repression of some more or less transferential drive he would have felt toward Flechsig, that led President Schreber to construct his enormous delusion. There really must be something more proportionate to the result involved.¹⁵

III. The Foreclosure of Castration in the Wolf Man

It is apparent in Lacan's work prior to *Seminar III* that he was already thinking about a mechanism in psychosis that is different from repression. In his *Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la 'Verneinung' de Freud*, published in 1956 but dating back to a discussion in his seminar in early 1954, Lacan refers to Freud's use of the term *Verwerfung* to characterise the Wolf Man's attitude towards castration.¹⁶ The discussion focuses on a series of comments in this case study where Freud first contrasts repression and foreclosure categorically, stating: 'A repression is something very different from a foreclosure.'¹⁷ Freud then observes:

[The Wolf Man] rejected [*verwarf*] castration. . . . When I speak of his having rejected it, the first meaning of the phrase is that he would have nothing to do with it in the sense of having repressed it. This really involved no judgement upon the question of its existence, but it was the same as if it did not exist.¹⁸

Lacan considers that the Wolf Man's attitude towards castration shows that, at least in his childhood, castration is foreclosed. It lies outside the limits of what can be judged to exist, because it is with-

drawn from the possibilities of speech. While no judgement can be made about the existence of castration, it may nevertheless appear in the real in an erratic and unpredictable manner which Lacan describes as being 'in relations of resistance without transference,' or again, 'as a punctuation without text.'¹⁹ While clearly indicating that a difference of register is at stake here, these formulations remain somewhat metaphorical. They will subsequently be developed into a more complex position concerning the vicissitudes of the foreclosed.

The implication in Freud is, then, that foreclosure is a mechanism that simply treats the foreclosed as if it did not exist, and as such is distinct from repression where the repressed manifests itself in symptomatic formations. Pursuing this line of thought further, Lacan turns to Freud's paper *Negation*, the topic of his discussion with Hyppolite during the seminar. In this paper Freud distinguishes between *Einbeziehung ins Ich* and *Ausstossung aus dem Ich*.²⁰ Regarding these respectively as 'introduction into the subject' and 'expulsion from the subject,' Lacan argues that the latter constitutes the domain of what subsists outside symbolisation.²¹ This initial, primary expulsion constitutes a domain that is external to — in the sense of radically alien or foreign to — the subject and the subject's world. Lacan calls this domain the real. He regards it as distinct from reality, since reality is to be discriminated within the field of representation (Freud's notion of *Vorstellung*), which Lacan, in taking Freud's *Project* as his point of departure, considers to be constituted by the imaginary reproduction of initial perception.²² Reality is thus understood as the domain in which the question of the possible existence of the object of this initial perception can be raised, and in which this object can also be refound (*wiedergefunden*) and located.²³ Although the real is excluded from the symbolic field within which the question of the existence of objects in reality can be raised, it may nevertheless appear in reality, but it will do so in the form of a hallucination. Thus Lacan's remark: 'That which has not seen the light of day in the symbolic appears in the real.'²⁴

Though there is no explicit statement to this effect, it is clearly implied in *Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite* that it is castration that is foreclosed. This issue is taken up again in *Seminar III*:

What is at issue when I speak of *Verwerfung*? At issue is the rejection [foreclosure] of a primordial signifier

into the outer shadows, a signifier that will henceforth be missing at this level. Here you have the fundamental mechanism that I posit as being at the basis of paranoia. It's a matter of a primordial process of exclusion of an original within, which is not a bodily within but that of an initial body of signifiers.²⁵

However, Lacan shifts ground in this seminar, concluding that the foreclosure of castration is secondary to the original foreclosure of the primordial signifier of the Name-of-the-Father.

IV. Schreber's Way

Lacan devoted his seminar in the year 1955-56 to a re-examination of Schreber's *Memoirs* and Freud's discussion of the case. Already armed with the distinction between *Verdrängung* and *Verwerfung*, Lacan intended to explore the clinical, nosographical and technical difficulties the psychoses raise.

In further examining the nature of foreclosure in *Seminar III*, the earlier views outlined above undergo a number of modifications. While it is a common assumption that foreclosure entails psychosis, there in fact appears to be nothing to rule out the possibility that foreclosure is a normal psychic process. Indeed, although he does not do this systematically, Lacan does not hesitate to speak of the foreclosure of femininity, or, later and in a different context, of the foreclosure of the subject of science.²⁶ Foreclosure in psychosis is the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, a key signifier that 'anchors' or 'quilts' signifier and signified.²⁷ Thus it is only when what is foreclosed is specifically concerned with the question of the father, as in Schreber's case, that psychosis is produced. The term 'Name-of-the-Father' indicates that what is at issue is not a person but a signifier, one that is replete with cultural and religious significance.²⁸ It is a key signifier for the subject's symbolic universe, regulating this order and giving it its structure. Its function in the Oedipus complex is to be the vehicle of the law that regulates desire — both the subject's desire and the omnipotent desire of the maternal figure. It should also be noted that since foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father is one possible outcome

It is not that the absence of this signifier, the Name-of-the-Father, prevents the symbolic from functioning altogether. Schreber is after all within the symbolic; indeed, he is a very prolix author, as his *Memoirs* so clearly demonstrate. Yet his entire literary output revolves around two connected, fundamental issues which he is unable to resolve: the question of the father and the question of his own sexual identity.

