

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Vol. XXXIV

1953

Part 3

ON THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THEORY OF AFFECTS

By DAVID RAPAPORT, Ph.D.

AUSTEN RIGGS FOUNDATION, STOCKBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

I

We do not possess a systematic statement of the psycho-analytic theory of affects.¹ The attempt I shall here make to piece together the existing fragments of this theory encounters two major difficulties. The first is that we have to deal with formulations originating from all three phases of the development of psycho-analysis: the beginning phase in which the theory of catharsis and the theory of psycho-analysis were not as yet sharply separated; the middle phase in which the id was in the centre of interest; and the recent phase in which interest is increasingly concerned with the ego. The treatment of the formulations of three such disparate origins is the more difficult partly because each of them persists into the later phases, and partly because most of the later formulations are to some extent anticipated in the earlier phases. The second difficulty is that the fragments to be put together are only too familiar, and culling them will thus appear to many just as superfluous as their systematization will seem unpalatable and unacceptable officiousness to others.

In view of these difficulties it will be worthwhile to remind ourselves, before going on to the task set for this paper, that an attempt at systematizing the theory of affects is not merely a theoretical nicety, but has eminent practical importance. Freud (28) wrote (p. 109):

If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea, or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it.

Indeed, it goes without saying that in his everyday work the transference affects are the guide of the therapist, and that, though affect-storms of abreaction and catharsis are no longer the aims of psycho-analytic therapy, 'recall' and 'insight' without affective experience do not usually yield therapeutic advance. But it is less obvious how we can explain theoretically that affects serve as such guides and that without them insight is ineffective. We know that when—in therapy in general, and particularly in 'working through'—defences are 'undone', affects arise as indicators of the drive discovered and 'liberated' from its defence-shackles. Freud (26, p. 376) wrote:

Theoretically one may correlate . . . [working through] with the 'abreaction' of quantities of affects pent up by repression, without which the hypnotic treatment remained ineffective.

We also know that 'liberation' of drives in the form of abreaction, i.e. massive affective outburst, is not as a rule therapeutically effective. Fenichel (15), criticizing Kaiser's resistance-analysis, wrote:

. . . there is a 'taking distance' from the affect, which seems to me—in contrast to Kaiser—desirable. The judging ego of the patient should take distance from its affect, should recognize it untimely and should remember its origins affectively. An 'affect breakthrough' without such 'taking distance' is—as Freud has put it once—'an outright calamity'. Kaiser's comment that 'after a "genuine breakthrough of drives" there is nothing left for the analyst to explain, or clarify, or add to the contents

¹ The term affect will in this paper be used to stand for the terms 'emotion' and 'feeling' also, since there is no clear distinction in the literature in the use of these

terms. For a suggested terminology, see Rapaport (60, Chap. II).

expressed by the patient' makes us suspect that he actually does not recognize this 'calamity' for what it is, that he neglects 'working through', does not understand its essential role in the actual elimination of repressions, and that thus he is after a sort of 'neo-catharsis'—instead of analysis.

A. Freud (17a, p. 42), in discussing the use of mechanisms of defence against affects, points to the importance of the understanding of affects for the technique of child analysis, and her point seems to have a validity beyond the confines of the latter also:

The analysis and bringing into consciousness of the specific form of this defence against affect—whether it be reversal, displacement or complete repression—teaches us something of the particular technique adopted by the ego of the child in question and, just like the analysis of resistance, enables us to infer his attitude to his instincts and the nature of his symptom-formation. It is therefore a fact of peculiar importance in child-analysis that, in observing the affective processes, we are largely independent of the child's voluntary co-operation and his truthfulness or untruthfulness in what he tells us. His affects betray themselves against his will.

Clearly, S. Freud, Fenichel and A. Freud imply that the liberation of drives from repression is necessarily accompanied by an appearance of affects, and therapy is dependent upon effecting the appearance of these affects in certain forms and handling the emerged affects in certain ways. But we are not so clear theoretically about the relationships between drive and effect implied in these propositions derived from therapeutic experience. Therefore clarification of the theory of affects should be a step towards the theory of psycho-analytic technique and therapy. It might even be asked whether a metapsychological theory of technique and therapy is altogether conceivable before the metapsychological status of affects, which occupy a central position in the processes of therapy, has been clarified.

Their central role in therapy, however, does not exhaust the clinical significance of affects.

We have come to label as affect such a wide variety of phenomena that both in diagnostic and therapeutic work we are in danger of being led astray by the term, as long as we lack a systematic view of the relationships of all the phenomena to which we apply it.² A brief survey will show the complexity of the situation. We call affect not only the infant's rage (encountered later on in temper tantrums and in the destructive outbursts of some catatonics) and the adult's anger accompanied by the corresponding expressive movements and other physiological concomitants, but also the subjective feelings of those well-controlled adults who show little or no affect-expression, as well as the anger of over-controlling compulsive persons who just 'know' that they 'could be' or 'should be' angry. We also call affects those displays which impress the onlooker as histrionic or affectations, and which certain character-types are prone to produce, either in exaggeration of experienced, or as substitutes for not-experienced, affects. It is not quite clear how these are related to the 'as if' affects of those schizoid personalities described by Helene Deutsch (8, p. 123).³ Nor is their relation clear to those oversensitive incipient and ambulatory schizophrenics who appear to wallow in their affects, which on closer inspection turn out to be restitution-products following a total withdrawal of object cathexes;⁴ these patients are affectively moved by anything that seems to promise them the experience of affects, because it proves to them that they are still capable of feeling.⁵ Nor is there clarity about the relation of both these latter types to those more crudely obvious schizophrenic affect-phenomena termed 'flat affect' and 'inappropriate affect'. We need not dwell on displaced affects, somatic affect-equivalents without conscious affect-experience, or the relation of these to conversion-symptoms and psychosomatic disorders and all the rest that belong to the chapter of 'unconscious emotion'; they have been variously discussed (Fenichel,

² While all the phenomena discussed below have to do with affects, and are time and again so referred to in the literature, my listing them here does not imply that they are correctly labelled as affects nor that the theory of affects alone must account fully for all of them. Indeed some of the phenomena to be listed are most complex, and more than the theory of affects will have to be invoked for their explanation. What I imply by listing them here is that they constitute an important problem for the theory of affects also.

³ ' . . . outwardly he conducts his life as if he possessed a complete and sensitive emotional capacity. To him there is no difference between his empty forms and what others actually experience . . . [this] is no longer an act of repression but a real loss of object cathexis.'

⁴ Here the subjective experience of lack of affect in depersonalization (Schilder, 65, Fenichel, 17) and in certain allied syndromes of organic etiology (Burger-Prinz and Kaila, 7, and Schilder, 65) is also relevant.

⁵ Compare Federn on narcissistic affect (12, p. 13).

17; Alexander, 1; Rapaport, 60). But we must mention the related phenomena of 'frozen affects' which find expression—without conscious affect-experience—in stereotyped postures, facial expressions, tones of voice, motility, etc., to which Reich (63) called attention. And we must take notice of such affects as anxiety, guilt, elation, depression, which—in contrast to the momentary affects so far mentioned—may take pathological chronic forms; even more important, they may take characterological chronic forms, as in anxious people, gay people, gloomy people, bashful people, etc. (cf. Landauer, 54). Furthermore, we must mention a special group of affects, namely those grouped around the experiences of the comic, wit, humour, etc., which are apparently related to a specific kind of saving of cathectic expenditure, rather than to any specific kind of cathectic tension. It is noteworthy that a proclivity to elicit and/or experience such affects may also take a chronic form and structuralize into a character trait (cf. Brenman, 4). Finally we must mention such specific and complex affective states as apathy, nostalgia, boredom, etc., which are also relatively chronic affect-formations (cf. 3a).

To make even more glaring the complexity of what a theory of affect must account for, we might add that, on the one hand, neurotic inhibition and ego-limitation cuts down the range of intensity and variability of affect-experiences; on the other, regression-processes bring to the fore unbridled and unmodulated affective attacks in which, while intensity is formidable, range and variability are minimal.

II

I shall now review the concepts of affect of each of the three phases of the development of psycho-analysis.

The dominant concept of affect of the beginning phase of psycho-analysis, in which no sharp differentiation between the theory of cathartic-hypnosis and that of psycho-analysis had as yet occurred, equates affect with the quantity of psychic energy, which was later conceptualized as drive-cathexis. But while later the cathexis of affects is distinguished from drive-cathexis proper and from bound-(ego-) cathexes, here affect stands for all of these. Freud (19, p. 75) wrote:

. . . among the psychic functions there is something which should be differentiated (*an amount of affect, a sum of excitation*⁶), something having all the attributes of a quantity . . . a something which is capable of increase, decrease, displacement, and discharge, and which extends itself over the memory traces of an idea like an electric charge over the surface of the body.

Accordingly, the role of affects in symptom-formation is that affects prevented from discharge remain on the one hand fixed to the pathogenic idea or phantasy, and on the other find outlet in the innervations of conversion symptoms. Freud (5, pp. 7-8) wrote:

The ideas which have become pathogenic are preserved with such freshness and affective force because the normal process of absorption by abreaction and by reproduction in a state of unrestrained association is denied them.

And Breuer (*ib.*, pp. 151-2) wrote:

The 'hysterical conversion' is then complete, for the original intercerebral excitement of the affect was changed into the process of excitement of the peripheral path, and the original affective idea no longer evokes the affect, but only the abnormal reflex.

Correspondingly, the role of affects in therapy is that the discharge of the dammed-up affect drains the pathogenic idea of its force and influence. Freud (18, pp. 40-41) wrote:

By providing an opportunity for the pent-up affect to discharge itself in words the therapy deprives of its effective power the idea which was not originally abreacted.

Simultaneously the anxiety-affect was explained as affect or libido (these terms were at this point still interchangeable) transformed by being repressed. Freud (19, pp. 96-7) wrote:

. . . an accumulation of excitation is involved. . . . Anxiety . . . probably represents . . . the deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical field, and . . . an abnormal use of it, due to this deflection. (20, pp. 96-7).

Libido will therefore subside . . . and the excitation will express itself instead subcortically as anxiety (20, p. 99).

Freud also (22, p. 227) wrote:

. . . anxiety actually was libido diverted from its usual course.

⁶ Italics mine (D. R.).

This concept of affect and anxiety persisted into the second phase of the development of psycho-analysis which, as we shall see, already contains fragments of a more advanced theory of affects and anxiety. Freud (23, p. 537) wrote: 1D.

