

# ON THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ANALYST IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SITUATION

## A Contribution to the Theory of Psychoanalytic Treatment<sup>1</sup>

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*"... the search for truth is more  
precious than its possession."*

—EINSTEIN QUOTING LESSING (10)

### INTRODUCTION

One might venture the guess that to the future historian of science one of the most intriguing features of the present era of psychoanalysis might lie in the following paradox: that while psychoanalysis, both as theory and practice, represents the most advanced form of current thought regarding psychological growth and human relationships, there is, at the same time, considerable vagueness and disagreement among workers as to what constitute the characteristic operations of this science. If we view this state of affairs in the light of the history of other sciences, particularly mathematics and physics, we find that the problem in psychoanalysis—as sketched above—has no parallel in the evolution of those sciences. Indeed, it is well known that in the natural sciences, a precise definition (description) of the scope and mode of opera-

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tions of a particular discipline has either preceded or has developed concurrently with the increasing theoretical grasp of the subject matter in question. Why psychoanalysis has taken a different course in its development (at least up to the present time) is an interesting problem but one with which we will not be concerned in this paper.

Agreement among workers about the identity of a branch of science (assuming that such agreement is sincerely desired) depends above all on an *adequate* isolation and description of the significant operations and concepts of that science. With respect to psychoanalysis, such work is as yet incomplete. What we do have includes an adequate isolation of the nature of the interaction between analyst and analysand together with much data on the experiences of one of the participants (i.e., the patient). In addition, we also have some rather fragmentary bits of description, opinion and recommendation about the behavior of the analyst in the situation. Accordingly, what we sorely miss—it seems to me—is an adequate account of the analyst's experiences in the psychoanalytic situation; an account which in scope as well as depth would be comparable to our knowledge of the experiences of the patient in the same situation (e.g., the transference neurosis, working through, etc.). The two sets of experiences—those of the analyst together with those of the patient—taken jointly would furnish that complementary picture without which an unambiguous identification of the precise nature of analysis does not seem possible (7, 8.).

We might note at the outset that this subject is by no means unexplored or unappreciated by analysts (30). Previous considerations of the analyst's position vis-à-vis the patient permit two generalizations about the points of view from which this matter has been approached. First, there is the comparison of the analytic situation with the relationship between parent and child. Like most of our ideas about analysis, this one too originates with Freud and was taken over by others. Adherence to this analogic model puts a certain bias on one's picture of the nature of the interaction between analyst and analysand and this bias should be made explicit. The second generalization can be stated as follows: the

analyst's behavior is scrutinized from the point of view of what is wrong with it. Accordingly, those features of the analyst's experiences occupy the center of attention which are undesirable for the work of analysis. As a result the analyst's position becomes defined in a primarily negative way, that is by making explicit those aspirations and actions which preferably he should not have.<sup>3</sup>

While the subject matter of this paper is clearly a familiar one, I hope to contribute to our understanding of it by examining it from what I think is a new point of view. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to attempt to ascertain the nature of the analyst's experience in the psychoanalytic situation—not in terms of technical errors or of undesirable countertransference—but rather in terms of the irreducible and unavoidable satisfactions which constitute the "realistic" counterpart in the analyst of the experiences of the analysand. I would like to suggest that we go as far as to regard these experiences of the analyst as complementing those of the patient, and that we regard the two together as the ultimate *raison d'être* of analysis as a method of treatment and as a profession. Finally, I will devote some attention to a discussion of the possible motives which may play a role in the persistent belief in the essential nongratification of the analyst in the psychoanalytic situation.

#### COMMENTS ON PREVIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS

There are countless references in our literature to various aspects of the analyst's feelings, thoughts or overt behavior which are considered undesirable for the proper progress of analytic work. I will make no attempt to review them. Instead, I will restrict myself to commenting about the few contributions which have dealt with our subject more explicitly. They include papers by Ella Sharpe (37, 38), Barbara Low (28), and Alice and Michael Balint (2, 3). These authors stand practically alone in emphasizing

<sup>3</sup> For a long time a similar bias characterized the psychoanalytic approach to the activity of the analysand: the very notion of "resistance" (valuable as it was for both theory and practice) betrays the analyst's preoccupation with what the patient ought not do. Increasing interest in ego psychology, however, has tended to attract attention also to those features of the analysand's behavior which are necessary and appropriate for the work of analysis.

that the analyst derives gratifications from his work which are neither "altruistic" nor based on countertransferences.<sup>4</sup> In addition to these, two papers by Fliess (14, 15) are devoted to an explicit consideration of the psychological nature of the work of the analyst and are of importance to us for that reason.

In her first lecture on "The Technique of Psycho-Analysis" (1930), Sharpe discusses the necessary qualifications for analytic work. She makes only some passing comments on what the analyst "gets" out of his work. She cautions us that, "We do well to know the deep-seated gratification that we get from the work, in order that deep-lying anxieties may be recognized and resolved in their true connections and not superficially explained" (38, p. 16).

It is in her paper, "The Psycho-Analyst," published shortly after her death in 1947, that she presents a more comprehensive survey of the nature of the analyst's work and the essential gratifications derived from it:

The ability of the psycho-analyst to analyze is what is required of him. If he can do this, and the patient is rehabilitated, the psycho-analyst can take credit to himself for setting in motion curative processes within the patient. He cannot claim credit for those processes themselves [37, p. 114].

The desire to cure, educate and reform, useful and valuable enough when employed in certain environments with specific people, is not the motivating power that produces the most efficient psycho-analyst. Cure and re-education, or, stated more analytically, psychical readjustment, happens as a result of the analytical process. It does not occur because of the analyst's desire to cure and reform, but because of his understanding and ability to deal with his patient's psychical mechanisms, i.e. repression, transference and the many forms of ego resistance [37, p. 116].