The difference between Schreber and the neurotic here is striking: the neurotic finds a response, in the form of a neurotic compromise, a more or less satisfactory solution to the questions of the law and of sexual identity. Schreber on the other hand finds himself completely incapable of resolving them because the material he needs to do so, the requisite signifiers, are missing.

Yet what is foreclosed from the symbolic is not purely and simply abolished. It returns, but, unlike the return of the repressed, it returns from outside the subject, as emanating from the real. As Lacan henceforth puts it: what has been foreclosed from the symbolic reappears in the real. It is important to recognise not only that what returns in the real is actual bits of language, signifiers, but also that the effects of this return are located at both the symbolic and imaginary levels.

With the emphasis upon the function of speech in *Seminar III*, where the Other is understood as the Other of speech and of subjective recognition, Lacan pays very close attention to the imaginary means by which the subject makes good the lack in the symbolic. For instance, Lacan considers that in psychosis there is a form of regression involved; there is regression, which is topographical rather than chronological, from the symbolic register to the imaginary.³¹ Thus, when he declares that what has been foreclosed from the symbolic reappears in the real, it is marked by the properties of the imaginary.

Whereas the symbolic is linguistic in nature, the imaginary groups together a series of phenomena the cornerstone of which is the mirror stage.³² The mirror stage, which refers to the infant's early experience of fascination with its own image in a mirror, relates how the child responds with jubilation and pleasure to seeing a reflection of its own image. Lacan claims that the child is fascinated with its image because it is here that the child experiences itself as a whole, as a unity, for the first time. Furthermore, the experience of a self-unity lays the basis for the ego, which is formed through the subject's identification with this image. The reference to the mirror is not essential, but is intended

to capture the fact that the ego and the other both come into existence together. Moreover, the ego and the other (or more strictly speaking, the image of the other, $i(a)$) are dependent upon one another, and indeed are not clearly differentiated. The reference to the mirror captures this ambiguity by emphasizing that the ego is built upon an image of one's own body as it would be perceived from another's point of view. The ego and its other are locked together in the sense that they come into existence together and depend upon one another for their sense of identity. For Lacan, this dual relationship epitomizes the imaginary relationship, which is characterized by identification and alienation, and marked by an ambivalent relationship of aggressive rivalry with and erotic attachment to the other. In psychosis this means that relations with the other are marked by the erotic attachment and aggressive rivalry characteristic of the imaginary. Thus, Professor Flechsig becomes an erotic object for Schreber, but also the agent of Schreber's persecution.

In *On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis* there is a shift away from the function of speech to the laws of language, which is accompanied by a simultaneous shift away from intersubjectivity towards the relationship with the Other as the Other of language. As a consequence, there is a somewhat more detailed analysis of language phenomena and language disorders in psychosis. This appears very clearly in Lacan's analysis of the psychiatric term 'elementary phenomena.' Throughout his work Lacan makes repeated references to these elementary phenomena, a term which embraces thought-echoes, verbal enunciations of actions, and various forms of hallucination. In *Seminar III* he uses it as a general term for the phenomena produced in psychosis by the appearance of signifiers in the real.³³ These are classically referred to as primitive phenomena, are considered to be instrumental in the onset of the psychosis, while they themselves lack any apparent external cause. Lacan's use of the term dates back to his 1932 thesis in medicine where he observes:

By this name [of primitive or elementary phenomena], in effect, according to a schema frequently accepted in psychopathology . . . , authors designate symptoms in which the determining factors of psychosis are said to be primitively expressed and on the basis of which the delusion is said to be constructed according to

secondary affective reactions and deductions that in themselves are rational.³⁴

In *Seminar III* Lacan's task is to explain how these elementary phenomena result from the emergence of signifiers in the real. He claims that if they are to be called 'elementary' then this has to be understood in the sense that they contain all the elements of the fully developed psychosis.³⁵ This approach is made possible by the recognition that all psychotic phenomena can in fact be analysed as phenomena of speech, rather than as a reaction by the subject, in the imaginary, to a lack in the symbolic.

In *On a Question Preliminary*, elementary phenomena (though no longer called this) are analysed as reflecting the structure of the signifier, resulting in an analysis of hallucinations that divides them into code phenomena and message phenomena.³⁶

The code phenomena include Schreber's *Grundsprache* or basic language and its neologisms and 'autonyms.' 'Autonymous' is Roman Jakobson's term for contexts in which expressions are mentioned rather than used — the first word in this sentence is an example. Jakobson describes this as a case of a message referring to a code. It is a common occurrence in ordinary language, but in Schreber's case there is a highly developed code-message interaction; moreover, one that is also reflected in the relationships between the 'rays' or 'nerves' that speak (*Gottesstrahlen*). These rays, Lacan says, are nothing but a reification of the very structure and phenomenon of language itself.³⁷