The fulfilment of these wishes would no longer produce an affect of pleasure, but one of pain; and it is just this conversion of affect that constitutes the essence of what we call 'repression'.

Even later Freud (24, p. 178) wrote:

When once a state of anxiety establishes itself, the anxiety swallows up all other feelings; with the progress of repression, and the more those ideas which are charged with affect and which have been conscious move down into the unconscious, all affects are capable of being changed into anxiety.

Indeed the use of the term affect as though it were psychic energy (cathexis) in general—aided and abetted by Bleuler's (3), Jung's (46), and Schilder's (64, 66) usage—persists in psycho-analytic literature to our own day. Academic psychology, psychosomatic medicine, and psychiatry at large lent a hand in perpetuating it and making it general usage, when psycho-analytic theoretical development had long since abandoned it.

Before turning to the affect-concept of the next phase in the development of psycho-analysis, we must point out that already in the *Studies in Hysteria* (published 1895) and in Freud's posthumously published *Outline of a Psychology* (written 1895)—which will not be discussed here—there are traces of the later conception of affects. For instance, the relation between drive and affect is indicated for the first time, though not theoretically further developed; the affective state of 'being-in-love' is derived from the 'sexual instinct'. Freud (5, pp. 145-6) wrote:

This is glaringly observed in the wonderful phenomenon of being in love . . . [The object] becomes endowed with the whole quantity of excitement set free by the sexual instinct; she becomes . . . an 'affective idea'. That is, in assuming actuality in consciousness, she sets free the increased excitement which really originates in another source, namely, in the sexual glands.

Even traces of a distinction between disposal of tension by action, by affect, and by binding through the work of thought (association), are already present, though still clouded by the

affect-terminology. Freud (18, pp. 30-31) wrote:

The fading of a memory or of its affect depends . . . foremost on whether an energetic reaction (discharge of feeling) supervened on the affective experience or not. By *reaction* we here mean the whole range of voluntary and involuntary reflexes, by which . . . affects are habitually worked off—from weeping up to an actual act of revenge . . . the reaction . . . to the trauma has a . . . complete cathartic effect only if it takes the form of a fully adequate reaction, such as an act of revenge. But man finds a surrogate for such an act in speech. . . . Abreaction is, however, not the only kind of solution at the disposal of the normal psychic mechanism . . . the normal man succeeds by means of associations in dissipating the accompanying affect.

III

The second phase of the development of psycho-analytic theory begins with *The Interpretation of Dreams* (23, 1900); it is characterized by the metapsychological systematization of psycho-analytic discoveries in general and by the development of the economic point of view, the theory of cathexes, in particular. It is a familiar fact that, while the dynamic point of view was highly developed by the time this phase of the theory opened, and while the economic point of view was developed in this phase, the structural point of view—the third of the metapsychological triad—was still lagging behind, taking the form of the topographical point of view. Metapsychology as we find it in Freud's main writings devoted to it (23, Chap. VII, and 'Metapsychological Papers', 1911-17) is an incomplete theory preparatory to the developing of the structural point of view, the advent of which ushers in ego-psychology and completes the formal framework of metapsychology.

The Interpretation of Dreams already breaks sharply with the previous conception of affect as psychic (drive) energy proper, and considers affects to be motor and secretory (discharge) processes which are controlled from the unconscious. Freud (23, p. 521) wrote:

We here take as our basis a quite definite assumption as to the nature of the development of affect. This is regarded as a motor or secretory function, the key to the innervation of which is to be found in the ideas of the Unconscious.

But this sharp break was not noted at the time; only well in the third phase of the development

of psycho-analysis did Kulovesi (52) come back to it, noting and attempting to clarify the relation between the James-Lange and the psycho-analytic theories of affects.⁷ The break is sharp, the dynamic is no longer that of affects but rather that of the energy (drive-cathexis) inherent in wishes. Affects are released by, and are indicators of, unconscious wishes. The complex relation of affects to the other class of indicators (representations) of drives—i.e. ideas—is also considered. Freud (23, p. 537) wrote:

The memories from which the unconscious wish evokes a liberation of affect have never been accessible to the Preconscious, and for that reason this liberation cannot be inhibited. It is precisely on account of this generation of affect that these ideas are not now accessible even by way of the preconscious thoughts to which they have transferred the energy of the wishes connected with them.

and:

. . . the ideational contents have undergone displacements and substitutions, while the affects have remained unchanged. No wonder, then, that the ideational content which has been altered by dream-distortion no longer fits the affect which has remained intact (*ibid.*, p. 434).

The realization of the theoretical programme forecast in the *Studies in Hysteria*—to differentiate between tension-disposal by means of action on the one hand, and by means of affect-discharge on the other—was ushered in by regarding affects as motor and secretory functions controlled from the unconscious. But not until eleven years later, in the 'Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning' (25), did Freud take the next step, when in delineating the development of the reality-principle he formulated that, with its advent, the role of motility changes: while hitherto it fulfilled, in the main, a safety-valve discharge-function for drive-tensions (affect-discharge), it now becomes an apparatus used in action designed to alter reality. This view co-ordinates affect-discharge with the pleasure-principle and with alteration of the internal environment, and contrasts it with action, which it co-ordinates with the reality-principle and with the alteration of the external environment so as to make the drive-object ultimately available. Affect-discharge is then the shortcut to tension-decrease, while action is the

realistic detour towards it. Freud (25, p. 16) wrote:

A new function was now entrusted to motor discharge, which under the supremacy of the pleasure-principle had served to unburden the mental apparatus of accretions of stimuli, and in carrying out this task had sent innervations into the interior of the body (*mien*, expressions of affect); it was now employed in the appropriate alteration of reality. It was converted into *action*.

Freud (28, p. 111, footnote) returned to this point to clarify it further:

Affectivity manifests itself essentially in motor (i.e. secretory and circulatory) discharge resulting in an (internal) alteration of the subject's own body without reference to the outer world; motility, in actions designed to effect changes in the outer world.

The tension which is diminished by affect-discharge is that of drives. More specifically, affect-expression is the final outcome of the discharge of a specific part of drive-cathexes, termed 'affect-charge'. 'Affect-charge' and 'ideas' are both drive-representations; they had to be theoretically distinguished because their fate under repression is different. They may both be repressed, as in severely inhibiting hysterical neuroses; ideas may be repressed while affects remain amenable to consciousness, as in hysterias characterized by affect-outbursts; or ideas (or their derivatives) may remain amenable to consciousness while affects are repressed, displaced, or isolated from them, as in obsessional neuroses. Freud (27, p. 91) wrote:

In our discussion hitherto we have dealt with the repression of an instinct-presentation, and by that we understood an idea or group of ideas which is cathected with a definite amount of the mental energy (libido, interest) pertaining to an instinct. Now clinical observation forces us further to dissect something that hitherto we have conceived of as a single entity, for it shows us that beside the idea there is something else, another presentation of the instinct to be considered, and that this other element undergoes a repression which may be quite different from that of the idea. We have adopted the term *charge of affect* for this other element in the mental presentation; it represents that part of the instinct which has become detached from the idea, and finds proportionate expression, according to its quantity, in processes which become observable

⁷ Note also Landauer (53).

to perception as affects. From this point on, in describing a case of repression, we must follow up the fate of the idea which undergoes repression separately from that of the instinctual energy attached to the idea.

In comparing the two kinds of drive-representations, Freud points out that affect-expression and -experience are related to discharge of cathexes; ideas, to cathecting of memory traces. He makes this distinction to explain that ideas when repressed—when their cathexis is withdrawn, or when they are counter-cathected—persist as actualities (as memory traces) while affects when repressed (de-cathected or counter-cathected) persist only as potentialities. Freud (28, p. 111) wrote:

The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes—ultimately of memory-traces—whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final expression of which is perceived as feeling. In the present state of our knowledge of affects and emotions we cannot express this difference more clearly.

I believe that here Freud as yet lacked the observations which could have indicated to him (as they did to him as well as to Brierley and Jacobson later) that discharge-thresholds of drives and affects are indispensable concepts of an affect-theory. But such thresholds heightened (presumably by counter-cathexis) to attain repression of affect would render the repressed 'affect-charge' just as actual as memory-traces render unconscious ideas. Freud's conception here shows the limitations of a pure discharge-theory of affects which has no place in it for threshold-structures.

In this discharge-theory, all affects, including the anxiety-affect, are partial vicissitudes of drives. Thus, though the earlier 'toxic' or 'transformation' theory of anxiety still persists, it no longer implies that undischarged affects can be transformed into anxiety, but only that repressed drive-cathexis can be so transformed. Freud (27, pp. 91-2) wrote:

The fate of the quantitative factor in the instinct-presentation may be one of three, as we see by a cursory survey of the observations made through psycho-analysis: either the instinct is altogether suppressed, so that no trace of it is found, or it appears in the guise of an affect of a particular qualitative tone, or it is transformed into anxiety. With the two last possibilities we are obliged to focus our attention upon the *transformation* into

affects, and especially into *anxiety*, of the mental energy belonging to the *instincts*, this being a new possible vicissitude undergone by an instinct.

Let us now fit this theory into the psycho-analytic model of psychic processes. This model⁸ is formed on the following observational (or hypothetical) sequence: the restlessness of the hungry infant → the appearance of the mother, i.e., breast, and sucking → subsidence of restlessness. We conceptualize this sequence as: drive-tension → appearance of, and action on, drive-object → gratification. In the absence of the drive-object, restlessness will persist and/or a hallucinatory image of past gratification will appear. We conceptualize the restlessness as *expression* of affect and refer it to an 'affect-charge', that is, to a part of the drive-cathexis which would be discharged if the drive-object were present and drive-action on it could take place. We conceptualize the hallucinatory gratification as *idea*, and refer it to the drive-cathecting of the memory traces of past gratification situations. Idea and affect-charge are both conceptualized as *drive-representations*, safety-valves of drive tensions. The quantitative relations that appear to obtain are: drive-cathexis → affect-charge → cathexis of memory-trace.