Sharpe is not satisfied with calling attention to motives and attitudes in the analyst which are undesirable, but goes on to

<sup>4</sup> It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the two analysts who have been most forthright in pointing out the unavoidable and important psychological gratifications which the analyst derives from his work were both lay (i.e., nonmedical) analysts (Sharpe and Low). This can hardly be an "accident." I believe it is consistent with the thesis, which I will discuss later, that the medical profession (in common with other authority groups) has a long tradition of denying its own satisfactions and emphasizing its altruistic motives.

describe the experiences of the analyst, not as they ought or ought not to be but as they are in actual fact.

We deceive ourselves if we think we have no counter-transferences.<sup>5</sup> It is its nature that matters. We can hardly hope to carry on an analysis unless our own counter-transference is healthy; that healthiness depends upon the nature of the satisfactions we obtain from the work, the deep unconscious satisfactions that lie behind the reality ones of earning a living, and the hope of effecting cures [37, p. 117].

The satisfactions which she then describes can be summed up as follows: (1) The pleasure obtained from listening to the patient's unclear complaints, due to the power and ability to interpret and thus make sense out of what is at first confusing. ("His pleasure is not in hearing the cry but in bringing comprehension and explanation" [37, p. 121].) (2) "Nor need we separate the analyst's pleasure in listening from the mastery of the dreads of his own infancy" (37, p. 121). That is, satisfactions obtained by virtue of achieving mastery over one's own anxieties by the working through of conflicts in the patient similar to one's own. (3) Sublimated sexual curiosity. We might include under this heading (though Sharpe mentions it in another connection) that each analysis is a venture in making a new discovery. ("A new patient will present a new field of discovery rather than an opportunity for application of acquired knowledge, or a repetition of a crystallized technique" [37, p. 112].) (4) Enrichment of the ego by contact with many diverse personalities. ("While our task lies primarily with the unconscious mind of the patient, I personally find the enrichment of my ego through the experiences of other people not the least of my satisfactions. From the limited confines of an individual life, limited in time and space and environment, I experience a rich variety of living through my work" [37, p. 122].)

Barbara Low in her paper, "The Psychological Compensations of the Analyst" (1935), comments on several types of emotional gratifications which the analyst may—but ought not—derive from

<sup>5</sup> It is clear that Sharpe uses the term "countertransference" here not as a phenomenon analogous to transference, but rather as denoting the sum total of the analyst's attitude toward his patient (irrespective of which facets of his attitude constitute the analyst's transference to the patient and which do not).

his work with patients, and then turns to a consideration of what may be thought of as the legitimate psychological satisfaction inherent in analyzing. Her main thesis regarding this matter is that the satisfactions of the analyst are akin to those of the artist. Her views are summed up in the following lines:

To take the introjected material and bring to bear upon it law, order, and unity, is the method whereby unconscious urges are satisfied: to project it again in new form gratifies sublimated desires. This is the work of the artist and scientist, and so must it be the work of the analyst [28, p. 7].

There appears to be little with which one can disagree in Low's essay. The chief weakness of her thesis, in my view, lies in its generality. There is no mention in her paper of those psychological elements which are satisfying and which are at the same time more or less specific for the work of the analyst.

Alice and Michael Balint (2) in their paper "On Transference and Countertransference" call attention to the importance of the emotional satisfactions of the analyst from analyzing, but do not make explicit what these satisfactions are. Their comments are of interest partly because their style betrays that they too must have felt, as late as 1939, that the notion of the analyst experiencing *bona fide* satisfactions in his work is somehow repudiated in our theory. They wrote:

We have not forgotten, of course, that our technique has first to comply with the objective demands of our work and naturally cannot be only an outlet for the emotions of the analyst. Viewed from the standpoint of the mental economy of the analyst, each technique has to cope with these two different tasks. The objective task demands that a patient analysed in any of the many individual ways shall learn to know his own unconscious mind and not that of his analyst. The subjective task demands that analysing shall not be too heavy an emotional burden, that the individual variety of technique shall procure sufficient emotional outlet for the analyst [2, pp. 219-220].

[And they conclude this paper as follows:] . . . the analyst must be required to make himself conscious of every emotional gratification brought about by his individual tech-

nique, in order that he may obtain a better control over his behavior—and over his theoretical convictions. Every advance in psycho-analysis has had to be paid for by an ever-increasing conscious control over the investigator's emotional life. We believe that our technique can be still further improved, if we are able to bear still further conscious control over our everyday analytical behavior. [2, p. 220].

In a more recent paper (1949), Michael Balint comments again that the analytic relationship depends on "how much and what kind of satisfaction is needed by the patient on the one hand, and by the analyst on the other, to keep the tension in the psycho-analytical situation at or near the optimal level" (3, p. 231).

Two papers by Fliess are also of importance in connection with this subject. In these papers, the author undertakes an examination of the psychological functioning of the analyst as it is specific for the work of analysis. In the first paper (15), Fliess presents a description, in metapsychological terms, of the analyst's activity. In his more recent contribution (14) he presents an exceedingly important theoretical distinction between two different types of experiences occurring in the analyst (countertransference and counteridentification). Countertransference is "the equivalent, in the analyst, of what is termed 'transference' in the patient." In the present stage of our theory, it is more difficult to give a brief and concise definition of counteridentification. Fliess describes it as follows:

The analyst's faulty involvement with his patients is that found in *folie à deux*: the identification is mutual, a response of the analyst to the patient's identifying with him, and repetitive in both patient and analyst of an early "constituent" identification. This term—designed to denote those identifications which the ego does not merely contain but of which it consists—is employed here in order to show that a counteridentification, regressive as it is, interferes with the non-regressive identification, which, as "empathy," represents a particular phase of the analyst's work [14, pp. 279-280].

