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Scilicet of the name-of-the-father

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Scilicet of the Name of the Father

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Edition and translations in English

A like...

ACT • J CHAMORRO
ADOPTIONS • G. STIGLITZ
ANXIETY AND CASTRATION ANXIETY • F. LEGUIL
ANOREXIA – BULIMIA • N SORIA
ATHEISM • MR. FOCCHI
AUTISM • V. BAIO
AUTHORITY • L. GOROSTIZA
CASTRATION • G. DESSAL
DESIRE OF THE ANALYST • D. COSENZA
DIRECTION OF THE CURE • D. LAURENT
DRUG-ADDICTION • G. REQUIZ

E like...

ETHICS • R.P. VINCIGUERRA
EVALUATION • C. LICITRA ROSA
EXTIMITY • R. CARRABINO

F like...

FAMILY • M. BASSOLS
FATHER, DON'T YOU SEE THAT I'M BURNING • M.H. ROCH
FEMINISM • M.H. BROUSSE
FUNCTION • J.C. INDART
FORECLOSURE • J.C. MALEVAL
FRATERNITY • E. BERENQUER / O. SAWICKE

G like...

GOD • A. DI CIACCIA
GUILT • V COCCOZ

H like...

HATE • P. LACADÉE
HAMLET • G. BUSTAMANTE
FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY • A. ARENAS
MALE HOMOSEXUALITY • A. RUBINSTEIN
HYSTERIA • L. D'ANGELO

I like...

IDENTIFICATION • R. SELDES
IMPOSTURE • M. BARROS
INTERPRETATION • H. TIZIO
INVENTION • D. MILLER

J like...

JOUISSANCE • E.SOLANO SUAREZ

JOYCE • A. LYSY-STEVENSON

K like...

KARAMAZOV • A. SZULZYNGER

KNOT • P. SKRIABINE

L like...

LAW • F VITALE

LIE • S. LAIA

LOVE • A. STEVENSON

M like...

MASTER • R. PORTILLO

MOURNING • P.G. GUEGUEN

MURDER OF THE FATHER • V PALOMERA

MYTH • A. VICENS

N like...

NEUROSIS • L. ERNETA

NAMING • S. BASZ

NAMES OF THE FATHER • R. MAZZUCCA

NORM, NORMALITY • M. MAZZOTTI

NOSTALGIA • M. ZLOTNIK

NOT-ALL • G.MUSACHI

O like...

OBJECT, OBJECT A • M.A. VIEIRA

OBSESSION • S. COTTET

OEDIPUS COMPLEX • S. TENDLARZ

OTHER • P. NAVEAU

P like...

PATERNAL METAPHOR • J.F. PEREZ

PASS • G. BELAGA / M. KUSNIEREK / P. MONRIBOT / C. RENNO LIMA

PERVERSION • O DELGADO / A. MERLET

PHALLUS • M. CHORNE

PHOBIA • C GARCIA / M. GOLDENBERG

POETRY • J. ATTIE

POST-MODERNITY • J. YUNIS

PROCREATION • F ANSERMET

PSYCHOSES • R. WARTEL

PSYCHOTHERAPY • P. HELLEBOIS

Q like...

QUANTUM • G ARENAS

QUILTING POINT • C ALBERTI / Y. DEPELSENAIRE

R like...

REALITY • M. RECALCATI
REAL • E SINATRA
REPRESSION • C VIGANO
RELIGIONS • A. LESERRE

S like...

SCIENCE • P. LA SAGNA
SECTS • R. C REGO BARROS
SEMBLANT • M. TORRES
SEXUATION • F. SCHEJTMAN
STATISTICS • P. TAGLE
SUBLIMATION • H. CASTANET
SUPERSTITION • J SANTIAGO
SUPPLEMENT • J.P. DEFFIEUX / C. DEWAMBRECHIES-LA SAGNA
SYMPTOM • MR. TARRAB

T like...

THERE IS SUCH A THING AS ONE • A. ZALOSZYC
TRADITION • A. HARARI
TRANSFER • F KRUGER/R.E. MANZETTI
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TRUTH • M.H. BRIOLE

U like...

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UNIVERSAL, PARTICULAR • S. MARRET-MALEVAL

V like...

VIRILITY • O. ZACK

W like...

WAR • G. BRIOLE
WELTANSCHAUNG • H. WACHSBERGER
WITZ • G GARCIA
WORSE • J.P. KLOTZ

X like...

X, THE UNKNOWN FACTOR OF THE EQUATION • N. CHARRAUD

Y like...

YAHVE • MR. MAUAS

Z like...

ZAZIE • C. LAZARUS-MATET
ZEN • J.L. GAULT

A like...

ACT • J CHAMORRO
ADOPTIONS • G. STIGLITZ
ANXIETY AND CASTRATION ANXIETY • F. LEGUIL
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The function of the anxiety

François Leguil

The suffering and incomprehension that characterize anxiety do not allow those who endure it to give it the status of a symptom. Its repetition accentuates the threat it carries, and its opacity offers no hope for finding a signification that might begin to point the way in the search for its origin. The outbreak of a state of anxiety, or the supervening of an even more abrupt attack, seem to separate the subject from his history. It is this immediate opacity and the solution of continuity it establishes with the surrounding reality that serve as a pretext for those who are determined to find the consequence only in biology.

The same opacity and intensity of displeasure that it induces lead the tenants of psychology to think that what distinguishes it from fear is the absence of an object or the absurd allegation that the motive is not credible, such as the sequels of infantile phobia. In addition to organic medicine and psychology, there exists a third direction of research: more reflexive, it considers that this opacity causes the person to question his existence, to question the mysteries of his place in the world; it also considers that anxiety can become the occasion to return to the sources of being, or the proof (and the sanction) that the subject is not dealing with it as he might with the means he has.

The actual history of the clinic of anxiety, which, like that of pain, has existed for hardly more than two centuries, is shared by these three traditions: first the medical tradition, which holds that anxiety is physical. Then the psychological tradition, which holds that anxiety is an anomaly, an anomaly touching judgment and knowledge, a behavioral anomaly, that is to say an anomaly touching the development of one's adaptation to reality. Finally, the philosophical tradition, existential, existentialist, ontological, pretends that anxiety is not unworthy of experiences of metaphysical purport.

A fourth tradition breaks with the first three that ignore it, be it by apparently celebrating its creator, recognizing in him the father of the veritable modernity of the history of the clinic of anxiety: this fourth is the Freudian tradition. But, although it can only be properly conceived from the aspect of its rupture with the three others, our facilities of thought intermix it too often with conceptualizations taken from the three others. It is useful to identify these intermixtures by a careful intellectual dissection, in order to find the true sense of this affect that remains the king of affects, of this displeasure that is deployed at the summit of displeasure. This is not a question of theoretical purity, but of practical efficacy: to say that anxiety, its essence, *das Wesen der Angst*, is neither physical nor psychological nor metaphysical is to advance the reasons that explain why our clinic cannot do without metapsychology.

We often repeat with good reason that anxiety “touches being”. But the certitude of the moment of the experience gives rise to uncertainty, because the experience does not provide access to the revelation of a determining subjective truth. And yet, according to Freud, anxiety is not a concept, but something one experiences, *etwas Empfundenes*. It is a fundamental phenomenon that poses a crucial problem (*Grundphänomen und Hauptproblem*).

What a person suffering from anxiety learns most often from anxiety is that it is urgent to take a side road that leads one far away from the active zone. At the end of his Seminar devoted to The Ethic of psychoanalysis, Lacan reminds us that anxiety is an obstacle and not the conclusion that follows the passage. Within its grips, the horror is sterile if one does not go beyond. Unlike the symptom, which is necessary, the question for anxiety is not that of its utility, nor of its inutility. This question proceeds from a confusion between its function as a signal, which Freud discovered, and the phenomenon itself, which must not be developed if we want the function to be merely thinkable.

The doctor can do no more with the essence of anxiety than the forger of *Weltanschauungen*, than the sage. More seriously confronted with the real demands of the times, or with the legitimate demand for relief, he confuses it with the pain he suppresses. But by suppressing the phenomenon, he amputates the subject of the essential guide that the function as a signal offered to his desire. As early as 1926, Freud indicated the direction that our contemporary medical science neglects: calm the phenomenon, *die Angstentwicklung*, avoid it, or even “eradicate” it, without depriving the subject of its function as a signal.

This discovery of Freud’s is accompanied by a reminder: anxiety is universal, but it is not general. Everyone does not suffer from anxiety and the light — Freud hoped this — that will reveal what the essence of anxiety is, can come just as well from the study of those who do not experience it, or from those for whom the phenomenon of the *Angstentwicklung*, of developed anxiety, does not check its function as a signal. The psychologist moves into this gap: the signal he knows is the famous couple stimulus-response, or something equivalent. His operation uses Freud’s discovery to make it say the contrary by presenting anxiety as the dysfunction of a subjective-alert mechanism, the dysfunction of the defensive functions of fear and flight: anxiety would be just exaggerated, immoderate, erroneous fear, a reaction that exceeds standardizable norms. In his teaching on anxiety, in 1963, Jacques Lacan reminds us that the Freudian distinction is very different and so much more decisive: in fear the danger is external; in anxiety it is internal; in reality for the former, with the real for the latter.

The conception developed by Lacan places the function of anxiety between the opaque function of the real and, opposed to it, that of the signifier. This conception gives its true value to the Freudian notion of signal. As early as 1916, Freud showed that anxiety is not an abnormal or immoderate fear, because it logically precedes it. Lacan reminds us of this when he emphasizes in his commentary on “little Hans” that fear “treats” anxiety.

An inassimilable succession of paradoxes is constitutive of the Freudian clinic of anxiety that Lacan shows is the consequence of the elusive character of the subject of the unconscious. These paradoxes lead Freud to trace the meanders of a difficult metapsychology. This metapsychology cannot be summed up by the academic identification of two successive theories in which anxiety would be the effect of repression, then its cause. That is too schematic; as early as the middle of the 1900s, Freud balances, not so much between two theorizations of anxiety, but between an approach to the question of anxiety from the point of view of truth or from the point of view of the real. In the end, far from throwing in the sponge, he gives his reasons for not choosing one theoretical construction that would refute the other.

Thus, by virtue of the dissatisfaction caused by the faltering of his thinking on anxiety, Freud proves that his metapsychology is the sign that makes of this major affect a cause of his determination not to give up on his desire, on a desire that we can designate thanks to the author of the *Écrits*: not to let go of psychic causality.

On the last page of the July 3, 1963 lesson, Jacques Lacan evokes what it means “to confront anxiety”, what “overcoming” it involves and the “trace of that something that goes from the existence of the *a* to its passage in history”. We read neither Freud nor Lacan as witnesses of their times, but as the harbingers of an ethical exigency of the clinic: how we can “relieve anxiety” in and by the analytic act? Or: how we can dim the affect of anxiety, how we can extenuate the phenomenon in a subject, so he might at last take the measure of its function?

Translation : Thelma Sowley

Autism

Virginio Baio

The Name-Of-The-Father and Autism. “We can live without the Name-Of-The-Father if we use it”, says Jacques Lacan (*Sém. XXIII*, page 136). Is this true also for the autistic child? If so, how does he limit and control his *jouissance*? How does he find his place as a subject in the social context? Under what conditions can he live without the Name-Of-The-Father?

Tano and his invention – Tano is five. Tano’s father calls me because after having been sent back home from the institution, Tano cries desperately for hours in the hall. I suggest that the father and I have a meeting. Standing in the middle of the hall, while Tano is crying desperately and walks back and forth, the father explains to me that he has been doing repairs in the house for two weeks. All of a sudden the father stops talking and says: “Oh no!.....I removed the sink! Look...” says pointing to an empty spot in the hall, “There was a sink right there. Every time Tano came home from the institution he would go and lean against the sink and spend hours hitting against the wall with an object. How could I destroy his place?”. He hasn’t finished the sentence yet, I hear a big noise. I turn myself and I see Tano smiling running towards his father and jumping on his lap. Touched, the father tells me: “It is the first time that he has hugged me!”

At the institution Tano sits in front of a door and bites the door frame continuously hitting with an object against the wall. He eats the little pieces of wood and wall that falls on the floor and in alternation to this he makes vocal sounds.

*A peculiar *sinthome** – The places and the times change, what doesn’t change is the pantomime that Tano performs in order to make the knot and to write his *symptomatique*, private language. This is a minimal language whom he tries to give the dignity of a significant chain, a unique knotting. In a first time this invention of his, though, repeats constantly in an *eternal present* and doesn’t find a point of anchorage.

THE NAME-OF-THE-FATHER IN AUTISM?

In the structuralist categorization of the first phase of Lacan’s clinic we don’t find the Name-Of-The-Father. In autism – that Lacan prefers not to keep separated from schizophrenia- the important characteristic of The Name-Of-The-Father as a guarantee inside the place of the Other.

If we refer to the Borromean categorization of the second phase of Lacan’s clinic we can say that there is the equivalent of the Name-Of-The-Father in the form of a *sinthome*, that is something that does not tie *standard* elements anymore but rather non-standard elements, rare elements that belong only to the subject. In Tano’s case those elements are the wood and the wall, elements related to the father’s, who works in constructions.

In the first phase of Lacan’s clinic The-Name-Of-The-Father is what keeps the world organized, what makes sure that our thoughts stay in our head and not somewhere else and what gives everything its own place. In the second phase of Lacan’s clinic the *sinthome* is the function that gives the subject a place, organizes the world and controls the enjoyment.

Sinthomo and social bond – If this necessary, ongoing pantomime, on one side, gives Tano a place, if this is his minimal enunciation with which he defends himself from the Other, on the other side he remains segregated and he keeps renewing it as a form of communication that doesn’t ties with the Other.

Under what condition is it possible to knot with the Other?

At the institution, in the “Atelier della parola”- the Laboratory of the Word - there are two guitars, one for the children and one for the educator. When a child receives the “Children’s guitar” he has the floor and can say whatever he wants, remain silent or sing. The educator uses his guitar to comment only with music the children’s words, his mumbling or his silence.

Every time it is Tano’s turn, the “Children’s guitar” remains on the table while he goes on, impassive, with his pantomime.

Lacan points out that something in the autistic child “freezes”. On one hand, he is busy with an “operation of self-defense” from everything that relates to the Other; on the other hand, he is busy through his pantomime with an “Operation of self-construction”.

How can we make it possible that Tano uses the educator as an instrument, as a “New Other”? How can we make sure that the invention of the subject be consistent? How can we engage in a conversation with him without him having to defend himself?

A silent conversation – Every time Tano hits against the wall with his stick I play a few notes on my guitar. If he stops, I stop. If he goes on, I go on. After a while, he stops hitting the wall, he turns and looks at me. When his glance meets mine, I happily sing: “Here comes Tano!”

These are the three steps: 1st step, Tano hits against the wall; 2nd step I play the guitar; 3rd step, Tano stops, turns himself and looks at me.

This goes on until one day he stands up and, leaning against the table, he looks at me while tapping on the “Children’s guitar”.

During the next laboratory, he quickly comes close to me, he leans against my guitar and taps on it. After a while, he grabs my guitar, climbs on my lap, takes the place of my guitar and taps on my shoulder. In the end, all of a sudden, he smiles, hugs me and bites my shoulder.

To serve as an educator so that there is significance. What happened?

1. Tano has already invented something but it is something that doesn’t tie.
2. The educator serves as a tool for Tano’s invention by learning Tano’s private language. (*Antibes*, page 266).
3. In the interaction with the educator, who acts as a partner-symptom and not as a partner-knowledge, Tano opens up to the Other pursuing an embodiment.
4. The invention of his *sinthomo* implies a two-steps operation: first, he makes the Other incomplete (the wood, the wall, the educator’s shoulder) and then he tries to become the missing part of the Other.
5. The minimal articulation between the tapping (S1) and the guitar tune (S2), in *après-coup*, has the effect to create a subject (S), traceable in the hole between S1 and S2, when Tano stops tapping, turns himself and looks at the educator.
6. His *sinthomo* is a minimal knowledge, it’s a knotting of language crossed by a specific meaning, meaning that could be related to his father’s occupation.

Doing without it. Using it – “Without symptom there is no subject” says Jacques-Alain Miller , (*Pièces détachées, lesson on 1st December, 2004*. In the passage from the Structural categorization of his clinic to the Borromean one, Lacan turns the relationship between significant and jouissance completely. In the first stage the question is: “Is the Name-Of-The-Father active or not?”; in the second stage the question is: “Is or isn’t there the element that gives meaning?”, be this a *sinthomo* like a knott of non-standard elements, or the Name-Of-The-Father as paternal metaphor.

If in a first time is The-Name-Of-The-Father, the significant, the father of mankind, the tool who orders the world, in the second time is the *sinthome* the condition of the operativity of the significant.

From this point we can say “significant’s creatures” or “children of our own *sinthome*”.

Even Tano is't without *sinthome* . A minimal *Sinthome* who gives him a place, that it tames the jouissance in a peculiar knotting, build of Imaginary and Real Presence.

Sinthome that, if wouDED, leaves Tano at the mercy of the invasions of the jouissance.

The Sinthome in the autism, sign of the singleness of the subject, is the way for the subject to make something with real of the jouissance.

We can conclude that if in the autism there is not symptom, Freudian symptom, there is Sinthome as in Joyce. Tano's father is not the significant, but he is children of his own Sinthome.

The condition of this being someone that lend himself to incarnate the knotting of Tano's Sinthome, Tano's smile is the sign of this, is the sign of its umanization, the sign that he is saying "yes" to the Other.

Italian translation's team : Daniele Maracci, Marco Bani, Chiara Tartaglione, Monica Vacca, Daniela Simone

B like...

BELIEF • F FONTENEAU
BUREAUCRACY • J.F. COTTES

Belief

Françoise Fonteneau

BELIEF

In French ‘croyance’, from Latin *credere*, previously ‘créance’ or ‘crédence’ (credence) : action, fact of believing something true or possible ; Engl. *belief*, Germ. *Glaube*, Span. *creancia*, Greek *doxa*, Hebr. ‘émét, Ital. *credenza*, Port. *crença*. The term can gather different notions : one close to logic and to assent, the other close to the religious connotation of faith linked to the Latin *fides*. The Latin tongues differentiate belief and faith. English has *belief* and *faith*, but German has only one term, *der Glaube*, faith. This often poses a problem to translators. *Das Glauben*, substantivised infinitive, i.e. the fact of believing (le “croire”), is often used by philosophers but the difference between faith and belief is tiny. Freud uses both in his investigation of the various forms of beliefs, from the *Psychical treatment* (1890) until *Moses and Monotheism* (1939). He distinguishes belief from illusion “that renounces to be confirmed by the real”. If sometimes he draws it close to *Schwärmerei*, he also distinguishes it from *Glauben* and *Unglauben* which is not “not believing in it” but “the absence of one of the terms of belief, of the term in which is designated the division of the subject.” (1)

BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE

“Nothing is more ambiguous than belief” said Lacan, reminding the analysts of the interest of examining the functioning of faith in religious experience. “What they believe in, whether they believe they believe in it or they don’t, (...), one thing is certain, they believe they know.” That knowledge deserves to be examined because as Freud had already often underlined, Lacan thought that there is no knowledge “which doesn’t emerge against a background of ignorance.” (2)

SAVED BY FAITH OR BY WORKS?

The analysand entrusts the analyst, has faith in him. If the analyst is not a god for his patient, “around what does it turn?” (3) It is based on a belief in a subject-supposed-to-know. This belief puts the analyst in a difficult position to hold “as he knows, as for him, that it is a question – because of the existence of the unconscious, of wiping that function of the map” (4) The analyst is in the not-knowing but he also has a faith. First, in the production of the unconscious. He is not the subject-supposed-to-know, he operates as object a. Still he has to commit the analysand to a task through which the analysand will have faith in what will later be put into question. The act of the analyst will be made equivalent to an act of faith by Lacan. In any case, is not any act that deserves to be called so, such an act of faith, has Lacan exclaimed sometimes. (5) In 1968, wondering about the act of the analyst, he evoked Luther and the question of knowing whether Man is saved by faith or by works. He then made us grasp that both get conjoined on the path “from the psychoanalyzing work to the psychoanalytic faith.” (6) But, then, can we “advance towards the conquest of truth only by way of deception?” (7)

BELIEF AND TRUTH

The analysand says what he believes is true. What he says has nothing to do with the truth but much more with belief. So, Lacan defines “believing” as “thinking something that exists”. What is true, the analysand does not know it, it is what he believes to be so. “Faith, even religious faith, here is truth, which has nothing to do with the real” (8) And this is why Lacan can equate psychoanalysis to a modern form of faith. Psychoanalysis, it’s what “makes” true. It is in that respect that he can say that “the analyst is a rhetorician“, that he “rhetorices” (“rhétifie”). But is it a power to make true, to make false? To be a “suitable rhetorician” “he has to operate with something that is not founded on contradiction.” (9) Because the unconscious does not know it.

BELIEF AND SYMPTOM

«Whoever comes to present a symptom to me believes in it, believes that it can be deciphered ». The analysand believes in a wanting-to-say (‘vouloir-dire’), a meaning (Sinn) of the symptom. The

symptom is situated between anguish and lie. The symptom lies , anguish does not. (10) Would meaning always be deceptive ? Does psychoanalysis itself escape the symptom ? Is psychoanalysis lie, imposture, swindling ? It is within the question about imposture that Lacan points out one of the parallel between religion and psychoanalysis. The point is that of forgetfulness. Religion is stricken by forgetfulness. (11) Therefore the function of the sacrament which is the renewal of a forgotten pact.. «The truth, by decree of the gods, gets forgotten .» for Lacan, analysis is marked by a similar forgetfulness. But does forgetfulness have here as well an operative function ? We find this place of forgetfulness in Lacan linked to saying (le dire). « That we say remains forgotten behind what is being said in what is being heard ». (12) It is in the relation between saying and said that this operative dimension will have to be looked for. « The saying passes the said. » (13)

BELIEF AND THE FATHER, BELIEF AND THE NAME-OF-THE FATHER

On the one hand, Lacan follows Freud's reflection on the belief in the Father and his criticism of religion, on the other, he brings together belief and «taking-as-true» ('tenir-pour-vrai') in a logic of the Name-of-The-Father. Sometimes psychoanalysis needs an act of faith, Glaube, other times it is believing, Glauben, für-whar-halten, taking as true, which functions. Lacan wonders about the Function of the father in Freud's. What is a father ? « A name that implies faith.» The father is only a symptom or a « sinthom » ('sinthome'). The hypothesis of the unconscious holds only by supposing the Name-of-The-Father which in other words says supposing God. One supposes a big Other not only to promulgate the law but to guarantee meaning. If it is impossible for us to say truly of the tell because the real dominates telling, Lacan – in order to make thinkable that there be some knowledge in the real, poses a borromean knot with four – that one that adds the Name-of-The-Father to the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real. The subject believes in this knot. (14) It ex-sists. Besides, the body has no respectable status without the knot with four. (15) Lacan sees the approach of this knot, this method, as « the negative of religion » because « we do not believe in the object as such but we notice desire » (16) Thus the Name-of-The-Father will be an implement. Because « in practice the real is measured with the impossible to tell» (17)

The last interrogations of Lacan on imposture, deception, swindling and crookedness underline the difficulty or even « the horror of the analytic act ». Semblance ('semblant') is not supported by this act. Still, are not all discourses semblance?

BELIEF AND SEMBLANCE

« Belief is always semblance in act(ion). (18) If all discourses are semblance, the analytic discourse however is listening to the discourse « that wouldn't be semblance.» Because the unconscious does not pretend ('ne fait pas semblant'). Regarding the analytic discourse, Lacan places semblance in a positive, operative value. (19) In analysis semblance has to be used, made use of, as an implement as the Name-of-The-Father. Imposture, on the other hand, has to be unveiled and chased away. Talking of imposture Lacan, in 1958, took up against « the mystifications of some therapies » Voltaire's rallying cry « Let's crush the infamous ! » ('Écrasons l'infâme !').(20) Belief is at the heart of psychoanalysis sometimes on the side of faith sometimes on the side of « taking-for-true », and undoubtedly linked to knowledge as well as non-knowledge ('non-savoir'), to the analytic act or the commitment of the analysand in his treatment. Present in every neurotic subject and in the reversed form of non-belief in the psychotic subject. The analytic act has faith in the functioning of an operative logic of the Name-of-The-Father whereby semblance plays an active role. But if psychoanalysis is « what makes true », how should we understand it ? It's a stroke of sense. « It 's a 'sens-blant' » (a «sense-blank » ?) (21) which is never protected from a forgetting (an oversight) of saying . Because, if « truth gets forgotten by decree of the gods », « that we tell remains forgotten behind what is being told in what is being heard »

Paris, 30th March 2005

Translation : Vincent Dachy

Footnotes :

- (1) Lacan, The Seminar, Book XI, The four fundamental concepts of Psychoanalysis, Penguin , p. 238. Cf. The Unglauben in paranoia.
- (2) Lacan, The Seminar, Book VII, The Ethics of psychoanalysis, Routledge, p. 171.
- (3) Lacan, The Seminar, Book XI, op. cit., p. 230.
- (4) Lacan, The Seminar, Book XIII. The analytic act, unpublished, session of 7/2/1968.
- (5) Lacan, Le triomphe de la religion, Seuil, 2005, p.95, not translated.
- (6) Lacan, The Seminar, Book XIII, op. cit.
- (7) Lacan, Introduction aux Noms-du-Père, in Des Noms-du-Père, Seuil, 2005, p.103, not translated.
- (8) Lacan, The Seminar, Book XXIV, L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre, Ornicar ? 12/13, Seuil, 1977, session of 14/12/76, not translated.
- (9) [NB : erreur de séminaire dans la note du texte original]Lacan, The Seminar, Book XXV, Le moment de conclure, session of 15/11/77, not translated.
- (10) Cf. Jacques-Alain Miller, Barcelona Seminar, Psychoanalytical Notebooks 1, London,1998.
- (11) Lacan, The Seminar, Book XI, op. cit., p. 265.
- (12) Lacan, L'Étourdit in Les Autres Écrits, Seuil, 2001, p. 449, not translated.
- (13) Cf. Lacan, ibidem, p. 482 and « it is in that sense that the saying of the analyst realizes the apophantic », p. 490.
- (14) Cf. Lacan, The Seminar, Book XXIII, Le sinthome, Seuil, 2005, pp. 42/43, not translated.
- (15) Lacan, ibidem, p.37. And Cf. Lacan's interrogations on what is a « living body » in Vers un signifiant nouveau in Ornicar ? 17/18, Seuil, 1979, not translated.
- (16) Lacan, Le Sinthome, op. cit., p. 36, not translated.
- (17) Lacan, L'Étourdit, op. cit., p.495, not translated.
- (18) Lacan, Dicours à l'ÉFP, 6/12/67, in Les Autres Écrits, op. cit., p. 281, not translated.
- (19) Lacan, « The analyst is in place of semblance of a, semblance of waste. Cf. Conférence au Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Scilicet 6/7, Seuil, 1976, pp. 62/63, not translated.
- (20) Lacan, La Psychanalyse vraie, et la fausse, in Autres Écrits, op. cit., p. 174, not translated. We could use it for the struggle against CBT.
- (21) For this paragraph see the session of 10/05/77, Vers un signifiant nouveau, in Ornicar ? 17/18, Seuil, 1979. p. 18, not translated.

Obsession and the Name-of-the-Father

Jean-François Cottes

The Freudian clinic gave a special place to the father in the obsessional symptom. The myth of the dead father finds there a major clinical reference for the Freudian construction of Oedipus. Guilt, self-reproach and conjuring rituals illuminate the ambivalence of feelings towards the father in the obsessional symptomatology.

Certainly the father is loved, but it is the inhibition of this love by hatred that constitutes the conflict of obsessional neurosis. A hatred macerated during childhood is injected adversely into the most authentic feelings of filial love. We recognize there the symptom of the Ratman, who, as a child, would spit out whatever word he came across as an insult to his father. Later, in analysis, his thoughts were just as unpleasant when directed towards the person of Freud, an eminent *Vatervertreter* in the transference. This verifies the Oedipal aggressiveness of the subject.

FROM THE DEAD FATHER TO THE MORTIFICATION OF DESIRE

This schema nevertheless calls for some rectifications: since love relations are marked by the same ambivalence, that is to say that the subject cannot love without destroying, we are founded in asking if the paradoxes of desire find their justification entirely in this hatred for the father. This is the displacement made by Lacan, who centers the affectivity of the obsessive on the imaginary prevalence of the ego. The schema L makes it possible to situate the place of the dead father on the symbolic axis while the mortification of the ego occupies the imaginary axis.

Abandoning Freud's « Totem and Taboo », the analysts of the 1950s placed pre-Oedipal aggressiveness at the center of obsessional neurosis. The influence of Melanie Klein gave the best part to the destructive drives. The confusion engendered by Kleinism gave birth to the thesis of a continuity between obsessional neurosis and paranoia. There is nothing to this. Lacan attributed the aggressive drives to self-destruction and this last to the subjective laceration peculiar to the inflation of narcissism in its tension with the symbolic Other.

In France, this theoretical syncretism characterized the work of Maurice Bouvet¹, one of Lacan's adversaries at the time. There was a doctrinal interest in cause with respect to the question of obsessional neurosis: one position centered the symptom on regression, the other maintained the axis of the relations between the Name-of-the-Father and desire.

Oedipus is hardly of more use. As early as the Seminar I, Lacan has recourse to a Hegelian schema: the relation of the master to the slave.² The obsessive awaits the death of the master so he can postpone the moment of his *jouissance*³. The function of the Other death contributes to the deconstruction of the Freudian Oedipus. The obsessive denies the Other in his function of normativizing desire. This is the reverse of hysteria, which supports on the contrary the desire of the impotent father. A countersense concerning the father, in a way a false cognition as the CBTs would say, is here in play. The father is supposed to prohibit desire, while it is its very destruction that annuls the necessary mediation of the symbolic in the advent of this latter.

This results in consequences for the conception of the superego. The superego is not the interiorization of the father's law, but the consequence of a scission in the symbolic order: it is what is not understood in the law that produces this imaginary gap.⁴ The superego appears in the place of the Name-of-the-Father. Which accounts for its obscene and ferocious injunctions.

THE FATHER OR THE PHALLUS?

The private religion of the obsessive finds its place here. The phenomenology of the symptoms concretely illustrates the catholic, apostolic and Roman dogma of the Eucharist in a degraded form. The “real presence” of the phallus is substituted to the Christian God. Lacan interprets the scene of the ghost of the Ratman’s father in the sense of an insult to the real presence of the phallus. The masturbatory ritual highlights the degradation of the symbolic phallus into an imaginary phallus.⁵

Lacan makes a similar comment on the case of an obsessional woman, which he takes from Bouvet. Her sacrilegious thoughts were supported by the following fantasy: “she represented in her imagination the masculine genital organs in the place of the host”⁶. The debasement of the symbolic is not to be confused with Oedipal aggressiveness.

The destruction and restitution of the Other rhythm a temporal pulsation whose logic resides in the relation of the subject to the impossible of its desire. In the “Direction of the cure”, Lacan gives an example of an obsessive patient in which the Oedipal reference is limited to the parents’ relation to each other while “the general combinatory” requires the designation of two concepts: the Other and the phallus. Here, the dialectic of desire and demand keep us at a distance from imaginary aggressions: “he was brought to recognize the place he had in the destructive game exercised by one of his parents with respect to the desire of the Other. He felt how powerless he was to desire without destroying the Other and so his desire itself, inasmuch as it is the desire of the Other”⁷ The phallic inflation is substituted here: the impotent subject renounces having it in order to be it .

These modifications do not spare the Freudian doctrine. In “Totem and Taboo”, Lacan rectifies the myth of the dead father. We know that on this point Freud is more Christian than Jewish: from “Totem and Taboo” to “Moses and Monotheism”, the murder of the father constitutes the repressed act that accounts for religious rituals and guilt. Obsessional neurosis is a private religion.

Freud thus finds in his myth “a singular equilibrium of the Law and of desire, a sort of co-conformity between them”, while the *jouissance* of the father remains “always veiled and unfathomable”⁸, which is what gives to it a tone of perversion. Does the dead father sustain the function of the Name-of-the-Father as symbolic father? Here we are in contact with Freud’s neurosis, in other words, Freud saves the father.

Another articulation is possible: a structural operator other than Oedipus exists, which is the impossible desire, impossible by the very supremacy of *jouissance*. From this we have the paradox: “the dead father is *jouissance*”⁹

After this, Lacan will try to articulate in new terms the relation between the demand for love addressed to the father and guilt. The seminar XXIII, “Le Sinthome” (1975-1976) dismantles the Freudian myth relative to the love of the father. Since guilt cannot exist previous to the law, and the sons prohibit everything to themselves after the murder of the father, it is because the only fault to be expiated is to have failed to love¹⁰. There is then another version of the Name-of-the-Father in obsessional neurosis that we find by way of another facet of Freudism. It is not a question of the symbolic father but of the real father. The legal father masks an illegal father. A rereading of the Ratman, notably, brings to light these two fathers: the father of the family myth and the function of the cruel captain. The latter exposes the function of the pleasure-seeking Master in the fantasy as opposed to the dead father¹¹.

This other version of the father makes it possible to articulate the obsessive’s imperative of *jouissance* with the degradation of the Name-of-the-Father: the correlation is confirmed with still more evidence in the case of a father who, in analysis himself, is prey to a sadistic obsession vis-à-vis his offspring.

A CASE OF PÈRE-VERSION¹²

A mature patient reveals an obsession concerning his eldest son. A divorced father, during many years of his analysis he had developed a long series of complaints and reproaches against his father, an authoritarian patriarch from whom he was incapable of detaching himself: he was Anchises carrying the weight of the paternal will by pursuing the same professional direction, assuring the renown of a financial dynasty. As for himself, he organizes the dependency of his children by supporting them financially without imposing a limit on the time this will last. The subject authorizes himself very little *jouissance* of this advantage.

His oblativity is connected to a strict asceticism, on the model of his father, for what concerns his needs, while he throws his money out the window and is stripped of his assets by different mistresses.

During his analysis, this man elaborated the relation that linked the failure of his love life with his myth of a sterile financial almightiness. He renounces this potlatch and allows himself to rend the destiny laid out for him by his family history. He, who up till then, without ambition, had been content to be the loyal manager of the paternal fortune, launches on a career as a determined and aggressive businessman. He changes his life, remarries, and in short, he makes a name for himself.

It is in this context of separation that the obsession emerges: he is humiliating his son in a parody of sodomization. His sublimational exuberance is paid for by a cynical balance; the new ambition is connected to the unbearable imperative: at this point the sacrifice of Abraham is evoked.

The fault of the father is his *jouissance* above and beyond the imaginary debt. By earning a name for himself, the subject broke the chain of submissive generations. He makes his son pay without yet elucidating what price he himself has paid for his own submission to the avaricious *jouissance* of his father. He now has to discover the benefits of this new naming.

Translation : Thelma Sowley

Footnote

- ¹ M. BOUVET ,1953 « Le moi dans la névrose obsessionnelle ». *Revue française de psychanalyse*.
- ² T.N., In the English translation, these are given as the lord and the bondsman.
- ³ Séminaire I, p.315
- ⁴ Séminaire I p.221-222
- ⁵ Séminaire VII, p.290
- ⁶ Séminaire VIII, p.303
- ⁷ « Direction de la cure », p.630.
- ⁸ J. Lacan, *Des Noms-du-père*. Paris : Seuil, 2005, p. 88-89.
- ⁹ Séminaire XVII, p .143.
- ¹⁰ Séminaire XVII, p .143
- ¹¹ On the obscene partriarch (*Vaterarsch*), see also : S. Freud « Mythological parallels to a plastic obsessional representation »
- ¹² T.N. : I've kept the French because I've yet found no satisfying English equivalent. For those who know no French, I need only indicate that « père » in French is « father ».

C like...

CASTRATION, FRUSTRATION, DEPRIVATION • G. DESSAL
CHRISTIANITY • C GONZALEZ TABOAS
CHURCH • A. ZENONI
CONTINGENCY • R. GRIGG

Church

Alfredo Zenoni

Lacan did not neglect to evoke that the place designated as that of the Name-of-the-Father in psychoanalysis is the same as the one occupied by God-the-Father in a very particular tradition, the one where, contrary to other traditions, the place of the Other, the «beyond», takes the form of One that exists. Behind the Father of the complex Freud called «paternal»¹, looms the God of the monotheistic religion of Jewish tradition and of the Christian religion that became its heir.

At the same time Lacan was careful to note the transformations and the additions that make it problematical to consider this tradition as homogeneous. The God who spoke to Moses in the burning bush is not a universal God, is not the All-Powerful; his power «falls at the limit of his people's territory. When an other *Elhoim* on Moab's side gives his subjects the right trick to push back the assailants, it works and *El Shaddai* retreats with the tribes that had brought him to attack»². The God whose wife is the Hebrew people, according to the image of the prophet Hosea³, is the unique lord and master there where he reigns, next to other eventual monotheisms. It is a God «as tribal as the others, but perhaps used with a greater purity of means»⁴.

The revival of Christ's message carried out by Saint Paul, as exegetes and historians have pointed out, was to give the monotheism of Jewish origin the scope of a universal truth. At the same time, far from remaining tied to a singular enunciation and the unpronounceable proper noun, the notion of the One God was caught up in a great network of representations and concepts which is nothing more than the consequence of this vocation to become a universal truth. From the first centuries of Christianity, the God of the Revelation was so thought of in terms borrowed from Greek philosophy. Notably, God the Father was identified with the Platonic demiurge, author and designer of the world. Many were the «fathers» who referred to Timaeus between 150 and 250 AD: Justin, Minucius Felix, Athenagora, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Finally, the notion of a universal God will find its definitive status when it converges with the idea –inconceivable to the human mind, according to Medieval theologians– of a «principle without principle», a «cause without cause» and of a «term beyond which it is impossible to go». All these formulations are nothing more than the other side of a supposed impossibility, that of the infinite in act, and held as «evident» until the 19th century.

Thus, the extension of the sovereignty of the One God to all of humanity created at the same time the necessity of a community of language and accentuated the demand for a unifying principle among believers. This God who, through the predications of Christ, passed on by Saint Paul, became the God of All things can only be reached through oral and written testimonies. These then must be interpreted, since their divine meaning must be deciphered into a human form of their language. The problems of compatibility among these diverse testimonies, the articulation between the so called old and new testaments, not to mention the debate about the «unbearable formulation of a God Three in One»⁵, are problems that could only be practically resolved by installing a centralized directorship for interpretation, for fear of seeing shattered a unity that reflects the very oneness of God. The more the Christian God becomes the Universal God, the more it becomes necessary to install a masterful authority, a guarantor for the common faith.

The universality of the Christian God therefore went hand in hand with the reinforcement of a single authority as a unifying principle for the entire community. In this way the «Holy Father» became the source of a power that exerts itself without recourse to force (although historically it did not do without it...) and whose effectiveness depends on the continuity of its transmission. This is based on the credibility of the heirs to the original charismatic enunciation, generation after generation. The notion and practice of Roman *auctoritas*, as founded by tradition, discovered in the Church a sort of extension.⁶

Thus we can say that the Church by its very structure constituted the most eminent form of «paternal» religion, in that it managed to best conjoin the transcendence of the founding One with the unity of the founded institution. The singular nature of everyone's cause of desire is sacrificed to a truth for all. Except that this One truth is «referred to what we call eschatological ends, that is, it only appears as the final cause in that it is attached to a judgement of the end of the world»⁷. Is it insofar as it takes frank advantage of a truth, all the more so a universal truth –contrary to other religions, and to the Jewish one in particular that makes use of the law– that Lacan designated the catholic religion as the «true religion»⁸?

The advent of the scientific discourse certainly marked the beginning of the end of a civilization that found its marks as much in the immutability of the cosmos as in a hierarchy of authorities appended to an ultimate Master. From the moment the scientific discourse disengaged itself from the certainties that underpinned the order of the world, replacing them with constructions, it is fair to consider that the theological One ceased to exist. The Father of religion, thought of as the Supreme Being, the immovable Force, etc. could not escape the destiny soon to befall all of the «first principles» and other foundations; that of becoming a postulate or a hypothesis whose necessity no less betrayed the interchangeable and multiple nature. In this way the effects of the scientific discourse further added to the pluralization introduced into the Occidental Church by the Reformation, permanently challenging a unity that the separation of the Oriental patriarchs had already compromised.

And nonetheless, it is precisely in having had to stop competing with science on the level of the real that the true religion, prophesied by Lacan in 1974, will find its new chance. Henceforth disengaged from the worry of having to test scientific statements against its own, the truth of the Church will find precisely in the hypothetical, concept-based, arbitrary nature of the foundations of science, the flaw allowing them to exploit a truth disjoined from the constraints of knowledge⁹. As a very result, the existence of diverse monotheisms, just as diverse Christian confessions, also becomes less embarrassing for it. Because it is less a matter of the universal dimension of its truth than it is... its therapeutic dimension. Henceforth, the important thing is to give meaning to all that the real of science happens to disrupt in the life of each. «Religion is made for that, for curing men, that is, so that they don't see what is going wrong»¹⁰. So, it is less as creator and master of the universe than as Father who answers sacrifice with love, that God is more inclined to be announced in the Church.

Faced with this return of the Father, psychoanalysis still has the responsibility to proceed in the direction of what does not stop *not* working in the working knowledge of science. For psychoanalysis, the wager is not to give meaning to what goes wrong, but to bring out the symptomatic nature. The impossibility of in any way writing the formula of the sexual relation is what, in marking the specificity of what we call being human, limits the omnipotence of scientific knowledge. The necessity of the symptom as it proceeds from this impossibility can be the principle for a practice that breaks with what is religious in treating the real with meaning and that holds its own as a symptom in a civilization modeled by science.

Translation : Julia Richards

Footnotes

- ¹ S. Freud, Remarques psychanalytiques sur l'autobiographie d'un cas de paranoïa, in Cinq psychanalyses, P.U.F., Paris, 1969, p. 302.
- ² J. Lacan, Des Noms-du-Père, Seuil, Paris, 2005, p.97.
- ³ Lacan mentions this in a conversation with Pr. Caquot, in Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, Seuil, Paris, 1987, p. 162-163.
- ⁴ J. Lacan, Le Séminaire, R.S.I., séance du 11 mars 1975, in Ornicar ?, n° 5, p. 27.
- ⁵ J. Lacan, Ecrits, Seuil, Paris, 1966, p. 873.
- ⁶ As H. Arendt, among others, developed it in her famous essay "Qu'est-ce que l'autorité ?", in La crise de la culture, Gallimard, Paris, 1972.
- ⁷ J. Lacan, Ecrits, p. 873
- ⁸ J.-A. Miller, "Un effort de poésie", cours 2002-03, leçon du 14/05/2003 (unpublished).
- ⁹ J.-A. Miller, *ibid.*
- ¹⁰ J. Lacan, Le triomphe de la religion, Seuil, Paris, 2005, p. 87.

The contingency of the Name-of-Father

Russell Grigg

How can the Name-of-the-Father be contingent? The entire Freudian edifice is built on the Oedipus complex of which the Name-of-the-Father is the *clé de voûte*. Moreover, the Oedipus complex plays a central role for Lacan; whereas Freud called it the “nucleus of the neuroses”, Lacan declares that it covers the entire field of analytic experience, marking the limit that our discipline assigns to subjectivity.¹

And yet, in *Seminar XVII* Lacan dismisses the Oedipus complex as useless and irrelevant, liable to lead to errors of clinical judgment. He now considers that the Oedipus complex is “Freud’s dream”. Far from being the bedrock of psychoanalysis, it is a formation of the unconscious and therefore calls for interpretation.²

While the Name-of-the-Father in the Oedipus complex occupies more than one place in Freud’s work, all versions of the myth consistently paper over the same form of the real as impossible: the absence of a sexual relationship. A further element that for Freud is essential to the father’s role in the Oedipus complex, but absent from the original myth of Oedipus, is the castration complex.

There is no real reason to specifically invoke castration in the case of the primal horde father. And in the Oedipal myth castration is not given a particularly prominent place; there is no inherent link between castration and either its mythical or Freudian settings. Lacan acknowledges the point and begins to treat them as separate and distinct in *Seminar XVII*. Thus, on the one hand he explores the question of the castration complex independently of the Oedipal context. It is this line of approach that eventually leads him to the formulas of sexualization. On the other hand, he enquires into the reasons why Freud holds so strongly to the Oedipus complex itself.

For Lacan castration is not a fantasy but a real operation brought about by language. It is determined by the master signifier, S_1 , and arises from a confrontation between the signifier and enjoyment. Lacan’s four discourses are an attempt to formalize the structure of this relationship between signifier, in the form of semblant, and enjoyment. All four discourses, but particularly the master’s discourse, share a common aim with the myth of the primal horde, in that they attempt to give an account of the social bond, which, in Freud, is constructed on the basis of the father’s murder. The primal horde tale takes precisely the place of a myth and thus raises the question of what role the father’s murder plays for Freud.

Lacan’s considers that the father’s murder is set in place as a myth in order to cover up the castration that institutes *both* the law *and* fantasy, as a consequence of the law. There is a fundamental fantasy here of the father who enjoys—and, in particular, who enjoys all the women. This fantasy, which denotes an impossibility, is also a retrospective effect of the institution of the prohibition of *jouissance*.

Lacan does not completely abandon all reference to the father of the Oedipus complex or to the father of the primal horde. While he separates the castration complex from the dead father, he retains the function that the dead father has as both *jouisseur* and prohibitor of *jouissance*. Question: if castration is a function of language then why does Lacan retain this vestige of a father, whom he refers to, somewhat obscurely, as a statement of the impossible? Possibly for this reason. If castration is a universal function of language, what do we say about the clinic of psychoanalysis, which includes the discovery of the foreclosure of phallic signification in psychosis and the implications this has for the way the psychotic enjoys? Or what about all the possible vicissitudes of neurotic sexualization and psychopathology? If castration is an automatic operation of language, there must be contingent elements as well.

What Lacan calls the real father is invoked as the agent necessary to explain the contingency of the encounter with castration; the real father is a contingent agent of a universal operation. This real father is unknowable, moreover; there is something that does not enter into the universal operation of castration but will remain an operator unknown to the subject. He is the master-agent and guardian of enjoyment.³ And what the subject has access to in analysis takes the form of figures of the imaginary father in his multiple representations: castrating father, tyrannical, weak, absent, lacking, too powerful, etc.

While both forms of the myth of the father in Freud deal with the Name-of-the-Father, a signifier closely bound up with jouissance and its regulation by the law, there are some profound differences between the two—as Lacan comments, there is “a split separating the myth of Oedipus from *Totem and Taboo*”.⁴

1. The relationship between the law and jouissance is inverted. In the Oedipal myth the law precedes enjoyment, which henceforth takes the form of a transgression; in *Totem and Taboo* it is enjoyment that is present at the outset, and the law comes afterwards.

2. Whereas the father of the Oedipus complex is subject to the law he transmits, the primal father is an exception: \$x Fx.

3. There is a striking development from the Oedipus complex to the myth of the father of *Totem and Taboo*. The father’s function initially is to pacify, regulate and sublimate the omnipotent maternal figure. By the end the father has assumed the power, obscurity and cruelty of the omnipotence his function was intended to dissipate initially.

In Freud’s approaches to the Name-of-the-Father many of these issues remain open. Lacan concludes that the Oedipus complex is “strictly unusable” in the clinical setting, adding, “It is odd that this didn’t become clearer more quickly.”⁵ This is a remark that Lacan is perhaps directing at himself. The new reference points unfolding in *Seminar XVII* take the place of the Oedipus complex: the introduction of a new concept of knowledge, S_2 , the split between it and truth, and, importantly, the concept of master which has “only the most distant of relationships” to the concept of father.

Footnotes

¹ “Function and Field of Speech and Language”, *Ecrits: A Selection* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), p. 65; “Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage”, *Ecrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1960), p. 277.

² *Seminar XVII*, p. 159.

³ See the discussion of “agent” in chapter 8 of *Seminar XVII*.

⁴ *Séminaire XVIII, D’un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant*, session of 9 June 1971.

⁵ *Séminaire XVII*, p. 113.

D like...

DEMOCRACY • R. NEPOMIACHI
DESIRE OF THE ANALYST • D. COSENZA
DIRECTION OF THE CURE • D. LAURENT
DRUG-ADDICTION • G. REQUIZ

The Name-of-the-Father and the “Direction of the Cure”

Dominique Laurent

“The Direction of the Cure” — I’m talking about the 1958 text — surpasses the Freudian perspective of the analyst’s occupying in the cure the place of the father. With his confrontation of phallic identification, Lacan lays the grounds, for his ulterior developments concerning the “beyond Oedipus”.

“The Direction of the Cure” defines a new status for the subject, the barred subject, apprehended with reference to the articulation of signifiers, and no longer with reference to signification. From that point on, Lacan has it function as a want-to-be. This want-to-be leaves the place to “receive the complement of the Other”, which will become object (a). The subject’s want-to-be, situated at the heart of “the analytic experience, in the same field in which the passion of the neurotic is deployed”¹ defines the function of desire as central in the direction of the cure. The definition of the binary opposition demand-desire is established as early as “L’instance de la lettre”² with reference to the signifier and the signified. The Other of the signifier brought into play in the analytic experience is perceived through the demand. Regression is not to be situated as a return to the past, but as the return to the present of signifiers used in demands that have undergone prescription. The drive is situated in the interval between the signifiers of the demand and not in relation to the object. He writes this ($\$ \grave{a} D$), an S fading within the cut of the demand. Lacan identifies desire to a metonymy whose signified slides from signifier to signifier. The desire is that of a subject between two signifiers, a barred subject. The analytic interpretation that comes from the Other identifies the desire in what is said. By relating the desire of the subject to the desire of the Other, Lacan specifies that “it is as Other that he desires”, but the subject does not know that. To the subject’s “what do I want?” is substituted a “what do you want?” addressed to the Other from whom the subject expects in fact an oracle concerning his desire³. It will be formulated for the analysand in the sense of “a what does he want of me?”. The desire of the analyst as desire of the Other is what supports and makes possible the discourse of the unconscious; it is the operator of the direction of the cure from the bias of interpretation. This perspective takes its distance from the consistence of the Other in the Freudian transference. It also takes its distance from the perspective developed in “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis”, in which the Other is conceived of as the whole of the signifying chain, which has the value of one, and whose consistence is assured by the Name of the father.

This text puts an end to the problematic of the desire for recognition, in favor of the recognition of desire⁴. The fundamental desire of the subject for Freud is to be the phallus for the Other. As Jacques-Alain Miller indicates⁵, “The Direction of the Cure” relocates the end of the analysis such as it was treated by Freud. It proceeds by discerning the identification of the subject to the phallic signifier beyond the imaginary signification. The obstacle that the castration complex constituted under the auspices of penis-envy for women and the refusal of castration for men is revealed as an effect of the position of the analyst as father that Freud occupied. If the Other embodied in transference is a father, he assures the consistence of the Other. The Freudian father tries to impose a norm on the *jouissance* of each of us. He knows what every one of us needs. Marriage, love and work are the paradigms. “The force of the subject’s phallic identification stems from the fact that it responds to the desire of the Other”⁶. When this Other in analysis has the consistence of the Name of the father, there is no reason for phallic identification to be doubted.

However, Lacan distinguishes the signifier of desire from the object of desire. The signifier of desire is the phallus. The object of desire is separated from it, or opposed to it. The case of the Three Card Monte tosser serves as a magisterial illustration. The dream of the lady responds to the demand of her lover. She does not believe in the fixity of her fantasy, but displaces it through her dream and

interprets it. Seeing herself endowed with a male organ does not prevent her from desiring it. She is subject to the want-to-be. The fact of having it provokes in her a desire. The demand of penis-envy apparently satisfied (having the phallus), this nevertheless makes way for a deep dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction of the demand appears as constitutive of the object of desire. The object (a) has a relation with the dissatisfaction of the demand and also with the dissatisfaction of need insofar as it is articulated to the demand. The articulation of desire to demand, that is to say with a signifier, has for effect to bring into the open an object that is related to dissatisfaction⁷. The notion of fantasy presented here highlights the object of desire (and *jouissance*) qualified relative to the demand and the signifier. It operates in the symbolic, in the field of the Other and not only with respect to the imaginary.

The whole problem for Lacan will then be to articulate desire as the subject's want-to-be, the desire for nothing, with the status of the objects concerned. This is what led him to reflect upon the object that is in front of desire. In his ulterior elaboration, Lacan would say that it is not only the dissatisfaction of the demand that is in play, but the dissatisfaction of the drive. The object (a) as surplus *jouissance* will be articulated with reference to "the dissatisfaction of the drive", with respect to a want-to-be.

The direction of the cure opens the register of \bar{A} (barred A) by the desire of the Other formulated by the "what does he want of me?" discussed in "Subversion of the Subject" and shows the incompatibility, for the subject, of desire and speech. The progressive pinpointing of the fantasy and the object (a) during the 1960s discloses for the neurotic the position of *jouissance* he occupies beyond the phallic identification he remained fixed to with Freud. Lacan's renovation of the concept of fantasy implied its being crossing and revealed the disjunction of the Other and *jouissance*. By situating the place of the analyst with reference to the desire of the Other, of an Other that will always reveal itself as still more inconsistent, Lacan displaces the issue of the Freudian cure achieved in the Name of the father by revealing the particularities of the *jouissance* of each one of us.

Translation : Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

- ¹ J. Lacan « La direction de la cure », *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, p. 613.
- ² J. Lacan « L'instance de la lettre », *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 524.
- ³ J. Lacan « Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir », *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p.824.
- ⁴ J. Lacan « La direction de la cure », *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 623.
- ⁵ J.A Miller « Donc », 1993-1994 seminar, session of 22 June 1994.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ J. Lacan « La direction d la cure », *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p.637.

E like...

ETHICS • R.P. VINCIGUERRA
EVALUATION • C. LICITRA ROSA
EXTIMITY • R. CARRABINO

Ethics and the Name-of-the-Father

Rose-Paule Vinciguerra

Ethics, Lacan says, consists essentially in a judgement of our action(1). This 'return to the meaning of action' is what justifies the moral dimension of psychoanalysis. If there is an ethics of psychoanalysis, it is insofar as analysis provides something that claims to be 'a measure of our actions'(2).

Is the Name-of-the Father that which gives us the measure of our actions? And, has the Name-of-the Father anything to do with the principle on the basis of which all actions can be judged? And what sort of relations does it maintain with the superego? If the superego is that which comes from the 'broken link of the symbolic chain' and from the 'rejection of the commandments of speech'(3), the Name-of-the-Father, on the contrary, is that which authorizes the signifying system to exist, it is the Law that governs it(4). With regards to that, superego and Name-of-the Father are opposite. What, is then the place we reserve for the Ideal? Psychoanalysis confronts ideals, it finds them, measures them, and situates them. But, it is not itself an ideal. So, is psychoanalytic experience at odds with regards to classic morality?

Let us consider classical ethics. Oriented towards the Sovereign Good, is it the effect of a regulation by the Name-of-the Father? Ethics, in Greek philosophy is always in the service of goods(5). The order of the Cosmos on which it claims to be founded, is already the order of power. Aristotle's Ethics is the Ethics of the Master and the *despotes*, the head of the family, is like the ancient meaning of the latin signifier *pater*, its signified is *founder*. But with the master emerges the ideal, behind which we always find enjoyment -*jouissance*- as discarded. The Sovereign Good here is only an ideal (imaginary) model which attracts but which lacks nothing. Greek philosophers pushed aside the real gods of tragedy. The place of monstrous desires is thus condemned as the place of the fury of signifiers which is the realm of the whim of gods(6). If, indeed, the Name-of-the Father is in the Other, if it is 'the signifier of the Other as the place of the Law'(7), that which as such orders reality, then it is with the exclusion of *hybris*, of the symptom in the city, and by means of moderation and prudence, that the Greek master meets with the effect authorised by the Name-of-the Father.

Now, what this function of the Name-of-the Father became in Judaism? Indeed, it is there that the rupture with the gods in the real has really operated -they became idols as a result- and what emerged was the symbolic function of the Name-of-the Father. By prohibiting human sacrifice and notably the sacrifice of Isaac, the god of the Jews, the god with the name that cannot be uttered, through the sacrifice of the ram in the place of Abraham himself(8), instituted the Name-of-the Father, the dead father, and the instance of the law which prohibits *jouissance*. 'To start with, the father is dead, but, what remains is the Name-of-the Father and everything turns around it' (9). Thus, the Name-of-the Father identifies the person of the father with that of the law(10), and the law which it founds, by authorizing belief in speech, is the pivot of the symbolic function. Correlatively to the prohibition of *jouissance*, it is also the moral commandment.

However, the law must reveal what lies beyond it, guilty, forbidden desire. This is what Saint Paul will bring to light by revealing the knot between law and desire. The principle of law is, therefore, the support of transgression towards *jouissance*. Thus, there is in human beings an attraction towards sin. Starting from Saint Paul's evocation of sin, at the very place of the Thing, Lacan shows that, even in the commandment of love for the neighbour, human beings retreat in the face of their own *jouissance*, because, on the horizon, there arises something which partakes of 'some intolerable cruelty'(11). Freud had already objected to that commandment, by underlining the neighbour's evil intentions(12). Here, this evil reveals mine to me. Evil, cruelty, are nothing else than identification to the bad intentions which we heap on God the Father, who, from being idealized and loved, now becomes the cause of

evil 'for having screwed us up'. Reproach and resentment carry with them, through identification, spitefulness against ourselves, which inhabits all of us. This is why the criminal longs for punishment. Psychoanalysis has thus affinities with moral experience, because it has to do with *jouissance*.

Should we then want, as Lacan notes about Freud, to save the ideal father, the agent of creation, who is also, in his essence, the depriving father? The psychoanalytic adventure leads us to the distinction between the real father representing a law, that of desire, from that imaginary father, but at the expense of exhausting hate by mourning his love. On the horizon of the Ethics of Psychoanalysis we meet the void of the Other's will concerning the subject. 'What does he want of me? Concerning me?' (*Que me veut-il?*). 'Nothing'! Concerning my *jouissance*, 'since the Other does not exist, all that remains to me is to assume the fault upon I' (13). In this respect, the only thing which we can be guilty of is to give up on the desire which inhabits us. The analytic experience as 'moral experience' allows us to encounter the function-limit of desire on the basis of a 'saying no', authorized by the Name-of-the Father in the face of the unlimited and ferocious call of the superego. The Name-of-the Father marks therefore its place as a 'saying no' to the ferocious figure of the superego and makes the Ethics of the act, as Ethics of desire, possible.

But, let us go back to our civilization of today. The new scientific and technocratic order is happy with horizontal identifications and encourages them: 'Enjoy, as you like, on condition that you work'! What bearings can Psychoanalysis find concerning the Name-of-the Father? Should we promote the paternal myth's restoration despite everything? Certainly in the family, and even in today's family, the father 'as name, as pivot of discourse' (14) remains a question of faith, faith in the meaning and the relative order that it allows to institute. But, those efforts of restoration of the moral sense based on the invocation of the father are futile. The disbelief caused by the hold of enjoyments (*jouissances*) other than the phallic enjoyment (*jouissance*) put in place by the Name-of-the Father defies those attempts. What is unfolding in our civilization in front of our eyes, in the very heart of limitless enjoyments (*jouissances*), is a return of the Other in an unexpected form, a return to a religious tradition linked to an appeal of the master, which can take the form of an appeal of the absolute master, death, as in terror. But, one also hears the call/clamour for a new totalitarianism in the behaviourist levelling of erratic enjoyments. The efficacy of the Name-of-the Father, as the quilting point in the discourse authorizing communication is not sufficient anymore.

When the lawless real prevails on a symbolic enslaved to the imaginary, what can then operate as the Name-of-the Father? Certainly not that which turns out to be a 'nominated to' something in the social order. This 'being nominated to' for the sake of which today the subject conforms to a specialization and becomes its servant, is indicated, drawn, planned by *the Mother alone*. Where the subject is asked to reduce itself to the place assigned to it in a world order without transcendence, the 'being nominated to' comes before what is the Name-of-the Father. Instead of the half-said, the 'gap in discourse' (15), the 'being nominated to' signals an iron order, as Lacan indicated (16).

Should we then find that which comes to inhabit the hole of the real 'in a community of values' making link, as Régis Debray advocates (17), and which would come to take the place of the religious properly speaking? This 'invariance of the symbolic aptitude' can it constitute the anchoring point which would authorize a new version of the Name-of-the Father?

We would rather wager on what testifies to the real as a hole and lies in the very nomination made by the symbolic. Thus, we can do without the Name-of-the Father as real on condition to use it as a 'semblance', as a symbolic being taken for real. What can then guarantee the function of this irreducible point, if not that which proves to be equally irreducible, namely the symptom, itself an effect of the symbolic in the field of the real? This is why the symptom is that which can enlighten an Ethics taking its orientation from the real. Thus, if we conjure away or attempt to erase the symptom, as it is attempted today in a uniform utopia, the conditions of any moral action as such are annihilated, which only

proves that nobody can be quits with the belief to the symptom which inhabits everybody. It is nevertheless there that lies the only chance for an Ethics which is an Ethics of Elucidation, as well as an Ethics of the act.

Translation : Haroula Pepeli

Footnotes

- 1 Lacan J., The Seminar Book VII *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, Seuil, Paris, 1986, p. 359, English Translation, Routledge, London 1992, p. 311(chapter XXIV).
2. Ibid.
3. Lacan J., '*Variations on the Standard Treatment*', Ecrits, Seuil, Paris, 1966, p. 360. Not translated.
4. Lacan J., The Seminar Book V, *The Formations of the Unconscious*, Seuil, Paris, 1998, p. 240. Not translated.
5. Lacan, J. The Seminar Book VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, op. cit. 362. English Translation, op. cit., p. 314.
6. Ibid. p. 363. English Translation, op. cit., ibid.
7. Lacan J., '*On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis*', Ecrits, op. cit., p. 583. English Translation, op. cit. p. 221.
8. Lacan J., *The knowledge of the psychoanalyst* (Seminar 1971-1972, not published. Lesson 1st June 1972.
9. Lacan J., The Seminar Book XVI, '*From an other to the Other*', not published. Lesson 29 January 1969.
10. Lacan J., '*Function and field of speech and language in Psychoanalysis*', Ecrits, op. cit., p. 278. English Translation,, op. cit., p. 67.
11. Lacan J., The Seminar book VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, op. cit., p. 229. English Translation, op. cit., p. 194.
12. Freud S.(1930a), '*Civilization and its discontents*', Standard Edition 21, p. 111.
13. Lacan J., *Subversion of the subject and dialectics of desire*. Ecrits, op. cit., 820. English Translation, op. cit. 317.
14. Lacan J., The Seminar Book XVI, *From an other to the Other*, non published, lesson of 29 January 1969.
15. Ibid. lesson of 12 February 1969.
16. Lacan J., The Seminar Book XXI, *Les non dupes errent*, non published, lesson of 19 March 1974.
17. Debray, R., *Human Communions*, Fayard 2005, p. 118.

As Evaluation

Carmelo Licitra-Rosa

An ingenious conception of scientific enterprise, which needs to emancipate once and for all: the illusion of scientific research has the privilege of directed access to the dull field of real. This prospect which has its own roots in the so-called baconian prejudice reflects, not only in fact of science, is shared openly by the common opinion, but also the a critical conviction of many scientists. It is necessary to oppose to this gross vision another one more advised: the galilenian with the famous axiom that the big book of nature is written in a mathematic language. Here the science appears, to be able to free oneself from a bad empiricist suggestion of experimental test, not more and not less that as a discourse, a mathematic discourse or as an approach to the real, not at all direct but intermediate by a symbolic system. This prospect on the other hand, can lead to deny the superiority and the authority of the science has the undisguised prerogative, for the same fact to adopt this last to the all symbolic system deputed, in every time and in every culture, to intermediate the relationship between the man and the real, as the magic, the religion, the myths, esoteric doctrines etc. It is necessary to provide to reweave the absolutely specified of galilenian model, against this pernicious relative result, dangerous possible outcome of an effort also honest, of concept, it is necessary to lead again the statute of science to a discourse untied as another one, it doesn't at all allow to reduce the property all special that it has, or to arrive at the end, at this real, to catch it, to take it out. Now, this «realistic « connotation, that signs definitely the first moment of scientific experience, is unexpectedly, if not completely dark, in the present discussing philosophic- epistemology, the one that at least spreads out the cultural Anglo-American epicentre, where to swing from the end of a real completely ignored (world is words) a — softer position of soft position of an admitted real, even if declared unknown. We are inclined to think that the rampant success, of protocols and procedures of evaluation in the present, is a direct consequence of evaporation of the real as the central point of scientific discourse. Artificial evaporation, so that this real doesn't stop to reclaim overbearingly his rights, how tat is left, in spite of all the efforts, strongly resistant to claim a power without a way out of « all valuable». The comparison between the galilenian conception of the science, and the psychoanalysis over described, shows an unpublished analogy and a clear difference. The analogy. The lacanian point of view considers that the psychoanalytic method, different from scientific proceeding, is based on a symbolic articulation, then a discourse, able to seize pieces of real, or to notch manipulating, the real involved in the symptom, which is showed as sufferance. It means so both for the postulate of the presence of a knowledge in the real and for the science as for psychoanalysis, it is the grounding of the function, so essential for the psychoanalysis, the supposed knowledge.