The code phenomena also include the frequently encountered phenomenon in psychosis of the enigma, along with psychotic certainty, which according to Lacan develops out of it.³⁸ Lacan claims that there is a temporal sequence between these phenomena. First, there is an initial experience of an enigma, arising from an absence or lack of meaning that occurs in the place where meaning should be. The enigma arises because the expectation of meaning that the signifier generates is radically disappointed. An enigma is not just the absence of meaning, but its absence there where meaning should be present. Thus, in a second stage, what was already implicit in the first comes to the fore, namely the conviction, which by its very nature the signifier generates, that there is a meaning, or as Schreber's rays put it, that 'all nonsense cancels itself out' (*aller Unsinn hebt sich auf*).³⁹

One should note that in both cases there is effectively a failure of language ('the code'), to produce meaning ('the message'): in the first there is a communication of the structure of language but no meaning is conveyed; in the second the absence of meaning gives rise to the conviction of the psychotic.

As examples of message phenomena Lacan gives the interrupted messages which Schreber receives from God and to which he is called upon to give a reply that completes the message. For instance, 'Now I will myself...' (*Nun will ich mich...*), to which Schreber replies, '... face the fact that I am an idiot' (*darein ergeben, daß ich dumm bin*). In calling these 'message phenomena,' on the grounds that the sentence is interrupted at a point at which the indexical elements of the sentence have been uttered, Lacan appears to have in mind Jakobson's observation that the 'general meaning of a shifter cannot be defined without a reference to the message.'⁴⁰

Both types of phenomena are examples of the return of the signifier in the real. Both indicate the appearance, in the real, of the signifier cut off from its connections with the signifying chain, that is, S_1 appears in the real without S_2 , and as a consequence the 'quilting' that would normally produce meaning cannot occur. However, this does not result in the complete extinguishment of meaning, but rather in the proliferation of a meaningfulness that manifests itself in the real in the form of verbal hallucinations, as well as in the enigma and the conviction the psychotic experiences.

Of special note as examples of the return of the signifier in the real are those verbal hallucinations, often persecutory, of the psychotic, such as the case of the hallucinated insult 'Sow!,' discussed in both *Seminar III* and *On a Question Preliminary*, where both imaginary and symbolic disturbances can be detected.⁴¹ On Lacan's analysis the example displays disturbances of the code. But it also reveals the appearance in psychotic form of the same content one finds expressed in different ways in neurotic formations of the unconscious — the utterance expresses the imaginary meaning of fragmentation of the body. What is perhaps different is that this emerges in the place from which phallic meaning has been foreclosed.

Given that the foreclosure of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father entails the corresponding absence of phallic meaning, it is to be expected that this will have particular consequences for the psychotic subject's sexual identity. Lacan speaks of a 'push towards woman' to

describe the gradual transformation of sexuality in Schreber's delusion as well as in other cases of psychosis. Prior to his psychosis Schreber lived as a heterosexual man with no apparent trace of feminization. The first intimation of this push towards woman is given in Schreber's conscious fantasy just prior to the onset of his psychosis: 'How beautiful it would be to be a woman undergoing sexual intercourse.' Subsequently Schreber's 'manly honour' struggles against the increasingly desperate attempts by God to 'unman' him and transform him into a woman. But he finally becomes reconciled to this transformation, recognizing that his emasculation is necessary if one day he is to be fertilised by God and repopulate the world with new beings. In the meantime he will adorn his naked body with trinkets and cheap jewellery to enhance and promote this unavoidable feminization.

Lacan sees in this development two separate aspects to the restoration of the imaginary structure. Both were detected by Freud and both are, for Lacan, linked either directly or indirectly to the absence of phallic meaning in the imaginary. The first aspect has already been mentioned; it is Schreber's 'transsexualism.' The second aspect links 'the feminization of the subject to the co-ordinate of divine copulation.'⁴² This psychotic drive to be transformed into a woman is an attempt to embody the woman in the figure of the wife of God. Lacan notes that transsexualism is common in psychosis and that it is normally linked to the demand for endorsement and consent from the father.⁴³

What triggers a psychosis? Lacan argues that even though the onset of psychosis is largely unforeseeable, the psychotic structure will have been there all along — like an invisible flaw in the glass — prior to the appearance of the clinical psychosis, when it suddenly and dramatically manifests itself. And we can see this in Schreber, who had up until the age of 51 led a relatively normal life, enjoying a successful career, and carrying out the demanding duties of a senior position in the judiciary.