The author also discusses the ways in which each of these processes interferes with the work of analysis. While Fliess does

not comment on the psychological gratifications of the analyst, it is implicit in his work that each of these mechanisms is set in motion by certain needs of the analyst and thus (may) lead to the gratification of these needs. These papers furnish us further data on the types of psychological satisfactions which we should consider *atypical* for analytic work.<sup>6</sup> An inventory of such needs, the mechanisms which they may set into motion, and the nature of the gratifications at which they aim and may obtain would help us—as was emphasized—to delineate the nature of analytic work with greater precision. The psychological gratifications of the analyst which are *inherent* (i.e., unavoidable and therefore legitimate and “necessary”) in his work constitute a set of needs, mechanisms and satisfactions complementary to those of the analysand. Only an awareness of both sets of motivations and patterns of satisfactions can show us what the psychoanalytic situation is like in a way that is at once humane and scientifically accurate.

#### THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SATISFACTION OF THE ANALYST IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SITUATION

We are now in a position to consider in detail the various ways in which the psychological satisfactions of the analyst, derived from analyzing, may be classified. We may begin with the categories supplied by Sharpe. (I am in agreement with her views on this subject.) She called attention to the following four factors:

1. Pleasure derived from listening to the unclear complaints of patients because of the ability to interpret and thus make sense out of what is at first confusing.
2. Mastery of the dreads of one's own infancy.
3. Sublimated sexual curiosity.

<sup>6</sup> Gitelson (20) has suggested that deviations from an interpretative technique may at times constitute “acting out in the countertransference.” The idea that therapeutic techniques are motivated by the therapist's needs is, of course, as old as psychoanalysis itself. Freud, for example, mentioned that among other reasons he chose the reclining position for the patient because he did not want to be stared at for many hours each day. The purpose of this paper is to make explicit and to try to systematize this facet of analytic technique.



4. Enrichment of the ego by contact with many diverse personalities.<sup>7</sup>

We may note that not all of these satisfactions are specifically (or uniquely) characteristic of the work of the analyst. The first item in the list is probably the most specific for analytic work, whereas the other three may occur in connection with other types of activities as well. I will return to this point later. I would like to add, however, that while no one factor taken singly could suffice uniquely to identify the satisfactions which the analyst derives from his work, as distinct from the pleasures of other activities, perhaps several of the factors combined, or possibly all of them, may add up to a complex *pattern* of psychological gratifications found *only* in the work of analysis. If this proves to be the case, we will have succeeded in further defining and clarifying the nature of what is operationally the essence of psychoanalysis, namely, the psychoanalytic situation.

In addition to the satisfactions mentioned by Sharpe, I would suggest that the following factors be considered:

1. The pleasure derived from doing "*useful work*." This type of satisfaction is, of course, least specific for analytic work and may escape notice precisely on that account. Its importance, however, can hardly be exaggerated. In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud wrote:

Another method of guarding against pain is by using the libido-displacements that our mental equipment allows of, by which it gains so greatly in flexibility. The task is then one of transferring the instinctual aims into such directions that they

<sup>7</sup> Hanns Sachs was apparently the first to call explicit attention to this source of gratification for the analyst (28, p. 3). I may add that I have omitted specific reference in this section to Low's contribution because it seemed to me that the psychological satisfactions of which she speaks are more precisely defined in Sharpe's second paper.

It may be noted that Theodor Reik has laid much emphasis throughout his writings on the inner experiences of the analyst. Accordingly, he has touched on various psychological satisfactions of the analyst derived from analyzing. (See particularly [32] and [33, pp. 61, 79].) However, his personalized and impressionistic accounts of analytic experiences are, it seems to me, more like works of art than of science. In this paper I attempt to abstract and systematize certain processes inherent in the analytic situation, many of which were commented on by Reik.

cannot be frustrated by the outer world. Sublimation of the instincts lends an aid in this. Its success is greatest when a man knows how to heighten sufficiently his capacity for obtaining pleasure from mental and intellectual work. Fate has little power against him then. This kind of satisfaction, such as the artist's joy in creation, in embodying his phantasies, or the scientist's in solving problems or discovering truth, has a special quality which we shall certainly one day be able to define metapsychologically. Until then we can only say metaphorically it seems to us 'higher and finer', but compared with that of gratifying gross primitive instincts its intensity is tempered and diffused; it does not overwhelm us physically.

[In a footnote, Freud added:] Laying stress upon the importance of work has a greater effect than any other technique of living in the direction of binding the individual more closely to reality; in his work he is at least securely attached to a part of reality, the human community. Work is no less valuable for the opportunity it and the human relations connected with it provide for a very considerable discharge of libidinal component impulses, narcissistic, aggressive and even erotic, than because it is indispensable for subsistence and justifies existence in a society. The daily work of earning a livelihood affords particular satisfaction when it has been selected by free choice, i.e., when through sublimation it enables use to be made of existing inclinations, of instinctual impulses that have retained their strength, or are more intense than usual for constitutional reasons [18, pp. 33-34].