This perspective is the only one that can drive the psychoanalysis back in the orbit of the science psychoanalysis, in her specificity of indissoluble practice from operative instrument of word, and it can redeem from condition of minority in that the Baconian conception finishes inevitably relegating.

Now the difference. It is characteristic of symbolic chain that reels off the psychoanalytic practice compared to what develops the scientific research; it is a kind of continuing solution, or the absence of a link or the absence of a ring. It is just that preventing from a side the psychoanalytic discourse to rise the full of scientific, and to the other side it is necessary the subscription of special element inside the chain precisely the significant of the Name of the Father, or his equivalent it can insure the catching of the real with what is has to relate.

However there in no need to rush into to considering this missing link as a mark of perfectibility- or to finish immediately that this link can become finally available if the psychoanalysis takes the scientific model in his integrity without any hesitations- but as the same condition because the psychoanalytic discourse in fact can undertake, without living the principles of scienteficity included in the same premises of his statute, with the subject who meets again extruded from the world of the

science in a way not contingent. This relationship of analogy- difference between psychoanalysis and science strengthens the thesis of their common origin, to allow on the light track of Alexander Koyre, in the historic emergency of cogito, as is sign, as a break, this beginning of scientific parabola in the west culture. The subject of the science is the same of the unconscious subject, Lacan says between all the traditions of thinking. However the inscription of cogito in the west-culture, while it begins a new and a fecund discourse, () is at same time at the beginning of a binomial configuration, the dichotomy between res cogitans and res extensa. If the galilenian physics puts the foundation of the scientific dimension in the res estensa size, on the other side as an authentic science arrives to see the res cogitans up, it is necessary to wait the arrival of Freudian psychoanalysis. This is Lacan's thesis in the Preliminary Question -Scritti p.527-. If this is true now, after Cartesio and Galileo, any other way that is not psychoanalytic to do science of subject, of res cogitans, () is a deception, or better a free will and a twisting: I mean both they try to apply res cogitans –thinking- the course extrapolated from res estensa –brain- this is the recognisable neuroscientific programme- and the pathetic ostination forces to make eternal the horizon of humanism, ineluctably faded. It is covered the big field of familiar, psychological, holistic relation... etc. And it has already been said, the psychoanalysis dominates not more as a theory but, in the same way of physics, as a true () dimension of discourse, it cancels on the beginning the popper confutation.

In this dualism, more and more pronounced, the psychology lands herself to be the Troy's horse in the scientific discourse, in her plan not too over masked to get in the humanistic field and to unhinge it. If the science ersethe function of subject of a proper immanent logic, the psychoanalysis on the other hand, is amputated for the obstinate castles around the ego instance. Just this commune characteristic – to erase the function of subject – made this last one slide to the science and () oppose in an awkward way. And as this science has absorbed in the meantime the prejudge of evaluation-or it has been found polluted by the distortion of galilenian paradigm, that is the hiding of real as background of scientific discourse- in the same way the psychology, linked to her as the last of his satellites, couldn't to be completely succubae of the ideal of evaluation and in the same time to be completely blind in front of the irruption of the real, as the Freudian death instinct –behind pleasure principle- The accurate confirmation of all that is the careful evacuation of subject unconscious theory and enjoyment from the doctrinaires cognitivists. Well, if the science supports the essential « doesn't want to know anything about the true as a cause» on the other hand, « it recognizes that the psychoanalysis is the essentially that reintroduces the scientific consideration of the Name of Father « Scritti p.879. So it means that the clinic of the Name of Father (or her equivalents), given that this factor is in agreement with the binomial of symbolic chain and the missing link a plain emission of the scientific discourse in the pureness of his origins- represents the opposite epistemology of evaluation, as while it springs from pseudoscientific degeneration linked to the removal of the real, all of that anchoring to the Name-of –Father is the only guarantee able to avoid, in the name of science, the obscurantist return of humanism in his wishful approach to the subject. Finally, the sign to evaluate statistically the results of psychotherapy refuses in the a-priori, as an inappropriate and specious abuse, in the a-posterior too, it starts from the open crack in the real efficacy of evaluation systems and from the alarm given in America on the budget of Fluoxetina using in the last ten years for depression therapy.

However the evaluations have been always positive, but also enthusiastic, about the benevolent effects induced on the mood tone by the prodigious molecule.

Sorry just for the worrying increase of suicide rate in the population of them (children and teenager) who have taken.

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Extimity

R. Carrabino

The term “Extimité” was introduced by Lacan during his Seminar VII “the ethic of psychoanalysis”. In his lesson on February 10th 1960 he says: “This key point, this intimate exteriority, this “extimité”, which is *the* thing. This term appears again a few other times as a noun or as an adjective –extime- in his seminars. One should not be deceived by the fact that the term is used so sparingly. Extimité should be related to two topological properties to which Lacan refers: the two-dimensional and unilateral properties. The two-dimensional property refers to the idea that no three-dimensional is needed for the subject – and therefore for the *discourse*. The second term – unilateral – is a structural characteristic of three out of four of the “non-spherical” surfaces used by Lacan to construct his topology: the Moebius strip, Klein’s bottle and the projective surface. The fourth “non-spherical” surface, the Torus, distinguish itself for the fact that it is not unilateral, but, as we will see later on, it is the one that shows more distinctly the topological location of the concept of *extimité*.

Even though addressed by Lacan, the *extime* dimension had been previously mentioned by Freud as we can find it in his work. I will limit myself to only two of his works in which *extimité* is more distinctly used: *Über den Gegensinn der Urworte* and *Das Unheimliche*. The structural function of *extimité* has been researched and explained by Jacques-Alain Miller in his seminar about extimité and then clearly summarized in his work “Extimité”, which was published in his work *Lacanian theory of discourse*.

The key point of Miller’s work is the relationship between Real and Symbolic and specifically the presence of the Real in the Symbolic. Indeed, as he writes, *Extimité* is a term that Lacan uses to indicate the problematic presence of the Real in the Symbolic. In his work he shows the relationship of *extimité* between R and S, *a* and A, A and S barred, A or *i(a)* and *a*, *a* and *phi A* and *-phi*.

The word Extimité comes from the fusion of external and intimacy. It should not be forgotten that the adjective *intimate* is the superlative of internal.

Extime refers to an external dimension that it is at the same time the most internal.

The concept of *Extime* as used by Lacan does not imply a union of the two dimensions of external and intimacy but a third, new dimension. To fully understand how *extime* distinguishes itself from the two dimensions of external and intimacy it is recommendable to refer to the topology of the sphere and the non-spherical surfaces.

From the topological point of view, the sphere is characterized as a closed surface that divides the space in two parts, an internal and an external one, and whose central point – from which it is generated- is located on the inside. The *Torus* is topologically identical to the sphere for what concerns the separation of internal and external space; structurally different, though, is the fact that its central point is located on the outside.

This point, although external, is structurally different from all the other external points of the Torus because it is the point from which the Torus generates and through which it can exist. From the topological point of view its central point can be defined as extime because it is located outside of the surface and it is logically implied: if *p*, than *q*. This explains why the Torus is non-spherical.

In his construction of the topology of the surfaces as topology of the subject, formally introduced in his lesson of March 7th 1962, seminar IX, Lacan uses four surfaces which have in common the possibility

to be generated from a hole on a sphere. Those surfaces are, beside the Torus, the aforementioned Moebius strip, Klein's bottle and the projection surface (sometimes improperly called cross-cap). In Lacan's work *L'Étourdit*, that deals thoroughly with the "non-sphere", we can find information about the way they are generated. The following picture shows the way preferred by Lacan for the creation of the aforementioned surfaces. Given a sphere, we will make a hole that for clarity's sake we will assume to be square; the square hole will also appear in each of the squares underneath the sphere. If we connect the opposite sides following the direction of the arrows on top of them, we will obtain the aforementioned four surfaces each one written under the corresponding square.

As to the creation of those four surfaces, two essential steps emerge: first, we made the sphere non-spherical through the hole in it, and then we worked around the hole's edge to create the four non-spherical surfaces of the topology of the subject.

The hole has an essential role in Lacan's topology and it is the element that allows us to perceive the structural peculiarity of the extimité. As a matter of fact, it is *it* that opposes to the surface to indicate the position of object *a*, that is a structural lack. Only if we assume this lack, can we create the surface. This is like saying that there is no significant phenomenon without the object *a* or that there is no position of the subject without lack, that is, without desire. We can now understand how in Lacan's topology the topological surfaces have no importance in themselves but are important because of the way in which they represent the organization of the significant around the hole. Consequently, on this organization depends the reciprocal position of the subject, of the Other, of the object and of the "jouissance". In the construct of a topological figure the logical *primum* is neither the surface nor the edge but the empty space around which the figure is organized. This notion, along with the cutting on each of the four topological surfaces and number of turns necessary for the cut (one or two), is fundamental in the psychoanalytical topology.

The hole is the object's space but it is also the space in which R acts on S because R makes a hole in S. Based on this, I graphically represented the series of extimité in the following frame in which each vector between the four vertexes of the rectangular indicates an extime index.

In this scheme we can find the Extimité of object *a* in regard to the subject and, along with that, in regard to the *phantom*; then, the Extimité of the *phantom* in relation to the symptom and of the symptom in relation to the subject.

The Extimité of the object *a* in regard to the subject is active in the *analyst's discourse*, in which the subject takes, almost as a paradox, the role of the Other. In this way, from the innermost side of the subject in himself, is possible the action of the outermost, of what is "most external": the object, that is, the "jouissance" and its implications in the Real.

We can say that the extimité of the Real is in connection with the symbolic and the object and the "jouissance" are in connection with the subject. On that concept of extimité is based the possibility of the analysis and its being irreplaceable there, where it is necessary to listen to the subject and his desire.

Italian translation's team : Daniele Maracci, Marco Bani, Chiara Tartaglione, Monica Vacca, Daniela Simone

F like...

FAMILY • M. BASSOLS
FATHER, DON'T YOU SEE THAT I'M BURNING • M.H. ROCH
FEMINISM • M.H. BROUSSE
FUNCTION • J.C. INDART
FORECLOSURE • J.C. MALEVAL
FRATERNITY • E. BERENGUER / O. SAWICKE

Family and Name-of-the-Father

Miquel Bassols

Studies of the history and anthropology of the family have long shown that its structure cannot be defined as a natural unit founded in reproduction as a goal. The human family is an institution that underwent historical changes; it is a structure of symbolic relations not always superimposed or coincident with the biological family. Even when they are, these relations ruling kinship and descent modify the supposed unit of the family in such a radical way that we may well state that its symbolic structure has entirely denaturalized it. As Lacan indicated quite early (1938, p. 17), the resemblance that could be observed between its regular members in the Western family –father, mother, children – and the biological family, is one entirely contingent, in a way leading our thought to the temptation of considering this resemblance as a community of structure directly founded on the constancy of the drives.

The totemic family group –totemism was actually one of the forms that Freud studied in order to elaborate his theory of the Œdipal complex- bears no relation to the supposed unity of the natural family. The act of adoption, in its various modes in different societies, also shows how a symbolic structure of relations not founded in nature can illustrate the profoundly denaturalized condition of family structures. The present-day rise of new forms of family, increasingly diverse, from those defined as «monoparental» (where a father or a mother alone live with the children) up to those defined as «homoparental» (where the couple are of the same biological sex), only confirm this fact: the family is a symbolic structure that may well rely on biological links, yet differs from them in order to impose its own laws.

Let us indicate, also, the need to distinguish the family institution from the institution of wedlock in order to understand these laws. The existence of polygamous marriages in various cultures already indicates this difference and shows that the family and its links cannot be explained by marriage. Marriage is, in a way, an attempt to provide a symbolic form to a relation between the sexes which is never obvious and which, from the standpoint of historical and anthropologic analysis, rather hinders the stability and permanence of family links.

At this point, it is still necessary to distinguish between the symbolic functions of the Œdipal complex and the family functions indicated in kinship relations. This means that the symbolic function of the father as situated by Freud in the Œdipal complex can be held by someone different from the father of the said family, just as the figure incarnating the mother's desire can be supported by someone other than the biological mother or the mother designated by kinship.

It is therefore convenient to clearly distinguish the function of the genitor from the symbolic function of the father. In fact, it was Roman law that already distinguished clearly the figure of the «genitor» from that of the «*pater*». Paternity was thus understood as an act of will rather than as a natural attribution, whereas the duty of the genitor was the purely material one of providing food, devoid of any other responsibility over the offspring. This introduces a fundamental question regarding the function of the father: there is no automatic attribution of the function to persons; rather, an act of will, subjective consent, is required for the function to hold and be transmitted as such.

The genitor is never automatically the father: for the father function to be supported by the genitor, a symbolic attribution is required which must take place both on the side of the father and on the side of the subject. At the same time, we must point at the fact that it is by way of this symbolic attribution that the father may be supposed genitor. We must not overlook the fundamental function of the Church

in the West, as it established the canonic form of the father in the figure of the genitor, in a way that will parallel the confusion thus imposed within wedlock between sexuality and procreation.

On the other hand, it is frequently observed that there is always certainty about the mother but never about the father. «*Pater semper incertus est*», while the mother is «*certissima*», thus read the Roman saying quoted by Freud. We must nonetheless indicate that today, the increasing presence of assisted reproduction techniques or forms called «surrogate mothers», tends to generalize the separation between the maternal biologic function and the symbolic attribution of maternal function. The mother becomes increasingly uncertain.

Thus, it will be clearer to say finally that both the father and the mother function must be «adopted», in the fullest sense of the term, by each of the subjects at stakes. In the varying forms of this symbolic adoption, or in its impossibility, we shall find the coordinates determining the place and signification of the subject's symptoms.

The limit of the analysis that Freud could inaugurate with the Œdipal complex was the lack of a signifier of femininity beyond the identification to the imaginary phallus or to the figure of maternity. This creates the logical need to study the difference between the sexuated positions beyond the Œdipus and its significations. This going beyond Œdipus implies for Lacan a criticism of the «œdipal ideology» (Lacan 1967, p. 21) that psychoanalysis had promoted, as well as a criticism of the place that the imaginary figure of the father held for postfreudian analysts themselves, most of which –in their longing for the father – had made both the analyst and the end of analysis into a kind of ideal father: an ever failing attempt to return to lost stardom.

Thus, in 1967, Lacan will provide two highly specific references, non-contradictory with each other from this perspective, to begin this criticism:

1. «I will clarify my intentions by saying simply this: remove the Œdipus and psychoanalysis in extension, I will say, will belong entirely in the jurisdiction of president Schreber's delusion». The case of D.P.Schreber's paranoid psychosis was, indeed, what indicated to Freud the psychotogenic effects on the subject of the *Verwerfung* (foreclosure) of the symbolic function of the father

2. «Let us observe the place occupied by the œdipal ideology in somehow exempting sociology for an entire century from taking sides, as it should have done before that, on the value of the family, of the extant family, the petit-bourgeois family in civilization, that is, in civilization as moved by science. Is it to our benefit to cover it up unknowingly at this point?»

There is no possibility for psychoanalysis to undertake the defence of a form of family tributary of the petit bourgeois ideal and whose devastating effects increase the stronger it holds on to its longing for the dead father, a longing that is always religious. Instead of covering up œdipal ideology, lacanian psychoanalysis intends to analyze it as an effect of meaning, not the least pathologic, of the subject of modernity and its discontents.

The problem of the structural relation of the family to the Names-of-the-Father will therefore be how to go beyond that œdipal father without fading him out entirely, how –as Lacan will state it years later by the formula that convenes us to this Congress- «to do without it, to make use of it.

Translation: Liliana Singer

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Father, don't you see...?

Marie-Hélène Roch

« We have blind men, one-eyed men, men with long sight, short sight, clear sight, dim sight, weak sight. All that is a faithful enough image of our understanding, but we are barely acquainted with false sight »¹. Voltaire is a man of wit. If there are no false sights, it is that in reality, man mistakes the moon for green cheese his whole life long; it is his natural state.

Another point of view is that of the writer Imra Kertész who uses the example of the leaders of the Hungarian communist party, calling them the language disabled for having « made bad use of language »², either by using it stereotypically in disjoining it from real facts, or in promoting it to the rank of a consensus.

It is clear that we have eyes to not see, ears to not hear and a consciousness to deceive ourselves.

Responsibility in the use of parole leads the analyst to attach great importance to what cannot be assimilated into language, to pay attention to a little real. The impossible assimilation is the proof – no doubt the only proof – that the unconscious cannot be totally accounted for by meaning. On the side of the subject there is the extraction of the object and on the Other's side there is a bar. The analysand experiences that the unconscious is not enlisted; it is an unknown that invents itself more than a getting into step. It is a gap between perception and consciousness, a knowledge that is not a priori, an instant of opening that closes just as quickly and that must be seized in time.

What difference is there between the remainder and the scoria? Lacan answered in 1964: «The remainder is fertile, the scoria is an extinct remainder»³. For Lacan during those years, the scoria was the analysts themselves, the unconscious disabled who had made bad use of the Freudian discovery: «they searched, said Lacan, for guarantees in the theories that make use of meaning for an orthopedic therapeutics, one that renders conformist, with the aim of *happiness*»⁴. It is an error that considers the phenomenon of consciousness as being characterized by unity. Psychological objectivity is based on this common reverie. Once you get the hang of it, you can think through that prism for a lifetime.

Psychoanalysis is the invention and the subversion of the subject. For example, we all agree to affirm that a man who feels he has a body does not think he is a horse; it is the point of view of a sensible mind. Even so, for many years I had a patient who was as free and unbridled as a horse with neither brand nor halter. He concluded his analysis after having found, in *his* language that was constantly slipping, a fastener to compensate for the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father that he lacks. He got himself a tattoo that said *Maverick the hypoman*, «the horse man»; it is a proper noun that he has put to use. From a no-mark, he made a mark on his body; from no family he managed to gather up and organize a story. In so doing he raised his father's ruined dignity, creating for himself a signet, an insignia of his own invention: the horse man. It was his way of knighting the name of the father and of putting back into place this essential piece, fallen from the board in the face of the mother's noble lineage; his way of informing fate that the blow had not yet been dealt. The hand can still be re-dealt, as he said. One had to count on what he called superfluous words. He works as a monitor in a high school. He used psychoanalysis like a pair of glasses. It corrects his vision, much better now in that he has access to the real and in that it affords him a tie that does not segregate him.

Psychoanalysis answers to paradoxes or to problems precisely like this one: how can a lucid mind think falsely about important matters? By what quirk can this man who has been coming to see me for only a short while have come to the conclusion at the age of seven that happiness was not for him – of that he was certain? This is surely the work of a lucid, but false, mind. He understands that the only

happiness comes from the phallus and turns away from it, closing off the access possible to the undertaking of his dreams. Since then he is a genius whose omnipotence is in seeing giants there where others see only windmills. Psychoanalysis accepts that geniuses can have a false mind about a principle that they received without examination. The analyst will not get muddled in trying to persuade him to examine once again the use of the principle of the phallic organization of the Oedipal myth. What is certain remains foreclosed. What is undone cannot be done over through the operation of castration. The key is not to be looked for in the Oedipal users guide, but in the hand Lacan offered by pluralizing the Names-of-the-Father. This extended hand is not a phallic promise, but an encouragement to tinker an organizing principle specific to each. This hand is offered to he who does not have Oedipus ready-to-wear and to those who ended up knowing that Oedipus was a dream of Freud's; the dream of saving the father.

«Father, don't you see, I'm burning?»⁵ When, in times of danger from the drive, the subject of the analytical experience invokes the Father (God), just as the cry evokes the silence in parol, what is revealed is not only the fissure in the paternal metaphor, but the causal lack of the living. The subject assumes responsibility for what he consents to say in being silent. The extreme function of the Name-of-the-Father is the experience of an orientation towards the real.

Freud told the poignant dream of a grieving father who was napping in the next room where his dead child's body laid and who was hit – awakened by something, the fall of candle that had just set fire to the bed where the child's body rested. Rather than rush into the burning room, the father dreams that his son says reproachfully to him: «Father, don't you see, I'm burning?» The first principle of this dream, of any dream, is the desire to go on sleeping. The dream as consciousness assures me that, after all, things will be fine; it's only a dream. Freud does not interpret this sealed, closed and unanalyzed dream any differently.

What awakens? A different reality, one that is in waiting, says Lacan in his commentary⁶. It is in the little sound, the *knock out*², a blow dealt by the real, a radiant point, fire, fever that introduces a fracture, a split between what is shown – the reproach that the death of a loved one always leaves behind, the regrets about a phallic loss, a symbolic lack, the remorse of a missed encounter – and what cannot be assimilated – the causal gape, the Cause of the fever, suggests Lacan.

The function of *tùche*, of the real as a missed encounter, first appeared as a traumatism. These days, those who are interested encounter its forcing aspect on television where it takes on a value of seduction, constraint, abduction, even of brazen soliciting. It is a force in disguised violation of the principle of voluntary engagement. The spectator is enlisted either by force or by guile just as for soldiers. In 1974⁷ Lacan gave his opinion on all these exasperating and devouring things, saying that there was no reason to make a fuss about it, that television, all these things that occupy us, are only a reviviscence of religion, and that that there was no better devouring monster. My answer to all that is that man has always known how to adapt to evil and to accept it.

«WHO RIDES SO LATE IN THE NIGHT AND THE WIND? IT IS THE FATHER WITH HIS CHILD.» (...)

In Goethe's poem, we see a father fleeing on horseback through the Landes, tightly holding his child under his cloak. It is this child that the King of the Aulnes tries to seduce and finally tears away from his father. Michel Tournier borrows the title *The King of the Aulnes* from Goethe and makes him the hero of his novel. Tiffauges, an anarchist caught in the trap of fascism, the Ogre, brazen solicitor of Kaltenborn, name of an ancient Teutonic fortress where students were chosen and trained –the *Jungmannen* called to become the fine flower of the III Reich. He writes his version of the trauma of the war as a new, non-genital model of sexuality and shows the deep and scandalous affinity that unites war and child, upsetting what he calls « the phorie by malignant inversion⁸ »; German youth used as cannon fodder.

The father is no longer called on in an ethical perspective. What father could still dream the poignant dream recorded by Freud? Today, the father is accused; the child himself has ended up by making heard in courts of justice that the paternal metaphor does not totally heal evil.

Psychoanalysis takes care of the father's cause, inasmuch as there are real effects of language that inhibit the functions of the subject. This demands of analysis that it be an invention and not the repetition of a disappointment, that it serve the subject to encounter the point between language and the real, that is, a good use of the symptom. There is no other way to keep the mind awake.

In his lessons on *Anguish*, Jacques-Alain Miller showed that in the very last glimpses of this seminar Lacan was sketching out a new figure of the father. «A father, proposes Miller, who would know that the object *a* cannot be reduced to a symbol, who would not be dupe to the paternal metaphor, who would not believe that it could accomplish an integral symbolization, and who would know, on the contrary, to bring desire to the object *a*, and likewise to its cause. That could well be the analyst»

Translation : Julia Richards

Footnotes

¹ En anglais dans le texte [NT].

² En anglais dans le texte. [NT].

¹ Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique; édition d'Alain Pons, Gallimard, 1994, p 248

² Kertész I, Un autre, Acte Sud, 1999

³ Lacan J, Le Séminaire, livre XI, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, seuil 1973, p.122

⁴ Lacan J, *ibid.*, p.122

⁵ Freud S, L'interprétation des rêves, " Rêve de l'enfant mort qui brûle ", Puf, 1976, p. 433

⁶ Lacan J, *opus cit.*, livre XI, p.66

⁷ Lacan J, Magazine littéraire, numéro 428, février 2004

⁸ Tournier M, *Le Roi des Aulnes*, Gallimard, Paris, 1971

Feminism

Marie-Hélène Brousse

Psychoanalysis was born at the end of the nineteenth century, the same that saw the first public feminist demonstrations emerging in a still Victorian England. It was another manifestation of the feminine, that of hysterical neurosis, that put it on the royal road to the unconscious. At the end of the twentieth century, Lacan changes course from the Freudian line that runs into the dead end of penis-envy and he develops the formulae of sexuation: *Encore...* the feminine. 'The Woman does not exist': consequence: exit from the 'dark continent' of psychoanalysis. This did not pass without a good deal of clamour in feminism... That was in the seventies. Where are we now, in 2006?

A FEW REFERENCE POINTS

After the second world war, with women's voting rights acquired in numerous Western countries, feminism ceased to be a movement of social and political demands and evolved into other fields: the body, writing, knowledge. The demands in the domain of the family and sexuality opened out onto the struggle for family planning, contraception, abortion, a re-definition of marriage rights, the transmission of the name, etc... Feminism contributed to the politicisation of the body. The universities created courses in 'Women's studies' or 'Gender Studies'. Different disciplines were seen appearing in art, history, literature and especially anthropology, on women as a category. In the seventies, these new categories (women, 'youth') mirror one another, competing with the notions of social class and the political and ideological struggles of the time. If in some countries, and particularly in France, certain tendencies in Feminism took their inspiration, in their own way, from psychoanalysis (the *Psy et Po* group), on a whole, Freudian psychoanalysis kept its distance from the movement. It had transformed Freudian doctrine into a deeply conservative movement as regards the family and female sexuality. Moreover, Freud is to this day still labelled in this way in Canada and the States. The reduction of the phallus to the penis, indeed the term of phallus alone, only allows one to see in psychoanalysis a male chauvinist doctrine.

In the last years of the twentieth century, feminism as a political movement and school of thought receded. What happened? On one hand, it became quite clearly apparent that women did not constitute in any way a consistent social category in the real: the study of women's voting trends is a demonstration of this. Some women are men. But in fields other than that of politics, the same effect was patent. On the other hand, what Lacan had foreseen, the rise of an ever more segregationist logic of the social bond and the advance of fundamentalisms, changed the order of the day. The feminist movement blended with the different sexual minority movements and the development of the religious in many minorities brought the traditional place of women back to the fore. These two widely differing currents nevertheless converged to produce an effect: women's orientation of protest for equality on a universal basis fell away, favouring an assumption of difference conceived of as natural. Feminism as a phallic demand, a response to the position of women as objects of exchange in the symbolic order, as singled out by Levi-Straus, a position Lacan referred to in the first part of his teaching, fell silent and gave way to an affirmation of the 'between us.' Have we moved into a reactionary period?

LACANIAN CLARIFICATION

Today, we may assert that the clarification that Lacan brought to the question of the feminine and feminism, its evolution and mutation, enable us to reply to this question.

FEMINIST LACAN

Several points developed by Lacan separate him once and for all from the traditionalist post-Freudian perspective of the feminine question. The first point is established during the first seminars and culminates in the *Écrits* from the end of the fifties. It is the difference introduced between the penis and the phallus, the fact that the latter is conceived of as signification or, later, as the signifier of desire. This gap enables Lacan to isolate the complex known as the castration complex from the 'heterogeneity' which characterises it in Freud, a heterogeneity which in his disciples gave way to the traditionalist

choice that separates psychoanalysis from the movements of innovative thought at the end of the twentieth century. If the phallus is not the penis, both sexes are characterised by a relation to the phallus that may very well differ, but both approach it via a first symbolic substitution and, therefore, neither through the organ nor through the image.

The second point concerns the emphasis Lacan puts on the father in psychoanalysis as opposed to the maternal and motherly deviations of the post-Freudians. This is a paradoxical element since the paternal figure, the 'patriarchal authority', was the feminists' enemy. Transforming the father into a symbolic function, effecting the cut between the Name-of-the-Father, a symbolic function, the imaginary father and the real father, constitutes a treatment of the father that implies a divergence from belief, a belief the feminists adhered to, and whose final defenders they became, in spite of themselves. To define the father by his function of naming is ultimately to undo the sacred aspect of his authority and reduce what used to present itself as the keystone of familial order to an instrument.

The next step taken by Lacan in the sixties is the multiplication of the 'names-of-the-father'. The pluralisation of the element that hitherto figured the One that the symbolic system rested on constitutes Lacan's response to what was being observed of the father's decline in the new forms of social bond, qualified by Lacan as 'fragmentation'. Proposing inhibition, anxiety or symptom as names-of-the-father, to which we may add The Woman, accomplished the reduction begun by the interpretation of the Freudian Œdipus to the Name-of-the-Father. The Woman, as universal, functions as one of the names-of-the-father. This is one interpretation from Lacan to the feminists. It clarifies the function of The Woman as a 'could have had' for the feminist movement: supporting the Name-of-the-Father function at a time when it was already vacillating.

PSYCHOANALYSIS BEYOND FEMINISM, OR LACAN, WAY AHEAD

This is in step with the logical formalisation with which Lacan, during this same time period, was moving on to a new approach to female sexuality in *L'Étourdit* and the seminar *Encore*, taking women one by one, beyond the set, beyond the universal. A Lacanian response, to both the Freudian 'enigma of the dark continent', but also to the straying of feminism, rather at a loss to specify the difference between male and female sexuality other than through an apologia for homosexuality or sublimation through writing, the definition of the feminine in terms of 'not all', based on inconsistency and logical incompleteness, precedes the era.

This response was not understood, and the feminists protested against the appearance of the famous, 'The Woman does not exist'. However, this wrenching of the feminine from the hold of Aristotelian logic was merely the heralding, through 'the other jouissance', of the fact that this wrenching indicated the mutations of the modalities of jouissance that have since been affirmed.

Already, in the seminar on Anxiety, Lacan was affirming that a woman does not lack anything, in direct contrast to the lack of the penis and the post-Freudian theory of women's relation to lack. This path leads him to differentiate, from this seminar onwards, between objects present in reality and the *objects a*. The object *a* does not belong to the exchange regulated by competition and the circulation of phallic value. This attention to objects leads him to affirm the 'object's rise to the zenith', a trait with which he characterises modernity in the Seminar *L'Envers de la psychanalyse*. Henceforth it is at the heart of this new master discourse that the feminine is re-deployed. The feminist refusal of the 'woman object' no longer carries a meaning at a time when anything can potentially come to the place of the object and when the object is triumphant over the symbolic. When Lacan posits that a woman is a man's symptom, he displaces the Lévi-Straussian emphasis on women as goods circulating in exchange towards an empty space that a woman may come to occupy for a man.

Thus it can be seen that the late Lacan had gone beyond the points the feminists were still using for support in the seventies and eighties.

Jacques-Alain Miller, in his address to the most recent WAP Congress, *Une fantaisie*, also enables us to have a head start on our epoch. Feminism has ceased to be a symptom. The feminine, as a mode of jouissance, will without doubt find other symptoms to insist.

Translated by Adrian Price

Foreclosure

Jean-Claude Maleval

Everyone agrees that the rise to glory of the object *a* is accompanied by modifications in contemporary clinic. The most recent and astounding of these is the considerable increase in the demands addressed to psychoanalysts by subjects whose mode of functioning leads us to consider them as ordinary psychotics. Consequently, we must ask the question: how can this be accounted for?

A first answer puts the emphasis on the mutations of the analyst himself: his better understanding of Lacan's last teaching, the discrete forms of the clinic of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, the recent construction (1988) of the concept of ordinary psychosis. The modifications in the psychiatric clinic also play a part in this phenomenon: ever more centered on the prescription of rapid and symptomatic treatments, they not only inhibit the course of the symptom but abandon speech based practices to others.

A crucial question remains: do social transformations induce subjective mutations? Is ordinary psychosis provoked by the emergence of an Other that does not exist? No one doubts that this Other is contemporaneous with a reconfiguration of the frequency of symptomatology, but does subjectivity itself become modified in its structure? Do the decline of authority, the disenchantment of the world, the rise of individualism undermine the Name-of-the-Father? Would an increasing number of subjects be forced to structure themselves under the regime of the foreclosed Name-of-the-Father?

Some affirm that there is no need to resort to such audacious hypotheses: a continuist clinic of knotting would suffice. Lacan's last teaching would substitute the progressive and subtle weaving of the elements of Borromean knotting to surreptitiously pass from one structure to another: ordinary psychosis would correspond with a phase in these modifications. To admit this thesis which leads to the conception that the functioning of a subject can participate in several structures, amounts to giving a structural filling to the concept of borderline. Lacan never varied on the rejection of this hypothesis. The refusal to envisage a jump between structures is a constant in his teaching. How are we to understand the advent or the disappearance of the paternal function passing in a same subject to a new structural knotting that could gain or lose its Borromean properties? Indeed, as Jacques-Alain Miller insisted during the «Conversation of Arcachon», the continuist clinic designates essentially «a gradation within the great chapter of the psychoses», not to be confused with a gradation between psychosis and neurosis¹.

At the same time wouldn't ordinary psychosis be a subjective potentiality because of generalized foreclosure? Did Lacan not make extensive use of the concept of delusion in his last Seminars? Does Jacques-Alain Miller not maintain that «everybody is delusional²»? So, if every reference to delusion or to foreclosure is blindly referred to psychosis, generalized foreclosure becomes an introduction in the Lacanian orientation to the Kleinian thesis of the psychotic core inherent to everyone. That which it is not. Foreclosure refers to psychosis when, and only when, it forecloses on the Name-of-the-Father. Generalized foreclosure, introduced by Jacques-Alain Miller in 1987³, constitutes another approach to the Lacanian thesis according to which «everything that is said is a fraud»⁴. Hence, we should clearly distinguish common delusion from psychotic delusion. Only the later is to be referred to the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. This is noted *Po*, deficiency of the Father, it refers to a failure in the Borromean knotting, whereas generalized foreclosure is noted *∅*, it emphasizes the flaw of the Other. It is transtructural. The impossible inherent to the cause, the emptiness of the reference, the absence of a metalanguage found the possibility of the creative «delusion» for everyone; on the other hand the psychotic forces himself to suture the incompleteness of the Other by means of a delusional construction in relation to which the subject ceases to be in a state of fading. From the

effects of the emptying of the thing specific to language ensues the universality of «delusion». This particular delusion is defined as « an editing⁵ of language» constructed on a vacuum, one that has no corollary in reality and to which nothing in intuition corresponds. Hence, explains Jacques-Alain Miller, « the secret of the clinic of universal delusion is that the reference is always empty»⁶. The restricted foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father painfully accentuates the flaw in the Other for the psychotic subject.

If theoretical advances object to a generalization of ordinary psychosis, one must return to social mutations in order to apprehend its increase. Some then lean on Lacan's saying, « the unconscious is the social». From the social decline of authority, they infer that society shows itself «as incestuous, disavowing the exercise of the paternal function and thereby collaborating at the same time with the decline of the father»⁷. If the Father's function is not ratified by the social, is not upheld by an environment, they say, it authorizes the modern subject «to contravene the laws of speech that specify us as human»⁸. From then on, in «a world without limits» they announce the coming of «a man without gravity», a plastic, undivided subject to be situated between psychosis and perversion⁹. Readings like these deliberately side step Lacan's last teaching, in which he operates using an axiomatic of jouissance rather than using, as he previously had, the Other of language. To do this, Lacan reduces the Name-of-the-Father to its radical function that is «to give a name to things with all the consequences that that implies, including for enjoyment [jouir] among others»¹⁰. The S1 of the sinthome, that fixes a jouissance without the Other, appears to him as offering the purest apprehension of the paternal function¹¹. In this way, Lacan formalizes his prior intuitions according to which the Name-of-the-Father constitutes an ex-istence to be situated outside of the field of the Other. He anchors it, not in the social, but in the first effect of language on being. Certainly, the unconscious is the social, but the unconscious is a construction of knowledge elaborated from the S1s of the language. Hence, when Lacan begins with «it enjoys [ça jouit]», with the One of jouissance, he clearly insists on introducing «something that goes further than the unconscious»¹², a beyond meaning. The law of the subject is in his sinthome.

The Name-of-the-Father upholds from the outside the consistency of the field of the Other. At the heart of which the ideals of the ego contribute to the support of jouissance. The rise to glory of the object *a*, during the times of the Other that does not exist, results in a mutation of ideals: it promotes a consumerist ideology, advocates a model of single jouissance [jouissance célibataire] and generates a crumbling of social ties. However, the decline of authority is not the decline of the Name-of-the-Father: the modifications in social ties do not bite into the law of the signifier.

Anchored in religious discourse, in the authority of tradition or in powerful ideologies, the ideals of times past drew their attractiveness from strong collective adhesion. This is no longer the case. Science, capitalism and psychoanalysis have compromised them. The old ideals, although they have been undermined, still subsist, while new ones, incited by a common form of added enjoyment [plus-de-jouir], establish themselves. The modern subject is not confronted with an absence of ideals, but with their fragmentation and multiplication which has as a major consequence that they are less obvious to him. This is why his mode of jouissance is characterized, not by an absence of limits, but by what Lacan calls «distraction» and «precariousness»¹³. The diversity of ideals is conducive to distraction; moreover their multiplicity strikes them with precariousness by showing them to rest on reversible choices. No one feels this more deeply than the ordinary psychotic. For those who do not dispose of the fundamental fantasy as a compass, ideals are all that is left to orient them in their existence. When ideals strongly impose themselves on the subject, the clinic of ordinary psychosis cannot be discerned. When they become precarious, diversified and uncertain, they no longer offer the psychotic subject with a ready-made mode of stabilization.

Uncontestably, clinical types are more sensitive to social changes than are subjective structures: the history of hysteria, anorexia or of «melancholy» offer sufficient proof of this. So one must suppose that an authentic modification in subjective structures should be the precursor of the emergence of new clinical types. Yet among the pathologies on the forefront (addiction, anorexia, autism, depression,

etc.), there can be found no veritably new clinical type. Even transexualism, supposedly generated by the advances in surgical technique, turn out to have already been described by Montaigne. For this syndrome, as for ordinary psychosis, certain configurations of the Other stifle its emergence while others excite it. It is a matter of a consequential mutation of symptoms, and not a mutation of subjective structures.

If foreclosure can still be of service, it is not on the condition that the Name-of-the-Father is made to depend on the social tie, but rather on the condition that we recall that the Name-of-the-Father is anchored in the connecting function of S1.

Translated by Julia Richards

Footnotes

- ¹ Miller J-A. Intervention lors de La conversation, in *La Conversation d'Arcachon. Cas rares : les inclassables de la clinique*. Agalma-Le Seuil. Paris, 1997, p. 256.
- ² Miller J-A. La psychose dans le texte de Lacan, in *La psychose dans le texte*. Analytica. Navarin. Paris. 1989, 58, p. 135.
- ³ Miller J.A Ce qui fait insigne. Séminaires inédits du 27 Mai et du 3 Juin 1987.
- ⁴ Lacan J. L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre. Séminaire du 11 Janvier 1977, in *Ornicar?*, bulletin périodique du champ freudien, Pâques 1978, 14, p. 6.
- ⁵ In French; «montage» means assembly, organization, editing, editing or cutting out. [NT]
- ⁶ Miller J-A. Clinique ironique, in *La Cause freudienne*. Revue de psychanalyse, 1993, 23, p. 10.
- ⁷ Lebrun J-P. Un monde sans limite. Erès. Ramonville Sainte-Agne. 1997, p. 242.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- ⁹ Melman C. L'homme sans gravité. Jouir à tout prix. Denoël. Paris. 2002, pp. 114-120.
- ¹⁰ Miller J-A. Clinique ironique, o.c., p. 21.
- ¹¹ Hence, we would do well to distinguish three categories of S1: the signifier S1, in wait of another signifier, the carrier of incompleteness, that of the divided subject; the litteral S1, whole and sufficient that founds the elementary phenomena; and the S1 that is niether signifier nor litteral, but a signe, reified, presentified and incarnated in an object in place of an other—that of the autistic subject. The first carries the function of the Name-of-the-Father, that of a regulated knotting; the other two testify to its foreclosure; the forms of knotting of the subjective structure they permit are not Booromeen, they can even leave the subject to grapple with the rages of a lalanguage.
- ¹² Lacan J. L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre. Seminar of November 16, 1976, in *Ornicar?*, bulletin périodique du champ freudien, December 1977, 12/13, p. 5.
- ¹³ Lacan J. Télévision. Seuil. Paris. 1973, pp. 52-53.

G like...

GOD • A. DI CIACCIA
GUILT • V COCCOZ

God

Antonio Di Ciaccia

Freud: Since the discovery of the Unconscious we can formulate the question in these terms: we know now that God is a substitute for the father, or more precisely, that he is a father who has been raised to a higher level; also, that he is a copy of the father as he has been perceived and known during the childhood by the single individual in his own personal childhood and by the human kind in its pre-history as the father of the pre-historical men. Later on, the single individual saw his father in a different way and he put him in perspective. The ideal image that the individual had of his father during his childhood remained and merged with the inherited image of the primordial father. It is from here that the individual representation of God originated.

Philosopher: It's not like that at all! The concept of God depends neither on the personal history nor on the pre-history of human kind. God is ontologically conceived as supreme concept of reality and as supreme concept of the thought, that is, as supreme value.

Freud: Philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of the original sense. They give the name of "God" to some vague abstraction which they have created for themselves. The man who goes no further but humbly acquiesces in the small part which human being play in the greater world – such a man is, on the contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the world.

Theologian: God is not a very vague abstraction or a semblance neither for the philosopher, nor for the theologian. As a matter of fact, as Saint Thomas of Aquin says: *Esse proprie convenit Deo*. Certainly, philosophy will tell us only that God is Being. It is, indeed, only through the revelation that we know that God is Person, and as Person, he is Father. *Proprie nomen personae patris est hoc nomen, pater, quod significat paternitatem*.

Freud: I need not to repeat here, the primal father was the original image of God, the model on which later generations have shaped the figure of God. The people which first succeeded in thus concentrating the divine attributes was not a little proud of the advance. It had laid open to view the father who had all along been hidden behind every divine figure as its nucleus. Fundamentally, this was a return to the hystorical beginnings of the idea of God. Now that God was a single person, man's relations to him could recover the intimacy and intensity of the child's relation to his father.

Theologian: The term father has to be referred to God first. Indeed, *Pater est principium sine principio*. So, *Pater prius dicitur de Deo quam de creatura*. It is only *analogice* that the name of father is given to the creation, as the Fathers of the Church have been saying from the beginning.

Freud: This hypothesis, which is founded on the observation of Robertson Smith (1889) and was developed by me in *Totem and Tabù* (1912-13), has been taken by Theodor Reik as the basis of this study on the problems of the psychology of religion of which this is the first volume. If the prehistoric and ethnological material on this subject is worked over psycho-analytically, we arrive at an unexpected result: namely that God the Father once lived upon earth in bodily form and exercised his sovereignty as chieftain of the primal human horde until his sons united to slay him. We have heard the admission that religion no longer has the same influence on people that it used to and this is not because its promises have grown less but because people find them less credible. Let us admit that the reason – thought perhaps not the only reason – for this change is the increase of the scientific spirit in the higher strata of human society.

Lacan: Here my views differ from Freud's. This knowledge, as we can find in the unconscious, is different from the scientific knowledge. Even though I predict the return to Freud's theories, I can say that *Totem et tabù* is twisted but for a good reason.

That story of the killing of the pre-historic human kind's father is Darwinian rubbish.

Freud: I wrote *Totem and Tabù* to say that it really happened.

Lacan: I know that for you, Freud, it is important that it *is* real and that everything originated from there. You care about it. We need to remember, though, that it is a myth. The myth incarnates the internal essence of every statement of the truth, which is that the truth can only be half said, we can only say half of it. Now, the role of the father, in our conception, it is that of a myth, nothing else but the dead father, just as you say. Only the dead father can be the symbolic father. Now, the symbolic role of the father is what I call – borrowing religious terms – the Name –Of-The-Father. Everything revolves around the Name-Of-The-Father. Just as for you, Freud, the sublimation. What I called the Name-Of-The-Father it is the place of God-Father. The Name-of-The-Father, that is God.

It is here that psychoanalysis, when successful, proves that we can live without the Name-Of-The-Father. We can live without it, if we use it.

Philosopher: But if God is dead, then everything is allowed!

Lacan: The conclusion that we can draw from our experience is that to the statement: “God is dead” follows the statement: “Nothing is allowed anymore”. But let's talk about *jouissance*. It is written in the *Ecclesiaste*: “God orders me to *jouir*”. I think you noticed the difference between the Hebrews' and Plato's God. Even though the history of the Christian religion, for what concerns the Hebrews' God, has found in Plato's God its little psychotic diversion...

Philosopher: Psychotic diversion!?

Lacan: The philosophers' God is the subject that we suppose that knows. Period. Einstein also uses it when he makes the point of the good old God that doesn't lie, the latent God behind every theory. It is at this level that we could question how much is left of the real atheism, the only one in which it is possible for the mind to face the challenge to the subject supposed to know. The real formula of atheism is not that God is dead but that God is unconscious. It is high time we remembered the difference between the Aristotelian God - immobile universal engine -, Plato's delirious view - God as highest good - and the Hebrews' God, who announces himself through the Word. The latter is a God who says: “I”, a God with whom one can talk, a God that asks you something and that in the *Ecclesiaste* orders you: “*Jouis!*” – which is really remarkable. To obey to an order to *jouir* is something that gives you anxiety. This is an order to which I can only answer: *J'ouis* “I hear”. This is a God that says precisely what he is.

Theologian: *Nomen, qui est, triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei...*

Lacan: If we translate, like Saint Augustine does, the biblical passage *Ehyeh acher ehyeh*, with the expression *Ego sum qui sum*, “I am which I am”, it would be revealed that God and the Being are one and the same. It is an absurdity when God talks to Moses in the burning bushes. Slightly better is the Settanta's translation: *Ego sum qui est*. As Greeks, they conceived God as the supreme Being. The Being is I. What we are talking about here is a unique Being, who has nothing else to say but “I am what I am”.

Philosopher: From the I to that? From “which” to “what”? From the subject to the object? Or are there from the logical point of view two position of God, a universal one and a particular one?

Lacan: Whether he believes in God or not, one must deal with him. He can't avoid him. It is a God you can't eradicate because he doesn't have any other fundaments but that he is the oath to the universe of discourse.

Should I remind you that one is not lonely when he has the universe of language by his side, as Baltasar Gracian says in his *Criticicon* about the deserted island? The thought, if it is undermined by lack of sexual intercourse, thinks and thinks only through the One. From here originates the universal. But where does psychoanalysis come from? From the Jewish tradition. And in the Jewish tradition, as I said when I did not want to continue with my seminar about the Names of the Father, I had time to point out the fact that in Abraham's sacrifice what is sacrificed is actually the father depicted as the mutton. Through this sacrifice, the universality of the human kind is castrated. The One of the thought that we assume has an essence; if we define the thought as effect, its essence is the function of object A, that we will call the cause. It is a privileged cause that gives us the game of language.

Philosopher: God is the language then?

Lacan: No, God is not the language but he is implicit every time there is a language expression. The language expression creates God just that simply. As long as we will say something, hypothesis of God will be present. In fact, it is impossible to say anything without making him exist in the form of the Other.

Theologist: After listening to your reasoning, I still don't understand if you believe God exists or not.

Lacan: he exists, this good old God. The mode in which he exists may well not please everyone, especially not the theologians who, as I have been saying for a long time, are far more capable than I am of doing without his existence. Unfortunately, I am not quite in the same position because I am dealing with the Other. This Other, while it may be one alone, must have some relation to what appears of the other sex. And why not interpret one face of the other, the God face, as supported by Feminine *jouissance*. Since all this cares about thanks to the being of significance, and since this being has no place other than the place of the Other which I designate with a capital O, one can see the cockeyedness of what happens. And since it is there too that the function to which castration refers, one can see that where this may not make for two Gods, nor does it make for one alone. In sum, the only possibility for God to exist is that He – capitalized – *jouisse*, that is, He be *jouissance*.

Italian translation's team : *Daniele Maracci, Marco Bani, Chiara Tartaglione, Monica Vacca, Daniela Simone*

H like...

HATE • P. LACADÉE

HAMLET • G. BUSTAMANTE

FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY • A. ARENAS

MALE HOMOSEXUALITY • A. RUBINSTEIN

HYSTERIA • L. D'ANGELO

Hate and the Name-of-the-Father

Philippe Lacadée

It's a strange hate that Alceste, addressing Philinte, admits having conceived for human nature, a dreadful hate that leads Molière's Misanthrope¹ to withdraw from the world, to "flee into the desert to escape the proximity of human beings". What then is this hate that aims at no one in particular but seems to be addressed to all of human kind? Alceste's target is the very principle that founds the human being, that attaches his being to the place of the Other, the place of language, which is pre-existent to him. It is unbearable for him that the speaking being make use of this place of the Other for anything besides the love of truth, that he make of it the locus of the *jouissance* of semblants by resorting to lies and hypocrisy. "Let us be men and in every encounter let our discourse reveal the depths of our hearts; let it be our hearts that speak and let our sentiments never be masked by vain compliments."

For Alceste, the parole² would be all the more true if it were to say the unsayable of the thing and make it possible to partake of its *jouissance* absolutely, if it were to guarantee an oath or the "whole truth" without any subjective presence that might denature the tenor. But, if the word expresses, it also veils the real that, because it is unsayable, is the cause of hate — the hate of this word that is only a semblant but also the still more lucid hate of the unsayable whose target is being³. The signifier is uncertain⁴ and the misanthrope obliges us to wander in search of a mythical place before the origin of language that denatures man: "Look on earth for a secluded spot where as a man of honor one is free." By denouncing the hypocrisy of all those who make pretty speeches without believing a word of what they say, Alceste's only victim is himself⁵. His hate has as its target then both what in speech reveals the creative, signifying face of the Name-of-the-Father, and what eludes this revelation, in order to aim at that part of being incarnated by the fantasy, the part that constitutes the particular *jouissance* of the subject, a part that Lacan will make into the object *a*. The world of semblants that Alceste denounces is the world that Lacan designates by pluralizing the Names of the Father and equivocating on *Les non-dupes errent*⁶. Not having consented to use the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, not having been its dupe, Alceste is devoted to incarnating in his beautiful soul⁷ the dilemma of lucidity, denouncing the signifier that never ceases to scourge him. Lacan raised Alceste's hate to the status of a paradigm in order to clarify "the suicidal aggression of narcissism"⁸, which, while denouncing the other, strikes himself⁹ with an imaginary counter-blow.

Why does anyone stab his neighbor? Because one no longer manages to relate to him and, failing to reach him through language, one targets him in reality, with insults, blows, and the murderous *passage à l'acte*. As early as the case of Aimée and the works of the psychiatrists Guiraud and Cailleux on unmotivated crimes, Lacan demonstrated in March, 1931, that what the criminal and the individual devoured by hate were trying to attain in the stricken object was nothing other than the *Kakon*¹⁰, the nucleus of his own being, his most intimate *jouissance*. This self-hate, the principle behind the aggression of an other, can just as well lead to an aggression against oneself, self-hate being, in the end, nothing else than shame at being alive, which can push the subject to suicide. Love of the mother is the basis for this double sense of aggression¹¹. The offspring of man, subjected to her caprice, to the reversibility of her presence-absence, experiences in this the reversibility of his love into hate of her presence¹². When he is forced to separate from the object of his love, in order to veil this depressive moment into which seep his feelings of hate, the child acquires his image in the mirror. This image, veritable support of an identification, imaginary construction of the identity of the ego, is, however, fragile and threatened with collapse; it also carries aggressiveness with it, because it anticipates too soon a luring and alienating image, which, in his heart, is chaos and discord, his very being. The hate of one's own image, as a semblant of being — the logical time indispensable to each one for the creation of his status as a subject — is the source of the hate of others, "a jealous hate that spurts out of the *jealouissance*¹³", of this counterpart that threatens the unity of the subject, its integrity, its image.

The question of hate is thus posed as soon as the human being finds himself in face of his semblable, of what, in his image, is both so like and so unlike him.

Psychoanalysis reveals to us that the stranger is not outside, but in the very heart of our being: in the inmost recesses of the subject there is, according to Lacan's felicitous expression, the *extimate*¹⁴. Between likeness and unlikeness, between *semblable* and *dit-semblable*¹⁵, the dimension of the said and of the name opens up. By betting on the "well-saying" the subject has a chance to make an ethical wager with what, in the other, will always remain strange to him, what Freud called "the narcissism of the little differences."¹⁶ For Freud¹⁷; hate is prior to love. It originates in the primordial refusal that the *lust-Ich* imposes on the outside world. The positions of love and hate are constructed during a primal time of constitution during which the subject expulses from his sphere of intimacy everything that in his encounter with the object of the drive does not satisfy the pleasure principle. This time is also the moment when the subject, because of the exigency of civilization, renounces a part of satisfaction, and by this is amputated of a part of his intimacy. Freud designated this renunciation in terms of a rip, of a split. Lacan employs the term of division. For Freud, this "rip is never cured and becomes greater with time"¹⁸. It is a wound of language, due to the passion for the signifier that signs, for every speech-being an inaugural loss, a renouncement of *jouissance*. Love makes it possible to ward off what reactivates this original fault, this loss. Love, Freud says, veils the birth of contemporary hate for this original loss.

Lacan places hate as one of the three fundamental passions of being¹⁹, together with love and ignorance. He makes of it one of the three fundamental forms of the relation of the subject to the Other and situates it in the heart of the dimension of language. Lacan formulates a strange paradox by attaching these three passions to the place of the Other, a place to which every subject must address his demand. Because of this, no subject that is a speaking subject, no speech-being, can attain the Other without attaining himself. On the horizon of any demand, there is the demand for death. Lacan comments the Christian commandment: "Love thy neighbor as thyself" in these terms: "as yourself you are, at the level of the parole, the one you hate in the demand for death, because you do not know him"²⁰.

Hate touches the very core of the subject at that point where he is divested of the signifier that would have permitted him to symbolize the hole in his parole that is implied by any demand to the Other. In effect, the impulse of hate as self-hate is aimed at being, that part of self that eludes parole, that *jouissance* that is intimate and ruinous. Well before the love-ties that veil it, hate has as its target the foundations of the paradox of language. If for Freud²¹ the essential point is not the reversion love-hate, nor ambivalence, but the recognition of the one in the other, Lacan stresses the primacy of hate by inventing the neologism *Hainamoration* (*heinamoration*)²². Alceste's hate pushes him to hate, beyond his semblable, the Other in general, because it seems to him that this Other has the *jouissance*²³ of what he is lacking, that the Other conceals the *jouissance* that the word purloins.

This is what Freud was dealing with in his treatment of the question of the Father and it is what led him to depict the father as the tyrant of the hordes against whom the primitive crime was perpetrated. He thus introduces the order, the essence and the foundations of the domain of the Law.

Self-hate can lead to the refusal of the Name, "Families, I hate you", to the refusal of the Name-of-the-Father and to the "love of the 'All'" — "that All from before birth or after life"²⁴ — it can also lead to the rejection of the slightest difference.

The hate that takes the Absolute for target denounces in effect the incompleteness the subject is confronted with, it is aimed at what in the Other partakes of *jouissance*²⁵ and which confronts the subject with his lack, with his own fissure. This marks the origin both of the reproach addressed to the Father and the paradoxical figure of a God who harbors *jouissance*, demanding death or the sacrifice of one's most precious possessions, and yet alone capable of guaranteeing to the subject, in a world beyond, the integrity that he is deprived of.

Lacan criticized Freud on this point for having linked, in accordance with the religious model, the first identification uniquely to the place of the father as all-loving. For Lacan, in effect, the primary identification can be accomplished in two ways: "Either we conceive the primary identification as connected to love with reference to the father, or we conceive it with reference to the worst²⁶, to the rejection of the lost, unrecognizable, part of *jouissance*²⁷."

The hate situated in the heart of the subject, beyond any identification to the ideal, beyond any love-tie to the father, beyond the Name-of-the-Father, is connected to the first tie with the outside world that we have already discussed, and for Lacan, this God that the Christians transformed into a flood of love is quite the most ignorant of men for having misrecognized the sentiment that founds the human being, for, not knowing hate, he cannot know love.

Like Freud, Lacan refers here to Empedocles: “God must be the most ignorant of all beings for not having known hate.”²⁸

If, because of this, God knows less than mortals, it is because living beings, having a body, experience the shame of living that is connected to the encounter with a living real that eludes the Name-of-the-Father.

Footnotes

- ¹ MOLIÈRE J.B. P.De , *Le Misanthrope* comédie in Œuvres complètes, II, La pléiade Gallimard, 1971. « Misanthrope » is derived etymologically from *misein*, to hate, and *anthropos*, man.
- ² TN : I have been translating the French « parole » by « parole » in English, with no italics because Webster’s gives it with a definition in the Saussurian sense. For a more detailed justification, see the translator’s note in the English version of Philippe La Sagna’s paper.
- ³ ⁴ Lacan J , Séminaire XX, *Encore*, Seuil, Paris, année 1975, p 91 « That being as such provokes hate cannot be excluded...We are talking about hate, so stifled that no one sees that a solid sentiment of hate is addressed to the being, to the very being of someone who is not forcibly God. »
- ⁵ Ewald François, “La misanthropie selon Alceste”, in *La haine*, Magazine littéraire, n 323, >July-August, 1994.
- ⁶ LACAN J., «Propos sur la causalité psychique», *Ecrits* Seuil, 1966, p. 175.
- ⁷ J. Lacan Séminaire XXI, *Les non-dupes errent*, unpublished.
- ⁸ J. Lacan « Propos sur la causalité psychique », opus, cit, p 174.
- ⁹ Ibid., p 175.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., “ Les propos furieux qu’il tient alors trahissent manifestement qu’il cherche à se frapper lui-même.” p 175.
- ¹¹ Ibid, p175.
- ¹² Cervantés, *Le colloque des chiens*, Aubier, 1992, p 99: “...that wrong doing and wrong saying come to us by inheritance from our first parents, and we suck it with our milk. That is clearly seen in the infant who with great difficulty, taking his arm out of his swaddling clothes, raises his hand as if he wishes to avenge the one he believes has offended him, and the first word he articulates, or almost, is to say whore to his nurse or his mother. ”
- ¹³ Balthazar Gracian, *El criticon*, Les documents de la bibliothèque de l’ECF, p 39: “ Each of us is the son of his mother and of her humor, married to her caprice, each one has her grimace and her manner so that they are all different... We will always find some who keep their hatred all their life and eat their vengeance cold and stale, like scorpions that strike with their tail.”
- ¹⁴ J., Lacan *Encore*, op. cit, p 91 Lacan speaks “ of the one who *s’imageaillisse* from the gaze of Saint Augustine who is observing him, the little man. He is in third position, he observes. He observes the little man and, pallidus, he becomes pale, from observing, suspended to the nipple, the conlactaneum suum.”
T.N. : « S’imageaillisse » is a port-manteau made up of « image » and « jaillir » which means « spurt ». The French « jalouissance » is made up of « jalousie » and « jouissance ».
- ¹⁵ J. Lacan, Séminaire VII, *L’Éthique* , Seuil, 1986, p 167. Cf also Jacques-Alain Miller’s course : *L’extimité* 1985-1986: the lessons of 27 November and 4 December in which J-A Miller puts forward the thesis that hatred is the hatred of the particular way in which the Other finds his jouissance, a hatred that has then as its target the real in the Other. « The constant in this affair is that the Other gets out of you an undue part of *jouissance*. »
- ¹⁶ T.N. : « *Dissemblable* » is the négation of the adjective *semblable*, thus introducing in this constructed pun *ditsemblable*, the « said », the “dit”.
- ¹⁷ S. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*.
- ¹⁸ S. Freud, *Instincts and their Vicissitudes*, « When the object is source of the feeling of displeasure we feel repulsion and hate for it »
- ¹⁹ S. Freud, « the Splitting of the Ego in the process of Defense ».
- ²⁰ J., Lacan, Séminaire I *Les écrits techniques de Freud* , Seuil, 1975, p. 297-298, and Séminaire XX, op. cit, p. 110.
- ²¹ J. Lacan, Séminaire *Les formations de l’inconscient*, Seuil, Paris, p 505.
- ²² S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (1923) « ...hatred is not only, with unexpected regularity, the companion of love (ambivalence), not only its frequent precursor in human relations, but also under all kinds of conditions hatred is transformed into love and love into hatred ».
- ²³ J. Lacan, *Encore* , op. cit, p 84.

TN : A portmanteau formed with « haine » (hate) and « enamoration ». In French, as in English, the form « enamoration » is not attested, although we have « enamouré » or « enamouement » in French, and « enamored » or « enamoredness » in English.

²⁴ TN : « ...car cet Autre lui paraît jouir de ce qui lui fait défaut »

²⁵ Catherine Clément, « La haine de soi », in *La Haine, Magazine Littéraire*, op. cit, p 51.

²⁶ TN : « ...elle vise ce qui de l'Autre jouit »

²⁷ TN : In French, we have « le père » (the father) and « le pire » (the worst).

²⁸ Eric Laurent, « La honte et la haine de soi », in *Elucidation*, Juin 2002, p. 29.

²⁹ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XX, Encore*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 82.

On Feminine Homosexuality

Alicia Arenas

It is possible to say that Lacan's work about the Name of the Father is especially indicated when we are trying to situate feminine homosexuality, where the relationship to the father occupies a central place.

Regarding the reference to the symbolic that Lacan gives us on 1956-571, the subjective assumption of the biology implies that both sexes must situate themselves in relation to the phallic attribute, which introduces a logic of the plus and the minus: to have it, or not to have it. The sexual position that the subject identifies with has, at that moment of Lacan's teachings, a direct relationship to the signifier of the Name of the Father, as a reference to the Desire of the Mother. The implication is that it is necessary for both sexes to pass by virility and its equivalences.

From this perspective, the case *princeps* of The Homosexual Young Woman² is conceptualized by Lacan as a woman with an imaginary identification with the father because of the deception he causes her when he "fails" to accomplish the symbolic promise of giving her a child/phallus.

The young woman's frustration provokes a step back on her way to symbolization which leads her to an imaginary defiance toward the father, expressed by the choice of an homosexual object.

With the development of object "a"³, Lacan creates an heterogeneous field of sexual *jouissance* and a type of lack separated from the phallic dialectics, which he situates on the Real.

In Seminar X, he illustrates the dimensions of acting out and *passage a l'acte* with the scene of the encounter of the Homosexual Young Woman and her girl friend with the angry look of the father. Besides the pure phallic identification, this dynamics shows how the sexual choice of the young woman is also trying to demonstrate to the father how a woman points out to a man, the place of the object cause of desire she wishes to occupy for him, which implies a demand of love to the father.

It is necessary to emphasize Lacan's statement regarding to the lack of fetishism in relation to the phallic organ in feminine homosexuality, which, on the contrary, he situates as present in masculine homosexuality.

For Lacan, the homosexual woman doesn't completely remove herself her position in sexuation because it is from femininity that she acts, even when she renounces to the incestuous object and, identifying with it, chooses someone with her own sex as a partner⁴.

The late Lacan's formalization of the sexuation formulas⁵ establishes

the feminine position as beyond the phallus. A woman may occupy the place of the object of the masculine fantasy, but when it has to do with her own subjectivity, The/ Woman will have the alternative of identifying with the phallus, hiding her privation to situate herself on the side of having, or, assuming it as a hole in the field of the Real. Paradoxically, it would be "fabricating a being with the nothing"⁶, when in relation with the S (A/).

The fact that these different positions can live together in the same woman, allows us to understand what Lacan says related to the possibility of understanding femininity from the different ways feminine homosexuality presents itself.

With the notion of the "pluralization" of the Name of the Father on 19637, Lacan establishes that other signifiers may occupy the place of the Name of the Father in an equivalent way. In Seminars RSI (1974-75), and *Le Sinthome* (1975-76), this same perspective allows us to think on the idea of the *supleance* of the Name of the Father, that is, singular symptomatic ways each one may find to be in the world without being devastated by his own *jouissance*. It also implies the notion of a generalized foreclosure of the Name of the Father.

In this sense, the feminine side of the sexuation formulas extends to be generalized to the speaking being as such, as the Other would only be present as A/. This is the perspective of the "There is no

sexual relationship” between the subject and the Other, which points out precisely that there is only the *jouissance* of the symptom.

This statement also underlines that there is not a relation within the signifying chain between S1 and S2. It leaves the S1 alone, without the Other, as different ways of *jouissance* which are not organized on a discourse, but with the possibility of establishing a link by way of the different forms of *suppleance*.

From this point of view, how do we situate the different groups whose politics accomplished the possibility that sexual choices were legally accepted as a lifestyle?.