Lacan holds that it is a certain type of encounter, in which the Name-of-the-Father is 'called into symbolic opposition to the subject,' that is the trigger, the precipitating cause of a psychosis.⁴⁴ What does this 'called into symbolic opposition to the subject' mean? The issue is explored in *Seminar III* in a lengthy discussion that continues over a number of sessions concerning the function of what Lacan calls *l'appel*, the 'call,' the 'calling,' the 'appeal' or even the 'interpella-

tion.' The discussion is not related specifically to psychosis but rather to a quite general function of language.⁴⁵

Lacan takes a number of examples from everyday French which draw on the difference between *Tu es celui qui me suivras* and *Tu es celui qui me suivra*, where the subordinate clause is in the second and third person respectively.⁴⁶ The same basic idea may be expressed in the English distinction between 'shall' and 'will.' Consider the two statements: 'You are the one who will follow me,' and 'You are the one who shall follow me.' It is possible to take the first as a description of or prediction about something that will come to pass: I predict that you will follow me. The second, on the other hand, can serve as an appeal, where the interlocutor, the one who is being addressed, is called upon to make a decision, to pursue a course of action which he or she must either embrace or repudiate. This latter case is, for instance, exemplified by Jesus of Nazareth's invocation, his appeal, to his disciples-to-be: 'I say to you: "You are the ones who shall follow me." Now, tell me, what is your reply, what do you say to this? Give me your answer, for now is the time to choose.' In this example we could say that Jesus is 'in symbolic opposition' to his disciples, or we could equally well say that he is asking them for 'symbolic recognition,' for his speech calls upon them to respond in a way that engages them in, commits them to, a decision, one loaded with practical consequences, as to whether they are to recognize him as the Messiah. For Schreber, then, there is a moment when he is called, interpellated, by — or perhaps better 'in' — the Name-of-the-Father. This is when the lack of the signifier declares itself, and it is sufficient to trigger the psychosis.

How is this symbolic opposition, this call for symbolic recognition, brought about in psychosis? Lacan gives this response: by an encounter with 'a real father, not necessarily by the subject's own father, but by A-father' (*Un-père*).⁴⁷ This is a situation that arises under two conditions: when the subject is in a particularly intense relationship involving a strong narcissistic component; and when, in this situation, the question of the father arises from a third position, one that is external to the erotic relation. For instance, and the examples are Lacan's, it may occur:

for the woman who has just given birth, in her husband's face, for the penitent confessing his sins in the

person of his confessor, for the girl in love in her meeting with 'the young man's father.'⁴⁸

And, as is well known, it can also occur in analysis, where the development of the transference can sometimes precipitate a psychosis. Lacan puts it thus:

It sometimes happens that we take prepsychotics into analysis, and we know what that produces — it produces psychotics. The question of the contraindications of analysis would not arise if we didn't all recall some particular case in our practice, or in the practice of our colleagues, where a full-blown psychosis . . . is triggered during the first analytic sessions in which things heat up a bit . . .⁴⁹

Indeed, at issue in the suitability or not of a subject for analysis is the unpredictability of psychosis, the uncertainty of knowing in whom a psychosis may be triggered, and the lack of diagnostic criteria for psychosis prior to its onset. And yet, if Lacan's views on the structure of psychosis are right, it makes sense to speak of 'prepsychosis' in the case of subjects with a psychotic structure who are not clinically psychotic.

Once the psychosis is triggered, everything will have changed for good, but what about before the onset? It is in pursuing this question that the work of Maurits Katan on prepsychosis and that of Helene Deutsch on the 'as if' phenomenon is discussed.⁵⁰ Lacan finds Katan's characterization of the prepsychotic period unconvincing, facetiously remarking that nothing resembles a prepsychosis more than a neurosis does.⁵¹ He finds more of interest in Deutsch's work, and especially in what she refers to as the 'as if' phenomenon, where, for example, an adolescent boy identifies with another youth in what looks like a homosexual attachment but turns out to be a precursor of psychosis.⁵² Here there is something that plays the role of a *suppléance*, a suppletion, that is a substitute or a stand-in for what is missing at the level of the symbolic.⁵³ Lacan uses the analogy of a three-legged stool:

Not every stool has four legs. There are some that stand upright on three. Here, though, there is no question of their lacking any, otherwise things go very badly indeed . . . It's possible that at the outset the stool doesn't have enough legs, but that up to a certain point it will nevertheless stand up, when the subject, at a certain crossroads of his biographical history, is confronted by this lack that has always existed.⁵⁴

Suppletion can take various forms. The case of Deutsch's is a good example of imaginary suppletion, where the support derived from an identification with the other is sufficient to compensate for the absence of the signifier. The psychosis is thus triggered at the moment at which the imaginary suppletion, with which the subject has until then been able to make do, proves inadequate. It is not uncommon for this to occur at the beginning of adult life when the subject loses the protective support of the family network. Indeed, Lacan even goes so far as to evoke the imaginary identification with the mother's desire as a means of maintaining the stability of the 'imaginary tripod.'

Lacan also considers that the delusion itself can provide the psychotic with a degree of stability in the form of a 'delusional metaphor,' which can be regarded as a second form of suppletion.⁵⁵ Considered by Freud as an attempt at cure, the stability of the delusional metaphor is seen by some in Lacan's school as the aim of the treatment of psychotics — an important consideration in the light of the claim that psychosis is a discrete subjective structure that no treatment will cure.