The satisfactions derived from this source have also been stressed by Hendrick (25) in connection with his "work principle."<sup>8</sup>

2. The pleasure derived from *being needed*. This facet of the analyst's gratification is related to the first factor mentioned. Yet it possesses features which are sufficiently distinguishing to be listed separately. Thus, the "need to be needed" is clearly related to the notions of doing useful work (since the product of one's work has to be needed, in this case) and of being an adult. The

<sup>8</sup> "The work principle has been formulated as the need of human beings for the pleasure afforded by the effective integration of the neuromuscular and intellectual functions. It has been emphasized that although generally experienced together with libidinal pleasure, work pleasure is not primarily, displaced or sublimated sensual pleasure" (25, p. 327).

two differ, however, in that the latter gratification probably derives its main force from anxieties and doubts connected with the question of "What is the purpose of life?" As we know, we attempt to counterbalance this uniquely human question and the anxieties to which it gives rise by *procreation* and by "*creating*" in our daily work (e.g., "helping" others, research, the creative arts, watching living things grow, etc.).<sup>9</sup> This type of gratification also is not confined to analytic work. Yet, it is clear that such work provides ample opportunity to the analyst for feeling "needed" and accordingly for richly gratifying this need.

3. Pleasure derived from the *mastery of conflicts in human relationships* through verbalization and mutual understanding. This feature of analysis seems to me the one that is most unique for our work. The characteristics of the gratification subsumed under this heading can be briefly described as follows. It is inherent in the nature of analysis that the patient's earlier conflicts in life become re-enacted—albeit in a muted fashion—in his relationship with the analyst. This must also mean that the analyst becomes the active partner in a human relationship which, for longer or shorter periods, will be characterized by emotional upheavals and "misunderstandings" of various kinds. This the analyst must be able to tolerate, while maintaining an integrity of his ego of sufficient breadth to be able to bring to bear his own, as well as his patient's "understanding" on the very upheavals which take place. How can he do this? Now, it seems futile to me simply to assert that the analyst must be well analyzed himself or that he must be exceptionally strong and "mature" psychically in order to be able to do this type of work. While I do not believe that such a formulation is "wrong," I think that it misleads us, since it points not to, but away from what may be the crucial factor. In other words, I believe that there is a specific gratification involved in this type of

<sup>9</sup> Consider, in this connection, Norbert Wiener's following words: "Properly speaking the artist, the writer, and the scientist should be moved by such an irresistible impulse to create that, even if they were not being paid for their work, they would be willing to pay to get the chance to do it. However, we are in a period in which forms have largely superseded educational content and one which is moving towards an ever-increasing thinness of educational content. It is now considered perhaps more a matter of social prestige to obtain a higher degree and follow what may be regarded as a cultural career, than a matter of any deep impulse" (43, p. 133).

ego activity: in re-creating situations of interpersonal stress and disharmony and then solving them by virtue of the most "progressive" forces at our command (i.e., by thinking and understanding rather than by persuasion or force).

The foregoing notion is, of course, closely related to the concept of "working through," except that it occurs in the analyst. The view that the analyst must do some "self-analysis" in the course of each analysis is no longer new (2, 5, 40). The gratification to which I here call attention could therefore be formulated as deriving from the pleasure of the successful accomplishment of bits of self-analytic work.<sup>10</sup>

4. Pleasure derived from contact with the patient as a *protection from loneliness*. I mention this factor last, since its importance may often be small. In addition, this factor may not be strictly comparable to the first three listed, since it is closer to an avoidable and possibly undesirable attitude on the part of the analyst than are the others which we consider "unavoidable" and characteristic of analytic work. I include under this heading the pleasure which the analyst may derive from his work as a result of what may be considered the satisfaction inherent in nonspecific human contact. This type of satisfaction plays some role in all sorts of work which brings people together. It is a satisfaction which is independent of the specific nature of the work and of the unique personal identity of the "other person." (We are most familiar with this type of psychological gratification in those work situations which provide few possibilities for the exercise of what Hendrick calls the "work principle.") The analyst's particular personality and actual life situation (which may vary from time to time) will largely determine the importance of the foregoing factor as a source of gratification. (Sharpe's "enrichment of the ego by contact with diverse personalities" may perhaps be viewed as a sublimated

<sup>10</sup> Both Berman (5) and Grotjahn (24) have noted that the patient provides the analyst with an object through whom the latter can continue his self-analysis. Accordingly, we would be justified in asserting that the patient fulfills a specific need in the life of the analyst. This need of course could be fulfilled by others also (e.g., wife, friends, former training analyst, etc.). If we agree that such a need "exists," its fulfillment in analysis will provide the gratification described above.

and specialized derivative of this essentially nonspecific need for human contact.)

It is to be expected that a better understanding of the analyst's experiences in the psychoanalytic situation should prove helpful in our endeavor to bring a maximum of precision and scientific agreement to the question, "What constitutes that process of human interaction which we designate as 'psychoanalytic'?" We have divided the complex generality of the "analyst's satisfaction" into eight factors. A few of these are highly specific for analytic work; others are a source of gratification to workers in many diverse fields no less than to the analyst (19, 31). However, if we consider all eight factors in combination as a single frame of reference from which the analytic situation may be viewed, we find clear-cut and important differences between analysis and its analogous models (parent-child, physician-patient). Accordingly, while we cannot discuss in detail the nature of the satisfactions which parents may derive from having and raising children or physicians from practicing medicine or surgery (21, 27, 39), it is evident that several of the factors mentioned do not play a part in parenthood or medical practice. Furthermore, gratifications which are typical (and perhaps "unavoidable") in child-raising and medicine have no part in analysis (or, if they do occur, are deleterious to the well-being of the analysand). A more explicit treatment of this subject must be left for another occasion.<sup>11</sup> Suffice it to say, that by focusing on the nature of the analyst's gratifications in his work, we may be in a better position than heretofore to pin-point some differences between analysis and other forms of psychotherapy. For example, it appears to be a *sine qua non* of analysis that one of the chief compensations of the analyst lies in the free exercise and gratification of his sublimated curiosity; that is, in