In 1973, the homosexual community organized as a political minority obtains from the American Psychiatric Association the withdrawal of homosexuality from the DSM. Two years later, the American Psychological Association declares that homosexuality is not a disorder.

In 1994, that same association establishes that homosexuality is not a choice. It is not a mental illness or social deprecation, but the expression of love and sexuality of a minority. The intent of a psychotherapist of changing the sexual orientation of a patient, or of referring a patient to an institution with this type of practices will be considered unethical.

The concept of generalized foreclosure of the Name of the Father offers to each one the possibility of installing him or herself in the world from the perspective of “doing with” his *jouissance* and “fabricating a being” where there is nothing. A way of understanding Lacan’s idea of “doing without” the father and at the same time “using it” as a tool.

The new forms of family established by stable couples of lesbians deciding to adopt children or having them by natural or artificial insemination show a type of link and family organization where sometimes it is excluded the notion of fatherhood from the very first moment, the official birth certificate of the child. The reason for that is that there are two declared mothers where none of them can legally occupy the place designated for the name of the father. The place simply stays empty. Could it be a way of doing without the father while using it, as it leads to a way of registration within the social Other?

If Lacan says that each one has to find his own way of link to the Other, and he also says it is of the order of the unclassifiable, then, it will not be always possible to coincide with the registrations the Other offers. However, it is also true that it would be insufficient to take the signifiers of the Other to give oneself a being. To the maximum, they would be able to allow an installation on the side of having.

The homosexual community may not have today the same worries as yesterday, which is fundamental. However, there isn’t any guarantee with respect to each one’s *jouissance* that comes from the Other.

Feminine homosexuality, as with other forms of sexual *jouissance*, have today different expressions. It doesn’t seem possible to think it without the phallus, or, without the fantasy, or, without the symptomatic *suppleance*, neither out of the civilization where it belongs, which will develop its own ways of organizing the Real with more or less success, a Real that pushes to the organization of discourses, *semblants*, but which at the same time cannot help leaving the “alive” of the *jouissance* out of the laws of the discourse.

To manage with singularity in an original way for each case, doesn’t go well with political flags, because it requires to point out to the “not all x”.

To elect feminine homosexuality today as a way of representation before the world, doesn’t exclude the job of constructing the particular field of the own ex-sistence respect to the Other.

Footnotes

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- 2 Freud. S. The Psychogenesis of a case of Homosexuality in a Woman. The Standard Edition of the complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London. Hogarth Press. 1955 (1920)
- 3 Lacan. J. Le Seminaire, Livre X. L’Angoisse. Edit. Seuil. 2004.
- 4 Lacan, J. Guiding Remarks for a Convention on Female Sexuality. Ecris. W.W. Norton and Co. NY. 2006.
- 5 Lacan. J. Psicoanálisis, Radiofonía y Televisión. Edit. Anagrama. Barcelona 1977.
- 6 Miller. J.A. De Mujeres y Semblantes. Pg.88. Cuadernos del Pasador 1. Buenos Aires 1994
- 7 Lacan, J. Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar. In Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment. New York: Norton, 1990.

Hysteria and Name-of-the-Father

Lucia D'Angelo

1. Our times have shaken the clinic of hysteria. The decadence of both the father and the ideals impinge on neurosis as well as on their very organization. Thus, we find old symptoms transformed in new contexts which, at the same time, change the very praxis of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis cannot remain indifferent to the consequences of the disavowal of hysteria or agree to its disappearance from clinical classifications¹. It can and therefore it *must* renew the Freudian clinic in the present-day context, renew the points of the newer references concerning paternal decadence and, mostly, update the parameters for interpretation of hysteria, whose limits prove to be those of its efficacy. According to Freud, it was the neurotic who invented the Father, and the Freudian hysteric paid him the most faithful homage by means of love. At the same time, the hysterical symptom became the gate to structural disorder of the body's *jouissance* under the influence of language, and deducted the subject's three fundamental identifications that will condition his position in sexuality. The renewal of the clinic of hysteria and the tools to approach it will not only reassert its citizenship in clinical classifications but will also provide an answer to another question. This question concerns what it is that makes body events and words to hold beyond beyond the Father, beyond the Œdipus and the identifications. This requires to bear in mind that nowadays, the love for the father as a horizon is no longer the good orientation in the cure of hysteria. Thus, the symptom is to be conceived as founded on the effectiveness of interpretation in analytical practice rather than on the Father as a conceptual operator.²

2. From the first analyses of hysteria and even before the conceptualization of the Œdipus complex³, we can verify, together with Freud, that the failure of repression and its relationship to *jouissance* are a preliminary condition of symptom formation in the paternal horizon. Likewise, human ailments known as *neurosis* should be referred to the multiple modes of failure of these processes of reshaping of the partial sexual drives, of which hysteria is paradigmatic: «Psychoanalysis never hides that that which is psychic relies on what is organic, even though it may achieve its work until this basis and not beyond⁴. [...] It is that fact which in connection to hysteria I have provisionally named *somatic solicitation of organs*»⁵.

Thus, psychoanalysis initially concentrated on hysteria as a disease of truth and as rejection of the body. This is a double rejection: of the subject's body as well as of the Other's. On one side, the body of knowledge, the epistemic body; on the other side, the libidinal body. One of them is the body regulated by pleasure, the other is the non-regulated body of *jouissance*, which introduces repression as rejection of truth and its consequences⁶.

In this sense, if we admit the new paradigms of *jouissance* in the later part of Lacan's teaching, the hysterical symptom is a particular mode of *jouissance*, that is, the incarnation of events occurring in the body traumatized by the word.

On one side, the neurotic side, the subject's partner is the real as that which is unbearable. In the case of hysteria this presentifies itself mainly in the body, as in conversion hysteria, less often seen in our times, yet transformed into new figures offered by science, biology, esthetics.

On the other side, the fundamental partner in hysteria is the Father. Experience shows that the partner-symptom of the subject is a weaving of these two questions. We approach the hysteric symptom starting from those new figures, but we always do so when the other who is the fundamental partner does not recognize desire.

From the angle of the hysteric's phantasm, the partner is object *a*, a prevailing object of the body that constitutes symptom and carries with it the subject's *jouissance*. The lack of sexual proportion translates at the very locus where the essential partner of the subject, object *a*, is *surplus jouissance*.

3. Lacan follows Freud's footsteps in his own way, while he renews at the same time the clinical experience of hysteria. Quite early in his teaching he remarked the poverty of the Œdipal interpretation in relation to hysteria. In the fifties, the introduction of the mortal narcissistic tear in the Œdipal relation deconstructs the Freudian triangulation and adds a fourth term.

It is however only towards the end of the seventies that Lacan argues against the Freudian interpretation of hysteria and emphasizes «the strictly useless nature of the Œdipus complex»⁷. Lacan stresses that the experience of the hysteric should have been a better guide for Freud than the Œdipus complex, and proposes to reconsider, at the level of analysis itself, what is the knowledge missing, *so that this knowledge might be questioned in the place of the truth.*⁸

Indeed, the invention of the Master signifier (S1) allows to separate the Master signifier and the place of the Father. Lacan re-examines the dialectic of the Master and the slave as separation from the Master signifier, the body and the Other. Thereafter, there will be a cleavage between the living and the body. With this Lacan pays homage to the hysteric for sustaining a discourse in which Lacan studies the relationships between the Master and the hysteric in terms of permutation of places rather than in terms of a dialectic. The hysteric's discourse questions the Master discourse of the idealized father as castrated Master.⁹

Present-day exploration of hysteria brings up other figures and other functions far removed from Freudian interpretation. Thus, the hysteric reveals that in its relation to the Master, beyond the father, the father is castrated and obtains love from that place. Love becomes a function of paternal jouissance outside any legality, which does not legitimize jouissance as One. To the hysteric subject the father is nothing but a title and all that love the subject feels towards the father is addressed to a name rather than to a man. The hysteric no longer makes the man but rather pushes him into his ramparts, she pushes him to play the man, she *pushes him to crime.*¹⁰

This epistemic renewal implies a renewal at the level of analytic practice, insofar as it opens for the hysteric the possibility to attain jouissance as such. The hysteric's discourse is the hysteric's response, it is her moral position regarding jouissance. She incarnates the Master's jouissance, by her jouissance in being deprived.¹¹

4. At these times of the Other that does not exist, the influence of the progress of civilization on the old hysteric symptom shows that a deep rearrangement is required in the clinic of the phallus and of phallic jouissance. Rather than the father of the phallic sense, a father-to-be-used must be proposed. The reason for this lies in that the avatars of libido are not exclusively dependent on the conceptual operators Father and phallus.

The new clinical orientation regarding hysteria shows that we can do without the father on condition that we make use of it. We may do without the father as a warrant of meaning provided that we consider the particular use that the subject makes of his modality of jouissance. The hysteric will be able to find there, in her body, the locus of the traumatic rise of jouissance.

Thus, the effective interpretation in hysteria is the one responding to the metaphor but it also evokes jouissance in the body, it causes it to *resound.*¹² The interpretation will have been a true interpretation if it succeeded in following the displacement of this surplus jouissance.

The analytic act, insofar as it is founded on interpretation and its consequences, translates into *resonance* by the impact on the symptom. It will be possible to know whether the interpretation was an act only at the end, at the time of separation between the subject and the Other. The experience of the pass in hysteric subjects allows to evaluate these results. Bearing in mind that in present-day practice on hysteria, the direction of the cure aims to the production of a Master signifier rather than to the search for one.

The update on the clinics of hysteria consists in deciphering events in the body and the words of the hysteric subject, in order to know how to find the effective analytic interpretation, one that may orient the subject in his sexual position, beyond the Father as structural operator.

Translation : Liliana Singer

Footnotes

- 1 Laurent, E.: «Los nuevos síntomas y los otros». Conferencia dictada en Roma el 30 de mayo de 1997, en revista «El Caldero de la Escuela», n° 57, Bs.As., 1997, p. 52
- 2 Laurent, E.: op.cit., p. 54
- 3 Freud, S.: «La perturbación psicógena de la visión según el psicoanálisis» (1910), Amorrortu, Buenos Aires, 1975, T.XI, p. 204.
- 4 Freud, S.: op.cit. 215.
- 5 Freud, S.: op.cit. 216.
- 6 Miller, J.-A.: Biologie lacanienne et événement de corps », en La cause freudienne, Revue de psychanalyse, Paris, 2000, n°44, p.7.
- 7 Lacan, J.: El Reverso del Psicoanálisis (1969-70), El Seminario, Libro XVII, Editorial Paidós, Buenos Aires, 1992, p. 104.
- 8 Lacan, J.: op.cit., p. 106
- 9 Laurent, E.: «Sorpresas y desarreglos», en El Caldero de la Escuela, n° 82, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 9.
- 10 Laurent, E. : op. cit., p. 11
- 11 Laurent, E.: op.cit. p.18.
- 12 Laurent, E.: «El reverso del síntoma histérico», en El Caldero de la Escuela, n° 77, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 9.

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IDENTIFICATION • R. SELDES
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INTERPRETATION • H. TIZIO
INVENTION • **D. MILLER**

The Father and Invention

Dominique Miller

The Father and invention. Does a better-matched couple exist? Believers think there is no better. They take God-the-Father to be the greatest inventor of all time. The harmony and complexity of Nature and Mankind are due to him. According to the Judeo-Christian morality that has structured the Western World, it is thanks to this Father that men are able to live together, not simply because they wait to be worthy of heaven, but above all because this Father regulates *jouissance* by raising it to the dignity of love. The faith of the One alone is reflected in the love for the neighbour. The Father is alleged to have invented love and recognition by inventing norms, a conformity, which one only has to respect in order to get on well together... and attain Nirvana. In heaven, not on earth. Thus, in founding a utopia, the Father would have protected *jouissance* from its hateful and destructive deviations. Civilisation has not failed to lean on religion so that it might believe in a founding Father of the peaceful and well-adapted social bond.

But, since physics, genetics and biology started demonstrating that soon nothing more than the invention of the soul will be attributed to God, the Father has appeared less powerful. His foundations were undermined.

Especially given that science had a weighty ally. Freud and his invention of the unconscious definitively opened the breach. Neuroses, psychoses and perversions were henceforth part of humanity. Sexual desire was entering on the scene, demonstrating its demands and ability to impose itself where it was not authorised. One could only conclude that alongside the soul, an irrepressible, senseless, unspeakable and lawless Being was imposing itself in man. Freud was not forgiven for making the Father fall from his pedestal. His thesis of the conflict between desire and duty was not appreciated. He persisted and denounced the malaise in civilisation. He went so far as to question the future of the illusion that religion was now showing itself to be.

Freud's detractors however, defenders of the 'Unian' Father's existence [*l'existence du Père « unien »*], did not see to what extent Freud himself was holding on to this Father. Didn't Freud summon up the myth of Oedipus to demonstrate that, even if the Father's murder was inscribed in man, the Father kept the upper hand by imposing himself as a fundamental Identification, and by feeding the son's guilt and the anxiety of his revenge? Didn't he insist on defining the Father's law and norms as the only viable regulation of desire for the subject? In sum, wasn't the Freudian Father similar to the Father of a believer? Who, moreover, is lodged in the heart of man's mental life! Freud turned the Father into a necessity of psychic structure. The founding Father of the unconscious: what more could you ask!

It wasn't the mothers who would rise up against such conclusions. They too held on to the Father. Today, a little less so. They preferred instead – sometimes against their will – to designate a father, knowing that the child's bond with the father required a mediator that was tribal, symbolic and now, scientific. In fact, in this reflection on the Father and invention, the real inventor seems to have been the mother herself. It is the mothers who constitute the fathers. And they appeal to the father for the same reasons as the believers: so that a superior law may regulate their *jouissance*. The Father was invented for mother and child to be separated, so that their respective *jouissance* may be untangled and diverge. Moreover, it can be seen to what extent this is an artificial device, even though paternity was considered to be an essential fact.

This is not the least of the surprises: between Father and invention, where is the invention? The invention is the Father. This is precisely what was smouldering away behind all these beliefs, and which scientific inventions have brought up to date: it's not God that invented religion, it's religion that invented God! Men invented the Father because they needed to be founded, to found their existence

and their *raison d'être*. The sons needed a name, and it was the Father's. This Father is of the order of semblance, that mixture of fiction and symbol. This semblance was needed to guarantee a basis for oneself, a pillar and, furthermore, a direction, the orientation of desires. Up until he appeared for what he is: a belief.

Another psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, concluded definitively that the Father is an invention: beings come to strike a balance with the Father or without the Father. Either subjects make themselves the son of a Father, or they invent another causality. The latter line up on the side of psychosis. Neurotics believe, psychotics are delusional. This is what led Lacan to say that neurotics are believers. Revealing the invention of the father reduced the gap between mad and normal. There is more than just the sacrosanct Name-of-the-Father for finding a balance between one's *jouissance* and language. Other names of the father can play this role. It is the fact of not erring that counts. Everyone has to make oneself the dupe of a father of one's own invention. To each their own invention, their own symptom. Rimbaud, Cantor, Joyce, Rousseau, Pollock, Van Gogh: Lacan did not hold back from multiplying the illustrious examples to convince of the force of subjective invention. On this occasion, he himself became the inventor, designating these symptoms beyond the Name-of-the-Father as 'sinthomes'.

But what do you do when you have an inventor-father who does not recognise you? It is rather frequent for artist, researcher or inventor fathers to set aside their entire libido for their work, and spare little love or interest for their offspring. Nathaniel Kahn is one of these children. He suffered from it. Is his solution a rare one? He had to pass by way of a film on his father, Louis Kahn, so as to get himself recognised, post-mortem, as his son. By way of a piece of work therefore, on his father-inventor who did not recognise him as his invention. This Nathaniel Kahn demonstrates the necessity of finding a father in order to exist. In order to find him, he has invented himself this monument that he has constructed: *my father, Louis Kahn*. He makes himself the architect of the architect. Thus, Nathaniel Kahn's film '*My Architect: A Son's Journey*' (*my italics*) is there to represent him, the son. It seems to be saying to this dead father: 'father, can't you see the oeuvre I am?' He substitutes for his blind father a worldwide public of spectators, to whom he shows his father's architectural oeuvre, and, implicitly, his other creations, his legitimate daughter and his two other illegitimate children, one of whom is Nathaniel. He is hoping to thereby legitimise himself, definitively granting himself his father's name. He sees this oeuvre as imposing, and shows it as such, multiplying the shots of the father's edifices, choosing angles from which the perspective is the most impressive, whose height is such that the summits of these monuments seem to touch the sky, whose openings blind the spectator with the light that passes through them. This son puts up a divine statue to this father who ignored him. He would like to turn him into a myth to assure himself of his eternity, and to finally possess him. Turning one's father into a legend is the surest way of reducing his factitiousness.

A fine illustration of the fact that the father is itself a necessary invention for edifying the son's existence. He thought that the only way to be his son was to show the proof of his artistic identity. Like father, like son, one might say of him. Here is one way of demonstrating that the paternal foundation is a symptomatic foundation. For the son finds the paternal path there where the father has let him drop, given him over to his position of rebus. An illegitimate son, a son who used to go and visit him secretly late at night, a son whose 'life had to take place in a secluded space,' Nathaniel Kahn took his revenge by bringing the father's fault into the light of day. But, he did so by taking the detour of creation rather than by condemning him publicly as is sometimes done these days. This recourse to invention seals a pact between the subject and his condition of rebus. He makes use of him to serve the father's grandeur and passion for architectural art. Nathaniel Kahn has turned this cast-off that he was, a cast-off of the father's creative *jouissance* as well as that of his love life, into his cause of desire. In creating this film, he rehabilitates himself as son and his father as father.

If therefore we are so keen to invent ourselves a father, our own or another, it is because he must free us of our condition of rebus, our condition of 'miscarriage' as Lacan said. We ought not to let go of this particular semblance too hastily, for it enables us to turn this dire lot inside out like a glove and turn this cast-off that one would care to forge into the cause of our desire.

Translated by Adrian Price

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JOUISSANCE • E.SOLANO SUAREZ
JOYCE • A. LYSY-STEVENSON

Jouissance and Name-of-the-Father

Esthela Solano-Suarez

The fundamental relationship between jouissance and the Name-of-the-Father can be resumed by the expression that the Name-of-the-Father, in psychoanalysis, «is the instrument to resolve jouissance with meaning»¹.

In «*L'Étourdit*»², Lacan says that he introduced the Name-of-the-Father in his paper «A Question Preliminary to any Treatment of Psychosis», where he condenses his re-reading of the Freudian Oedipus complex in the formula of the Paternal Metaphor. Here, the Name-of-the-Father –in singular form– is the signifier that makes a metaphor of the signifier of the Mother's Desire, and substitutes it. In this way, the Name-of-the-Father operates an erasure of jouissance by means of the signifier and engenders a regulated restitution of jouissance in the form of the signification of desire. So then, this major signifier is also predominantly a metaphor of the father's presence, used here in its discursive function, in the mother's parol. Under these conditions, it is «as such, dead, mortified, by discourse»³.

In this way, the paternal metaphor brings together three sides of the Freudian theory: the myth of *Totem and Taboo* and the father as dead, the Oedipus complex, and the castration complex. The Name-of-the-Father, as a metaphorical instrument, is the signifier that, in the Other –as the place of language–, functions as a quilting point that links signifier and signified, desire and the law, the symbolic and the imaginary.

From this structuralist conception emerge two consequences. The first implies that the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father renders the Other consistent. It is the «signifier that, in the Other, as the place of the signifier, is the signifier of the Other, as the place of the law»⁴. The second consequence comes from the power of the symbolic that, in mortifying jouissance, changes it all to signifier, without any remainder.

Later, Lacan introduces S(Barred A)⁵, that we read as «the signifier of a lack in the Other», responsible for the incompleteness as well as the inconsistency of the Other. As Jacques-Alain Miller has shown, the Name-of-the-Father is no longer the signifier of the law in the place of language, but is reduced to being only a name among others that substitute for it, like a cork. This opens the way to the pluralization of the Names of the Father. Common nouns fill the place left vacant by S(Barred A). At the same time, the common noun accounts for the subject's being as already dead since it is the name that will be on his tombstone⁶. How then is the subject to be designated, not as a subject already deceased, but by that which remains alive in him? To answer that question Lacan introduces the concept of jouissance that takes the place of a being «who appears as it were at fault in the sea of common nouns»⁷. In its place is the object little *a* as the name of the subject's jouissance, «a name that would not be a metaphor. It is the name where the Father and the jouissance are included together»⁸.

In *Seminar X*, Lacan gets over the pitfall that derives from the treatment of jouissance by means of the metaphor and operates a first disjunction between Oedipus and castration⁹. Man's anxiety of castration is no longer correlated with the menace coming from the father, but has to do with the detumescence of the organ. Henceforth the object will no longer be correlated with the law and with desire, but with an object whose status is prior to the law and its phallic signification. J.-A. Miller puts it this way: «Compared to this object which is the object of desire law, the object organ, let's say the little *a*, itself, is not determined by the taboo (...) but by the pure and simple separation»¹⁰. So, by means of anxiety Lacan elaborates the function of the object little *a*, and defines the subject's singular jouissance, that escapes the universalizing operation of the father.

Lacan will go one step further a year later, pulverizing the unique Name-of-the-Father to introduce the plurality of the Names of the Father. This passage carries with it a relativization of the Name-of-

the-Father but also touches on its status and its function. If the Name-of-the-Father is written as a function NP(x), there is, in each case, the matter of knowing what takes the place of the variable in order to complete the function. Hence the multiplicity. Developing this elaboration, Lacan will invent the category of the master-signifier as S_1 , capable of supporting the function. This function of master-signifier allows Lacan to definitively separate the Oedipus myth from castration.

In *Seminar XVII*, Oedipus complex and *Totem and Taboo* are conceived as myths that try to account for the loss of jouissance. This loss, naturally introduced by the repetition of S_1 , produces little *a*, the object of *added enjoyment* [*plus-de-jouir*], as pure entropy. Jouissance is no longer a forbidden zone accessible only by transgression, but a loss that results from the operation of the signifier on the body. We can only enjoy [jouir] little bits of jouissance salvaged in the form of the object little *a*.

The father of the Oedipus complex is no longer the agent of castration, but rather the veil that makes believe in the forbidden jouissance. The murder of the Father of *Totem and Taboo* covers up jouissance as impossible. Separated from the myth, castration becomes «the real operation introduced by the incidence of the signifier what ever it may be, in the relation to sex. And it goes without saying that it determines the father as being this impossible real that we have mentioned»¹¹.

Lacan will then choose the path of logic to account for the sexual real in the *speaking-being* [*parlêtre*]. Logic permits the demonstration of the point of impossible as real. The real at stake in psychoanalysis is specified as the impossible writing of the sexual relation. The phallus, as big phi, here takes on the value of «the function that substitutes for the sexual relation»¹². In this way, Lacan constructs the logic of sexualization, according to the mode of inscription of sexual beings, in the place of the argument of the function.

On one side, the masculine side, he puts the One that excludes itself from the function by saying no to the phallic function. It is in the existence of the One that denies the function that Lacan identifies the function of the father¹³. With this limit on the function, can then appear the possible of the operation of castration that dominates the set of All those who are inscribed as all-man [tout-homme]. Here, jouissance is inscribed in the phallic function. In this logic of the One and the all, «is resumed everything having to do with the Oedipus complex»¹⁴. On the other hand, on the feminine side, not all the jouissance is subjected to the function of castration. As a result, there is no limit attributed by the exception. That opens onto the unlimited series that permits no universality. Feminine jouissance is therefore inscribed in a logic beyond the Oedipus complex. Women have a relation to the phallus, but also have a relation to S(Barred A) as Other radically Other¹⁵. In that women's' jouissance has a relation with the hole in the symbolic, it finds a substitute [suppléance] in love.

Along the same line, feminine jouissance exploits love as the substitute for the sexual relation that does not exist, as the impossible union of the One with the Other, there where phallic jouissance admits its failure at getting beyond the autistic One of jouissance.

This logic which renders feminine sexuality its place beyond the Father, and from there, radically distinguishes it from male coordinates, only accentuates «the no-hope of a relation between the sexes»¹⁶.

The logic of the non-relation will lead Lacan to conceive the tie between the symbolic –parol–, the imaginary as it relates to the consistency of the body, and the real that exists apart from the other two, using the Borromean knot. The three registers, presented as homogeneous, are knotted together, but if one of the three is undone, the others are freed. This is the Borromean property. At first, Lacan will assert that the symbolic, the imaginary and the real are the names of the father, «the first words in that they name something»¹⁷. So, there can be an infinite number of names of the father, just as there can be an infinite number of ring of strings tied into the Borromean knot, but «in as much as they are knotted, everything depends on one, on one as a hole, it communicates its consistency to all the others»¹⁸. In this way, the Name-of-the-Father is not the privilege of a single consistency. One consistency makes the Name-of-the-Father function using the four consistencies tied together in the Borromean knot, distinguishing them by a nomination. The function of nomination is supported by the fourth ring of

string; «nomination is a quarter element»¹⁹, says Lacan. From that moment on, we see the appearance of a redefinition of the function of the Name-of-the-Father «that is to give a name to things, with all the consequences that that carries, up to and including for enjoyment [jouir]²⁰ notably»²¹. The act of nomination specific to the function of the father «is not communication. It is there that talk becomes tied to something real»²². Through nomination, the Name-of-the-Father is an instrument that creates a tie, not between One and the Other, but between «meaning and the real» and in so doing, «it associates the symbolic and the real»²³. Under these conditions, added-enjoyment [plus-de-jouir], understood as the core of jouissance that can be elaborated on, is a version of the father²⁴ [père-version], a consequence of nomination.

From this perspective, the analytical operation as it can be seen from Lacan's last teaching, includes a use of the function of nomination with the aim of deciphering. To use the function of nomination to decipher the name of jouissance included in the symptom, even the subject's singular version of the father [père-version], is that not the good way of using the Name-of-the-Father on the condition of doing without believing in it?

Footnotes

- ¹ J.-A. Miller, " Annexes, Notice de fil en aiguille ", J. Lacan, *Le séminaire Livre XXIII, Le sinthome*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2005, p. 240.
- ² J. Lacan, " L'étourdit ", *Autres écrits*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2001, p. 458.
- ³ J.-A. Miller, *Comentario del Seminario inexistente*, Manantial, 1992, p. 22.
- ⁴ J. Lacan, " D'une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose ", *Ecrits*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1966, p. 583.
- ⁵ J. Lacan, " Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir ", *Ecrits*, op. cit., p. 818.
- ⁶ J.-A. Miller, *Comentario del seminario inexistente*, op. cit. p. 29.
- ⁷ J. Lacan, " Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir ", op. cit., p. 819.
- ⁸ J.-A. Miller, " L'orientation lacanienne ", class of December 4, 1991, unpublished.
- ⁹ Here, we refer to J.-A. Miller's commentary: " Introduction à la lecture du Séminaire de L'angoisse de Jacques Lacan ", *La Cause freudienne*, n°58, pp. 93-97.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- ¹¹ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1991, p. 149.
- ¹² J. Lacan, " L'étourdit ", op. cit., p. 458.
- ¹³ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre XX, Encore*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1975, p. 74
- ¹⁴ J. Lacan, " L'étourdit ", op. cit., p. 458
- ¹⁵ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre XX*, op. cit., p. 75.
- ¹⁶ J.-A. Miller, " Notice de fil en aiguille ", op. cit., p. 240.
- ¹⁷ J. Lacan, " RSI ", *Ornicar ?*, n°5, lesson of March 11, 1975, p. 17
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, lesson of April 15, 1975, p. 54.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, lesson of May 13, 1975, p. 61
- ²⁰ Lacan nominalizes the infinitive form of the verbe jouir, saying; «jusqu'au jouir notamment» where he could have made use of the noun jouissance. Lacan's choice seems to question the possibility, the potentiality, even the existence of jouissance. For the sole sake of readability, «enjoyment» is used here. [NT]
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, lesson of Mach 11, 1975, p. 21.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- ²³ J.-A. Miller, *Pièces détachées*, class of November 17, 2004, unpublished
- ²⁴ Here Lacan plays on the word perversion as a version of the father, or the father's version; père-version, and the notion of desire as always having something perverse about it. [NT]

Joyce and the Name-of-the-Father

Anne Lysy

Could James Joyce have encountered Jacques Lacan? Might he have been able to turn his attention away from his own singularity for a moment in order to discover those *Écrits* that claim to be ‘not-for-reading’? Might he have been able to overcome his aversion to psychoanalysis and hear the one who reads him and ordains him as the incarnation of the *sinthome*, for ‘having gone straight to the best of what may be expected of psychoanalysis at its end’, and this without recourse to analysis? We may wonder; we shall never know.

For his part, Lacan met Joyce both in *praesentia* and through his texts. In his youth, he moved in the circles of Adrienne Monnier, and there attended a reading from *Ulysses* in 1921, prior to its highly controversial publication.¹ Joyce was present. He had left Dublin in 1904, and after a turbulent voyage across Europe and a succession of moves worthy of his childhood ups and downs as a result of his father’s debts and disappointments, he had reached Paris in 1920, and would remain there until 1939, two years prior to his death in Zurich. He had already written a great deal, but published little, and with great difficulty – *Dubliners*, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* – he only had a few friends and rare patrons. Lacan would encounter him again fifty odd years later, on 16 June – a symbolic date since *Ulysses* – : at the invitation of Jacques Aubert, he opened the 1975 International Joyce Symposium in front of a stunned audience of specialists with his text, ‘Joyce le symptôme.’ Quite a task! Having failed to please this auditorium, this text would sway the direction of his Seminar: instead of pursuing *RSI* with 4,5,6, he entitled it, *Le Sinthome*. There, he gives a new interpretation of Joyce, he even addresses a posthumous interpretation to Joyce: ‘I’m giving to Joyce, in formulating this title, ‘Joyce the symptom’, nothing less than his proper name, the one I believe he would have recognised himself in, within the dimension of naming.’² This interpretation is in an utterly different vein from the one that since his death has been invading, in great volume, the university libraries and internet sites – different from the one Joyce was wishing for when in response to someone who was asking him why he wrote in such an obscure way, he replied, ‘to keep the critics busy for three hundred years,’ ‘the only way of insuring one’s immortality.’ Lacan gives another fate to the unreadable. He does not aim at explanation and an infinite commentary of enigmas, but he designates a function. He takes seriously the fact that Joyce, ‘wanted to be someone whose name, precisely the name, would survive him forever.’³ Was this merely a search for fame? One anecdote suggests that another dimension is in play: Joyce once asked a young painter who wanted to do his portrait, ‘do you wish to paint me or my name?’⁴ Joyce wanted to be famous from the start, certainly, even before publishing anything he begged his brother Stanislaus to send his ‘Epiphanies’ to libraries throughout the world were he to die. These short texts of a few lines, somewhat trivial, were gathered together by Joyce as the product of a revelation, the matrix of his artistic mission. He wanted to be *the* artist, and his first finished work, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, depicts the birth of this vocation in five acts. Such simple words that nevertheless sound so strange (kiss, suck...), letters that concern him, proper names that trace the limit beyond which there is nothing: a host of experiences for the young Stephen Dedalus that bear witness to the questioning that Joyce would never stop pursuing, to the point of triturating, massacring and transforming the language itself: ‘What’s in a name?’ (*Ulysses*⁵). Stephen finishes by realising his destiny, written in his name: ‘his strange name seemed to him a prophesy [...] a prophesy of the end he had been born to serve [...] a symbol of the artist forging anew in his workshop out of the sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being.’⁶ He responds to the call, to the vocation, and leaves his country in order to ‘forge in the smithy of [his] soul the uncreated conscience of his race.’ We know the last words of the book, a prayer to the father – not to John Joyce but to the ‘artificer’ Dedalus: ‘Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in good stead.’⁷

Lacan gave a particular reading of this. It is a call in vain, because his father was inadequate; ‘his father had never been a father for him,’ he said. He mentions a ‘paternal copping out’ [*une démission paternelle*] and speaks of ‘*Verwefung de facto*.’⁸ And he proposes that, ‘it’s on account of wanting a name for himself that Joyce made the compensation for the paternal shortcoming [*la carence paternelle*].’⁹ These terms can only make our clinician’s ears ring, well-versed as they are in the classical Lacanian doctrine of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. So does Lacan consider what in his Seminar he sometimes calls ‘the Joyce case’ to be a case of psychosis? And does he thereby give in to the banal psycho-biographical explanation that he had nevertheless always condemned as boorishness?¹⁰ Straying into an endless discussion on whether or not Joyce was psychotic seems to me to be not only sterile, but also erroneous. Not only would this do violence to the delicacy with which Lacan, step by step, raises the question ‘was Joyce mad?’¹¹, but above all it would efface the subversion he effects at the same time as he poses it. ‘At one point is one mad’, in fact? If man is a trinitarian composite of the dimensions R, S, I, and their knotting is never anything but an artifice, in other words, if the knot is only worth something because it presupposes an un-knotting at the beginning, then, ‘being mad is not a privilege.’¹² From this point on, Lacan reads the Joyce case as a ‘a way of supplementing an un-knotting of the knot.’¹³ There where the knot is coming undone, something enables it to continue to hold together or restore the bond. This is the function of the *sinthome*, a new way of naming what is in question with the Name-of-the-Father [*appeler ce qu’il en est du Nom-du-père*], the function of the Father who names – that is to say, who lays down a bridge between Symbolic and Real.

In his Seminar, Lacan advances into his construction bit by bit, tentatively, meandering, both using Joyce to clarify himself and at the same time clarifying Joyce. It is an arduous undertaking, he breaks his teeth over Joyce, he gets tangled in his knots. He touches on different aspects of Joyce’s writing as being the consequence of a failing of the knot – the epiphanies and the great number of riddles – and invents the *ego*-function of his writing that makes up for the falling away of his body, legible notably in the episode from *Portrait of the Artist...*, which thanks to Lacan has since become famous, concerning the beating. Therefore, according to Lacan, Joyce wanted a name for himself, as a writer, and made himself a body through his writing. It still needs to be said what his art is characterised by, what his work as an ‘artificer’ was. Joyce’s privilege, accorded him by Lacan, is not to be mad. This privilege is one of showing what constitutes each subject’s relationship to language and raising it to the dignity of an oeuvre that alters literature. For Lacan, in 1975, language does not appease at the beginning, it ravages. The speaking being is traumatised by it. More often than not, he does not even realise that language is a parasite for him, especially if he is protected by the operation of the Name-of-the-Father that tempers its effects. Joyce ‘gives us a little notion’ of this, says Lacan.¹⁴ ‘Something, at the place of speech, was increasingly imposed upon him’¹⁵; as with Lacan’s patient who suffers from ‘imposed words’ and says of himself that he is a ‘transmitting telepath’¹⁶; as with Lucia, whose gift of ‘second sight’ is admired by the writer, a gift which he finds moreover in his own works. Something is accentuated ‘in the [...] continuous progress that his art constituted’ and culminates in *Finnegans Wake* where, ‘he ends up dissolving language itself, as Philippe Sollers has aptly remarked.’¹⁷ It is through writing that speech gets decomposed, but, says Lacan almost in passing, it is a ‘deformation regarding which there remains an ambiguity when it comes to knowing whether it’s a question of freeing oneself from the parasite of language [...] or on the contrary of letting oneself be invaded by the properties of an essentially phonematic order of speech, by the polyphony of speech.’¹⁸

Ellmann tells us that after *Ulysses*, the book of one day, Joyce wanted to write a night book.¹⁹ This is how he sometimes justifies not being able to use words in their ordinary relations and connections. He invents a technique, ‘working in layers’²⁰, which produces infinite multilingual word-play and turns the text into a fabric of puns. Begun in 1923, initially titled *Work in Progress*, the book utterly absorbed him. For sixteen years. It was, in his own words, ‘a greater reality than reality itself.’ It was very quickly dismissed for its obscure and unreadable character.

Joyce was deeply wounded by the criticisms but persisted, in accordance with Blake’s idea that, ‘if the fool would persist in his folly he would become wise.’²¹ He objects that, ‘if someone does not understand a passage, he only has to read it out loud’; that ‘it’s pure music,’ or even that, ‘it’s just to make you laugh.’ It is a titanic piece of work however, a superhuman expenditure of energy that he proclaims as such when he says that the twenty pages of the Anna Livia Plurabelle chapter with its

three hundred and fifty names of rivers incorporated into the text cost him one thousand two-hundred hours of work!

Lacan retains above all the work of the letter. While multiplying the resonances of the words, *Finnegans Wake* cuts through the effects of meaning and truth, and subtracts itself from the decipherment of the unconscious. Joyce ‘cancels his subscription to the unconscious’²² says Lacan. His equivokes do not come from his unconscious nor do they stir the reader’s. The only thing we may latch onto is the jouissance of the one who wrote it. It is precisely here that Joyce touches on the symptom, and even ‘gives the essence of it,’²³ if the sinthome is that effect of the parasite of language in the body, the unanalysable ‘jouissance that is opaque by dint of its exclusion of meaning.’²⁴ Lacan will go even further, recognising through an act of naming to what lengths and to what degree of exception Joyce pushed his enterprise of the expansion and explosion of language with *Finnegans Wake*: Joyce does not merely ‘illustrate’, he does not simply show this relationship of the *jouissance* pulverisation of the language that marks the body, he ‘incarnates’²⁵ the sinthome, he is it. Lacan’s discernment of his proper name, ‘Joyce the Symptom’, does not simply say that he is his oeuvre, that his writing has fashioned him, but also implies, through the introduction of this characterised vocable that the symptom is, that Lacan is included in the artifice.

Translated by Adrian Price, footnotes established by the translator

Footnotes

- ¹ See Lacan, J., ‘Joyce le symptôme (I)’, in *L’âne*, 1982, issue 6, p. 3. Republished in *Joyce avec Lacan*, Paris, Navarin, coll. Bibliothèque des Analytica, 1987.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ³ Lacan, J., ‘Joyce le symptôme (I)’, *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
- ⁴ Ellmann, R., *James Joyce*, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 565.
- ⁵ See Joyce, J., *Ulysses*, The Bodley Head, London, 1937, p. 197, 198, 200, 584.
- ⁶ Joyce, J., *A Portrait of The Artist as a Young Man*, chapter 4.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, chapter 5.
- ⁸ Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII, Le sinthome*, Seuil, Paris, 2005, p. 89
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- ¹⁰ Lacan, J., ‘Homage to Marguerite Duras, on Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein,’ in *Duras on Duras*, City Lights Books, San Francisco, 1987.
- ¹¹ *Op. cit.*, *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII*, p. 77.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- ¹⁵ Modification of *Ibid.*, p. 96.
- ¹⁶ See, ‘A Lacanian Psychosis: Interview by Jaques Lacan’ in Schneiderman, Stuart (ed.) *Returning to Freud; Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of Lacan*, Yale University, 1980, p. 20 (where *paroles imposées* is translated as ‘imposed speech’) and p. 35.
- ¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII.*, p. 96.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- ¹⁹ Ellmann, R., *Op. cit.* p. 546.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 546.
- ²¹ See also *Ulysses*, *Op. cit.*, p. 173.
- ²² Lacan, J., ‘Joyce le symptôme (I)’, *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ²⁴ Lacan, J., ‘Joyce le symptôme (II)’, in *Autres écrits*, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 570.
- ²⁵ Lacan, J., ‘Joyce le symptôme (I)’, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

K like...

KARAMAZOV • A. SZULZYNGER
KNOT • P. SKRIABINE

Karamazov and the Name-of-the-Father

Anne Szulzynger-Bernole

« Love, says Lacan in *Les-non-dupes-errent*, has to do with what I isolated from the title of the Name of the Father. »¹ We will attempt to see how these two concepts are related in the last work of Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*. Indeed, my hypothesis will be that this detective novel, constructed around parricide, the crime that Freud set at the origin of civilization, is above all a story about the quest for love.

But can one love the father? When he appears in the guise of a libidinous old miser, like Fyodor Pavlovitch Karamazov who abandoned his three sons as soon as their respective mothers were dead, leaving the eldest in a servant's care and confiding the other two to distant relatives, this seems impossible. In fact, this is what the three brothers incessantly repeat all throughout the novel. So, before the court that judges Dimitri, Ivan exclaims as though it were self-evident: « Who doesn't wish their father dead ? » Another of Lacan's remarks may help us to better understand why : the Name of the Father « gets its value from² the mother's voice »³ Whereas, as we have mentioned, the mother is totally absent from the novel. Fyodor Pavlovitch's two wives die one after the other, both very shortly after having given birth to their children. Only the youngest brother, Aliocha, still has a memory of his mother, or an image rather: a beautiful, tormented face, on a night where, holding him tightly in her arms while on her knees before the icons, she implored the Virgin to protect her little four-year-old son. Does the mother's absence render the relationship between old Karamazov and his sons more difficult ?

Another element noted on by Lacan also seems important: « love is intended for the father in that he is the bearer of castration. »⁴ This is obviously not the case of the depraved old man who occupies the place of the father for the three brothers. Each of them will try therefore to « tinker » his solution in order to make up for this deficit.

The eldest, Dimitri, will try to structure himself on an identification to the libidinous father. Having become too much like him, he will no longer be able to put up with the presence of this double. Killing the father will soon become Dimitri's only solution in order to go on living, in as much as the father, not satisfied with having refused him his mother's inheritance, also has the intention of taking from him the woman he loves.

The second son, Ivan, is the only one who manages to live in the paternal dwelling. He even serves, for a while, as protection against Dimitri's parricidal furies. If, in place of the hero of a novel, it were question of a veritable subject, we would no doubt not hesitate to speak in terms of foreclosure for Ivan. He tries to supplement this with a philosophical construction, exposed in *The Legend of the Great Inquisitor*, a « poem » he dreams and tells to his brother Aliocha. In it, he stages another caricature for the father, not at all castrating, but brutally « emasculating ». Against this terrible old man, he sets the figure of Jesus, an image of infinite, but silent and evanescent, love.

There remains the last brother, the young Alexis. He too tries to give himself a father in the person of *starets* Zossime, a monk from the monastery where he has taken refuge and begun his noviciate. Zossime, revered as a saint by all the monks and by the laity who listen to his sermons, is also an incarnation of love. Yet, as failing as Ivan's Jesus, far from expiring in an odor of saintliness, Zossime leaves his spiritual son faced with his remains that rot at a disconcertingly unnatural rate and that fill the death chamber with a pestilential odor.

And still, it is love, constantly held in check, that is the capital point of the novel. For lack of the father's love, the three brothers incessantly proclaim their unflinching affection for one another. This

love, they clearly link it to a name: Karamazov, the unique inheritance from their failed father. « I am a Karamazov! » proclaims Dimitri. To which Aliocha answers immediately: « I'm like you ! »⁵ And Ivan, in turn, speaking of his « thirst for living », remarks that « it is a trait of the Karamazov's »⁶. So they all recognize each other as being marked by this fearsome signifier. If one cannot love the father, how could one not love his name?

But there is one who did not receive this name and who consequently could not claim the love of his half brothers (at least the first two) who pour scorn on him. Smerdiakov, the bastard, whose name in Russian, bears the same malodorous connotations as those it evokes in French⁷, will be the one who silently accomplishes the act that the others do not stop talking about.

In this way, none of the Karamazovs managed to do without the name of the father anymore than they did to use it. A clinical vignette illustrates that still today, a subject can attach the greatest importance to this, seeing in the bestowal of this name the only true proof of love.

This young man came to see me in a state of acute anxiety. As a posthumous child, born shortly after his father's death, he bears the name of a man he never knew. When he was two, his mother remarried a man who already had two children and had with him another son. The subject has always called this man « daddy » and considers the three other children as his brothers and sisters despite the difference in name to which, until now, he had attributed no importance.

But then, following an unhappy love affair, someone recommends he go into psychotherapy. Having heard his story, the therapist declares on the spot that all the pain comes from this difference, and calls on him to ask his « daddy » to adopt him, so that he will finally bear the same name as the rest of his siblings. He hastens to follow the advice and receives an embarrassed answer from his stepfather. As for the two elder siblings, they very vehemently oppose the project because it would reduce their part of inheritance. This refusal sets off anxiety attacks and a depressive state that bring the subject to consult me. His complaint resumes itself in a phrase: « If they don't want me to bear their name, it's that they don't love me ». I do not know if the work he is engaged in with me will help him to one day do without this name that he has been refused.

In his closing address to the XXXIII Study Days of the ECF, Jacques-Alain Miller, commenting Lacan's « witticism » that constitutes the subtitle of the future Congress of the WAP, « doing with, making use of », says that it is a matter of « doing without believing [in] it, even while using it like an instrument ». I will conclude this brief study of the Karamazovs in attempting to see how Dostoevsky himself went about doing without.

We know that Dostoevsky's own father served as a model for the character of de Fyodor Pavlovitch. The life of debauchery he led after the death of his wife, and the ill treatment he inflicted on his serfdom brought about his assassination by these same people when Dostoevsky was eighteen. The young man then adopts the attitude that he will later attribute to his heroes: lacking the father's love, he finds refuge in the love of humanity, and adheres to one of the clandestine revolutionary movements that were blossoming in the tsarist Russia of his time. For a time, he even seriously considered attempting to assassinate the tsar, so passing from an unaccomplished parricide to a dreamed of regicide. We know what follows: arrested, he hears himself condemned to death and is subjected to a mock execution before being sent to a penal colony. This terrible experience will make him the author of several masterpieces, where he incessantly explores the paths of love as it wrestles with hatred. But it is only in his last novel that he will manage to take on the tragedy that marked his youth; the murder of the unworthy father whose name he bears. Is it a coincidence that he gave his own first name, Fyodor, to the sinister father Karamazov? That brings the angelic figure incarnated by Aliocha to be called Alekseï Fyodorovitch, that is, the name and surname of Dostoevsky's youngest son, whose death in childhood greatly bereaved him.

In this way, what ever it may have cost him all through out his difficult life, Dostoevsky, if he did not manage to do without, did know how to make the name of the father the instrument that allowed him to create the work we know. Would psychoanalysis have offered him another possibility?

An analyst of the school [AE] is, by hypothesis, someone who took her analysis as far as possible, right up to « the last good story » that can be told. What does the name of the father become in this final story? A signifier, an S1, devoid of meaning because it is not linked to any S2. « To be nominated to something, that is what sticks in an order that effectively happens to substitute for the name of the father⁸ »⁹, again states Lacan. *To be nominated to*, is what confronts certain passants. AE, would that be our new Name of the Father? No, because no AE would believe in her nomination. But every AE will try, after their own style, to make it an instrument, in the path of love that Lacan indicated to us when he called into his last School « those who still loved him »...

Translated by Julia Richards

Footnotes

- ¹ LACAN J., *Les-non-dupes-errent*, unpublished, lesson of March 19, 1974.
- ² Lacan says: « se monnaye par la voix de la mère » The mother's voice is the agent or the location of the operation « se monnayer » . In French monnayer means to mint coin; to exchange for, or convert to cash. The reflexive form, *Se monnayer* : to make money from, to get paid for – or to have to pay for – (doing) something. If we understand Lacan's phrase as a metaphor, we can gloss something like; [the Name of the Father] « enters into circulation as valid currency and receives its effective exchange value from the mother's voice ».[NT]
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ LACAN J., *Le Séminaire*, L. XXIII, Paris, Seuil, 2005, p. 150.
- ⁵ DOSTOIEVSKI F.M., *Les Frères Karamazov*, Paris, pocket edition, 2004, p. 125.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 263.
- ⁷ There is merd(e) in Smerdiakov. Merde in French means shit. [NT]
- ⁸ Lacan says: « Etre nommé à quelque chose, voilà ce qui point dans un ordre qui se trouve effectivement se substituer au nom du père
- ⁹ LACAN J., *Les-non-dupes-errent*, op. cit.

Knot and Name-of-the-Father

Pierre Skriabine

21 CONSIDERATIONS ON THE STRUCTURE

1. Human experience is structured according to three categories – that of the analytic experience, extracted by Jacques Lacan under the names of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary.

2. These three registers are fundamentally heterogeneous.

3. In order to hold himself in “human reality” – that of discourses, to make this reality consist in its three dimensions, to create and maintain a social bond with his congeners, the subject needs to hold these three registers together; he must find some common denominator between them.

4. In order to make consist a “reality” which has no intrinsic existence – because it is only a veil woven with the imaginary and the symbolic used to cover the real, is nevertheless necessary for the speaking being, the subject, to protect himself from this real that escapes the signifier and the image and that is unbearable as such.

5. This protection that allows the possibility for a discourse to develop and make a bond, implies a counterpart: the limitation of enjoyment (limitless otherwise) of the primordial Thing i.e. the mother. This limitation comes from the father function becoming operative: interposition, interdiction of incest, symbolic law being put in place are due to this function.

6. The role of the paternal metaphor – substitution of the Name-of-the-Father for the Desire of the Mother, is thus to allow an access to the discourses in exchange of a loss of enjoyment. This, in Lacanian terms, is nothing else than the operation of castration, in Freudian terms.

7. In this way the Name-of-the-Father – as *Bejahung* (saying/telling yes) of the reality of castration, realises the access of the speaking being to the universe of discourses and to the protection against the real, which allows the installation of the social bond.

8. In other terms, the function of the Name-of-the-Father is to hold together Real, Symbolic and Imaginary – for every subject, one by one; to make a reality without existence consist where the social bond can nevertheless develop itself in the field of discourses.


9. The Other is failing as the subject is. There is no Other that is both complete and consistent. This is because of the very structure of the signifier which is differential and thereby excludes any absolute reference.

10. As the Other does not exist there is no ultimate guarantee: the signifier that would guarantee the Other lacks. God could not guarantee the Father. There is no Name-of-the-Father unless every subject invents and puts in place something that will take that place for him. In other words, there is no other choice than to do without (the Name-of-the-Father as guarantee that does not exist) on condition of using it (i.e. to put its function in place).

11. First conclusion: structurally, there is foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father considered as “innate” common denominator, mythical “normality” which would hold together Real, Symbolic and Imaginary thanks to a successful Borromean knotting with three. Nothing links them a priori. Generalised foreclosure: “all debilitated ones”, Lacan said – going thereby beyond the reassuring reference to the Freudian myth of the father that was invented to palliate the fundamental dissociation of the three registers R, S and I for every subject.


12. Second conclusion: the structure of human experience – not only the analytic one, is to be thought outside of a reference to the Other. It has to be thought in reference to the three categories of experience only: Real, Symbolic and Imaginary. Pressing on, Lacan showed that this structure founded on a lack, on an original defect, is topological: it is the very structure of knots. Beyond metaphor, the real of this structure is the topological real of the knots.


13. The Borromean knot with three is the figure of the lack, of what there is not: it would be the Name-of-the-Father if it existed. The Borromean knot with three – perfect solution, is always a failure. There is foreclosure of the Borromean knot as Name-of-the-Father. This is why we are interested in it. In order to make the Bo knot three elements are needed: R, S and I, disjoint two by two and topologically equivalent. Yet there are four; there is the Bo knot itself. Each of the three- R, S and I, knots the other two and makes the knot consist: each as implicit fourth bears the efficiency of the Borromean knotting. The breaking of any one of them unknots the whole.



14. There are many ways to fail the knotting and many ways to supplement this failure to make R, S and I holding together nevertheless. There are therefore many names-of-the-Father. With topology Lacan demonstrates the necessary pluralisation of the name-of-the-Father: if the Name-of-the-Father always fails, many are the names-of-the-Father to supplement it.

15. A fourth element is therefore needed to supplement the original foreclosure. In his *RSI* Seminar Lacan deploys the supplementations, the names-of-the-Father which reconstitute a Borromean knotting with four: three different types of supplementation. The symptom (S) to start with.






The last one above is a new figuration which shows in which way the fourth element – here associated with the symbolic, translates a renewal of the symbolic itself: compared to the Bo-knot with three the symbolic is here replaced by a binary, divided into (symbolic + symptom). Lacan will designate this binary as (unconscious + sinthom). This binary is Borromeanly knotted to R and to I.

16. The symptom and, more radically, the sinthom are names-of-the-Father.


17. In this figuration we find, coupled, the signifying chain (interpretable unconscious) and the sinthom (unanalysable unconscious, opaque enjoyment).

18. The name-of-the-Father reducible to the unanalysable sinthom, pure name, is the locus where the enjoyment that escapes the defile of signifiers, takes refuge. It has exactly the same function than the delusional metaphor in psychosis - attempt at curing said Freud, because it condenses the enjoyment that the symbolic does not bar any more. Contingent indeed, the delusional metaphor is a name-of-the-Father as Jacques-Alain Miller had already underlined it in 1979. The paternal metaphor is only a delusional metaphor amongst others but it is socially shared.

19. The fourth element here is nothing else but that which supplements the symbolic in its primary function i.e. nomination (which names the unspeakable real, supplementing thereby the failure of the Other). In addition to the nomination of the symbolic as symptom are added the nomination of the imaginary as inhibition and the nomination of the real as anguish. There we have three primary names-of-the-Father that Lacan delivered at the end of *RSI*. And the first figuration of the knot with four that Lacan gave in his lesson of the 14th January 1975 in *RSI* was precisely that where the real is supplemented by its nomination: the Oedipus.



20. A mode of repair totally different is deployed by Lacan in his seminar *The sinthom* : that of Joyce.



The ego, writing, the works of Joyce, is the name-of-the-Father with which Joyce supports himself in order to exist and make a name for himself. A hand-crafted mending which leaves Real and Symbolic intertwined; the epiphanies are the trace of this remainder of the mending.

21. Ready made supplementation as the Oedipus or hand-made and made-to-measure DIY in Joyce, the name-of-the-Father reconsidered in this way by Lacan at the end of his teaching and articulated within the topology of knots, opens a reformulation of our differential clinic. A task that is now ours, work in progress...

L like...

LAW • F VITALE
LIE • S. LAIA
LOVE • A. STEVENS

Lies and the Name-of-the-Father

Sérgio Laia*

In Brazil, there's a saying that, since it is among the sayings imposed from the field of the Other, takes the form of an imperative of the superego: literally translated – “lies are short legged”, which means: a lie doesn't last long. Rather than relying on the unveiling power of truth, this saying bets on the twists the signifier engenders for those who get carried away by the lucrubrations of the language: those who lie will eventually get entangled in their own tales and then the truth will be revealed. The meaning of the word “short”, attributed to the legs of a lie, can also be interpreted as a metonymic transposition of a castration: the liar's body is preserved while the cut is made on the “body of the lie” or, more specifically, on the “leg of the lie”. Even so, the liar is threatened with castration, because of the anguish and the fear that such saying is meant to instill into people who lie or seem undaunted in persevering with a lie.

The effect of the anguish and the fear that is put into the speaker as much as the linguistic functioning of this saying spring from a belief in this fundamental signifier coined by Lacan as “the Name-of-the-Father”. If the liar can betray his/her deception and show us something about the truth, if the “lie's short legs” is in fact a replacement in disguise of the liar's castration, the concealment of a fragility such as this is an action which, according to Lacan's terminology, arises from a “love for truth”¹. Well, in “The dissolution of the Oedipus complex” and referring mainly to boys, Freud pointed out that the narcissistic preservation of an intact body, that is, postponing the real effectuation of the castration menace and consolidating the phallus as a symbol are associated with the acceptance of the paternal authority and with the identification with the father². In turn, for Lacan, the Other as “the place of the signifier” and, in the context presented here, as a place in which the articulations of the so-called “popular sayings” become feasible, is guaranteed by “the Name-of-the-Father”, by this “signifier of the Other as the place of the law”³. Therefore, the passion for truth can be just another name for the love for the father, since only the Name-of-the-Father – the fundamental signifier of the symbolic order – may assure us that God is not a deceiver even when is casting dice. Because of that, it will be safe to bet that the liar will betray himself and, once it happens, reiterate, not without some sacrifice, the saying of the Other about “lies being short legged” and the functioning of the Name-of-the-Father as the ruler of a tradition associated with the phallic meaning transmitted, for example, by popular proverbs. So, there's an order that, however elusive it might be to the speaker, is sustained by him and always drives him to say more than he planned at first, and therefore, even white lies still give place to the truth dimension.

Another facet of the truth that is in the body of the lie can be glimpsed from the Lacanian formulation that attributes a fiction structure to truth. However, unlike the saying “lies are short legged”, it is truth that seems to be, because of its fiction structure, if not far more threatened at least haunted by the seductive presence of the lie. One of the references that Lacan had to demonstrate that truth has a fiction structure came from Jeremy Bentham: a fictitious entity is not “an imaginary and deceiving entity”⁴. It only exists due to language, and because of that, whenever it is confronted with reality, it seems to be impossible, but as long as it is put into words, it is imposed on us as indispensable⁵.

According to Bentham, the actual existence of fictitious entities is independent from reality, but is inseparable from the creationist power of language: the fictitious “is undoubtedly an artifice, or a make believe, ...but it is inherent in language and has a conventional nature”⁶. It is not, therefore, a non-entity or something that simply does not exist or that requires persuasion to make it come into existence: if human beings use language, the “fictitious entities” are imposed on them effortlessly,

allowing them to “reach essentially practical ends”. It is language itself that brings them into existence, not persuasion.

As Bentham pointed out, even if the Devil is described as a being who has a fixed address somewhere or, at the same time and in a more fictional way, as a being possessing “a head, body and limbs like a man’s, horns like a goat’s, wings like a bat’s and a tail like a monkey”⁷, Devil is a “non-entity” and is, therefore, different from a fiction, since a great persuasive effort would be necessary to bring him into existence. Paternity is a “fictitious entity” because *pater semper incertus*, but, on the other hand, even uncertain, paternity is not a fallacy and stands as a symbolic creation with a “conventional nature” that is effortlessly accepted. Contrary to what is often assumed, resorting to modern “DNA exams” does not put an end to the fictional and uncertain dimension of paternity: In fact, it is the uncertainty inherent in paternity that such exams are supposed to solve. However, though they are considered to give irrefutable proofs in polemic court cases, they may reveal a genetic match that seems as unreal as the devil mentioned by Bentham.

Thus, in conventional circumstances, the belief in the creationist power of language dissociates paternity claims from persuasion processes: the fact that the father is unknown does not shake the foundations of the existence of paternity as a “fictitious entity”. However, if paternity is presented in unconventional situations, its uncertainty might hamper its acceptance as an existent fictional entity: the paternity can be the reason for court disputes or be considered an embarrassing or bewildering enigma to those who are involved in it.

An example of such bewilderment can be found in an interview with the parents of a seven-year-old psychotic child. The parents attributed the boy’s unrelenting and aggravating refusal to speak to the fact that the boy did not know that he had been adopted while still in his mother’s womb, a woman who works for the couple. When they were asked why they still insisted on hiding the truth from him, the father replied: “We never had any other children, so we don’t know how to tell him his true origin”. On one hand, this paternal justification reiterates the psychoanalytic conception that children, even when they are not adopted, are metaphorically adopted in the symbolic dimension of paternity and, on the other hand, this reiteration cannot face the hole of the symbolic transmission of the Name-of-the-Father. The fact that this father did not have his own children is a real impediment to transmitting to the adopted kid that paternity – conventional or adoptive – has a fiction structure.

Faced with the real of paternity that adoption made evident, the father chose to lie about the child’s origin, which is another embodiment of a lie. The lie is no longer, due to its “short leg”, a metonymy of the powerlessness of truth to reveal itself through a different route from that of equivocation. Neither it is something that, like a kind of parasite, can feed on the fiction structure pertaining to truth. What it is now is a lie as the “symbolic included in the real”⁸: the justification of lying to the adopted son shows the way a father, when he does not feel that the symbolic-fictitious paternity dimension concerns him, makes the Name-of-The-Father persevere in the real, immune to wanderings between truth and lie. Under this perspective, the father’s silent lie, that is, the paternal symptom – which Lacan taught us to read as a “father-version” (*père-version*)⁹ – is prolonged in his son’s adamant refusal to talk to anybody except his father, his father’s wife and the biological mother.

Therefore, the psychosis results from the heresy – the theological name of lying – of one touching the Name-of-the-Father, putting in evidence the hole where “jouissance” flows in and “whose failure would make the universe vain” and “whose absence makes the Other inconsistent”¹⁰. The child’s refusal to talk to anyone outside his most intimate family circle is an extension of the consistency of a father who does not permit himself the transmission of the lure proper to paternity. Lacan, as argued by Jacques-Alain Miller, also committed the heresy of touching the Name-of-the-Father when he proposed a pluralization that ended up by relativizing and trivializing what was formerly designated as “the fundamental signifier”¹¹. Having become a heretic, Lacan was “excommunicated” by the International Psychoanalysis Association (IPA), an institution that had been founded by “the father of psychoanalysis”, that is, by Freud himself.

Confronted with the hole his heresy had disclosed and following his “excommunication” from the Freudian tradition, Lacan chose to silence, though just partially, in relation to the pluralization he intend to make evident: he interrupts the *Seminar* on the Names of the Father and substitutes it by another one entitled *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*; he prefers not to publish, during his lifetime, the only lesson consecrated to the Names of the Father; he discreetly evokes the “nonexistent Seminar” and, being a reader of the fiction theory, he makes this *Seminar* really ex-sist¹². However, I believe it is possible to state that it was from the hole that his heresy made evident that Lacan, with the pass¹³, made it possible for analysts to touch the Name-of-The-Father without having to be punished with their excommunication or, like the psychotic child I have mentioned, with their silence. Thus, the procedure of the pass pluralizes the heresies and summons all those who become Analysts of the School (A.E.), to report what happened to them when, from their analysis, they were allowed to touch the Name-of-The-Father and to witness the presence of the “jouissance” that this fundamental signifier, often making the universe vain, insisted on hiding as a lie that couldn’t be confessed..

Translation : Berenice Ferreira Paulino and Maria Aparecida Farage; *Revision* : Berenice Ferreira Paulino and Ram Avraham Mandil.

Footnotes

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¹ LACAN, Jacques. *Le séminaire. Livre XI: les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*. Paris: Seuil, 1973, p. 58.

² FREUD, S. A dissolução do Complexo de Édipo (1924). In: *O ego e o id; Uma neurose demoníaca do século XVIII e outros trabalhos*. Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1976, p. 220-221 (Edição Standard Brasileira das Obras Psicológicas Completas de Sigmund Freud, vol. XIX).

³ LACAN, Jacques. D’une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose (1957-58). In: *Écrits*. Paris: Seuil, 1966, p. 583.

⁴ CLÉRO, Jean-Pierre and LAVAL, Christian. Introduction: la théorie des fictions et l’utilitarisme. In: BENTHAM, Jeremy. *De l’ontologie et autres textes sur les fictions*. Paris: Seuil, 1997, p. 12.

⁵ BENTHAM, Jeremy. *De l’ontologie et autres textes sur les fictions...*, p. 84-85. See too, in the same book, p. 207-209, an Glossary by Cléro and Laval.

⁶ CLÉRO, Jean-Pierre and LAVAL, Christian. Glossaire. In: BENTHAM, Jeremy. *De l’ontologie et autres textes sur les fictions...*, p. 208.

⁷ BENTHAM, Jeremy. *De l’ontologie et autres textes sur les fictions...*, p. 84.

⁸ LACAN, Jacques. Vers un signifiant nouveau. *Ornicar?*, n. 17/18, p. 9, printemps 1979.

⁹ In French, *père-version* («Father-version») sounds like *perversion* («perversion»). LACAN, Jacques. *Le séminaire. Livre XXIII: Le sinthome*. Paris: Seuil, 2004, p. 19, 85, 107 e 150.

¹⁰ LACAN, Jacques. La subversion du sujet et la dialectique du désir dans l’inconscientfreudien (1960). In: *Écrits*. Paris: Seuil, 1966, p. 818-819.

¹¹ MILLER, Jacques-Alain. *Le la naturaleza de los semblantes*. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2001, p. 25-53.

¹² About Lacan’s excommunication : LACAN, Jacques. *Le séminaire. Livre XI: les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse* (1964). Paris: Seuil, 1973, p. 7-17; MILLER, Jacques-Alain (éd.) *Excommunication*. Supplément au numéro 8 d’*Ornicar?*, Bulletin Périodique du Champ freudien, 1977. About « Nonexistent Seminar » denominated « Names of the Father » : LACAN, Jacques. La méprise du sujet supposé savoir. In: *Écrits...*, p. 852. The only lesson the Seminar on « Names of the Father » was recently published by Jacques-Alain Miller : LACAN, Jacques. *Des noms-du-père*. Paris: Seuil, 2004, p. 65-108.

¹³ LACAN, Jacques. Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l’école. In: *Autres Écrits*. Paris: Seuil, 2001, p. 243-259.