It seems to be assumed that if drive-action—discharge of drive-cathexes—were possible, no separating off of a cathectic amount in the form of affect-charge, or disposal of it in the form of affect-discharge, would take place. This proposition contains on the one hand a crucial implication for the theory of affect and on the other a factual fallacy. The *implication for theory* may be formulated as the 'conflict theory' of affects. The *fallacy* lies in the untenable assumption of immediate and complete discharge by drive-action. Let us discuss these, keeping in mind that our framework at this moment is that of drive-cathexes and drive-representations, that is, mobile cathexes and primary processes. In other words, we are still considering that hypothetical state of affairs which is supposed to obtain before definitive ego-formation, before the establishment of bound cathexes and secondary processes, before the internalization of the *delay* of drive-discharge and of the *detour*-behaviour towards the drive-object, and before they become guaranteed by psychic structure-formation, that is, before the fami-

⁸ Freud, 23, Chap. VII, pp. 508-509; 25, p. 14. See also Rapaport, 61, Part VII; and Rapaport, 62.

liar advanced defensive and adaptive mechanisms are established. Or, in other terms, we are considering the state of affairs in which the pleasure-principle is supposed to hold full sway before the establishment of the reality-principle.

The 'conflict-theory' of affects. The major implication of the affect-theory of the second phase of psycho-analysis is that affect-expression is the outcome of the discharge of part of the accumulated drive-cathexes when direct discharge in drive-action *cannot* take place. This conception of affects was forecast already by Spinoza (68, p. 129):

By emotions (*affectus*) I understand the modification of the body by which the power in action of the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained and at the same time the ideas of these modifications.

and by Dewey:

When there is no inhibition there is no overflow and no affect.

The psychologist Drever (9a) saw the necessity for such a conflict (for him, 'obstacle') theory of affect, but realized its insufficiencies for the explanation of continuous pleasurable affects.

One of the finest Anglo-Saxon psychiatric observers and thinkers, MacCurdy, influenced by psycho-analysis, by his studies of circular psychoses, and by the theories of James, Lange, Dewey, Cannon, MacDougall, etc., stated this conception in 1925—before Freud's 'The Problem of Anxiety'—and concluded that affects are products of conflict. He wrote (56, p. 65):

[Affects] . . . appear both objectively and subjectively when instinct is aroused but not in operation as such. The function of emotion is to warn oneself or others of the nature of behaviour that is likely to develop.

In the psycho-analytic literature too—though only after 'The Problem of Anxiety'—we find a tendency to state the conflict-theory of affects explicitly. Landauer (54, p. 390) interpreted Freud's 'The Problem of Anxiety' to imply such a conflict-theory. He wrote:

The affective process is not a simple response to a stimulus . . . there are at work at least two directly conflicting tendencies. . . Freud thinks we must assume in all affects an inherited compro-

mise of this sort between conflicting tendencies . . . the affects are inherited hysterical attacks.

In a discussion of the state of affairs obtaining *after* definitive ego-formation, after *delay* of drive-discharge has been internalized—that is, after drives and discharge-controlling structures clash intrapsychically—such a conflict theory would be a matter of course for us;⁹ it seems less obvious at this point, where drives conflict with reality—i.e. where the absence of the drive-object is what prevents drive-action. Several considerations recommend themselves at this point: (1) To consider affects which derive from the clash between mounting drive-tension and the reality-absence of the drive-object as a prototype of conflict (namely, of that conflict which gives rise to affect-discharge) has a precedent in our theorizing: the derivation of anxiety from reality-danger. Freud (33, p. 116) wrote:

. . . instinctual demands often become an (internal) danger only because . . . their gratification would bring about an external one.

(2) In discussing the concept of 'unconscious affects' Freud inferred from his observations that the 'affect-charge' cathexis is *not* segregated in a persisting fashion from drive-cathexes proper; when repression (or other defence?) blocks its discharge it has—unlike the idea—no actual unconscious existence but only a potential one, in that when the discharge-channels are unblocked affect-discharge again serves as a safety-valve to mounting drive-tension. Freud wrote (28, pp. 110–11):

. . . we apply the term 'unconscious' to those affects that are restored when we undo the work of repression. So . . . the use of the term . . . is logical; but a comparison of the unconscious affect with the unconscious idea reveals the significant difference that the unconscious idea continues, after repression, as an actual formation in the system Unconscious, whilst to the unconscious affect there corresponds in the same system only a potential disposition which is prevented from developing further.

Thus in this conception 'affect-charge' would be defined simply as that amount of drive-cathexis which the constitutional nature—that is, thresholds—of the affect-discharge channels (motor, secretory, etc.), permits them to carry off. This is a pure 'dynamic theory' in which affects are created always *de novo*.¹⁰

⁹ Federn's affect-theory (12, p. 14 ff.), which is part of his ego-psychology, also implies such a conflict theory.

¹⁰ Cf. Freud, 33, pp. 19–20.

It will be discussed later whether or not such a conception can be sustained for the state of affairs that obtains after discharge-controls and delay are internalized and become the preventers of drive-discharge—that is whether or not ‘affect-charge’ remains always an unsegregated and *ad hoc* discharged part of drive-cathexis even when, with the advancement of psychic development, structuralization of other psychic functions becomes the typical form. It is clear here, however, that in this phase of his theorizing Freud considered affect-discharge a dynamic product (that of the conflict between mounting tension and discharge-preventing reality) and saw only its direction as determined by inborn discharge-avenues. A consideration of these discharge-avenues leads to the *factual fallacy* mentioned above.

The *fallacy* in question seems not to vitiate the core of the ‘conflict-theory’, but only to point up its limitations. It is a fallacy inherent in a purely dynamic—i.e. drive-cathexis—theory of affect. To bring this into sharp relief, let us remind ourselves that the stress we have put in our discussion on inborn discharge-channels of affects is in part ‘borrowed’ from Freud’s *The Problem of Anxiety*,¹¹ that is, from the third phase of the development of psycho-analytic theory. In the second phase, motor and secretory channels are neither treated with a stress on their inborn character, nor built into the theory. The very existence of inborn discharge-channels raises several questions: Does discharge in drive-action not itself have channels and thresholds? Or in other words: to what point (threshold) must drive-tension mount before discharge in action becomes imperative? Do inborn drive-discharge thresholds—as structures—prevent drive-discharge before the absence of the drive-object in reality prevents it, and thus before defences—or more generally: internalized delay-mechanisms—prevent it? Is it possible that such drive-discharge thresholds (disposition to frustration-tolerance?) have decisive influence on how the experience of the absence of the drive-object will affect psychic structure-formation? Does the relation of affect-discharge thresholds to drive-discharge thresholds explain why drive-action too (e.g. sexual intercourse, cf. Jacobson, 42)—and not only its delay—is accompanied by affect-discharge and affect-experience? Does

the relation of these two kinds of thresholds to each other influence decisively the development of controlling and defensive structures? These questions lead into the most obscure and least explored areas of psychic organization to which we refer by such terms as ‘disposition to anxiety’, ‘constitutional intensity of drives’ (Reich, 63; Freud, 35), etc. There are but a few facts known which are relevant to these questions:

(1) Affect-discharge can and does occur not only when the drive-object is absent, but also before the drive-tension has reached the point where its discharge is imperative, and even parallel with actual drive-discharge. These familiar phenomena cannot be explained by the dynamic—i.e. conflict—theory of affects. They indicate that a conflict and drive-safety-valve (dynamic-economic) theory of affect is insufficient and has to be supplemented by a structural theory, which must take into consideration affect-discharge and drive-discharge thresholds¹² (cf. Jacobson, 42, 43).

(2) It seems that we can conceive of two kinds of such thresholds: inborn ones (Freud’s —30, 32—‘stimulus barrier’ is of this type), and defensive counter-cathexes (repression is of this type). It is possible that a structural theory will explain the relations between drives and affects—pointed to in the questions above and in (1)—by the conflict of thresholds of defensive and controlling organizations of counter-cathexes with discharge-bent drive-tensions for which affects serve as safety-valves and indicators. It is, however, just as—indeed even more—possible that such a structural theory will have to take *inborn* discharge-thresholds also into consideration. In doing so it would have a precedent in Hartmann’s treatment of memory, motility, perceptual organs, as ego-apparatuses: that is, structures which unlike some other ego-structures do not grow from conflict, and are in this sense ‘autonomous’; rather, being innate they are pre-existent to the differentiation of the ego and the id from their undifferentiated matrix, and become—once the ego is fully developed—apparatuses in the service of the ego. Thus drive- and affect-discharge thresholds would be added to the so far familiar list of those inborn apparatuses which have primary autonomy from conflict (though these, too,

¹¹ Cf. Freud, 33, pp. 70–71, 117.

¹² It is not implied here that consideration of thresholds will alone make the theory a structural one, nor

that a structural theory considering thresholds is necessarily an adequate theory of affects.

like other such apparatuses, may become secondarily involved in conflict).

(3) These considerations are not pure theoretical niceties: there are clinical phenomena necessitating some such assumption. (a) The psychosomatic symptoms appearing in the first days of life, such as infantile exemata, inclination to colics, and also the early manifest individual differences, e.g. of hypo- and hypermotility, suggest the crucial role of differential thresholds in channelling the discharge of tensions into specific individually varying directions (10). (b) The observations of autistic disorders of infancy and childhood (Kanner, 47; Putnam, 59; Mahler, 57; Bergman and Escalona, 2) show hypersensitivities and affect-phenomena which are relevant in this context. Bergman and Escalona (2) felt that their observations could be explained by assuming that the discharge thresholds are low in these cases, giving rise to high sensitivity, with the result that a precocious, partial and uneven ego-development sets in, in order—as it were—to establish new and higher thresholds to compensate for the low inborn thresholds.

Summing up: The affect theory of the second phase of the development of psycho-analysis is a *cathectic (economic) theory* in that affect-discharge (affect-expression and affect-felt) is a discharge of a definite part of the accumulated drive-cathexis, termed *affect-charge*. It is a *dynamic theory* in that affect-charge is discharged as a safety-valve function when discharge of drive-cathexes by drive-action meets opposition ('conflict'). It is, however, also a *topographical theory* in that *affect-charge* is conceptualized as a drive-representation of the same order as the *idea*. It contains also traces of a *structural theory*, in that it stresses the importance of discharge-channels by characterizing affect-expression as discharge into the interior of the body, in contrast to action which is discharge into the external reality. As a structural theory it is quite unsatisfactory, in that it deals exclusively with primary affects carrying fully mobile drive-cathexes which strive to discharge with full intensity. This theory remains an id-theory of affects, not exploring their relation to, and function in the service of, the ego and its role in the development and release of the broad range and variety of what Fenichel (16, 17) has called 'tamed' affects. It was left to the third phase of the development of psycho-analytic theory to make the first systematic moves towards coping with

these problems, partly with the aid of the budding concepts of the structural point of view and ego-psychology, which were available for the first time, and partly as a means and a by-product of its attempts to develop these very concepts.