<sup>11</sup> The reader's attention is called in this connection to an excellent discussion by Glover (22) of the psychological processes which characterize the work of the medical practitioner and of the (nonanalytic) psychotherapist. While Glover does not deal explicitly with the psychology of the analyst in this essay, he concludes with the following significant statement: "If the views I have presented here have any validity, it follows that there is a fundamental subjective incompatibility between the tendencies gratified in transference manipulation and those gratified in transference resolution. Any mixing of methods must be in the nature of an unstable emulsification liable to separate out in moments of stress."

making new discoveries in the process of analyzing. In contrast to this, "psychoanalytically based" psychotherapies all emphasize that work of this type consists more of the *application* of knowledge previously acquired. Now, the latter is undoubtedly a "legitimate" source of pleasure. This sort of activity would be gratifying in that it demonstrates (to oneself) that one's ideas and concepts—in general, one's picture of the situation—are, after all, "correct." This would tend to reassure one's ego that what has been arduously learned from others, or perhaps what has been discovered for oneself, remains valid in other instances as well. In brief, it makes it possible to rediscover the past in the future.<sup>12</sup>

SOME SOURCES OF RESISTANCE IN THE PSYCHOANALYST  
AGAINST RECOGNIZING THE SATISFACTIONS  
DERIVED FROM HIS WORK

In the preceding pages I have brought together a number of observations and conclusions about the various facets of the satisfaction which the analyst derives from his work. Most of these were described by others. Those which I have added myself can hardly be considered novel. The fact remains, however, that while this "knowledge" about the analyst's gratifications "exists," it is at best latent and is unacknowledged officially. It seems to me fair to assert, first, that little emphasis is placed in our theory in general, and in discussions of techniques in particular, on this aspect of

<sup>12</sup> It would appear that the difference in the psychological satisfactions derived from making new discoveries on the one hand, and from applying established knowledge on the other, are of far-reaching importance. For one thing, these two tendencies are, at least to some extent, antagonistic to each other. This psychological phenomenon is illustrated by the common observation that a new discovery and its practical development are usually carried out by two (or more) different persons. It also happens that a person produces something genuinely novel (in a scientific sense) and then spends the rest of his life applying (and defending) it. These two patterns of intellectual work and their relation to psychoanalytic technique were considered more fully in another publication (41).

In this connection, see also K. R. Eissler's (11) work on the treatment of schizophrenic patients. He noted that in order for the therapist to be effective with such patients, he must be endowed with wishes (and with the possibility for their gratification) toward his patients which are different from the aspirations most suitable for analytic work (e.g., a strong feeling of omnipotence and an urge to cure the patient).

the analytic situation; and, secondly, that on the contrary, we frequently encounter authors dwelling at great length on the emotional hardships to which the analyst is subjected by the nature of his work. Is it not possible that from the point of view of psychological science this socially condoned position of the analyst is not altogether honest? Indeed, the situation is amazingly similar to that of parents vis-à-vis their children (4). And it seems surprising, further, that this parallelism has not evoked more comment heretofore. Let us examine this matter more closely.

We are familiar enough with the psychological attitude of parents toward their children: they tend to stress to the child how they have tried to take good care of him and sacrificed for his well-being (9). While there may be shades of difference in the intensity or quality of this attitude among various cultural and economic groups, the foregoing orientation characterizes the essential relationship between parents and children in all of twentieth century Western civilization. It is a corollary of this view that the parent is regarded as "giving" and the child as "receiving."<sup>13</sup>

It is easy to see how such a notion could have arisen and how it may be justified on "rational" grounds. For it is obvious that the infant and child need the parent for their very survival; whereas the converse relationship does not apply. It seems likely that this simple fact is the basis of the child's feeling that it needs the parent *more* than the parent needs him. Now, this is true enough if we regard *physical survival* as the basis of our measure of the "quantity of need." On the other hand, if we take a more relativistic position, and look upon the interaction in terms of each organism's need according to its particular developmental state, then our previous judgment of the situation can no longer be justified. Indeed, as children get older, they perceive this fact, and may point out to their parents that they did not ask to be born. This childish counterargument to the parental emphasis on self-sacrifice

<sup>13</sup> I have raised some doubt about the psychological accuracy of this description elsewhere (40). In that paper I commented on the general problem of the nature of human relationships and on how psychological growth may differ fundamentally from growth of the physical organism. In the present paper I am concerned with an application of some of the same considerations to certain aspects of our theory of psychoanalytic technique.

clearly betrays the child's correct recognition that the parent gave birth to the child and took care of its upbringing, at least in some part, because it satisfied some need in the parent himself.<sup>14</sup> One need hardly bring weighty arguments to show that our traditional view of parent-child relationship has something to do with the fact that an emphasis on what the parent does (gives) for the child, and a de-emphasis on what he receives from him, helps the parent maintain a measure of authority (power) over the child. We have reason to assume that this makes good biological and psychological sense since such authority is required as part of that specifically human environment which the child needs to develop the complex psychic organization expected of him. By the same token, however, it does not follow that the analytic patient—who is not a child—"needs" a situation which is similar in this particular respect to the relationship between parent and child.

Restating the foregoing considerations, what I wish to suggest is that our traditional views regarding the question of "Who needs whom, and how much?" in regard to the paired system parent-child is based on an arbitrary selection of the criterion by which the "quantity of need" is judged. Each participant in such an interaction needs the other in a *different way*. Instead of this, however, the child is thought of as *more needful*. As Riesman (34, 35) has pointed out, this is because we look upon the child from an adult-oriented point of view.<sup>15</sup> In addition to this, as noted previously, this attitude is also useful in providing a more favorable position for that member of the pair which is designated as "less needful": he becomes, *ipso facto*, more powerful and the proper object of devotion and gratitude.