Love (and Name-of-the-Father)

Alexandre Stevens

« Amor omnibus idem »¹. These are the opening lines for the entry « love » in Voltaire's Dictionary of Philosophy, *Reason through the alphabet* in its 1769 edition. Love's inclination is towards the same, as Voltaire underlines, both in its side of bodily excitation and in its dimension of self-love. This gets translated a century and a half later in Freudian terms as: love is always narcissistic. In his 1914 text 'Introducing Narcissism' Freud is especially clear on that aspect of self-love. Whether anaclitic or narcissistic the choice of object is always based on the original narcissism. The summit of narcissistic choice is what Freud calls the most frequent feminine type, those women who only love themselves or who love themselves as strongly as the man loves them.

Even when love leans on the other, as in the anaclitic object choice, it is not less narcissistic, because it asks for love in return, a capture of the other in oneself, as Lacan comments in Seminar I. This narcissistic character of all love, or rather this foundation of all love in the Narcissus's mirror was perceived well before Freud and Voltaire as witnessed by certain poems of courtly love.

Love cannot do without culture either. Thus, men 'have perfected love' (Voltaire) and 'there would be no question of love if there was no culture' (Lacan, *Seminar X*). Let us remember here all the various references of Lacan to courtly love, as moments of the invention of a new link, of an erotic beyond, up to the formulation, in the *Non -dupes err*,² 'love is courtly love' insofar as it represents the impossibility of the sexual link with the object, the sexual rapport that does not exist.

Because of the non-existence of that rapport, 'the enjoyment³ of the Other(...), of the body of the Other(...) is not the sign of love' (*Seminar XX*). Indeed the *jouissance* in question is only reached where there is rapport, and from then on love is not necessary as a supplement. This is the case in Schreber's psychosis, as Jacques-Alain Miller developed in his course of 9 June 1999. Thus the man meets the woman in psychosis only.

Therefore, love is not only narcissistic. It has a function of supplementation⁴. For want of the existence of sexual rapport, it is the task of love to make up for it. There is certainly an illusion here, the illusion that the famous rapport exists, that we only make one, that we understand each other beyond words. But love is not only illusion. Love wants also to be a sign, it wants also to be *jouissance* and commitment, that is symptom, in order to effectively make up for the missing rapport between the sexes.

It is a patent fact in psychoanalytic practice, that the sign of love is expected from the partner beyond his/her declarations of amorous intention. Sign is not meaning and gift is not love. The only sign of love with an effective value is to give what one has not, as Lacan makes it clear in Seminar IV: 'there is no greater possible gift, no greater sign of love than the gift of what one has not'. In the following Seminar, he further clarifies that it matters little that the person receiving the gift has or has not what it is about, because what matters is that the one who gives it does not have it, that the busy man gives his time, the poor woman her lack of being, the unfaithful his/her fidelity, the fickle his/her constancy... But this sign includes a paradox because by giving what one has not, it can be noticed that he/she does not have it. 'Not having it' evokes the phallus inevitably, and thus, when the father shows an excessive love for the mother, the child suspects him of not having it (Lacan, Seminar V).

Lacan's aphorism, 'only love allows for *jouissance* to condescend to desire' (*Seminar X*), is of a very different order than the sign of love. It introduces rather love in its function of veil in relation to the real, that is in relation to *jouissance*. Jacques-Alain Miller gives the following commentary: 'on the side of love, the real object is elevated to the dignity of the symbolic object' which transforms the

satisfaction of need to the metonymy of desire (*Cause freudienne*, no 58). Love and anxiety are both between *jouissance* and desire. Love as a veil, anxiety as that which does not deceive.

In *Seminar XX*, Lacan makes very clear the link between love and *jouissance*. It is not Aristophanes's myth, it is rather the disjunction between the two sides of the sexual drama.

On the side of man, 'what he approaches is the cause of his desire(...), object *a*. It is the act of love. Make love, as the name indicates, is to make poetry. But, there is a world between poetry and love. The act of love is the polymorphous perversion of the male...' (Lacan, *Seminar XX*). The act of love for the male is phallic *jouissance*, insofar as it is autistic, without an Other, without including love and only going through the cause of desire. It is the love of the lamella, at the very most, with which Lacan answers the question of Aristophanes in Seminar XI. Love without love, love which does not need the Other. It is the enjoyment of the idiot, the *homo* side being the one which contents itself with silence. Lacan goes beyond the position of Freud to the commonest of the debasements of love.

On the side of woman, love is included in *jouissance*. In other words: it cannot be without words, because indeed, 'to talk about love is itself *jouissance*' (Lacan, *Seminar XX*), and even: 'it is by talking that one makes love'. (Lacan, *Seminar XIX*, 4. 5. 72)⁵. To talk involves the Other, the *hetero*. This is what allows Lacan to write: 'let's say the heterosexual is by definition the one who loves women, whatever his/her sex is' (Lacan, *L'Etourdit*⁶). Love is necessarily on the side of woman for Lacan, with all that it contains as work of civilization. Here there is no room for silence, but rather *jouissance* which can reach mysticism. Feminine *jouissance*, the Other *jouissance*, about which Lacan talks in *Seminar XX*, is supplementary to the phallic one, which is not beyond the reach of women for all that. Supplementary is opposed here to complementary. A complement would ensure a (mathematical) relation between the sexes. The supplement does not ensure anything of the sort. It is a do-it-yourself, DIY, job.

Jacques-Alain Miller's commentary on that supplementary *jouissance* in 'A sexual repartitory'⁷ is especially enlightening with regards to the place of love, when he describes the two aspects of that supplementary *jouissance*: Its limitless side concerns *jouissance* of the body which is not limited to the phallic organ, while the other side has to do with love's talk. One can guess *erotomania* here, as Miller actually suggests, insofar as it is '*jouissance* which demands that its object talks'.

This leads us to the positions of love in psychosis which range from erotomania to the delusional idealisation of the love object. Thus, for Gerard de Nerval the ideal of the Lady provokes the triggering of psychosis, when that ideal is reduced to the level of any woman. Then, love as rapture (or ravishing) presents its face of devastation (ravages). These ravages are not only present in psychosis, they are simply a side of love. If a woman can be a symptom for a man, a man can be ravaging for a woman. Dissymmetry of love.

But, this dissymmetry does not stop love from becoming commitment. At all the different moments of Lacan's teaching love always involves full speech, the commitment of the whole being: from full speech to the subject of the enunciation and to the value of exception of a Saying⁸.

Thus, in *Seminar I*, Lacan states: 'The active gift of love aims for the other not in his/her (narcissistic) specificity, but in his/her being'. We know well the formula- test of full speech with its value of recognition, at the same time as it bears on the subject's being: 'you are my wife'. The active gift evoked by Lacan is situated on the symbolic level in its value of full speech. This becomes 'marriage is... love as mutual dupery' which we find in Seminar '*The non-dupes err*'⁹. The question is how to accept to be the dupe of a woman, precisely, because 'the non-dupes(...), those who keep elbow room [are necessarily in the] error', that is they err¹⁰. It is a way for Lacan to clarify that the woman is one of the names of the father of whom he must accept to be the dupe.

But, love is also one of the names of the father. This is in the last chapter of *Seminar XX*. The impossible of sexual rapport finds its limit and its answer in the illusion that this rapport exists in the love encounter, 'the encounter in the partner of symptoms, affects and all that in every one marks the trace of their exile (...) from the sexual rapport'. However, all love endeavours to transform this

contingency into necessity, into a 'does not cease'. 'Such is the substitute which (...) makes the destiny, but also the drama of love'. One goes thus from the illusion of love to its symptomatic substitute. It is love as symptom, substituting, like one of the Names of the Father, for the real of 'there is not'.

In 'The Italian Note'(1973)¹¹ Lacan proposes again to try to 'increase the resources thanks to which we could succeed in getting rid of this unfortunate rapport, in order to make love something more dignified than the profusion of chattering which it is to this day'. It is possible to recognize here the evocation of a new love, as in Rimbaud's poem, 'To Reason':

A tap with your finger on the drum releases all sounds and begins the new harmony.
One step of yours, and the new men rise up and march.
Your head turns aside: new love! Your head turns back: new love!
The children sing to you: "Change our fate, overcome the plague and begin with time".
They beg you: "Raise where you wish the substance of our fortune and our prayers".
You will go everywhere, since you have come from all time.¹²

Translation : Haroula Pepeli

Footnotes

- 1 « Love goes for the same in all».
- 2 We keep the homophony with the French verb *errer* used by Lacan for its double meaning: 1. To wander and 2. To make a mistake, an error. The English *err* has only the second meaning.
- 3 We translate *jouissance* as enjoyment, but we also keep at other times the French term.
- 4 The French term is *suppleance*
- 5 Seminar '...ou pire', 1971-1972, not published. Short account of that Seminar in: *Autres Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil 2001, 547-552. First published in *Scilicet*, no 5, Seuil, Paris, 1975.
- 6 Also in : *Autres Ecrits*, op. cit., 449-496. First published in: *Scilicet* no 4, Seuil, Paris 1973, 5-52.
- 7 Transliteration of the neologism 'repartitoire' made here by JAMiller to produce a pun between 'repertoire' (repertory) and 'repartition' (apportionment, distribution).
- 8 To render the use of the infinitive as a substantive in french, in this case: du Dire
- 9 Literal translation of the title of Lacan's Seminar: 'Les Noms du Père' which has an homophony with the 'Names of the Father'.
- 10 Pun between *err*: wander and error. As Lacan explains in the Seminar, *une erre* is a rare word for '*lancée*', the stride, the acquired speed of an object or a person after they have been set in motion.
- 11 In *Autres Ecrits*, op. cit. p. 307. First published in *Ornicar*, no 25, 1982.
- 12 'A une Raison', from the *Illuminations*. In Arthur Rimbaud, *Complete works, selected letters*. The University of Chicago Press, 1975. Translation introduction and Notes by Wallace Fowlie.

M like...

MASTER • R. PORTILLO
MOURNING • P.G. GUEGUEN
MURDER OF THE FATHER • V PALOMERA

Mourning and the Name-of-the-Father

Pierre-Gilles Gueguen

The question of mourning is central to the Kleinian current of psychoanalysis. The work of mourning, the working-through of the depressive phase, leads, in theory, to the reparation of the object up till then in pieces, and which finally recovers its unity. The model of mourning for Melanie Klein is the moment of weaning, the moment of the loss of an object that assured the satisfaction of the child in his dependency on the mother. This loss of the object considered as being a part of the mother's body constitutes a loss of *jouissance* that precipitates the child into attacks against his mother, related, in his "interior reality" to fantasies of morcellement. Melanie Klein in her last texts, however, was to question the myth of the reparation of maternal unity as an indication of the ending of an analysis.

It is not surprising to see the concept of mourning so largely developed in this current because the discussion between Freud and Abraham at the time of the publication of "Mourning and Melancholia" was animated. While Abraham was trying to interpret the phenomenon of mourning in relation to the objectal stage, Freud was trying to relate the conceptualization of mourning to the father and particularly to the primordial identification to the father, that so inexplicit form of identification which he nevertheless held to: the myth of Totem and Taboo.

Freud's indications for the theoretical elaboration of the phenomena of melancholia testify to his reticence concerning Abraham's theses. And in fact, although he recognizes the phenomenology of mourning and melancholia, its depressive aspects and its incidence on mood, Freud does not make of these phenomena the lever of his approach. Beyond these phenomena and the imaginary dialectic of the Kleinian other, he asserts a causal but not an empiric position, by relating the primeval mythical feast to the roots of the social bond, by seeing in it the origin of the foundation of totemism. Lacan will never lose sight of this point. He will never relinquish it. *Moses and Monotheism* is the occasion for Freud, with regard to the theme of renouncement of the drive, to renew the connection between the figure of the father, his mythical murder and the process of mourning. Although in this second myth, the symbolic aspect is more in the foreground, it does not eclipse the "orang-outang" father of *totem and Taboo*, but accentuates the symbolic side related to the loss of libido that, according to Freud, is the counterpart of the symbolic assumption. He thus incorporates the function of the death instinct and his conception of the dualism of the drive into the myth of the primitive father.

Lacan was to adhere first to this line of thought by accentuating the primacy of the symbolic over the imaginary. The function of symbolization is related structurally to the paternal function as testifying to the incidence of language on the living, in order to advance that mourning, but also the depressive phenomena that accompany it, must be conceived as a failing of the symbolization of the ego ideal the I(A), whose adjustment is then considered as the result of the analysis. It is not sufficient that the father be dead, as Lacan points out in "Subversion of the Subject", his grave must also be empty. The *jouissance* of mourning, as an imaginary identification to the deceased must be exhausted, in order for it to leave place for the pure Identification, the unary trait. The place of the father, insofar as it is an introduction to the desire beyond maternal *jouissance*, is always an empty place and the lack it constitutes is an opening to the realization of desire, which in the Lacan of before the 1960s is the finality of the analysis. In this perspective, mourning is above all a process during which the enumeration one by one of the traits of the lost object makes it possible to situate the place of the lack it revealed and to symbolize it.

Soon after, with the Seminar "L'angoisse" and the turning point that accompanies it, the function of the Name of the Father is called to question: the father is from then on a semblant, that is a mix of imaginary and symbolic. Certainly we must know how to use it in analysis in order to be able to do

without it, but it can no longer support all alone the function of anchoring the modern subject besieged on all sides by solicitations of *jouissance*. Mourning is not an illness of ideality: and Lacan indicates that there is a version of the father proper to each one, which accounts for the clinical impossibility of establishing a paternal universal.

In his introduction to the publication of the French edition of the Seminar “L’angoisse”, Jacques-Alain Miller insists on the importance of this turning point: “to say that the object a is not nameable, is only to repeat in another form the path Lacan has it take in this Seminar, that is to say the object a is irreducible to symbolization. In other words, the object a has the value of the failure of the Name-of-the-Father inasmuch as the Name-of-the-Father is the major operator of symbolization” (revue *La Cause Freudienne*: Introduction to the reading of the Seminar L’Anglisse, n° 58, p. 89).

Up till then Lacan had seemed, as Freud himself, to relate the phenomena of mourning to the loss of a love object for which the father furnished the metaphor in the symbolic, that is to say, as a loss of love belonging purely to the realm of the signifier. The conceptualization of the object a as object cause of *jouissance* leads us to a more subtle conception of mourning. The reason is not to be looked for as the Kleinians do on the side of a loss of *jouissance*. It is not the *jouissance* that is lacking, on the contrary, there is always too much of the object.

If it is really love that the subject is lacking, it is love inasmuch as it is always nourished by the demand — that of narcissistic deceit — to be loved. But if mourning, with its depressive suite, is certainly linked to the loss of love, the lost object — the one that produces disturbances in the signifying register, as well as in the economy of *jouissance* by provoking the sadness, the despondency, the grief of mourning — is also the metonymical version of the object cause. It is in this way that the Lacanian construction is renewed, giving the true sense of *Totem and Taboo* and Freud’s brilliant intuition. In this chapter of the Seminar *L’angoisse*, Lacan shows in effect how the game of the Fort-da is not only in the domain of the signifier but that the appearance and disappearance of the reel itself must be included in it. Mourning thus appears more closely constructed on the model of the trauma that touches the always precarious relation between barred S and a, the relation designated by the diamond of the fantasy. Effectively, the loss that inaugurates mourning affects the subject’s window onto reality. The homeostasis, normally assured by the relation between the signifier and *jouissance* is upset.

Certainly the place of the father is an empty place, certainly it is a place of semblant, the loss of the one deceased gives him too much weight as a real. In the same way it must be understood that the loss that takes place on the occasion of a death causes the rise of the excessive presence of *jouissance* in the locus where the object presents itself as a void, since this place is normally occupied only occasionally by an “episodic” substance, as Lacan qualifies it. Thus mourning for Lacan is dissipated by means of a new work of significantization that allows the subject to reconstitute the diamond of the fantasy. The loss that causes mourning produces an effect comparable to that of trauma. To leave mourning behind we must proceed to a new form of corporal subtraction, the operation of separation and alienation that Lacan describes as preliminary to the act. The work of mourning is nothing else but that.

The identification to the dead father, to the symbolic father, is not the only identificatory support able to permit the reconstitution of the knot between symbolic, real and imaginary. Lacan indicates this with reference to the film *Hiroshima mon amour* when he points out that the mourning for a German soldier can find its termination in the encounter with the first Japanese that comes along, in a new form of symptomatization. But he had also shown in the example of Hamlet that the true mourning of Laerte offers Hamlet the occasion to proceed to a new marriage with the act. It was then, already in this case, by an identification to a semblable that the pretender to the throne managed to overcome the endless sadness that the absence of mourning in the queen Gertrude had condemned him to. Thus, it is not the Name-of-the-Father in the classical and universal sense Lacan gave to it at the beginning of his teaching that is in play in mourning, but one of its multiple forms — particular for each subject — that are susceptible to operate as a quilting point by restoring the mesh of the fantasy, that is to say, the seizing of the object a under its aspect of void in the apparatus of semblants.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Murder of the Father and Name-of-the Father

Vicente Palomera

‘One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde’¹. How did Freud come to this myth, the only truly modern myth, as Lacan said? This myth of the origins, this epic without words which Lacan termed an ‘aphasic drama’, will wring out of Freud many words and variations in order to answer the question: What is a father? Hence, the Freudian versions of the father which orientate psychoanalytic theory -the Oedipus myth, *Totem and Taboo*, and *Moses*- all set off from the so-called myth of the ‘murder of the father’, insofar as it is an answer to that question and maintains that a father is someone killed by his sons, or, that the murder of the father is what founds the father, which is the same thing.

But why did Freud find it necessary to turn the death of the father into the murder of the father? Lacan asked the question with regards to Moses: ‘Why was it necessary for Moses to be murdered? Freud explains this to us, and the best of it is that, it was in order for Moses to return in the prophets, undoubtedly through repression, by the mnemonic transmission through the chromosomes, we just have to admit it’².

Although the facts narrated by Freud are supported by ethnological (*Totem and Taboo*) or historical data (*Moses and Monotheism*), he presents them always as a romance, as fiction. The two years which Freud devoted to writing *Totem and Taboo*, and reading numerous books for that, books which took him from the Australian deserts to the study of the rites of the ancient Semites, had a unique objective: to demonstrate that the murder of the father of the horde constitutes the real origin, a kind of *big bang* of human institutions. We were able to read recently in Maurice Godelier that ‘Freud could not do otherwise than tinker about with an imaginary story’ and, that ‘it is not so much a false story, as a falsified history’³. This conclusion is, however, not new. It reminds us of what Kroeber said in his article ‘*Totem and Taboo in retrospect*’: ‘I found myself somewhat conscience-stricken when I listened to a student in Sapir’s seminar in Chicago making his report on *Totem and Taboo*, who like myself, first spread out its gossamer texture and then laboriously tore it to shreds. It is a procedure too suggestive of breaking a butterfly on the wheel. An iridescent fantasy deserves a more delicate touch even in the act of demonstration of its *irréalité*’⁴.

There is no shortage of stories, good or bad, but what Freud gives us, amongst other things, in *Totem and Taboo*, is a prescription concerning the way to tell a story. Here the difference made by Aristotle between history which recounts things as they have been and poetry, which tells them as they might have been, becomes blurred and vanishes. Freud did not proclaim the superiority of imagination with regards to reality. But, if for him finding the context of the past is a task bound to fail, the poetic hypothesis reveals itself to be an instrument all the more necessary to resurrect those places for ever lost. He borrows the phrase with which he decides to close *Totem and Taboo* from Goethe’s Faust. Instead of St John’s ‘In the beginning there was the Word’ Goethe announces ‘In the beginning there was the Deed’ -*Am Anfang war die Tat*. In the Freudian myth, the first deed becomes a murder and the question which arises is to know if one can talk about an act just before the advent of humanity.

This story which Freud called a ‘*just so story*’⁵ can be compared to the tales of Kipling and Andersen; it evokes stories like the ones cinema director Francis F. Coppola was able to put into images in *Apocalypse now*. Starting off from Conrad’s tale ‘The Heart of Darkness’, wasn’t Coppola forced to incorporate the Doors’ song and letter, in which we hear Jim Morrison say: ‘Father! Yes son, I want to kill you...Mother, I want to f... you’, just at the moment when we see Willard brandishing his machete

to execute Kurtz? Amongst his bedside books he also had Frazer's *Golden Bough*, one of the references in *Totem and Taboo*. All the action is supported by images of the ritual murder of the sacred animal. Has Coppola falsified the historical facts of the Vietnam war? What can be the meaning of such a tinkering about, if not to show the gesture which Willard carries out in the final act, when he throws down his weapon: breaking the Golden Bough's myth with that gesture Willard indicates that the place of the victim, like that of the father of the primal horde, will for ever remain empty.

As for Freud, why has he insisted on visualizing the murder of that *Urvater*?

Let us remember that moment when Freud realized that the seduction scene was a hysteric fantasy. At the same time, he discovered the structure of desire: The seduction scene made obvious Lacan's formula according to which 'desire is the desire of the Other'. The subject enounces and supports his own desire in a staging in which the Other is in charge of that enunciation. The substitution of the scene of seduction by a fantasy has, in that sense, modified the scene of seduction. Freud came up then against something which could not be conceived any more, namely the father as a traumatic element and a cause of desire. The father was going to be transformed to a partner of the dialectics of desire. The renunciation of the theory of seduction was thus going to transform the father to an essential formation of the unconscious.

In *Totem and Taboo* Freud confronts the application of the Oedipus to ethnographical data, that is to 'the implication of the symbolic network which demonstrates that the attribution of procreation to the father cannot be but the effect of a pure signifier, the recognition not of a real father, but of that which religion taught us to invoke as 'the Name of the Father'⁶.

Thus *Totem and Taboo* supposes a questioning of the signifying network. The father of the horde is introduced only at the end, and not without precautions. To put it succinctly: Freud believed that he met the ancestor of the Oedipal father, the original father of the neurotic.

In the Freudian myth, the castration of the sons is presented to us as the product of a symbolic which instead of being an event 'before' history, would rather be an event evoking an abolished past and which would project itself in a dimension of permanence.

Lacan was, however, the first to dismantle the Freudian myth of the Oedipus when he questions: 'What has Moses to do, for God's sake*, with Oedipus and the father of the primitive horde? There must be something in here like the manifest and the latent'⁷, and he signals that the Oedipus complex must be analysed as a dream of Freud⁸. If the Oedipus complex is a dream of Freud, it should be interpreted, like any other dream.

When Lacan indicates that the fantasy in which the castrating father is the father of the primitive horde is absent from all the forms of the myth to which Freud devoted himself, he is indicating that castration, as a statement of prohibition, can only be founded at a second moment. The paradox resides, then, in the fact that according to the Freudian myth this prohibition only comes as a result 'of a common agreement, a singular *initium* the problematic character of which I showed you last time', as Lacan says⁹.

'Singular *initium*': Lacan emphasizes here the term of 'initial act', but, as he clarifies, we cannot talk about act if there is not a symbolic network prior to that. 'There could be no act other than within a context, already filled with all that goes with the effects of the signifier...[...], there could be no act in the beginning, in any case no act which would qualify as murder. The myth would not have any other meaning here than that to which I have already reduced it, the meaning of a statement on the impossible'¹⁰. In other terms, castration, the real operation of language and arising from the symbolic, can never be an act. The act always involves a 'before' and an 'after'. What is in the beginning is jouissance, is language. If the act demands a prior signifying context, then that implies that it cannot be anything else than a real consequence of that which cannot be said in the symbolic, of that which cannot be articulated in language.

If no original deed is conceivable, then the supposed murder of the father cannot be neither a historic event nor a deed. To say that the murder of the father is a 'statement about the impossible' indicates the function of 'half-said**' of the myth, as knowledge in the place of truth.

The most surprising of Lacan's operation on the myth of *Totem and Taboo* is that it ends with the love of the father, which is the foundation of monotheistic religion. Lacan criticizes Freud for having based religion on the articulation of the myth instead of combating religion. Rather than founding atheism on the murder of the father, he saves the father and founds monotheistic religion. Jacques Alain Miller saw right through this paradox in 2003 in his course entitled 'An effort of Poetry': 'There is in Freud a refusal to interpret the father, and this is what leads him to what Lacan called his Darwinian tomfoolery, that is to the event of the murder of the all powerful father...'¹¹.

If the myth of the murder of the father is impossible, this is due to the attribution of a primordial jouissance to the original father. The one whom Freud situates as the Urvater supposes 'at least one' who -something which is impossible- 'enjoys all the women'. If we eliminate the dead father, the only thing which remains of the Freudian myth is the function occupied by the dead father, a function which consists in concealing castration. What 'the latent content' of the Freudian dream of the Oedipus tells us is that the succession from father to son is preceded by the castration of the son. The 'murder of the father' masks therefore the castration of the son'. This is not a myth but a real operation, an effect of language and in that sense, castration has nothing to do with the father.

Translated by Haroula Pepeli

Footnotes

- 1 Freud, S.(1912-13), The Return of Totemism in Childhood, Totem and Taboo, Standard Edition 9, 141.
- 2 Lacan, J., The Seminar book XVII, The Reverse of Psychoanalysis, Paris, 1991, Seuil, p. 132.
- 3 Godelier, M., 'Metamorphoses of kinship', Paris, 2004, Fayard, p. 428.
- 4 Kroeber, A., '*Totem and Taboo in retrospect*', American Journal of Sociology, XLV, 1939, p. 446-451. *in French in the text.
- 5 Kroeber, A., op. cit., ibid.
- 6 Lacan, J., Ecris, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 538.
- 7 Lacan, J., The Seminar Book XVII, The Reverse of Psychoanalysis, Paris, Seuil, 1991, p. 135.
- 8 Ibid., p. 159.
- 9 Ibid., p. 145.
- 10 Ibid. The author puts in italics the three last words of the sentence in the original text [in Spanish]: '*un enunciado imposible*'. * 'Foutre de nom de Dieu, you've said it, ...'
- 11 Miller J.-A., Lacanian Orientation, 'Un effort of poetry'. Lessons in the Department of psychoanalysis of the University of Paris VIII, session 11 June 2003, not published.** 'Mi-dire' in the French

N like...

NEUROSIS • L. ERNETA

NAMING • S. BASZ

NAMES OF THE FATHER • R. MAZZUCCA

NORM, NORMALITY • M. MAZZOTTI

NOSTALGIA • M. ZLOTNIK

NOT-ALL • G. MUSACHI

Rule, Normality

Maurizio Mazzotti

Normality like symptom – The question of normality in psychoanalysis appears overcome today. What is normality and how can normality be defined from the point of view of psychoanalysis?

According to Freud psychoanalysis proves that disorders in the human being are not due to a loss of health. Contrarily to this every human being is affected by neurosis and thus partially sane. In the same way Lacan declared in 1974 (*Le triomphe de la religion*, p. 93) that as human beings we are affected by this symptom, ie we are sick, the talking being is a sick animal. Lacan stated that since the Word embodies itself problems arise and the talking being lives through the relationship with his body, ie through his pulsion as a symptom.

Psychoanalysis confirms how problematic is the reference to the concept of normality as an asymptomatic condition, thus absence of disease before and after the disease itself. According to psychoanalysis disorders are not deviations of normality, normality is instead perceived as a particular adjustment of the relationship towards the disease. The concept of normality is therefore considered uthopic and the declared absence of symptoms is a symptom in itself, a problematic condition as a sign of a conformism that suggests the misknowledge of the real relationship between the subject and his pulsion.

Lacan has played with the concept of normality like symptom thanks to the French language and has referred to normality as “norme-male” ie “male norm” simplyfing this concept further. This is to underline the fact that the very idea of normality falls under the “logic of everything” that supports the male norm, the universal norm, that defines everyone in a fallic way. Besides a health condition defined by the absence of symptoms, normality as “norme-male” would be a consequence of the universal “logic of everything”. Nowadays normality is even less a convincing concept as the universal dimension of the “everything” does not make any more sense compared to the “one to one”.

The metaphor of the father and the meaning rule of pleasure – Since Freud has centred the theme of the unconscious around the function of the father and the castration complex psychoanalysis has identified a fundamental distinction between normality and rule that shows how psychoanalysis itself is far from dealing with the rule even if it treats normality as symptom of a conversation.

We had to wait for Lacan and his theory of the metaphor of the father at the end of the Fifties to acknowledge exactly how the metaphor of the father implied its non suitability to any reference to environmental normality or particular normality. In the evolution of the metaphor of the father as a ruling principle of the function of the father in the unconscious castration complex and as an enaction of the meaning rule of pleasure we find filtered through the Lacanian formalisation the epistemological lesson of Georges Canguilhem regarding the distinction between rule and normality and health and normality.¹ Canguilhem had clarified the meaning of the rule as individual and normality as a rejection of the individual ruling capabilities, ie a minus of the subject’s ruling capabilities since the notion of health in itself implies that the subject feels more than normal and capable of creating new rules in new situations and therefore expressing a plus of vital ruling. In Seminar V (*Sem. V*, cap. IX, X, XI) Lacan makes many explicit references to these relevant epistemological theories of Canguilhem. Lacan’s above mentioned references show a high clinical relevance and are real theories referring the necessary distinction between rule and normality, especially between the ‘normal’ father and the ruling father, ie inbetween the person itself and the way he covers a ruling function in the castration complex and as a consequence how the psychoanalysts should not misunderstand the metaphor of the father that acts in

the unconscious with the typical scene of the edipus family as individuals with mutual relationships. There is therefore a wealth of references of Lacan referring to the epistemology of the rule and the ruling capability of the function of the father in the unconscious. This explains the function of the father in the ruling of the subjective pleasure and helps to understand how the metaphor of the father corresponds to the extrinsication of the ruling capability of the father naming and meaning the subjective pleasure.

The Lacanian father of the metaphor of the father as naming power of the pleasure places itself beside the father of the forbidding, the negative power of the symbol, ie the father that the post-freudism and its sequel has identified eternally in the agent of the imaginery castration that attracts the fear of the nevrotic ghost and many more. According to Jacques-Alain Miller (*Il nuovo*) the Lacanian father that empowers his ruling effect on pleasure, ie the castration, is on the other hand the 'yes father', the father that allows of *licet habere* that as in the Witz metaphor welcomes and accepts the peculiarity of the desire of the subject promoting the agreeing rule more than the conflicting one. The ruling power of the function of the father and its meaning of pleasure around the the meaning of the fallus opens up to the peculiarity of the 'new subject' (*Sem. V*, p. 297) of desire in its relationship to the law.

What is enabled by the metaphor of the father is a naming of the pleasure that doesn't leave anything beside its meaning. Starting from this point of view it is clear that we record continuous failures in the clinical practice because something in the subject has represented an obstacle avoiding the perfection of the meaning rule of the father. In fact the metaphor of the father represents the most articulated and efficient accomplishment of the aedipical ruling and the ruling function of the pleasure in the Name of the Father of the unconscious. Jacques-Alain Miller has recently remarked (*Introduction to Sem. X*) that we've been for a long time under the influence of this great artifice meaning of the Name of the Father up to the point that many psychoanalysts miss this moment and even desire its restoration. We've been under this 'enchantment' and maybe we would still be if Lacan had not given a decisive turning point starting from the Seminar on the anguish that precedes the one on the 'Names of the Father'.

The defeat of the Father and the rules of the pleasure – In the X Seminar Lacan has dropped the Name of the Father and its function of meaning power and of meaning nomination of the pleasure. This is the new statute of the object, object of the anguish and cause object that hinders the meaning machine of the metaphor of the father in its process of giving a meaning to pleasure. Starting from this absolute remaining of the meaning process, ie the non-meaning, failure of the metaphor of the father is not only an obstacle placed by the subject and by the imaginary sequels of his fixations to the aedipical objects that diminish its efficiency but a structural problem: 'The father and its (meaning) power that is hindered by the object'. The object as an absolute remaining of the symbolisation of the Other condenses in itself the pleasure that the metaphor of the father isn't able to name and to translate into the fallic ruling. While the metaphor of the father, the same principle of the 'norme-male' named the pleasure of the 'whole' without remaining, now the relationship towards object fails faced to this same metaphor and not as a subjective contingency. It is the turning point that opens up to an horizon of the questioning regarding the rule and the pleasure no longer limited by the 'major operator of symbolisation' as the Name of the Father. From this point of view the Seminar X and the introduction to the object *a* represent the start of the improvement of what Lacan had anticipated with great foresight at the end of the Thirties announcing the decline of the father and his function in the future. Since Lacan investigated the pleasure that doesn't fall into the naming of the meaning of the father and makes of this pleasure the deepest nucleus of the symptom of the subject, the non crossable one, the issue of the ruling of the subjective position whom the metaphor of the father had given its maximum accomplishment of meaning takes on a necessary amendment. In this case can we still examine the problem? In which ways?

A whole perspective opens up and helps us to approach the issue of the rule to its own dimension that progressively will become more central for Lacan, ie the symptom. The road towards this direction is initiated by the subsequent comparison of Lacan between the symptom and the Name of the Father that makes of the symptom a function that equals the one of the Name of the Father identifying in this way the way of its decline. On this new basis I believe it is possible to question the problem of the rule of pleasure that the metaphor of the father focuses on the centrepiece of the fallus in the subjective desire around the function of the symptom. It is through the symptom that the subject normalises what becomes possible in his relationship to pleasure that the meaning of the father would fail to name at all. Even if this seems like a paradox from an epistemological point of view it is normal to question oneself whether the symptom might identify itself in a new way in the issue of a more individual or even singular (in the words of Canguilhem) rule of pleasure.

The Lacanian psychoanalysis leads to this new perspective that Jacques-Alain Miller (*Ib.*) has defined as the function of a new father who knows that there is a pleasure that can be confined to its meaning and that does not believe in the metaphor of the father that can give an integral naming of pleasure: this is the father who is an analyst and whose function aims at investigating the real symptom and therefore questions himself whether the pleasure of each one of us can be necessarily named by its meaning.

Italian translation's team : Daniele Maracci, Marco Bani, Chiara Tartaglione, Monica Vacca, Daniela Simone

Footnotes

¹ Cfr. G. Canguilhem, *Le normal et le pathologique*, PUF, Paris 1993 e anche, *Ecrits sur la médecine*, Seuil, Paris 2002.

O like...

OBJECT, OBJECT A • M.A. VIEIRA
OBSESSION • S. COTTET
OEDIPUS COMPLEX • S. TENDLARZ
OTHER • P. NAVEAU

The *objet petit a* and the Name-of-the-Father (or the psychoanalysis of the trash)

Marcus André Vieira

HOLE

An analysis is kind of like cleaning up our houses. The feeling is that of anyone that tidies up their home: “I’ve got too many things here”. Paying attention to what is essential, however, doesn’t take away the feeling of strangeness, for even the most intimate object is never singular enough. Therefore, it’s not necessary to search for alligators under the bed to verify the famous freudian saying: “The ego is not master in it’s own house”. It suffices to realize how our possessions belong, in fact, to the Other.

The analytical pair consists of an Other and a subject. The first one has everything but a name for the singularity of the latter. This lack of a name is essential, because, for each one of them, it preserves a space that was not colonized by the Other and is out of the subject’s reach. As for the origin of this lacking, Freud reffers to the mythical assassination of the Father. Dead, he carries with him the secret of the true *jouissance*, keeping his children together surrounding his absence.

During his 10th seminar, Lacan adds to this freudian picture the *objet petit a*. Since every object belongs, first of all, to the Other, it’s necessary the loss of something for there to be something missing. The castration, hole in the Other, receives, as it’s fundamental correspondent, the objectal presentification of the reality of the loss.

The body, also lended by the Other, will be the space from which this irreducible remainder is extracted. It’s mythical shape will be the *placenta-lamella*: what comes between the “I” and the Other – it doesn’t belong to anyone of them. It’s subjective presentation won’t be deprived of anguish, for the subject its obscures the Other, and for the Other it crushes the subject.

The *a object* questions, however, the freudian myth for putting the essentiality of the lack under suspicion. It locates it, just like the unconscious, at the time of a beat. As an opening, it might shut down if it’s object, no matter how anguishing it is, stops presenting itself. Would the myth of the Father really be equivalent to the myth of the lamella? The loss of the object exclusively correspondent to the advent of the Name-of-the-Father?

OBJECT

The simpler way of trying to come up with an answer, I believe, consists in starting off with the pair proposed by J. A. Miller as the first reference to the analytical situation. It is not so much, in analysis, something about what is said and a saying that insists in what was said. It’s about something that is heard and something listened in what was heard. The “saying” and “what was said” are displaced. The essential happens between what was “heard” and a “saying” that could have been listened there.¹

Aside from valorizing the presential aspect of the Other – slightly less important when the previous pair is emphasized, a distinction of the lacanian structuralism – this promotion of “what is heard” changes the statute of our fundamental partner. The Other of “what is heard” distinguishes itself from the Other of “what was said”. What is said consists of a pair of signifiers, a minimal chain. It demands an essential gap between it’s elements, S1-S2, where the subject takes shelter. The Other that possesses what is heard, however, inscribes the presence of the signifier in the real. The paradigmatic experience of injury, or even of imperative hallucination, gives us an idea of what would be it’s presence.²

The end of an analysis deals with this Other, demonstrates the pass (*témoignage de passe*) of Leonor Ferfer. Once the frame of fantasy is deputed, she sees herself captive of an Other whose presence is that of “a mouth stuck to the ear”. The interpretation locates a “you listen too much, there’s a lot of accumulation but little remainder”. A “razor” is placed between the mouth of the Other and the ear of the patient, where the extraction of a remainder will lead to the possibility of not hearing the Other in the same way.³

Something must come between the ear and what is heard, something that stops the continuous flux of sounds and allows it to be cut into several sayings. That is what happens to a character in “Budapest”, by Chico Buarque, while listening to the news on the hungarian TV: “I couldn’t tell where each word began or where they ended, it was impossible to differentiate one word from the other, it would have been like wanting to cut a river with a knife [...]. I was listening to those mixed sounds when suddenly I heard the clandestine word: *Lufthansa*. Yes, that was what I needed to be able to understand all the vocabulary”.⁴

In both cases, however, it was not something that was missing that took action. We can say that instead of an *olvido*⁵ [what was heard] (the fundamental forgetfulness of the repression) between what was heard and what was said, we find what remains, “the only proof and assurance of the alterity of the Other”.⁶

This Other is close to the most important partner of the contemporary man. Described by J. A. Miller as *notwhole*, this Other is a social form that differs from the brother’s collective, where the limitation by paternal exception is the rule.⁷ It is not organized surrounding a central hole. It does not have a shape because it lacks is lacking. For us to be able to imagine it, it suffices to see what we call as “market” as a way of life *notwhole*. It’s capricious and without precise limits. No object, however, escapes from it. The indians? They have cell phones already. The tibetan monks? They write best-sellers.

The mothers know him well. Even though they knew a lot, they submitted themselves, till not very long ago, to a hierarchized Other and transmitted the efficacy of the lack by consenting with a higher knowledge, out of reach. Today they know little, but they have as a prevalent partner an Other that has virtually all the answers in little knowledges, close to a button of a mouse. At the first difficulty with a child, a team of experts is called and they quickly deliver a diagnosis of hyperactivity and suggest the child take ritaline. Instead of the lack in the Other as an element that constitutes a subject, we see in action an Other virtually without lack that does not deal with subjects, but with objects.

TRASH

The Other *notwhole* is correlative to what J. A. Miller designated as “rain of objects”. They are the gadgets, that come forward with the “ascention to the social zenit of the *objet a*”⁸. How, under these circumstances, can we keep our clinical conception of the *a* object as essentially inaccessible?

More than never we have the impression that the intermediation between what was “heard” and what was “listened” vanishes. There are plenty of examples of subjects that act without anything that could explain what happened if not a simple invitation to action by friends, for example. The disproportion between the act and it’s subjectivation seems to highlight the emptying of the function of the paternal *olvido*⁵ and the strong necessity that something comes between what a father says today and what a child listens to.

In a world where silence is not the gold-pattern of what is said anymore, where we have phrases like: “what doesn’t appear, disappears”, the analyst has to materialize his desire, presenting himself in the city – in hospitals, prisons, slums – to materialize the unconscious. We often see him stablishing the distance between what is heard and what is said with his own body, as if the applied psychoanalysis was mistaken with the front line of a war with no boundaries. In this situation, the analyst must struggle with his own object that is everything but a corporeal unity.

It is possible that in these delicate situations we might still have to learn from the remainder-function of the *a object*. It’s “pure logical consistence” must not make us forget it’s presence of dejection, even if it is absolutely partial and with no participation whatsoever in the imaginary shapes of the body.⁹

The most direct way to incarnate this totally assymmetric substance is by the remainder. It is just necessary to add that when the loss abandons the object, as it seems to occur with the contemporary Other, maybe the best way to find it is in the trash.

Where there is trash there are men, Lacan says. The trash locates the very human point where the signifier and the real meet in the symptom way: more excess than lack. It is the failure of the civilization and, because of that, the heart of the culture. It realizes the paradox of the *objet a*: a remainder that has no place in the Other, but it depends on him¹⁰.

The trash marks the limit of an active real, essential to the dance of desires that agitates men because it adds to them the ballast of the impossible. After all, not everything that makes men will be human if everything that the Other says is directly absorbed. The real with which the analyst deals is close to this essentially non-recyclable trash, that resists not only the determinations of the paternal Other, but also the demands of recycling of our corporative Other.

An entire industry of the remainder shows today the impressive capacity of the reproximity of the objects by the capital. All of them? It suffices to contemplate the debries that accumulate in the peripheries of the big cities to be convinced of how much the utopic total recycling of trash depends on how many steps were coquered in the scale of richness.

“There is nothing more fascinating than these nocturnal beings that grab the trash bins, with an utility that is impossible to comprehend”, says Lacan¹¹. Maybe the analyst is, in his own way, a trash retriever, especially the non-recyclable one, so that he can build something with the definitive mark of what is singular. May the psychoanalytical spirit of *bricolage* allow him to carry on, becoming the addressee of the remainders that draw the place of the object so that, with a little bit of luck, it can give it style, a home.¹²

Translated by Helena Deccache.

Footnotes

- 1 Cf. Miller, J. A. «Pièces détachées», *L'orientation lacanienne*, 2004-2005 (unpublished), lesson from 17/11/2004. The starting point it's the assertion “it is said and gets lost behind what we say upon what we hear” (Lacan, J. *Outros Escritos*, Rio de Janeiro, JZE, 2003, p. 448). In such a reading, the phrase demonstrates, the other way around: “what was said” (what we say), “what was heard” (what we hear) and a “saying” (it is said). This complex depends on the subjunctive of a stay/remainder forgotten (*reste oublié*). Cf. Vereecken, C. “La voix, le silence, la musique”, *Quarto n. 54*, Bruxelles, 1994, p. 90.
- 2 Lacan says the same thing when he locates language as an elucubration of knowledge starting from *lalangue* (cf. Lacan, J. *Le Séminaire, livre XX*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 126).
- 3 Ferfer, L. «Isso que passa», *Opção lacaniana n. 30*, São Paulo, EBP, 2001.
- 4 Buarque, C. *Budapeste*, São Paulo, Cia. das Letras, 2003.
- 5 In Portuguese and Spanish, the word “olvido” means “to forget”. This word is similar to “ouvido”, which is Portuguese for “ear”. The author played with the almost similarity of these two words.
- 6 Lacan, J. *Le Séminaire, livre X*, Paris, Seuil, 2004, p. 37.
- 7 Miller, J. A. “O Outro que não existe e seus comitês de ética”, *L'orientation lacanienne*, (unpublished), lesson from 04/12/1996.
- 8 Lacan, J. *Outros Escritos*, Rio de Janeiro, JZE, 2003, p. 411. The proximity of an Other not whole to psychoanalysis is maybe “dellusion” as was designated by J. A. Miller in Comandatuba (<http://www.wapol.org/>), but the same doesn't happen with the “machine of the not whole» (cf. Miller, J. A. “Intuitions milanaises”, *Mental, n. 12*, Paris, 2002, p. 17). As for the gadgets, I'm thankful to M. Veras and allow myself to take the reader to the opening of XIV Brazilian Congress of the Freudian Field (cf. Vieira, M. A. “Fazer Análise: do fútil ao fato”, *Opção lacaniana n. 40*, São Paulo, 2004, pp. 21-26).
- 9 Cf. Miller, J. A. “Introduction à la lecture do Séminaire *L'angoisse*”, *La cause freudienne, n. 59*, p. 88; and Zenoni, A. “Le corps de la phénoménologie” *La cause freudienne, n. 59*, p. 106.
- 10 Cf. “The civilization (...) is the gutter”, Lacan, J. «Lituraterra», *Outros Escritos*, Rio de Janeiro, JZE, 2003, p. 11. As for the paradoxical aspects of the object and if it's on real cf. Miller, J. A., *op. cit.* p. 75 e Lacan, J. “L'objet défini comme um reste irréductible à la symbolisation au lieu de l'Autre dépend, néanmoins de l'Autre”, *Le Séminaire, livre X*, Paris, Seuil, 2004, p. 80.
- 11 Lacan, J. *O Seminário livro 13 (O objeto da psicanálise)*, (unpublished), lesson from 15/12/1965. In this same lesson, it can also be read: “The fortuitous conjunction of something written, that has close relations of the *objet a*, gives every non order conjunction of something written the appearance of a trash bin”. It is clear that the trash has an intimate relation with the letter and with the symptom, that cannot be developed here.
- 12 Rio's trash reservatory sustains approximately 15000 people that working during the day never free from the scars of darkness described by Lacan. We know today a great deal about what they do: they recycle. Not just that. It is common in poverty, specially in this trash reservatory, to create something out of remainders (*bricolage*). In this sense, Estamira, a known esquizofrênica, deserves a special place. She affirmed to be married to the spirit of the trahs reservatory “Dr. Cisco Monturo”, and seems to have build her house upon a trash foundation, turning remainder into S1. She was freed from the hallucinations, built her house in the middle of the trash reservatory, educated her children and became known because of her original symptom, that came from creating something out of trash (*bricolage*) (cf. Prado, M. *Jardim Gramacho*, Rio de Janeiro, Argumento, 2005).

Obsession and the Name-of-the-Father

Serge Cottet

The Freudian clinic implicated principally the father in the obsessional symptom. The myth of the dead father finds there a major clinical reference for the Freudian construction of Oedipus. Guilt, self-reproach and conjuring rituals illuminate the ambivalence in play with regard to the father in the obsessional symptomatology.

Certainly the father is loved, but it is the inhibition of this love by hatred that constitutes the conflict of obsessional neurosis. A hatred macerated during childhood is injected adversely into the most authentic feelings of filial love. We recognize there the symptom of the Ratman, who, as a child, would spit out any word he could find as an insult to his father. Later, in analysis, his thoughts were just as unpleasant when directed towards the person of Freud, an eminent *Vatervertreter* in the transference. This verifies the Oedipal aggressiveness of the subject.

FROM THE DEAD FATHER TO THE MORTIFICATION OF DESIRE

This schema nevertheless calls for some rectifications: since love relations are marked by the same ambivalence, that is to say that the subject cannot love without destroying, we are founded in asking if the paradoxes of desire find their justification entirely in this hatred for the father. This is the displacement made by Lacan, who centers the affectivity of the obsessive on the imaginary prevalence of the ego. The schema L makes it possible to situate the place of the dead father on the symbolic axis while the mortification of the ego occupies the imaginary axis.

Turning away from Freud's « Totem and Taboo », the analysts of the 1950s placed pre-Oedipal aggressiveness at the center of obsessional neurosis. The influence of Melanie Klein gave the best part to the destructive drives. The confusion engendered by Kleinism gave birth to the thesis of a continuity between obsessional neurosis and paranoia. There is nothing to this. Lacan attributed the aggressive drives to self-destruction and this last to the subjective laceration peculiar to the inflation of narcissism in its tension with the symbolic Other.

In France, this theoretical syncretism characterized the work of Maurice Bouvet¹, one of Lacan's adversaries at the time. There was a doctrinal interest in cause with respect to the question of obsessional neurosis: one position centered the symptom on regression, the other maintained the axis of the relations between the Name-of-the-Father and desire.

Oedipus is hardly of more use. As early as the Seminar I, Lacan has recourse to a Hegelian schema: the relation of the master to the slave.² The obsessive awaits the death of the master so he can put off the moment of his *jouissance*³. The function of the Other death contributes to the deconstruction of the Freudian Oedipus. The obsessive denies the Other in his function of normativizing desire. This is the reverse of hysteria, which supports on the contrary the desire of the impotent father. A countersense concerning the father, in a way a false cognition as the CBTs would say, is here in play. The father is supposed to prohibit desire, while it is its very destruction that annuls the necessary mediation of the symbolic in the advent of this latter.

This results in consequences for the conception of the superego. The superego is not the interiorisation of the law of the father, but the consequence of a scission in the symbolic order: it is what is not understood in the law that produces this imaginary gap.⁴ The superego appears in the place of the Name-of-the-Father. Which accounts for its obscene and ferocious injunctions.

THE FATHER OR THE PHALLUS?

The private religion of the obsessive finds its place here. The phenomenology of the symptoms illustrates concretely the catholic, apostolic and Roman dogma of the Eucharist in a degraded form. To the Christian God the "real presence" of the phallus is substituted. Lacan interprets the scene of the ghost of the Ratman's father in the sense of an insult to the real presence of the phallus. The masturbatory ritual highlights the degradation of the symbolic phallus into an imaginary phallus.⁵

Lacan makes a similar comment on the case of an obsessional woman, which he takes from Bouvet. Her sacrilegious thoughts were supported by the following fantasy: “she represented in her imagination the masculine genital organs in the place of the host”⁶. The debasement of the symbolic is not to be confused with Oedipal aggressiveness.

The destruction and restitution of the Other rhythm a temporal pulsation whose logic resides in the relation of the subject to the impossible of its desire. In the “Direction of the cure”, Lacan gives an example of an obsessive patient in which the Oedipal reference is limited to the parents’ relation to each other while “the general combinatory” requires the designation of two concepts: the Other and the phallus. Here, the dialectic of desire and demand keep us at a distance from imaginary aggressions: “he was brought to recognize the place he had in the destructive game exercised by one of his parents with respect to the desire of the Other. He feels how powerless he is to desire without destroying the Other and so his desire itself, inasmuch as it is the desire of the Other”⁷ The phallic inflation is substituted here: the impotent subject renounces having it in order to be it .

These modifications do not spare the Freudian doctrine. In “Totem and Taboo”, Lacan rectifies the myth of the dead father. We know that on this point Freud is more Christian than Jewish: from “Totem and Taboo” to “Moses and Monotheism”, the murder of the father constitutes the repressed act that accounts for religious rituals and guilt. Obsessional neurosis is a private religion.

Freud thus finds in his myth “a singular equilibrium of the Law and of desire, a sort of co-conformity between them”, while the *jouissance* of the father remains “always veiled and unfathomable”⁸, which is what gives to it a tone of perversion. Does the dead father sustain the function of the Name-of-the-Father as symbolic father? Here we are in contact with Freud’s neurosis, in other words, Freud saves the father.

Another articulation is possible: a structural operator other than Oedipus exists, which is the impossible desire, impossible by the very supremacy of *jouissance*. From this we have the paradox: “the dead father is *jouissance*”⁹

After this, Lacan will try to articulate in new terms the relation between the demand for love addressed to the father and guilt. The seminar XXIII, “Le Sinthome” (1975-1976) dismantles the Freudian myth relative to the love of the father. Since guilt cannot exist previous to the law, and the sons prohibit everything to themselves after the murder of the father, it is because the only fault to be expiated is to have failed to love¹⁰. There is then another version of the Name-of-the-Father in obsessional neurosis that we find by way of another facet of Freudism. It is not a question of the symbolic father but of the real father. The legal father masks an illegal father. A rereading of the Ratman, notably, brings to light these two fathers: the father of the family myth and the function of the cruel captain. The latter exposes the function of the pleasure-seeking Master in the fantasy as opposed to the dead father¹¹.

This other version of the father makes it possible to articulate the obsessive’s imperative of *jouissance* with the degradation of the Name-of-the-Father: the correlation is confirmed with still more evidence in the case of a father who, in analysis himself, is prey to a sadistic obsession vis-à-vis his offspring.

A CASE OF PÈRE-VERSION¹²

A mature patient reveals an obsession concerning his eldest son. A divorced father, during many years of his analysis he had developed a long series of complaints and reproaches against his father, an authoritarian patriarch from whom he was incapable of detaching himself: he was Anchises carrying the weight of the paternal will by pursuing the same professional direction, assuring the renown of a financial dynasty. As for himself, he organizes the dependence of his children by supporting them financially without imposing a limit on the time this will last. The subject authorizes himself very little *jouissance* of this advantage.

His oblativity is connected to a strict asceticism, on the model of his father, for what concerns his needs, while he throws his money out the window and is stripped of his assets by different mistresses.

During his analysis, this man elaborated the relation that linked the failure of his love life with his myth of a sterile financial almightiness. He renounces this potlatch and allows himself to rend the destiny laid out for him by his family history. He, who up till then, without ambition, had been content to be the loyal manager of the paternal fortune, launches on a career of a determined and aggressive businessman. He changes his life, remarries, and in short, he makes a name for himself.

It is in this context of separation that the obsession emerges: he is humiliating his son in a parody of sodomization. His sublimational exuberance is paid for by a cynical balance; the new ambition is connected to the unbearable imperative: at this point the sacrifice of Abraham is evoked.

The fault of the father is his *jouissance* above and beyond the imaginary debt. By making a name for himself, the subject broke the chain of submissive generations. He makes his son pay without yet elucidating what price he himself has paid for his own submission to the avaricious *jouissance* of his father. He now has to discover the benefits of this new nomination.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

- ¹ M. BOUVET, 1953, « Le moi dans la névrose obsessionnelle », *Revue française de psychanalyse*.
- ² NDT, In the English translation, these are given as the lord and the bondsman.
- ³ Séminaire I, p.315
- ⁴ Séminaire I p.221-222
- ⁵ Séminaire VII, p.290
- ⁶ Séminaire VIII, p.303
- ⁷ « Direction de la cure », p. 630.
- ⁸ J. Lacan, *Des Noms-du-père*. Paris : Seuil, 2005, p. 88-89.
- ⁹ Séminaire XVII, p .143.
- ¹⁰ Séminaire XVII, p .143
- ¹¹ On the obscene partriarch (Vaterarsch), see also : S. Freud « Mythological parallels to a plastic obsessional representation »
- ¹² NDT I've kept the French because I've yet found no satisfying English equivalent. For those who know no French, I need only indicate that « père » in French is « father ».

The Other and the Name-of-the-Father

Pierre Naveau

“Say what you like, you have to admit that the Christian religion has something surprising about it”¹.

The signifier and its locus - What is the order of the relationship between the Name-of-the-Father as *signifier* and the Other in its capacity as *locus* of the signifier? Indeed, once the Name-of-the-Father is conceived as a signifier, the question to be asked is this : Is it or is it not *in* the Other, considered here as locus of the signifier?

Russell's Paradox – At the end of “On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis”, Lacan’s definition of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father introduces a nuance between *in* and *of*: “The Name-of-the-Father is the signifier that, *in* the Other, in its capacity as locus of the signifier, is the signifier *of* the Other, as locus of the law”².

Such a definition implies that : $NF \hat{=} O_{\text{signifier}}$ and that: $NF = S(O_{\text{law}})$.

If the Other is approached like a set, is not the consequence of this definition that the Name-of-the-Father is both an element of the set and the name of the set? But can the element of a set be both a set and an element of itself? We then come up against Russell’s paradox. Does not the Name-of-the-Father, as a signifier of the Other, constitute a sort of Other of the Other? We thus find ourselves grappling with what Jacques-Alain-Miller calls “the curse of Russell”³.

Lacan’s introduction of the S(barred O) in “The Subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire” entails a rupture.

The signifier S(barred O) means that there is no Other of the Other. As a consequence, the signifier of the Other S(O) does not exist. The Name-of-the-Father ceases to be a chosen and privileged signifier and becomes a signifier among others. Henceforth, a Name-of-the-Father has to be situated within a multiplicity of Names-of-the-Father. The definition, by Lacan, of the signifier S(barred) means that the signifying chain is articulated not in the Name-of-the-Father, but in the signifier S(barred O): “The signifier S(barred O) is the signifier for which all the other signifiers represent something (the subject, in this instance). In the absence of this signifier S(barred O), all the other signifiers would represent nothing”⁴. A rupture therefore occurs. We have thus made a leap from the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, as signifier of a *non-lack* in the Other, to the signifier S(barred O), as signifier of a lack in the Other. The particular consequence of such a leap is this: There is no guarantee. A statement has no other cause than its enunciation. This consequence highlights the importance of the leap that is accomplished by the act of enunciation.

The father is a metaphor – The metaphor of the Father, Lacan says, is “a separation principle”⁵. A metaphor substitutes one signifier for another. Here the metaphor substitutes the Name-of-the-Father for that signifier that Lacan calls “the place symbolized by the absence of the Mother”⁶ and which he thus designates “the Desire of the Mother”⁷. The substitution in question signifies that the link to the father supersedes the link to the mother.

In his “Address to the Catholics”, Lacan proposes a formulation of the metaphor of the Father by contrasting, on the one hand, the invisible with the visible, and on the other hand, the law with the flesh: “The primacy of the invisible, in as much as it characterizes the promotion of the paternal link, founded on faith and the law, prevails over the maternal link, which is itself founded on a manifest carnality”⁸.

The fight of faith against the flesh – Saint Augustine evokes the wound that the fight of faith, against *the concupiscence of the flesh*, opens up in the body of the sinner. The soul, writes Saint

Augustine, aspires “to be liberated from the glue of concupiscence”⁹. In the tenth book of his *Confessions*, Saint Augustine’s link to God is tied to privation, which he determines to abide by: “It is continence that you require of me”¹⁰, he writes. In fact, as he notes more precisely, continence before the triple modes of concupiscence – the flesh; curiosity; and arrogance, pride and ambition¹¹. *Concupiscence, curiosity, arrogance* – these are what Pascal calls “our impotences”¹². They are what he could equally have called “our modes of jouissance”. At the very heart of the metaphor of the Father, the battle rages between the signifier and the flesh – that is to say the drive. In this respect, the human condition is *misery* for Saint Augustine, and *unworthiness* for Pascal. Only thought, that is we could say, the signifier, Pascal maintains, allows man to escape his condition. Indeed, we remember that faint swaying that the inspiration of Pascal’s phrase evokes: “Man is (before the wind, we could add) a mere reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed”¹³. This reed that bends but does not break. For we also remember, of course, the humble reed confronted with the arrogance of the oak tree: The Tree stood firm, the Reed, it bent / But the wind redoubled... etc., etc.”¹⁴.

The Name-of-the-Father as a signifier – If, guided by Lacan’s hand, we follow Saint Augustine and Pascal, then the Name-of-the-Father appears to have been invented in order that the dignity of the signifier – through it, to be precise – (would ?) be called into question. When, for example, Lacan speaks of that strange thing that is the “signifiable”, in as much as it is raised to the function of the signifier, does he not mean by this that the “signifiable” in question is thus raised to the dignity of the signifier? Function and dignity are consonant.

This consonance is precisely what is in question in Act 2 of Claudel’s play, entitled *The humiliated Father*, and whose heroine bears the sweet name of Thought. This fallen signified is a way of pointing to the gash, the fault, the wound, through which the Name-of-the-Father is reached in its position as signifier.

For, there is no Father without a signifier. This is what Lacan emphasises in his texts “The symbolic, the imaginary and the real”: “The Name-of-the-Father creates the function of the Father”¹⁵ and in *Seminar III*: “Before there was the Name-of-the-Father, there was no Father”¹⁶. In this respect, a shift comes about in Lacan’s approach to the Name-of-the-Father. When the Name-of-the-Father was one, it was something heavy. Once multiplied, it became light. “When it comes down to it, the Name-of-the-Father is something light”, says Lacan in his *Seminar on the sinthome*¹⁷.

The case of Stephen Dedalus – When Lacan evokes the hole in the Other that this exclusion of the Name-of-the-Father gives rise to, brought about by its “foreclosure”, the expulsion thus effected does not turn on the person of the Father, but on the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father. Lacan articulates Joyce’s symptom – Joyce the Artist – in the following terms: “He remains rooted in the father, but the father is all the while repudiated”¹⁸. The term “repudiation” is a strong one. The expulsion at issue concerns the link that makes the element a member of the set: NF // O.

When the link is broken between the Name-of-the-Father as signifier and the Other as locus of the signifier, the symptom, which Lacan speaks of in relation to Joyce, writes the paradox that consists in the fact of *being linked to something with which you have broken the link*.

In *Ulysses*, Lacan points out that there is a *father somewhere* for Stephen Dedalus. This father is not his father, Simon Dedalus, but Leopold Bloom. Jacques Aubert has drawn attention to a sort of missed encounter which shows that, in Stephen Dedalus’ case, the signifier of the Father fails to fulfill its function as a signifier. Bloom invites Stephen – who has nowhere to sleep – to stay with him. Stephen refuses this invitation: “Was the offer to put him up accepted? Promptly, without explanation, politely and with gratitude, it was refused”¹⁹. This evocation of such an avoidance, of such evasion and shirking, has a Beckettian resonance. Lacan comments on this refusal as follows: “In contrast to Bloom – a father who seeks a son for himself – there is *very little in it for me* for Stephen. After the father that I have had, I have had a bellyful of it. No more father”²⁰. Stephen wants nothing more to do with the signifier Father.

As a consequence, there where Saint Augustine, in his relation to the metaphor of the Father, *finds faith*, Stephen Dedalus, for his part, loses it. When Stephen is 16 years-old, his friend Cranly pushes him into a tight corner. Even if he has lost the love of God, he can at least hang on to his love for his mother! For, Cranly argues, “whatever the mother *feels* when she carries her child in her body, at least that is *real*”²¹. It is the flesh of her flesh. Here we find again what founds the link to the mother – that is, what Lacan calls, in his “Address to the Catholics”, “a manifest carnality”. Stephen is tormented by the demons of the flesh. On this point, Joyce makes particular reference to Saint Augustine and Pascal. Stephen is engulfed in the concupiscence of the flesh. That is his hell: “That was the work of the Devil: to scatter his thoughts, over-cloud his conscience, assailing him at the gates of the cowardly and corrupted flesh.”²²

At the end of *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Cranly urges Stephen to renounce his faith, and, as a Catholic, to become a Protestant. Philippe Sollers likes to quote Stephen’s retort:” What sort of deliverance would it be to forsake one absurdity that is logical and coherent, in order to embrace another that is illogical and incoherent?”²³ By way of summary, for Stephen, the religion of the Name-of-the-Father is an absurdity. All that is left for him, as he confides to Cranly, is this wish – to express himself freely in his art²⁴. His weapons, as Lacan emphasises, are: silence, exile and cunning²⁵. Henceforth, it is for Stephen Dedalus to see to it that the hole in the Other makes itself a symptom, in the form of the sonorous and equivocal flesh of the signifier. This leads Joyce to a particular use of the signifier in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. The point of articulation between the link and the locus becomes the target of his revolt and his irony. As a consequence, the art of the artist that Joyce is, is a way of supplementing the failure of the link between the Name-of-the-Father as signifier and the Other as locus of the signifier.

Translated by Michèle Julien

Footnotes

- ¹ Pascal, *Pensées*, édition by Philippe Sellier, Pocket, Paris, 2003.
- ² Lacan J., “On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis”, *Écrits*, Seuil, Paris, 1966, p. 583.
- ³ Miller J-A., “Note on one thing leading to another”, in Lacan J., *Seminar XXIII The sinthome*, Seuil, Paris, 2005, p. 211 to 215.
- ⁴ Lacan J., “Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire”, *Écrits*, op. cit., p. 819.
- ⁵ Lacan J., “Position of the unconscious”, *Écrits*, op. cit., p. 849.
- ⁶ Lacan, J., “On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis”, *Écrits*, op. cit., p. 557.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 557.
- ⁸ Lacan J., “Address to the Catholics”, Lacan’s *Paradoxes*, Seuil, Paris, 2005, p.38.
- ⁹ Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, Paris, 1998, p. 1009.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1008.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1008.
- ¹² Pascal, *Pensées*, op. cit., p. 160.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 181.
- ¹⁴ La Fontaine, “The oak tree and the reed”, *Fables*, Le Livre de Poche, p. 85-86.
- ¹⁵ Lacan J., “The symbolic, the imaginary and the real”, *Paradoxes de Lacan*, Seuil, Paris, 2005, p. 55.
- ¹⁶ Lacan, J., *Seminar III, The Psychoses*, Seuil, Paris, 1982, p. 344.
- ¹⁷ Lacan J., *Seminar XXIII The sinthome*, op. cit. p. 121.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.70.
- ¹⁹ Joyce J., *Ulysses*, New translation edited by Jacques Aubert, Gallimard, Paris, 2004, p.862.
- ²⁰ Lacan J., *Seminar XXIII The sinthome*, op. cit., p. 69.
- ²¹ Joyce J., *A Portrait of the artist as a young man*, Gallimard, Paris, 1992, Folio, n° 2432, p. 347.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 210.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 349.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 353.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

P like...