IV

The discussion of the affect-theory of the third phase of psycho-analytic theory must begin with the admission that here too the development of affect-theory has remained scanty, and received little attention; the beginnings we do possess have not been made very explicit, and are even less integrated with the rest of the theory than were the previous affect-theories. The discussion of this third affect-theory is even more difficult than that of the first two, because it presupposes a meta-psychological theory of psycho-analysis, complemented by the structural point of view (absorbing the topographical one), a systematic presentation of which is simply not extant. Hartmann's (38, 39), Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein's (40, 41), and my own (61, 62) efforts to develop such a systematic presentation remain incomplete; they will not be reviewed here, since the more incomplete a theory, the less it lends itself to concise restatement.

Though the systematic status of this third theory is still deplorable, its roots go back to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (23). There the conversion-theory of affects (particularly of anxiety) still persists in the framework of the cathectic (second phase) theory. Freud wrote (23, p. 521):

. . . the suppression of the Unconscious becomes necessary . . . [because] if the movement of ideas in the Unconscious were allowed to run its course, it would develop an affect which originally had the character of pleasure, but which, since the process of repression, bears the character of pain.

Nevertheless, traces of the third theory of affects already appear. Even then Freud recognized that one of the concomitants of the development of the secondary process and reality-testing is the 'taming' of affects to the point of changing them into signals, though he was also cognizant of the fact that this process is never crowned by complete success.

Thought must concern itself with the connecting-paths between ideas without allowing itself to be misled by their intensities. But it is obvious that condensations of ideas and intermediate or compromise-formations are obstacles to the attainment

of [this] . . . Such procedures are, therefore, carefully avoided in our secondary thinking. It will readily be seen, moreover, that the pain-principle, although at other times it *provides the thought-process with its most important clues*,¹³ may also put difficulties in its way in the pursuit of identity of thought. Hence, the tendency of the thinking process must always be to free itself more and more from exclusive regulation by the pain-principle, and *to restrict the development of affect through the work of thought to the very minimum which remains effective as a signal* . . .¹⁴ But . . . this refinement is seldom completely successful, even in normal psychic life, and . . . our thinking always remains liable to falsification by the intervention of the pain-principle (23, pp. 535-6).

Thus affects appear here as 'most important clues' and 'signals' of the secondary process, but also as 'falsifiers' of it, since this 'refinement is seldom completely successful', and therefore actually—to use Fenichel's term—affects of all degrees of 'taming' appear in consciousness.

Furthermore, defences directed against affects (in the example below: reaction-formation) are already noted and attributed to the 'secondary system'¹⁴ which binds cathexes—that is, delays and regulates discharge, instead of directly discharging mobile cathexes. Defence against affects is a part of the complex structural view of affects, and will be further discussed below. Freud wrote (23, p. 537):

. . . such a conversion of affect occurs in the course of development (one need only think of the emergence of disgust . . .) and that is connected with the activity of the secondary system.

It is in accord with this that in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and even more in 'The Unconscious' (28), there are indications of the conception that it is not repression which gives rise to anxiety (affect) but rather anxiety which is a motive of repression. Freud (28, p. 110) wrote:

. . . to suppress the development of affect is the true aim of repression and . . . its work does not terminate if this aim is not achieved.

But let us turn now from these predecessors to the third phase of the theory. *The Ego and the Id*, which officially ushers in the third phase

of psycho-analytic theory, contains a simile which paraphrases well the portent of the third phase of the theory of affects also; it forecasts the view that, owing to structure-development, processes which are originally related to the conflicts of the id recur and involve higher levels of psychic structure. Freud (31, p. 53) wrote:

The struggle that once raged in the deepest strata of the mind . . . is now carried on in a higher region, like the Battle of the Huns which in Kaulbach's painting is being fought out in the sky.

Otherwise, we find in *The Ego and the Id* little about affects in general, but much about guilt and unconscious guilt. I cannot discuss the complex issue of guilt here, since it would lead us far afield. I will restrict myself to pointing out—crudely simplifying matters—that Freud represents the guilt-affect as arising from a conflict of the ego with the super-ego; and that his discussion of 'unconscious guilt' again implies the conception of defence against affects. Thus a structural conflict theory of affects is already forecast here, and so is a hierarchic layering of affects. But at the same time Freud holds fast to the previous drive-theory of affects, though he has to invoke the death-instinct to do so. He writes (31, p. 77):

If we turn to melancholia first we find that the excessively strong super-ego which has obtained a hold upon consciousness rages against the ego with merciless fury as if it had taken possession of the whole of the sadism in the person concerned . . . The destructive component had entrenched itself in the super-ego and turned against the ego. What is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the death instinct. . . .

This conception of the guilt affect¹⁵ was further extended, in regard to both its origin in conflict and its multiple layering, by Jones in his 'Fear, Guilt and Hate' (45), which already makes use of Freud's major contribution to the third phase of affect-theory, i.e. *The Problem of Anxiety* (33). It is to my knowledge the first study of affects in the literature to make use of this advance in affect-theory. Jones shows that fear, hate, and guilt are multiple-layered, in that any one of them may

¹³ Italics mine (D. R.).

¹⁴ This point was then taken up first by Grueninger (37c).

¹⁵ Federn (11, 12) presents a different theory of guilt and of affects in general. His theory is not only the earliest but also the most extensive attempt to develop a theory of affects which takes the structural point of view

into account, and most of the problems and phenomena of affects touched on in the contributions here discussed have been noted and tackled in it; I will not discuss it here because its idiosyncratic character and terminology divides it from the mainstream of psycho-analytic thinking, and makes its presentation (short of a most extensive review) impossible.

appear not only under the basic dynamic conditions which usually give rise to it, but also as an outcome of defence against any of the others. This conception implies, besides the conflict origin of these 'secondary affects' and their hierarchic layering, the concept of defence against affects. Regrettably, Jones makes no clear distinction between the defence against the underlying drives and the defence against the affects; nor does he point up that these three affects are, even in their basic forms, of different orders of complexity (and thus imply even before the 'secondary defence' a hierarchic order) in the ascending sequence: fear, hate, guilt—although in the adult individual there are fears, hates and guilts of equivalent orders of complexity also. Jones (45, p. 396) wrote in his summary:

. . . I called attention to the various layers of secondary defence that covered the three attitudes of fear, hate and guilt, and pointed out that the defences themselves constituted a sort of 'return of the repressed'. We have seen how deep must be the primary layers of these three emotional attitudes, and also that two stages can be distinguished in the development of each of them. The relationship of the secondary layers would appear to be somewhat as follows. Any one of these primary attitudes may prove to be unendurable, and so secondary defensive reactions are in turn developed, these being derived, as was just indicated, from one of the other attributes. Thus a secondary hate may be developed as a means of coping with either fear or guilt, a secondary fear attitude ('signal' anxiety) as a means of coping with guilty hate, or rather the dangers that this brings, and occasionally even a secondary guilt as a means of coping with the other two. These secondary reactions are therefore of a regressive nature, and they subserve the same defensive function as all other regressions.

As we see, Jones leaves it rather indefinite whether these secondary affects are *the* defences pitted against the primary ones, or whether they issue from the defences that are brought to bear. This type of uncertainty—implying also the uncertainty of distinction between defences against drives and those against affects to be touched on below—is characteristic for the psycho-analytic theory of both defences and affects.

After this excursion on guilt, for the sake of which we have broken the chronological order, we come to Freud's *The Problem of Anxiety* (33),

which by its treatment of anxiety and defences ushered in ego-psychology, gave substance to the programme of the structural approach presented in *The Ego and the Id*, and constitutes the most important advance of the third phase of psycho-analytic theory in regard to the theory of affects.

In the first theory, affects were equated with drive-cathexes; in the second theory, they appeared as drive-representations, serving as safety-valves for drive-cathexes the discharge of which was prevented; in the third theory they appear as ego-functions, and as such are no longer safety-valves but are used as signals by the ego. Freud wrote:

Anxiety . . . [as any] affective state . . . can . . . be experienced only by the Ego (33, p. 80). [Anxiety is] not to be explained on an economic basis;¹⁶ . . . is not created *de novo* in repression but is reproduced as an affective state . . . (*ibid.*, p. 20).

This is then a structural view of affects. 'Affect-charge' if prevented from discharge does not become merely 'potential', as was asserted in the discussion of 'unconscious emotion'; it is structuralized and thus it can be reproduced as a signal without its 'economic basis', i.e. without 'affect discharge' actually taking place. The ego, which before the affect was 'tamed' into a signal endured it passively, now produces it actively.

Brierley's (6) was the first attempt to state the ego-theory of affects here implied. She did this partly by stressing the role of affects in the interplay between internal and external reality, and partly by insisting that affects are tension-, rather than discharge-, phenomena. Basically, however, she persisted with the second (cathectic) theory. She wrote (6, p. 259):

All our modern conceptions of the relation of anxiety to symptom-formation and of its role in development contradict the idea that affect is itself a discharge and support the view that it is a tension-phenomenon impelling to discharge either in the outer or the inner world. . . . Affects which appear to arise spontaneously always have unconscious stimuli and, in practice, we find affectivity tends to be high where frustration, particularly internal frustration, is marked.

In considering affects as tension-phenomena and in bringing up the question of thresholds, she touches on issues crucial to the structural

¹⁶ That is, the affect is no longer a cathectic discharge-process; it does not serve as a safety valve for drive-tension dammed up by repression.

approach, but she does not make the transition from the cathectic- to the signal-theory. She wrote (*ibid.*, pp. 259-60):

The conception of affects as tension-phenomena is, of course, in line with Freud's earliest formulations of the working of the psychic apparatus and the pleasure-pain principle (*The Interpretation of Dreams*). On the quantitative side we have, I think, to conceive of some threshold above which instinct-tension becomes appreciable as affect, and of a higher threshold, which may be attained either by the strength of the stimulus itself or by damming due to frustration, above which affect becomes intolerable and necessitates some immediate discharge, either outwards or inwards.