In so far as such a picture of the parent-child relationship serves

<sup>14</sup> The foregoing interpretation need not necessarily be the correct meaning of the child's thoughts (and reproaches) about his "being born" in all instances. Of the various overdetermined ideas which may be contained in this theme, the following might also be frequently of importance: "I did not ask to be born. Even though you (the parent) did not want me to be born either, *do not blame me* (for the burden which you feel that I am . . .)."

<sup>15</sup> Riesman (34, 35) has called attention to the authoritative role of the analyst vis-à-vis the patient. He examined this subject in terms of Freud's personal predictions concerning authority, strength, weakness and related notions and ascribed the persistence of these patterns of orientation in psychoanalytic practice to Freud's strong personality and to his being imitated by his followers.



as a model of the relationship between analyst and patient, we are justified in concluding that possibly the same (or analogous) considerations operate and make it practically useful for the analyst not to dwell upon *his* satisfactions in the interaction. Indeed, it seems to me that we are here dealing with a matter which, while not exactly "unconscious" psychologically, is so structured—including our social conventions based upon it—as to make a significantly different orientation toward it difficult. We need to think only of the simple, but "realistically" and emotionally important, matter of money in this connection. Our society is so constructed that in professional work there seems to be a definite connection between the degree of discomfort to which one puts oneself while performing work and the amount of money one can charge for it.<sup>10</sup> This being the case, the question naturally arises as to how we know the degree of discomfort (or pleasure) which the worker in question is supposed to experience. Clearly, there are two simple ways of trying to assess this: by empathy and by the worker's own admission of what he feels. This then puts an obvious premium on the worker not being honest (even with himself) about his experiences, since if he likes what he does and says so, it will be more difficult for him to earn a living by that activity, irrespective of how "useful" it might be to others.

It may seem to some that I have exaggerated the significance which an explicit understanding of the worker's role in his social function may have on his social (interpersonal) status. In so far as these considerations are applied to the domain of psychoanalysis, such doubt is readily understandable on the grounds that the foregoing processes have not yet taken place and the analyst continues to occupy a lofty and even mysterious position in society at the present time. Lest there be too much doubt, however, about the likelihood of a change which would make the analyst's position less powerful (in any of its social meanings) in the event of a better general acquaintance with his work, we must note that pre-

<sup>10</sup> It is not implied that the degree of the worker's discomfort is the only, or even the chief, criterion which determines the monetary compensation usually associated with the particular work in question. The scarcity of the skill needed, or its dramatic quality (e.g., brain surgery) are other features which must be considered in this connection.

cisely such a transformation of attitudes has already taken place with respect to public opinion toward workers engaged in the natural sciences. Bertrand Russell has commented on this phenomenon in a searching psychological and social study of power. Although his chief emphasis was different from the theme of this essay, his incisive insight into this matter makes his words valuable to us in our present inquiry:

The truth is that respect accorded to men of learning was never bestowed for genuine knowledge, but for the supposed possession of magical powers. *Science, in giving some real acquaintance with natural processes, has destroyed the belief in magic, and therefore the respect for the intellectual.* Thus it has come about that while men of science are the fundamental cause of the features which distinguish our time from former ages, and have through their discoveries and inventions an immeasurable influence upon the course of events, they have not, as individuals, as great a reputation for wisdom as may be enjoyed in India by a naked fakir, or in Melanesia by a medicine man. The intellectuals, finding their prestige slipping from them *as the result of their own activities*, become dissatisfied with the modern world. Those in whom the dissatisfaction is least take to Communism; those in whom it goes deeper shut themselves up in their ivory towers [36, p. 45; italics mine].

One is certainly impressed in all this by how strong the need must be in all of us to think of the ideal family situation (perhaps both in retrospect and even more as a wishful fantasy) as one in which powerful adults labor hard to provide for carefree children. "Hard labor" thus becomes synonymous with useful adulthood, and "joyous play" with useless childhood. If the appeal of this image is doubted, we should recall Freud's emphasis on how hard he had worked and how much he insisted on the unrewarding nature of the professions of analysis, teaching and the governing of nations.<sup>17</sup> It is clear, however, that he was not unaware of the

<sup>17</sup> I might add that I am not oblivious of the hardships inherent in these situations and activities; nor do I want to minimize their importance. Such considerations, however, should not blind us to the satisfactions which people derive from these "arduous" tasks. Clearly, the two phenomena (hardship and satisfaction) are not mutually exclusive when we deal with persons with well-developed egos involved in complex social situations.

pleasures to be derived from such activities, as the quotation given earlier shows (18). It seems especially significant, therefore, that he did not make these gratifications more explicit, as he had done with the pleasures inherent in many socially unacceptable actions. The importance of the "hard-working" model of adulthood is further borne out by Freud's repeated emphasis on his dislike of Vienna and his having to live there. Sometimes we say that facts speak louder than words: in this case, the facts suggest that he must have liked that city very much. Other, contemporary examples illustrate the same mechanism. Witness the apparently worldwide reverence in which Albert Schweitzer is held. Here is a man on whom millions of people look as the veritable embodiment of a wished-for good parent who labors for his children with no regard for his own satisfactions. The denial of the satisfactions of the adult is a recurrent theme in the fantasies of the child about the good parent.<sup>18</sup> Such considerations probably play a part also in the way in which the man on the street in America scrutinizes how much the President (or other powerful public figures) "works" and how much he "plays." The frame of reference from which this scrutiny is carried out is such that work is equated with non-gratification and self-sacrifice, and play with its opposite. Accordingly, the parent figure is expected to work "hard" but not as hard

<sup>18</sup> Alice Balint (1) has emphasized this fact in her paper "Love for the Mother and Mother Love." She wrote: "When children, with the most innocent faces in the world, speak of the desirable death of a loved person, it would be quite erroneous to explain this by hatred, especially if the wish concerns the mother or one of her substitutes. The little daughter who is of the opinion that mummy should peacefully die in order that she (the daughter) might marry daddy does not necessarily hate her mother; she only finds it quite natural that the nice mummy should disappear at the right moment. *The ideal mother has no interests of her own.* True hate and with it true ambivalence can develop much more easily in relation to the father whom the child gets to know right from the beginning as a being who has interests of his own" (1, p. 111; italics mine).