PATERNAL METAPHOR • J.F. PEREZ
PASS • **G. BELAGA** / **M. KUSNIEREK** / **P. MONRIBOT** / C. RENNO LIMA
PERVERSION • O DELGADO / **A. MERLET**
PHALLUS • M. CHORNE
PHOBIA • **C GARCIA** / M. GOLDENBERG
POETRY • J. ATTÉ
POST-MODERNITY • J. YUNIS
PROCREATION • F ANSERMET
PSYCHOSES • R. WARTEL
PSYCHOTHERAPY • P. HELLEBOIS

The Pass and the Name of the Father

On the side of the Baroque

Guillermo A. Belaga

The theory of the Pass formulated by J. Lacan starts from a questioning of the Oedipus, of the obscuring and coagulating effect that the defense of the Ideal Father, the dead Father, produces in psychoanalytic practice¹.

From this perspective it is a new procedure to evaluate the formation of analysts, the passage of analysand to analyst and the shaping of the desire of the analyst.

To this end, the jury of the Pass is directed² to evaluate the Oedipal ideology present at the end of the analysis, starting from:

1) In the symbolic: the critique of the Oedipal myth.

2) In the imaginary: to rectify the formation of analysts in psychoanalytical societies, on account of the function they attribute to the Ideal Father, because they conform to this Ideal of the Father.

3) In the real: the rise of a world organized around all forms of segregation, correlative with the universalisation of the subject proceeding from science.

This proposal on the Pass will bring many controversies, amongst other things because it differentiates from Freud's desire as an analyst who wanted to support the ideal father with Oedipus. Faced with this, Lacan formalized the myth under the signifier of the Name of the Father, responding with a desire of the analyst that would be written in the baroque phrase "the father, it is possible do it without him, on the condition of making use of him".

At present, the incidence of Lacan's teaching brings us also to the question of what is the presence of 'Lacan's desire' in the examination of the Pass.³

In this sense, in Seminar XX he recognizes the pertinence of those who say that his discourse "participates in the baroque"⁴. On this basis, F. Regnault qualified this desire as elliptic, emphasizing his choice of the Keplerian metaphor: of the ellipse where in one point is the focus and in the symmetrical one there is nothing, as an ethical choice, a mark of style⁵.

In this respect, J.A. Miller speaking on this theme affirms that the expression and the question of Lacan's desire must be introduced so that the use of his signifiers does not have the result of a certain identification with him, which would constitute an obstacle. In this way, thinking that the desire of Lacan can occupy one of the focuses of the ellipse, it will not be the same if it occupies the solar center or the empty center, if it is the motor of our wandering, or the Name of The Father as hole. Then, extending this formula, the structure of the desire of the analyst becomes something opaque, one by one, which illustrates how the neurosis particular to the position of the analyst has been marked. Involved in the configuration of this desire are, on one hand, the reasons that each subject has for his decision for psychoanalysis and the incidence of the desire of Lacan in this, and on the other hand, what it costs each analyst to conform his desire to the desire of the analyst, and what would be the degree of divergence from the desire of Lacan.

Moreover, this would reaffirm that in the end a particular relation to psychoanalysis is established, organized from a mode of jouissance and a style of life.

In a more general form, the reference to the baroque will be fundamental in Lacan's teaching to think the *parlêtre* and sexuality, the relation between the Name of the Father and feminine *jouissance*. And to situate psychoanalysis with respect to science and religion.

In this sense, on the religious slope, baroque art has its root in the Catholic doctrine of original sin. It arises with the Counter-Reformation in response to the Lutheran questioning, and reflects the ‘know how’ of the Church, aware of the determining effect of the scopic upon the subject, in relation to which there is on one side the order of *jouissance* and on the other side the order of truth. Both can and must coexist, but they should not be mixed up in an operation that leaves *jouissance* pacified by truth⁶.

For this reason, after verifying in the churches of Rome the ‘obscene’ of this art of the exhibition of the bodies, Lacan defines it as “a regulation of the soul by the corporal gaze”. Adding that it is a parody of Christianity, inscribing on one side the passion of a body that suffers and, on the other, inventing a God as the one who enjoys. In order to draw up a binary in which on one side is the law of language, the function of the Father who prohibits, assigning here the loss of *jouissance*, that of the guardian of sexual sense and phallic *jouissance*; and on the other side, a ‘beyond’ of the same, a supplementary *jouissance*, feminine *jouissance*.

From this we can gather that, while Freud stops at the Name of the Father held in a logic that preserves a universal where “for all x” is valid, for Lacan the end of analysis is a route that perforates the paternal metaphor to the desire of the mother and the supplementary *jouissance* of the woman that exceeds all measure, and that belongs to a logically inconsistent set that is called “the not-all”.

On the side of science, the baroque shows how the subject was affected in all its imaginary representation from the moment of a change of symbolic position. In this respect, E Laurent comments that at the moment at which the subject of science was put in place, the art of anamorphosis produced by means of optical effects a re-inscription of the body on the imaginary landscapes, reinstalling “the new weddings of the body and space” that science had broken down⁷.

In this sense, Holbein’s picture ‘The Ambassadors’ is a metaphor of the analytical treatment and of the pass, in as much as it demonstrates in principle how the neurotic attempts to choose his own point of view so that the death skull of the anamorphosis does not appear to him. A question which is reached at the exit, and which can be theorized in different ways according to whether the end is formulated in relation to death, to truth, and/or to *jouissance*. But where in either case the invention of the end - and/or the creation ex-nihilo that Lacan proposes - is not sustained only in the Name of the Father, but rather would be situated more on the side of the Taoist philosophers, who declared that “in the beginning is the void”⁸.

From the point of view of rhetoric, the baroque produces tropes of opposition: irony, antiphrasis, sarcasm, etc: the opposite of what is said with the words is said with the tone. It functions as oximoron, as an anti-semantic cut that produces and sustain all types of semantic discourses, as the variable introduced into the discourse of supposed identity. In this is the contingency that returns to the necessary⁹.

Similarly, we can conceive of a matrix of a passional language between the drive and the definition of the ego as a rhetorical apparatus¹⁰, following the homology that Lacan makes in ‘The Instance of the Letter...’ between the ego’s mechanisms of defense and the tropes and figures of rhetoric, where he mentions periphrasis, ellipsis, suspension, anticipation, digression and irony¹¹.

In my particular case, in the testimonies as AE, I could follow these aspects to describe a temporal arc of the subject that has gone from periphrasis to irony. From the prohibitions, conventions and uses of the language of neurosis - ordered by the Names of the Father in the face of a real without law - to arrive by way of the well said at other discursive modes for the fantasmatic combinatories.

Specifically, the periphrasis that consists of using a phrase to say what could be expressed with a word, illustrating in this way the ‘many returns’ of the subject, ‘piling up words’ in order to cushion the relation of the enunciated to the enunciation, as an attempt at the fullness of sense.

The other figure, irony, without leaving the effects of language, denotes a vector whose horizon is the barred Other: S(A/). Far from mockery, irony is of interest in as much as an ironic enunciation wants to be something that says what there is to say, but does not have the relation to this that the others have.

This can be linked to the mention that Freud makes of periphrasis in ‘Totem and Taboo’, to describe the phenomenon in which some cultures, as part of the nominal taboos tied to mythical tragedy, use this figure instead of pronouncing the proper name¹².

Having said this, if we start from this as a way of designating socially a person or an object by an ‘other thing’ than its name - as was the case of the subject recognized only in a pseudonym – we would arrive at irony as the way of permitting the approximation to a community, even though the inadequation of the subject to this linguistic community always persists. In this way an inscription became effective where is known: the point at which one is identified with the group, the S1 that permits one to have one foot in the Other, but also a foot in the fantasy.

Similarly, if the Freudian myth of the father is inscribed in trauma and in repetition¹³, and in terms of the formulas of sexualization guarantees the ‘All’, periphrasis would be a rhetorical way of locating oneself on the masculine side with the stupid belief that women constitute a class, as men do. In this respect, the treatment of the proper name has a fundamental value in the cure, where the name - which marks and knots the body - was the sign of the impositions, the challenges, the ‘without limit’ of the mother, and of how the mourning for a ‘*gran amor*’ from the past was incarnated in its person. Forms in which were established the connection between the phallic identification with the Name of the Father and the desire of the maternal Other, whose castration was plugged by this circuit. And which in the analytical experience will be led to its inconsistency, opening up the possibility of authorizing oneself in the discourse of the analyst.

A question for which it was necessary to know that the Superego is not the result of the interdiction of the Father, but rather the voice of the *surmoiété* – the way in which Lacan describes the feminine Superego for the man and for the woman – the mortifying imperative, mortifying for whoever rejects confronting the originality of the feminine position, for those who deny the origin of a specific feminine saying where there is a direct incidence of the Other. And which could finally be made incomplete, inconsistent, indemonstrable, unsayable¹⁴.

In this way, we arrive at shaping and rectifying the desire of the analyst from the angle of the modes of response to the ‘song of the sirens’. Finding how to respond without trying to complete, without trying to get a satisfaction, and/or in the way of Ulysses ‘bound’ to the phallic semblant. Arriving at the position of a desire of non-action opposed to the world of the useful, which makes possible the maneuver to push the Other to decide for himself.

To conclude, the prohibition of Freud is a tragic figure, for which Lacan substitutes the Real as impossible. Hence the Pass has only the character of the possible and contingent.

In this sense, neurosis as lack of irony would be to believe excessively in what the signifier drags with it, to take it seriously instead of playing with it¹⁵. “Doing without on the condition of making use of” would correspond in this case to how in the treatment of the real it is possible to arrive at being serious and comic, ironic and radical.

In this way, the style of the end would be closer to the ‘mock-heroic’ or ‘mock-epic’ that would consist of making a laughing-stock of the epic, of the heroic, in as much the hero that supports the analytic epic is evacuated at the end as the residue of his act.

It is thus that the *object a* has its character, the character of revelation of everything that mobilizes a life, the drives, the emotions, the feelings that at the end of the journey, according to this style, are expressed as “it is only that” or “everything turns around nothing more than that”.

Translated by Alicia Maabel Ryan

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- 2 Laurent, E.: "Hay un fin de análisis para los niños", Colección Diva, Bs. As., 1999, pág. 34
- 3 Miller, J.A.: "El deseo de Lacan", colección Diva N° 10, Bs.As., 1999.
- 4 Lacan, J.: "Del Barroco", Seminario XX, "Aún", 1972-73, Ed. Paidós, Bs.As., 1991, pp. 127-141
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- 9 García, G.L.: "El oxímoron", en "Psicoanálisis dicho de otra manera", Ed. Pre-Textos, España, 1983, pp. 149-159.
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The pass and the Name-of-the-Father

Monique Kusnierek

I will treat this binary in four points:

1. The pass designates the moment of passage from the analysand to the analyst, which happens at the end of the analytic experience. Henceforth the analyst is not approached through his practice and a number of criteria that would guarantee him any more, but as the product of his treatment: he is an analysed. The procedure of the pass takes this analysed as the object of its research, is animated by the question of knowing what is an analyst.

This, as Eric Laurent stressed in his commentary of the “Proposition of October...”, is different from the traditional institutional model that left that question aside, eluding it. This model suggested an answer to that question: “Freud knew it (what an analyst is) and it has been transmitted. He knew it as founder first, then as *dead father* from which originated the identification of the sons of the Horde.”

And, indeed, when the knowledge becomes that of the dead father, it gets itself buried and is not questioned any longer. Instead of the experience that was alive come the norms, the standards, the criteria of ability, which are supposed to account for the conformity of the copy to the embalmed model.

It is at that point, Eric Laurent continues, that Lacan set an interrogation. “He emptied the tomb and considered that it was a vain quest to search for the definition of the psychoanalyst in the institutional procedures and its various prescriptions...”; he refocused the question on the analysis of “formation” as experience (with all its diversity and its heterogeneity) and “installed the emptiness of the definition of the analyst instead of the identificatory trait. The procedure of the pass started there: the Analyst does not exist, there is only the existence, one by one, of analysts.”

But this implies that the institution that would welcome and admit this singularity, has to be in tune with a living practice of psychoanalysis.

2. In his Turin theory Jacques-Alain Miller proposes what he calls his theory of the School. In a school, he says, everything is analytically relevant and that is the condition that makes it interesting. He presents this proposition as an axiom as well as an experiential truth.

If everything in the School is analytically relevant it is because the School is caused by the desire of the analyst i.e. “the desire to separate the subject from the master signifiers that collectivize him; to isolate his absolute difference; to circumscribe his subjective loneliness as well as the object surplus of enjoyment that sustains itself with that emptiness and fills it up at the same time.”

Because it is caused by the desire of the analyst, the School, therefore, decollectivizes. It remains, however, that as a community the School is a collective formation. And this is a paradox.

Whether subjective loneliness and collectivity can be knotted together – and they can only be so on this paradoxical mode, depends on the mode of collective logic at play in the School. In order to allow such knotting and to give place to different enunciations in the collective, this logic cannot come under the universal i.e. what operates “for all x”. On the contrary it has to function beyond the Oedipus and follow the model of the set logically inconsistent “which presents itself in the form of a series that has no law of formation”. That is to say as a sum of lonelinesses, each of them exceptional and incomparable to the others. Hence, “the only statement capable of collectivizing the School” is, paradoxically, “that which states it as not-all.”

3. Reversely, if the collective comes under the logic of the universal, it can be united, in a quasi religious manner, by what I would call a logic of anonymity – one does not talk in one’s own name any more but in the name of the collective. It can even happen, in this logic, that this effacement could be considered equivalent to the height of de-identification – that which would allow to gather all in a community at last. That one who excepts himself is then called to order because he endangers the community.

The effacement of what would be a personal enunciation in relation to the conventional and authorized discourse, is however not the sign of a de-identification. On the contrary, it marks the way one belongs to the community which one wears as a uniform. Then one counts oneself amongst the class of the effaced, of the all similarly effaced who speak in the same way, in relation to the dead father that one finds in place again and whose heritage one transmits.

This way of belonging brings probably some not negligible advantages: one belongs to the family, one is not on one’s own; and if one is a good pupil, one gets love. But at what price?

I would say that this effacement is nothing but one of the names of the cult by which one can worship castration. But who comes forth with the mask of castration exposes himself to the return of enjoyment under the guises of sacrifice and mortification. Moreover this has also the effect of putting knowledge in the cupboard because nothing, in this case, should move. The father himself cannot wake up.

The experience of a School, in Lacan’s sense, is different. It is not easier. No question here to blend into the collective or anonymity. One acts in one own’s name, one by one, which of course entails more risks.

4. “(So) the analyst is authorized only by himself”. In his “Italian note” Lacan makes this aphorism the principle of the pass. And, as Eric Laurent remarked, this aphorism condenses the postulate according to which the analyst is the product of the experience led to its end. This supposes that the dead father’s grave is empty and that the question of what is an analyst is reopened.

The School is caused by this question. It is in that respect, it seems to me, that Jacques-Alain Miller in his Turin theory develops the thesis according to which the School, because it comes under the logically inconsistent set, is nothing else than a subject – a barred subject, a new subject supposed to know, an effect of signification produced by the symbolic determinations related to the foundation act of the School. But, similarly to the operation of Lacan on Freud, which introduced “a shift between the cause of Freud’s desire and the Freudian Cause, which has logified Freud’s desire in separating it from its particularity, in uprooting it from the paternal fantasy and extracting from it the form called desire of the analyst”, this subject-School is to be interpreted.

And the analyst, as for him, that one who is only authorized by himself, who does not “fear neither God nor man” insofar as he chose to be part of the School, subjectifies the School and adopts it as an ideal signifier - at the condition though that he repeats Lacan’s interpretation for himself and in his own way. If not, he runs the risk to devote himself in a sacrificial way to the perpetuation of an already constituted knowledge.

This, as Jacques-Alain Miller stressed, constitutes at the same time “the paradox of the School and its bet – which supposes that a community is possible between people who know the nature of semblance and whose ideal, the same for each of them, is nothing but a cause experienced by each of them at the level of their subjective loneliness as their own subjective choice, an alienating choice, even forced perhaps, and implying a loss.”

Translated by Vincent Dachy

The Father, Transference and the pass

Patrick Monribot

The father and the pass can be articulated and disarticulated on the basis of transference. In the pass the becoming of the paternal function is at stake.

‘Doing without the father on the condition of making use of it’ are the two principles brought out by Lacan in 1976 (*Le Sinthome*, p. 136). The first principle conditions the second. The binary of ‘doing without’ and ‘making use of’ is inscribed in the temporality of a cure as verified by the pass. On this account, this binary takes part in the analyst’s formation. In effect, these two principles coincide with two conclusive moments of the end of analysis, two distinct moments separated by a temporal interval. These markers are, on the one hand, the lifting of the misapprehension of the Subject supposed to Know, and, on the other hand, the extraction of the object *a*, the object fallen outside the field of the Other. The future of the father is at stake in this space of the logical time.

TO LIQUIDATE THE LIQUIDATION

What, therefore, is this lapse if not the time required to elucidate the transference? The term ‘resolution’, chosen here, renders all hope of liquidation, so dear to the post-Freudians, obsolete. In mathematics to resolve is to find a solution and it is the opposite of a dissolution.

In *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (p. 267), Lacan contests the vague term ‘liquidation’: “If the transference is the enacting of the unconscious, does that mean that the transference might be a means of liquidating the unconscious? Do we no longer have any unconscious after analysis? Or is it, to take up what I said before, the subject supposed to know who must be liquidated as such?”.

Of course, Lacan evokes the term of ‘liquidation-for’ in the *Preface to the English Language Edition of the Seminar XI (Autres écrits, p. 572)*, but it has to be understood in a very restrained way, given in *Seminar XI* (p. 241): “It can only be, if the term of liquidation means anything, a question of the permanent liquidation of that deception through which transference tends to work in the sense of the closure of the unconscious”.

It is therefore about liquidating the closing transference’, the avatar of the Subject supposed to Know which is not destined for a liquidation in the sense of eradication without any remainder. In *The Psychoanalytic Act*, session of 24 January 1968, it was specified that the illusion of the misapprehension appears when the analytic act reduces the Subject supposed to Know ‘to the function of the object *a*’. Thus, it is not a liquidation of the Subject supposed to Know but a reduction to the remainder that it was masking the little *a*, impossible to liquidate. The fallen object is an indigestible left-over of the transferential banquet in the course of which the analysand ate his *dasein*. But what about the totemic meal?

THE MISAPPREHENSION OF THE SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOW

The time of desupposition does not cancel out the supposed knowledge. It is the subject adjoining the supposition that is destituted. The supposition of knowledge perdures as the true invitation to knowledge. The supposition is thus displaced to other places of elaboration: Schools, instances, pass. But the supposition with regard to knowledge functions as a ‘push to invention’ and no more as a ‘push to deciphering’. The famous *scilicet* of Lacan means this: the desire for knowledge — of knowledge to be invented by the analysand after the pass — takes precedence over the love of knowledge that aims at a knowledge already in abeyance, well sheltered in the Other, and a motor of transference love where a verification of “I don’t want to know anything about it” takes place, which is proper to the transferential resistance. There is an overtaking of ‘the horror of knowledge’ that the love of knowledge

was masking. Such is the transgression obtained from gaining knowledge on the limit of knowledge. In this instant, the wager on the Name-of-the-Father as a guarantee of a universal knowledge about *jouissance*, ceases. And the unconscious is no longer the signifying chain, the factory where to produce sense, but a hole in the sense from which an Other *jouissance*, called feminine, comes to be questioned.

The desire of the analyst allows in the analysand for the desupposition in producing a maximum distance between the capital 'I' of the Ideal and the *a* of the cause such that the identificatory ideals, for which Freud was able to announce their relation to the father, cease to conceal the real that causes desire. Thus we can say that transference is not without a remainder. When the analyst falls from idealisation, when the misapprehension becomes blurred, when a beyond of the Oedipus and of the limits of the paternal function emerges, transference does not disappear. It is simply emptied of the mirage of the Subject supposed to Know, subtracted from the empire of the senses, from the grip of the father, from the span of the paternal metaphor.

The disclosed misapprehension implies the lifting of the mirage tied to the Name-of-the-Father, but this operation does not make it possible, however, to get along radically without the latter. There is no question of declaring oneself non-dupe in order to finish it. The remainder of transference, as incurable as it is, has to be treated by the end of analysis without which it will not take long for it to resuscitate the father who is not so dead as is said.

EXTRACTION OF THE OBJECT¹

The second moment of the extraction of the object from the field of the Other makes effective the first moment of the misapprehension by way of retroaction. This extraction allows for the new relation to knowledge, to *jouissance* and to the father. The Members of the School (AE) of the World Association of Psychoanalysis have shown at what point the act does not aim so much, *in fine*, at countering transference with desupposition as at making the surplus *jouissance* [*plus-de-jouir*] fall outside the place of the Other where the subject had lodged it.

From thereon, as Lacan showed in *The Psychoanalytic Act, comte-rendue* (*Autres écrits*, p. 375), it is on the basis of the object thus extracted, and, in the end, reduced to a consistency of pure logic, that the analytic act becomes possible for the one who ceases to be analysand. He can authorise himself to be a semblant of this object for an other. At the moment of dealing him the final blow, he is no longer authorized by the father but by himself and 'a few others'. Those 'few others', materialised as the jury of the pass, are all the more necessary to the guarantee as there is no longer a father to judge. A few others could not function as pairs referred to the dead father. In the procedure of the pass, they are closer to the ethical committee referred to the inexistence of the Other. They are to judge the effect of the psychoanalytic act in the passant and to bet on his capacity to endorse the responsibility for this type of act.

Is the analytic act not a solution to the incurable of transference rather than a total dissolution of transference? This moment is verified by the pass and the object *a* is its 'hinge', the precise term used by Lacan in reference to the door, the door-sill and the crossing. But the little *a* is only a hinge on the condition that it undergo an extraction thanks to which the inconsistency of the Other is perceived. Its extraction from the Other is obtained by squeezing the signifying chain more closely to the point of emergence of the signifier all alone (S_1). In the final analysis, this conclusive term indicates the traumatic *jouissance* of the signifier on the body and the absence of a possible articulation to any other signifier. This interrupts the chain effect which made the symbolic Other, S_1-S_2 , consistent. For this reason, the signifier 'all alone', S_1 , designates the point where the Other replies no more. This point of failure is equivocal with that which Lacan called the signifier of the lack in the Other ($S(A/)$). These two indelible remainders (S_1, a) are the true stigmata of the inexistence of the Other. They make the alchemy of the ink with which have to be written the letters of *jouissance* allowing the speaking-being to 'know how to do with' the incurable. These letters designate the conclusive symptom, or *sinthome*, as the issue of analysis. The *sinthome* is thus conceived as a mark of a writing necessary to stake out *jouissance* in what the latter has as most real.

The symptom has therefore a double value: literal and ‘littoral’. What’s more in the years 1975-76, Lacan shows that the symptom also has the function of the knotting of the Name-of-the-Father or of the Oedipus. Both knot the real, symbolic and imaginary in the same way. On the basis of this, the symptom can be pronounced ‘*sinthome*’. This borromean equation between *sinthome* and the Name-of-the-Father leads Lacan to state that ‘the father is a symptom’ (*Le Sinthome*, p. 19). This topological equivalence of the father and the symptom, or *sinthome*, has another consequence, that of its possible substitution by an infinite variety of ‘sinthomes’. In effect, the Name-of-the-Father, which is no longer only a signifier, ceases therefore to have a One value. That is why, Lacan can thus propose a pluralised version of ‘the names of the father’. In effect, the function of the father submits to a mutation: the Name-of-the-Father as signifier condensed and assembled under the banner of the One while the *sinthome* equivalent to the father knots that which makes irreducibly three, R S I, even four if one adds the *sinthome* itself to the series. The father no longer assembles as signifier and agent of the metaphor, but knots as *sinthome*.

CONCLUSION

Thanks to the symptom become *sinthome*, a speaking being makes use of the father as a topological knotting. At the end of an analysis, the analysand identifies with the *sinthome* with a possible effect of nomination, and this is the ultimate Lacanian definition of the pass. It is about appropriating one’s residual symptom, of identifying with the incurable part of one’s being of *jouissance*, ‘I am as I *jouis*’ (*Je suis comme je jouis*)², as Jacques-Alain Miller said, and of knowing how to make use of it as a bond. From then on, the analysand can do without the Name-of-the-Father, its effects of metaphor and sense, because he has acquired a borromean use of the father, that is to say *sinthomatic*. Lacan makes of this the sign of a successful analysis (*Le sinthome*, p. 136). It is this symptom, which makes it possible to do without the father, that Lacan raises to the dignity of the *sinthome*.

The issue of transference is determinant. The lifting of the misapprehension opens to the necessity of doing without the father. But this is only effective if the extraction [*déprise*] of the object allows retroactively for an original use of the Name-of-the-Father. The *sinthome* is tied up by definition to the very moment when transference is untied by the finish. Such is the stake of the pass.

Translated by Bogdan Wolf

Footnotes

- ¹ Or *La déprise de l’objet* in distinction to the first moment and the title of the previous section: *La méprise du Sujet supposé Savoir* [TN].
- ² TN: With homophony between “Je suis comme je suis” et “Je suis comme je jouis”.

Perversion and Name-of-the-Father

Alain Merlet

Correlating perversion and the Name-of-the-Father requires psychoanalysis to distance itself both from religion, dominated by the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, and perversion, marked as it is with infamy.

Why did Lacan forge the term of *père-version* in his late teaching, breaking down the term ‘perversion’ into parts? He gave several answers to this question in his seminar *Le sinthome*, and three of them have caught our attention.

i. Firstly, ‘perversion merely means *version towards the father* – [...] all in all, the father is a symptom, or a sinthome, as you will.’¹

ii. Next: ‘the father version [*la père version*] is the sanctioning of the fact that Freud makes everything hang together with the function of the father. [...] the love that may be qualified as eternal, is addressed to the father, by virtue of the fact that he is the bearer of castration.’²

iii. Finally: ‘[...] all human sexuality is perverse, if we follow carefully what Freud says. He never managed to conceive of the said sexuality other than as perverse [...].’³

In his *R.S.I.* seminar⁴, Lacan turns the Borromean knot into the monstration of the plurality of the Names-of-the-Father that the symbolic, the imaginary and the real are. These Names-of-the-Father serve to name something, and, Lacan adds, ‘it’s because it’s about *jouissance* that one believes in it’⁵, specifying that *jouissance* more or less concerns the phallus. In a word, with these answers, the main co-ordinates of the issue can already be made out.

To invent, with the sinthome, a type of symptom that holds up in much the same way as the father, but also in much the same way as perversion, one might, ‘do without it, on the condition that use is made of it.’ With the sinthome, it is a question of obtaining a different result from analysis to a mock religion upheld by a perverse belief in one’s fantasy.

How, at the end of a psychoanalysis, can one get to a symptom that is neither belied by the real [*démenti par le réel*], nor eternally fed by the symbolic, nor veiled by the imaginary?

This is a crucial question for psychoanalysis, and one that Lacan therefore responded to with what he called the sinthome. In order to make the dimension of the real of the symptom more evident – the real of its *jouissance* – Lacan situated his questioning at the same level as what is named of the ‘unnameable’. He turned to the Name-of-the-Father as what names a hole, a name of the father which, if it refers back to God, then it is a God without Being, but which ex-sists with respect to a hole and not a lack.

Lending Being to the father is precisely what the invention of the sinthome avoids, so as not to tumble into the cult of the father or the idolatry proper to perversion. The pervert, as Lacan says in his seminar, *From an Other to the other*, is God’s servant, he renders unto Cesar what is Cesar’s. To achieve this, the pervert spots the moment when the body comes loose from its *jouissance*, so as to give back to the Other what he believes him to have lost. This kind of devotion to the Other, wanting to gain possession of what he has lost in order to return it to him, dooms the pervert to endless activity, for he wants to complete the Other while not perceiving his inconsistency of structure, the object (a) that the pervert hunts out as his partner’s soul not being an element but rather a part of the Other. As Lacan puts it, the pervert ‘*manque donc à son affaire*,’ he falls short of being in his element.

Nevertheless, the sinthome has to ex-sist as the remainder of an analysis, otherwise what would one identify with? To correlate perversion and the Name-of-the-Father by detaching perversion from the

will to jouissance that animates it, is to designate common or generalised perversion such as it is practised by the constant, partial and acephalic drive, ever at work in the sinthome, by virtue of which it is a body-event.

Why did Lacan maintain that Freud was unable to conceive of sexuality other than as perverse? The way that Lacan situates The Woman and God in the register of the Other's inconsistency and a love that is addressed to the real introduce, it seems to me, a semblance of response.

Faced with the horror of female castration, Freud successfully isolated the splitting of the ego linked to the disavowal of castration, as much in the pervert as in the neurotic, but he did not go further, hence his stumbling up against the bedrock of castration that he reports in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'.

The sinthome, which is that of a *parlêtre*, that is, a subject who enjoys a body along with the stumbling block of the sexual non-relation, offers a different psychic reality to the religious or perverse, a hitherto unknown reality that does not stem from the ideal, nor from obscenity, but which enables a jouissance compatible with the living being.

In order to grasp what is at stake in the sinthome from the point of view of *père-version*, we might consider what the sinthome brings in terms of a clarification of perversion such as theology and literature conceive of it, both of which often take evil as the privileged grist for their mill.

We owe to Saint Augustine the invention of the notion of *perversio*⁶ to designate in a given creature the perverse imitation of God, i.e., the sin of pride that pushes ill will to revolve around itself rather than turn to God. This will to jouissance turns away from God to transpose itself toward physical things, and Saint Augustine baptises it even at this early stage with the name of libido, because it is employed in the work of the flesh. At this point, writes bishop Hippo, 'the soul slides towards the less that it takes for the more.'⁷ To get out of this hell and be saved, the soul has no other recourse but to wait for the grace that depends on nothing other than God's good will.

As for literature, it shares all the more the privileged exploration of the existential possibilities proper to perverse experience since it does not come up, at least not directly, against the bodily limit of pain and pleasure. This sometimes leads it to skirt the chasm of the mystic writings. In this respect, writers such as Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowski and Marcel Jouhandeau have left us documents that are all the more precious since the perverts who risk undertaking an analysis are rare. As for the psychoanalytic literature on perversion, it may be summed up as follows: if a pervert comes to see an analyst, it's because he's got the wrong address, and if he comes back, it's because he wasn't a pervert, and if he keeps coming, it's because he wants to pervert the analyst.

From the perspective of the sinthome, unless he turns his 'perversion into his religion and his religion into his perversion,' making him a 'perfect pervert' as Jouhandeau boasted, it may happen that a perverse subject finds his place of *parlêtre* on the couch.

Translated by Adrian Price

Footnotes

- 1 Lacan J., Le Séminaire, livre XXIII, Le sinthome, Seuil, 2005, Paris, p. 19.
- 2 Ibid., p. 150.
- 3 Ibid., p. 153.
- 4 Lacan J., Le Séminaire, livre XXII, 'R.S.I.' (unpublished), 11 March 1975 lesson.
- 5 Id.
- 6 Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, XIV, 13.2.

Phobia and Name-of-the-Father

Célio Garcia

We all are exposed to fear. Fear can be a reaction caused by a feeling of danger or fear of an external object. It can be a signal before panic, eminent danger.

It is true that fear can make us lose tranquillity, we become uneasy, without peace (the French say “effrayé”, a term derived from “ex-fridare”, a feeling of quietude or peace being taken away). French language researchers say that Romans in Pompea’s wall paintings express “effroi” before sex (Quignard, 1994). Fascinated with “fascinus” (phallus), they had lost the sweet expression of “jouissance” that can still be contemplated in the faces of some women in those paintings. Since that time fear would visit the sex’s whereabouts and its respective figuring, in either the parade of its phallic exuberance or its embarrassing disorder.

Today, the fear we deal with has an object, even though this object is not empiric. Let us call it phobia. Phobia will be for us what we will nominate fear. Freud can be regarded as the starting point of our comprehension of what would be phobia (Leguil, 1979). Prior to Freud psychiatry attempted to define the term, but let us consider Freud’s narrative about what he heard from little Hans and his father as our starting point.

The father talked to Freud who talked to Hans who talked to himself, with the intention to calm down his anguish, to name his fear. Sometimes Hans would address to his father directly sure that what he felt was related to him. “Draw me the thing- to- pee, father, draw it”. And the father would not. The father did not authorize himself to give him an answer, and on the following day he would ask the professor (Freud) about it. The real father did not authorize himself to give an answer to his son, preferring that the professor legitimated his intervention. A little word lacked in the father’s speech to calm down the son’s fear.

As Hans grew up and could not wait for his father any longer, he built a phobic symptom (fear of horses) with the intention to overcome the lack of a father. Freud picked up the word *pferd* (horse), close to other words familiar to Hans, in order to understand what phobia was. *Vater* (father in German) and even his name, Freud could have been reminded because both have a similar sound in German. In one occasion Freud asked Hans “Does the horse you talk so much about wear glasses?” Hans did not expect that question and what amused him the most was Freud and his father’s smile when Freud made that joke. All became clear when Freud asked: “Like your dad?” Freud had hypothesized that horse would be equivalent to father.

Certainly there were horses on the streets in the city where Hans lived. It was the beginning of the twentieth century when chariots were the vehicles (*Wägen*, in Hans’ language to express cars). Freud again paid attention to the phonetic similarity of *wägen* (vehicles) and *wegen* (because), both of them usual in Hans colloquial language. The second case of similarity of sound is less convincing than the first one, and Freud didn’t insist on this. But if horse is the phobic object, the thing that conducted the horse calls attention.

We can think that there were other objects in Hans’ world close to the object of his phobia (horse) and soon or later he could be afraid of them by just replacing the horse. Lacan called phobic significant the galvanized term, almost detached of the object and that could pass from an object to another. It is a significant useful to anything, even to allow a passage from one object to another.

In this case, everything is related to what he would call object *a*, a non empiric object, as we said before, non objective, that follows the subject wherever he goes, and without he being aware of it.

Later on, thanks to what he concluded, Hans allowed himself to play with these elements and to find answers to the questions that were in the “why” stage (*wegen? wegen?*). Inventing a visit of a plumber that would have fixed something (his butt), Hans gave answers to the questions about what he

experienced in his body and about his feelings towards his mother and father. In other words, there was a relation that guided the son to the father and there was an alliance between that father and that mother.

Affiliation and alliance define parenthood say anthropologists and jurists (Cadoret, 2000).

The nuclear family was the corner stone of division and sexual complementation in society.

And if the father was nominated in other terms different from the ones that are familiar to us in our parental system (Cadoret, 2000)?

Nowadays, we see new types of family structure: adopted family, family with mistress, reconstituted family, families that resort to assisted reproduction, and in all of them there are combinations of the two criteria, affiliation and alliance.

The homosexual family (“homo-parental family”) can be defined in three ways:

1- It can be the result of a family of partners of the same gender, each of them coming from a previous heterosexual relationship or not, but with a natural child of one of them (rebuilt family);

2- It can be established in a system of co-parenthood, in which partners of same sex gender raise a child for a period of time in one home and for another period in another one;

3- It can be a family with partners of same gender with an adopted child or a child born from assisted reproduction.

In the adopted family, the biological parents are kept away or even forgotten; in the family with a mistress, it is not the marriage but the child acknowledgement by the parents that creates maternal and paternal affiliation;

In the assisted reproduction, the donor remains unknown;

In the rebuilt family, the new characters present in the stage are strangers to the child.

Finally, the term “homo-parental family” has led jurists and anthropologists to deal with an unusual situation because sometimes there is not an affiliation to be recorded in a lineage and occasionally there is not even an alliance. All of this makes us think of a real “metamorphosis of parenthood” (Godelier, M. 2004). Anthropology teaches us that there are several forms of distribution of function when discussing parenthood.

These situations grow, being considered as an assembly (this term comes from the legal world) to be followed by researchers of the subject. Nowadays, there are 14 million children in the United States living in homosexual homes; in France the number is 50.000 boys and girls living in these homes; 50% of homosexuals are willing to adopt a child.

“NEW PARENTS”

The title of this thesis draws attention to “la liberation des pères: modernité, égalité, paternité” (Gratton, 2003). The term “new parents” points out to the eventual parental character that are seen in these homes where we can find families built according to the various patterns above described. Some conclusions suggested from this thesis are:

- Quest of new complementarities between men and women a bit less marked by the difference derived from sexual roles and functions;
- Parenthood would be better defined in terms of responsibility rather than authority;
- The biological lineage would play a role less important than the contract;
- The “new parents” will find a way of expression in the social and psychological world;
- The parents’ liberation has begun!

PHOBIA AND NAME-OF-THE-FATHER

Can one consider phobia and its significant an attempt, as it is suggested in the old model, to nourish the lack of a father?

Will a “liberated” father have more conditions to liberate his child from his or her burden in the symbolic order?

Will the male parental function assumed in its complete social dimension be able to create conditions in order not to make phobia the only destiny of fear?

Let us elaborate something in the point of the view of the son, in parallel with the expression that the father is uncertain (“Pater semper incertus est”). Could a son assume this uncertainty as well?

The juridical category “father”, as the uncertainty of the son, will be elaborated from the status of “fiction”.

The concept of father in the contemporary times ended out released from the burden of power that seemed senile; the space is free to the work of elaboration, where Psychoanalysis certainly has something to say, thanks to its vast experience. In fact, the father’s and mother’s places carry out their work and are effective in the way they relate to a logic relation, to a third category; i.e., the space of representation where the concept of father is built, and built as though it were in a theatre play, in a presentation of characters.

Perhaps we could remember the Greek tomb inscription mentioned by Legendre; “Filoclés son of Dikaïos. Dikaïos son of Filócles”. One beside the other, the grandson and the grandfather had the same name that consecrated them while they lived; the father was just a link between them.

The clinical experience and our everyday experience, tell us that the son will need to abandon his status of son if he wants to become an adult.

Being the father uncertain, I, the son, assume the fatherhood signal believing in this signal, as I have to believe in order to know. But here the father will not have been neither the patriarch nor the only enjoyer; he will have been someone that provided the withdrawal of the omnipotent and threatening father’s character. A French television show (Bébés sur commande, channel Arte, February 1st 2005) made a relate about the first experiences in Assisted Reproduction. It is possible that the Londoner Doctor Barton requested that her husband donated most of the semen to inseminate many of her patients. One of the children born from these procedures, living nowadays in the United States, attempted to find his biologic father. He concluded that he had several brothers, visited them and started a collective journey towards the common past of those people whose mothers were Doctor’s Barton patients. One of these persons that were found thanks to this investigation had known Doctor Barton’s husband. With white hair, paused voice caused by natural tiredness of life, the former collaborator of Dr Barton warned (in the form of piece of advice) those who tried to know about his paternal biologic origin: “don’t insist so much in this search, you already know what you had to know. You have been adopted by the parents that have raised you, you are an adult. You need not to know more.”

The end of the present note brings to our attention Lacan’s sentence of 1960:

“Faudra-t-il que nous soyons rejoints par la pratique qui prendra peut-être en un temps force d’usage, d’inséminer artificiellement les femmes en rupture du ban phallique,... pour tirer de nocus sur la fonction paternelle un verdict?”

English version : Luciana Silvano Brandão

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The Object is Poetics¹

Jo Attié

Le pré, ce divan que la nature nous prépare

Francis Ponge

*It is in so far as the master's discourse reigns that S_2 is divided.
The division in question is that between symbol and symptom.
This division is, if I may, reflected in the division of the subject.²*

Jacques Lacan

DÉJOUER

Leaving aside the question of knowing how the analysand comes to grips with his division, this inheritance from the Name-of-the-Father, we shall turn to the way in which the poet comes to grips with this symbol and this symptom. This indeed is Lacan's line of inquiry: 'how is it that artifice can expressly target what initially presents itself as symptom? How is it that art, the artisans, can finesse [*déjouer*], if I may, what imposes itself of the symptom? Namely, truth?'³

How is it then that art finesses the truth of the symptom? Note that *déjouer* is a derivative of *jouer*, to play. It comes from the Latin *jocus*: the *jeu* which in Old French gave *jongler* and *jongleur*, likewise for *joyau* that can be found in English and German (*jewel*, *juwel*). Might one say, *jouer de son joyau*, to play or exploit one's jewel or gem? One's phallus? Moreover, the etymology gives us *se dejuër*: to rejoice in, to enjoy oneself.⁴

Saying *jouir de son symptôme*, to get jouissance from one's symptom, already comes within our psychoanalytic doxa. But to say *to rejoice in, to enjoy oneself with, to play with, to finesse* in the sense of *déjouer*, opens a completely different perspective. Lacan installs us in an utterly different logic from that of the analysand.

So, we are going to see how the poet can *jouer* and *se déjouer* with the symptom, starting from the question of the Name-of-the-Father, and with reference to Francis Ponge, before extending the problematic to other poets.

THE POET AND HIS FATHER

Francis Ponge (1899-1988) was twenty-four when, in 1923, he lost his father. The figure of the father was to dominate his work for a long time to come. In the month that followed his father's death, he wrote a poem called *La famille du Sage* which constitutes a Tomb for his father,

Au bruit d'une source de nuit (...) - Père – un jour ta présence nous fut

He considers this poem as a dedication of his entire oeuvre to his father,⁵ the latter being therefore both source and trunk. Thus from the outset we are installed in a paternal metaphor. In 1929 he wrote two other Tombs for him. First *Le Monument*, and then a more primitive version of this poem, *À mon père décharné*, a poem of sixty three lines.⁶ The title alone merits our attention. It is no longer the spring [*la source*], the trunk or the monument that constitute the metaphor of the dead father, but the description of the corpse transformed into a skeleton:

*Le corps
Convoque les vers pour son arrangement
Muscle à muscle tout cède et se répand en
boue (...)
Les os désalliés s'installent à leur boîte*

This description, which could have provoked horror, leads the son to say:

*Je peux rouvrir les yeux sur ta transformation
Qui ne me choque point si complète soit-elle*

This Tomb leads the poet to discover his proper poetic art, and he has the father say:

*Mon fils,
Il faut venger des mots l'illégitime abus...
Change à plaisir le nom de tout ce qui t'irrite
Approuve la nature, - ou plutôt la récite...*

The son was to remain loyal to this advice. He would take the side of *things*, that mute world to which he would give speech, while taking account of *words*. He would speak of the pebble, of the bar of soap, of the dried fig, of the meadow, of the sun, &c. Amongst these poems, his *Pour un Malherbe* stands out, written between 1951-57, in which Malherbe⁷ assumes the true figure of the dead father.⁸

*Qu'est-ce à dire, que c'est à peu près l'écrivain
le plus considérable de notre Littérature.
Que c'en est le Père, le tronc.*

Thus, in this almost forgotten writer, he finds the model par excellence, even if he has to turn him into an object of this mute world. Indeed, Malherbe becomes a dictionary: he is a machine. He is the French dictionary in full function.⁹ A Name-of-the-Father ready to function.

AN OBJEU

And here we have the poet at work with all his science of language. Indeed, he knows how to use the signifier without worrying about its signification, which allows him to escape its viscosity. He simply integrates it into a line of verse for example, i.e., at the most formal level. The symptom passes then by way of writing. More precisely, writing constitutes a response from the subject to what, in addition, makes for a symptom.

As he puts it in a Proem: truth? I don't understand. Beauty? I don't understand.[...] in the end, all I deal with is death.¹⁰ By what means would he deal with this unnameable that death constitutes? Through the Rage of expression¹¹ which is a continual rectification of expression.

In order to see this poetics at work, we shall read one of Ponge's poems: *La Fabrique du Pré*. 'Crquote' is one of these objects of the mute world treated according to time, space, man's relations with nature, the logic of language, current uses of French, the roots of words, dictionary or encyclopaedia quotations, &c.

He draws this to him from where he buried his father. Furthermore, the *pré*, the meadow is an anagram of *père*, father. At the end of the path, he obtains an *Objeu*, that is, a concerto of vocables, a verbal world, one sole textual field that makes the author disappear along with the object referent.

The father under ground has joined the roots of the words and things that will be born again from his Name, in order to metamorphose it into an object, a meadow. This is where the interest of the successful poetic discourse lies. Handling language [*la langue*], that is to say, the symptom, it happens that the poet does not know how to extricate himself by means of truth. But whatever wrangles he might have to grapple with, it does not stop him from continuing to weave his poems, raising his symptom to the dignity of the *sinthome*. Ponge's *sinthome* consists of naming all these mute things.

This handling of the symptom does not fail to touch on the phallic dimension present in the signifier *pré*. This dimension is very much the crucial moment in every psychoanalysis [*tout cure*], when the phallic function, being utterly contingent, will stop not being written. But the stopping-point that is important for the poet is entirely different. This is what is implied by his poetics.

THE STOPPING-POINT WITH FRANÇOIS PONGE

Indeed, every poet aims, in his poetics, at a stopping-point that is utterly singular for him. Once he has pinpointed it, he does not stop turning around it in order to name it, as Jean-Claude Milner emphasises.¹² Let us see then what happens with *La Fabrique du Pré*. This poem (penned between 1960-64) begins with what Ponge calls 'the original storm (that) has spoken, rumbled (within him) at

length, Original Language'. This is what for him results from his first perception of a well-defined meadow, located between rock and brook. 'I was seized I don't know why by a kind of secret, calm (quiet) enthusiasm... I knew immediately this vision would remain just as it was, intact in my memory. And so I'd have to try to say it. To understand it? Understand is not the word. To try to conserve its *pré*-sumptive jouissance, and perpetuate it.¹³' This jouissance is the jouissance of words that, through descriptions and definitions, culminate in acts of naming. This initial storm was accompanied by an original intuition, an intuition of *pré*-words,¹⁴ (from the Latin *pratum*), *prêt*, *près*, *prai* (from *prarie*), *paré*, *pré-paré* (from the Latin *paratume*). Such are the original onomatopoeias from which there is no question of leaving, therefore one must enter within.

The poem is engaged then, constructed and closed in on these phenomena. That is to say, by way of three accents: acute, grave and circumflex, not to mention the dot on the *i* in *prairie* synonymous with the *prée* that denotes a flower meadow.

Pré is a prefix, the prefix of prefixes. For Ponge, it pullulates like this in all the verbs, throughout the language. It is just as much a past participle, a pleasant corridor, a couch for resting on, the green incarnation of rain, a breakfast of reasons, for this it is *prêt*, ready, *pré*-pared by nature, between a solid and liquid state.

The *Pré* is also an adverb, *près*, close to the rock and the brook, to man and animal, to water, vegetable and mineral.

The *Pré* is way of being, a way of dying and being born again, it is a particular modality of perpetuation.

It is a perfect combination of the horizontality of the surface and the verticality of grass. It is also the site of the dual between men. In sum, *to achieve a perfect (the most perfect) horizontality you arrive standing up, then you cross the oblique swords to finally achieve the most perfect horizontality (above at first, thanks to your enemy's care) then (thanks to the care of your friends) below.*¹⁵

This is how the *pré* nourishes, buries and gives birth once again. It is the tomb par excellence for our poet. A tomb from which he is born again as object, *objoy*. Laden with a substantial consistence, he is next emptied, and becomes an accent that produces a causality for the subject. By virtue of which the object is poetics, beyond all the signifiers it hauls around. The rage of expression aims at emptying out any object so as to name a lack that lies at the heart of this whirlwind of language.

Language is but an *ornure* Lacan tells us.¹⁶ An ornament of this object *ordure*, this object of filth. This is what best summarises the *doing without, making use of* the Name-of-the-Father. It is indeed when one knows how to make use of it that it literally means one is doing without it.

The poet is *mangé des vers* notes Lacan, he is eaten by the worms of verse.¹⁷ Ponge and his Factory [*sa Fabrique*] could not be spoken of better.

Lobjeu, Lobjoy, *that which functions all by itself*, is a structure, a metaphorical-metonymical set, a factory of objects *a*. And once one gets to this, *a sort of transmutation* is produced.¹⁸ It is a jouissance that is both possible and permitted, a surplus jouissance. *There is in this a kind of moral that consists in declaring that an orgasm must happen and that this orgasm only happens through a kind of avowal and proclamation that I am only what I am, that there is a kind of tautology.*¹⁹ The orgasm took place between the words, whose names have been found.

POETICS

Discerning and turning around the point that does not cease is the fact of all poetics. For Mallarmé, it was about naming, about remunerating the lack in language [*la langue*] by giving a purer meaning to the words of a tribe. By way of the phonic. It was about leaving behind the utilitarian and the journalistic side of language in order to access a free jouissance, *Aboli bibelot d'inanité sonore.*²⁰

Yves Bonnefoy spots the limit that he would not be able to cross. And it is *Le Leur du seuil*,²¹ whose dupe he will become in order to access this *Arrière pays*²² where he finds the repose of evidence.

Courtly poetry strives to say this inaccessible embodied by the Lady of love.

Each time there is a search to make this lack cease, a lack that does not cease not being written. This is what finds in Ponge that rage of expression that passes from one object to another.

THE ANALYST THE POET²³

The analysand is inscribed starting from an S_1 that divides him in the analytic discourse (a \tilde{O}) in the name of the love that brings him to knowledge.

The poet is borne by *the love of words*. By virtue of which he veils the sexual non-relationship. Through the use of words, he never stops wanting to conjugate S_1 and S_2 to produce little a. The matheme of his discourse could thus be: (\tilde{O} a). He finds himself divided by the object that he has produced, and not by the signifier. *Un or agonise* Mallarmé tells us, speaking of the sunset.²⁴ *L'œil de l'herbe* notes Ponge in order to name the dew and make us remember this initial storm with which everything began.

Hence the heaviness, the inertia, the shuffling of the discourse of the first and the lightness of that of the second who can do without the Name-of-the-Father in order to make use of it.

Can one speak of a poetics of the analyst? Lacan's poetics in any case is founded in his invention of the *objet petit a*.

There is clearly a crossover between these two practices to the extent that both are practices of the letter.

All of this operates in the name of a *libido become object* that queries and traces and advances and perpetuates.

Translated by Adrian Price

Footnotes

- ¹ This formula comes from Georges Braque, quoted by Ponge in *Œuvre Complète, Tome II*, Ed. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2002, p. 657.
- ² Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire, Livre XXIII, Le sinthome*, Le Seuil, 2005, Paris, p. 23
- ³ *Ibid*, p. 22
- ⁴ From the *Trésor de la langue française* on-line dictionary.
- ⁵ *Entretiens de Francis Ponge avec Philippe Sollers*, Ed. Gallimard/Seuil, 1970, p. 66.
- ⁶ Published in the journal *La Licorne*, issue on *Le tombeau poétique en France*, 1994-95, UFR Langues Littératures Poitiers.
- ⁷ Ponge attended secondary school at Caen's *lycée Malherbe*.
- ⁸ Ponge, F., *Pour un Malherbe*, Ed. Gallimard, 1956, p. 87.
- ⁹ *Ibid*. p. 164
- ¹⁰ Cf. Ponge, F., *Œuvre Complète, Tome II*, Ed. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2002, p. 309.
- ¹¹ *Ibid*. Tome I, pp. 337-445.
- ¹² Milner, J.-C., *For the Love of Language*, Palgrave MacMillan, 1990.
- ¹³ Ponge, F., *Op.Cit.* Tome I, p. 488.
- ¹⁴ [T.N., As in 'key-words']
- ¹⁵ Ponge, F., *Op. Cit.*, Tome II, p. 460.
- ¹⁶ Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire XXII, R.S.I.*, unpublished (lesson of 21 January 1975), Cf. *Ornicar ?* Issue 3, p. 106.
- ¹⁷ [Lacan, J., 'Introduction de Scilicet au titre de la revue de l'École freudienne de Paris', *Scilicet* 2/3, 1970, p. 57. (In their plural form, 'worms' and 'lines of verse' are homonyms in French)]
- ¹⁸ *Entretiens, Op. Cit.*, p. 190.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*. p. 190.
- ²⁰ [From the second stanza of « *Ses purs ongles très haut dédiant leur onyx* »]
- ²¹ Bonnefoy, Y., *Dans le leurre du seuil*, Mercure de France, 1975.
- ²² Bonnefoy, Y., *L'Arrière-Pays*, Albert Skira éditeur, 1972, (Collection Les sentiers de la création; 17)
- ²³ Di Ciaccia, A., « *Psychanalyse et poésie* », in *Quarto*, Issue 80-81, January, 2004
- ²⁴ [From the third stanza of « *Ses purs ongles très haut dédiant leur onyx* »]

Procreation

Francois Ansermet

« The interrogation *what is the father ?* is posed at the centre of the analytic experience as eternally unresolved. » Jacques Lacan ⁽¹⁾

One comes from two : unless resorting to cloning by which a woman potentially can reproduce from herself, one must effectively be two to make a baby. But with whom does each of the two make it ? Has the woman who carries the child and will give birth to him, made him with the man she conceived him with ? Or with another, unconsciously : her own father, her first love or an impossible love? In any case, it *could* have been another. Sometimes it should have been so. Why that particular man ? When we think of all the circumstances that were required in order that it would be him – up to, sometime, the medically assisted procreation and that gynaecologist who can sometimes leave the father in the background.

Why, sometimes, make a baby at all costs - like in the medically assisted procreations ? We know the supplementation function that a child assumes in front of the non-relationship imposed by the sexual encounter. A gap always remains open in the relationship between man and woman from the moment it has been consecrated.(2) We find this gap along the series that goes from procreation to birth. There is no continuity between sexuality and procreation or between procreation and gestation. Origin, sexuality, procreation, gestation and birth mobilise subjective universes that are radically different. For procreation we lack representations to the point that everything can be swallowed up by it – up to delusion sometimes. That is the problem of every procreation : « the subject may well know that copulating is really at the origin of procreation, but the function of procreation as a signifier is something else. » (3)

Procreation aims at the immortal part in the mortal living. (4) To think about procreation obliges to think about death in life – be that which carries or that which puts a term to it : « in order for procreation to have its full sense, there must also be, in both sexes, an apprehension, a relation with the experience of death. »(5) The rejection of death in procreation paves the way for all delusion with a procreation content as Schreber demonstrated to whom « that fundamental signifier called *being a father* »(6) lacked. This affirmation does not imply that one can truly know what it means to be a father in the sense of procreation – question without answer : « the sum of these facts – of copulating with a woman, that she then carries something within her womb for a period, that this product is finally expelled - will never lead one to constitute the notion of what it is to be a father.» (7)

For biology sexuality and death are considered to have appeared together in evolution. (8) Death could hence be seen as both a condition and a consequence of sexuality that leads to the power to procreate and reproduce in dissimilar and innovative forms (9) while being caught in the mortal condition. Procreation implies the other. Even if we can suppose a predominance of matriarchy (10) at the beginning of Time, the discovery of the role played by sexuality in procreation would have originated the establishment of patriarchy. In doing so was brought up a paternal, symbolic filiation dissociated from the natural conception of maternity rooted in pregnancy and delivery.(11)

The contemporary biotechnologies of reproduction are paradoxically reenforcing this tendency in allowing to go beyond what biology imposes in the making of babies. They totally dissociate sexuality from procreation and procreation from gestation. Therefore the possible construction of a filiation is

left to the symbolic bearings alone. And thereby the theses of psychoanalysis are unexpectedly brought back to the fore.

We could take the example of a technology of medically assisted procreation – the intracytoplasmic injection of spermatozooids i.e. I.V.F., which aims at compensating for masculine sterility with a spermatozoid directly taken from the vas deferens or from a fragment of testicle. Here is a technique by which one can be certain of the father at last. Strangely, what the clinic teaches us is that it is not the case. The subject finds a way to reinstate an uncertain father in displacing the doubt on paternity onto a doubt on the choice of the spermatozoid. A father imagines that one could have chosen the millionth one that would have given a genetic illness. This is the height for someone suffering from oligo-azoospermia. Another is perplexed thinking of the person who has chosen the spermatozoid. He imagines a female lab assistant in a hurry, busy thinking of a coming date, who decides with a pipette held heedlessly between her fingers with painted nails and the tinkle of bracelets shifting on her wrist, of the child to come picking this one rather than that one. Some fathers talk about the I.V.F. which is an autological procreation i.e. that respects the biological filiation, as if it was an insemination via donnor, heterological. They experience this technique as if the spermatozoid in question was not their's. Others again imagine the always possible mistake of the medical team which would have confounded two samples. So, everything happens as if they needed to re-establish the father as were were uncertain, as if there could only be a paternal function, an operation of the Name-of-The-Father based on a background of biological uncertainty.

These clinical elements teach us a lot. They show to which extent no ready-made answers – including those coming from reality, can give a solution to the question of what a father is. This question remains fundamentally unresolved. We could even deduce that it is only in remaining without answer that the paternal function can get deployed and operate. That is what these fathers invent in spite of themselves in those situations, as if the biological certainty of their paternity was an obstacle for the paternal function to be put in place.

Thus it seems that the role of the father in procreation has to remain enigmatic. We could see there the survival of the denial that everyone operates of his own parents' sexuality. (12) The only couple in the unconscious is that of mother and father not that of man and woman. The link between sexuality and procreation remains a mystery that is circumvented by the infantile sexual theories. These are produced by the insatiable searching activity of the child concerning his unthinkable sexual origin, which systematically circumvent sex in any case. The very idea of coming from such a practice remains unthinkable for the subject who prefers to imagine anything but being the product of sexuality coming into the world « inter feces et urinas.» Subjectively he cannot conceive himself coming from the sexuality of a man and a woman who moreover were doing something else as they were making him. (13) He invents every possible fiction rather than a sexual explanation.

Hence we could, so to speak, say that subjectively we are all indeed coming fantasmatically from medically assisted procreation! That could also explain the tendency to reject these kind of techniques that paradoxically unveil while getting round it, the role of sexuality in procreation. This is also why the unconscious infantile sexual theories mark predominantly the subjective effects brought about by the technologies of artificial reproduction, which become the material cause of what the subject manifests and that are too often linked back to the reality of the technique that has been used. For every subject, one by one, things are determined far beyond the laboratory.

The same can be said about the father. As we saw about the I.V.F. he re-instates the doubt about his own paternity as if the paternal function was only possible but based beyond the biological reality of procreation, on an uncertainty. The question is to find again the dimensions of an enigmatic desire that overtakes the will of having a child at all costs, which sometimes make desire peter out. The doubt of the father about procreation is therefore a liberating doubt which creates a void, a space to invent

oneself as father in front of the sudden appearance of a child who does not only realise the bond between a man and a woman but also between generations.

The I.V.F. and the biological certainty implied by it concerning procreation, form in fact a false answer to a true question that persists and insists : that of knowing what a father is. This clinical fact surprisingly revealed by the medically assisted autologous procreations, shows to which extent the question about the father, about his function, is to be situated beyond the horizon of procreation. (14) That question must remain unresolved in order for the father function to operate. Not only to block and intervene across the enjoyment ('jouissance') at play in the relationship between the mother and the child (15), but also to open a space to the child, to indicate to the child a possible exit (16), a path beyond the determinants to which he is submitted – including those of the conditions of his conception.

Translated by Vincent Dachy

Footnotes

- (1) J. Lacan, *The Seminar, Book IV, The object relation* (1956-57), Seuil, Paris, 1994, p. 372. Not translated.
- (2) *Ibidem.* p. 374.
- (3) J. Lacan, *The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses, Routledge*, 1993, p. 293.
- (4) « And hereby indeed resides immortality for the mortal living being : in pregnancy and procreation. » Plato, *The Symposium*. Translated by us from French translation, Luc Brisson for Garnier-Flammarion, 2000, p. 149.
- (5) J. Lacan, *The Seminar, Book III*, op. cit., p. 293.
- (6) *Ibidem*, p.293.
- (7) *Ibidem*, p. 293.
- (8) André Langaney, *Le sexe et l'innovation*, Seuil, Paris, 1979, p. 28. We don't know whether it has been translated into English.
- (9) François Jacob, *La logique du vivant*, Gallimard, Paris, 1970. We don't know whether it has been translated into English.
- (10) On this see the reference made by Jacques Lacan in Bachofen about matriarchies underlying antique culture everywhere. Jacques Lacan, *Les complexes familiaux dans la formation de l'individu* (1938), *Autres Écrits*, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p.57. We don't know if there exists an English translation. See also « The universally present traces and the widespread survival of a matriarchal structure in the family » (...) « the order of the human family has foundations protected from the force of the male. » Our translation. *Ibidem*, p. 49.
- (11) Henri Altan, *L'utérus artificiel*, Seuil, Paris, 2005, p.128. We don't know if there exists an English translation.
- (12) S. Freud, *On the sexual theories of children*, 1908.
- (13) Paraphrasing Pascal Quignard, *Le nom sur le bout de la langue*, Gallimard, Paris, 1993, p.68.
- (14) «The position of the Name-of-The-Father as such, the qualification of the father as procreator is a matter that is situated at the symbolic level. » Our translation. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar, Book V, The formations of the unconscious* (1957-58), Seuil. Paris, 1998, p. 181. Not translated.
- (15) I.E. that the mother would remain a woman, «object a that causes his desire » - which is designated by Lacan as « paternal care ». Our translation. Jacques Lacan, R.S.I. (1974-75), seminar of the 21/01/1975, *Ornicar ? 3*, 1975, pp. 107-108. Not translated.
- (16) About this see Lacan's development on the third time of the Oedipus where he underlined a father who « intervenes at that level to give »... « who appears effectively in the act of giving », who « allows and authorizes ». Our translation. Jacques Lacan, *Les formations of the unconscious*, op. cit., p. 205.

Psychosis and the Name-of-the-Father

Roger Wartel

Lacan considered the clinic of psychosis as essential to psychoanalysis in that the scope and the object of psychoanalysis would be lost if limited to the clinic of neurosis. To talk about the Name-of-the-Father requires that we have taken the first step towards psychoanalysis, and that precludes handling it as though it were an academic question.

The Name-of-the-Father states the symbolic filiation; it teaches how to count, in that digits and numbers have something of the nature of a signifying chain. It indicates right and left, not according to a code but according to an address and the implication of the body. It avoids mistaking a glove for a shoe. And it also establishes what is valid, what guarantees, like when we talk about the validity of a passport. In using it, we can readily tell and make known to others fundamental distinctions, without which intolerable consequences for humanity would result, brought about by the effacement of social ties and the exclusion from discourse.

The trail Freud blazed for psychoanalysis was marked by an astonishment, a halt, before the incongruous manifestations that did not correspond with neurological cartography. They turned out to be singular; impossible to put in a series so hopefully anticipated by the 19th century neurologist. This singularity was the discovery that opened the door to meaning and to the words that carry it. We wonder then about the creative meaning of the symptom where a radical satisfaction lurks so subtly that its deciphering would leave unshaken an «I know, but still». During this Freudian period, the Name-of-the-Father does not appear in the title, but in the functions, in the very laws that it promulgates, of what speaking means. Here then, the Name-of-the-Father is on duty; it must hold together so that rules can be bent and juggled with.

Its duty will also be that of the phallus that, without any direct concatenation, without linking together, will, all the same, allow the institution of the signifier. Its duty is the place of an Other that gives access to, that authorizes, even imposes the interplay of signifiers, to the extent that we require an anchoring point without overstepping the limits of the working drawing. With this invention, Freud anticipates the work of Jakobson, in that he reads the abscissa and ordinate of the step by step creations and the enigma of the clinic.

So it is a trail. One that encounters at least two stumbling blocks. The first is historical: Freud's advances and concision in the clinic of neurosis did not manage to convince the medical world. In the name of the exact sciences, its partisans refute an approach marked all the same by intelligibility. The second obstacle is much more pregnant for us: what is to be done with these crazy people who fall into the classical category of the psychoses? A particular semiological point had, been isolated a long time ago, that of speech difficulties. That will become the somewhat forgotten work of Seglas. Could it be that the organizing place that both issues and records the subject's discourse is faulty? Here, Freud evokes a pact, an agreement, a consenting to language. The subject must have said yes to language. Here, difficulties arise. To have said yes from the start, allows and even calls for saying no a whole life long. However, the affirmation was there, radically present and untouched. But, it may happen that this affirmation be supplanted, originally, by a total rejection, one without any recourse or appeal, where we obviously encounter the consequences for language. In 1911, Freud fundamentally asserts for us this foreclosure, to use Lacan's translation, in the very make up of psychosis. It is not for as much that the subject neither speaks nor hears, but the stamp that guarantees the foundation for the Other of language is inscribed nowhere. This foreclosure, this lack of a signifier for the Name-of-the-

Father, does no longer, does not then, insure either the quality of Discourse or of social ties. This questions the very foundations of human language and either connects or disjoins the word and the thing. It also sheds light on the subtle mechanism that develops between the emitter and the receiver. It is a mechanism, rather than a simple gesture like throwing a stone –since words are not stones, even though they can make a direct hit. Up until now, we have been considering the years between 1953 and 1957. The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father translates the gulf between neurosis and psychosis. As a consequence, the psychotic structure is characterized as incomparable to the neurotic structure, irrevocably so. All of the mechanisms of neurosis cannot therefore be transposed, even in a watered down or accentuated form. This is a very important moment in the history and the practice of the clinic. However, we can already surmise that there will be shifts that can only be argued and justified on the basis of this first datum. The subject, if there is one, is under the *status* of a foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. Let's not interfere too much with him since he manages to hold together, quite well sometimes, in a world where he chooses what he thinks is best: a good course of studies, a good education, a good job well done –why not? The apparent mastery seems insured on the condition that he not overstep the limit. Some worries or anxiety arise, sometimes shared by the family circle, some originalities, some religious, philosophical, even esoteric commitments; or a mimetism in style or in drug use. Apparently, it holds together, but let us beware, let us handle with great care: the vase has a crack.