—Brierley's viewing of affects as tension-phenomena is certainly in keeping with the general conception of ego-psychology: the ego, the secondary process, strives on the one hand to bind mobile cathexes, and on the other to control and delay their discharge. But even in terms of the cathectic (second) theory one might consider affects as tension-phenomena, as phenomena of drive-tension mounting to threshold-intensity; though—since this theory is concerned with mobile cathexes and deals with the safety-valve role of affects—this distinction of tension *versus* discharge has little theoretical meaning in it. However, it has much theoretical meaning on the level of the third, the ego-theory, of affects. Yet it is possible that a *pure* tension-concept of affect (Brierley's is not quite that: note again the quote from pp. 259-60) empties out the baby with the bath water, by laying the foundations of an ego-theory of affects at the price of disregarding the indispensable elements of the superseded id-theory. Indeed Landauer (54) and Fenichel (16) referred to genetic (developmental) observations, showing how massive affect-discharge recedes with maturation, and thus began to lay the foundations of a theory which takes both the discharge and tension aspects of affect into consideration. Landauer (54, pp. 396-7) wrote:

Thus it is really only in children that we see affective attacks in an approximately pure form. But we see too how phylogenetically older affects are overlaid by others more recent and more complicated, which in their turn become obsolete and are gradually surmounted. Thus in a new-born baby fright can still be very easily and extensively mobilized, especially in the form of starting. It is only gradually that fright is increasingly pushed aside by anxiety.

and (*ibid.*, p. 401):

I have described anxiety as a secondary hysterical attack, which serves as a means of escape from the primary hysterical attack of fright. The affects of gaiety and sadness have been evolved as a means of escape from despair; they have absorbed the latter affect and amalgamated it with many other tendencies. In melancholic and manic seizures the two affects become to a large extent disintegrated and then certain characteristic features of despair become prominent.

Fenichel described the role of increasing ego-mastery in the decreasing discharge-character and increasing tension-character of affects during the course of development, as well as the consequences in affect-phenomena of pathological impairments of ego-mastery. Just as ideation is tamed into 'trying out' experimental action in thought, so, according to him, affect-discharge is tamed into anticipatory signals in the service of the ego. Fenichel (16, pp. 49-50) wrote:

... children and 'neurotic personalities', i.e. persons with many repressions, and therefore greater tensions, in general have more frequent emotional spells than normal adults. It is obvious that the normal adult does not lack emotions. But he does not have overwhelming emotional spells. Apparently the ego's increasing strength enables it somehow to get the upper hand of the affects at the moment when they arise. The ego is no longer overwhelmed by something alien to it, but it senses when this alien something begins to develop and simultaneously upon this recognition it re-establishes its mastery, binding the affects, using them for its purposes, 'taming' them as it were. To be sure, even the most adult ego can do this only to a certain degree. Too much excitement is emotionally upsetting for everyone. Thus we see that the first stage, in which the ego is weak and the affects dominant, is followed by a second in which the ego is strong and has learned to use the affects for its purposes. But a third state is always possible in which once more an elemental affect may overwhelm the organism.

Furthermore, Fenichel (17, p. 43) wrote:

When the child learns to control his motility, purposeful actions gradually take the place of mere discharge reactions; the child can now prolong the time between stimulus and reaction and achieve a certain tolerance of tension. The characteristic capacity for 'trying out' that is thus acquired changes the ego's relation to its affects. Affects are originally archaic discharge syndromes that supplant voluntary actions under certain exciting conditions. Now the growing ego learns to 'tame'

affects and to use them for its own anticipating purposes.

—Indeed, the very fact that Freud in his *The Problem of Anxiety* envisaged two forms of anxiety production—on the one hand, anxiety issuing from economic conditions, i.e. as safety-valve drive-discharge, and on the other, anxiety being issued by the ego as a signal (pp. 108–9)—already foreshadows Landauer's and Fenichel's views.

Most recently Jacobson (42) has criticized sharply both the tension-, and the discharge-theory of affects. She argued justly:

MacCurdy [56] and even Brierley [6] and Rappaport [60]¹⁷ seem to ignore . . . that not only all normal ego functions, but particularly direct instinct gratifications, such as the sexual act or eating, are accompanied by intensive affective expression (42, ms. p. 29).

Analysing the course of the pleasure-experience in orgasm, she concluded that (a) the orgasmic experience includes alternating increases of tension and partial discharges accompanying the rise of tension to a climax and its drop after the climax; (b) the affect-experience corresponds neither to tension nor to discharge *per se*, but rather to the change (increase or decrease) in tension. Thus hers, too, is a combined tension- and discharge-theory of affect. But this theory leaves us with the questions: (a) does it not limit itself to considering only the conscious experience of affect? (b) does it not equate the concepts of pleasure-pain as defined in the pleasure-principle with subjectively experienced affect? But more about this later. Jacobson (42, p. 39) wrote:

If what we perceive as feelings is not 'tension'—in contradistinction to 'discharge'—but the flux of mobile psychic energy released, the changes in the level of tension—or in the amount of excitation respectively—above a certain threshold, then Brierley's tension-concept would become more meaningful. But her argument against the discharge idea would be senseless, because what we would 'feel' would be the rises as well as the drops of tension in the course of a discharge process.

The recent closely reasoned and stimulating manuscript of M. Schur (67) concerning the

theory of anxiety centres also on this discharge *versus* signal (tension) dichotomy, and proposes a theory to resolve it. His theory—as I see it—stresses that the ego is always passive in anxiety experiences, and that anxiety is always a regression phenomenon. He therefore negates the 'signal-theory' and explains the role of the ego in anxiety by means of Kris's (51) concept of 'regression in the service of the ego.' Though Schur's theory appears to have a primarily id-psychological slant, actually it touches on the least clear, yet central issues of the ego-psychology of affects, and it treats of ego-aspects of the anxiety and affect problem not heretofore discussed in the literature.

But let us return to the affect theory of *The Problem of Anxiety*, to outline further features of it. Freud takes cognizance there of the innate factors in affect-formation.¹⁸ He characterizes affects as congenital hysterical attacks and suggests that even the obscure phobias of early childhood are remnants of congenital equipment commonly observed in animals. Freud (33, pp. 70–71) wrote:

For we hold that other affects as well are reproductions of past experiences of a character vital to the organism, experiences possibly even antedating the individual; and we draw a comparison between these, as universal, specific, congenital hysterical attacks, and the seizures of the hysterical neurosis, later and individually acquired, the genesis and significance of which as memory symbols have been made clearly manifest by analysis. It would of course be most desirable to be able to demonstrate the validity of this conception for a number of other affects, but at the present time we are far from being in a position to do this.

and further (*ibid.*, p. 117):

The enigmatic phobias of early childhood deserve mention once again at this point. Certain of them—the fear of being alone, of the dark, of strangers—we can understand as reactions to the danger of object loss; with regard to others—fear of small animals, thunderstorms, etc.—there is the possibility that they represent the atrophied remnants of an innate preparedness against reality dangers such as is so well developed in other animals. It is the part of this archaic heritage having to do with object loss which alone has utility for man. If such childhood phobias become fixed, grow more intense, and persist into a later period of life,

¹⁷ Jacobson's criticism applies to my discussion in *Emotions and Memory* (60), which at the time failed to consider the structural ego-psychological issues. Cf., however, my discussions in *Organization and Pathology of Thought* (61), and in 'The Conceptual Model of Psy-

choanalysis' (62).

¹⁸ In doing so, he returns to a conception expressed already in *Studies in Hysteria* (pp. 151–2), according to which hysterical attacks are abnormal expressions of affects.

analysis demonstrates that their content has become connected with instinctual demands, has become the representative of internal dangers also.

Thus Freud's ego-theory of affects implies the recognition of the innate character of some basic affect-discharge channels, and even the innate character of their thresholds and of their relation to releasing stimuli. It seems safe to assert that any theory of affects which implies the structural point of view will consider these innate aspects of affects as its point of departure. But Freud's theory also shows how these innate structures are to be embedded into the rest of the theory. These preformed affect-discharge channels are made use of for safety-valve discharge by a whole series of conflicted drives on various levels of structure-formation in the course of development. In the case of anxiety, for instance, the series of conflicts has the common denominator of helplessness, and some of the situations in which conflicts leading to helplessness use anxiety as a safety-valve are: birth, separation from the mother, castration threat, etc. Furthermore, Freud points up that these inborn discharge-channels and thresholds—as well as new ones formed in the course of development—come progressively, with advancing psychic structure-formation, under the control of the ego. Freud (33, pp. 114–5) wrote:

The danger situation is the recognized, remembered and anticipated situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to helplessness in the traumatic situation, which is later reproduced as a call for help in the danger situation. The ego, which has experienced the trauma passively, now actively repeats an attenuated reproduction of it with the idea of taking into its own hands the directing of its course.

and further (*ibid.*, pp. 108–9):

The anxiety felt in the process of birth now became the prototype of an affective state which was obliged to share the fate of other affects. It was reproduced either automatically in situations which were analogous to that of its origin and as an inexpedient type of reaction, after having been an appropriate one in the initial situation of danger; or else the ego acquired control over this affect and reproduced it itself, making use of it as a warning of danger and as a means of rousing into action the pleasure-pain mechanism. . . . To anxiety in later life were thus attributed two modes of origin: the one involuntary, automatic, economically justified when-

ever there arose a situation of danger analogous to birth; the other, produced by the ego when such a situation merely threatened, in order to procure its avoidance.

Fenichel (17, pp. 133–4) states some aspects of this view of the development of affects concisely:

This triple stratification of anxiety may be summarized in a short table:

- (1) Trauma Anxiety automatic and unspecific.
- (2) Danger Anxiety in the service of the ego, affect created by anticipation, controlled and used as a warning signal.
- (3) Panic¹⁹ Ego control fails, affect becomes overwhelming, regression to state (1); anxiety spell in anxiety hysteria.

The same triple stratification of anxiety will be found again in all other affects.

While as a schema this triple stratification appears to be correct, in actuality there is a fluid transition between the three; Fenichel's emphasis on ego-control also seems to imply that there are transitions of all shades between these three strata, depending on the availability of the synthesizing forces of the ego (and these, of course, vary in the course of individual development, show inter-individual variations, and fluctuate in the adult individual also). On the one hand, there occur normally, even at sustained ego-control, automatic affect-phenomena; on the other, affect-attacks due to pathological failing of ego-controls have many shades short of panic. This, too, seems to be the implication of Fenichel's phrase concerning the ego's 'taming' of affects. One facet of this process is described in Jones' discussion of the various layers of hate, fear, and guilt affects, and of their relation to defensive operations. Further light is thrown on it by the process of binding of affects by processes of thought, pointed out already by Freud and Breuer. They (18, p. 31) wrote:

Abreaction is . . . not the only . . . solution. . . . The normal man succeeds by means of associations in dissipating the accompanying affect.