If the ideal mother has no interests of her own, it follows that she can have no gratifications other than those of the child. And, conversely, any evidence which points to the existence of independent gratifications on the part of the parent interferes with this regressive image of her and activates the ego to repress or deny such evidence. As an illustration of this thesis, consider the wording of the special citation recently presented by President Eisenhower to Dr. Jonas Salk for the development of an anti-polio vaccine. The following quotation is from *Time* magazine: ". . . Dwight Eisenhower read and presented him [Dr. Salk] with a special citation for a 'historic contribution to human welfare . . . in the highest tradition of *selfless* and dedicated medical research'" (42; italics added).

as to be disabled by it: then he could no longer take care of the children. Accordingly, a certain amount of play is permitted and even encouraged. If religious belief is (among other things) a socially accepted form of mass delusion, as Freud suggested, and as no doubt it is—there can be equally little doubt that the foregoing picture of psychological functioning relative to “work” and “play” is also a socially accepted delusion. And, as with religious belief, there are good psychological reasons for the persistence of these psychoeconomic beliefs.

#### MOTIVES FOR THE PERSISTENT BELIEF IN THE NONGRATIFICATION OF THE IDEAL ADULT

I propose briefly to summarize now what appear to me the principal reasons for the persistence of the type of psychoeconomic picture of the adult which was discussed earlier. This is an intricate and rich problem for psychoanalysis as well as for sociology, and what follows should be looked upon as nothing more than a preliminary step in its exposition.

1. *The need for an explanation* of the nature of what human beings do for each other. I believe that this is the prepotent reason for the belief in the type of psychoeconomic arrangement with which society conceives of basic human relationships. The problem of what people “do for each other” is so intricate that the average person is left without any hope whatsoever of gaining a “realistic” understanding of the processes involved in such interactions. He therefore takes refuge in what may be thought of as “the great oversimplification.” Once this is accepted, the world—or at any rate that particular segment of it at which the explanation is aimed—becomes orderly and manageable. In the evolution of civilization, human thought experienced a similar problem and reached a similar temporary solution in relation to the mysteries of the workings of our physical surroundings. Religious belief thus had, as one of its functions, the duty to explain how various natural events took place. In the face of initial ignorance, such a demand presents a hopeless task and evokes a response of a simple but comprehensive scheme which will furnish an answer to

all possible questions. The Old Testament embodies such a comprehensive "explanation" of all of biology and cosmology.

In the realm of human relationships, we are faced with a somewhat similar situation. If we try to understand and evaluate what it is that human beings do for each other, and moreover even try to assign quantitative values to whatever it is that is being "exchanged," we are faced with a problem not unlike that which prescientific man faced in relation to his questions regarding the weather, the movements of the planets, procreation, etc.

If we look upon human interactions in terms of "Who does what for whom?" we are confronted with a problem regarding which we do not have much scientific knowledge. We are therefore greatly handicapped in trying to "understand" this problem, as it stands. In this situation we can try to break down the problem into smaller parts, which might be more manageable, or else we are forced to come up with a "comprehensive explanation" with no more than a nucleus of truth in it. It seems to me that the latter solution applies to many of our present views regarding fundamental paired systems, such as parent-child, doctor-patient, leader-follower, etc. Instead of analyzing such complex situations of interaction in terms of component parts and clearly defined criteria—which would, at least at first, lead to making what may now appear like simple matters more complicated—we simply look upon these situations along the line of a basic model according to which A does something for B, or vice versa. Further, since it is often difficult to be clear about what B "gets," insistence that A "gives"—and "receives" *nothing*—makes for apparent clarity. Abandoning this simplification exposes us to the anxiety of being much less certain about the nature of "gains" and "losses" in human relationships than we have been heretofore. It will inevitably lead, however, to the establishment of new and meaningful concepts which will clarify our presently vague (and often misleading) notions about "giving" and "receiving."

2. The second motive which plays a part in the persistent belief in the psychoeconomic model noted may be attributed to its *self-aggrandizing qualities*. In other words, in so far as the parent, the physician, the teacher, the statesman or the man of religion finds

himself on the "giving" side of the interaction, he can feel himself to be in a position which will appeal to his narcissism. As a matter of fact, by so splitting human relationships, man finds satisfaction for his narcissism in the so-called "adult role" in a way similar to that which was provided by the old egocentric and anthropomorphic notions of religious cosmology and pre-Darwinian biology. The foregoing motives could also be considered a special manifestation of that ubiquitous psychological phenomenon so aptly termed the "God complex" by Jones (26).

3. *The motives of power, money, and prestige.* These are actually based on the previous considerations and on an ongoing structuring of society along such lines (36). They are thus not really separate motives, springing from autonomous sources, but are rather derivatives of the egocentric position mentioned above. When man believed that God created him in his own image, he also believed that this made him the supreme creature in the world to whose well-being all other organisms are rightly subordinated. It also followed that his habitat must be the "best" (i.e., the Garden of Eden, until he lost it) and that the earth is the center of the universe.