This clinic of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father worked wonders in forming several generations of practitioners. The very concept of foreclosure, the «there is no», allowed for the apprehension of what was primordial in the term of the Name-of-the-Father.

Two essential points for the clinical practice will gain importance from this period onwards. First, the clinic of triggering will appear as a veritable turn-around in the way of considering what the classical French tradition called « bouffées délirantes » [delirious episodes]. They would occur at the time of an encounter, a conjuncture, and a whole series of situations inclined to provoke these sorts of disturbances was documented. In 1957, Lacan asserts that the encounter that will turn out to be overwhelming has to do with «A-father [who] comes in to this place where the subject was not able to call him previously». «A-father who takes up the third position in the field of eroticized aggression».

This concept, then, suddenly came to designate and enfold both the disparate and the anecdotal that had previously been the reason and the motive for the beautiful descriptions, where the psychiatrist – reader of Flaubert and of de Maupassant– tried his pen in the art of the admission certificate. This progress in theory, one that issued from practice, radically modified how the psychotic subject was taken into consideration and to this day, prevents catastrophes. Let us say we have learned how to be careful, and it was taught that one does not correct the master of interpretation. To play on a signifier in these circumstances, would that not be equivalent to playing with the patient who, pierced through by a jouissance that comes at him from everywhere, feels that his body is possessed –and who is in fact dispossessed of his body? Will a supplemental [de suppléance] Name-of-the-Father be able to focalize and ease, into a bearable bundle, this ravaging jouissance?

Secondly, let us recall the very title of Lacan's «...of a possible treatment...». From this paper we will see the elaboration of a clinic that is truly new since it will not aim at abrading the delusion but at respecting it, at letting it become established. It will be considered in its comfort value for the patient, as the creation of a world where the subject can live, a substitute Name-of-the-Father, a signifier that neither fills nor annuls foreclosure, but that tempers it or covers it until it can find a paraphrenic-type mode of evolution. This new clinic revolutionized hospitalizations, long term therapies, that became associated with coherent and efficient medicinal treatments. It was the way madness was looked on that was enlightened by, displaced, shifted according to another angle. Clinicians were enthusiastic; they got cracking and asked their questions during clinical discussions. The phenomenon was new enough and widely spread enough to get noticed. Could it be worth reviving it? It would be a reconquest!

Let us dare to advance a formula: implant, rather than eradicate. It is in the name of what we owe to the symptom, to the work done by the delusional subject in his delusion, to the restitution of the patient's vital enterprise. This was a revolutionary stand in its day. Let us add that the development of psychoanalysis in our society, a development of fashion, of curiosity and of culture, brought about an inrush of delusional psychotics, or untriggered psychotics, unplugged, as we say, to the psychoanalysts' office; there where they could not have been anticipated ten or twenty years ago. Sometimes they were discouraged, in the name of a generalized medicalization and the inaccessibility of the psychoses to psychoanalytical treatment. All at the same time, thanks to this open mindedness on the world, the rift that separated psychosis from neurosis became less sharp. At that time, Lacan's teaching came to base itself on the Borromean knotting of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. So then, psychosis can be apprehended as the untying of this knot and the dispersing of its rings. Its loosening immediately leaves floating, evanescent, the knot's virtual and essential point of interweaving, called little *a*. The imaginary takes wing, the signifying chain breaks down, fragments; the metaphor coagulates. As for the Real, it imposes itself until it takes up all the space: it screams in the ears and tortures the body. Was the Name-of-the-Father to be carried away by this, no longer foreclosed but null and void, useless? Not in the least: the supplement [suppléance] that was a success in «the attempt to cure» (1911) is now what will stop this dispersal as well as what will again tie together and hold the dislocated elements.

Let the composer write his score. Above all, do not stay too close to him. Because he is a tightrope walker on his infinite cord. He places one foot after the other; he places his note. He holds together by holding on to this cord that is a fourth element, that will bring together and contain the three others. There are so many resources in language [la langue] that he will find what he needs to use to ensure his singularity. Following Lacan, on June 11, 1975, «what is about the Name-of-the-Father, I crown it with what is well called the *sinthome*». Does this concern us? Yes, since the 13th of April 1976, Lacan already asserts that «the psychoanalyst can only be conceived of as a *sinthome*».

Translated by Julia Richards

Psychotherapies and the Freudian Field

Phillippe Hellebois

Psychotherapy is one of the practices constitutive of what we now call the «psy» field. The unity of this field is manifest, even if it is disparate. We find in effect «degree-holding psys», produced by the university — psychiatrists and psychologists — and other «trained psys» — psychotherapists and psychoanalysts — belonging to associations and diverse schools. What they have in common is not their curriculum — there is no relation between the content of a university degree and the more complex training that mixes transference and a personal cure to the study of theory — but rather the same idea of the psyche conceived at least as something other than the reflection of the body as an organism. From there, the paths probably diverge, but many, even sometimes without realizing it, are oriented by what Freud qualified as the unconscious¹.

The psychotherapies that are called relational are the disciplines of the «psy» field that are closest to psychoanalysis, but this is not without producing misunderstanding and confusion. A number of them for a long time qualified their practices as being psychoanalytic, while at the same time psychoanalysts did not always know how to clearly articulate the differences between them. If we share, roughly speaking, certain fundamental references such as attention to speech, listening, the unconscious, transference or the Oedipus complex, we really do not make the same use of them. We cannot be content with only considering that one aims first at curing and the other at elucidating. Applied psychoanalysis also aims at therapeutic results and in Lacan's last teaching, it is less and less distinguished from pure psychoanalysis.

Should we not rather hold that therapeutic results can be understood in more than one sense: care or cure? It is not because the second use sometimes takes precedence over the first that they are equivalent. On the contrary, they each imply a very different approach to the real. Curing is an idea belonging not to our clinic but to that of medicine. It reposes on a conception of the psychism as a prolongation of the organism, which is then connected to the brain but not to the unconscious. The practices that are inspired by this in our field are forcibly limited to supposing the practitioner to be someone pretending to know and always then submitted to the discourse of the master. In questions of health, the doctor is effectively more competent than the patient who must make shift with suffering. He who wishes to cure the other will then be persuaded, not without reason, that he knows better than him what is good or bad for him.

The analytic discourse is constructed precisely on the rejection of this pretension to know in advance where the good of the other might lie. It only takes a position concerning the distress the subject is suffering from because of a too devastating symptom. As for his good, he will let the subject decide this in the light of what the cure will have brought him. This abstention that Freud qualified as neutrality is not pure passivity. It is on the contrary the means by which the analyst lodges his action beyond the sense constituted notably by this opposition good-bad. He thus presentifies the real in cause.²

It is around this question of sense that the paths diverge most clearly. If psychotherapy hopes to resorb the real in sense whether it be sexual, familial or other, psychoanalysis only finds its accomplishment in the pinpointing and the readjustment of that which does not cease not to be written. «It is there [in the sense] that psychotherapy, whatever psychotherapy, falls short, not because it does no good, but leads back to the worst³.» The good in question is the reasoned and reasonable regulation of the sense, which relieves by lightening the symptom, and the worst, what turns out to resist any cure, the untamable real the subject can never escape. It can insist in diverse ways that annul any

recovery, the most radical being of course the negative therapeutic reaction. Psychoanalysis is based upon the recognition of the incurable. An incurable that implies no resignation, but on the contrary this singular form of care that the invention of a new use of a symptom can constitute, a symptom that is no longer devastating, but productive, able to give rise to singular effects of creation⁴. By privileging the sense, psychotherapy remains then necessarily within the limits of the name of the father that staples it. On the other hand, by taking its orientation in the sense-less, that is in the real of the symptom, psychoanalysis makes of this same Name-of-the-Father an instrument necessary but not sufficient.

It would also be profitable to distinguish psychotherapy from psychotherapists. If the first remains an uncertain discipline, partly and partially related to Freud, there are a number of the second who probably have a practice that goes further than the theory they claim. On the other hand, the history of psychoanalysis has shown and still shows that a number of psychoanalysts are sometimes very far from the exigencies of the analytic discourse...

This «psy» field, which in its widest extension could then be qualified as Freudian and include the most diverse practices, is unbearable for those who endorse the contemporary scientist ideology. This ideology is as nebulous as it is authoritarian. It is scientific only in appearance under the guise of a cult dedicated to statistical measure... Science is not scientism. If the first is founded on the rigor of logical-mathematical reasoning, it does not hide its foreclosure of the subject and necessarily admits the limits to the knowledge it produces. The second, on the contrary, has recourse neither to reason nor reasoning, but to a quasi-religious passion for which knowledge, even fake, is the idol, the obscure god. Obscure because it is difficult to grasp what a shadowless knowledge, with neither real nor impossible, might be, except a both grotesque and totalitarian fantasy. On this canvas, the CBT drilling qualified by their servants as scientific psychology, and psychotropic medicines are imposed with no other discussion than the colloquiums of experts. The discourse of the master has finally found how to be realized without opposition, public health will be its pretext and the neuronal man its prophet. Lacan recognized in this lamentable and delirious conjecture of adaptation by which the rat represents the future of human kind, nothing less than the mark of the American way of life⁵. Isn't this because he saw in this way of life characterized by the frantic cult for the new, that he also qualified as anhistorism, the most favorable medium for mass conformism and behaviorism⁶?

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

¹ Jacques-Alain Miller « La guerre des palotins » in Quarto, n°82, juin 2004, pp.70-71.

² See in particular the text of Pierre Malengreau « Le neutre et le thérapeutique » on the site of the Encounter Pipol 2 « Rapid Therapeutic Effects in Psychoanalysis»³ Jacques Lacan « Télévision » in Autres écrits, Paris, Seuil 2001, p.514.

⁴ Jacques-Alain Miller « Psychothérapie et psychanalyse » in La Cause freudienne, n°22, October, 1992, pp.7-12 and « Psychanalyse pure, psychanalyse appliquée et psychothérapie » in La Cause freudienne n°48, pp.11 ff.

⁵ TN In English in the text.

⁶ Jacques Lacan, « Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse » in Ecrits, Paris, Seuil 1966, p.245.

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
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The Quilting Point and the Name-of-the-Father

Christiane Alberti

Lacan avouches that what he does is not linguistics but «linguistricks»¹. It belongs to the psychoanalyst, in his use of linguistics, to examine the question of what «consequences are entailed by the definition of language for the foundation of the subject»². Among the obstacles to this use that we meet up with in purely Saussurian linguistics, Lacan remarks the schema of the double flux³ whose principle of segmentation remains fuzzy and which, above all, does not solve the question of the relation between the signified and the signifier, which appears in Saussure's schema as being «always fluid, always on the verge of being undone». Lacan elaborates an original response that we owe to psychoanalysis: the quilting point, or the knot that puts a stop to the sliding of the signified under the signifier. By using this mattsing term designating the knotting of the cord that, passing through the mattress, contains and disperses the wool, he indicates that, at one point (a signifier) of the language system, other signifiers converge and intersect, constituting the staple by which «the signifier and the signified form a knot». He designates in this way the element out of which discourse is organized, «the converging point that allows the retroactive and prospective location of everything that takes place in discourse»⁴.

The graph of desire, in its most elementary form⁵, can be considered as a representation of the quilting point. This notion appears on it as bound to the movement of signifying retroaction according to which signification is only generated as a deferred effect of the completion of the sentence. The schema shows that the quilting point is realized entirely within the order of the signifier.



Schema of page 805 of the French version of the *Écrits*

The convergence of the signifiers at one point supposes the synchronic structure of language⁶. Lacan's invention of the notion of quilting point can be deduced then from requisites inherent to the system of language as such, which (contrary to the systems of particular languages) calls for a function of self-completion. Lacan will be led then by purely formal necessities to make of the Name-of-the-Father the major quilting point of the symbolic order. No ontological dimension prevails in the definition of the function of the father: the name of the father is an instrument. It was to constitute the main stream⁷ of the clinical theory forged by Lacan and inaugurated in his Seminar, *The Psychoses*.

The objective of this Seminar is precise: to construct the concept of psychosis (in the singular) in order to organize the multiplicity of the clinical forms of the psychoses that had already been observed in the field of psychiatry. Psychosis in the singular is the *Lacanian psychosis*, which takes as its reference President Schreber's paranoia and the systematized construction of his delusional metaphor. In order

to establish this, Lacan draws the consequences of the foreclosure of the *signifier of the Law* (the Name-of-the-Father) in the Other of the signifier (the symbolic order). What is presented in discourse as a floating mass of significations is organized thanks to the quilting point. The quilting point is defined as a logical operator of knotting, which inscribes the effect of the name of the father within the organization of the subject's signifiers – it supports the signifying order and inscribes the signifier of the Law within language. The distinction between psychosis on the one hand and neurosis-perversion on the other is constructed with reference to the presence or absence of this signifier of the Law. The Name-of-the-Father is either present or absent. Between these two there is no third term – there is no border-line⁸. This structural construction of the clinic constitutes the base of the Lacanian *doxa*. It is founded on a logic of classes and of discontinuity — there is neither a passage nor a gradual process between the classes, but a rupture.

Nevertheless the last years of Lacan's teaching, in the 1970s, introduces other criterion. The Conversation of Arcachon⁹ on clinical unclassables, which was held in 1997, is a precious tool elaborated within the framework of a conversation of the Clinical Sections of the Freudian Field. According to the discontinuist logic that presides over the clinic in the Seminar III, the principle of a differential clinic opposing the neuroses and the psychoses can be formulated as «quilting point, yes or no». But Lacan's teaching cannot be limited to this consideration. It conveys more than this, as Jacques-Alain Miller has emphasized: «Just as we have generalized foreclosure, the Name-of-the-Father must also be generalized. This movement is present in Lacan's teaching. As I deal with it here, the quilting point generalizes the Name-of-the-Father. But this is an abbreviation: the quilting point in question is not so much an element as a system, a knotting, an apparatus, forming a quilting point, a staple¹⁰.» If the quilting point is a system, the pertinent opposition is no longer «quilting point, yes or no». Such a remark is possible if and only if we actuate a logic of continuity —that is to say an extensible and modifiable formalization of the clinic, with no rupture, in which it is no longer the class that predominates. It is a logic of the more or less, a logic of degree. Between the quilting point, which brings into focus the reality of the subject by knotting together the signifier and the signified, and its absence, which provokes blurring, indistinction and a lack of focus, there is precisely a continuity, passages, a gradation that must now be studied. This clinic that has recourse to the Borromean knotting of the registers of the real, the symbolic and the imaginary, poses the status of the *symptom* differently. If the knotting of the three registers, which assures the stability of the subjective position, can endure without the support of the Name-of-the-Father, we must deduce, Jacques-Alain Miller tells us, the equivalence: $S \circ NP$. «This formula is a cardinal principle of the Borromean clinic. Whether the knot has three or four rounds, these are only ways of buttressing the equivalence symptom-Name-of-the-Father. We might say that a symptom can fill the function of Name-of-the-Father¹¹.»

The clinic of the knots goes beyond the opposition presence-absence, and studies the multiplicity of knottings. How then can the quilting point be conceived? It assumes two principle forms: the Name-of-the-Father in the discontinuist logic, the symptom in the continuist approach. In the first case, the quilting point is a pertinent distinctive feature, *QP*, *yes or no*, in the second it is an apparatus. This requires defining the type of rigging involved: «I said apparatus. We can make of it a capital concept. The apparatus of the symptom assures the articulation between a signifying operation and its consequences for the *jouissance* of the subject. [...] I think the connection signifier-*jouissance* must absolutely be restored, and this is what makes the concept of an apparatus of the symptom possible»¹². Jacques-Alain Miller's remarks here are congruent with the double articulation between signifier and *jouissance* that Lacan speaks of at the opening of his Seminar *Encore*. The signifier *puts a stop* to the *jouissance* — it keeps it within bounds, it excludes it and localizes it as forbidden. This is the explicit thesis of *Seminar III*. By the construction of his delusional metaphor, and so by the ordered play of the signifier, the *jouissance* that invades both the thought and the body of Schreber is pacified. But the signifier also *causes* the *jouissance*. This thesis, unthinkable within the configuration he proposes in the *Seminar III*, brings into question the effects of the signifier on and within the body. The newly defined symptom harnesses these effects that the signifier has on the living body – effects of *jouissance* precisely.

This change of perspective does not nevertheless invalidate the structural discontinuity neurosis-psychosis, but imposes that we take into consideration the diversity of the knottings within the field of

the psychoses. If the quilting point is present in the psychoses just as in the neuroses, its structure in the mode «non-NF» is undoubtedly very complex¹³, which Lacan endeavored to account for by his reference to the Borromean knot. In the Seminar *Le Sinthome*¹⁴ he develops this clinical question with reference to the case of Joyce. He poses this question: was Joyce mad? and examines how Joyce was able to avoid the outbreak of a psychosis without the support of the paternal metaphor. In effect, Joyce was very much up against what Lacan calls «paternal deficiency». He had to compensate for an error — Lacan calls it a «fault» — in the knotting of the three consistencies, the real, the symbolic, the imaginary. The imaginary in this knot is not linked to the other two registers, the real and the symbolic, which are bound to each other. Lacan detects this quite precisely in the very strange relation Joyce has to the image of his body, when he narrates his experience of a sort of abandonment of his body after the famous scene of the beating related in *The Portrait*: the round of the imaginary slips away, Joyce experiences the flight of his body as if it were a membrane. Lacan makes the hypothesis that the correction of this error in the knotting is effected by the ego «as a corrector of the missing relation, that is to say, that which, in the case of Joyce, does not knot the imaginary to what constitutes a chain of the real and the unconscious»¹⁵. He thus discerns in Joyce a very strong *Urbild* of the ego, attested to by his determination to bring renown to his name, which must be distinguished from the image of his body. The fact that with Joyce, the idea of self is not supported by the body as an image, signals for him a very special, reparative function of this ego.

The reversal operated by Lacan concerning the articulation quilting point/Name-of-the-Father, leads us to rethink the clinic with psychosis as our table of orientation; The name of the father is relegated to its status of a singular knotting, nothing more than a semblant, «symptom of the faulted knot»¹⁶.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

- ¹ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XX, Encore*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 22 et p. 92 : « Ce que je fais ici, c'est-à-dire de la linguistique »
- ² J. Lacan *Le Séminaire, Livre XX, op. cit.*, p.20.
- ³ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre III, Les Psychoses*, Paris, 1981, p. 296 ff.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 303-304.
- ⁵ J. Lacan, « Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir », *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 805.
- ⁶ For this, R. Jakobson's linguistics will offer Lacan decisive theoretical elements by recognizing for the signifier the two axes of combination and selection.
- ⁷ TN « Main stream » is in English in the French text.
- ⁸ TN « Border-line » is in English in the text.
- ⁹ *La Conversation d'Arcachon, Cas rares : les inclassables de la clinique*, Paris, agalma Editeur, 1997.
- ¹⁰ J.-A. Miller, *La Conversation d'Arcachon, op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 156.
- ¹² *Ibid.* p. 176.
- ¹³ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 257
- ¹⁴ J. Lacan *Le Séminaire, Livre XXIII, Le Sinthome*, Editions du Seuil, 2005.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 152.
- ¹⁶ According to the formula proposed by Jacques-Alain Miller in the text on the back cover of J. Lacan, *Des Noms-du-père*, Paris, Seuil 2005.

Name-of-the-Father and quilting point

Yves Depelseñaire

«The signifier doesn't just provide an envelope, a receptacle for meaning. It polarizes it, structures it, and brings it into existence.»¹ In the twenty-first session of the seminar *The Psychoses* Lacan illustrates this proposition by evoking the first line of Racine's *Athalie*: «Yes, I come into his temple to worship the Eternal Lord.» Since *Andromaque* and *Iphigénie*, both of which begin with a «Yes», start off in the same way, this sentence already displays a great deal of complexity. «Yes» can serve as a simple shifter, but in certain circumstances it can also mean «No» or «Perhaps». A «Yes» at the beginning of a sentence always suggests a «but» somewhere down the line.

And if we pause at the second word, «I», or at the third, «come», each providing an orientation, the promise of a different meaning emerges. It is an absolutely essential feature of signifiers that they are not isolatable from one another. For signification to be complete we have to have come the final term of the utterance for the signification to be revealed retroactively. In the interrupted sentences that assail President Schreber in his hallucinations we can see, in dramatic fashion, the suspension of all established signification and its madness inducing nature. The first line of *Athalie* is, then, the paradigm of this retroaction for Lacan. We have to have come to the end of the utterance, «Eternal God», before we can know what it is about.

But Lacan's analysis extends to the whole of the play's first scene. Abner, a principal officer of the Kings of Judah, enters the temple having come from Jerusalem where Joad, the High Priest, is situated. Joad, thanking him, stigmatizes him for his passivity. Abner then recounts his lassitude, the Hebrews' despair of God following the uprisings, perpetrated by Athaliah upon her own posterity, that have put an end to the line of King David. Only a miracle would give them any hope. Joad, enigmatically, presages that a sign from God is near. By following the signifiers' trajectory line by line Lacan shows how, beginning with this scene, the said Abner, without anything having been revealed to him, however, was hooked by Joad in a way that at the end of the dialogue his subjective situation has been turned completely upside down and that he himself has become the «bait on which Athaliah will be taken». He leaves the ambiguous «zeal» that he professed and joins the ranks of the «faithful», of those who can be recognized by this unequivocal trait that is an insignia of God himself. This «God who is faithful during all his threats», a sinister and vengeful god, but the fear of whom rids one of all other fears, «I fear God, dear Abner, and have no other fear». The fear of God in this scene is the keystone around which the dialogue unfolds and is articulated. The floating mass of significations gets comes to be tied down, becomes focused and retroactively clarified around this «quilting point».

What is this fear of *God*? Lacan notes that the cultural history of this signifier deserves to be retraced and that the substitution of this signifier for the fear of *the gods* is not at all the invention of small minds. It finds love at the level of a signifier where multiform and unlocalised terrors reign unrestrained; in short, it evokes desire as a defence against jouissance. There is something here, surely, that very directly touches on Racine. If the fear of *God* haunts *Esther* and *Athalie*, his two final works, the anger of the *gods* is a major signifier in all his earlier tragedies from *Thébaïde* to *Phèdre*.

However constraining it might be, the fear of God, the fear of a being who can carry out his punishment only through the evil that is already there, is the opposite of a fear. Thus we see Abner leaving the temple no longer trembling at the name of Athaliah, all his fears transmuted into a determined courage. «When the quilt-maker's needle, which has entered at the moment of 'God, faithful in all his threats', emerges, it's done, the guys say, «I am going to join the faithful troops.»

This quilting of signification around a primordial signifier evokes for Lacan the idea of a musical score to explain what is going on in this scene. Already in *Seminar I* he had had the image of a stave of music as better able to formalize discourse than the Saussurian division between signifier and signified.

We found this stave again in Lacan's teaching two years later in the form of the graph of «Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire», where the mechanisms of signifying retroaction are set out. In his elementary cell, Lacan comments, «what I have called the quilting point, by which the signifier stops the otherwise indefinite sliding of signification . . .

The diachronic function of this quilting point can be found in a sentence, in so far as a sentence closes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in the construction constituted by the other terms and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its retroactive effect.»²

The synchronic structure is «more hidden, and it is this structure that brings us to the beginning. It is metaphor.» We can see this mechanism in the text of Racine's in the substitution of the fear of God for the fear of the gods.

The fear of God is «something quite similar to the idea of the Father», Lacan says. Quite similar, but not quite the same thing, then. From the subject Abner's point of view, it would be more precise to read the agency of the ego-ideal in the fear of God, that is, vectorizing metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father following the developments of the seminar, *Formations of the Unconscious*. The fear of God sets Abner on the highway, the one that designates the signifier «being a father», as Lacan defines it at the end of his seminar *The Psychoses*.

In the '70s Lacan returns twice to his analysis of *Athalie*. In Seminar XVII *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, and in his text «On Reading Freud», given to Robert Geogin. IN *The Other Side* he gives his audience some homework concerning Balzac's novel, *L'envers de l'histoire contemporaine*.

Do exactly the same as the one which, about one hundred years ago, I had tried to give to the people I was speaking to at Sainte Anne concerning the first scene of Act One of *Athalie*. All they heard were the quilting points. I am not saying that it was an excellent metaphor. In the end, it was this S_1 , the master signifier. . .

It was a way of asking them to notice how something that spreads throughout language like wildfire is readable, that is to say, how it hooks on, creates a discourse. . . .

As for psychology, it is striking that there is not even a shadow of it in the order of things that are enlightening, like *L'Envers de la vie contemporaine*. . . . It is a little montage whose entire value comes through its master-signifiers.³

The other allusion is similar.

Recall the way I designated what became an agreed-upon point in my school under the name «quilting point» in my analysis of the first scene of *Athalie*. The direction of my analysis was not to seek the heartfelt declarations of Abner or Joad, any more than of Racine, but instead to show the effects of discourse by which a member of the resistance, who knows his politics, succeeds in hooking a collaborator in the process of abandoning his solitude, to the point where he leads his own boss into the trap, with in short the same effect on the audience no doubt as Sartre's play when he had the insults of his own militia flying all about, not sparing the portrait of Pétain, before an audience who were still blessing the above-mentioned to themselves for having spared them the spectacle of these things while they were taking place.⁴

Another duty to fulfil, then, based on *Morts sans sepulture*, a play Sartre wrote two years after the Liberation.

Nothing that is of the order of intersubjectivity, of possible relations of love or hate, between Joad and Abner is decisive in what Racine presents to us. It all stems from the fact that Joad, the High Priest, utters the Master trump at the right moment, to use Lacan's 1956 formula, that is, the master signifier, «the fear of God», by which Abner's floating discourse is orientated, quilted, in such a manner that a complete reversal takes place within him. We observe a process of a similar kind in *L'envers de l'histoire contemporaine* with the young Godefroid's initiation into the Congregation of Madame de la

Chanterie. As for *Morts sans sepulture*, on the contrary, it on the contrary presents us with the disintegration of the abject Vichy militia, when the image of the puppet-master is collapsing, faded guarantor of feebleness.

The metaphor of the quilting point condenses two operations in fact which Lacan undertakes to distinguish little by little, and even to separate them off from one another: the signification effect and the knotting effect.

And the reduction of the quilting point, «not an excellent metaphor», to the master signifier is highly indicative of a change in perspective in Lacan's teaching concerning the Name-of-the-father. Any signifier whatever can be called into the position of master signifier, the stress placed upon the fact of being tied down by a primordial signifier fades. The master signifier is in this sense the «ultra-reduced myth».⁵ There is henceforth no reason to identify the father with the Eternal Lord, this father around whom, in religion, signification is knotted. As to the knotting, the Sinthome will accomplish this.

Translated by R. Grigg

Footnotes

¹ J. Lacan, «J. Lacan, The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses, p. 260

² J. Lacan, «Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire», *Ecrits*, trans. B. Fink (New York, Norton, 2002), 291-2.

³ J. Lacan, *Séminaire 17, L'envers de la psychanalyse*, p.219, Paris, Seuil, 1991

⁴ J. Lacan, *C'est à la lecture de Freud*, in R.Georgin, Lacan, P.17, Petit-Roeulx, Cistre, 1977. Reprinted in *La Lettre mensuelle de l'ECF*, n° 102, sept/oct 1991

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 102.

R like...

S like...

SCIENCE • **P. LA SAGNA**
SECTS • **R. C REGO BARROS**

SEMBLANT • M. TORRES
SEXUATION • F. SCHEJTMAN
STATISTICS • P. TAGLE

SUBLIMATION • **H. CASTANET**
SUPERSTITION • **J SANTIAGO**

SUPPLEMENT • **J.P. DEFFIEUX / C. DEWAMBRECHIES-LA SAGNA**

SYMPTOM • **MR. TARRAB**

REALITY • M. RECALCATI
REAL • E SINATRA
REPRESSION • C VIGANO
RELIGIONS • A. LESERRE

S like...

SCIENCE • P. LA SAGNA
SECTS • R. C REGO BARROS
SEMBLANT • M. TORRES
SEXUATION • F. SCHEJTMAN
STATISTICS • P. TAGLE
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SYMPTOM • MR. TARRAB

Science and the Name-of-the-Father

Philippe La Sagna

The father is not an affair of sentiment, even if modernity has done everything to render his figure endearing, but a question of logic. The existence of a father cannot be deduced from sentient experience, nor from love, but from a «logical conclusion» that Freud considered as a giant step for civilization. By developing this logical capacity that allowed him to name the father, man ended up by inventing a science. A science liable, curiously, to put a stop to the murmurings of genealogical stories and legends, on which it had for a long time founded its existence. With time, science gave rise to a new subject, disengaged from its roots, a universal subject, freed from tradition and its authority, and perceiving its own vacancy and the loss of its identity. Psychoanalysis turned up at that point to offer a response to the question of what desire, kinship, death and the body might be for such a subject of science.

For the father, the truth of the logical conclusion is dependent on the parole¹ of a woman, the mother. The progress of science today has made it possible to found paternity in nature, by naturalizing the father through biology and genetics. But this has not yet eradicated the power to name that can be summed up in the «religious» formula of the «name-of-the-father». This «name» clearly indicates that the question of the father involves the origin of a subject and not merely the reproduction of bodies or of DNA. The maternal parole has always linked the question of the father to truth. If the father is a name, his «truth» is that he is also a metaphor. This truth of the father and of Oedipus seemed like the good news of psychoanalysis, which even lets us believe that the concealment or the repression of this truth might be the cause of our symptoms, since they ceased when it was discovered.

Science refuses to believe in the causal power of a hidden truth because it only believes in what is clearly intelligible and liable to be calculated. In this, the rigor of science joins that of psychosis in its disbelief. It cannot accept then the causal determination of a hidden truth. For religion, the love of truth and the love of the father go together and this perspective could, paradoxically as research, give its impetus to science. But science very soon left to God the Father the charge of the truth that hampered its calculations. So it substituted to the true and the false formulas that can be ranged within the real. The formulas of science are just as real as the planets whose courses they inscribe. The effective consequences of these formulas in reality appear every day a bit more «real», impossible to think and to bear... Consider for example the famous heating of the planet. Contrary to a widely spread idea, science does not transform the real into symbols by reducing them, but, with its symbols, it produces a new real that is constantly growing and reducing our space.

By turning its back on its rigor, by pragmatism, science has contributed to a secular religion preaching for «scientific truth»: scientism. Within the scientist perspective, nature takes precisely the place that was previously attributed to the father. Thus in the name of nature, scientism intends to restore commandments, morals, a way of behaving in the world, which formerly belonged to the domain of tradition and of «the fathers». The scientists have then become the ministers of nature, the only ones entitled to the knowledge of how to read its commandments. The power of scientism reposes on its confusing the methods of science with science itself. While the «true» science is situated precisely at that point where the value of its method disappears behind the result obtained, which the formula inscribes.

Science had in the beginning a semantic consistence, it described reality, or it inscribed it in formulas. Then its consistence appeared as a syntax related to the logical rigor of its formulas, to the laws that ordain its little letters. Today this model is in crisis. The rise of peripheral sciences, such as biology, have brought about a return of the semantic exigency. The will to naturalize what is human tends to eradicate the rigor of science. The neo-semantic naturalist considers today as scientific what is received as such by the so-called scientific community. This fictional community, made up of anonymous

components, of committees of experts in which there reigns conformist mediocrity rather than the exception, consider themselves as the exclusive judges of «scientific norms».

This situation permits science to appropriate domains it had formerly neglected, in order to conserve its consistence. The project of naturalization of the mind proposed by the cognitive sciences is a good illustration of this neo-semantics that manages to confuse with science what some called «metaphysics» not long ago. The new objects of science have become questions: what is thinking, wanting, deciding, being conscious? Outwardly aiming at reducing the «logical construction» of the mind, in order to include it in the materialist perspective of science, they establish a new metaphysics. This neo-metaphysics is presented as cognitive knowledge that restores a subject more scholastic than it is Cartesian, essentially committed to a scientist apprenticeship and the spiritual exercises that the cognitive mental therapies constitute. The insane hypothesis is, then, to want to constitute the science of the mind as the science of science!

The history of science embodies a refusal to consider origins, or any determining and verifiable reality for tradition. In this perspective, science ignores what the Name-of-the-father designates, if we take it here in the sense of origins, principles, or order. The father is on the contrary the name of the impossibility of this enterprise. He represents, in effect, this necessary ignorance concerning origins that makes it possible for knowledge to appear. A creator as a procreator, he knows nothing of the act that constitutes him. Freud, who was oriented by the ideal of science, knew, contrary to common sense, how to maintain at the origin of psychology, a part of history, of *mythos* that the logos does not dissipate. He wrote his «scientific myth», *Totem and Taboo* in order to maintain the figure of the real father, murdered by his sons. Scientific myth here means myth according to the age of science. The Freudian original father constitutes the very origin of the father, what is most real in him. Reality is possible, truth surprises, but the real is presented as impossible. If Freud considered this impossible important and even posited it as true, it is because he did not want to renounce a fact of experience: castration. This term implies that, for the speaking being, the reality of sexuality is present under the sign of an ineluctable fault in knowledge. This fault, which cannot be known, can find its cause, or rather its agent, in the forged figure of the real father, as the agent of castration. It is in order to reject the effective reality of castration that the subject displaces it and covers it with death wishes concerning his father and with his fear of retaliation. Thus, the figure that made it possible for knowledge to develop became the representative and the screen of its limit. In this perspective, the father and his name designates a hole in everything that can be written. A hole at the origin, not of words, but clearly of names.

Science might have seemed not to take this name into consideration, but perhaps it only kept repeating the writing of it, in the pure order of its formulas and its infinite quest for a unity that would be the unity of the world itself. Psychoanalysis does not oppose science to religion, it unites them in the practice of reading. In the Old Testament it is written that the infiniteness of creation, its swift expansion, ended up by wrenching a cry from God. And by this cry he manifested the possibility of putting a stop to creation. This stop is a cut that marks one of the names of God, the very name of El Shaddāi. Today the knowledge of science incarnates this infinite power of creation. The question is posed, not of stopping, but of introducing a cut liable to air it a bit and so bring to it something new.

Psychoanalysis takes its start from what is unreadable for a subject, which it discovers in the symptom. This enigmatic symptom proves to be readable, decipherable, by means of the principle of reading the name-of-the-father constitutes. Freud posed it as equivalent to the hypothesis of Oedipus. But the name-of-the-father, if it can be written and if it makes it possible to read, becomes then itself unreadable. So it cannot be the object of a rejection, which is the position of science, or of a cult and a mystery, the case of religion. In order to avoid this obstacle, psychoanalysis, with Lacan, maintains that the analyzed symptom retains a part of its unreadability. There is a real limit to reading, which is not necessarily that of castration. This limit, which is not that of the Freudian castrating father, indicates a new real to us, which appears then as lawless. This lawless real denounces the identity and the unity of the world that the laws of science supposed.

In order to counter this lawless real, it is proposed today that we substitute to it a generalized negotiation whose mode is scientism, by substituting to the rules of reason and of the law, the limp

norms of commerce. At the age in which DNA can be used to «name» the father, the law prefers, for example, to envisage a father designated by family and social negotiation, or by the evaluation of his capacities to assume the role.

The symptom, thanks to psychoanalysis, appears as that part of the human being that can and must remain non-negotiable, in the age of rampant science and «globalization». It is clearly this that introduced a new cut in knowledge, which makes it possible to escape the diverse projects of post-humanity, supposed to replace the universal man of the past century. The Freudian father is just a dated and still unavoidable form of this symptom.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

- ¹ TN : I have not written « parole » in italics because Webster's gives a Saussurian definition of it, thus making of it an English word. Lacan does not use « parole » of course precisely in the Saussurian sense, but since this was his initial reference for the term, it is important for the connotations connected to it. There is also a considerable advantage for translations, which have always required a long series of « equivalents », different according to the context, and practically always forced and awkward in English : speech, word, words, utterances... ; they have also varied from translator to translator and from text to text for each translator. In this context, I suppose I would have been forced to say something like « the mother's words », but parole is not precisely that or else is more than that. We will have to verify that it effectively works in all the contexts, but if it does, it will also permit English speaking readers to have access to the profusion of senses that this single signifier carries.

The sects and the Name-of-the-father

Romildo do Rêgo Barros

Où le dommage pourtant ? quand pas plus loin ne va-t-il que n'en souffre le personnage vapoureux de l'histoire, qui pour avoir, des barreaux d'une grille tâtés pas à pas, retrouvé l'un marqué d'abord, concluait: "Les salauds, ils m'ont enfermé". C'était la grille de l'Obélisque, et il avait à lui la place de la Concorde.

Jacques Lacan (1)

The divergence concerning the etymology of the word "*sect*" is well known. Some refer its origin to the latin verb *secare* meaning *to cut*, while others oppose the verb "*sequi*" meaning *to follow*. The first explanation emphasizes the separation of a whole from which the sect would have been a part, while the second one points out the sectarian's relationship with the leader and his doctrine.

Let's imagine, just as a fiction, that this isn't just a dispute among erudite men to be solved when one of them finally produces the full proof in favor of one of the two verbs. Even if it seems absurd, let's imagine, that the double etymology is due to the fact that the suitable meaning of this term oscillates. This would make necessary more than one latin source to deal with its meaning, although never achieving unanimity.

Secare and *sequi* will, therefore, be necessary to each other, and the choice of one rather than the other will produce a loss in its meaning.

SECARE

The definition of "sect", in this sense, follows the pattern of the relationship between the whole and a part. That is: sect and church imply one another to the point in which the birth of the former is frequently a trace of a crisis, either of the functioning, or of the legitimacy inside the church. Sects usually refer themselves to the orthodoxy from which they devided themselves, in the name of fidelity to the original doctrinal goals.

That is the overall sense of the definition proposed by theologian Ernest Troeltsch, a colaborator and friend of Max Weber, which I resume in my own words:

The church is a conservative organization well adapted to the secular power structure, while the sect is distinguished by its separatism and laity.

The church considers the secular order as a preparation to the supernatural life while, in a way, the sectary practice is already part of life's supernatural goals. If the church's main job is to prepare its members for eternity, the sect pretends to anticipate it.

Max Weber(2) added another observation to Troeltsch's', which considered today, from our point of view, can be surprising: the adhesion to the sect is a free choice of the candidate as well as the acceptance of its norms and rules. This is a different approach, specially if compared with the brain-washing delation made against some sect directors, that mobilized governments, families and educators.

Certainly, the freedom which Weber refers to – even if he reported to religious activities somehow different from today's sects – is related to the lack of the structural complex power, whose best example can be found in the Catholic Church. Weber shows, therefore, an earlier agreement with what Jacques-Alain Miller and Jean-Claude Milner will affirm: that the contract is a contemporary alternative to the law (3), and that the sectary community is the offspring of a voluntary contractual commitment.

The adhesion to the sect is an individual act opposed to what happens in the churches, where the transmission is made from generation to generation, by traditional ways, in sympathy with local culture.

These definitions, as anyone can see, demand that a relationship between the whole and the part has to be kept: there is a sect, only if related to a church. To use the example of the most famous heresy of medieval christian occident, there is always a *catholic* (universal, in greek) as a background from which a *catarrh* (a pure, also in greek) stands out. A sect is a sect, only if considered as an extraction of a church, even when it claims to be the most integral and severe realization of the church's original goals.

The sect, understood as a separation, intends, in many cases, to represent, in act, the most intimate and the very essential of the founder's original message. It's a part that justifies its present existence, with the hope that in the future it will become a whole: one day we will be the human kind. So, what today is considered heretic, will tomorrow become the orthodoxy, with one difference: that when it occurs, the purity of the doctrine will be sustained and its literalness won't be lost when expressed through devices.

We have here an inflexible machine: the ecclesiastic – or either, the political or the intellectual – operation, which is a synthesis between the founder's message and the inevitable automaton of institutional devices, is seen by the sect's followers as treason, while they are considered by the church's pomp as heretics. This mutual denial is probably what gives consistency to their relationship.

Where lies the border? How, when and in which point a sect becomes a church, or when does it renounce itself to be the expression of the whole and decides to become a singular group? Or, on the other extreme, how does one distinguish the sectary's specificity from the communitary trend, equally linked to a crisis of the law? They are probably oscillating borders impossible to be precised.

SEQUI

The definition of a sect becomes less simple when it's understood as a derivation of the latin verb *Sequi*. It's not well defined to which group the adjective "sectarian" should be assigned to. The "*dérive sectaire*" (4) reasonably considered as a serious problem, characteristic of our times, denotes equally a dispersion of meaning.

Contemporary sects seem to be determined mostly by the adhesion to a guide, rather than to the opposition to a universal from which they would have been separated. This is partly due to the fact that some of them demand no religious basis whatsoever. Some of them simply proclaim a new doctrine or a new enlightenment incarnated by a leader or prophet, whose legitimacy, Max Weber would call "charismatic", since it doesn't come, either from a tradition or from the prerogatives of the function. Therefore, it's quite normal that today's debate should revolve around the risk of unrestrained surrender to a leader's caprice, rather than argue if the doctrine is false or true – specially if one doesn't know where the decision over the orthodoxy (5) comes from. The brutal conclusion *Roma locuta, causa finita*, that under the catholicism hegemony would silence the dissensions, by setting an authority source, at least for a while, seems to be pulverized in the voices of many anonymous agencies and other fragmentary places of the bureaucratic power. The theological debate – that naturally doesn't need to define any god as an object of studies, but anyways, demands a consistent One – meets an obstacle at this point.

We have to consider, here, two apparently contradictory features: from one side, sects serve as an attempt of recovering the One, in the sense that the unrestrained surrender of its members, confines a collective space and gives to each one and all, a master signifier, in which all can recognize: oneself, the sect members and the strangers.

On the other hand, one cannot ignore that the sects, as they appear nowadays, are the expression of the fragmentation of the One, and in this sense, they're themselves the dispersion and not just a reaction against it. They can even dismiss any intention or "salvation strategy", as the ones with simple acquaintance practices (therapeutic, sexual, nourishing, etc.) can show. That means that in lack of a universal answer, subjects represent themselves through particular traces (or "parish" traces in the sense once used by Jacques-Alain Miller), or through any other partial agreement, but not through an universal communion.

I, AND AFTER A

Secare and *sequi* emphasize, in this text, two important dialectical moments. The organization of a sect as *separation* represents an attempt against the One, usually compensated in a hysterical way, by the demand that It should resist, for, it is the One's permanence that gives sense to the attempt.

Seen as adhesion – or as alienation – the sect is a return of the One, under a master form – a law, a rule. Maybe separation leads inevitably to adhesion, but one must not forget that between one and the other, there is a passage through the object, at the crucial point where collective ideals exhaust themselves.

This is precisely the point of today's uneasiness and debate: in this time of crisis of the universals, the sects self-sufficiency - that seem to be satisfactory either as a world's explanation, or as a way of life - has, in some cases, led to an extreme, as the famous massacre, in April 1993, in the USA, of the sect guided by David Koresh.

Could psychoanalysts, extracting what they learn from their practice, show that it is possible to produce new master signifiers – or new contracts – after the harsh experience of the failure of the ideals? This would be an alternative to the worst.

Translation by Maria Cristina Vidigal

Footnotes

- 1 LACAN, J. "Discours à EFP", *Scilicet* 2/3 p. 9 – 29.
- 2 WEBER, Max. *Sociologie des Religions*, Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 1996. p. 318.
- 3 MILLER, J-A. And MILNER, J-C. "Voulez-vous être évalué?" Grasset & Fasquelle éditeurs, col. *Figures*, Paris, may 2004.
- 4 Expression created by Anne Fournier : "La dérive sectaire" , in *Le Journal des Psychologues* n° 174, février 2000, dossier *Les Sects: un danger pour la profession*. The author published in collaboration with Michel Monroy, in a book of the same title. (Paris, PUF, 1999)
- 5 An example of this trend is on a list I quote here, recently published by a peruvian catholic organization, alerting the readers about the many and serious dangers of sects although never referring to any doctrine mistake: "sexual abuse and minor corruption, leads to prostitution, freedom deprivation and kidnapping, torture, self-mutilations, drug abuse and traffic, suicide, hired murder , war weapon traffic". (*ACI-digital orgão da ACI Imprensa*).

Sublimation and name of the father

Hevé Castanet

The Freudian concept of sublimation is first referred to in the opening chapter of *Metapsychology* in 1915. The thesis is well known. For Freud, the drives have four destinies: «their reversal to the opposite, their redirection back onto the person himself, their repression, their sublimation». The binomial drive-sublimation extracts sublimation from what is still too frequently chit-chatted about it: a reduction to an insipid attitude that intellectualizes, even to the point of abstraction, what the drive in its constant push (*konstante Kraft*) is actually doing non-stop day in day out. As Freud says, the drives «are capable of operations far removed from the actions imposed by the original goals. (Sublimation).» Sublimation finds itself immediately associated with art, esthetics, distancing; in short, with a renunciation-displacement from the goals of the drive. A veil (beauty) comes to cover the drive, diffracted into its four heterogeneous components (Lacan will call it a «montage»).

These remarks, although they are not wrong, remain short.

In his Seminar XI, J. Lacan will insist on what is at stake for the drives in order to seize the logic of sublimation. The operation of sublimation shows how the drive objects to the mythology of satisfaction (*Befriedigung*): «the satisfaction of the drive is to arrive at its *Ziel*, its goal. The predator leaves its hole *querens quem devoret...*» That is precisely what sublimation contradicts. This point has often gone unnoticed; «... it is rather remarkable that no one ever brought it up, after all the time its been there proposing itself as an enigma, which in keeping with all of Freud's enigmas, was raised like a challenge right to the end of his life, without his ever deeming to explain himself more fully... in this article, a thousand times over, Freud tells us that sublimation is also a satisfaction of the drive, even though it is *zielgehemmt*, inhibited as to its goal – even though it does not attain it. Sublimation is no less a satisfaction of the drive, and it is so without repression.» Lacan adds a blunt turn of phrase: «In other words – for the time being, I'm not fucking, I'm talking to you, well then! I can have exactly the same satisfaction as if I was. That's what it [sublimation] means.» In other terms, sublimation, because it is one of the drive's destinies, is a full-fledged mode of satisfaction – of enjoyment [jouissance] as Lacan will say in his last teaching. But this satisfaction is not univocal – it is «paradoxical». «When we take a good look, we see that something else has come into play – the category of the impossible. It is, in the foundations of Freudian theory, absolutely radical. The path of the subject... goes between two walls of the impossible». To say «paradoxical satisfaction» is to say that in the drive, things do not fall into place, that the object supposed to satisfy by appeasement is neither found nor seized. The real is implicated in this; «...the real, that is the obstacle to the pleasure principal. The real is the clash [heurt], it's that things don't work out straight away, unlike the hand reaching for objects in the world». In short, the drive does not find its object, it goes around it – it misses the object and evades it. It is in its quality of lost, radically lost, that the object comes into function, opening the field of its research – of repetition. It is in this course (the course of the drive) that satisfaction lodges itself; but in that the object aimed at is missed, the drive touches the real – «...the real as impossible» – and cannot be reduced either to signifiers or to imaginary snares alone. From what can be read in the Seminar of 64 and what is to follow, especially in 1972-73 in the Seminar *Encore*, we can posit that to say that satisfaction touches the real is to affirm that the impossibility of a sexual relationship is at the heart of it. This paradox of the satisfaction of the drive, framed by the impossible, is what Lacan articulates as «the enjoyment [jouissance] that is not fitting¹». This paradox, this logic of the impossible that goes around, – and this is the next step – has to do with the object and its miss for the spoken-being [parlêtre]. «This miss,» says Lacan in *Encore*, «is the only way of realizing the sexual relationship if, as I posit, there's no such thing as a sexual relationship ... it misses ... It's a matter of repeating until you're blue in the face why it misses. It misses. That is objective... Indeed, it is so plain that it is objective to center the question of the object, in the psychoanalytical discourse, precisely thereupon. The miss is the object... The object is a miss. The essence of the object is that it misses.» This missing

the mark, as regards the object, situates satisfaction of the drive in its articulation with the category of the impossible. In other words, as enjoyment [jouissance] it is not fitting»: enjoy [jouir] the miss. Object *a*, drive and sublimation become three inseparable terms. The result: sublimation is enjoyment [jouissance], that is to say, sublimation is the junction of satisfaction and of the real (=the impossible).

These remarks from 1964 for the most part, as a detailed reading of Freudian Metapsychology, are the markers that restore a vital place to sublimation, one far removed from the insipidness attributed to the word in common speech.

It allows us to reread the chapters VII and XII that Lacan devotes to sublimation in his Seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis (1959-60). This seminar marks a break in a series that unfolds the unconscious as worker whose formations have a Baroque style. In The Ethics, it is *das Ding* (the Thing) that dominates – it does not speak, it creates a halt, a stopper to the logic of the signifier: «the silent reality that is *das Ding*». *Ding* is «without-signified» and always beyond (the pleasure principle). Lacan will put the Thing in the position of cause: the subject «can groan, roar, curse, he does not understand – here, nothing hinges together, even by metaphor».

Thus, good and bad are metaphors (lies). At the heart of the subjective world where the signifiers of desire organize themselves, there is *das Ding* – it is at the center as excluded, it is: « what is foreign to me while being at the heart of this ego...» *Das Ding* determines a (topological) place where Lacan will later situate the real and the paradox of the impossible that constitutes sublimation. It is with this new topology that Lacan introduces sublimation in its relation to the symbolic father. In the Freudian fiction *Totem and Taboo*, the symbolic father proceeds from the murder of the father – this murder being the condition for culture, the law, and the return of love that is both the basis of Christianity and the inspiration for the poetry of Courtly love. This murder does not open the way to enjoyment [jouissance] that remains doubly forbidden.

The thesis of «Civilisation and its Discontents» and «Totem and Taboo» is that the sovereign good that is the mother (in the place of *Ding*) is forbidden. «... the step taken by Freud, as regards the pleasure principle, is to show that there is no sovereign good - that the sovereign good, that is *das Ding*, that is the mother, the object of incest, is a forbidden good, and that there is no other good.» Moral law is centered on this point: it presentifies, in the name of the symbolic father, this ban on the sovereign good. The name of the father is the operation of sublimation. Lacan says nothing different when he speaks of the «sublimation of the Father». Nor is it an accident if, to define moral law, Lacan makes use of the Deuteronomy. God is grasped there by means of the law that sublimates.

In the Middle ages, courtly love put the Lady in exactly this place of the Thing. This is one of the historical paradigms of sublimated love. «The object, namely the feminine object in this case, enters through the singular door of deprivation, of inaccessibility. What ever be the social position of he who functions in this register... inaccessibility is the principal at work there.» That is to say; «there is no way to sing the Lady, in her poetic position, without the presupposition of a barrier that surrounds and isolates her.» That is the «vacuole».

These few markers, beginning with the Freudian binomial drive-sublimation presented at the outset, allow us to seize the clinical conclusions Lacan draws therefrom. Behind the veil of beauty that covers the inaccessibility of the object, is the radical demonstration that the object of the drive is always a lost object, that the course of the drive is satisfaction by its very miss, that *Ding* is a mute reality that provokes talk, that the sexual relation cannot be written – extracting the impossible. These different expressions of Lacan's, depending on the emphasis of his teaching, bare the same logic in every case: sublimation is a way of covering and – at the same time – of causing to suddenly appear the real that the subject confronts (*tuché*).

Translated by Julia Richards

Footnotes

- ¹ See Bruce Fink's translation note page 61 in *Encore The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, W.W. Norton and co., Paris, New York, 1998.

Superstition and Name-of-the-Father

Jésus Santiago

One recognizes that the general sense that the Age of Enlightenment gave to the term superstition – a fake God cult – have a past that is object of many philological interpretations. It's through the Latin word *superstitio* and the derivate adjective *superstitiosus* that Moderns have set the usual sense of the superstition notion. From the point of view of formal structure, *superstitio* should be the abstract term corresponding to the base term *superstes*, that is, 'survivor'. The basis question that lives up these many interpretations is connected to the relation that these two terms keep between themselves, having in view that *superstes* doesn't concern only to what 'survives', 'sub exists', 'remains', but is also associated to the idea of 'witness'. The same difficulty is found in the clarification in the relation between *superstitio* and *superstitiosus*. Admitting that the Latin term *superstitio* brings, somehow, to the meaning of 'superstition', how to conceive that *superstitiosus* has assumed, at Antiquity, the significance of 'divine', 'prophetic', and not 'superstitious'¹?

For the purposes here claimed, it's enough to point out the culminant aspect of this interpretation in which *superstes*, 'survivor', mixes with *superstitio*, giving to it the sense of 'survival'. According to Benveniste, the term *superstitio* would indicate the existence of an old belief that, in remote times, already seemed to be something superfluous. One can see that that such an explanation rests itself, according to him, over a historical absurdity: «... it would be to lend to the ancients, and even before historical tradition, the spirit attitude and critical sense of the XIXth century or from our modern ethnologists who made practical the discernment in religion of older age's 'survivals' ...»². On the other hand, he further adds that, from this anticipatory vision, inscribed in the expression *superstitiosus*, the moderns preferred to privilege the opposition between the fake cults and the ones from the real religion, at the expenses of the singular phenomenon of the «survivals», which, in that era already, do not harmonize with the instated belief system.

We shouldn't forget that Freud is included in this list of moderns who used to reaffirm the distinction involving the various modalities of beliefs, especially concerning the superstitious beliefs and the Jewish-Christian religion. If there is an aspect that imposes itself as you consider the Freudian conception of civilization, it is the one that there was a time when religion was absent and, therefore, without the faith in the unique and supreme God. With basis in history of civilizations researches, Freud demonstrates that, in spite of being an inherent factor to the human condition, the belief expressions pass, along history, by significant transformations. Under the optic of these manifestations, it is necessary to take into account the importance of a historic period, which came before the monotheist religion, nominated animist phase by the epoch ethnology. We also distinguish, that, for Freud, many of the expressions of the animism survives, until today, by means of what is called superstition, parallel to, and hidden behind religion³. He arguments that no one should be surprised, even after the Jewish-Christian monotheism emergence, with the fact that the religious practices can conserve essential aspects from the animist way of thoughts: the super-valorization of the magic from the words in the prayer rituals and the belief that, with the help of the divine forces, the world's real events take the course that the human mind desires to impose. Therefore he sees, that superstition is conceived, in this context, as an «animism without magical acts»⁴. The way the phenomenon is perceived is an evidence that the accusation of an evolutionism in matter of civilization's history, that weighs against Freud, shows itself insufficient, as it broaches the difficulties in making disappear something that, in the field of beliefs, demonstrates strong psychic expression.

On the other hand, the hypothesis that this superstitious reason survival in religious speech expresses itself with the same strength, in the operation of neurosis, took place, since the beginning of Freud's elaboration. It's important to notice the fact that he had chosen, as a conclusion of «The psychopathology

of daily life», the discussion about how much superstitious belief is a demonstration of unconscious knowledge interference in the random acts and chance actions of the subject. After the report of an event that could promote a superstitious judgement, such as an omen or a destiny advertence, Freud questions the casualty of such a sort of belief. In face of this episode, whose origin can be considered accidental, he questions himself about the distinctions that involves the incidence of belief in the superstitious man and in the psychoanalyst, whose example is himself.

Questioning the casualty of superstitious belief supposes to admit that the conviction obtained by the analyst from the real is always conditioned by contingency, by what is introduced as unessential and definitely variable. Freud refuses every psychologism, which ignores that «*one event, in which occurrence my mental life didn't participate, can teach something about the future configuration of reality*»⁵. The superstitious person refuses to accept the casual factor involved in his random acts and in his chance actions. To the contrary, he is strongly inclined to attribute sense to the unexpected events from the real. He doesn't believe that the contingency, in the meaning of what shows itself as possible to *be* or *not to be*, might constitute itself as the property of things. At last, to the superstitious, there is no unconscious's subject, there's a psychological determinism, which ambitions to take the real as possible and markedly reducible to the sense. This contingency's refusal as demonstration of the real while impossible, is what marks the essence of the superstitious reason. To the contrary, the scientist, as the psychoanalyst accedes to the real by means of the impossible, but of a very singular impossible because it takes roots in contingency, and not on necessary.

It has been observed, from the beginning, that Lacan brings back the superstitious belief problem, in a perspective which intentions are to make it pass through the evaluation of the reason since Freud. It is not his interest to retrace the careful exam of what turned the superstition and the Enlightenment into two completely antagonistic notions. The combat that the XVIIth century established against superstition, as known, is part of the legacy that chooses to break the link with ancient ages and, therefore, inaugurates the modernity. The consideration that the philosophy of the Enlightenment, in this respect, wasn't innovative enough as it could be imagined, was not unfounded, since the Catholic Church had already, in the past, widely compromised itself with this same combat against superstition⁶. In this historical context, this ceases to be conceived as a foreign element to Christianity. Superstition menaces Christianity from the inside. Superstition becomes one kind of «*other's religion*», since it confuses itself with the impure forces that contaminate the cult of the true God.

It's through this point of view that the reasons which made Lacan suggest, to the effect of defining superstition, the reading of *De Natura Deorum* from Cicerus, and not, for example, Voltaire's philosophy⁷, are understandable. According to Voltaire, superstition is «*everything that is added to natural religion*» under the shape of all types of excesses and extravagances, expressed in fanaticisms, beliefs and devotions that are susceptible to affect properly religious behavior⁸. The Voltarian notion of «*distance by excess*» (*écart par excès*), that affirms itself in this profane utilization of theological qualifications, indicates how much, for him, the idea of excess supposes, in the same proportion, the one of rule.

In opposition to this properly prescriptive orientation, Lacan appreciates, with acuity, the distant example from Cicerus text, which deals with the question concerning the nature of gods, recognizing the impact that this issue brings to social and political life as well as in the practices of ethical virtues. Lacan is especially interested in highlighting the genealogical topic in Cicero's work, because that is the way that the distinction between the general sense and the literal sense of *superstitiosus* arises. He points out that «*the superstitiosus were people who prayed and did sacrifices, all day long, aiming that there descendents survive them*. The emphasis on the idea of survival is clear in this appropriation of devotion by people who aim for a goal that is essential to them. This formulation elucidates much more about the Ancient's notion – notion that is very important in every ancient society – of «*lineage continuity*» than about the opposition between the superstitious cult and the cult of the true God. Lacan observes that maybe, the genealogical reference to *superstitio* is the way that leads to knowledge of the true definition given to the word superstition – «*withdrawal of one part of a behavior's text in prejudice of others*». Evidently, this extraction of a part of the text is what survives, what remains as a «*parcel formation*» and, also, as a witness to the «*methodic displacement*» of what is essential in neurosis mechanism.⁹

Some years later, in his seminar «*The four fundamental concepts in Psychoanalysis*», Lacan brings up again this same elaboration about superstition. He is now moved by the problem about what sort of truth the analytical practice produces. Certainly what psychoanalysis produces as practice has the right to distinguish itself by the needs it implies, and, over all, by the manner it handles the question of truth. According to Lacan, it is possible to ask the same question by this exoteric formulation: *How can we guarantee that we are not in imposture?* He also points out that his elaboration requires the use of the word imposture because this is the safest way to deal with the relation between psychoanalysis and religion, and also with science¹⁰.

As we have seen before, this is the same problem that mankind faced at the Age of Enlightenment, during the XVIIIth century, when it was put into question the presence of an imposture in the middle of religious speech, which would be contaminated by the impurity that comes from superstitious beliefs. In the end, the essential fact of the discussion about the sort of truth produced by psychoanalytical practice resolves itself by the questioning about the destiny of belief, that, under the prism of Lacan's teaching, is supported by the interposition of a fundamental alienation. It is only when the significance of belief seems to vanish that the being of the subject comes to light to reach what was, properly speaking, the ultimate reality of this belief.

This is the same problem of the belief's vanishing as pointed by J.-A. Miller when he invites the psychoanalyst to give an answer about what would remain of psychoanalysis when you stop believing in it, when you stop believing enough to work with it. Finally, what would remain of psychoanalysis, of what it makes us understand, of what it brings us, when it would be no more than superstition.¹¹ Superstition is understood here as survival and not in the sense of an impure belief. It seems clear that the answer given by Lacan to the problem uses superstition as *superstitio*, as he textually says «it's not enough to defeat it (the superstition) to calm down its effects over the subject»¹². He also alerts us, that psychoanalysis is suspicious of all speeches that make an apology of unbelief, as well as of everything, that conforms itself «*as a triumph of delusionment*»¹³, mainly because the last, somewhere, keeps some remains of superstition. In «*D'un Autre à l'autre*» he still says that this discussion about the genealogy of superstition may be a chapter in his inexistent seminar «*The Names of the Father*»¹⁴. It is possible that, in this chapter, the superstition would be present to show us what survives, what remains and keeps existing when the father does not exist anymore, to show us what would qualify this survivor.

Translation: Marina R. Kaufmanner

Rev: Simone P. Ribeiro

Footnotes

- ¹ Benveniste, É. *Pouvoir, droit, religion. Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, Paris: Minuit, 1996. t 2, p. 273.
- ² Idem, p. 274.
- ³ Freud, S. (1932). «Conferência XXXV: A questão de uma Weltanschauung», op. cit., v. XXII, p. 201.
- ⁴ Idem.
- ⁵ Freud, S. *A psicopatologia da vida cotidiana* (1901), op. cit., v. VI, p. 308.
- ⁶ Dompnier, B. *La superstition à l'âge des lumières*. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 1998, p. 9.
- ⁷ Lacan, J. (1956). *O Seminário, Livro III, As psicoses*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 1985. p. 135.
- ⁸ Voltaire. *Dicionário filosófico*. São Paulo: Atena Editora, 1956. p. 316.
- ⁹ Lacan, J. (1956). *O Seminário, Livro III*, op. cit., p. 135..
- ¹⁰ Lacan, J. (1964). *O Seminário, Livro XI, Os quatro conceitos fundamentais da psicanálise*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 1998. p. 249-250.
- ¹¹ Miller, J.-A. *O último ensino de Lacan. Opção Lacaniana 35*, São Paulo: Eólia. p. 7.
- ¹² Lacan, J. (1964). *O Seminário, Livro XI, Os quatro conceitos fundamentais da psicanálise*, op. cit., p. 250.
- ¹³ Lacan, J. (1968), *O Seminário, Livro XVI, D'un Autre à l'autre, leçon du 4 decembre 1968*. Inédito.
- ¹⁴ Idem .

Name-of-the-father and Supplement

Jean-Pierre Deffieux

THE 1950s

«No one doubts that the figure of Prof. Flechsig, despite his seriousness as a researcher....did not succeed in supplementing the suddenly perceived vacancy of the inaugural *Verwerfung*¹.»

We find the verb «supplement» for the first time in Lacan, in this text from the *Écrits*, articulated to the foreclosure of the signifier of the Name of the father. Lacan chooses the form of the negation in order to advance a possible compensation for the vacancy of the paternal foreclosure, in psychosis and for Schreber.

This response comes at a moment when psychoanalysis is referred exclusively to an Oedipal clinic, divided between neurosis and psychosis, according to the «either...or» principle of the operation of the paternal metaphor.

Language is submitted to the regulating apparatus of the Oedipal Name of the father. The signifier of the Name of the father imposes its order on language, inscribes the subject in the symbolic law and names the desire of the mother by giving it phallic signification.

Psychosis can no longer be considered as a deficit that calls for compensation. Supplement and deficit are then indissociable here, neurosis being considered as occupying the privileged position; not referred to a deficit, it does not call for a supplement.

Putting forth in 1958 that it is possible to supplement the inaugural *verwerfung* is a major step forward making it possible to stop superposing the psychotic structure and madness. It also makes it possible to single out the notion of triggering as coming to sign the moment in which the supplement no longer operates.

Two modalities can be retained in reading Lacan during these years: «»The absence of the imaginary compensation of Oedipus»², the ideal imaginary identification coming in time to supplement the foreclosure, and the delusional metaphor, the symbolic ordering that does not pass by the Oedipal name of the father.