A third form of suppletion is, despite the air of paradox, best called symbolic suppletion. It is an intriguing fact that some psychotics have been capable of making important scientific or artistic contributions. The mathematician Georg Cantor is a famous example, but there are numerous such cases. We know about them because of the documented psychotic episodes these people underwent. But it is also interesting to speculate that there may be cases where the psychosis never declares itself and the clinical phenomena never eventuate. Perhaps in these cases the (pre)psychotic subject may find a form of substitute for the foreclosed signifier that enables him or her to maintain the fewest symbolic links necessary for normal, even for highly original and creative, functioning. In his *Seminar XXIII, Le sinthome* of 1975-76



Lacan argues that James Joyce was such a case. And indeed, there are a number of indications that one can point to in support of the claim that Joyce was probably a psychotic who was able to use his writing as an effective substitute to prevent the onset of psychosis. This is an interesting thought, and I return to it below. There is something necessarily speculative about such cases, and Joyce himself is obviously such a special case that he can hardly serve as a model for others. Still, there are important issues here concerning the diagnosis of psychosis. Could, for example, the so-called borderlines be situated here? Are they to be regarded as undeclared psychoses? Clearly, the Lacanian model implies a search for indications of psychosis independent of and prior to the onset of a full-blown clinical psychosis.

What causes foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father? Assuming the psychotic structure is laid down at the moment of the Oedipus complex, under what conditions is this foreclosure produced? Lacan does not have much to say about this issue, though he does make a criticism of certain views and offers some positive observations of his own. The criticism is that it is not enough to focus on the child-mother or child-father relationship alone; one must look at the triadic, Oedipal structure. Thus, in looking at child, mother and father, it is not enough to think in terms of 'frustrating' or 'smothering' mothers, any more than in terms of 'dominating' or 'easygoing' fathers, since these approaches neglect the triangular structure of the Oedipus complex. One needs to consider the place that the mother, as the first object of the child's desire, gives to the authority of the father, or as Lacan puts it, one needs to consider 'the place that she reserves for the Name-of-the-Father in the promulgation of the law.'⁵⁶ Lacan adds (and this is the second point) that one also needs to consider the father's relation to the law in itself. The issue here is whether or not the father is himself an adequate vehicle of the law. There are circumstances, he says, that make it easier for the father to be found undeserving, inadequate or fraudulent with respect to the law and therefore found to be an ineffective vehicle for the Name-of-the-Father. This leads him to remark that psychosis occurs 'with particular frequency' when the father 'has the function of a legislator,' whether as one who actually makes the laws or as one who poses as the incarnation of high ideals.⁵⁷

V. Heavenly Joyce

Lacan's discussion of Joyce, some twenty years after the seminar on Schreber, was not as it happens merely an occasion to explore further the issue of suppletion in relation to foreclosure. It resulted in nothing less than a reformulation of the way in which the differences between neurosis and psychosis should be approached and also contributed to an understanding of the difference between paranoia and schizophrenia.


From the discussion so far it can be seen that initially neurosis is taken as the model for the formation of symptoms and the construction of the subject. When, in *On a Question Preliminary*, Lacan writes that 'the condition of the subject . . . is dependent on what is being unfolded in the Other,' it is clear that the structure of psychosis is conceptualised as a variant of the structure of neurosis.⁵⁸ One only needs to compare Schema R and Schema I, for instance, where the psychotic structure of Schema I is a transformation — produced by the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father and the corresponding lack of phallic meaning — of the neurotic structure in Schema R.

Schema R⁵⁹Schema I⁶⁰


Lacan's approach in his seminar on James Joyce offers a different perspective, from which what Colette Soler has called a 'general theory of the symptom' can be extracted.⁶¹ This general theory is applicable to both neurosis and psychosis, whereas the theory of neurotic metaphor becomes a special case, created by the addition of the function of the Name-of-the-Father. Thus, rather than taking neurosis as the primary structure and considering psychosis to be produced by the

foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, neurosis is henceforth considered as a special case created by the introduction of a specific signifier. This step effectively generalizes the concept of foreclosure. The delusional metaphor of psychosis is *one* response to this foreclosure; the symptom-metaphor of neurosis is another.

Developing these views by way of topology, Lacan revises his earlier thesis that the symbolic, the imaginary and the real are linked like the rings of a Borromean knot, i.e. in such a way that severing any one link will untie the other two.




The Borromean knot⁶²



Three separate rings

However, in the seminar on Joyce, Lacan declares that it is incorrect to think that the three-ring Borromean knot is the normal way in which the three categories are linked. It is therefore not the case that the separation of the three rings is the result of some defect, because the three are already separate. Where they are joined together, they are joined by a fourth link, which Lacan calls the *sinthome* and which he writes as Σ .



The Borromean knot with four rings⁶³

The Name-of-the-Father is henceforth only a particular form of the *sinthome*:

The Oedipus complex is, as such, a symptom. It is in so far as the Name-of-the-Father is also the Father of the name that everything hangs together, which does not make the symptom any the less necessary.⁶⁴

In *Ulysses* this father has to be 'sustained by Joyce in order for the father to subsist.'⁶⁵

Lacan's thesis, then, is that although Joyce was psychotic, he succeeded in avoiding the onset of psychosis through his writing, which thus plays the role for Joyce of his *sinthome*. Indeed, Lacan says, through his writing Joyce went as far as one can in analysis.⁶⁶ Joyce's achievement in preventing his own psychosis means that in him the psychotic phenomena appear in a different form both from neurosis and from a declared psychosis. Lacan locates the elementary phenomena and the experience of enigma, for instance, in Joyce's 'epiphanies,' fragments of actual conversations overheard, extracted from their context, and carefully recorded on separate sheets.⁶⁷ All this was completed even before Joyce's first novel, and many of the fragments were subsequently reinserted unannounced into later texts. Torn from their context, the epiphanies remain nonsensical or enigmatic fragments and are striking for their qualities of incongruity and insignificance:

Joyce — I knew you meant him. But you're wrong about his age.