This process of binding affects by processes of thought is elucidated in Freud's description of the work of mourning. He (29, p. 154) wrote:

The task is now carried through bit by bit, under great expense of time and cathectic energy, while

¹⁹ Fenichel (13) likes to use the analogy that panic occurs when the drive-tension is excessive, and thus the anxiety signal acts as a lighted match in a powder keg.

all the time the existence of the lost object is continued in the mind. Each single one of the memories and hopes which bound the libido to the object is brought up and hypercatheted, and the detachment of the libido from it accomplished. Why this process of carrying out the behest of reality bit by bit, which is in the nature of compromise, should be so extraordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain in terms of mental economics. It is worth noting that this pain seems natural to us. The fact is, however, that when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again.

Glover's characterization of certain obsessional systems, too, seems to be relevant and to elucidate this process of binding. Indeed it seems to link 'binding' and 'taming' of affects, and to suggest that their end-products are variable and modulated affects instead of massive affect-attacks. Glover (36, p. 137) wrote:

. . . we see that apparently complicated rituals . . . provide an ever more complicated meshwork of conceptual systems through which affect may pass in a finely divided state. When . . . these rituals are interfered with, we observe once more the existence of massive affects.

Fenichel's and A. Freud's discussions of defences against affects elucidate this taming process. Fenichel's discussion (14) of defence against anxiety, and of anxiety as a motive of defence, is a particularly instructive analysis of the hierarchic layering of gradually tamed affects. Anna Freud's (17a) discussion centres on the relation between defences against drives and defences against affects, and states sharply the relative independence of these two. She wrote (pp. 34-5):

We know that the fate of the affect associated with an instinctual demand is not simply identical with that of its ideational representative. Obviously, however, one and the same ego can have at its disposal only a limited number of possible means of defence. At particular periods in life and according to its own specific structure the individual ego selects now one defensive method now another—it may be repression, displacement, reversal, etc.—and these it can employ both in its conflict with the instincts and in its defence against the liberation of affect. If we know how a particular patient seeks to defend himself against the emergence of his instinctual impulses, i.e. what is the nature of his habitual ego-resistances, we can form an idea of his probable attitude towards his own unwelcome affects. If, in another patient, particular forms of affect-transformation are strongly in evidence, such as complete suppression of emotion, denial,

etc., we shall not be surprised if he adopts the same methods of defence against his instinctual impulses and his free associations. It is the same ego, and in all its conflicts it is more or less consistent in using every means which it has at its command.

Fenichel pursues further Anna Freud's distinction between defences against drives and defences against affects; his treatment of blocking, postponement, displacement, equivalents, reaction-formations, change of quality, isolation, projection and introjection, and the varieties of defences against guilt (16 and 17, p. 161 ff.) appears to be singular in the literature. Yet even this discussion leaves the concept of 'defence against affects' with some of the same lack of clarity as Jones' (45) contribution left it. (a) Fenichel speaks of defences against affects as 'primitive defences', a phrase suggesting a relation to 'pre-stages of defence'. 'Pre-stages of defence' in turn seems at least in part to imply for Fenichel (17) inborn mechanisms; it certainly implies for Hartmann (38) such inborn mechanisms of 'primary autonomy' which determine the subsequent choice of defence-mechanisms used against drives. If these 'primitive defences' against affects are indeed to be so understood, then they must be closely linked to, or identical with, the thresholds and other propensities of inborn affect discharge-channels. (b) Fenichel does not shut the door on interpreting 'defence against affects' as defence against the drive-impulse which gave rise to them; though (c) in the main he seems—in agreement with A. Freud—to suggest that signal-affect just like thought, and affect-charge just like ideas, and all of these just like drives, are subject to defensive operations. It is possible that this lack of clarity arises because all these three forms of defence are extant and used on the various levels of the motivational and structural hierarchy in all kinds of complex combinations.

Landauer pointed out another aspect of the 'taming of affects', namely their changing their 'attack' character to one of a continuous state, and attributed it to continuous super-ego stimulation, as Freud did for grief (29), guilt (31), and certain forms of anxiety (33). Landauer (54, p. 389) wrote:

Are the affects really reactions? In children we still see them as such. But in later life anxiety is apparently continuous in the anxious-minded, the pessimist is permanently melancholy and the cheerful man consistently buoyant. How does an

isolated reaction become a continuous state? Freud has solved this problem in the theory of the affects by demonstrating the function of the super-ego in their release. He illustrated his remarks chiefly from the example of anxiety.

Landauer expressed the conception of continuous affect-stimulation in a different way also, implying—as did Jones (45)—a conception of hierarchic layering of affects arising from defensive operations, directed against more basic affects. Landauer (54, p. 402) wrote:

Some of the affects have been relegated to subordinate egos, whilst the ego-in-chief addresses itself to reality in a manner at once reasonable and good, affectionate and defensive. These affects have gradually become shut off, have dwindled into mere reflexes. But the converse process may take place and super-affects be formed. Thus there arises embarrassment, i.e. fear of shame, and prudence, i.e. fear of anxiety. Since a prohibited affect threatens to return again and again, the super-affect, once formed, seems to be continuously present. A mood or a certain type of temperament is created. The commonest super-affect is certainly anxiety, but there are quite a number of other super-affects. Embarrassment may mean not only that we fear shame but that we are ashamed of fear. Next to anxiety sadness is, I think, the commonest super-affect. Since it may bring about a real loss of love or, later, forestalling the condemnation of the super-ego, an endopsychic loss of love, sadness becomes itself an occasion for sadness.

While Landauer's terminology (subordinate egos, super-affects) is not easy to follow and his documentation is insufficient, he certainly points more than any other psycho-analytic author—excepting perhaps Flügel (1948)—to the need to explain continuous affects which take the form of structuralized affective states and even of character traits. Flügel (1948)—like Drever—notes the insufficiencies of a purely dynamic conflict-theory of affect for the explanation of sustained pleasurable affects, and advances a theory of hierarchically layered derivative needs to explain these. Landauer's suggestion that continuous affects are to be explained by continuous stimulation by one of the three structural divisions of the psyche

seems to fit certain cases (e.g. certain forms of sadness and guilt). But studies of boredom (Fenichel, 14; Greenson, 1951), apathy (Greenson, 1950), teasing (Sperling, 1951), Freud's (34) discussion of humour, Kris's (48, 49, 50) various papers on the comic, and particularly Bibring's (3a) discussion of depression and Brenman's (4) discussion of teasing, suggest that in general such affective states are too complex to be so accounted for, and though they are ego-reactions or ego-states, yet in them ego, id, and super-ego contributions are integrated into complex quasi-stable substructures.²⁰

The attempt to develop a definitive psycho-analytic theory of affects has culminated in two attempts at a classification of affects. The first of these, Glover's (37, p. 300), brought the great variety and complexity of affect phenomena most clearly to the fore:

... affective phenomena call for a greater variety of approaches than any other mental manifestation. This is borne out by the fact that affects can be classified in a great variety of ways. They can be described in crude qualitative terms, e.g. of subjective pleasure or 'pain', or labelled descriptively according to the predominant ideational system associated with them in consciousness. They can be classified by reference to the instinct or component instinct from which they are derived, or they can be considered as either 'fixed' or 'labile'. They can be divided into primary affects and secondary affects, more precisely into 'positive' and 'reactive' affects, or they can be considered as tension and discharge phenomena. Finally, they can be grouped as simple or compound ('mixed' and/or 'fused') affects.

Otherwise, however, Glover's theory failed to pass from the second (cathectic) to the third (signal) level of affect-theory, and remained—as Jacobson (42, p. 21) implied in her discussion of it—a fragmentary drive-theory without significant application of the structural point of view. The second of these classifications implying an affect theory—Jacobson's—is founded on the structural point of view and succeeds in restating the 'conflict theory' of affects in structural terms. In this theory, affects arise from tensions in the id or ego, or

²⁰ By this comparison I do not imply that Landauer's super-affects, moods, affect-attitudes crystallized into character-traits, apathy, etc., are of the same order of complexity. I mean only that all these, though they must be dealt with by a theory of affects, are complex integrated formations which cannot be accounted for by an affect-theory alone. Kris's contributions are well known, thus only his theory of the affective reaction to

the becoming conscious of daydreams (51) should be particularly pointed to. Bibring's (3a) and Brenman's (4) contributions are, however, little known and the reader's attention is called to their far-reaching implications for the extension of the structural point of view in general and that of the theory of affective states in particular. It would lead too far afield to discuss them here.

from tensions between id and ego, or ego and super-ego. Jacobson (42, pp. 22-3) wrote:

We may consider replacing . . . [Glover's] with a classification that employs our current structural concepts. Even though all affects are ego experiences and develop in the ego, one of their qualitative determinants must be the site of the underlying energetic tension by which they have been induced and which may arise anywhere within the psychic organization. Practically, certain affects have always been characterized in this way; guilt feelings, for instance, are commonly defined as arising from a tension between ego and super-ego. There is no reason why we should not introduce this kind of classification for affect types in general. Thus we might distinguish:

- (1) simple and compound affects arising from intrasystemic tension:
 - (a) affects that represent instinctual drives proper, i.e. that arise directly from tensions in the id (e.g. sexual excitement, rage);
 - (b) affects that develop directly from tensions in the ego²¹ (e.g. fear of reality and physical pain, as well as components of the more enduring feelings and feeling attitudes, such as object love and hate or thing interest);
- (2) simple and compound affects induced by intersystemic tensions:
 - (a) affects induced by tensions between the ego and the id (e.g. fear of the id, components of disgust, shame, and pity);
 - (b) affects induced by tensions between ego and super-ego (e.g. guilt feelings, components of depression).

As will be noticed, I have not included tensions between ego and reality. These represent conflict, that is, affective responses to reality. The underlying energetic psychic tension can only arise within the psychic organization and not between it and the outside world. (This is another example of the prevailing lack of distinction between affective and energetic processes.)