THE 1970s

Twenty years have passed and society has appreciably changed. Lacan was aware of this before everyone, he foresees in 1960 the decline to come of the paternalist society: «Oedipus cannot indefinitely hold its place in forms of society in which we are steadily losing the sense of tragedy»³.»

This assertion is echoed in another quotation that dates well before 1938⁴: «The Oedipus complex cannot be founded outside of sociological relativity and the function of the father is related to the prevalence of a certain social determination, that of the paternalist family».

In the 1970s, Lacan draws the consequences of these profound sociological changes for psychoanalysis, for its clinical theory and its practice,.

The Borromean clinic, the new clinic inherited from the last 10 years of Lacan's teaching relating to the knots, aims, if not at entirely excluding the paternal reference in psychoanalysis, at least at reducing it to its mere stump. The term of supplement attached to the Oedipal Name of the father, becomes an outdated term that belongs to a clinic that is no longer the one we find ourselves at grips with today.

Nevertheless this term was to find a new youth, in particular in *Le Séminaire Livre XVIII*, in which Lacan relates it to the knotting of the sinthome, as serving to repair an error in the three-round knot: «What I am proposing here, is that we consider the case of Joyce as a response to a manner of supplementing an untying of the knot»⁵.» Joyce's sinthome comes as a supplement to the error in the knot by reinforcing the round of the symbolic and repairing the Borromean chain.

This supplementation is no longer a response to the deficit of Oedipal Name of the father. The supplement is generalized in the sense that any human being is just a potential *parlêtre*, a speech-being. We must then leave aside the disjunction that founds the knot and consider the three rounds of the real, the symbolic and the imaginary as playing their part all alone, the supplement serving to make it possible for the three rounds to be held together by a fourth. Jacques-Alain Miller in his course of 2004-2005, «*Les pièces détachées*» («Spare Parts»), emphasizes that man is a composite made of three disparate elements and that only the symptomatic knotting gives him his substance.

For man to find his substance as a speech-being, we need a sinthomatic supplement that makes the three rounds hold together. The Oedipal name of the father, which is a symptom, serves as a supplement, but it is only one among many more. Joyce gives us the example of another mode of sinthomatic supplement by a writing that is not submitted to the Oedipal Name of the father.

Any human being must confront the traumatism of *lalangue*, and he has to become a speech-being by stapling sense onto the real of *lalangue*. It is this staple that supplements the constant dissonance coming from *lalangue*, that we clearly meet up with in the averred psychotic phenomena.

SINTHOME AND SUPPLEMENTATION

Can we go so far as to detach the supplement from the name of the father? This is the question Lacan poses in his seminar «RSI» in 1975: «For these three to be knotted, do we necessarily need one more whose consistence would be to refer to the function of the father? The Borromean knot demonstrates the contrary»... «Is this supplementary function of the father indispensable? I am showing you that it might be fabricated⁶.»

However a few lines further, Lacan adds that we are not to imagine that he is prophesizing we could do without the name of the father, that each of the three rounds might go its own way. We would still need the name of the father to knot them.

If we follow Lacan during the last years of his teaching, it is difficult not to keep a minimal tie between the supplement and the name of the father. On the other hand, the name of father must be detached from the paternal function in order to retain only its function of naming.

The seminars «RSI» and «The Sinthome» make it possible to conciliate supplement and naming .

Naming constitutes a supplement. Naming is knotting, giving a name to one of the three knots, beyond the real, the symbolic and the imaginary, because these names do not specify the rounds when they are untied. The symptom has a function of «naming to». Joyce, called to the task of writing in order to escape the constant rumbling of *lalangue*, finds he is named to a function he will devote his life to and through which he will find his proper name.

But Lacan does not limit the function of naming and so of supplementation to the round of the symbolic and to the sinthome: «...perhaps we can specify that after all, it is not only the symbolic that carries the privilege of the Names of the father, it is not obligatory that the naming be conjoined to the hole of the symbolic»⁷.

He ends his seminar «RSI» on May 13, 1975 by proposing the naming of the imaginary as inhibition, the naming of the real as anxiety and the naming of the symbolic as the symptom.

We can consider these three modes of naming that knot the three rounds in a Borromean manner, as the three modes proposed by Lacan for the supplementation of the primordial error in the knot.

This extreme point of his teaching encourages us to look in the clinic for possible applications of his proposals, in an époque for which the paternal function is hardly any more the reference that makes it possible to assure the structure. The assurance of the repartition neurosis/psychosis has been somewhat perturbed by these breakthroughs.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

This text could not have been written without the necessary support of Jacques-Alain Miller's course of 2004-2005, « Pièces détachées ».

Footnotes

- ¹ J. Lacan, « D'une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose » (« On a question prior to... », *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 582.
- ² J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire Livre III, Les psychoses*, Paris, Seuil, 1981, p.218.
- ³ J. Lacan, « Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir », *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p 813.
- ⁴ J. Lacan, *Les complexes familiaux*, Paris, Navarin éditeur, 1984.
- ⁵ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire Livre XVIII, Le sinthome*, Paris, Seuil, 2005, p 87.
- ⁶ J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire R.S.I, 11 février 1975*, *Ornicar* N°4, 1975, p 99.
- ⁷ J. Lacan, *The seminar « R.S.I »*, April 15 1975, *Ornicar*, N°5, p 56.

Suppletions and Name-of-the-Father

Carole Dewambrechies-La Sagna

‘What is a father?’ has no doubt been a question instrumental to the birth of psychoanalysis, Lacan used to say. In a way, the father has been the pillar of psychoanalytic enquiry. When Lacan advocated the return to Freud in the 50’s, it is also a question of countering the psychoanalytic theory in vogue at the time, which assigned a major role to the mother.

From the start of his teaching, Lacan re-interprets this Freudian question thanks to the ternary structure of the imaginary, symbolic and real and teaches his audience how to distinguish between symbolic, imaginary, and real father, and then to draw from these distinctions what he meant by paternal function. At that point in time, the paternal function is inherent to the symbolic order. It is by way of a metaphor, i.e., the paternal metaphor, that the child substitutes the enigma of the mother’s desire for the Name-of-the-Father and that the phallus becomes the cause of desire, with castration as its limit and law for the infant. In the early stages of Lacan’s teaching, the clinic reorganizes according to this process thanks to the supremacy of the symbolic over the imaginary and the real as well as to the supremacy of the Name-of-the-Father. The neurotic symptom is itself structured like a metaphor, a metaphor that makes up for, as it were, the errors, inadequacies or lacks of the paternal metaphor and Name-of-the-Father. Little Hans’ phobia, says Lacan, supplements the castration that the father is unable to implement in this particular case of Freud’s, at the point when phallic signification acquires an importance for him.

For every speaking subject, the Name-of-the-Father is the signifier that orders the world as well as the grand questions of human existence such as the relations between the sexes and between life and death.

The clinic of the psychoses stems from this theory: the psychotic subject has not experienced the operation of the paternal metaphor; the subject has no Name-of-the-Father as reference point in life. The Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed, *verworfen*. Freud’s main example, which Lacan revisits, is President Schreber whose memoirs have classically been the reference text on psychotic unravelling as well as notions of triggering and decompensation. Here, he demonstrates the extraordinary appeal to the whole of the symbolic order that is necessary for him to face his own experience and the no less extraordinary work that he will have to put in to ensure a new relation to the world. This work is the work of the delusion: the delusion as deluding metaphor that re-establishes some relation to the world and that represents an attempt at restoring mental health, a successful attempt at the cure in Schreber’s case, in fact. It must be taken into account, though, that the world at stake is not the same world as before and that the subject himself has had to consent to ‘being God’s wife’ in order to stabilize the order of the world.

If this theory is not lacking, it is nonetheless based on a lack, a failure: the failure of the phallic signification which is correlated to the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father as well as the delusion with its ghostly figures and the imaginary identifications these bring with them are conceived of within the framework of a metaphor which supplements the one that did not occur. The failure is situated within the symbolic. So is the solution: either through metaphor or metonymy. Suppletion is *signifianting*.

The opposition neurosis / psychosis that puts neurosis in a flattering light is however toned down by the fact that even in the case of neurosis, the Name-of-the-Father does not subsume the whole of *jouissance* and that the neurotic symptom also plays the role of suppletion.

To supplement, which has first been a transitive verb in French and which has become intransitive, always means to supplement a lack: a *suppléant* (deputy) is someone who occupies a vacant place. Funnily enough, it would seem that the term, in its formation, crossed the path of *supplier* (to implore or beseech). If God is the agency hidden behind the name-of-the-Father, etymology is spot on in

highlighting that suppletion and Name-of-the-Father are structurally linked. This is what Lacan's final teaching as it develops from the seminar *Encore* emphasizes. Jacques-Alain Miller stressed during his own seminar how important the schema figuring on page 90 of the English version of *Encore* is, as it inscribes the imaginary, the real and the symbolic as the three points of a triangle.

Here, the real, the symbolic and the imaginary are apprehended as three heterogeneous dimensions, but these are without a hierarchy and of equal consistency. The clinic of knots, the borromean clinic, takes off from here. The property privileged by Lacan in the borromean knot is what allows, when three loops of string are tied together, for the unknitting of one to entail the separation of the others. These three loops of string are called the real, the symbolic and the imaginary. One studies the various modalities of knotting of these loops, the faults too, and the possibility of correcting a faulty knotting by adding a fourth loop. Lacan posits that this fourth loop might well be the rule, whether one calls it Name-of-the-Father or symptom. He invokes Joyce's work to show how Joyce's writing and work function in this respect, i.e., by examining Joyce's writing practice with regard to what his father meant for him. Joyce's father has by no means been a father. He has failed on all registers and modes. The Name-of-the-father did not work. Joyce found other solutions: notably by 'making a name for himself' in the deployment of a work that would keep academics busy for the next centuries. 'It is through the desire for a name that Joyce has compensated for the failure of the paternal function'. Joyce's writing is unconventional and enigmatic: Lacan conjectures that it bears the trace of the faulty tying of the knot and that Joyce's ego functions as fourth knot. Joyce's relation to his own body—which rather functions on the mode of non-rapport or disgust—indeed suggests that the loop of the imaginary is not tied to the other two: it is slipping away and Joyce is indifferent to what happens to him in adverse circumstances. Lacan sees here some special relation to the body, which he calls ego, i.e., the idea of oneself as a body. Letting fall the body suggests that for Joyce the ego has a peculiar function, i.e., to ensure the knotting that did not take place.

Joyce's ego relies on writing, a writing that Lacan deems other, *sinthomatic* as the old spelling of the French word for symptom has it, i.e., combining symptom and *jouissance*. Thus Lacan proposes to 'consider the case of Joyce as a way of supplementing some untying of the knot'. Lacan's work in this regard is particularly useful for the clinic: the types of psychosis indeed change and if schreberian psychosis still exists, many subjects now appear to be joycian, or even alternate between the two modes. A clinic of supplements has come into being, which explores how a subject manages to tie together the imaginary, the real and the symbolic without having recourse to the Name-of-the-Father. Supplements are no longer the sole province of the symbolic, but can just as well be imaginary or real, which the transference as the real often demonstrates.

Similarly, one can see that the question of suppletions is greater than first intimated and that it concerns, beyond what have now become fuzzier clinical structures, every speaking being. The hole in the symbolic applies to everyone: there is no signifier for woman in the unconscious that would enable the sexual relation to be written, which Lacan sums up as 'there is no sexual relation'. This 'there is no' points to an empty place that always calls for a supplement. The function of the father supplements, through castration, the sexual relation in so far as the latter can by no means be written. But the Freudian father is no more and the science of the real inaugurated by Lacan supplements this version of the father. The true speech required in the analytic experience has to bridge the gap with this science of the real.

Translated by Dominique Hecq

Symptom

Mauricio Tarrab

1. - BETWEEN LACAN AND THE EPOCH

The Symptom and the Name of the Father are fundamental concepts that are deeply marked by the development of the teachings of Lacan, by his progress and change of direction, by his changes of paradigms, by his multiple and ever changing references. But both concepts, Symptom and Name-of-the-Father, are also deeply marked by their time.

The teaching of Lacan is permeable to the crossing of concepts and epochs, the epoch infiltrates the concepts and Lacan bends under their influence when they are important, but also he anticipates them, he interprets them and hopes that psychoanalysis may have an effect on the epoch. It is also the good judgment he proclaims when he says in one of his last seminars: we have to be judicious and realize that neuroses are sustained by social relations».

Lacan announced very early that the weakening of the paternal imago would be a decisive factor in future subjectivity. Forty years later, in an amazing forewarning that concerns us, Lacan highlights the predominant value of the social aspect in detriment of the Name of the Father, in the production of the framework of «hypermodern» subjectivity itself.

In turn, the symptom has become a «Freudian» concept linked to the Father, attached to the realm of the Father, which is the realm of meaning. It was unveiled as a coded message, articulated, addressed to the locus from where the Name-of-the-Father sustains the impossible balance of desire and the law.

The Freudian symptom is the first to perforate with its nervousness –given its sexuality- the calmness of the Victorian Father, whose time no longer was that of the victorious Father. Freud announced it and Lacan in turn takes the symptom further beyond what Freud had foreseen. He takes it to «out of speech», until it becomes a substitute in lieu of the emptiness of a «generalized foreclosure». The symptom-tool, which doesn't say anything to anybody, and least of all to the Father, but which holds together the registers that support the world of the subject.

2. - THE REDUCTION OF THE SYMPTOM AND THE NAME-OF-THE-FATHER.

The future of the teachings of Lacan regarding the Symptom and the Name-of-the-Father is not an evolution of these concepts. Rather than evolving, the Symptom and Name-of-the-Father are «reduced» by the teachings of Lacan.

This reduction turns the Symptom into a bond with a function: that of the Name-of-the-Father. In turn, this reduction, in the case of the Name-of-the-Father turns it into a symptom.

The epoch crosses these fundamental concepts; changes in clinical practice show their correlation with changes in subjectivity. These changes are verified in the presentation and the statute of what we call «contemporary symptoms». The «new symptoms» are paradigmatic of an epoch that rejects knowledge, an epoch of decadence of references linked to the ideal, of the faltering of pretenses in culture. These «new symptoms» are very close to what Lacan called the wild operation of the symptom, and they go in opposite direction to the symbolic side of the symptom as a message. It is the symptom that doesn't ask for anything, a symptom that is a fixation of *jouissance*. Its opacity rejects the Father and slips as the libido does, out of the barrels, in a completely different tune than that of the Freudian symptoms.

3. METAPHORS

To start with, symptom and Name-of-the-Father are metaphors. The goal of applying linguistic concepts to Freudian psychoanalysis is to reformulate the oedipal complex and the symptom.

In the Oedipal operation, the Paternal Metaphor is a privileged operator: the signifier of the Name of the Father that metaphorizes the arbitrariness of the Desire of the Mother by founding the Law.

It is a rewriting of the Oedipus complex in terms of structure that puts the Name-of-the-Father in the center of the Lacanian reflection as a preliminary question to any possible psychopathology. It begins by elucidating the fundamental mechanism of Psychoses. The link between the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father and the Symptom show the way for much later developments in the last teaching of Lacan.

It is also a reformulation of the symptoms, a reformulation that defines it as a metaphoric signifier, a hieroglyphic, an emblem, a labyrinth, hermeticism, which requires a liberation of the sequestered meaning, and as such reveals the truth there where knowledge fails.

The signifier-symptom that was previously completely resolved in an exercise of language is correlative of the Name-of-the-Father metaphorized by Maternal Desire.

It could be said then that the association between Symptom and Name-of-the-Father was already there, but only on the condition that it highlights the fact that both are supported by this metaphoric operation.

Name-of-the-Father	Symptom
Desire of the Mother	A Crossed out

4. - MYTHICALLY

If Psychoanalysis had the myth of the Father in the chore of its doctrine, Lacan not only goes from the myth –*mythique ment* (mythically, or myth lies) - to the structure, but he dares to go beyond Freud, opening a field beyond Oedipus: the field of *jouissance*. He reserves for the Father the classifying essence of the Totem and highlights the function of the name at the level of the Father, outlining what would later become the reduction to its radical function.

The symptom with his weaving of meaning has had castration as a correlate. It will now also be submitted to this operation that begins to detach him from the Other. The correlate of the Symptom that «doesn't mean anything anymore» is *jouissance*, although preserving the link with the unconscious. The symptom as a mode of *jouissance* of the unconscious is the complement of the (hysteric) Symptom that aims at the truth, which says that the «master is castrated». Our «classical» Lacanian praxis has found its grounding in this articulation between the Name-of-the-Father and the Symptom.

5. - NOT ONLY ONE

The reduction of the Name-of-the-Father is reinforced when *jouissance* and language are in the starting point and the Other is a hole. The Name-of-the-Father replaces this inexistence. This leads to its proliferation: operationally, the Name-of-the-Father is not the only one that can play this function.

The epoch has its effects and Lacan underlines it: it is the sign of the time in history we are living ...when the Name-of-the-Father is replaced by a function: to name- for. She -The Mother-, who should translate the name (nom) (of the Father) into a no, can now fend for herself and play this naming function. It is very strange –thinks Lacan- to see how the social takes on the prevalent function of a knot...After giving this definition, he doesn't refrain from anticipating in it the sign of a catastrophic degeneration. This is how things are: «contemporary symptoms» show that to us.

6. - THE REAL NAMES-OF-THE-FATHER AND THE SYMPTOM

The Names-of-the-Father are: the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary [...] They are the first names, inasmuch as they name something.

The reduction to the function is completed. Nevertheless, there still remains a fundamental operation concerning the Name-of-the-Father and the Symptom, because for Lacan even these reals are disconnected and they do not guarantee the knotting of the three. It lacks what Freud called «the psychic reality» (religious reality» for Lacan) to keep them together. What holds them together is the fourth knot, the symptom.

Here, Symptom and Name-of-the-Father concur in a completely new way, as the fourth knot is the Symptom and also the Father. This is true insofar as he guarantees the *pereversion* (the father's version) and insofar as he is also the one who names.

When all we have left from the Father and the Symptom is their use, it is because they have lost their essence, or because their lack of essence has been revealed by use and by the epoch.

Affected by the fall of pretenses in the epoch as well as in psychoanalysis, the Name-of-the-Father and the Symptom are instrumental concepts, «necessary» tools, to support a knot of *jouissance* and meaning that sustains the world for a subject.

Symptom and Name-of-the-Father are no longer transcendental concepts, but they continue to support the foundations of subjectivity.

The Name-of-the-Father, as a ball of string, meaningless, useful for knotting, is no longer the metaphoric signifier that, with its added signification responds to the arbitrariness of the maternal Desire. Beyond Oedipus, what the whole thing is about is to «keep together», not about the essence of the Name-of-the-Father, but about its artifice.

This is correlated by a Symptom whose thirst, that thirst of meaning that takes the Demand to the Other, is quelled only by the reduction, which in analysis becomes instrument and sign.

Finally, the power of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, privileged S1 is reduced to the knot, that is, to its negative.

This is what Lacan means in his statement: Our psychoanalytic perception of the knot is the negative of religion». This is what allows me to paraphrase him: we don't believe in the Name-of-the-Father, but it doesn't prevent us from using it for what it is: a Symptom.

Translated by M.C. Aguirre
Reviewed by Isabel Aguirre

Bibliography and Footnotes

[nt] There is a problem with the location of the footnotes, some of them are in the text, others are not, and some numbers don't have a reference. Must check with author.

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T like...

THERE IS SUCH A THING AS ONE • **A. ZALOSZYC**
TRADITION • **A. HARARI**
TRANSFER • **F KRUGER/R.E. MANZETTI**
TRAUMA • **G. DARGENTON / E. PIECHOTKA**
TRUTH • **M.H. BRIOLE**

Y a d'l'Un¹

Armand Zaloszc

The formulation, *y a d'l'Un* [there's (some) One], that makes its entry in Lacan's last teaching, is a translation of Plato's first hypothesis in the *Parmenides* as it was emphasized by the Neoplatonists, where Lacan sees a «curious avant-garde» of his own career.

1. The demonstration of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* leads to the conclusion that it is impossible that the One exist. So it is, the One of this first hypothesis, being one by definition, could neither have parts nor be a whole. Therefore it will have neither beginning, nor end, nor limits. For the same reason, it will not participate in time. It will therefore have no being since to be implies the participation in a time. And, if it is not at all, then can it have something that belongs to it or comes from it? Most certainly not. Therefore it has no name; there is no definition, no perception, and no knowledge of it. Is it possible that this be so of the One? No.

From this demonstration of impossibility it can surely be legitimately introduced that «since the One in no way participates with being», it does not exist, that there is nothing beyond being, that being is therefore all. The Neoplatonists chose to read the *Parmenides*' demonstration of impossibility differently. They agreed that there is an incompatibility between the One and being, but rather than deducing that the One does not exist, they concluded that no doubt, the One did not exist in terms of being, but that beyond being, there is the One, that the One ex-sists from being.

In this way, *there is the One*² constitutes a formula that opposes ontology, and leads towards the notion of the not-all of a radical Other, in terms of the otherness with which there is no relation, where emerges the logic of the *Parmenides* demonstration.

Being on one side, and on the other, the *there is*: incompatible. Being on one side, the real on the other. We immediately see that this opposition is the one at work in the negative theologies, in the pursuit of a non-knowledge that equals itself to learned ignorance, in the accounts given by the great Christian mystics of their experience, using oxymorons drawn from *The Mystic Theology* of Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite. A whole part of the analytical experience is open to this sort of description, one that Lacan does not default in.

2. The One that there is, is the one of the jouissance One, that is the jouissance designated in the terms of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. This is why it is characterized by being «enveloped in its own contiguity». In this respect, it is opposed to a jouissance developed *partes extra partes* that is consequentially accountable and numerable according to the measurements of the signifier. If we think about it, the being itself, is only determined by meaningfulness, whereas we refer the jouissance One to the real – the real as impossible, as we have already seen.

So there is a jouissance that is not without a relation to the Other of the signifier (that is alienated to the signifier), and there is an autistic jouissance, separated from the signifier and separated from the Other, for which the paradigm is the non-relation – that is the jouissance One. From there, there are two ways to go: either maintain that there is no other being than being – with the will to forclose the jouissance One, or, support that there is the One that exists apart from being – in which case the demonstration of impossibility takes into account the trace that this One leaves in the Other, in the form of «there is no sexual relation».

We recognize the kinship of this last bipartition with the double edge of God, in Lacan's use of Pascal: the philosophers' God, the supposed subject of knowledge; the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, enigma of his desire, that is, the trace in the Other of the real as impossible.

3. The real is an impasse inscribed by the mathematical formalization of significance. Here, Lacan proposes two approaches. The first is clearly that the One has no object. It falls then under the analysis with which Frege «engenders the One from the empty set» and pursues the progression of whole numbers by counting zero for one. In his course «*Ce qui fait insigne*»³, Jacques-Alain Miller demonstrated that this One designates the subject as want-of-being and is correlated with the unary One which comes from a trait without any quality to mark the lack which is this want-of-being (see § 7 of J.-A. Miller's «*Notice de fil en aiguille*» in the annex to the Seminar *Le Sinthome*, Seuil editors, Paris, 2005).

4. The second approach to the real that Lacan offers us with the mathematical formalization refers the One to an uncountable infinity that is the infinity of real numbers. For this he uses Cantor who showed that the power of this infinity is superior to that of the countable infinity and who invented a new variety of numbers, the transfinite numbers, noted (*aleph*), to designate the cardinality of these infinite sets. This is why we say that such an infinite set has the continuous power, and that the continuous presents the characteristics of the jouissance One that we described earlier.

From the jouissance One that implies the non-relation, it is under the conditions of a reduction in the degree of the infinity of jouissance that the relations of male sexuation and feminine sexuation will be established. In male sexuation, in response to the jouissance indexed by the phallic signifier, will answer the merely potential condition of the countable infinity, while a relation will conjointly bind the subject and the object *a*, there where we recognize a constant that bears a transfinite value, as Jacques-Alain Miller showed in his course «*Le banquet des analystes*». This relation is that of the phantasm. The feminine side of sexuation will present itself, not without a tie to the phallic signifier, but also not without having preserved a relation with the jouissance One –although it cannot be named for the very best logical reasons of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. That is what gives the character of a non-locatable infinite to feminine jouissance and makes a woman an exception, forever non-locatable in relation to any all whatsoever. From the viewpoint of intuitionist logic, we understand that there is no way to bring this not-all into a determined existence, except one by one. This is what Aristotle's famous *me pantes* points towards (on this point, once again, see Jacques-Alain Miller's «*Notice de fil en aiguille*», § 4).

5. What relation will there be between *Y a d'l'Un* and the Name-of-the-Father? The main themes are easy to deduce from what precedes. To pass from the jouissance One to the Name-of-the-Father, will be to pass from the not-all to an all, by means of the trace that the jouissance One will leave there, in the form of the myth of the father of the horde of *Totem and Taboo*, the one who enjoys all the women: impossible! It is this impossible, a fossil trace of the jouissance One, after the death of the father, that will be recovered, in the speaking-being, in the form of the Oedipal taboo.

Translated by Julia Richards

Footnotes

- ¹ English translations for Lacan's expression 'Y a d'l'Un' are many. Here, we propose: 'there is something like (some) One', '(some) One is', 'There's (some/such) One'. Bruce Fink uses 'There's such a thing as One' in his translation of *Encore*, (p.5). But not without a footnote where he also proposes, 'There's something like One' and even, 'One happens'. Thelma Sowley has suggested; «'Some One is there' under the condition that we hear an unstressed 'some'». [NT]
- ² Some translations of the *Parmenides* reference to the One include: «there is the one», «there is the (bare) one, there (just) is the one. However, Lacan's expression is not identical to that of the *Parmenides*. [NT]
- ³ Literally translated: «What makes insignia». In the first lesson of this course J.-A. Miller carefully separates the notion of insignia from the sign; *insigne* [insignia] and *un signe* [a sign], having the same pronunciation in French. [NT]

Tradition and Name-of-the-Father

Angelina Harari

We will start by noting the equivalence of the terms, tradition and Name-of-the-Father. On one side, one of the versions of the term tradition refers to what is transmitted: «...what in a society, small or large, particularly in a religion, is transmitted in a lively way, by spoken or written word, or by manners of acting»¹. On the other side, one knows that Lacan acknowledges the term, Name-of-the-Father, introduced by him in Psychoanalysis, was taken from religion. Tradition and Name-of-the-Father have as a reference the religious doctrine. Thus, we find in the article, «A First Question to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis», that the «attributing of procreation to the father can only be the effect of a pure significant, of a recognition, not of the real father, but of what religion has taught us to invoke as the Name-of-the-Father»².

It is not our interest here to enumerate the evocations by Lacan in respect to the relationship between the Name-of-the-Father and religion. Lacan links the two terms since the inaugural article, «Function and Field of Speech and Language», until the lesson of the Non-Existent Seminar, term printed by J.-A. Miller to name the first lesson of the Seminar about the Names of the Father, that Lacan interrupts when he is ex-communicated from IPA. In various ways, he mentions this interruption throughout his teachings, always with the purpose of questioning what remains of religion in psychoanalysis. Specifically, he questioned what elements of religious tradition remain linked to the Name-of-the-Father, used until then as a principle method that influences all analysis direction³.

In November 1963, the transition from singular use of the Name-of-the-Father, to the plural Names of the Father, present in the title of the seminar interrupted by Lacan, marks the change from religion to logic. In other words, the change was from the use of the Name-of-the-Father of religion to the Names of the Father as a logical operator. The interruption of the seminar allows the interpretation of a punishment for having touched the father constructed by Freud, making evident the split with religious tradition.

To multiply the Name-of-the-Father signifies that the Father is a Name-of-the-Father among others, and that the woman may be a Name-of-the-Father. In this context, it interests us to introduce a possible articulation between tradition and a Name-of-the-Father among others⁴. To do so, I will use as an example of tradition, referring to how a society «...transmits itself in a lively manner...», the carnival as a collective popular party which transmits itself in Brazilian society⁵. To link the term Tradition to that of a Name-of-the-Father among others, allows the unlinking of tradition from its religious aspect and at the same time to classify it on the female side, which is what happens in the Brazilian carnival.

In February 2005, a journalist chronicled the idea that carnival is a female party. On one side, we have Tradition, and on the other, the feminine of carnival as a Name-of-the-Father among others⁶. Let's see how the journalist exposes the argumentative logic around the feminine. He starts by commenting on the traditional presence of provocative women in the parade and quotes the example of a popular participant, Elvira Pagã. (Her name, according to the journalist, suggests anti-Christianity and nakedness.) In 1950, as the first completely nude woman in carnival, Elvira Pagã was seen standing on a float, parading through Rio Branco Avenue. In carnival, we see the cultural unconscious (Would this expression be justified? Wouldn't it be better to simply use the term unconscious?) at the surface of the skin. The journalist concluded that the more civilized a country, the deeper the repression. The Calvinist orgies of New York invented the unhealthy sex nightclubs, which led to a culture of AIDS. These clubs are different from the Brazilian type of explicit sex performed in the woods, without guilt, by Indians and Africans. He continues with his idea of the feminine saying that: «Comparing with joy of a rich world, our carnival is feminine, while rock belongs to men (in masculine). Rock is war; carnival is luxurious and voluptuous. In carnival, men want to become women. Everybody wants to be everything. Men want to have breasts and be fertile and women want to be seductive machines in order to excite dancing penis. (...) The great tradition of carnival is more present in the blocks of

anonymous dancers. On the streets, you will also see blocks of dirty face angels, those of the «escrotas», vagabonds, ornamental drunks and poor Negroes. We can see on the streets the precious origin of profound carnival. There they are: the hungry for love, the crazy and those excluded from the official party. Only the dirty are holy»⁷.

Lacan suggested one Name-of-the-Father among others is the result of the hole of the father's metaphor, which effectuates Lacan. J.-A. Miller places this notion in the written preface to «The Awakening of Spring» from Wedekind. «(...) it's possible that the father remains only one of the names of the goddess mother, the White Goddess, that remains other in her jouissance»⁸. Lacan makes a hole in the father's metaphor in order to arrive at the mother's desire and to the supplementary jouissance of the woman⁹. The notion of carnival as a female party seemed to us a useful example to designate that, in the annual date programmed by the calendar and attached to the religious calendar (carnival anticipates Lent), a hole is produced in the chauvinist cultural program, a traditional hole. The timing of the Momeau celebration period turns around the dates pre-determined by the church itself. It is a non-religious party ending on Ash Wednesday in penance¹⁰.

In the second father metaphor, says Eric Laurent, the Other of the language takes the charge of linking the pluralizing of the Names of the Father. (...) Contemporary paganism searches proof of God's existence through overdose. The modern subject confirms the presence of the Other through the experience of ecstasy in himself. He can, thus, believe¹¹.

The topology of borromean knot, introduced by Lacan in *Encore* (1970) is used to reformulate the concept of structure through the categories of real, symbolic and imaginary. These are the only categories of analytical experience. It is a reformulated structure in which center is the *a* object, reference of a new kind, born from the articulation itself. It is not the idea of the negative reference any more that Lacan takes into consideration from the structure of language, in which the Freudian castration is an important catalyst¹². As a consequence, the status of the Other suffers a displacement. It is not a question of dialectics subject/other anymore, but of a concept organized around a nucleus, a vacuum of jouissance. What supports the alterity is the object *a*, rest not symbolized of the Thing. The object *a* doesn't become an element of the Other, but finds a place in it as a point of extimity: intimate does not mean less heterogeneous. To this structural lack of the Other corresponds the pluralizing of the Names of the Father as replacement. There is not only one way of conveying the gap¹³.

Lacan goes even further, postulating the concept of the language, as a symbolic unplugged from the Other and having the One as reference.

Psychosis furnishes the model of the real nucleus of every symptom: as function of the letter that fixes the jouissance, without Other.

And about the conclusion of the carnival article: «There in the dirty streets are the three Brazilian races, intertwined in the hope of a crazy group wedding: Negroes, whites and Indians giving birth to a huge and laughing mixed baby, teaching that life is art and straight logic is death¹⁴.»

English version: Elisa Alvarenga, Revision: Nancy Long

Footnotes

¹ Lalande, A. *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie*, Paris, PUF, 1972, p.1140/41

² Lacan, J. *Escritos*, «De uma questão Preliminar», Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 1998, p.562

³ Lacan, J. *op.cit.*, «Função e Campo da Fala e da Linguagem», p.279/280

⁴ Miller, J.-A. *Comentário do Seminário Inexistente*, Buenos Aires, Manantial, 1992 p.20

⁵ Lalande, A. *ibid.*

⁶ Jabor, A. in: *O Estado de São Paulo*, 8 de fevereiro de 2005

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Lacan, J. *Outros Escritos*, «Prefácio a 'O Despertar da Primavera' de Wedekind», Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 2003, p.559

⁹ Miller, J.-A. «Religião, Psicanálise» in: *Opção Lacaniana*, nº39, p.24, [originalmente publicada em *La Cause freudienne*, 55. Textos e notas estabelecidos por Catherine Bonningue]

¹⁰ Site Web: <http://www.geocities.com/aochiadobrasileiro/historia/historiadocarnaval.htm>

¹¹ Laurent, É. «La sociedad del sintoma» in: *Lacaniana*, revista de psicoanálisis, nº2, Altamira, Buenos Aires, 2004

¹² Miller, J.-A. *Matemas*, Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 1994, p.195

¹³ Skriabine, P. «La clínica del nudo borromeano» in: *Locura: Clínica y Suplencia*, Madrid, Eolia Dor, S.L., p.86

¹⁴ Jabor, A. *ibid.*

Transference

Flory Kruger

INTRODUCTION

Freud's intimate relation with the father is the heritage of his compromise with neurosis. The Freudian father, the love of the father, an essential articulator of his work, will give rise to significant consequences in the psychoanalytic clinic. The transference, then, is implicated in the function of the father.

Lacan will situate the place of the father as function, in the symbolic register, as place of the Other and will elevate it to the status of primordial signifier: the Name of the Father. The central question posed to us is how to treat neurosis, taking into account that it is productive of the father.

The neurotic illusion is to encounter in the analyst a father possessed of knowledge and who, via the transference, will reveal to him the reason of that which is enigmatic in his symptom. The neurotic maintains the hope of knowing the cause and the sense of what is wrong with him, sustained in the Name of the Father.

The question is to find the adequate analytic response that does not perform the limited function of stabilizing the neurosis. The analyst in the place of the father can only aspire to an equilibrium that does no more than leave the subject immersed in the machinery destined to the articulation of desire, but also to its ravages.

According to J.A. Miller, the Freudian father does not know castration; rather he is its agent, he is the function of the threat that will be encountered in castration anxiety, its complement. In contrast Lacan, in the logic of the Seminar on 'The Names of the Father' would have sketched the father who knows castration and would have called him 'Psychoanalyst'.¹

RESPONSES

This confronts us with a fundamental question: if neurosis calls the analyst in the place of the father how must the analyst respond? I will propose three alternatives:

1. The treatment of the father by the father: when the name of the father responds in place of the desire of the analyst. If the transference is a response produced on the basis of the encounter of the desire of the subject with the desire of the analyst, then to confuse the desire of the analyst with a desire reduced to sustaining the desire of the father at the level of the ideal would be to conduct the analysis by way of the identifications arising from the love of the father.

2. The treatment of the father by the advised (*advertido*) father: In the Seminar on Ethics, Lacan speaks of the desire of the analyst as an advised desire and links this advice to a knowledge of the impossible. The function desire of the analyst that Lacan develops in Seminar XI distinguishes with precision its differences from neurotic desire. It is not a question of a desire sustained in the Ideal, in narcissism, in the pleasure principle. It is a desire that, in distinction from transference, which isolates the demand from the drive, returns to lead the drive to the demand. If the demand has the value of representing a narcissistic demand, identificatory, is also has the possibility of being linked to the drive, which will carry it beyond the narcissistic identifications. The response of the analyst in the function of desire of the analyst will be the orientation necessary to attain this.

3. There is no father: The paternal function will find two heirs in Lacan's teaching, neither of them will incarnate the Freudian heir of the father – the superego. For Lacan, having crossed the imaginary figure of the father, the heirs of the father, at various moments of his teaching, will be language on one side and the symptom on the other. When transference is sustained in the affects, there is no escaping it, the paternal function is ratified in the transference. If we think of transference in the symbolic register, what Lacan called the subject supposed to know, this function is also oriented to restore the paternal function, now in knowledge, with the consequent signifying articulation and its product, the

effects of sense. It is in the limit that escapes signification, heiress of the Name of the Father, that Lacan in the place of the father will encounter the symptom. The work of the analyst, availing itself of the real face of the transference, will be to show that there is no father, or rather, that the figure of the father has to be crossed in order to be able to make use of him.

THE SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOW

The subject supposed to know is the symbolic face of the transference that allows the imaginary effects linked to the affects to be avoided. The subject supposed to know is an effect of the signification of signification produced by free association. Far from being an artifice, it is a natural phenomenon of the analytic experience. The subject supposed to know is a semblant. «The semblant is operative, it is a category that allows us to reunite in the face of the real, the symbolic and the imaginary.»²

This effect of the signification of signification that free association produces, produces an analytic delusion, in the style of the delusion of interpretation in psychosis. The Name of the Father is the semblant that the Freudian analyst uses to arrest the delusional triggering of the subject supposed to know.

What corresponds to this in Lacanian psychoanalysis? It is a question of reintroducing into the analytic experience a non-sense that puts a limit to the all-sense. The Lacanian psychoanalyst knows that he should not confuse his position with the Name of the Father. But the theory of the subject supposed to know is not sufficient either, since it is equivocal or rather it escapes all effort at capture. The analyst, then, is determined by something that escapes. This is his problem.

To cite Lacan: «The position of the analyst is suspended from a relation of hiatus. But not only this, because he is also required to construct the theory of the essential equivocation of the subject in the theory: what we called the subject supposed to know. A theory that includes a lack that must be encountered at all levels; inscribed here as indetermination, there as certainty and forming the knot of the uninterpretable.»³

The position of the analyst is suspended from a void, from a hiatus, from an impossibility of capturing a knowledge. This is the very definition of the unconscious, one does not succeed in capturing it because, structurally, it escapes. This is why psychoanalysis deals with a knowledge to which one can accede only by being deceived, it can only be captured in a moment of failure. This is why to capture this knowledge the analyst has to be deceived, it is necessary to allow oneself to be deceived in order to obtain this knowledge. It is for this reason that the disillusioned are incapable of being surprised by a knowledge that misleads, which is why they go astray.

What qualifies a Lacanian analyst is his ignorance, which consists in knowing how to preserve at the center of knowledge the place of not knowing. This ignorance is a certain knowledge of the hiatus, it is not knowing nothing but knowing that there is a failure.

The subject supposed to know as semblant is the equivocation that conceals the structural hiatus making believe that there is a subject that knows about unconscious knowledge, when the very definition of this knowledge supposes that no subject knows it, because there is a hole in the knowledge.

What happens when the analyst believes that he knows this knowledge?

THE INFATUATION OF THE ANALYST

Socrates received as a calumny the words said by the soothsayer of the Oracle of Delphi that he was the wisest of all men. To discover the signification of this enigma, he dedicated himself to deciphering it, conversing with the men who were believed to be the wisest of all. His observation led him to discover that one and all manifested an exaggerated pretension to knowledge but without the irrefutable elements that would demonstrate it. This allowed him to conclude that if the oracle had named him as such it was to present him as an example. «It is as if it were saying: Men, that one of you who, like Socrates, has realised that he is not worth anything in terms of wisdom, is the wisest.»

This example leads us to the relation between the analyst and knowledge. When Lacan, quoting Baltasar Gracián, compares the analyst with the saint, he maintains the position of the analyst on the side of not dazzling, «not manifesting himself».⁵ It is not what he knows as accumulated knowledge that matters, but his particular position with respect to that knowledge.

When the analyst believes that nothing is going to surprise him, when he believes that he already knows beforehand everything that the analysand can produce, he loses his position as analyst, he no longer operates with the subject supposed to know as natural semblant of the experience. Absolute knowledge engenders sufficiency and impedes the maintenance of the hiatus that contributes to the production of a knowledge: the result is infatuation. Infatuation is the not-knowing of the not-knowing, it is the antinomy of the desire to know. «Infatuation designates an occupational hazard of the analyst, in as much as he identifies himself with the subject supposed to know, he takes himself for it. It is the semblant characteristic of the analyst, making semblant of already knowing»⁶.

This is not without relation to the Name of the Father. In the measure in which the analyst dresses himself in this vesture, he constructs this illusion with the Name of the Father. If equivocation is the form appropriate to unconscious knowledge, and the subject supposed to know is formed by the analytical experience itself, sustained in equivocation, the subject supposed to know is a formation 'in the vein', typical of its homologation to the unconscious as such. By this path, the analyst, sustained in the Name of the Father, as artificial formation, constructs the illusion of knowing everything. In this way the dialectic of the subject supposed to know is replaced by the Name of the Father. The infatuated one is the subject that believes that he manages his act when in fact the true analyst is superseded by his act.

Translated by Alicia Maabel Ryan

Footnotes

- 1 Miller, J.A. «De un esfuerzo de poesía», Seminario inédito.
- 2 Miller, J.A.»El analista y los semblantes», en *De mujeres y semblantes*, editorial cuadernos del pasador. Año 1993
- 3 Lacan, J. «La equivocación del sujeto supuesto saber», en Momentos cruciales de la experiencia analítica, editorial Manantial, año 1987
- 4 Platón «Defensa de Sócrates», en *Obras Completas*, pág.205, editorial Aguilar, año 1966
- 5 Lacan, J. «Televisión», en *Psicoanálisis Radiofonía y Televisión*, pág. 98, editorial Anagrama, año 1977
- 6 Miller, J.A. idem 1, página 22

Trauma and Name of the Father

Ernesto Piechotka

1

The «hypermodern» discourse (as coined by Jacques-Alain Miller) created «victimology» as a new social phenomenon. In what is called the «Recovery Bill of Rights for Trauma Survivors», we read : «by virtue of your personal authority you have the right to.... choose to accept or decline feedback... to hold your therapist's undivided loyalty in relation to all abusers». This Bill of Rights charts the characters of a new identity: one of the object-victim. Current times, those of a subject lacking the compass which was once given to him by the paternal morality, drives towards the establishment of a generalized practice of reinvocation; a practice which attempts to recreate an Other in order to make up for the lack of sense characterizing this era.

We are currently witnessing the substitution of the paternal myth, which the neurotic subject creates in order to cope with the senselessness of the sexual encounter. Instead of the particular myth we witness an extreme homogenization of the trauma, reduced to the «objectivity» of the event itself, eliminating any trace of subjectivation. In this manner, historization amalgamates with pseudo-objective event story , the derivative being the annulment of the unconscious order and the increasing erasure of any subjective responsibility in regards to the trauma; this erasure acting out and expanding the universal jouissance of the innocent victim.

«Victimology» leaves its trace upon the clinical act.

Let us choose an example. In the May 2000 issue of the *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Nada L. Stotland writes about a case of «family abuse ». Stotland uses the case in order to prove that the conflicts are not strictly internal, and to illuminate the way in which diagnostic mistakes are made when the patient's legitimate and inevitable reactions are attributed to prolonged abuse of personal issues. While cooperating with the victim-patient's lawyer, Stotland asks whether it would not be more accurate to diagnose these cases as a type of PTSD, a diagnosis which would generate fewer stigmas than the Borderline diagnosis.

«It was as if my brother and my father sexually molested me», says the patient, for which the very interesting pseudo name Violet was chosen. «Violet reported that it was when Luke first beat her that she felt comfortable because this was the type of relationship she felt she was meant to have» – instead of asking about the necessity of this «feeling» and about the jouissance interlaced with this necessity, lunges the therapist and draws out the empathic, and for him required, response: «she had no choice».

Trauma opens up the question regarding the cause of the symptom and neurotic's choice. We are at quite a distance from 1887, when Freud wrote his famous sentence: «I no longer believe my neurotica». The search for an instigative event, leads Freud to the reality of the Oedipal phantasm and the retroactive traumatic efficiency. Contrary to Freud, the above discussed case proves that the way in which one answers the question of the cause of trauma, determines the fate of the therapy as well as that of the the subject: either a responsible subject or an innocent object-victim. In this context we can mention the subject position's rectification which Lacan pinpoints as the milestone for the beginning of analysis.

Freud progresses from traumatic event to phantasm and from there to the drive. Lacan, following in his footsteps, answers the inquiry of the drive by designating another course of treatment, grounded in a jouissance that can not be assimilated: the sinthome as a solution. This solution requires the renunciation of the idea that there is an agent for trauma and that the subject is the victim of the agent's own jouissance, in other words, that he is the victim of the Father's jouissance.

If we are currently witnessing the revision of trauma, surplus, terror and violence; it is because the discourse is unhinged, no longer regulated by the Master, but rather by the alliance between science and market. «Science promotes a planned causality which as long as it progresses also generates the appearance of the traumatic scandal that alludes any planning- everything that requires planning becomes a trauma... for some the best way to extricate themselves from everything in psychoanalysis that smells of the XIX century, is to change the rhetoric and relay on neurological sciences», thus, Eric Laurent emphasizes a growing and expanding trend: the appearance of the psychoanalyst who espouses progress, seeking a way to ground the future of psychoanalysis in a partnership with science , simultaneously joining the forces that deepen the current foreclosure of the subject.

Let us choose one of the 2004's *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* articles, belonging to the series of essays through which the IPA prepares for the conference in Rio, dedicated, precisely, to trauma. Juan Carlos Tutte uses the concept of trauma in an attempt to create an interdisciplinary dialogue between psychiatry, neurology, biology and psychoanalysis. To sustain this dialogue, Tutte concentrates on neurological research within the field of memory, yet not without adding that «understanding the therapeutic possibilities opened up in these studies [for psychoanalysis], more than compensates for the possible loss of accuracy when determining the clinical picture». It is about nothing less than the future of psychoanalysis: «psychoanalysis must advance through the designated borders of its discipline, and to achieve this, the psychoanalytic theoretical effort within the field of psychic trauma must be confronted with PTSD». Within this context, Tutte refers to a binary that might be of interest to the Lacanian psychoanalyst, a depiction of memory composed out of multiple systems: declarative are the memory forms subjugated to the action of a system which first processes or codes the sketches, then accumulates them in a fashion that would make them accessible for future use, thus eventually linguistically verbalizing these sketches. Yet, opposed to the declarative memory forms, other non declarative memory forms which cannot be verbalized exist. This means, that memory differentiates between what can be thought of and represented; and that which exclusively belongs to processes loaded with motor affects, never reaching verbalization in treatment but are rather expressed only through «acting out». The latter memory forms are primal traumas, inaccessible to the verbal memory, play a crucial role in PTSD.

Can the traumatic state be thought of from a purely economic perspective? Asks Tutte, attempting to find a place for the drive in his explanations. He answers the question with the use of neurology, thus placing the economical, evolving, non-declarative memories in the dysfunctional physiological circuits due to an injury to the hippocampus. If the declarative belongs to the order of sense, the non-declarative supposedly belongs to the order of the Real.

«Is psychoanalysis still relevant today?» – This is Tutte's decisive question, his answer directs to a practice completely immersed within the order of sense. This is, without doubt, a practice in the Name of the Father, yet at the same time giving up the Name of the Father for a biologically real quilting point for the trauma.

Stotland's earlier quoted case constitutes a good example of the return to morality as a means against the unhinged jouissance characterizing this decade. «God's freaks», termed by Miller, exposes the way Miller relates to a certain practice of psychoanalysis, which he defines as fundamentalist.

Due to the guilt awoken in his patient from the feeling that she must choose between God and her analyst, Stotland turns to a Christian organization for consultation. The organization provided two video tapes which the analyst watched with his patient in their session: «Wings like a dove: healing for the abused Christian women» and «Broken vows: religion perspectives in domestic violence». The therapist makes use of the tapes, providing her with absolution: «God and I are on the same side» he tells the patient in order to silence her guilt.

Based on this case, Stotland refers to a use of what he calls «Christian therapy», which encourages the patient's attempts to think, act and live in accordance with his religious commandments, while weaving prayers into therapy, since sometimes «guilt constitutes an answer to certain behavior»

So much for Stotland.

The Lacanian Psychoanalyst is not exempt from falling asleep within the practice of sense, in the Name of God the Father. Between science and religion, will the psychoanalyst choose to base his practice on sense by combining semantically S1-S2 into an attempt to instaure sexual relationship? Or will he gamble on the traumatic affect within the chain of signifiers generated by his act? Will he embrace the religious belief in the father as an ally, in order to curve that which is impossible to be curved? Or will he agree to a sinthomatic use of the Name of the Father, one that will awaken and direct analysis towards *lalangue's* disharmony?

This question touches upon the very existence of psychoanalysis in times of the non-existent Other. Miller attempts to answer this question when he views Lacan's Seminar on the Sinthome as Lacan's invitation to think of psychoanalysis beyond its old toolbox, i.e. beyond the unconscious; since «the hypothesis of the unconscious can not hold unless we assume the Name of the Father». This invitation implies the adoption of a practice directed by the use of the Name of the Father through consent, precisely, to traumatize homeostasis while striving beyond what Miller terms «Daddy's unconscious».

Truth and the Name-of-the-Father

Marie-Hélène Briole

In order to counter the effects of the frenzy of science and the return in force of the religious, Lacan says we have a choice: to either confront truth or else ridicule our knowledge. This choice is more than ever actual and belongs to the responsibility of every individual analyst. If the real of the clinic is intimately articulated to the knowledge that can be extracted from it as well as to the politics of psychoanalysis, it is because we find in it the structure of the analytic discourse itself, in which the knowledge of *jouissance* is found in the place of truth.

As Lacan emphasized at the same moment he was taking the decision to found his school on the pass, we must find, at every level, a theory that includes a lack: «This is because my enterprise does not exceed the act by which it is apprehended and so its only chance is to be misapprehended». Misapprehension is at the very basis of transference, since the analyst becomes the dummy of the subject supposed to know: wherever there is knowledge without a subject, a subject will be supposed to this knowledge. Sense will then be given to the symptom...in the time required.

In the beginning, *there is* psychoanalysis. Since Freud, the hysterical is intimately associated with the truth that the unconscious, put to work by transference, produces during the cure. The love of knowledge is sustained by the transference love, which is an authentic love and which works for the affirmation of a truth that had been repressed up till then — a truth that is not known.

Psychoanalysis appears from the start as a dialectic experience whose contour is that of the Oedipus complex. Belief in the father is fundamental because it is correlative to the supremacy of the symbolic. The father appears then as the guarantee of the symbolic order, and the truth is founded on the fact that truth speaks. The symptom is interpreted in the register of the signifier, and the truth of the symptom is found in the articulation S1 – S2.

Lacan, rereading Freud in order to extract from him a new knowledge, would present, in his Seminar *L'Envers de la psychanalyse*, a reversal of perspective that can be translated like this: the truth is the sister of *jouissance*. The surplus *jouissance* (*a*) comes to supplement the lack and it is introduced as a corporal element. The symbolic order is no longer transcendent; the great Other and the signifier do not function autonomously, but in relation to the body and the drive.

If the hysterical is not satisfied just to desire, it is precisely because she wants to attain *jouissance*¹: *jouissance* and the automatism of repetition are subjected to the principle of the symptom and its complaint, as a negative therapeutic reaction. The truth, which can only be *half-said*, lets its other face appear, its face of *jouissance*. The truth has the structure of fiction, a *fixion* of *jouissance* that is related to the fundamental fantasy, by which the divided subject of the signifier compensates for its want-to-be with the object (*a*). For this reason, the truth is radically deceptive, and the love of truth can only lead to an impasse.

The fact that the subject of the unconscious is the subject of science puts emphasis on the division between knowledge and truth, and underlines the function of truth as cause. The discourse of the analyst stresses that there is a truth in *jouissance*, and that this truth is a readable, decipherable knowledge: *a* / S2. The analyst interprets *jouissance* in terms of the signifier, but interpretation pertains to the cause of desire. The symptom is defined as an effect of truth. In the place where there was *jouissance*, the signifier must come.

The Oedipus complex, which Lacan presents as equivalent to the paternal metaphor and the Name-of-the-Father in his Seminar «R.S.I.», will from then on be considered as «Freud's dream». Freud interprets the symptom in the name of the father, in terms of truth, while the signifier is a cause of *jouissance*. Lacan establishes, as J.-A. Miller has shown in his «Paradigms of *Jouissance*», a circularity

between signifier and *jouissance*. One more step and the signifier would become the equivalent of *jouissance*: *jouissance* seeps into everything.

This means that the symptom, from *Encore* on, can no longer be conceived in the same way: the concept of speech-being (*parlêtre*), and that of *lalangue* testify to this. Lacan gives a name to the parole² when it is disjoined from the structure of language and separated from communication: he calls it *lalangue*. The great Other, the Name-of-the-Father and the phallic symbol are here reduced to a function of pure semblant, of a *staple* between the disjoined elements, detached pieces. With respect to the sexual non-relation, *jouissance* results from a fundamental *there is*: the speaking body is only attached to its own *jouissance*. This non-relation between the *jouissance* of One and the Other of the signifier appears as what objects to psychoanalysis. How then can the direction of the cure, interpretation and the end of analysis be conceived?

The autistic conception of the symptom precludes its being deciphered in terms of truth. The symptom is then defined as an event of the body: to the place where there was a body-event, a truth-effect must come. Since what is fundamental is not the symbolic order but the consistence of the body, there can no longer be any question of revelation, but only of reduction — the reduction of the symptom to what does not make sense. This is what Lacan puts forward with Joyce and, we can say, *against* Freud.

The symptom, after 1975 with «R.S.I.», is recast as the equivalent of the Name-of-the-Father. A symptom, coming to this place of semblant in the discourse of the master (that of the unconscious), can take on the function of the Name-of-the-Father. The Name-of-the-Father, from then on, will have no more value than a semblant. From the *essaim*³ of the master-signifiers, we arrive at the pluralization of the Names-of-the-Father that marks Lacan's final teaching.

The hypothesis of the unconscious can hold only with reference to the Name-of-the-Father: it must first be supposed that there is knowledge in the real, and that this real is structured as a language. In a cure, we make an effort to give sense to the real, while the real has no sense and is lawless. But thinking misses the mark, just as sexuality misses the mark, because of the *jouissance* of bodies. The body is even what objects to the barred subject of the signifier, which is referred to the universal and is revealed in the end to be only a myth — this is why Lacan preferred the term of *parlêtre* (*speech-being*).

What can be done with what affects the body irrepressibly? Does psychoanalysis permit a subject, in the end, to find happiness in the symptom? Certainly it permits us to learn to read the *body-event*, which brings relief up to a certain point, the point at which one inevitably comes up against something unreadable. What we learn from Lacan with Joyce, is that we must push the reading of the symptom beyond its ultimate ramparts in order to manage to make of the *sinthome* a work. This is precisely what is at stake in the pass, so much the more so as the holes opened in the structure by the last Lacan leave place for invention. But that supposes, as J.-A. Miller has emphasized in his course entitled «Pièces détachées» (2004-2005), having divested oneself of truth and the illusion that the deciphering of the unconscious might deliver an ultimate truth.

The fact that there is no ultimate truth accentuates the responsibility of each analyst with respect to the theory that orients our practice. Articulating the theory of the misapprehension of the subject supposed to know with reference to the real of *jouissance* becomes an ethical exigency if it is the duty of the psychoanalyst to be atheist. What Lacan calls a *sinthome* takes on all its value by situating the target of psychoanalysis in a beyond sense that is a beyond the Father. Interpreting, and even naming things, supposes a certain harmony between symbolic and real, supposes the Name-of-the-Father, supposes believing in God. This is why Lacan attracted our attention to the proper name taken as a rigid designator, that is to say as empty of description, referring to nothing else but S(A). At the end of his teaching, Lacan leaves aside the Other of sense, leaves aside the effects of truth in order to concentrate on the real and take the direction of a theory of the *sinthome* with its reference to the proper name. The subject concerned is no longer that of the signifier, but the subject completed by its *jouissance*, the subject as a response of the real, having a body imbued with *jouissance*⁴. The accent is put on the letter, the sonority, the murmur of the language.

If the symptom becomes name in the end, it is because it collects the interests of the subject's *jouissance*. In the fragment of his seminar published in the review *La Cause freudienne* (notably, n° 39

and 49), Eric Laurent indicated that the subject, in face of the enigma of his *jouissance*, makes an effort to name it and is inevitably confronted with the fact that the reference is never the right one, declining first its name as a symptom then its name as a fantasy, before getting to its name as a *sinthome* in the pass. This orients us towards the dichotomy that exists between those two modes of writing: the signifier and the letter. We can then envisage the course of a cure as going from the symptom to the *sinthome*, that is to say, the truth-effects produced by body-events, from the sense to the non-sense, from the decipherable to the undecipherable, from the signifier to the letter — in order to arrive at the *realization* of the subject.

While the Freudian symptom is related to the S1 that is in a position of agent in the discourse of the master, the Lacanian *sinthome* relates to the S1 that is found in the place of the production in the discourse of the analyst. ‘This requires that a distinction be made between the Name-of-the-Father and the Father *qui n’homme*⁵, but at the same time the disjunction that must be made between symbolic and real, beyond sense and signification. The impossible relation between truth and knowledge is correlative to the absence of guarantee that the analytic act supports. Where the surplus *jouissance* (*a*) was, the realized subject must come.

This orientation towards the real implies that the place of God-the-Father be left vacant, in order to be able to operate on *jouissance* and transmit psychoanalysis. If Lacan invites us, with the pass, to construct the theory of the misapprehension that transference depends on, it is because the place that is suitable for the act is the sunken place of the object of the drive reduced to his logical consistency. That is what will bring us together in Rome: the Name-of-the-Father that we must do without, in order to use it.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

¹ TN : « elle veut jouir »

² TN : I have been translating the French « parole » by « parole » in English, with no italics because Webster’s gives it with a definition in the Saussurian sense. For a more detailed justification, see the translator’s note in the English version of Philippe La Sagna’s paper.

³ TN Essaim means « swarm » (such as of bees) in French, but it has the same pronunciation as S1. I keep the French because the *équivoque* S1 seems here more important than the swarm.

⁴ TN : « un corps qui jouit »

⁵ TN : That is, « The Father who names ». Lacan plays here on the phonic *équivoque* between *n’homme* (a neological invention with the negative particle *ne*) and *nomme*.

U like...

UNARY TRAIT • F. NEMIROVSKY
UNCONSCIOUS • MR. FERNANDEZ BLANCO
UNIVERSAL, PARTICULAR • S. MARRET-MALEVAL

The Universal, the Particular and the Name-of-the-Father

Sophie Marret

From the moment the object is perceived as «anterior to law and desire»¹ the reexamination of the father that the seminar *L'Angoisse* leads to can be implemented. Jacques-Alain Miller emphasizes that «when the domination of the signifier [which culminates in the Seminar V] asserts itself, when [the signifier] becomes totalitarian, [...], then, correlatively, what does not fall within the domain of the signifier asserts itself». He proposes this formula : $a \llcorner$, with which he represents the object a^2 . «And it is clearly because [...] (the object small a) has no name that it calls to question the Name-of-the-Father», correlatively this seminar on anxiety shows that the power of the father «stumbles over the object a »³.

Thus, submitted to logic, the Name-of-the-Father moves forthwith from the category of the universal to that of the particular.

In the seminar *Les formations de l'inconscient*, at the time of this all symbolic, the Name-of-the-Father is in effect understood as: «the signifier that, in the place of the Other, posits and authorizes the play of signifiers»⁴, as the «support of order installed by the signifying chain»⁵. It founds the symbolic order. It is from this status that it derives its universal function. Lacan notes, in the seminar «From an Other to the other», that for the speaking being language hoists the living to the universal⁶. It is the order of the signifier that is here understood as being related to the universal.

In the seminar *L'Identification*, Lacan assures the anchoring of the Name-of-the-Father in the logical category of the universal, after an examination of the specificity of the universal proposition with respect to existence. This particularity, which we find the trace of in Aristotle, only encounters its full expression with John Venn in the middle of the XIXth century, with the beginnings of the mathematization of logic, when Venn considered the universal as a hypothetical proposition: «if there are men, then they are all mortal». Venn rendered null and void one of the fundamental rules of classical logic, by which the existential import of the universal led to inferring the existence of subjects that verified it. Classical logic made it possible, according to the law of subalternation, to infer, from the truth of the universal, the truth of the particular. Lacan never ceased insisting on the fact that the universal in no way engaged the affirmation of existence. «The Word exists, but not Descartes' God»⁷, he indicates to introduce his observations in the seminar on identification. He emphasizes that the particular and the universal do not have the same «level of existence» and he situates the opposition between universal and particular in the order of the «lexis», that is to say, of the choice of the signifier, that he distinguishes from the «phasis»: something that is here proposed as a parole by which I engage myself, yes or no, as to the existence of this something that the first lexis casts a doubt on»⁸. To illustrate this, he states, «If I say: all lines are vertical, that means that when there is not a vertical, there is not a line», marking, as Venn does, the universal by an empty compartment on a diagram by which he represents the opposition of affirmative and negative universals, and of affirmative and negative particulars.

This distinction allows him to enclose the function of the Name-of-the-Father within the order of the universal:

«What it is about is that the order of function we introduce with the Name of the Father is this something that, at the same time, has its universal value, but that charges you, the other, to control whether or not there is a father of this stamp. If there are none, it is still true that the father is God, but the formula is only confirmed by the empty sector of the dial, in consideration of which at the level of the phasis, we have: there are fathers that more or less fill the symbolic function that we must denounce as such, as being that of the name of the father, there are some who and there are some who not»⁹.

The phasis is the realization or not of the lexis, the universal is isolated from the affirmation of existence. Whether there are fathers or not does not affect the level of the universal of the Name-of-the-Father to which the particular is referred and which is grasped as pure signifier. Lacan adds:

«This means something: within the ambiguity of the particular support we can give by engaging our parole in the Name-of-the-Father as such, it is still the case that we cannot do anything whatever that, sucked into the atmosphere of what is human, if I may express myself thus, might, if it can be said, be considered as completely disengaged from the Name of the Father, that even here (empty) where there are only fathers for whom the function of father is, if I can express myself thus, pure loss, the non-father father, the lost cause, on which my seminar ended last year, it is nevertheless in function of this decline with respect, with respect to a first lexis which is that of the Name of the Father, that this particular category is judged»¹⁰

The pluralization of the Names-of-the-Father, consecutive to the seminar *L'Angoisse* and the conception of the object *a* as cause of the desire it introduces, is accompanied consequently by a shift of the Name-of-the-Father from the universal to the particular. Lacan retraces the progress of his teaching with reference to the Hegelian dialectic. He notes that the Hegelian dialectic can be reduced «to the intrinsic deficit of the logic of predication»: «it remains to be seen that the universal, all things considered [...] is only founded on aggregation, while the particular, alone to find its existence in it, appears as contingent». He denounces the path followed by Hegel in which he tries to mask «this fault» and to «show [...] how the universal can manage to be particularized by means of the scansion of the *Aufhebung*». The path of «reconciliation», that of the dialectic synthesis, permits Hegel to attempt to reconcile the universal and being, by means of the «dialectic unity» that defines the relation of the particular to the whole¹¹. Lacan recalls for his part that God is not identical to being¹², and he defines the Other on the one hand as a «mirage», «the place of the lure under the form of *a*»¹³, the object *a* being «what has no Name in the place of the Other»¹⁴ the object *a* objects then to the totalization of the Other. On the other hand, he defines the Other also as the place where «it speaks»¹⁵, and he relates the father to the function of the proper Name¹⁶. This last shift contributes once again to having the Name-of-the-Father pass from the universal to the particular. $\exists x \overline{Sx}$

The function of the father later finds its expression through the particular: $\exists x \overline{Sx}$. It is not for Lacan a matter of joining back together being and existence, on the contrary. He emphasizes in the seminar ... *Ou pire*, the precarious sense of this «there exists»: « \exists means 'there exists'. There exists what? A signifier»¹⁷. «You exist surely», he adds, «but it doesn't go any further. You exist as a signifier», and then further on: «It is evident that God exists, but no more than you do!» Once the universal is reduced to the level of the possible, in accordance with John Venn's interpretation of the universal as hypothetical, Lacan strives to mark the disjunction of Being and the One. He recalls how Frege founded the 1 on the 0. Taking up the question of the One, then, with reference to set theory, he indicates that the One of the set can be the empty set, while any set includes the empty set as a fundamental element. On the side of the unary, as of the unian, Lacan separates Being and the One. «*Y'a de l'un*¹⁸ does not mean that there is something like an individual, but that there is no other existence for One than its mathematical existence.» Related to the particular that gives it its only existence as a signifier, and to the affirmation that there is something like (some) one», the father is reduced to the master signifier, to the S_1 .