Maggie Sheehy — (*leans forward to speak seriously*).

Why, how old is he?

Joyce — Seventy-two.

Maggie Sheehy — Is he?⁶⁸

What is so striking is not so much that the epiphanies do not make much sense, which is what one might expect of such fragments taken out of their context, but rather that Joyce, or Stephen, should describe these meaningless and enigmatic fragments, outside of discourse and cut off from communication, as a 'sudden spiritual manifestation.' Lacan claims that this process in which the absence of meaning of the epiphany is transformed into its opposite, the certainty of an ineffable

revelation, is comparable to the enigmatic experience and its conversion into psychotic conviction in Schreber. Of course, Joyce differs from Schreber in that he cultivates the phenomenon and transforms it into a creative work. In *Finnegan's Wake* Joyce the craftsman transforms linguistic meaning into nonsense and vice versa, so that what corresponds to the enigmatic experience of a Schreber is thereby raised to the level of an artistic process.

It is therefore to be expected that the question of jouissance in psychosis should be treated somewhat differently in the seminar on Joyce. In the case of Schreber the foreclosure of phallic meaning leads to homosexual and transsexual impulses. For Freud, as we have seen, this is to be regarded as the consequence of a repressed passive homosexuality, whereas Lacan does not think that this will adequately account for the psychosis. It is more accurate to say that Schreber's virility itself is attacked by the return in the real of the castration that is foreclosed from the symbolic. In Schreber the barrier to jouissance is surmounted and jouissance is no longer located outside the body. Schreber's body is thus no longer the desert it is for the neurotic and is therefore besieged by an ineffable, inexplicable jouissance, which is ascribed to the divine Other who seeks his satisfaction in Schreber.⁶⁹

Joyce's writing transforms the 'enjoy-meant' (*jouis-sens*) that literature normally conveys into jouissance of the letter, into an enjoyment that lies outside of meaning. But what is even more astonishing is that in a secondary way, through imposing or introducing this strange literature that is outside of discourse, he manages to restore the social link that his writing abolishes, and to promote himself to the place of the exception. Furthermore, he has the responsibility, which is usually assumed by the work of the delusion, for producing sense out of the opaque work, passed down to his commentators, thereby assuring the survival of his name.

One final important consideration is the particular prominence Lacan gives in *Seminar XXIII* to the function of the letter in psychotic experience. In his earlier work, in which he spoke of the symptom as a formation of the unconscious on a par with dreams, jokes and parapraxes, the symptom is taken to be a knot of signifiers excluded from discourse and therefore unable to be included in any circuit of communication. However, alongside this emphasis placed upon the signifier as such there are a number of important observations on the

function of the letter. In fact, as early as 1957 Lacan stated that the symptom 'is already inscribed in a process of writing.'⁷⁰ The materiality of the letter was further discussed in *The Agency of the Letter*, while an important thesis of the *Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter*,' in which Lacan made his first reference to Joyce's 'a letter, a litter,' is that the letter is not just a signifier but also an object.⁷¹ As such it may become a remainder, a remnant, a vestige left in the wake of the message it conveys. The letter may occupy a status not unlike a fetish object, as was the case with André Gide, whose letters were burnt by his wife when confronted with evidence she could no longer ignore of his sexual exploits with young boys. Gide's collapse belies the fact that the letters were the vehicle of a jouissance supplementary to the message they conveyed.⁷² Similarly, the assumption in the seminar on Joyce is that the symptom is no longer to be regarded simply as a message excluded from the circuit of communication but also as a site of jouissance. While this does not make the theory of the signifier redundant, nevertheless it stresses the localised effects of the materiality of the letter.

VI. Conclusion

The thought that something fundamental may be excluded from the symbolic, and the role that this may play in understanding psychosis, was immediately grasped by Lacan, even prior to the discussion of Schreber in *Seminar III*, as a corollary of the thesis that the unconscious is structured like a language. Not only did this thought offer Lacan, with his psychiatric grounding, the means to develop a better theory of psychosis than psychoanalysis had previously managed to do but the detailed work on the Schreber case can also be seen as a verification of the theoretical position Lacan had until then been developing in the context of neurosis alone. The Schreber case highlighted the nature of what it was that was foreclosed: the Name-of-the-Father. But it also brought the category of the real into much sharper focus than was apparent in earlier seminars, where the demarcation between the imaginary and the symbolic was more pressing, no doubt as the result of a focus on neurotic structures. In this context, the return to a discussion of psychosis and foreclosure in the seminar on Joyce is quite

important, with the real taking on a new and more ramified role in the overall explanation of psychosis. What is of particular interest in the discussion of Joyce is that it presents a new theory, according to which foreclosure is the universal condition of the symptom.