Analogously, if the adult "gives" so much to the child, or if the physician "heals" the patient with complete disregard for his own welfare, or if the political leader works "on behalf of his people," it is only logical that he must be given power, reverence and money, as the case may be, for his "work." Consistent with this thesis we find that those professions which have not de-emphasized or denied their own gratifications in their work—notably, the physicists, mathematicians and modern scientists generally—have been compensated much less for their productivity than have other groups (6). Thus the scientist who develops a new invention receives far less money (and has far less social power) in our age than does the industrialist who manufactures the product of invention (whether this be an antibiotic or a weapon of war). The latter does his work allegedly for the "public good" and gets "only money" for it. The overt admission of enjoying one's work seems to be penalized in our society in every field except that of entertainment.

4. Finally, it may be worth while to mention that our traditional picture of human relationships may persist by "*force of habit.*" Since we are all raised in the framework of this belief and later live in it, we tend to keep it as a matter of course. We therefore "naturally" take for granted that physicians, for example, take care of patients. The idea that a converse relationship of a complementary character exists runs counter to acknowledged social belief and the institutions based upon it (e.g., medicine, law, religion, government).<sup>19</sup>

#### SUMMARY

In the theory of psychoanalytic treatment the position of the analyst in the psychoanalytic situation has heretofore been considered mainly from two points of view. One of these regards the analyst's psychological situation as somewhat analogous to that of a (good) parent vis-à-vis the child (e.g., devotion, the wish to help, analysis as "re-education," etc.). The other point of view emphasizes, in general, those strivings and attitudes of the analyst which interfere with proper analytic work (e.g., countertransference, counteridentification, criticism of active techniques, etc.). In this paper an attempt is made to make explicit and to systematize those psychological needs and gratifications experienced by the analyst which are considered to be, more or less, inherent in the psychoanalytic situation.

Previous contributions relevant to the subject are briefly reviewed. The psychological satisfactions of the analyst in the psychoanalytic situation are then presented. Discussion of this subject leads inevitably to a consideration of those factors which operate as resistance—in the analyst, the analysand, and in others—against the recognition of such satisfactions. These resistances appear to be intimately linked to the psychological motives of man (child) which drive him toward a persistent belief in the essential non-gratification of the "ideal adult." Consideration of the resistances

<sup>19</sup> A French film of a few years ago, entitled "God Needs Men," brought out forcefully and with beauty the complementary character of the relationship between God and man (and priest and parishioner).

against the recognition of this aspect of the analytic situation prompts one to conclude that the history of the development of our theory of analytic technique has gone through the same stages as has human thought regarding the structure of the family and the nature of sexuality. In other words, the individual's concept of the family usually progresses through the following three stages. (This will be described in an abbreviated and perhaps exaggerated way, but it is, after all, for the purpose of illustrating a particular point regarding the theory of psychoanalytic technique.) First, there is the belief of the small child that the parents (the mother) have no function other than to take care of his needs. Second, we have the child's feeling (and belief, perhaps) that the parents are entirely selfish and that his needs are wholly subordinated to theirs. This concept may become conscious in the child at the time when his sense of identity (13) becomes a vivid experience (e.g., around puberty and adolescence.) A coexistence of both these stages leads man to look upon human interactions (or social ones) as being advantageous for either one or the other participant but not for both (or either). The third stage would be that of achieving a genuine notion of *mutuality*. This requires an awareness of the other person as a human being exquisitely *distinct* from oneself, and yet *like* oneself. In the realm of sexuality, the notions of "rape," of masochistic submission ("being raped"), and of a mutually satisfying relationship correspond to the same steps as those described above in terms of the child-parent relationship. In psychoanalytic theory, emphasis on transference corresponds to that stage in the above scheme which conceives only of the pleasure of the child. Predominant emphasis on countertransference (or, more correctly, on the personality or behavior of the analyst), on the other hand, corresponds to the second stage, that is, to the emphasis on the parent. The present paper, although it deals only with the experiences of the analyst, represents an attempt to view the analytic situation from the third point of view, namely, from that of mutuality. It thus deals with those satisfactions of the analyst which may, under favorable circumstances, lead to the "satisfying" development of the analysand as well.

In conclusion, it seems to me that we have ample reason to be-



lieve that an acknowledgment of the analyst's psychological satisfactions in his work—in a fashion which is more explicit and candid than what appears to be the general custom at present—would be desirable for the optimally unhindered psychological development of the analysand. This is to be expected on the grounds that first, the de-emphasis or denial of the analyst's satisfactions in the analytic situation presents the analysand with an untrue picture of the actual interaction and thus interferes with his reality testing. Clearly, it runs counter to the very principle which governed Freud's attitude to his work: ". . . we must not forget that the relationship between analyst and patient is based on a love of truth, that is, on the acknowledgment of reality, and that it precludes any kind of sham or deception" (17, pp. 351-352). Secondly, we must remember that in the absence of such a candid appraisal of the analytic situation, there is no safeguard against the hazard of the patient re-experiencing in his relationship with the analyst a human interaction significantly similar to that between a child and a masochistic, "self-sacrificing" parent. The burdens and inhibitions which such a relationship can place on the developing child's ego are familiar enough to us and do not require further comment. Since the analytic situation contains potentialities for re-creating such a "paired system" and also for leaving it unanalyzed, these considerations call for appropriate technical handling. It must be emphasized, however, that the foregoing line of thought appears to be—at least to me—entirely compatible with a strict adherence to a purely interpretative technique and calls for no technical "modification" other than an awareness in the analyst of the possibilities of the phenomena mentioned, and, whenever indicated, their interpretation to the patient.

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