The passage from the universal to the particular also has as a consequence that the Father is no longer apprehended solely with reference to the Symbolic, but also to the Real. «I speak of the one as of a real», Lacan asserts¹⁹, when he shows that the proposition $\exists x \overline{Sx}$ articulates this «*y a de l'Un*» to the «at least one»²⁰. In addition, he reminds us that «The number is part of the real». The function of the father is finally detached from the all of castration. Lacan reproaches Aristotle for having eluded the «not-all». He himself introduces, side by side with the negation of the universal «no or not any *x* is *y*», the affirmative particular not-all *x* is *y*, of which the proposition $\exists x \overline{Sx}$ is the expression. The paternal exception is thus situated on the side of the not-all that bounds the set of the «for all» ($\forall x \Phi x$), which confers on it a limit by being situated outside the set²¹. The Father unites²². But just like the object *a* that brings to light that not-all falls within the domain of the signifier, the paternal exception is not

only the construction of the myth: «there exists one who is not castrated». Lacan shows that the particular posits the «there exists» of this «it is not true» of castration²³. He continues: «It is not true that castration dominates all»²⁴. The passage from the universal to the particular gives another blow to the power of the symbolic and to that of the Name-of-the-Father.

In the seminar ... *Ou pire*, Lacan notes the utility of the function of the letter, of the S_1 as letter, «it is of use to explain to you in another way, what I have completely given up approaching by way of the Names-of-the-Father»²⁵. We have here a first outline for a new approach to the Name-of-the-Father that will take shape with the *sinthome*. The letter is substituted to the Name-of-the-Father and Lacan will later exploit the littoral function, elaborated at the same time as the seminar ... *Ou pire*. One more turn will be given in effect when Lacan leaves behind the logical model for that of topology. In the seminar *Le sinthome*, it is the function of the nomination of the father that is put forward. Jacques-Alain Miller indicates that at the end of Lacan's teaching, the Name-of-the-Father no longer associates the signifier to the signified but the symbolic to the real²⁶. He advances that the *sinthome* is «of the order of the letter»²⁷. The abandon of the logical model consecrates the end of the power of the Father, «The Name-of-the-Father», Lacan remarks in *Le sinthome* is, all things considered, something weightless.»

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

- ¹ Jacques-Alain Miller, « Introduction à la lecture du Séminaire l'Angoisse de Jacques Lacan », in *La Cause Freudienne*, n° 58, Paris : Navarin, Seuil, p. 94.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- ³ Jacques-Alain Miller, « Introduction à la lecture du Séminaire l'Angoisse de Jacques Lacan », in *La Cause Freudienne*, n° 59, Paris : Navarin, Seuil, February, 2005, p. 89.
- ⁴ Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire livre V, Les Formations de l'inconscient (1957-58)*, Text established by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris : Seuil, 1998, p. 317.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 480
- ⁶ Jacques Lacan, « D'un Autre à l'autre » (1968-69), unpublished seminar, lesson of May 14, 1969
- ⁷ Jacques Lacan, « L'identification » (1961-62), unpublished seminar, lesson of January 17, 1962.
- ⁸ *Ibid.* T.N. I have been using «parole» as an English word with the authorization of Webster's which defines it with reference to Saussure. For a more detailed explanation, see the translators note on the first page of P. La Sagna's paper in this volume. I must indicate, however, that in this particular context, it could have been translated very well by «word», with a slight alternation of the sentence structure. I'm keeping «parole» experimentally to see what the effect is.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ Yvan Belaval (dir.), *Histoire de la philosophie*, vol. 2, Paris : Gallimard, col. *Encyclopédie de la Pléiade*, p. 859.
- ¹² Jacques Lacan, « Introduction aux Noms-du-Père », Nov. 20 1963, in *Des Noms-du-Père*, text established by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris : Seuil, col. « Champ Freudien », 2005, p. 78.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 83.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 84
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92.
- ¹⁷ Jacques Lacan, « ... Ou pire » (1971-72), séminaire inédit, cours du 15 décembre 1971.
- ¹⁸ T.N. An approximate translation : « There is something like (some) one »¹
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, lesson of April 19, 1972.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ Cf. Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire livre XX, Encore (1972-73)*, text established by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris : Seuil, 1975, p. 74.
- ²² Jacques Lacan, « ... Ou pire », lesson of June 14, 1972.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, lesson of December 15, 1971.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, cours du 14 juin 1972..
- ²⁶ Jacques-Alain Miller, « Pièces détachées », unpublished seminar, lesson n°5, 15/12/2004, p. 40.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, lesson n°6, January 12, 2005, p. 48.

V like...

VIRILITY • O. ZACK

W like...

WAR • G. BRIOLE
WELTANSCHAUUNG • H. WACHSBERGER
WITZ • G GARCIA
WORSE • J.P. KLOTZ

War and the Name-of-the-Father

Guy Briole

«What can be done so that the human masses consigned to the same space, not only a geographic space but sometimes a familial space, might remain separated?» This question posed by Jacques Lacan is relevant to any war of nations, of clans or of families. But there are distinctions that must be made here. The wars of fathers are wars of conquest for the survival of their own, for their security, for their honor. The wars of sons are wars of vengeance, to make a name for themselves by restoring or sustaining the ideal of the father, or just as well to attempt to break away from him, so great a burden he may turn out to be. The sons take up the wars where the fathers have left them. Contemporary history shows to what extent the sons can carry the chastisement beyond the laws that the fathers had taken as their limit. The pretext: the fathers had not treated the evil, leaving it in place, a menace for all.

The decline of ideals is often put forward in contemporary discourse to explain this war-like frenzy, as disorderly as it is multifocal, and also to justify the rise of racisms and segregation. One pretends to be surprised by this and persists in misconstruing what Freud had remarkably demonstrated in *Civilization and Its Discontents*: behind the screen of civilization, which contributes to the pacification of the relations between men in their fundamental instincts, nothing changes. Social constraints, the education system, or even the army participate in an attempt to channel these instinctive forces by finding for them acceptable issues and by managing as well as possible the «left-over», inherent in any social group. But, the disruption of social bonds and the fact that the father is being put into question over his idea of a Nation, revive the tensions between the groups within a same State, reactivate rancor and hatred, and bring back into the open promises of vengeance. Once again and inexorably men are prepared to engage in the worst, so aware they are that the nets of war are being tightened around them.

IN THE MIRROR, THE RICOCHET

Among the virtues that Sun Tse distinguishes for a warrior, he retains the love for his comrades in arms but, more generally, «love for his fellow-men». It is not the least of paradoxes to say that in order to fight a better war you must love your fellow-man. Lacan, after Freud, emphasized the ferocity behind this commandment: *Love thy neighbor as thyself*.

Freud leaves no alternative other than to take seriously the observation that «the most profound essence of man» pushes him to egoism, cruelty and destruction. These motions persist in our unconscious and Freud does not hesitate to say that if we were judged with respect to these motions, we would be considered, like the men of our origins, as «a gang of assassins». He insisted again on these morbid tendencies in man in his *Discontent* by showing how man uses his neighbor to satisfy his need for aggression, «using him sexually without his consent, appropriating what he possesses, humiliating him, making him suffer, martyring him and killing him».

The neighbor is a wicked being and the presence within him of wickedness is the «consequence of the commandment to love one's neighbor». The violence and aggressiveness in direction of the neighbor is another modality of the violence turned on oneself. In the mortal face to face that situations of war produce what does the other demand? «Kill me or spare me»? That is the echo of ambivalence that can be fatal to him and that Freud discriminated for the soldier: kill or be killed. War confronts man with the expression of the violence contained within him against his neighbor at the same time as he feels constrained by another commandment marked by a prohibition: *Thou shalt not kill*.

Death endured is the complementary side of death given. The bullet ricochets on the mirror and comes back to the one who had destined it for the other. This is just one of the variants of the turning around of a weapon, an altruistic form of the sacrifice of one's life.

The relation of exclusion, «it's him or me», brought into evidence in the aggressiveness inherent in narcissism finds its paroxysm in the situation of war. A war that can only be have the mirror as its principle. This radicality of imaginary aggressiveness is displayed when what pacifies the relation and keeps it at a distance comes to lack: «a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervening of a word, that is to say of the father» argues J. Lacan. Then the chaos of the war is related to that of the imaginary dissolution. The crepuscule of Schreber's world joins that of the warrior and it is the other of the imaginary axis that is found to be the recipient of the insult, swine!

THE INDESTRUCTIBLE AND THE LOGIC OF GENOCIDE

The modern warrior does not escape the rule defined by Georges Dumézil : no one wages a war for himself, but always on account of an other. Indeed we can say of an Other. Whenever he thinks he is unique, he is in fact only an instrument of the collective. An instrument of war that, outfitted with protections and equipped with electronic devices, feels he is invincible and can only think of the death of the other. This modern warrior could be one of the children Freud talks about and who would write home from the front: «Dear Mom, when you die...». He merges rather than identifying with the indestructible machine-man. He wants to believe in it. But the facts, above all the facts of war, dismantle the utopias. Nevertheless, on this path, man does not give up and he keeps an unshakable faith in technology. He always wants to believe that this time, with the help of science and thanks to its progress, he is finally going to get to this individual that will be an exception to all the others. He forgets that the one who uses him can still manipulate him as he wishes. This man also forgets that, because they were made of lead, the soldiers of his childhood had no other existence than what his own imagination breathed into them. At one moment, one of them could triumph over an entire army and be the object of the enthusiastic child's passion. At another moment, this same army of figurines could find itself the object of a total disaffection, when the interest of the child turned elsewhere. Today the game is intersideral and the child of yesterday finds a new interest in it, the reality of war seeming so well to be confused with the fictions of his videogames. The imaginary is unchained, the attack has the status of a declaration of war, the transposed infantile cruelty is displayed with no limit. Wars no longer have names. They have been obliterated in favor of operations that no longer aim at reestablishing peace or envisaging it within the framework of a renewed legislation, but at the total destruction of the enemy designated by virtue of nothing more than their *small differences*. So everything happens according to a logic of genocide: segregation in the name of a distinctive feature, designation and regrouping, then systematic elimination. They operate venture by venture. One operation over, one drags one's purifying morals to another place. The world is full of wicked beings, the task is infinite! Nothing any longer limits the imaginary whose overflow is aggravated by the unilateral power of the arms and of the reference to moral conscience.

THE RETURN OF THE SAME

Today it is said we have new Gods — in the world of science, of consumption, of humanitarian ideals, in the cyberworld, etc. or renewed ties with the already known Gods, with the recrudescence of religions and the reinforcement of sects. There is said to be a hope on the side of the Gods and their disciples, in order to make up for the fathers in disgrace, or eliminated.

Modern society finds itself under the influence of the «rise of the discourse of science», correlative to the fall of ideals as well as the function of the father, and consequently, of religions.

Is that what we are faced with or is it rather a rise in violence, a solidification of the religious under its most extremist aspects? We continue to kill, to decimate, to eliminate with a formidable systematization due to a segregation, which is always accomplished in the name of the father.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Weltanschauung and Name-of-the Father

Herbert Wachsberger

‘Wenn der Wanderer in der Dunkelheit singt, verleugnet er seine Ängstlichkeit, aber er sieht um nichts heller’.¹

SIGMUND FREUD

Is Psychoanalysis a *Weltanschauung*, a world view?² According to the reverend Oscar Pfister, in the eyes of religion’s *Weltanschauung*, which is based on absolute values, it cannot be. But, he credits psychoanalysis ‘with the most precious contributions to the creation of an image of the universe’.

Freud, equally, asserts that psychoanalysis is not *Weltanschauung*. It is a scientific method of investigation, but one which does not expect anything from that illusion which is religion. In *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud concluded that religion derives from the relations of the child with the father and that the primordial father served as a prototype for God.

Denouncing Freud’s scientism, Pfister, in the ‘*Illusion of a Future*’ returned the compliment to Freud and closed his ‘amicable discussion with the Professor’ with a formula which supposes them both, the one and the other, saying in unison the same ‘credo’: ‘Truth will make you free’.

THE DEBATE ABOUT VALUES

The question of the relations between psychoanalysis and philosophy was the first form of the ‘debate about *Weltanschauung*’. The discussions diversified after the first World War and overflowed the psychoanalytic circles towards the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s.

Already the digressions on the struggle between reason and demon were making good progress, after Freud’s description, in *The Ego and the Id*, of the Ego’s dependent relations. A few years later, referring to those speculations, Freud declared that he left those fabrications to the philosophers who are unable to walk in life without those guides which are nothing else than a substitute for the good old Sunday school teachings. A way of acknowledging what *Weltanschauung* owes to the Other, indeed to the ready-made ideology.

Nevertheless, the Freudian discoveries were providing the analysts with innovative insights and were giving rise -in those years of turbulence between the two wars- to hopes going beyond the Freudian circles. The debate on *Weltanschauung* amplified.

Serge Bernfeld, in a vast survey of those different aspects, adopted a position in accordance with the Freudian alternative of either religion or science: for those who only retain from psychoanalysis its essential equivalence to a theory of knowledge, there is no other choice than to sacrifice either God or the Oedipus complex. It is an alternative which has the father as pivot.

Freud, who treated abundantly with ‘*Weltanschauung*’ and its forms in private, took position in one of his writings. In it, he attempted to establish that psychoanalysis, as a science, had no relation with the non-scientific *Weltanschauungen*: art, philosophy and its different systems, religion and its precursors, nihilism or Marxism. ‘*Civilization and its Discontents*’ had already made the militant left, sympathetic till then to psychoanalysis, grind its teeth, as it reminded them that man had little to expect from progress in civilization.

A GERMAN PSYCHOANALYSIS, SPIRITUALIST AND CONSTRUCTIVE

Fifteen days after the action undertaken ‘against the un-German spirit’ which condemned the works of Freud and the Freudians to the stake, the psychoanalyst Carl Müller-Braunschweig praised the psychoanalytic *Weltanschauung* in a nazi newspaper. The circumstances demanded an updating. Müller-Braunschweig described a heroic struggle, inherent to the human soul, between spiritual forces and drive forces, and the functions of the three spiritual agencies: the ego, which aspires to synthesis, the

superego (conscience) which appreciates ideals and values, and the id, a corrupting agency which leads the ego, incapable to resist, to lazy compromises and the superego to neglect to rally the idealizing tendencies under the standard of ideals. On condition to put psychoanalysis in good hands and in the service of the wholly new and heroic conception of life, it can revive the deadened forces, bring men back to life, make them face reality, transform them into beings capable of love and sacrifice, ‘servants of the Whole’ (*zu Dienern des Ganzen*).

FREUDIAN DEFINITION OF THE *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

Freud’s definition was precise. ‘*Weltanschauung*’ is an intellectual construction which resolves all the problems of our existence. Its coherence is based on an adopted principle (*eine Annahme*, an accepted hypothesis, an axiom of the subject), which presides over its organization. It belongs to the domain of desire, and, by this fact, it is articulated to the register of the ideal. To believe in it gives someone confidence in life, allows him to better manage his own interests and affects, and to know what to aim at.

How can we not recognize here the convergence between the Freudian definitions of *Weltanschauung* and the Lacanian definition of fantasy? At this point, however, Lacan and Freud diverged: Freud believed he could not do without the father, while Lacan taught psychoanalysts how to make use of the father in a different way.

In 1935, in the ‘*Post-Scriptum*’ to his *Selbstdarstellung*³, Freud went back to his reflections. He had admitted that the power of religion stemmed from its content of truth, but, contrarily to what he thought when he wrote *The Future of an illusion*, it was not about a material truth –for which one should look on the side of the unbridled jouissance of the father of the primitive horde– but about a historical truth in that the originally repressed of the shameless Father would have returned under the auspices of a God of monotheism (whose historical phases Freud recounted in *The Man Moses and the monotheistic religion*)⁴, a God who would have instituted the paternal authority within a different context than that of the primordial father.

That signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, guarantor of the Other, lost what it had preserved as sovereignty since Lacan acknowledged that there was not an Other of the Other, that the signifier of the Other was lacking. Lacan pluralized that name in lay signifying functions which are nevertheless capable of stowing or restricting jouissance.

ETHICS VERSUS *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

Fantasy was recognized as the distinguished function of filling the gap in the Other, supporting all our reality, in every sense⁵. However, it is by going beyond that, that the analysand, destitute from the ‘assurance (he finds) in that fantasy which for each one constitutes their window on the real’, and because he will have preferred that ‘point of the real which, for him, has been the principle of his disagreement with the Other’, according to the path shown by Lacan in *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, he will have the chance, at the end of his trajectory, of finding and making his own solution starting from that which is the most singular in his symptom.

Such a subject, who has come ‘to a departure from the norm’, when he reports on the effects of the analytic act upon the decisive moments of the trajectory concluding his experience, he cannot fail to testify, in one way or another, of the fact that the father’s tomb was empty’. Facing the discourse of the hypermodern civilization, will he be inclined to restore the oedipal ideology or adapt psychoanalysis to suit the ideals of the *Zeitgeist*?

Translate by Haroula Pepeli

Footnotes

- 1 When the wanderer sings in the dark, he denies his anxiety, but he does not see clearer around him for that.
- 2 A world view, a philosophy (of life), an ideology (Langenscheidt Dictionary).
- 3 Freud’s *Selbstdarstellung* was first published in 1925. Cf. Standard Edition, An Autobiographical Study, 20, 7-71. Nachschrift, 1935, *ibid.*, 71-74.
- 4 Cf. Moses and Monotheism (Freud, 1939a), Standard Ed. 23, 1-137.
- 5 ‘aux cinq sens près’

Pire

Jean-Pierre Klotz

«*Pire*» is in French a comparative, or a superlative («*le pire*»: the worst), what must be avoided, with discreet fascination. Imagining it, expecting it, going towards the worst means having an outlook on the out-rageous, , ghastly [*immonde*], but from a spot within the world (*monde*). This brings into play a negative orientation accentuated from a departure point that we are inexorably sent back to, even without saying. The worst refers to what it supplements (the «evil» remaining — or becoming — basic) which it would rupture by worsening it. And this induced em-pire can also assonate with the «*père*» [father]. We had at one time the *Père Pire*, a Belgian Dominican, Nobel Prize for Peace in 1958 for his action in favor of «displaced persons». *Père* and empire, *pire* and displacement, the interconnections I have here proposed for these terms are not inappropriate for an introduction.

In Lacan's Seminar XIX of the year 1971-72, yet unpublished, strangely entitled «...ou pire», the One that there is («Y a d'l'Un») emerges, distinct from the One that is, and analysts can become muddled in the confusion these two give rise to: «*s'oupirer*»,¹ suspiring, for the One makes them believe they are part of it, a fatal error for locating their place. We also have the two well-known quotations on psychotherapy, which «whatever it is, falls short, not because it does no good, but because it leads to the worst.»² In the remarkable conclusion to «Television» (dated 1973, published in 1974), in the form of an envoi, after having asserted that «the interpretation must be nimble to satisfy the *entreprêt*»³, Lacan adds «Between which perdures through pure dross, and the hand that draws only from Dad to worse»⁴ The displacement operates from the father, or the Name-of-the-Father, the one of whom he will say on April 13, 1976, that «we can get along just as well without him, under the condition that we make use of him»⁵. That is precisely what is done: the accent placed on the worst, but making use of the father to launch the rocket of a wager while keeping it connected to its launching base. Towards the worst then, with a string attached to its foot present in the *nom du pire* (name-of-the-worst) itself, and underneath just pure and hard loss.

The worst must then be neither forgotten nor omitted in one's plans, if not it will refresh our memory, sometimes ill-timed or even frightening, to be fled or held in respect in order not to be overcome by it, sometimes the element of the wager by which it testifies to the orientation towards a real beyond the father, but not without him.

In «...ou pire», Lacan plays a good deal on a Charybde and Scylla style alternative, the other choice being the sexual relation there is not, or the real the subject has to deal with. The choice is posed between two evils, one of which is worse. Lacan's wager is to place his honor in not sighing («*s'...soupirer*»)⁶, as he says of what he is trying to do, when we hop to the end (having turned the page) of the envoi, which we previously mentioned, in the *Autres Écrits*. The temptation of those who *s'...oupirent* is to do it for the One. A forced choice in which the worst is inevitable. What does this mean, except to posit that in order to elude the abyss of the real of sex, of the unsymbolizable, of the impossible to say, to be regulated, to be tamed, one cannot be content to choose the One of mastery, or conditioning or drilling, without taking into account what the subject, to be a subject, has brought into operation as symptom. Reciprocally, there is no symptom without some worse included, not-all and impossible to resorb, a worse that prohibits — but it remains for us to demonstrate this, within the analytic experience — that we consider the father may be the solution...without the worst.

The worst, the father, and now the symptom: it is this last that returns, in Lacan's approach to it in his latest teachings, in order to resolve, that is in order to posit by localizing it, by binding it, the problem of the worst in psychoanalysis.

If we choose to tackle the question by psychotherapy, how does this amount to the worst despite the good that it can dispense? By not recognizing the symptom as the subject's own invention introducing a limit to *jouissance*. The subject as a want-to-*jouir*⁷, an effect of language, is incapable of receiving from the Other the means to «cope with» the *jouissance* he is confronted to, with respect to which he finds his bearings as subject to be in want of it. Through all the semantic reductions to which he is confronted in the experience, the blockage by the opaque kernel allows him, if he accepts to consent to it, to count on it in order to find a space for the limited desire to which he is reduced in the end. This modifies the relation to the symptom: there is no longer question of suppressing it, of eradicating it, of identifying it to an obscure dysfunction to be repaired, but to recuperate it. It is the major tool of the subject in his relation to *jouissance*, the space of permanent debate, or of contained revelry, where the space of the livable is deployed, outside any automatism. The part of choice present in suffering as in pleasure, along with their limits, comes to the fore.

It is crucial then not to misconstrue the variations in the use of the symptom, which can itself show its therapeutic side. To have as one's goal its «cure», even by means of some «psycho-» treatment, or aiming at well-being, health or the norm, all universally instituted on bases considered as «evident», will propel outside its field the consideration of a «pire», nevertheless indissolubly bound to the promotion of the *père* thus suggested.

Wherein lie the well-being, the health and the norm thus promised? What characterizes them is that they are impossible to define firmly for a subject. They suppose a sort of flight forward, an «ever more» that is easily surmised. And the disposition of the father, universally instituted to assure the good without the bad, is the matrix of all the modern totalitarianisms, publicly and widely experienced throughout the last century. The worst dictators, Lacan reminds us, never wanted anything but the good of their people, for which the one is identified to the all, at whatever price, according to the idea they had of it. This is also so for more particular coercions. The structure of the symptom, the singularity that can be extracted from it case by case, is what constitutes an obstacle to this destiny. It can be demonstrated for the symptom that its inherent contradiction, its crucial heterogeneity, its irreducibility to the One without uneliminable supplements cannot be neglected. Considerable damage results from such blindness, which flourishes out of what must well be called contemporary idyllism, which speculates on a cure that would be the cure from «there is no sexual relation». The symptom is only what treats it, what overcomes it, what gives it a place, or is even substituted to it, but without muting its real. There is reason to get used to not complaining, and not for the greater glory of God, about one's «calamitous past»⁸ nor about one's unpromising future, if not of the «return» of the worst.

The return is that of the real left at the door that comes back through the window. That is the worst that the one who wishes to «therapize the psychic»⁹ is incessantly reduced to, while omitting that it is not, unless symptomatically transmitted, approachable by that path. In the analytic experience, there is not only the treatment, but also the analyst, who has not to avoid the worst, but rather to take its place so as to deal with managing it.

These considerations on the father, the worst and the symptom clarify why this last is the sole path towards a solution. It is possible to aim at the worst in psychoanalysis, on condition that the politics of this be referred to the symptom and that it not ignore its reality by idealizing itself (by its depolitization). At the opening of the Seminar XX, *Encore*, Lacan brings to light that the «*je vous en prie*» of the formula of politeness is the other side of a not so pleasant «*je vous en pire*». When the prayer resounds, that is to say the demand that is presented as pure love, the worst cannot be excluded nor conjured, if the pacifying side of the symptom, the ethereal God-the-Father, goes too far in obliterating the pungent smells entombed in the depths of cellars. Even if the cellars are those of the Vatican!...

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

- ¹ T.N. A Lacanian neologism made up of the reflexive « s' » contraction of « se » and a verb « oupirer » derived from the name of his seminar : « ...ou pire » and producing an équivoque with the existing French verb « soupirer », meaning « to sigh ».
- ² J. Lacan, « Télévision », Autres Écrits, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 514.
- ³ T.N. This Lacanian neologism plays on « interprète » [the interpreter] and a potential homophony with « être preste » that is « to be nimble », the circumflex accent in « prêt » marking the deletion of an « s ».
- ⁴ Ibidem, p.545. T.N. Translation from the English edition of Television, W.W. Norton and Company. I will not attempt to comment on the assonance, homophony and rhyme in play here, but I'll give them to you raw : « De ce qui perdure de perte pure à ce qui ne parie que du père au pire ».
- ⁵ J. Lacan, Le Séminaire Livre XXIII Le Sinthome, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2005, p. 136.
- ⁶ J. Lacan, « ... ou pire », Autres Écrits, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 547.
- ⁷ T.N. « Manque-à-jour » formed with reference to the « manque-à-être » for which Lacan gave as its English equivalent : « want-to-be ».
- ⁸ J. Lacan, « Télévision », Autres Écrits, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 534
- ⁹ J. Lacan, « Clinique psychanalytique », Ornicar ?, n° 9, p.14, Lyse, Paris, April, 1977.

X like...

X, THE UNKNOWN FACTOR OF THE EQUATION • N. CHARRAUD

X : the Unknown of the Equation and the Name-of-the-Father

Nathalie Charraud

That the Name-of-the-Father can be the operator that puts an unknown into equation will not surprise us if we read the paternal metaphor itself as an equation permitting the solution of the X of the desire of the Mother in terms of signifiers.

The duality between known and unknown, which Descartes brings into evidence with the introduction of algebraic geometry, will guide us on to equations, and we will attempt to make explicit the homology between the theories of numbers and the theories of desire. In the course of Lacan's teaching, desire is first defined as reposing on metonymy, whose structure is that of the undefined sequence of *whole numbers*, in order subsequently to find its place in the partition of the *real numbers*, when Lacan articulates it to the question of *jouissance*. We are accustomed, since the *Seminar XX*, to associating the discrete sequence of whole numbers, or the indiscrete sequence of rational numbers, with the signifiers in order to attach the irrationals, inaccessible to the whole numbers in a simple way, to the register of the real. The title that was proposed to me for this article pertains to another partition of real numbers than that between rational and irrational numbers, and opens up a new mathematical approach to the question of desire and *jouissance*.

1) A LETTER FOR AN UNKNOWN

«And one can always reduce in this way all the unknown quantities to just one, whenever the Problem can be constructed by circles and straight lines, or again by conic sections, or even by any other line that be only one or two degrees more composed.»

It is in his text *Geometry* (1637) that Descartes so introduces his method of equations and unknowns to solve classical problems of geometry.

Why is the Unknown since then always attributed feminine gender in French¹?

It is because it refers to a «quantity» or a «line», and not to a number². The numbers we call real did not yet exist: Descartes' mysterious unknown cannot be measured, it is deduced, it is calculated in function of other magnitudes, the «knowns».

The French geometer introduced the symbolism of letters: the beginning of the alphabet, a,b,c,... refers to the constants, to the magnitudes supposed to be known, and we reserve the end of the alphabet z,y,x, for the unknowns. A typesetting problem was finally to give the preference to x: the French language using the y and the z more often, the x was available in greater numbers and thus prevailed in representing the unknown quantity.

The Unknown was thus written preferably as x for the establishment of equations.

«But I shall not stop to explain this to you in more detail, so as not to rob you of the pleasure of learning it yourself, and the utility of cultivating your mind by its exercise, which is in my opinion the most important thing one can get out of this science.»

He who wrote in his introduction (the «Discourse of the Method») «And I always had an extreme desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false, in order to see clear in my actions, and walk with assurance in this life» is considerate of his reader's pleasure, which will be greater if he finds for himself the unfolding of the demonstration rather than reading it passively, or even distractedly. The moment of birth, in this golden century, of this new geometry is thus accompanied by the profound satisfaction of the author. We can only believe him when he adds:

«That is why I will do no more than advise you that, if in untangling these Equations you do not fail to use all the divisions that are possible, you will infallibly arrive at the simplest terms to which the question can be reduced.»

In the same way Lacan, classical, wrote, at the time he was making of psychoanalysis a «French garden»: «It does not mean anything in particular, but it is articulated in chains of letters so rigorous that, unless one of them is botched, the non-known is ordained as the frame of knowledge.» (A.E. p. 249)

The non-known, an x , is ordained as intricately connected to the knowns a, b, c such as in the equation $ax+b=c$ for example.

But the letter feminizes at the place where it is inserted:

«For this sign is effectively that of the woman, because, through it, she highlights her being, by founding it outside the law, which restrains her always, by the effect of her origins, in the position of signifier, or even of fetish.» (É. P. 31)

Effectively, the solutions for equations of a higher degree are going to come up against more and more contentious questions, which will find some clarification in the round of the roots of Galois theory, after the equation $X^2+1=0$ had made possible the definition of the body of complexes by introducing $\sqrt{-1}$ (the root of -1). We know that the imaginary and powerful work at the symbolic level, which the unknown of $x^2+1=0$ had made necessary, a work that led to an extension of the notion of number, inspired Lacan in his approach to the subject. The subject of the unconscious is intimately bound to the subject of the *cogito*, but is not reduced to it; this is the lesson to be drawn from the passage of this equation to $\sqrt{-1}$ (the root of -1):

«It is what the subject lacks in order to think itself as exhausted by its *cogito*, that is to say, what is unthinkable in it» (É. p. 819). The mathematic transposition is here clear: the subject is not exhausted by the rational numbers (the terminology chosen by the mathematicians is, moreover, telling!), it is intimately bound to what other numbers represent, those introduced by equations than cannot be solved on the «body» of the rational numbers, called algebraic numbers.

2) THE PATERNAL METAPHOR, THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE PHALLUS AND WHAT TRANSCENDS THEM

Solving an equation makes it possible to pass from the introduction of an unknown to a number, or to a letter: this is also the case for example for the golden number, b , used by Lacan, which is the root of the equation $X^2+X-1=0$ and which verifies $1/b=1+b$.

The formula of the metaphor, such as Lacan wrote it in «La question préliminaire» («On a question prior to any treatment of psychosis»), is presented then as an equation, in which the x of the signified of the repressed signifier finds a solution by the effect of the metaphor that produces a signification s . (É. p.557)

Applied to the paternal metaphor, this solution is made through the Phallus, a positivized signifier of *jouissance*. The x of the signified of the desire of the mother finds its «solution» in this letter Φ

(Phi) defined as being produced by the Name-of-the-Father.

More generally, the unknown of an equation is on the side of the Father, and we remain in the field of the imaginary and the symbolic. The unknown of the paternal equation is transmuted into capital Φ (Phi) which, in «La signification du Phallus» («The Signification of the Phallus») for example, introduces to the semblant and the masquerade sexed images. Just as for $\sqrt{-1}$ once produced, the significations that proceed from it can be multiple and varied, unexpected with their effects of feminization specific to the letter according to Lacan.

But every number is not associated to the unknown of an equation and the numbers called «transcendent» are defined as eluding it. The number π (Pi) is one of them, which clearly illustrates the possible links between the imaginary (a number that triumphs in the circle and the sphere) and the real (inaccessible by the intermediary of an equation), such as Lacan evokes it in *Le Sinthome* (p. 21).

The real numbers, which constitute the continuum, are divided thus between those that are roots of an equation with whole number coefficients, and those that are transcendent, the latter being infinitely more numerous, or, more precisely, they have the power of the continuum, while the first form a countable set. What unifies the real numbers is not on the side of algebra (the solution of equations) but of calculus: any real number is the limit of a convergent sequence of rational numbers.

Every real number is not then the root of an equation: as for the numbers that can be approached *only* by a limit ad infinitum, which requires a «passage to the limit» that is beyond the phallic countable, Lacan made them symbols of the Other *jouissance*, the supplementary *jouissance* in the *Seminar XX*, the «transcendent» *jouissance* of the mystics, carried by the structure of the numbers of the same name. We can in this way exploit this more discriminating partition of the real numbers: the whole numbers and the rational numbers (signifier level), the algebraic numbers (phallic level) and the transcendent numbers (level of the Other than phallic). As for *jouissance*, this partition corresponds to these three levels: a signifierized *jouissance*, a phallicized *jouissance* and an Other *jouissance*.

The transcendent numbers, without numerals, excluded from equations, excluded from writing except for a few, can justly be considered as the cause of desire, such as it is defined by Lacan as the «small a», as exceeding precisely the Name-of-the-Father and phallic signification. Very few transcendent numbers are known, π (Pi), e , and a few others, while it is they that give to the real numbers their power of continuum. We can add to these few another letter: Lacan's «a», which by definition designated the «holes» in the symbolic identified to what is accessible to the metaphor, here again to equations. Lacan's small a, if it has a «numeric» essence, runs its course then outside the algebraic numbers, and it is fundamentally «transcendent».

Doesn't the theory of real numbers «realize», at the same time as it (un)veils it, the structure of desire, in this monstration of whole, algebraic and transcendent numbers.

Translation by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

¹ TN « L »Inconnue »

² TN « Quantité » and « ligne » are both feminine in French, while « nombre » is masculine.

Y like...

YAHVE • MR. MAUAS

Yahweh, Name-of-the-Father

Sin, heresy and separation

Marco Mauas

« QUESTION THE FATHER AT THE LEVEL OF THE REAL »

Lacan poses this question in his seminar of May 13, 1975, with reference to the original « *fiat lux* » of the Bible and to the name given to each animal of Paradise: « What does the naming of each species with a name that is a common noun represent? An assuredly symbolic naming, but limited to the symbolic. Is that enough for us to support the function of the Name-of-the-Father? Is the Father he who has given their names to things, or else must he be questioned at the level of the real?¹ Do we not have to knot the term of naming at the level of the circle whose real we support? » Questioning Yahweh at this level implies that we question its real effects: sin, heresy and separation. But it is a phrase pronounced by a specialist of the Cabala that has shown us that the effects of Yahweh, of the name of the god-Father and of his desire, are quite perceptible at the level of the community of those who « have dreamed » of being the cause of this desire².

1. AN UNPRONOUNCEABLE NAME

« ...father of the finder of the pfinder of the pfinder of the furst man »
« James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake*, 481.32

The name of God is *unpronounceable* for the Jew. The philologist Fabre d'Olivet (who compares the translations of the Bible to the grotesque statues of Silenus that, once opened, revealed within them the divinities of Olympus, and who reminds us that Plato applies the comparison to Socrates in *Symposium*) proposed an explication for this fact. If it were pronounced, it could be confused with a malediction, for « Yahweh » is written like « have » which is « a calamity, an existence of misfortune, and so is far from expressing the divine perfections I have mentioned. »

« Such is the reason, known or not, for which the Jewish people are not allowed to pronounce his name, and for which only writings without dots are authorized in the synagogue; for the pronunciation due to these dots alters in a certain manner the original signification of the words, and renders them unrecognizable. »³ In the beginning, then, the name was unpronounceable because of the equivoque: either the name of God or a calamity.

2. IF IT WERE PRONOUNCED...

« ...malchik! Gothgorod father godown followay tomollow the »
(*Finnegans Wake*, 565)

Nevertheless, if the name were pronounced, it would not be after all a heresy (kefir[†]). « In Judaism, it is very easy to be a sinner, and it is very difficult to be a heretic (kofer) », our interlocutor started to say... If this name (known as *shem hamephorash*, that is to say the explicit name, and also *tetragrammaton*, of four letters) were pronounced, it would not entail a heresy such as Spinoza's, but rather the creation of a *golem*. This theme was treated by Gershom Scholem in his *princeps* article « the idea of the golem in its telluric and magical relations »⁴ and this article inspired Borges in his marvelous poem « The Golem », in which he relates how the pronunciation of this name creates a being which, however, does not speak — that is to say that nothing is known of his *jouissance* — and on whose passing the rabbi's cat hides, terror-stricken. Gershom Scholem, in his research on this name of four *fundamental letters* in the medieval book (S-III-VI) *Ietzir[†]* or on Creation, relates these *fundamental letters* to the *stoicheon*. It is what Jacques Lacan situates in *lalangue* as the element, « the signifier One which is not just any signifier, because it is with reference to that place that the entire chain subsists. »⁵

3. TO BE A HERETIC, ON THE CONTRARY...

... To be a heretic in Judaism, you need to be Spinoza. « What was the cause of Spinoza's Herem? « If Spinoza was excommunicated, it is because he said it was possible for the creature, it was possible for man, to manage to conceive himself as God conceives creation. He did away with the incommensurable of the position of the father and humanity. » He did this « free from metaphor and myth ».

*« Free from metaphor and myth,
He shapes an arduous crystal; the infinite
Map of He who is all his stars »⁶*

He shaped it out of textual knowledge — and it is thus that he « encountered the Revelation »⁷ And there is a clear sign of this in his text on the Holy Scriptures, the « Theological-Political Treaty »⁸, when he writes that « there is no impiety » in upholding that the prophets have not entirely understood the Scriptures.⁹

4. THE DESIRE OF YAHWEH. SPINOZA, THE ONE WHO REDUCES.

Yahweh's very clear desire is what made of the Jewish people a people whose fate was marked¹⁰. Freud upholds that this mark is in a certain way indelible because this people, unlike the Christians, did not recognize the original crime of parricide¹¹. Spinoza, on the contrary, maintains that he is ready to accept the notion of « chosen people », on condition of reducing it to two points: the state and the commodities of the body. *For the rest, *no nation is chosen over the others*¹²*

5. TWO PATERNAL METAPHORS — ONE, UNPRONOUNCEABLE.¹³

In his course « Extimity »¹⁴, Jacques-Alain Miller distinguished two paternal metaphors in Lacan's teachings. The first substitutes the Name-of-the-Father to the signifier of the desire of the mother. The second substitutes to the jouissance of the desire of the mother, the impossible consistence of the Other. While the first is perfectly comprehensible, Miller remarks that the second is already present in the text « Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire... ». Isolating it thus provoked a great surprise in J.-A. Miller's course. Perhaps we can explain this surprise by asking: what is left of the Father in the second paternal metaphor? Why do we still call it « paternal »?

We can add that it is not fortuitously, but in a structured and coherent construction that in this same course, Jacques-Alain Miller situated what he calls the « Jewish position »—a position of separation. The unpronounceable metaphor is a sort of key to decipher the position of those who have to do with the desire of this God with the unpronounceable name. And, even though we do not there recognize the Father, he is present by his function. The second metaphor is paternal because it conserves the function of the father; moreover it is a reduction, a concentration of this function. What is the essence of the function concentrated there? The extraction of a jouissance.

6. A REDUNDANT YAHWEH AND ANOTHER LESS REDUNDANT.

The mathematician Gregory Chaitin explained what is meant when we speak of « extracting »¹⁵. « To extract » means « to compress », that is, « to extract redundancy ». The first paternal metaphor is the most redundant. The second comports a lesser redundancy. How can we know that the first metaphor is the most redundant. Because, by its operation it reduces the Other to the One. The reduction of the Other to the One is the maximal redundancy. The minimal reduction is the cliché, or generalized redundancy. The reduction of the Other to the One, as J.-A. Miller has shown¹⁶, is avoided if we consider that the empty set is always present in the place of the Other. It corresponds to the Cabalists' intuition when they called God « The Place ». God-Place is less redundant than God-One. It concentrates his function more adequately; there is room for the knot of the real. A lessening of redundancy that made the Cabala equivalent to a veritable theology in the absence of orthodoxy. The mystical sometimes opens up a path, when religion only adds redundancy.

The problem is then to know how to speak of the jealous, the Unique (not without others) Yahweh as non-One. Freud tried to with his « Moses », what he later called with a certain irony « a work of historical criticism »¹⁷. With the help of metaphor and myth, with reference to trauma, he infers the two, « two masses of people, two kingdoms...two names of God, two foundations of religion, two founders of religion, bearing the same name: Moses... »

7. YAHWEH WITH MINIMUM REDUNDANCY: THE BIBLE HAS 600 000 FACES.

Freud's two is less redundant than the One, and the Cabala reduced the redundancy by speaking of the Torah as infinite meanings of the divine word: the 70 faces of the Torah, and the possible number of readings, equal to the six hundred thousand that were present at the foot of Mount Sinaï, that is, one Torah for each.¹⁸ Perhaps we have there the response to Gershom Scholem's question: « What is the secret of the prodigious success of the Cabala among our people? »: « How did it achieve to become a decisive factor in our history, to determine its destiny and model the life of a great number of Jews, while its contemporary, Jewish rational philosophy, was incapable of attaining the spiritual hegemony it was searching for with so great ardor? »

Effectively, if « the Name-of-the-Father is the worst and the best of symptoms, since it is much more commonplace than the others », as J.A. Miller indicates at Arcachon,¹⁹ a theology with reference to the letter of Yahweh — the Cabala — more popular and less commonplace, brings within the scope of Yahweh-He-She (in the Cabala, Yahweh is sometimes She) the way the Law is deficient for each one.

8. Heresy and structural herem .

« ...of Delude of Isreal, which is Haraharem and the diublin's owld »
(Finnegans Wake, 331.16)

Perhaps Josef Dan, in this almost casual remark — « *in Judaïsm it is very easy to be a sinner, and very difficult to be a heretic. To be a heretic one has to be Spinoza* » touched incidentally on something Lacan insists on concerning Spinoza in the Seminar XI. He is a « Jew detached from his tradition » (he says from his tradition, not from his Judaism²⁰): « ...a unique position by which the philosopher is amalgamated to a transcendent love ». He withdrew serenely from human desire, having reduced the field of God to the universality of the signifier.

A jealous and « ferociously ignorant »²¹ God, Yahweh determines a particular relation to heresy and to the heretic that can be situated in the crystal of the language. The « Kofer », the heretic, is designated by the same word that designates the gage, the payment, the redemption. The Greco-Latin term « heresy » has another origin, « hairesis » or « election ». The Christian heretic has « chosen », while the Jewish heretic, on the contrary, being an « already chosen » puts himself in the position of « gage » of the community. For the Hebrew, the term « Herem » indicates both what is consecrated to God (Leviticus, 27, 28) and what is anathematized (Leviticus, 27, 29), as well as what is repudiated (Deuteronomy, 7, 26). The Herem would then be the result of a « structural realism », of the position of the « chosen ». « There is the Jew » is equivalent to « There is the gage of the desire to know, the Herem. » It is the expulsion, the foreclosure.

The Jew lacks the Borromean protection of the Trinity, and he must confront either the *Herem of the Kofer*, or « being chosen by this marked desire ». This is how we understand Joseph Dan's remark. We can add that Joyce's interest for the Jews²² is perhaps not unrelated to his perception of the « foreclosure in fact »²³ of the effective deficit of his father. This is why Lacan says (*Autres écrits*, p. 588) that the « existence »²⁴ of the Jews constitutes the intersection point of three major factors: the function attributed by Freud to Societies, the Oedipal dialectic, the real of the concentration camp.

An « existential » intersection point: one more tour of Spinoza's geometry? The Borromean knot, according to Lacan, is a new *mos geometricus*.

Translated by Thelma Sowley

Footnotes

- ¹ J. Lacan, Le Séminaire, lesson of May 13 1975, published in *Ornicar* ?, 1975, p. 57.
- ² J.-A., Miller Le neveu de Lacan, Paris, Verdier, 2003, p. 212.
- ³ Fabre d'Olivet : *The Hebraic Tongue Restored* (1815), Samuel Weiser, New York, 1978, p. 69.
- ⁴ Gershom Scholem, «L'idée du Golem dans ses rapports telluriques et magiques», *La Kabbale et sa symbolique*, Payot, Paris, 1966.
- ⁵ J. Lacan, Le Séminaire, livre XX, *Encore*, Paris, Seuil. Texte established by Jacques-Alain Miller, XI, 3.
- ⁶ J.L. Borges, «Spinoza», («The Other, the Same», 1964).
- ⁷ J. Lacan, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 250. Eric Laurent pointed out in 1993 that J.-A. Miller had invited us to recognize Spinoza in this phrase of Lacan's.
- ⁸ «Salva pietate» – Spinoza, TTP, chap. II, 37.
- ⁹ J. Lacan, Le Séminaire, « La logique du fantasme », lesson of 25 janvier 1967, unpublished.
- ¹⁰ S. Freud *Moses and Monotheistic religions*, (1939), Gallimard, Paris, 1986.
- ¹¹ *loc. cit.*
- ¹² Spinoza, TTP, chap. III, «De hebraeum vocatione».
- ¹³ J. Lacan, *Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 819 : « It is as such unpronounceable, but not its operation ...» Cf. J.-A. Miller, cours du 27.11.1991 (*La nature des semblants*) : « Le nom propre est un signifiant de l'Autre barré » [S(A barré)]
- ¹⁴ Miller J.-A., *Extimité*, cours des 22 et 29 janvier 1986, version non révisée par l'auteur.
- ¹⁵ Chaitin G., *Irreducible complexity in pure mathematics*, <http://www.umcs.maine.edu/~chaitin/>
- ¹⁶ Miller J.-A., *Extimité*, course of June 18, 1986, unpublished and not reviewed by the author
- ¹⁷ *Lettre à Zweig*.
- ¹⁸ Gershom Scholem, *Les grandes tendances de la mystique juive*, (1941), Buenos Aires, FCE, 1993.
- ¹⁹ *La Conversation d'Arcachon*, Seuil, *Agalma*, 1997, p. 281.
- ²⁰ J. Lacan, *Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, Paris, Seuil, 1973, lesson of June 24, 1964.
- ²¹ J. Lacan, Le Séminaire, livre XVII, *L'envers de la psychanalyse*, Paris, Seuil, 1991, chap. IX.
- ²² . «I sometimes think, he said later to Frank Budgen, that it was a heroic sacrifice on their part [the Jews] when they refused the Christian revelation. Look at them. They are better husbands than we are, better fathers, and better sons.» Richard Ellman, James Joyce, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.373.
- ²³ J. Lacan, Le Séminaire, livre XXIII, *Le Sinthome*, Paris, Seuil, 2005, p. 89 (V).
- ²⁴ Lacan J., Le Séminaire, livre XXIII, *Le Sinthome*, lesson of December 9, 1975 : «Le nœud est fait dans l'esprit d'un nouveau mos geometricus.»

Z like...

ZAZIE • C. LAZARUS-MATET
ZEN • J.L. GAULT

Zazie and the Name-of-the-Father

Catherine Lazarus-Matet

We must take into account a double disappearance in connection with *Zazie in the Metro*. In the February 11, 1959 lesson of his Seminar, at the end of his development of the dream discussed by Ella Sharp, Lacan has recourse to Queneau to illustrate that it is possible to conceal the essential, here in this lesson, the phallus.: «Very recently a man of talent, Raymond Queneau, wrote as an epigraph to a very delightful book, *Zazie dans le metro*: ‘The one who has done this has carefully dissimulated his design».

Lacan perceived that, with this quotation from Aristotle, Raymond Queneau puts us on the trail of what he had obliterated in a plot for which, and this is really surprising, a number of commentators had simply doubled the effacement by seeing in the story nothing but a very determined little girl who goes through Paris during a metro strike. The epigraph was occulted and the metro eradicated. Queneau was right to put Zazie on her guard. Zazie, «essméfie»¹. It is true that she is on her guard in face of everything that is said, and everything she sees. Between her all-embracing distrust and her famous «my ass!», she marches forward in a world in which the sexual object is everywhere present, where «essméfie», where she distrusts semblants and has no illusions about the grandeur of civilization. Someone should have been inquisitive about her great interest in the metro and the fact that she is inside it even though she should not have been able to get in!

One commentary, fortunately, opens the gate. That of feminine cynicism, that is to say the paradigmatic version of the feminine hostility towards semblants that Jacques-Alain Miller read into Zazie and developed in his course on «The Nature of Semblants» (1991-92, unpublished).

Zazie punctuates with a «my ass!» everything that is displayed to her as a product of sublimation. There is sex at every turn. And Zazie never stops questioning, commenting, looking for what each of us represses or keeps silent, in the underground territory of her personal metro. Laverdure, the parrot, with his «You talk, you talk, that’s all you know how to do» underlines the uselessness of all the verbiage, including Zazie’s.

Nevertheless isn’t Zazie’s cynicism itself a semblant, since everything is semblant, even if Zazie is looking for something closer to *jouissance* than to sublimation? There is a place of desire, the metro. It is the place of the sublime. And a coveted object, the «bloudjinnes» (blue-jeans) thanks to which she will longer be dressed in a skirt, like a girl. The metro is closed. She is ready to appropriate the jeans. A true Freudian girl, in short, who is in want, who veils and preserves, for herself, the phallic semblants.

Deprived of the metro, she finds around her, with the help of a taxi driver, the means to accede to the place of the sexual relation: «...well, the taxi drivers was suppozte see all kinds and all sorts of seshuality». The way she has of not believing in anything other than the expression of «seshuality», her insatiable curiosity sniffs out the complex in the one who is shocked by what she says, or on the contrary the vice in the man who treats her like a little girl. The only issue is sexual. The organ is omnipresent. There is always a veil to lift, a lie of the signified to be denounced. Whatever the mode of enunciation of each character (the novel swarms with different styles, from the metaphoric speech of Gabriel, the transvestite, to Zazie’s phonetic utterances). But Zazie knows that the shocked as well as the considerate think of nothing else except ass. That’s what her father did.

Which is why the imp is interested in Uncle Gabriel’s «hormoseshuality». He is the only one that Zazie’s mother knows her daughter is safe with. Because her mother has killed her father with an axe. He drank a lot — which made him mean — because his wife didn’t love him. But when he wanted to go for Zazie, she killed him. Then she had another man who also ogled the child. She left him. Zazie makes this commentary: «So mommy said like that she couldn’t kill them all (...)» She has a sense of morals. The mother, crazy about a third man, confides her daughter to Gabriel. Zazie is constantly

asking what a homosexual is and that someone prove to her he's not a man like the others. Just like Lacan, she knows that the human being is «homosexual», that is, hetero, just because he talks (cf. «L'Étourdit», 1972, *Autres Écrits*; Paris; Seuil; 2001, p. 467). And precisely, Lacan, at the bottom of this page, cites Laverdure with respect to the unconscious structured like a language: «...they talk, they talk but that's all they know how to do».

Zazie's distrust of semblants can be imputed, as J.-A. Miller indicates for women, to a friend from the real. The ideals of culture, Napoleon and company, are worth nothing in face of the proof she demands that there is something other than just sex. She believes in certain values: what is done and what is not done. But this is always idealized, beyond the limits of what is. She believes in love, in respect, in ties to others, even if everything is smut (love) or poppycock (fairy tales). She wants to know if she is attractive. «You're just a kid» she's told. «My breasts are growing», she says». So she is a woman, no mistaking that. The paternal metaphor cannot operate for her from the standpoint of the paternal law but from that of the maternal guarantee. Her mother knows what to do to avoid that a man, a potential satyr, touch her daughter: he must be either dead or homosexual, or at a good distance. If not, careful.

Zazie demands respect, while belittling the most proper behavior. A little more sublimation, hang it! In his seminar «L'Éthique de la psychanalyse», Lacan speaks about the paradoxes of sublimation under the title «a curiosity of sublimation»: «Sublimation is not, in effect, what a vain people thinks and does not always practice in the sense of the sublime. The change of object does not forcibly cause the sexual object to disappear, far from that. The sexual object, called attention to as such, can be brought to light through sublimation. The crudest sexual play can be the object of poetry, without poetry's at all losing its sublimating goal» (Séminaire, Livre VII, Paris, Seuil, p. 191). If these words can be applied to an example of courtly poetry, the sublimating objective is present in Queneau. Is it also present in Zazie?

It's not just because the metro is for her the sign that humanity has created means of transportation that are more useful to the collectivity. Isn't such a resounding denunciation of semblants just a surface cynicism? Zazie is trying to find, by her infinite questions, who might be able to open up a more worthy world. Wouldn't feminine cynicism be the most undisguised call for an effort for the humanization of the relations between the sexes? What Zazie the non-dupe's urban poetry says is that if there is nothing to veil the sexual non-relation, everything is reduced to the exercise of the drive. What's more, she wants to be a schoolteacher to «faire chier»² generations of children, and even Martians.

Feminine proximity with the real of *jouissance* creates an unexpected kinship between Zazie and a contemporary symptom of subjective distress that we are unfortunately confronted with today, a symptom denounced by young women, those of the organization «Ni putes, ni soumises» («Neither whores, nor submissive»), who suffer in their being, their flesh and their life the real of a barbarian *jouissance*. Zazie knows that the relation to the other can push people to crime. The poetic fruit of Queneau, a paper character, has left its place to the sinister reality of lawless phallic exercise. The metro of the XXIst century, the dehumanized worlds of the ghettos of our isolated urban zones, has created a demand for respect that is not only the fact of a structural outrage, of the feminine lack. The civilizing value of sublimation is called for by these young women who ask to find a way out of the alternative they have been trapped in: either «whores» if they are free, or pure if they are submitted to the law of their fathers and brothers. That is the way their manifest expresses it. Zazie's crude denunciation of semblants is there then for a counter-Zazie, for more semblants, a more elegant universe, in the sense of Balzac's definition in the *Traité de la vie élégante*: «It's an exquisite tact whose constant exercise alone can make us suddenly discover relations, foresee consequences, estimate the place or the importance of objects, words, ideas and persons....A lofty thought of order and harmony destined to impart poetry to things». These women denounce the semblants of the law of men and are sustained by a modality of the Name-of-the-father with a collective and social goal, which they had to invent by associating their own names, against cynicism. The cynicism of men this time. That marks the difference with respect to Zazie who gauges culture by the standard of the anal object, while these other women demand a civilizing effort from a-cultured men.

These women and Zazie «essméfient», not for the same reasons but with the same objective, that sexuality be written in veiled and civilized terms, even if, as Diderot has put it, responding in a realist and inelegant manner to feminine cynicism: «There's a bit of testicle at the bottom of our most sublime sentiments and our most refined tenderness» (*Les bijoux indiscrets*, Paris, Gallimard, 1982). The one who wrote this did not dissimulate his design.

Footnotes

- ¹ TN A contraction of « elle se méfie », « she is on her guard ». This contraction is entirely credible for rapid informal speech in certain dialects of French. The comic effect that Queneau obtains here depends on his rendering of this phonetic contraction in writing, that is, in letters.
- ² Literally « to make shit », an idiom that can be translated by « harass » or any figurative synonym to be found of « harass » : bug, hassle, drive nuts, give a hard time to ; but it also means « bore ».

Zen and Name-of-the-Father

Jean-Louis Gault

At the end of the year 1953, Lacan set out to give his seminar on *Freud's technical writings*. He wanted his listeners to get acquainted to the art of dialogue which this new interlocution practice initiated by Freud required, and to follow its technique. At that precise moment, psychoanalysts were trying to determine the appropriate technique which would best meet the objectives of the analytical treatment. Did it have anything to do with making the unconscious conscious, as Freud initially taught it, or should resistances be suppressed, as the supporters of the new technique advocated? To systematize technique and to conceive standard procedures were indeed very tempting.

Lacan got out from these misleading issues and started looking far beyond psychoanalysis, towards the remote Orient. Then he turned to the Zen (1) tradition practiced by Buddhist masters. In Japan, in the Zen monasteries of the *rinzai* sect, times of collective meditation alternate with moments when master and pupil meet face to face. As a rule, these sessions take place twice a day, one in the morning and one in the evening. Once a year, during the week that commemorates the awakening of Buddha *Çakyamuni*, there are four sessions a day. During the session, the master presents a *kôan* to the young monk.

The *kôan* is a problem to which the pupil must find a solution. It may be formulated as a simple question, and may also consist in either a paradoxical or enigmatic anecdote which the novice must solve. The monk is supposed to bring the appropriate answer at the next session. Most of the time, the disciple and his answer are greeted by a sarcasm, a kick or anything else, and he is offered to come back later. The way may be long before the novice finds an answer to the *kôan*. He will then be proposed another one and this is through progressing on the way that he will become an accomplished Buddhist monk.

Lacan had realized, when he was experiencing with his short sessions, that his process had something to do with the *kôan*(2) technique. While rejecting the extreme aspects that this technique involves, he insisted on a discreet application of its principle in the analytical dialogue. The implementation of this technique has a precise dialectical meaning. The answer the pupil must find out does not exist as a ready made one, as a constituted whole apart from him: the master's abrupt interruptions aim at the organized discourse through which the pupil seeks the solution, so as to make him discover on his own the answer which is his. In psychoanalysis, according to Lacan's formula, the practice of the short session «breaks up wording to give birth to speech» so that while seeking truth, the subject is building himself up. What is at stake is to tear the veil of imaginary certitudes embedded in the conscious talk, and to restore the subject in a position from which he will find access to his being.

The Zen practice is a liberating path which can be achieved by an esoteric initiation and which is transmitted from master to disciple. It is a wisdom, namely a knowledge on «jouissance» and its treatment. It is part of the Buddhist doctrine which teaches that each human existence encloses four fundamental verities.

1. There is suffering, also called *dukkha* in Sanskrit. Life is pain and suffering. There is an «it is suffering», namely a primary «it is enjoying».
2. The cause of this suffering lies in all the forms of desire and in the very quest for «jouissance».
3. *Nirvana* appears as a possible liberation from the suffering caused by existence.
4. Ultimately, there is a way, taught by Buddha, that leads to the *nirvana* and the ceasing of this «jouissance».

In Zen Buddhism, the ascetism of both meditation and the *kôan* practice goes along with a discipline of the body and a renunciation of the thinking activity which Lacan interprets as a castration (3). The master spares no stick stroke to achieve this goal.

Japanese Zen is the heir to Chinese *chan*. It appeared in the archipelago at the end of the XII th century. *Chan* results from a graft of the reformed Indian Buddhism, the Mahayana (4), on a Chinese Taoist root. Orthodox Buddhism, called Théravada, was born in northern India in the VI th century before Christ. Considered as a heresy of Brahmanism, it teaches that everyone, following their own individual way, can achieve awakening. In reaction to this elitist conception, Mahayana asserts that there can't be any real salvation if it is only reserved for a few people. To the ideal of the saint who is entirely absorbed in his personal *nirvana*, it opposes the *bodhisattva* figure who, having reached the verge of *nirvana*, refuses to engage in it so that he may save all those he has left behind him. This compassion figure is constantly present in Japanese Buddhist temples.

Zen sects conquered the Japanese military aristocracy which ruled the country during several centuries and within which a warrior ethics developed. Only could the atomic fire force it to surrender. At the same period, Zen monks formed an intellectual, highly influential elite which infused the Japanese culture through the works of its architects, sculptors, painters, poets, playwrights and mystics. Painting and poetry masters were Zen monks.

As regards the Freudian Oedipus myth, it just transferred to the father the privileges which, in religion, were only granted to God the Father. The Oedipus complex is a kind of private monotheism and the status allotted to the father is the continuation at an individual level of the reign of the One, initiated by the religion of the unique God. This analysis incites us to examine the traditions which have not experienced the empire of the One(5). In Mahayana, the figure of the historical Buddha disappears in the countless Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* who emerged in the course of history. In one of his preaches, the *Chan* master Lin-Tsi studied this dialectic of the One and the multiple. He had chased away one of his listeners who, trying to make things difficult for him, asked him the following question: « In the great Compassionate (*Bodhisattva*) with the thousands hands and eyes, which one is the real one?» According to the master, this question is misleading since the one and the multiple intertwine, as the sutra formula of The flower garland indicates : « One is in all» .

Ten years after his first reference, during a lecture of his seminar on « Anxiety»(7), Lacan came back to Zen. He had just returned from Japan and he mentioned his encounter with the great Buddhist statuary. While visiting a temple, he stopped short at the sight of a devoutness scene of a kneeling man who was praying at the feet of a *bodhisattva* statue.

This temple seems to echo another temple to which Lacan takes us on the year of his seminar on «*Psychosis*»(8). He was then busy formalizing the Freudian doctrine of the father and had set to explain that the name of the father operated as a padding stitch. At that very stage, we follow him into the temple of Solomon with the first scene of *Athalie*, by Racine. Abner, the officer, introduces himself to Joad, the great priest, with the following verse: «Yes I have come to His temple to adore Eternal God», eventually telling him about his fears due to *Athalie*'s menaces to the temple. To which Joad replies he fears nothing : «Dear Abner, I fear God, and I have no other fears.» What struck Lacan was the sudden presence of the signifier «the fear of God». It is opposed to the «fear of gods» which haunted the pagan world of antiquity. The fear of the unique God ends all other fears. It is a stopping point, in which Lacan perceived the process that gives its function to the name of the father in the elaboration of the Freudian edifice.

A few year later, leaving the temple of Jerusalem, we move to the temple of *chuguji* in Nara. Not only has the scenery changed but also the entire construction that goes with it. Lacan had seen the limits of the name of the father and more particularly its inability to curb anxiety. Then, as he was about to work on anxiety, Lacan saw a new perspective ahead of him. It appeared to him that the God of monotheism had another face. This was no longer the God that suppressed all fears, it was from then on the God of wickedness who claimed a pound of our flesh to make up for the debt (9).

The Freudian conception, as formalized by Lacan until then, led him to identify desire with Law, as incarnated by the name of the father. The Buddhist experience of divinity opens a new way to desire.

By denouncing the illusion of desire, Buddhism says that the object desire places ahead of it and which it pursues is nothing but a mirage. The real object which is really at stake in desire is beyond desire and may be grasped within the deity contemplation experience.

With the Buddhist image, the subject does not face the presence of a unique God who rules over desire. The *bodhisattva* statue is not an almighty one, neither is it a supreme Being, nor an eternal God. It is an object, the cause of a long lasting desire which is addressed to it. The drawing of its eyes makes it especially noticeable :it is reduced to a sharp crest which gives it a downward gaze, in accordance with its Sanskrit name *Avalokiteçvara*, where *avalokita* means «that turns the gaze down» . In the course of centuries, the eye slit worn off with the nuns' daily massages to wipe the tears of the one who cries for the suffering ones. With its eyes turned towards the invisible, this Buddhist figure preserves within itself the scope of the hidden eye (11) which stirs the desire of looking.

This statue has another remarkable aspect. It represents a feminine deity but it has masculine features and faced to it, the faithful are left with the unanswered question of her sex. With its lowered eyelids, it protects us from the fascination of the look which might be a source of anxiety and, because of its psychological ambiguity, it suspends the mystery of castration. The contemplation scene of this Buddhist deity enabled a new theoretical opening in Lacan' s elaboration. By breaking up the uniqueness cage of the name of the father, it allowed to get over the deadlock of the castration anxiety, and it disclosed an object : the gaze, which is not submitted to the Oedipus law. Likewise, Lacan started questioning the uniqueness of the name of the father. This is what he attempted to do the following year with the interrupted seminar « Names of the father» (12).

Zen Buddhism presents two aspects which were successively favoured by Lacan. As an initiation, it is placed under the dimension sign of the One, whereby the master guides the novice on his quest for truth. Initially, this is this orientation that Lacan was interested in, at a time when he was himself placing the direction of the cure in the sphere of truth. Besides, another specificity of Zen is its extension to the overall aspects of social life and its participation in the development of creation. Lacan explored this register when he started his work on anxiety.

Through its works of art, Zen Buddhism fosters an aesthetic experience whereby the subject, in his relationship to the deity, is introduced to a dimension of desire which is no longer submitted to the jurisdiction of the One.

Footnotes

- 1 Lacan J., Les Ecrits techniques de Freud, Seuil, 1975, p.7
- 2 Lacan J., Ecrits, Seuil, 1996, p. 315-316
- 3 Lacan J., Encore, Seuil, 1975, p. 104
- 4 One of the founding texts of the Mahayana is «The lotus of the real law», which Lacan studied with Paul Demiéville (*L'angoisse* p. 261)
- 5 Miller J.A, Le neveu de Lacan, Verdier 2003, p.257 (December 11,1991 lecture of the course on *De la nature des semblants*) : « Some traditions have eluded the Name of the Father. Buddhism, for example, is ruled by a multiple divine which is irreducible to unity.»
- 6 Discussions with Lin-Tsi, translated from Chinese by P. Demiéville, Fayard, 1977, p. 29
- 7 Lacan J., *L'angoisse*, Seuil, 2004, p. 247
- 8 Lacan J., *Les psychoses*, Seuil, 1981, p.298
- 9 Lacan J., *L'angoisse*, Seuil, 2004, p. 255
- 10 id., p.312
- 11 id., p.279
- 12 Lacan J., *Des Noms du Père*, Seuil 2005

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