Notes

1. J. Damourette & E. Pichon, *Des mots à la pensée: Essai de grammaire de la langue française* (7 vols.), Paris, d'Artrey, 1911-1940. See also: J. Damourette & E. Pichon, Sur la signification psychologique de la négation en français, *Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique*, 1928, XXV, pp. 229-253. Pichon was also a psychoanalyst and senior colleague of Lacan's in the *Société Psychanalytique de Paris*.

2. J. Damourette & E. Pichon, Sur la signification psychologique de la négation en français, *o.c.*, p. 245. 'Scotomisation' is a term they adopt from René Laforgue. See: R. Laforgue, Verdrängung und Skotomisation, *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1926, XII, pp. 54-65.

3. J. Damourette & E. Pichon, Sur la signification psychologique de la négation en français, *o.c.*, p. 243.

4. See: S. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), *Standard Edition*, IV & V; S. Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b), *Standard Edition*, VI; S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c), *Standard Edition*, VIII.

5. For 'the unconscious structured like a language,' see for example: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (1959-60) (trans. with notes D. Porter), Edited by J.-A. Miller, New York NY-London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1992, p. 32.

6. See: S. Freud, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918b[1914]), *Standard Edition*, XVII, pp. 79-80.

7. For *rejet*, see for example: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique* (1953-54) (trans. with notes J. Forrester), Edited by J.-A. Miller, New York NY-London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1989, p. 43. For *retranchement*, see: J. Lacan, Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la 'Verneinung' de Freud (1954), *Ecrits*, Paris, du Seuil, 1966, pp. 381-399 and p. 386 in particular.

8. J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses* (1955-56) (trans. with notes R. Grigg), Edited by J.-A. Miller, London-New York NY, Routledge, 1993, p. 321.

9. See, for example: S. Freud, The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis (1924e), *Standard Edition*, XIX, pp. 181-187.

10. See: J. Lacan, Ouverture de la section clinique, *Ornicar ?*, 1977, no. 9, pp. 7-14.

11. See: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, p. 10; S. Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes Upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (*Dementia Paranoides*) (1911c[1910]), *Standard Edition*, XII, pp. 3-82; D.P. Schreber, *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (1903) (trans. I. Macalpine & R.A. Hunter), with a new introduction by S.M. Weber, Cambridge MA-London, Harvard University Press, 1988.

12. See: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, p. 10.

13. See: S. Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes Upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (*Dementia Paranoides*), *o.c.*, pp. 41-48.

14. See: S. Freud, Neurosis and Psychosis (1924b[1923]), *Standard Edition*, XIX, pp. 147-153; S. Freud, The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis, *o.c.*, pp. 181-187.

15. J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, pp. 85-86.

16. See: J. Lacan, Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la 'Verneinung' de Freud, *o.c.*, pp. 385-393. See also: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique, o.c.*, pp. 52-61 & 289-297. This seminar includes Lacan's original discussion and Hyppolite's article, *A spoken commentary on Freud's Verneinung*.

17. S. Freud, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, *o.c.*, pp. 79-80. Translation modified. This passage illustrates the difficulty of tracking the term *Verwerfung* through the *Standard Edition*. Freud's '*Eine Verdrängung ist etwas anderes als eine Verwerfung*' is rendered as 'A repression is something very different from a condemning judgement.'

18. *Ibid.*, p. 84. Again, I have modified the English version, but this time by restoring Freud's punctuation.

19. J. Lacan, Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la 'Verneinung' de Freud, *o.c.*, p. 388. My translation.

20. S. Freud, Negation (1925h), *Standard Edition*, XIX, pp. 233-239.

21. J. Lacan, Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la 'Verneinung' de Freud, *o.c.*, p. 388.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 389. See also: S. Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950c[1895]), *Standard Edition*, I, pp. 295-343 & pp. 347-387.

23. J. Lacan, Réponse au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite sur la 'Verneinung' de Freud, *o.c.*, p. 389.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 388. My translation. Compare with Freud's observations on the mechanism of paranoia in the Schreber case: 'It was incorrect to say that the perception which was suppressed internally is projected outwards; the truth is rather, as we now see, that what was abolished internally [*das innerlich Aufgehobene*] returns from without.' S. Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes Upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (*Dementia Paranoides*), *o.c.*, p. 71.

25. J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, p. 150.

26. For the foreclosure of femininity, see: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, p. 86. For the foreclosure of the subject of science, see: J. Lacan, Science and Truth (1965) (trans. B. Fink), *Newsletter of the Freudian Field*, 1989, no. 3, pp. 4-29 and p. 22 in particular.

27. For the notion of 'quilting point' (*point de capiton*), see: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, pp. 258-270.

28. The first use in writing of this term, which occurs in the so-called 'Rome Report' published in 1956, links the symbolic father to the law: 'It is in the *name of the father* that we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law.' J. Lacan, *The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis* (1953), *Ecrits: A Selection* (trans. A. Sheridan), London, Tavistock, 1977, p. 67.