The problems Jacobson's theory leaves us with are these: (a) One wonders whether or not her structural theory is achieved at a price of disregarding some of the insights (drive representation, affect-charge, affect-discharge) of Freud's previous drive-theory of affects without which an affect-theory cannot be complete, since it

would disregard the hierarchic continuum discussed above. (b) One is left uncertain whether her treatment of pleasure and pain (referred to earlier in this paper) means to subsume pleasure and pain as affects, and if so, whether or not so doing disregards the fact that in the conception of the 'pleasure-pain principle' pleasure and pain are *neither affects* subjectively felt nor 'affect-charges', *but concepts* the referent of which is the process of discharge regulation; the various phases of this may or may not be experienced as pleasure or pain, and if they are so experienced, they *are not just pleasure or pain in general but specific qualities of pleasure and pain.*²² (c) It is difficult to be sure whether or not Jacobson, by limiting her discussion to the conscious subjective experience of affect, has neglected affect-discharge and affect-equivalents, for which it is hard to account without incorporating the second (the cathectic) theory into the definitive one. An affect-theory centred on the conscious experience of affects runs into yet another difficulty: the very act of becoming conscious is dependent on a complex balance involving more than just the affect-process (cf. Kris, 51, and Brenman, 4). (d) One wonders whether in its classificatory simplicity it may not preclude a theoretical accounting of the many shades and varieties of affects arising in the taming process, as well as those varieties of continuous 'affective states' which we referred to above and which appear to be quasi-stable formations integrating complex id, ego, and super-ego contributions and their shifting balances into something like a sub-structure. In passing, it may be mentioned that the structural point of view does not seem to stop at the analysis of ego, id, super-ego factors; it enters upon the study of structuralization within each of these, as well as upon the study of structuralization of functions uniting components from all (Hartmann, 38; Kris, 51; Brenman, 4).

V

The complexity of the phenomena and of the theoretical implications of affects which I have attempted to unfold here in the fashion of a review makes a definitive formulation of an up-to-date psycho-analytic theory of affects certainly ill-advised, if not impossible. Yet I

²¹ Federn (12) has dealt with these extensively and, indeed, attempted to reduce all affects to this category.

²² The same difficulty is particularly clear in a paper by Jelgersma (44) dealing with the psycho-analytic theory of feelings.

should like to sketch the outlines of a theory as it seems to emerge from this review, because even though necessarily characterized by gaps and assumptions easily proved to be unwarranted, it will give us one possible interpretation of where we stand and thus may facilitate orientation for future observation and theorizing.

The following outline of a theory attempts to integrate the affect theories of the second and third phase, and uses some contribution from the theory of the first phase.

(1) Affects use—to begin with—inborn channels and thresholds of discharge. These may be considered apparatuses pre-existing the differentiation of ego and id from their undifferentiated matrix (Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, 40). This is the referent of the phrase 'affects are inherited hysterical attacks'. In this respect affects are common properties of the species, and this may have to do with the roots of their social role in communication and empathy (Schilder, 65). Yet even in this respect there are already at birth great inter-individual differences (Bergman and Escalona, 2; Escalona and Leitch, 10) which seem to have to do with what develops into 'predisposition to anxiety' and into various affect-equivalents in psychosomatic pathology, as well as into various 'frozen affects' taking the form of character traits (Reich, 63).

(2) At the reconstructed hypothetical stage (see p. 182 ff., above) where the pleasure-principle holds full sway, drive- (mobile-) cathexes strive for immediate discharge; affects arise as safety-valve functions when drive-discharge by drive-action is not possible because of the absence of the drive-object in reality. This stage is hypothetical because drive-tension, too, has thresholds and before these are reached no discharge occurs; thus these set limits to the full success of the pleasure-principle, i.e. they prevent a completely tensionless state. At this stage affects appear as discharge-phenomena of a part (a determinate quantity) of drive-cathexis, which is conceptualized as 'affect-charge' and is probably determined by the amount of cathexis the various inborn affect-discharge channels can carry.

(3) 'Affect charge' and 'idea' are drive-representations, both still operating with mobile cathexes, abiding by the pleasure-principle. Affect-discharges are massive affect-storms, which discharge into the interior of the body through secretory and motor innervations,

instead of discharging in action on to the drive-object.

(4) The general development of psychic structure begins with innate discharge-regulating thresholds, is fostered by delays of discharge enforced by reality conditions, and progresses by internalization of the delay of discharge caused by reality, establishing an *ability to delay*. This ability is achieved by defences (counter-cathetic energy-distributions), which may be regarded as alterations of discharge-thresholds. The damming up of drives by defences makes for more intensive and more varied use of the affect-discharge channels and of the corresponding 'affect-charges'.

The establishment of counter-cathetic energy distributions, however, has other crucial consequences. It gives rise to varied derivative and partial drives (the latter particularly in conjunction with somatic maturation), some of which arise as modifications of the drives defended against, others as modifications of drives to which the counter-cathetic energy-distributions generalized (that is, spread or were displaced), others as motivating forces originating from the counter-cathetic energy-distributions themselves (cf. Rapaport, 61, pp. 699-701). These all have their thresholds of discharge, and when prevented from discharging by reality conditions or by the counter-cathetic energy-distributions which developed as internalizations of these reality conditions, they apparently use and modify the thresholds of the existing affect-discharge channels. This process is repeated variously for the derivative and partial motivations also in the course of development, giving rise to a hierarchy of motivations ranging from drives to interests and preferences. This process is apparently synonymous with that of binding (Freud, 23; see also Rapaport, 62) and/or neutralization (Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, 41) of mobile cathexes. Another aspect of this process is the development of the secondary thought-process from the primary one, that of experimental action in thought by means of small amounts of bound (neutralized) cathexes and memory traces, from hallucinatory gratification by means of drive-cathexing of memory traces to perceptual (hallucinatory) intensity (see Freud, 25; also Rapaport, 61). The drive-representing idea tends to become reality-representing thought. Drive-discharge is delayed and becomes action using thought as preparation, and the tension dammed up by delay is dis-

charged through the safety-valve of affect-discharge. But affects do not remain inborn discharge-channels used by dammed up-drives as safety-valves; they too partake in the development sketched: they become progressively tamed. This is achieved by various means: (a) At each level of the motivational hierarchy the derivative motivations use affects as safety-valve discharge-channels, but the cathexes of these motivations are more and more neutralized with the ascent of the hierarchy; consequently the cathexes of the affect-charges too become less and less preemptory, and the affect-discharges less automatic and massive. (b) It appears that not only are the discharge-thresholds of the drive-derivatives and of the affects altered with the ascent of the hierarchy, but also new, more complex, and subtle affect discharge-channels are created with general maturation, ascending hierarchy, and psychic structure-formation. (c) Furthermore, affect-charges themselves also seem to become subject to defensive counter-cathecting, that is, to direct modification of their discharge-thresholds.

(5) This hierarchic development has a dual outcome: (a) On the one hand, since various drives and derivative drives (motivations) from all levels of the hierarchy remain effective in psychic life, we find in the normal adult also affect-phenomena of quite mobile cathexes, akin to massive affect-attacks, just as we find in his conscious thought primary-process phenomena too. (b) On the other hand we find affects of highly neutralized cathexes, which serve as signals and means of reality-testing for orientation to both external reality (danger) and internal reality (drive-inundation). The continuum of affects extends in all shadings from massive affect-attacks to mere signals and even signals of signals (Fenichel, 13). The development of the motivational- and affect-hierarchy is one aspect of structure-formation and ego-development. In the course of it the ego, which originally endured affects passively, obtains control of them and comes to release them in tamed forms of anticipatory signals. Massive affect-attacks may come about either owing to weakening of ego-control or with the 'consent' of the ego as 'regressions in the service of the ego' (Kris, 51); Schur (67)

suggests that affect-signals too are such 'regressions in the service of the ego'. To be sure, there are great differences within the normal range as to which end of the affect-continuum, and which qualities of affect within it, are emphasized in the individual. On the whole, the less rich the hierarchic development of controlling counter-cathectic energy-distributions, the less the variability and modulation and the greater the intensity of massive affect-outburst; the less flexible and more excessively rigid these controls, the more meagre both in intensity, variability, and modulation affects become; and, as so often in life-phenomena, the optimum is not the maximum. Rich and modulated affect-life appears to be the indicator of a 'strong ego'.

(b) 'Affect-charge' if discharged may arouse further tensions. To prevent the development of these, the underlying drive as well as the 'affect-charge' must be defended against. Thus affects (e.g., anxiety) become motives of defence (Fenichel, 17). It appears that otherwise also, under special conditions, affect-charge as energy-quantity may come to play the role of motivation. But these conditions are not well understood and it is not certain that, if understood, they cannot be accounted for by assuming that the drive underlying the affect rather than the affect itself acts as the motivation. Should this way out not prove feasible, we are faced with a return—true, only a limited and partial one—of the first phase of affect-theory, in the framework of the third-phase theory.

(7) The development of the ascending hierarchy of motivations appears to be one aspect of psychic structure-formation, id-ego-superego differentiation. On each level of the hierarchy the conflict of discharge-bent cathexes with innate thresholds, or with reality (absent object), or with counter-cathexes, is the *dynamic aspect* of affect-formation. The *economic aspect* of affect-formation is the partial discharge of motivational cathexes of ever-increasing neutralization. The *structural aspect* and the *adaptive aspect*²³ of affect-formation are more complex.

(8) *Structurally* the integration of the ascending motivational systems into id, ego, and super-ego amounts to the creation of mutually

²³ The 'adaptive aspect' is not of the same order as the dynamic, economic and structural. Actually it may be regarded as part of the structural aspect. It is here

separated and singled out thus because of its singular importance, which has been already stressed by Hartmann (38).

controlling systems of organization, continuous conflicts among which also give rise to tensions and to their discharge, i.e. to affects which may thus become continuous. This is what Landauer (54) and Jacobson (42) conceptualized, following Freud's (31, 33) lead. But such enduring affective states are mostly not outcomes of a conflict within one, or between two, of the three institutions; rather they often come about as integrations of complex balances and conflicts of components from all three major structural divisions of the psyche. The closer study of these complex affect-states and of their chronic characterological forms (see e.g. Brenman, 4) may lead to an important advancement of the structural point of view.

(9) From the *point of view of adaptation*: On the one hand, affects seem to start even in human beings to some extent—and certainly in animals—as what Hartmann called states of adaptedness: that is, the affect-discharge apparatus has a limited attunement to certain external reality stimuli, such as is seen in startle (Landis, 55) and smile (Spitz, 69). On the other hand, affects as signals are just as indispensable a means of reality-testing as thoughts. Indeed, they are more indispensable

for reality-testing in all except successfully intellectualizing and obsessional characters. Reality-testing without the contribution of affect-signal readily changes into obsessional or paranoid magic. The expelled affect-signal returns through the back door: there is no warning of the impending affect-formation which may therefore, unimpeded, appear as mobile cathexis and disturber of the secondary process.