29. See: J. Lacan, *L'étourdit, Scilicet*, 1973, no. 4, p. 22.

30. J. Lacan, *On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis* (1957-58), *Ecrits: A Selection, o.c.*, p. 200. In the formula, I have modified Alan Sheridan's translation of Lacan's *signifié au sujet* (signified to the subject) to 'signified for the subject.'

31. For 'topographical regression,' see: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, pp. 154-155; J. Lacan, *On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, o.c.*, p. 209.

32. See: J. Lacan, *The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience* (1949), *Ecrits: A Selection, o.c.*, pp. 1-7.

33. See: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, p. 19.

34. J. Lacan, *De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité* (1932), Paris, du Seuil, 1975, p. 207.

35. '[T]he elementary phenomena are no more elementary than what underlies the entire construction of a delusion. They are as elementary as a leaf is in relation to the plant, in which a certain detail can be seen of the way in which the veins overlap and insert into one another — there is something common to the whole plant that is reproduced in certain of the forms that make it up . . . A delusion isn't deduced. It reproduces its same constitutive force, It, too, is an elementary phenomenon. This means that here the notion of element is to be taken in no other way than as structure, differentiated structure, irreducible to anything other than itself.' J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, p. 19.

36. In Schreber's verbal hallucinations we can recognize 'quite other differences than those into which they are 'classically' classified . . . namely, the differences that derive from their speech structure, in so far as this structure is already in the *perceptum*.' J. Lacan, *On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, o.c.*, p. 184, translation modified. The original translation is quite misleading. Lacan is following a distinction Jakobson draws between message and code. See: R. Jakobson, *Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb, Selected Writings, Vol. II*, The Hague, Mouton, 1971, pp. 130-147.

37. J. Lacan, *On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, o.c.*, p. 185.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 185. 'What is involved here, in fact is an effect of the signifier, in so far as its degree of certainty (second degree: signification of signification) assumes a weight proportional to the enigmatic void that first presents itself in the place of the signification itself.'

39. D.P. Schreber, *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, o.c.*, pp. 182-183.

40. R. Jakobson, *Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb, o.c.*, p. 131.

41. See: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses, o.c.*, pp. 47-53; J. Lacan, *On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, o.c.*, pp. 182-183.

42. J. Lacan, On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, *o.c.*, p. 210.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
45. See: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses*, *o.c.*, pp. 247-309.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 271-294.
47. J. Lacan, On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, *o.c.*, p. 217.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
49. J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses*, *o.c.*, p. 251.
50. See: M. Katan, Schreber's Prepsychotic Phase, *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 1953, XXXIV, pp. 43-51; M. Katan, Structural Aspects of a Case of Schizophrenia, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 1950, V, pp. 175-211; H. Deutsch, Some Forms of Emotional Disturbance and their Relationship to Schizophrenia, in J.D. Sutherland & M. Masud R. Khan (Eds.), *Neuroses and Character Types: Clinical Psychoanalytic Studies*, London, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1963, pp. 262-281.
51. See: J. Lacan, *The Seminar. Book III: The Psychoses*, *o.c.*, p. 191.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.
53. It should be noted that the actual term suppletion (*suppléance*) does not appear in Lacan's work until 1975. See: J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIII, Le sinthome* (1975-76), texte établi par J.-A. Miller, *Ornicar ?*, 1976, no. 6, p. 6 (seminar of 18 November 1975).
54. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
55. J. Lacan, On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, *o.c.*, 217.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
61. See: C. Soler, L'expérience énigmatique du psychotique, de Schreber à Joyce, *La Cause freudienne*, 1993, no. 23, pp. 50-59.
62. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XX, Encore* (1972-73), texte établi par J.-A. Miller, Paris, du Seuil, 1975, p. 112.
63. J. Aubert (Ed.), *Joyce avec Lacan*, Paris, Navarin, 1987, p. 45.
64. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXIII, Le sinthome*, seminar of 18 November 1975, *o.c.*, p. 9. My translation.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
66. J. Lacan, *Lituraterre, Littérature*, 1971, no. 3, p. 3.
67. 'By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.' *Stephen Hero*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1956, p. 216.

68. R. Scholes & R.M. Kain (Eds.), *The Workshop of Daedalus: James Joyce and the Raw Materials for 'A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,'* Evanston IL, Northwestern University Press, 1965, p. 21.

69. This explains Lacan's 1966 comment that in paranoia jouissance is identified as located in the place of the Other as such. See: J. Lacan, Présentation des *Mémoires* du président Schreber en traduction française (1966), *Ornicar ?*, 1986, no. 38, p. 7.

70. J. Lacan, La psychanalyse et son enseignement (1957), *Ecrits, o.c.*, pp. 444-445.

71. See: J. Lacan, The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud (1957), *Ecrits: A Selection, o.c.*, pp. 146-178; J. Lacan, Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter' (1956) (trans. J. Mehlman), *Yale French Studies*, 1972, no. 48, pp. 39-72; J.-A. Miller, Préface, in J. Aubert (Ed.), *Joyce avec Lacan, o.c.*, pp. 9-12.

72. See: J. Lacan, Jeunesse de Gide ou la lettre et le désir (1958), *Ecrits, o.c.*, pp. 739-764 and pp. 760-761 in particular.