VI

The theory of affects, the bare outlines of which seem to emerge, integrates three components: *inborn affect discharge-channels* and discharge-thresholds of drive-cathexes; the use of these inborn channels as safety-valves and indicators of drive-tension, the modification of their thresholds by drives and derivative motivations prevented from drive-action, and the formation thereby of *the drive-representation termed affect-charge*; and the progressive 'taming' and advancing ego-control, in the course of psychic structure-formation, of the affects which are thereby turned into *affect-signals* released by the ego.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- (1) ALEXANDER, F., 'Fundamental Concepts of Psychosomatic Research: Psychogenesis, Conversion, Specificity', *Psychosom. Med.*, 5, 205-210, 1943.
- (2) BERGMAN, P. and ESCALONA, S. 'Unusual Sensitivities in Very Young Children.' In: *The Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, 3/4, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1949, pp. 333-352.
- (3a) BIBRING, E. 'On Depression'. Unpublished ms., 1947.
- (3) BLEULER, E. 'Affectivity, Suggestibility, Paranoia', *State Hosp. Bull.*, 4, 481-601, 1912.
- (4) BRENNAN, M. 'On Teasing and Being Teased: and the Problem of "Moral Masochism"', *The Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, 7.
- (5) BREUER, J. and FREUD, S. (1895). *Studies in Hysteria*. Trans. by A. A. Brill, New York, Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Monographs, 1937.
- (6) BRIERLEY, M. 'Affects in Theory and Practice', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 18, 256-268, 1937.
- (7) BÜRGER-PRINZ, H. and KAILA, M. 'Über die Struktur des amnestischen Symptomenkomplexes', *Z. Neurol. Psychiat.*, 124, 553-595, 1930. 'On the Structure of the Amnesic Syndrome.' In: *Organization and Pathology of Thought*, ed. by David Rapaport, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 650-686.
- (8) DEUTSCH, H. 'Some Forms of Emotional Disturbance and Their Relationship to Schizophrenia', *Yearb. of Psa.*, 1, 121-136, 1945.
- (9) DEWEY, J. 'The Theory of Emotion', *Psa. Rev.*, 1, 553-569, 1894; 2, 13-32, 1895.
- (9a) DREVER, J. *Instinct in Man*. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1917.
- (10) ESCALONA, S. and LEITCH, M. 'Progress Report: Early Phases of Personality Development; A Non-Normative Study of Infant Behavior', Report to the U.S. Public Health Service, Project MH-27, 1951.
- (11) FEDERN, P. 'Das Ich als Subjekt und Objekt im Narzissismus', *Int. Z. Psa.*, 15, 393-425, 1929.
- (12) ——— 'Zur Unterscheidung des gesunden und krankhaften Narzissismus', *Imago*, 22, 1-40, 1936.
- (13) FENICHEL, O. 'Über Angstabwehr, insbesondere durch Libidinisierung', *Int. Z. Psa.*, 20, 476-489, 1934. 'Concerning Defense Against Anxiety, Particularly by Libidinization.' In: *The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel*, New York, Norton, in press.

- (14) FENICHEL, O. 'Zur Psychologie der Langlebigkeit', *Imago*, 20, 270-281, 1934. 'On the Psychology of Boredom.' In: *Organization and Pathology of Thought*, ed. by David Rapaport, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 349-361.
- (15) — 'Zur Theorie der psychoanalytischen Technik', *Int. Z. Psa.*, 21, 78-95, 1935. 'Concerning the Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique.' In: *The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel*, New York, Norton, in press.
- (16) — 'The Ego and the Affects', *Psa. Rev.*, 28, 47-60, 1941.
- (17) — *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*, New York, Norton, 1945.
- (17a) FREUD, A. (1936). *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*. New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1946.
- (18) FREUD, S. (1893). 'On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. I, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 24-41.
- (19) — (1894). 'The Defence Neuro-Psychoses', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. I, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 59-75.
- (20) — (1894). 'The Justification for Detaching from Neurasthenia a Particular Syndrome: The Anxiety-Neurosis', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. I, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 76-106.
- (21) — (1895). 'Entwurf einer Psychologie', *Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse*, London, Imago Publishing Co., 1950, pp. 373-466.
- (22) — (1898). 'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. I, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 220-248.
- (23) — (1900). 'The Interpretation of Dreams', *The Basic Writings*, New York, Modern Library, 1938, pp. 179-548.
- (24) — (1909). 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. III, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 149-289.
- (25) — (1911). 'Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. IV, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 13-21.
- (26) — (1914). 'Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis. Recollection, Repetition and Working Through', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. II, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 366-376.
- (27) — (1915). 'Repression', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. IV, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 84-97.
- (28) — (1915). 'The Unconscious', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. IV, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 98-136.
- (29) — (1917). 'Mourning and Melancholia', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. IV, London, Hogarth, 1946, pp. 152-170.
- (30) — (1920). *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, London, Int. Psa. Press, 1922.
- (31) — (1923). *The Ego and the Id*, London, Hogarth, 1927.
- (32) — (1925). 'A Note upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad"', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. V, London, Hogarth, 1950, pp. 175-180.
- (33) — (1926). *The Problem of Anxiety*, New York, Norton, 1936.
- (34) — (1928). 'Humour', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. V, London, Hogarth, 1950, pp. 215-221.
- (35) — (1937). 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', *Col. Pap.*, Vol. V, London, Hogarth, 1950, pp. 316-357.
- (36) GLOVER, E. 'A Developmental Study of the Obsessional Neuroses', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 16, 131-144, 1935.
- (37) — 'The Psycho-Analysis of Affects', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 20, 299-307, 1939.
- (37a) GREENSON, R. 'The Psychology of Apathy', *Psa. Quart.*, 18, 290-302; 1949.
- (37b) GREENSON, R. 'Apathetic and Agitated Boredom'. Unpublished ms., 1950.
- (37c) GRÜNINGER, U. *Zum Problem der Affektverschiebung*. Zürich, Buchdruckerei, des Schweizerischen Grütlivereins, 1917.
- (38) HARTMANN, H. 'Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem', *Int. Z. Psa. and Imago*, 24, 62-135, 1939. 'Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.' In: *Organization and Pathology of Thought*, ed. by David Rapaport, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 362-396.
- (39) HARTMANN, H. 'Technical Implications of Ego Psychology', *Psa. Quart.*, 20, 31-43, 1951.
- (40) HARTMANN, H., KRIS, E., and LOEWENSTEIN, R. 'Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure.' In: *The Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, 2, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1946, pp. 11-38.
- (41) — 'Notes on the Theory of Aggression.' In: *The Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, 3/4, New York, Int. Univ. Press, 1949, pp. 9-36.
- (42) JACOBSON, E. 'The Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects', ms., 1951.
- (43) — 'The Influence of the Speed Factors on the Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities of Feelings and Their Relations to the Psychic Discharge Processes', ms., 1952.
- (44) JELGERSMA, G. 'Psychoanalytischer Beitrag zu einer Theorie des Gefühls', *Int. Z. Psa.*, 7, 1-8, 1921.
- (45) JONES, E. 'Fear, Guilt and Hate', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 10, 383-397, 1929.
- (46) JUNG, C. (1906). *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, New York, Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub., 3, 1944.
- (47) KANNER, L. 'Early Infantile Autism', *J. Pediatrics*, 25, 211-217, 1944.
- (48) KRIS, E. 'The Psychology of Caricature', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 17, 285-303, 1936.
- (49) — 'Ego Development and the Comic', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 19, 77-90, 1938.
- (50) — 'Das Lachen als Mimischer Vorgang; Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse der Mimik', *Int. Z. Psa. and Imago*, 24, 146-148, 1939.
- (51) — 'On Preconscious Mental Processes', *Psa. Quart.*, 19, 540-560, 1950. Also in: *Organization and Pathology of Thought*, ed. by David

Rapaport, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 474-493.

(52) KULOVESI, Y. 'Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen zur James-Langeschen Affekttheorie', *Imago*, 17, 392-398, 1931.

(53) LANDAUER, K. 'Die Gemütsbewegungen oder Affekte.' In: *Das psychoanalytische Volksbuch*, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, ed. by Paul Federn and Heinrich Meng, Stuttgart, Hyppokrates-Verlag, 1928, pp. 136-151.

(54) — 'Affects, Passions and Temperament', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 19, 388-415, 1938.

(55) LANDIS, C., and HUNT, W. A. *The Startle Pattern*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1939.

(56) MACCURDY, J. T. *The Psychology of Emotion, Morbid and Normal*, New York, Harcourt, 1925.

(57) MAHLER, M. 'Remarks on Psychoanalysis with Psychotic Children', *Quarterly J. of Child Behavior*, 1, 18-21, 1949.

(58) MAHLER, M. S., ROSS, J. R., JR., and DE FRIES, Z. 'Clinical Studies in Benign and Malignant Cases of Childhood Psychosis (Schizophrenia-like)', *Amer. J. of Orthopsychiatry*, 19, 295-305, 1949.

(59) PUTNAM, M. C. 'Case Study of an Atypical Two-and-a-Half-Year-Old', *Am. J. of Orthopsychiatry*, 18, 1-30, 1948.

(60) RAPAPORT, D. *Emotions and Memory*, Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins, 1942.

(61) — *Organization and Pathology of Thought*, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951.

(62) — 'The Conceptual Model of Psychoanalysis', *J. of Personality*, 20, 56-81, 1951.

(63) REICH, W. *Charakteranalyse*, Vienna, Selbstverlag des Verfassers, 1933.

(64) SCHILDER, P. 'Über Gedankenentwicklung', *Z. Neurol. Psychiat.*, 59, 250-263, 1920.

(65) — *Medizinische Psychologie*, Berlin, Springer, 1924. *Medical Psychology*, trans. by David Rapaport, New York, Int. Univ. Press, in press.

(66) — *Studien zur Psychologie und Symptomatologie der progressiven Paralyse*, Berlin, Karger, 1930. 'Studies Concerning the Psychology and Symptomatology of General Paresis.' In: *Organization and Pathology of Thought*, ed. by David Rapaport, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 519-580.

(67) SCHUR, M. 'Some Modifications of Freud's Theory of Anxiety', ms., 1952.

(67a) SPERLING, S. 'On Teasing'. Unpublished ms., 1950.

(68) SPINOZA, B. DE. *Improvement of the Understanding, Ethics, and Correspondence*, New York, Willey, 1901.

(69) SPITZ, R. A., and WOLF, K. M. 'The Smiling Response: A Contribution to the Ontogenesis of Social Relations', *Genetic Psychol. Monog.*, 34, 57-125, 1946.

(Received 21 May, 1952)